Canadian Political Science Association, Société Québécoise de Science Politique Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique

Socit qubcoise de science politique
Public-Private Partnership? Shifting Paradigms of Economic Governance in Ontario

Author(s): Neil Bradford
Source: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol.
36, No. 5 (Dec., 2003), pp. 1005-1033
Published by: Canadian Political Science Association and the Socit qubcoise de science
politique
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Public-Private Partnership? Shifting Paradigms
of Economic Governance in Ontario
NEIL BRADFORD Huron University College
In recent years, governments everywhere have been preoccupied with the

complex economic and technological challenges accompanying globaliza-
tion. Aware that the living standards of their citizens depend ultimately on
the capacity of all economic actors to "adjust through innovation," gov-
ernments are searching for new policy approaches. No strategy has
attracted greater interest than governance through public-private partner-
ships, which effectively devolves authority and responsibility from the
state and instead relies on the policy networks found in civil society.
Despite widespread enthusiasm, there is disagreement over the purposes
of such decentralized collaboration. For some, the intent is public sector
rationalization achieved through a combination of programme cost-shar-
ing and the transfer of corporate management practices into the bureau-
cracy. For others, the aim is to address problems of social exclusion in the
new economy by encouraging associative dialogue among diverse repre-
sentative groups. Still others emphasize how decentralization can revital-
ize local democracy and empower community-based development. Hence
while economic governance has become a growth industry, it remains an
unsettled field informed by different logics of devolution and partnership.
The purpose of this article is to advance the understanding of gover-
nance and public-private partnerships through a contextual, comparative
analysis of two economic innovation strategies recently launched in
Ontario. The time frame is the 1990s, when the province faced intense eco-
nomic restructuring pressure in a turbulent political climate shaped by the
Acknowledgments: I thank Caroline Andrew, William D. Coleman, Peter Graefe and

the anonymous reviewers of the JOURNAL for their helpful comments and constructive
suggestions on an earlier version of this article. I also gratefully acknowledge the finan-
cial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
Neil Bradford, Department of Political Science, Huron University College, London,

Ontario N6G 1H3; [email protected]
Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique

36:5 (December/decembre 2003) 1005-1033
O 2003 Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique)
and/et la Socidt6 qudbdcoise de science politique
1006 NEIL BRADFORD
dramatic mid-decade ch
New Democratic party
both provincial governm
based global economy by
so in very different way
nomic governance parad
The article begins wit
tion, public-private part
the two governance para
their respective political
economic development f
of structural design and
the public purposes assig
tional level to which gov
the viability of these exp
cles each government e
The article closes with a
vation" in economic dev
Constructing the Lear

Economic Governance
The 1990s in Ontario was a turbulent decade characterized by intensi

policy debate and bold institutional experimentation. To capture th
breadth and dynamics of change, we use the concept of a governance par-
adigm. A governance paradigm describes the intellectual framework a
institutional relations that structure public policy making in a particular
field. As Peter A. Hall (1993) has elaborated, such paradigms define t
broad goals behind policy, the problems to be tackled, and the instrumen
to deploy, as well as mapping the respective responsibilities of the sta
market and citizens in meeting societal challenges. Once institutionalized,
a governance paradigm channels the thoughts and actions of a range
state and societal actors, reflecting shared policy knowledge and habitual
decision-making routines. The result is broad continuity in both the con-
tent and process of public policy.
However, periods of normal policy making are sometimes inter
rupted. New and different problems rapidly converge, confronting policy
makers with developments "that were neither anticipated nor fully com-
prehensible in terms of the prevailing paradigm" (Hall, 1993: 68). T
accumulation of such anomalies can trigger policy failures and a recogni-
tion that the paradigm's organizing principles no longer match real-world
conditions. Its authority fragments and the demand for innovative id
rises; experts and officials once exercising a virtual monopoly over legit-
imate options are challenged by policy entrepreneurs such as oppositi
Abstract. In recent years, many governments have embraced new modes of economic
governance that rely on public-private partnerships. These forms of governance effectively
devolve authority and responsibility from the state, and instead rely on the policy networks
found in civil society.This article argues that despite the general enthusiasm for such decen-
tralized collaboration, there is significant variation in its meaning and practice. Comparing
the public-private partnership strategies of two governments in Ontario in the 1990s, the
article analyzes the origins and progress of two distinctive governance paradigms, looking
for signs of economic innovation.The case studies demonstrate that each of the social dem-
ocratic and neoliberal paradigms contains its own specific representational logic, organiza-
tional design, and policy purpose. The article underscores the analytical importance of link-
ing the study of decentralized policy networks at the meso or local scale to macro-level
political and economic factors that condition their operation and effects. It concludes with a
discussion of the obstacles to institutional innovation in Ontario, and the conditions that
facilitate successful public-private partnerships in economic governance.
Resume. Au cours des derinires annees, plusieurs gouvernements ont adopt6 de nouveaux
modes de gouvemance 6conomique fond6e sur des partenariats entre le public et le priv6.
Ces formes de gouvernance remettent aF lEtat, de maniere efficace, autorit6 et responsabi-
lit6, et s'appuient plut6t sur des r6seaux d'action publique au sein de la soci6t6 civile. Cet
article montre qu'en d6pit de l'enthousiasme gen6ral pour une telle collaboration decentra-
lis6e, sa definition et son application varient substantiellement. A la recherche de signes
d'innovation 6conomique, l'auteur compare les strategies de partenariat public/priv6 de deux
gouvernements en Ontario dans les ann6es quatre-vingt dix et analyse les origines et le pro-
gres de deux paradigmes distincts de gouvernance. Les etudes de cas montrent que les pa-
radigmes social-d6mocrate et n6olib6ral contiennent chacun une logique de representation
sp6cifique, une structure organisationnelle et un objectif public. L'auteur souligne l'impor-
tance, au plan analytique, de la mise en relation de l'6tude des r6seaux d'action publique
d6centralis6e i l'6chelle meso ou locale avec des facteurs politiques et 6conomiques qui con-
ditionnent leur fonctionnement et leurs effets au niveau macro. En conclusion, I'auteur pro-
pose une discussion sur les obstacles F l'innovation institutionnelle en Ontario et les condi-
tions qui facilitent la reussite de partenariats public/priv6 dans la gouvernance 6conomique.
political parties or new social movements that mobilize support for alter-
natives. Experimentation may result in a paradigm shift if the new ideas
and practices are institutionalized. Indeed, Hall and numerous other ana-
lysts have used these concepts to account for major policy transformations
in the 1980s and 1990s that led many countries to break with the reigning
Keynesian economic orthodoxy (Hall, 1989).
While this analytic framework has been applied almost exclusively to
national-level dynamics, its insights are equally applicable to the subna-
tional policy contexts of provinces or states. In the 1990s, Ontario politics
featured a protracted struggle over the terms of a post-Keynesian paradigm
shift. The trigger was a series of shocks beginning in the 1980s that chal-
lenged core assumptions guiding postwar economic management in
Ontario and Canada. As Thomas Courchene has described, in the three
decades after the Second World War, economic governance in "Tory
Ontario" was distinguished by a series of basic orientations (Courchene
with Telmer, 1998: chap. 2). To begin, Ontario decision makers supported
the federal government's embedded policy paradigm: Ottawa's commit-
ments to Keynesian stabilization policies and east-west trade flows secured
Ontario's position as "Canada's industrial heartland." As such, caution and
1008 NEIL BRADFORD
incrementalism were the p

government never becomi
development policy with
and technocratic, substan
enjoying the confidence of
machine that delivered m
sum, in this period of par
scale was pre-eminent in p
bureaucratic preserve, tha
tinct realms, and that t
demand rather than innov
In the 1980s, most of t
paradigm unraveled. Eco
placed intense competitiv
try, largely foreign-owne
Many Ontario branch pl
southward rationalizatio
investment deals that inte
a pillar of the postwar par
ment implemented its own
perceived in Ontario as co
ties (Cameron, 1994: 109
from quietly supporting t
about Ottawa's trade and
mental financing of social
concerns crystallized into
economy plummeted to
The search was on to defin
economic strategy that wo
success in continental and
A central issue was the p
renewal, and especially the
would bridge long-stand
resources to meet complex
1997). Here, a post-Keynes
communities, stressing th
many observers describe
regions are subnational s
actorscome together to dia
region, and collaborate in
production, ranging from
and the commercialization o
To this end, the provinci
command and control reg
Shifting Paradigms of Economic Governance in Ontario 1009
on policy expertise-to allow for more flexible interventions and two-way

relations with private sector "stakeholders." The government leads
"socially organized learning processes" that mobilize the ideas, expertise
and money of various societal groups for collective problem solving
(Gertler, 2000: 34). Relevant stakeholders include business associations,
labour unions, research organizations, community-based movements, and
municipal authorities. Public-private partnerships come to be seen as an
indispensable foundation for the learning region in a global age, offering
solutions to state and market failures in economic innovation. On the one
hand, states draw on the contextual intelligence of the stakeholders them-
selves to design appropriate public policies to assist firms and workers in
upgrading their competencies. On the other hand, the resultant collabora-
tion mitigates the market-based barriers individual firms or workers con-
front in making the large-scale, risky investments required for success in
the new economy.
Yet, within this common discourse highlighting the global-regional
nexus and the benefits of provincial economic governance through public-
private partnerships, many questions remain unanswered and open to contro-
versy (Linder, 2000). Who among the many societal actors are recognized as
legitimate partners and invited to participate? Should the partnerships strive
for representation of societal diversity or narrow their reach to streamline dia-
logue and decision-making processes? Which public policy tools are most
conducive to productive interaction among the partners? Should the state rely
on exhortative measures to facilitate collaboration, or should it be more pre-
scriptive in steering the process toward outcomes? What is the optimal geo-
graphic scale for such institutional arrangements? Should the operative sub-
national setting be local communities, metropolitan areas, or industrial
sectors that could span the entire province?
We find answers to these questions through analysis of the political
construction of Ontario's learning region (Daugbjerg and Marsh, 1998). In
Britain, as Peter A. Hall (1990: 67) argues, "the breakdown of the Keyne-
sian paradigm initiated a wider societal debate that soon became bound up
with electoral competition." Similarly, in Canadian economic develop-
ment policy, provincial political parties are well positioned to act as
change agents for paradigm shifts. The constitution assigns to the
provinces, rather than the federal or local governments, pre-eminent pol-
icy capacity in industrial assistance, education and training, corporate
governance, and labour-management relations, all legislative matters cen-
tral to economic development. Further, the majoritarian biases of West-
minster-style cabinet government and the first-past-the-post electoral sys-
tem offer governing parties considerable autonomy in setting policy
agendas and legislative priorities.
Indeed, in studying paradigm shifts, the Ontario experience in the
1990s is of interest precisely because two governing political parties
1010 NEIL BRADFORD
launched their own disti

government made simila
dynamic learning region in
nership approaches differe
As we shall see in detai
introduced a social partner
cross-section of interests
new multipartite bodies at
view of the economic dev
different perspectives on
ciency concerns in compre
ment and industrial innov
resentatives would build w
as formerly adversarial l
and learned to recognize
enhancing strategies. From
the new economy were a
workers, and to collaborat
lar competitiveness challen
nerships would not only im
a particular industrial sect
cial economic culture tow
concern for inclusive par
ness-labour co-operation,
this approach constitut
(Healey, 1997).
As will also become clea
sored an alternative approa
alized partnerships more
design and policy mandate
sentation and launching
subject to collective negoti
worker training or techno
competitive market forc
had no interest in experim
sectoral level that would e
opment. Instead, they valu
that transmitted private s
enabling the latter to beco
ness private investment to
structure, especially in urb
ness elites over labour un
since the former were the
of the major capital projec
business leadership in decentralized economic development, this approach

expresses a neoliberal partnership paradigm (Courchene, 1999).
In sum, we propose that the 1990s in Ontario were a decade of party-
led policy experimentation with two novel economic governance para-
digms. The broad differences are encapsulated in Table 1. The case stud-
ies below explore in more detail the efforts of the NDP and Conservatives
to institutionalize their own version of public-private partnerships.
TABLE 1
Ontario Regional Economic Governance Paradigms
Social Democratic Neoliberal
Partnership Rationale Social learning and State retrenchment and

sectoral innovation competitive city-regions
Participation and Mulipartite: Bipartite:
Representation State business, labour, state/municipalities
and social movements and business
Policy Scope Provincial labour market Municipal infrastructure

and industrial policy and urban clusters
Scale of Action Meso-sectoral Micro-local
Partnership Form Sector-wide productivity City-region growth

coalitions machines
Provincial State's Facilitate consensus Prescribe contributions

Role among partners from partners
Institutional Logic Bottom-up negotiation Top-down rules
Learning Process Deliberative dialogue Contractual exchange
Facilitating Sectoral Social Partnerships, Ontario 1990-1995

The election of a New Democratic party government in 1990 was a sig
icant event in the political history of the province. It was a remar
breakthrough for the social democratic third party after decades in o
sition (Rachlis and Wolfe, 1997). While the incoming governmen
rather vague about governing plans, its commitment to charting
course was apparent. In the NDP's social base, an absence of busi
community linkages was paralleled by formal partnerships with organ
labour and informal connections to a host of new social equity movem
that were gathering momentum in national and provincial politics. In
nomic policy, the party had long been interested in a more activist an
laborative approach to "structural adjustment" than was contemplated
either previous Ontario governments or the state bureaucracy. An
NDP had added its voice to the growing Ontario critique of the f
economic development agenda. In short, the NDP came to power se
policy ideas beyond the traditional channels and discourse. They p
hard for public-private partnership institutions that could build cons
1012 NEIL BRADFORD
and lead change. Three su

governance: the Premier's
generate longer-term vis
Training and Adjustment
(SPF) were sector-oriented
The Premier's Council w
Peterson as a 28-member ad
of economic leadership a
160). In launching the ND
Rae called for a major cult
ety. "[W]e have to create a
declared, adding that the "
do, but it is critical" (Rae
to lead change from a "low
The future of the Premier
in providing policy advice
under the Liberals, but in
common challenges and s
notion of using the Counci
icy culture, Rae greatly ex
business, labour and educ
actors, some prominent in
sentative positions in sec
multi-partite task forces
lenges of lifelong learning
based production. Rae's hop
a focal point in building
capacity. As one labour p
degree of social bargaining
Ontario public policy (Ma
The NDP government ap
ships organized through
tion formula and a power-
put it: "This government r
and an understanding bet
wealth and those who are
1991b). A number of assu
an insistence that competi
plementary; that input fro
tivity of business investm
perity is achieved on th
(Ontario Ministry of Tr
budget, the NDP governme
tural change, not only to m
them more fairly, but actively to promote the development of high value-
added, high-wage jobs through strategic partnerships" (Ontario Ministry
of Treasury and Economics, 1991: 87). The so-called "progressive com-
petitiveness" strategy envisioned a knowledge-based, export-oriented
economy that also advanced the interests of groups politically aligned in
varying degrees with the NDP: organized labour and such newer social
equity movements as feminists, visible minorities, and anti-poverty and
environmental activists (Ernst, 1995). Aware of the policy dilemmas and
legitimacy problems of traditional postwar social democracy, the Rae gov-
ernment attempted to position its broad-based social partnership approach
as an alternative to both welfare statism and exclusionary corporatism.
To implement this agenda, NDP policy intellectuals serving in the
government-such as David Wolfe and Peter Warrian-recommended an
associative infrastructure for negotiated policy making at the meso-level of
industrial sectors (Gunderson and Sharpe, 1998). Wolfe drew lessons
from the writings of Michael Best (1990) and other European scholars
who described successful sectoral adjustment strategies, while Warrian
referenced his own direct experience in a sectoral council to manage
restructuring in the Canadian steel industry. The findings from this blend
of research and practical knowledge were attractive to Ontario's first
social democratic government. The sectoral approach promised both bet-
ter policy intelligence rooted in the expressed needs of the economic
agents themselves, and greater co-operation among their representatives
as they came to appreciate, through ongoing dialogue, their common stake
in the industry's long-term productivity.
The showcase policy fields for this strategy were industrial policy
and labour market policy, with new partnership structures proposed to
engage firms, unions, educators and other relevant stakeholders in mutual
learning and planning processes. Ultimate policy responsibility remained
with the government but much discretion in programme design and deliv-
ery would shift outward. In 1991, OTAB was announced to overhaul the
$442 million spent annually by the province on labour market upgrading,
followed in 1992 by a three-year $150 million SPF:' For the rest of its
mandate, the NDP expended considerable political capital and administra-
tive resources in putting these partnerships into practice.
In its approach to labour market policy, the NDP emphasized the
integration of economic and social issues as well as the need for inclusive
representation of all stakeholders. Accordingly, the government proposed
a multi-partite governing body for OTAB that would privilege business
and labour, but also feature representation from other communities-peo-
ple with disabilities, visible minorities, women and francophones. Within
this structure, a separate council was mandated for sectoral training and
adjustment policy. Proclaiming that "never before in North America has
any government shared so much responsibility for the policy and direc-
1014 NEIL BRADFORD
tion of programmes wi
a "roundtable of divers
(Ontario Training and A
However, the governm
ward. With the exceptio
little history of collect
public policy responsib
most part, Ontario's bus
tions at the sectoral lev
larger provincial econo
between firms more tha
1998: 124). Similar prob
representation and poli
community, where lack
sultation process, the go
servants to assist the v
with the dual demands o
lic policy decision maki
Compounding the org
social partners invited
ing of the basic purpose
gramme reform. Speci
its decision-making pr
indeed the definition o
nious and drawn-out d
separately before board
tional culture was eme
common ground (Klass
never fully embraced O
degree of power-shari
ments on controversial
in the workplace, or th
tives argued that the m
social than economic foc
itiveness would be re
Ontario, 1993: 1597).
By contrast, social equi
and economic policy in t
mal labour market strat
established, then achiev
promotes social justic
Ontario, 1993: 1,711). T
partner wary of decent
ued OTAB's delegated a
organizational matters not possible in traditional market-based or bureau-

cratic decision making. As D'arcy Martin, a labour representative active
in both the Premier's Council and OTAB, put it: "[B]y linking arms with
other firms in the same economic sector," local unions gained "technical
support and clout with government funders and educational providers as
well as with head offices in other countries" (Martin, 105).
Not surprisingly, government officials became frustrated with the
ideological differences, protracted disputes and slowness of policy
progress. Aware of the complexity of the issues at play, and with much
political capital invested in the social partnership model, they remained
uncertain about how to orchestrate productive dialogue. The strategic
challenges in facilitating mutual learning among societal interests, and
knowledge exchange across what still amounted to class boundaries
even in the new economy, proved daunting for both politicians and
administrators. These disputes became increasingly heated, and, from
the government's perspective, unmanageable, as the provincial economy
plummeted into a debilitating recession. Pressure for economic policies
with more immediate job creating effects were demanded by labour
while business protested the government's mounting deficits.2 OTAB
was launched amid high expectations about the benefits of public-pri-
vate policy partnerships, but the lack of tangible results in the face of a
rapidly deteriorating economy eventually relegated it to the margins of
the government's agenda.
The NDP's second major partnership initiative was also conceived
ambitiously, in the words of one of the programme's architects, "to alter
the business culture of the province in the direction of creating socially
organized, firm-based systems for learning, collaboration, co-operation
and regulation-in other words to move it in the direction of a networked
and associative model" (Wolfe, 2002). Departing somewhat from its
approach at OTAB, however, the government reserved a larger place for
itself, specifying more concretely its expectations for both the partnership
process and policy outcomes. The Social Partnership Fund's core goals
were threefold: to increase investment in sectoral infrastructure that was
beyond the means of any single firm but which would upgrade the com-
petitiveness of all; to tailor government industrial expenditures to the par-
ticular product, market and organizational conditions prevailing in differ-
ent sectors; and to restrict the public commitment "to creating capabilities
and promoting winning activities," as distinct from trying to pick the win-
ning companies of the future (Ontario Ministry of Industry, Trade and
Technology, 1992: 12-18).
Reflecting the NDP's overarching desire to connect economic and
social development agendas, the SPF was available to networks in less
conventional industrial sectors such as the environment, culture and
health care. In all cases, sector representatives were invited to develop
1016 NEIL BRADFORD
action plans that diagno

posed collaborative proj
new products and proce
dards, inter-firm associa
motion and global market
tor required a forum or c
of all relevant stakehold
among those interests.
available to help the secto
tive organizations.
Close observers of the
mixed (Wolfe, 2002; Er
impressive network of s
ing numerous industr
researchers (Ontario Mi
1995). On the other hand
associative infrastructu
culture, institutionalized
even implemented many
allocations were consist
whether the various par
once public funding ran
a complex agency struc
problem was stakeholde
commit the resources nec
into action.
Either way, it was clear by the end of the NDP's mandate that pub-
lic-private partnerships were not flourishing in Ontario, despite the
government's intentions and investments. Bob Rae later reflected that
his government was "right to put bankers and brokers and social work-
ers and union leaders in the same room and ask them to work to a com-
mon goal...and a respect for partnership" (Rae, 1996: 286). Yet, if the
NDP's social partnership strategy was to survive its multi-faceted
growing pains then far more time for social learning on behalf of all the
partners, including the state, was a minimum requirement. Only a
robust commitment to "negotiating order" could ride out the inevitable
disputes and setbacks, allowing that a certain degree of failure was a
necessary part of partnership development (Wolfe, 2002). However, the
NDP's window of opportunity, never open very wide, slammed shut in
1995 with the election of the Conservative government. Drawing very
different lessons from Ontario's initial foray into associative gover-
nance, the Harris government pursued a radically different conception
of public-private partnerships.
Retooling Urban Growth Machines, Ontario 1995-2001

The "Common Sense Revolution" platform on which Mike Harris, leader
of the Conservatives, became premier has been aptly termed a neoliberal
manifesto for change in public policy and economic governance. The
emphasis was on smaller government and greater reliance on market
forces in public decision making and resource allocation. In their cam-
paign manifesto, the Conservatives promised to reduce the number of
public servants by 15 per cent and politicians by 25 per cent. Clearly, the
incoming government rejected the NDP's associative model of policy
development, through which the state had attempted to facilitate a dense
network of organized interests and draw on their collective knowledge to
merge economic and social goals. In fact, the Conservatives sought to
restrict the state's policy discretion and civil society's input into public
decision making. Among the measures proposed to discipline the state and
rein in group influence were: balanced budget requirements for govern-
ment, citizen referenda before any tax increases, and corporate self-regu-
lation in aligning the private and public interest. As Thomas Courchene
has observed, Ontario since 1995 has been "in the throes of a series of
internal socio-economic revolutions that have no subnational parallel any-
where in the world and, arguably, may even compare with the revolutions
in Thatcher's UK and in New Zealand" (Courchene, 1999: 12).
In fact, there were two interlinked components in the Conservative
government's neoliberal revolution: fiscal retrenchment and institutional-
municipal restructuring. The fiscal retrenchment occurred in the form of a
rapid and large shrinking of the public sector powered by a 30 per cent cut
to the personal income tax rate. In economic development policy, this
retrenchment translated into unprecedented reductions in ministerial
budgets achieved through an across-the-board termination of the NDP's
flagship industrial assistance, training and job creation programmes. More
broadly, the Conservatives were concerned with asserting greater central-
ized control over the public education system, which they viewed as cap-
tured by a spending coalition of elected school trustees and public sector
unions. At the same time, they aimed to rationalize the local government
system that they perceived as rife with duplication, overlap and over-
spending by too many politicians.
In this context, institutional-municipal restructuring took the form of
a sweeping realignment of roles and responsibilities between the provincial
state and municipal governments, featuring boundary amalgamations to
create stronger local authorities to manage a host of new programmes and
services formerly run by the province (Graham and Phillips, 1998). In
order to achieve its takeover of the provincial education system, the gov-
emrnment downloaded to municipalities financial and administrative respon-
sibility for such services as social housing, welfare assistance, public health
and childcare subsidies. In engineering this realignment, the Conservatives
1018 NEIL BRADFORD
apparently had a number

of the provincial burea
income tax to local prop
sector unions, specificall
directly with a hostile p
core suburban electoral base in the Greater Toronto Area where suburban
municipalities would be less pressured than the inner city by the down-
loaded social responsibilities in housing and welfare.
A unifying theme across the fiscal and institutional-municipal com-
ponents of the Conservative agenda was the reduction in interest group
political influence as it had developed through the NDP's social partner-
ships.3 Legislative amendments were made in labour relations, employ-
ment equity and social assistance to limit the resources and policy voice
of unions, social equity movements and anti-poverty activists. In turn, the
Premier's Council, the SPF, and OTAB, structures that had institutional-
ized a policy role for civil society representatives, all disappeared in the
government's first year. When unions and social movements protested the
pace and direction of change in a series of "Days of Action," Premier Har-
ris repeated that "no special interest group or lobby will stop us" (Harden,
1999: 178). Abolishing the NDP's meso-level associative networks that
had combined policy formulation and programme delivery, the Conserva-
tive government sought a new division of labour for the two functions.
With its state retrenchment and service realignment, it enhanced the pol-
icy control of the cabinet while transferring much responsibility in pro-
gramme administration and financial management to local actors, ranging
from amalgamated municipalities and merged school boards to informal
alliances of business and community leaders.
If the Conservative government's primary motivation in their institu-
tional-municipal restructuring was to shrink the state, there were also evi-
dent connections to a new provincial economic development strategy. As
John Ibbitson (1997: 241-42) has reported, in his first year in office Pre-
mier Harris completed global trade visits where he "stumbled into the
modem world of city-states, of economic zones dominated less by national
government-and far less by provincial or state administrations-than by
conurbations, a world economy realized through great urban hubs." The
premier "discovered the importance of large powerful cities as engines of
the late twentieth century economy" (Ibbitson, 1997: 241-42). The gov-
ernment's interest in the potential of city-regions as strategic economic
spaces, and the policy leadership inherent in urban-based private sector
coalitions, found its formal expression in the "bold visioning exercise"
that the premier chaired in the final years of the government's first man-
date, with the formation of the Ontario Jobs and Investment Board (OJIB)
in 1998 (Ontario Jobs and Investment Board, 1999: 1). Composed of busi-
ness and government elites, the OJIB conducted a series of regional con-
sultations on economic growth and innovation policy in the province

under the direction of the premier's long-time advisor David Lindsay. The
purpose was to generate an "action-oriented plan-not just for the govern-
ment, but for all sectors, all communities and all citizens of Ontario"
(Ontario Jobs and Investment Board, 1999: 1).
In the end, the OJIB exercise produced a substantial public policy
blueprint, A Roadmap to Prosperity, identifying a series of longer-term
destinations for the provincial economy and society while specifying the
responsibilities of various actors in the innovation process. OJIB's eco-
nomic development recommendations placed new attention on the role of
cities and their governance arrangements: "Municipalities are key in
implementing the philosophy central to Ontario's economic success:
Think Globally, Act Locally" (Ontario Jobs and Investment Board, 1999:
55). It exhorted the provincial government to "develop through local lead-
ership groups, urban-centered, globally-competitive regional economic
development approaches" based on the realization that "around the world,
cities are focal points for creativity, innovation, production and the sup-
porting infrastructure" (Ontario Jobs and Investment Board, 1999: 49, 64).
The OJIB approvingly reported that many municipal governments were
already teaming up with local business, community and education leaders
to realize the power of local approaches to economic development. In this
framework, the provincial government's responsibility was to deploy its
legislative resources for the supply of "more effective local governance
arrangements to support local economic development leadership"
(Ontario Jobs and Investment Board, 1999: 48). The rationale was
straightforward: "Local governments need the right flexibility, scale and
tools to support the growth and competitiveness of businesses, economic
clusters and industry sectors in their communities and region-and to be
competitive with other cities and regions around the world" (Ontario Jobs
and Investment Board, 1999: 48).
The OJIB recommended numerous specific provincial actions to
facilitate greater inter-municipal and region-wide collaboration. Two spe-
cific priorities were the continued amalgamation of local governments and
a modernized Municipal Act that would "provide local governments with
the tools to manage their responsibilities and plan for economic develop-
ment more effectively" (Ontario Jobs and Investment Board, 1999: 49).
The goal was to enhance the capacity of the newly consolidated gover-
nance bodies to mobilize private sector partners in matters ranging from
urban infrastructure financing, regional service delivery, and the forma-
tion of "economic clusters-the geographic concentrations of intercon-
nected firms and institutions in a particular field" (Ontario Jobs and
Investment Board, 1999: 29). As OJIB put it, municipal governments
needed to recruit "local 'champions' to galvanize their communities
around an action plan for economic competitiveness, growth, and success"
1020 NEIL BRADFORD
(Ontario Jobs and Inves

municipal economic d
alliances were all identif
model of decentralized
With the OJIB bluepr
ernment began to expl
tional-municipal restruct
many advocates of urb
gamations to advance
poorer inner cities and
tion was different.4 It
in the global context. S
ment ran, would attract
plifying regulatory appr
ment, and by providin
achieved through econ
layer of government. S
seen to be conducive t
leading edge sectors. F
city-regions of Toronto
ICF Consulting, to advi
sultants emphasized th
to be developed and im
or remedy if necessar
(Toronto Economic Dev
was the appropriate geog
cial government would
this metropolitan space
communities or individ
Following its re-elect
launched numerous pol
economic innovation. The vision was one of decentralized economic
governance anchored in urban public-private partnerships privilegin
business interests. "Economic development," the minister of municipa
affairs and housing proclaimed, "is one provincial priority where loca
governments, developers, builders and business can and do play a crucia
role" (Association of Ontario Land Economists, 2000). The most ambi-
tious follow-up was the Ontario SuperBuild Corporation established by
the Ministry of Finance in 1999 (Ontario Ministry of Finance, 2001): a
five-year $20 billion initiative mandated to lead and co-ordinate public
private partnerships while also advising the cabinet on privatization
opportunities. The Corporation's approach was to lever private sector
monies and technical expertise to build and operate public infrastructure,
ranging from highways and water treatment to "new economy infrastruc-
ture" such as biotechnology research centres (Ontario SuperBuild Corpo-

ration, 2001 a). The provincial government would invest $10 billion and
seek another $10 billion or more in investment from the private sector
and the broader public sector.
The central element of the strategy targeted infrastructure gaps in
the province's largest urban centres. SuperBuild proclaimed the urban-
focused Millennium Partnerships Initiative as the government's "flagship"
for partnerships between public and private sectors, a model for all other
infrastructure projects across the province. Under the Millennium Partner-
ships, the province's eight major urban areas competed for provincial
investments, with priority given to those projects whose partnerships fea-
tured maximum possible private sector investment and savings to taxpay-
ers, and a sound business case to justify the initiative (Ontario SuperBuild
Corporation, 2000). In communicating the purposes underlying its part-
nership approach, the SuperBuild Corporation made clear the priority on
cost-savings, private sector incentives and the economic development
rationale in all public infrastructure investments:
[I]mposing the discipline of the market on the ambitions of governments
and pressure groups reduces the number of white elephants that get built.
Says Russell Goodman, senior vice-president of Price Waterhouse Coopers
Securities, and an expert in public-private partnerships: "If a project cannot
be made financially attractive within a reasonable period of time, it proba-
bly should be shelved. Social analyses do not pay debt service on a proj-
ect."(Ontario SuperBuild Corporation, 2002: 39-40).
Alongside its infrastructure partnerships, SuperBuild examined other

ways of "enhancing municipal capability" to position "large urban areas
or city regions, as dynamic centres of innovation, production and con-
sumption" (Ontario Ministry of Finance, 2001: 25). It has proposed legis-
lation to remove impediments to brownfield redevelopment, that is, rein-
vestment in dilapidated buildings or derelict lands. It has recommended
new economic policy tools that would help Ontario cities compete more
effectively with metropolitian economies across the United States. Such
tools could include "urban development corporations, new powers to
allow municipalities to be full partners in public-private partnerships and
tax incentives for private investment in infrastructure" (Ontario Ministry
of Finance, 2001: 26).
In this context, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing rein-
forced SuperBuild's urban focus and placed new emphasis on city-region
economic competitiveness. As the minister expressed it in 2000, "munic-
ipal economic development is a 'hot topic' in municipalities across
Ontario" (Association of Ontario Land Economists, 2000). Following its
amalgamations, the Ministry explored ways to equip municipalities with
greater economic development policy capacity. An overhaul of the Munic-
ipal Act included approvals for municipalities to set up development cor-
1022 NEIL BRADFORD
porations and involve priv

taking of public infrast
framework remained hig
broader authority in eco
Improvement Areas" (BI
ization projects led by lo
owners to organize, finan
nomic development. With
across the province, the
approach to revitalizing b
Affairs and Housing, 20
actors to benchmark and
opment."
As part of its "Smart Growth" initiative in 2002, the Ministry also
established five public-private advisory panels to help plan provincial eco-
nomic development at the city-region scale (Ontario Ministry of Munici-
pal Affairs and Housing, 2001a). Consistent with the government's clus-
ter formation strategy, the councils would advise the province and
municipalities on "zone-wide" infrastructure and planning "across munic-
ipal boundaries" and on a "long-term vision for economic growth" (Gov-
ernment of Ontario News Backgrounder, 2001). Finally, Harris' successor
as Conservative leader and briefly premier, Emie Eves, endorsed and
extended the province's urban economic development thrust. In Septem-
ber 2002, he unveiled plans to enable selected municipalities to create tax-
incentive zones to entice companies, and more broadly to allow munici-
palities to finance their economic infrastructure through provincial
"opportunity bonds" that would subsidize 50 per cent of interest costs for
borrowing (Ontario Ministry of Finance, 2002).
For its part, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade also
signaled "the importance of urban-centred regional economies as key eco-
nomic growth engines and centres of innovation in Ontario" (Ontario
Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, 2001). A new bureau-
cratic unit for urban economic development co-ordinated information bro-
kerage and partnership-building services for the province's seven largest
urban centres. The unit led the "Ontario Competitive City Regions Part-
nership" to "galvanize community commitment" and "support local strate-
gic change" (Ontario Ministry of Enterprise, Opportunity and Innovation,
2002). Such initiatives reflected the shift in the Ministry's policy focus
from the sectoral partnership orientation that had been at the forefront of
provincial industrial assistance under the NDP. In following the OJIB road
map, the Ministry also implemented the Prosperity Development Fund "to
support locally driven partnerships that demonstrate innovative ways of
advancing prosperity by promoting the strategic goals of the OJIB"
(Ontario Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, 2001). Consis-
tent with the Conservatives government's partnership philosophy, provin-

cial monies were available only if the applicants included a business part-
ner prepared to match any public funds.
In sum, the Conservative innovation strategy may be viewed as an
attempt to retool Ontario's "urban growth machines."5 The growth
machine concept has been invoked to describe city-based economic
development coalitions led by business elites seeking to enhance local
property values and rents in fierce competition with other localities.
Whereas the growth machine framework originated in the United States,
with its greater local autonomy and business activism, the concept has
been applied recently to jurisdictions exhibiting a more centralized and
controlling state presence in local affairs, such as can be seen in the
United Kingdom (Jessop, Peck and Tickell, 1999: 154-59). Indeed, the
British Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s supplied the
template in their approach to urban regeneration. "Urban growth
machines" in the UK, it has been argued, appeared as the national eco-
nomic development strategy emphasized local infrastructure investments
made conditional on public-private partnerships, maximum business par-
ticipation and competitive bidding among localities for funds tightly con-
trolled from above. Ontario's version of the urban growth machine took
shape as local business networks were exhorted by the provincial state,
on the one hand, to lead the formation of economic clusters, and, on the
other hand, to finance and operate the urban infrastructure that municipal
governments were unable to supply. To this end, SuperBuild and the Min-
istry of Municipal Affairs and Housing joined forces in conducting work-
shops on public-private partnerships to help municipal officials and local
private sector leaders mount successful projects. As the SuperBuild Cor-
poration explained: "The demand for public infrastructure has out-
stripped the ability of current revenues to pay for them, and municipal
leaders are stuck with the unenviable task of explaining that fact to their
communities unless they can find a better way to do things. The better
way is public-private partnerships" (Ontario SuperBuild Corporation,
2001). David Lindsay, who moved from OJIB to serve as the president
and CEO of SuperBuild, aptly summarized the government's overall eco-
nomic development strategy:
Clusters are the key to regional economic growth and success because they
enhance productivity, foster innovation and spur new business formation.
Their strength comes from the proximity of and synergies between like
competing firms; interconnected buyers, suppliers and workforces, and
anchor institutions such as a university, college or research institution....The
new approach should be locally led-not necessarily by local mayors or
local bureaucrats, but by top executives and entrepreneurs from the region's
fastest growing firms, by presidents of the region's universities or commu-
nity colleges, or by other community leaders. (Lindsay, 1999)
1024 NEIL BRADFORD
Discussion: Paradigm
The above case studies
els of analysis to compar
lic-private partnership
Conservatives used thei
ations in economic gover
disciplines and incentiv
development. It followed
composition and scale o
the scale of economic sec
icy consensus to generat
Conservatives abolished t
of action in economic d
provincial state sought f
to work together for clu
with representative soc
innovation strategies, w
individual firms or inf
contractual arrangement
urban economic infrastructure.
In launching these projects, both governing parties also curtailed in
some measure the lead role of the public service in Ontario policy formu-
lation. They drew on economic ideas circulating outside regular ministe-
rial channels. For the NDP, policy blueprints and governance models
developed at the Premier's Council advocating sectoral strategies and
multipartite dialogue meshed with the party's evolving social democratic
orientation stressing broad social partnerships. The Conservatives came to
power with their own electoral manifesto, and made it known that the
bureaucracy's main policy contributions would be in implementing the
party's agenda. Subsequently, they used the OJIB consultation to engage
the ideas and commitment of their preferred private sector partners-prin-
cipally, business leaders, local economic development officials, and scien-
tific researchers-for the technology cluster and urban infrastructure
strategies.
Both governments thus departed in significant ways from embedded
economic policy ideas and long-established state decision-making routines.
What assessments can be made of these two ambitious attempts to institu-
tionalize partnership-based paradigms of economic governance in Ontario?
The NDP encountered problems early in the process, and never really
progressed to a full implementation of their paradigm. The OTAB bogged
down at the policy formulation stage; the government was unable to
engage the social partners in joint planning, much less action. As Bob Rae
reflected, three years into the debate about labour market policy at OTAB:
"I've certainly expressed concern at a number of meetings that this is all
taking quite a lot of time. But, I think it's important that we get the process
right" (Klassen, 129). In the case of the SPF, similar, albeit less pro-
nounced, difficulties with the partnership process were evident. When the
NDP left office their partnership structures remained fragile, and still
without champions from either the public or private sector who could
place the inevitable growing pains in a broader context of social learning
and institutional evolution. The social democratic economic development
legacy is notable less for sectoral partnership innovations and more for
traditional labour market and industrial policy approaches: wage subsidy
programmes and public works projects for short-term job creation as well
as bail-outs of individual companies in steel, pulp and paper, and aero-
space industries (Rae, 1996: 137-58).
In contrast, the Conservatives managed to implement much of their
public-private partnership agenda. Clearly, their efforts were aided by the
upturn in the North American economy that contributed to rapid growth in
Ontario in the second half of the 1990s. The timing of the business cycle
favoured neoliberal over social democratic innovations. At the same time,
the Conservative local growth machine strategy for cluster building effec-
tively capitalized on Ontario's long history of "municipal boosterism," the
co-operation of local political and business elites for the "profitable devel-
opment of private property" (Andrew, 2001: 109). Where the NDP was
inventing wholly new sectoral institutions, the Conservatives looked only
to catalyze existing business-dominated associations such as local boards
of trade, chambers of commerce, and urban economic development corpo-
rations or regional growth councils.
In this regard, the Canadian Urban Institute's director of applied
research catalogued the positive economic development opportunities that
might flow from the municipal amalgamations, including greater regional
co-operation and infrastructure investment (Miller, 2001). Along the same
lines, recent economic development studies of Toronto, Kitchener-Water-
loo and Ottawa have documented the growth of clusters of knowledge-
intensive firms in information and communications technology, and high-
lighted the leadership of local champions (Wolfe, 2002b; Leibowitz,
2001). Further, SuperBuild's streamlined model of public-private partner-
ship has generated considerable infrastructure investment; in its first two
years of existence, commitments were made to 3,300 projects worth over
$13 billion, with $1.5 billion dedicated over five years to partnerships in
urban centres.
The Conservatives, therefore, realized greater policy returns than the
NDP from their investment in public-private partnerships. Such neoliberal
success and social democratic failure in Ontario confirms, and takes fur-
ther, an influential line of argument in the comparative political economy
literature on the prospects for institutional innovation in economic policy
making. Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (Hall and Soskice, 2001) adopt
1026 NEIL BRADFORD
a "varieties of capitalism
institutions across nationa
ence development traject
of business associations,
trial relations, Hall and S
configurations decisively
innovative capacities of g
Anglo-American "libera
European "co-ordinated
In CMEs, the private s
and dense networks of int
and national scales that
tion in business innovati
technology transfer and
(2001: 8) put it, firms dep
their endeavors with oth
cies." In CMEs, corpora
through deliberation, neg
vate partnership institu
absence of such network
other means, specifically
services in a context of
Soskice, 2001, 8). In plac
LMEs rely on market sign
guide their investment ch
Hall and Soskice's particu
ferent institutional legaci
adjusting to globalization.
ity of different governm
paradigms. Simply put, th
class collaboration in CM
LMEs, however, social dem
ing partnership bodies;
capacities of the social par
ticipate in collective proce
the workplace or their in
"Political Economy of N
Desmond King and Stew
of coordination strongly
ratist collaboration' are st
The implications for the
Hall properly place Canada
limited institutional capac
challenges (Bradford, 1998
land, has contributed much to the historical pattern. The policy environ-
ment is without strong representative organizations or associational net-
works at either the provincial or sectoral scale (O'Grady, 1993). From this
perspective, the NDP's foray into social democratic partnerships pro-
ceeded with little institutional infrastructure in place to assume the signif-
icant policy responsibilities implied by the sector-based partnership para-
digm, nor could the government rely on bureaucratic expertise or
experience in devolving governance authority to the private sector. At a
minimum, the experiment demanded more time than the five-year elec-
toral cycle allowed, first, to permit the government to fine-tune the design
of institutions such as OTAB and the SPF, and second, to enable the social
partners to learn their new roles.
By the same token, the Conservatives' neoliberal governance para-
digm, with its narrowly construed partnerships, resonated with the provin-
cial institutional landscape. In facilitating metropolitan economic clusters,
the government relied mostly on pre-existing urban business networks;
with Superbuild, the public-private interface has been tightly controlled
from above by a regulQ4iry state. Given the lack of economic collabora-
tion at wider geographic scales or higher institutional levels, the local
approach to partnerships avoids the organizational rivalries and ideologi-
cal disputes that helped derail the NDP. In Margaret Weir's (1992: 189)
evocative phrasing, Ontario's recent policy history is one of "bounded
innovation": neoliberal partnerships secured a foothold whereas the social
democratic option "steadily lost ground."
Yet it would be wrong, or at least premature, to conclude that this
functional fit between Ontario's economic institutions and the neoliberal
governance paradigm ensures the latter's longer-term stability. If the NDP
failed to sufficiently push the policy formulation process, then the Conser-
vatives may have moved too boldly and unilaterally. In the words of cabi-
net minister, Tony Clement: "The way we've decided to run the govern-
ment is revolutionary. It involves change first, then consolidation"
(Ibbitson: 147). But as Weir (1992: 193,194) also reminds all policy inno-
vators, "tactics useful in passing a policy can actually undermine the emer-
gence of long-term political coalitions and enduring institutions needed to
sustain a policy direction." Implementation problems, she continues, "can
erode support for policy by giving force to arguments that unwanted side
effects outweigh benefits, even if the policy is inherently desirable."
The Conservatives were hardly insulated from such unwanted side
effects. Even those sympathetic to the government, such as former
Toronto mayor and long-time party member David Crombie, warned that
the Conservative localizing approach jeopardized the fiscal and social sus-
tainability of municipalities when new responsibilities were downloaded
without adequate resources (Dale, 1999: 55). Rather than empowering
local coalitions to lead economic development, the government may set in
1028 NEIL BRADFORD
motion a zero-sum com

hardly an outcome conduc
stood as crucial for dyna
376).Furthermore, cash-s
meet SuperBuild's matc
public confidence in an en
operation of municipal in
ity to oversee the perform
contractual obligations
Neoliberals, keen to mobil
to provincial state retrenc
actually enable local colla
public interest, as private
rebuilding cities and comm
Conclusion
This article has described the origins and progress of two ambitious insti-
tutional reform projects that aimed to position Ontario for competiti
success in the knowledge-based global economy. In tracking their fate, the
analysis contributes three interrelated points to understanding innovative
dynamics in learning regions.
First, contrary to much conventional wisdom about the technocratic
rationality of governance through public-private partnerships, there are a
least two distinctive versions of this strategy, with choices informed by th
political priorities, partisan strategies and ideological dispositions of gov-
erning parties. It is also noteworthy that these partnership approach
reveal how contemporary social democratic and neoliberal policy thinking
has evolved beyond traditional nostrums celebrating either state or mar-
ket. Clearly, both the New Democratic and Conservative parties wer
experimenting with new governance structures that crossed the public-pr
vate divide. For the Conservatives, greater private investment in publ
infrastructure could be achieved by supplementing the outcomes of th
free market with government incentives. For the NDP, dirigiste modes of
bureaucratic intervention were rejected as ill-suited to the innovation pol-
icy challenges of the knowledge-based economy, such as chronic underin-
vestment in collective goods, free riding and poaching on collective
investments, and adversarial labour-management relations.
Second, and related to the above, the Ontario case studies under
score the analytical importance of linking interpretation of decentralized
policy networks to macro-level institutional factors that fundamental
shape their operation and policy consequences. On the one hand, the
province's Westminster-style political institutions placed party compet
tion at the centre of policy innovation processes. The two governing par-
ties defined the terms of the public-private partnerships, deciding who

would be at the table, what issues would on the table, and the expecta-
tions and accountability of the partners. On the other hand, as Hall and
Soskice demonstrate, provincial economic institutions heavily mediated
the viability of competing governance paradigms. The organization of the
Ontario political economy conforms to the logic of the LME, and this
institutional reality underlay the relative success of the Conservative
party's governance paradigm.
Finally, Ontario's recent experiments with public-private partnership
foreground questions not often asked about the dynamics of governance
failure. Much is known about the limits of bureaucratic and market mech-
anisms in co-ordinating economic innovation and the corrective allegedly
supplied by public-private partnerships. Yet the above case studies reveal
that these devolved governance arrangements carry their own frailties,
even dysfunctionalities. Governments pursuing partnerships must assess
the "fit" between their preferred paradigm and the prevailing institutional
landscape. And they must find the policy tools to ensure effective imple-
mentation of public-private partnerships, whether launched at the scale of
industrial sectors or urban regions. Scholars and policy practitioners alike
still require more knowledge of the factors enabling states and societies to
share power effectively.
Notes
1 In addition to OTAB and the SPF, the NDP pursued sectoral training initiatives in
partnership with the federal government in the steel sector, the electrical/electronics
sector and the autoparts sector. In the broader public sector, the government estab-
lished a multipartite Health Sector Training and Adjustment Panel to administer
programmes for laid-off workers. The role of OTAB in co-ordinating these various
sectoral initiatives was a key institutional design challenge for the government in its
devolutionary strategy (Bradford, 1998b: 173-74).
2 By 1993 a ballooning provincial deficit focused the government's attention on pub-
lic sector restructuring. It introduced a Social Contract that proposed a sectoral
process for negotiating cost-savings in the public service and broader public sector.
Aspects of the NDP's social partnership model were in evidence as the government
invited the sector stakeholders themselves to develop adjustment plans to meet the
fiscal targets. (For contrasting interpretations of this social democratic approach to
deficit reduction see McBride, 1996; Rae, 1996: 193-216.)
3 Concerning the Harris government's relations with civil society representative organ-
izations, Ian Urquhart summarized: "Unlike his predecessors, Harris does not appear
to reach out to the major interest groups in Ontario for input. It is well known that he
froze out the unions.... Less well known is that Harris has also shut out the official
representatives of doctors, hospitals, universities, teachers and school boards.... In
contrast... Bob Rae scheduled regular meetings with these and other groups, even at
the risk of hearing unpleasant criticism. Rae, for instance, met frequently with busi-
ness leaders who were unfriendly to his government" (Urquhart, 2001).
4 This thrust is particularly evident in the debate in the United States about the "new
regionalism." (See Rusk, 1996 and Orfield, 2002.)
1030 NEIL BRADFORD
5 The growth machine concep

ment of its continued explana
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Socit qubcoise de science politique

Public-Private Partnership? Shifting Paradigms of Economic Governance in Ontario

Canadian Political Science Association, Socit qubcoise de science politique are

NEIL BRADFORD Huron University College

In recent years, governments everywhere have been preoccupied with the

Acknowledgments: I thank Caroline Andrew, William D. Coleman, Peter Graefe and

Neil Bradford, Department of Political Science, Huron University College, London,

Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique

Constructing the Lear

The 1990s in Ontario was a turbulent decade characterized by intensi

incrementalism were the p

on policy expertise-to allow for more flexible interventions and two-way

launched their own disti

business leadership in decentralized economic development, this approach

Ontario Regional Economic Governance Paradigms

Social Democratic Neoliberal

Partnership Rationale Social learning and State retrenchment and

Policy Scope Provincial labour market Municipal infrastructure

Partnership Form Sector-wide productivity City-region growth

Provincial State's Facilitate consensus Prescribe contributions

Facilitating Sectoral Social Partnerships, Ontario 1990-1995

and lead change. Three su

organizational matters not possible in traditional market-based or bureau-

action plans that diagno

Retooling Urban Growth Machines, Ontario 1995-2001

apparently had a number

sultations on economic growth and innovation policy in the province

(Ontario Jobs and Inves

ture" such as biotechnology research centres (Ontario SuperBuild Corpo-

Alongside its infrastructure partnerships, SuperBuild examined other

porations and involve priv

tent with the Conservatives government's partnership philosophy, provin-

motion a zero-sum com

ties defined the terms of the public-private partnerships, deciding who

5 The growth machine concep

Ontario Jobs and Investment B

Ontario Ministry of Enterprise, Opportunity and Innovation. 2002. "Ontario Competitive

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