Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION
HEIRS OF JOSE MALIGASO, SR.,
namely, ANTONIO MALIGASO, G.R. No. 182716
CARMELO MALIGASO and

JOSE MALIGASO, JR., Present:

Petitioners,

CARPIO, J.,

Chairperson,
- versus -
BRION

PEREZ,

SERENO, and
SPOUSES SIMON D. ENCINAS and REYES, JJ.
ESPERANZA E. ENCINAS,

Respondents. Promulgated:

June 20, 2012

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

REYES, J.:
 This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the
Decision1[1] dated November 26, 2007 and Resolution2[2] dated April 28, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64775. The CA reversed and set aside
the Decision3[3] dated April 2, 2001 of Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, which affirmed the Decision4[4] dated August 22, 2000 of
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon dismissing the Spouses
Simon D. Encinas and Esperanza E. Encinas (respondents) complaint for unlawful
detainer.

Respondents are the registered owners of Lot No. 3517 of the Cadastral
Survey of Sorsogon, which has an area of 2,867 square meters and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4773.5[5] The subject matter of this
controversy is a portion of Lot No. 3517 with an area of 980 square meters, which
the Heirs of Jose Maligaso, Sr. (petitioners) continue to occupy despite having
received two (2) notices to vacate from the respondents.

1[1] Penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia, with Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-
Salonga and Vicente Q. Roxas, concurring; rollo, pp. 31-41.

2[2] Id. at 49-50.

3[3] Id. at 112-116.

4[4] Id. at 102-111.

5[5] Id. at 67-68.

 Lot No. 3517 was previously covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 543, which was issued in the name of Maria Maligaso Ramos (Maria), the
petitioners aunt, on February 7, 1929. Sometime in May 1965, Maria sold Lot No.
3517 to Virginia Escurel (Virginia). Three (3) years later, on April 5, 1968, Virginia
sold Lot No. 3517 to the respondents, resulting to the cancellation of OCT No. 543
and issuance of TCT No. T-4773.6[6]

On March 16, 1998 and June 19, 1998 or approximately thirty (30) years from
the time they purchased Lot No. 3517, the respondents issued two (2) demand letters
to the petitioners, asking them to vacate the contested area within thirty (30) days
from notice.7[7] The petitioners refused to leave, claiming that the subject area was
the share of their father, Jose Maligaso, Sr. (Jose, Sr.), in their grandparents estate.
Thus, the respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against them with the
MTC, alleging that the petitioners occupation is by mere tolerance and had become
illegal following their refusal to vacate the property despite being demanded to do
so twice.

The petitioners, in their defense, denied that their possession of the disputed
area was by mere tolerance and claimed title thereto on the basis of their fathers
successional rights. That the petitioners occupation remained undisturbed for more
than thirty (30) years and the respondents failure to detail and specify the petitioners

6[6] Id. at 32.

7[7] Id. at 33.

supposedly tolerated possession suggest that they and their predecessors-in-interest
are aware of their claim over the subject area. The petitioners also attacked the
validity of OCT No. 543 and TCT No. T-4773, alleging that it was thru fraud that
Maria was able to register Lot No. 3517, including the disputed area, under her name.
The petitioners likewise moved for the dismissal of the complaint, claiming that the
allegations therein indicate that it was actually an action for reconveyance. Further,
laches had already set in view of the respondents failure to assail their possession
for more than thirty (30) years.8[8]

In an August 22, 2000 Decision,9[9] the dispositive portion of which is quoted

below, the MTC dismissed the respondents complaint.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

1. Dismissing the instant case;

2. Adjudicating the possessory rights over the litigated portion to the

defendants;

3. Ordering the Register of Deeds to cause the annotation of the equitable

title of defendants, who are entitled to their fathers rightful inheritance
which is part of the property in plaintiffs TCT No. T-4773 as a lien or
encumbrance;

8[8] Id. at 34.

9[9] Id. at 102-111.

 4. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay defendants the amount of [P]10,000.00
as attorneys fees; and

5. The cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.10[10]

The MTC gave more weight to the petitioners possession of the contested area
than the respondents title as the former is founded on Jose Sr.s successional rights
and even held that the registration of Lot No. 3517 in Marias name created a trust in
Jose Sr.s favor insofar as the disputed portion is concerned. The MTC also held that
the respondents are barred by laches from pursuing their cause of action against the
petitioners given their inaction for more than thirty (30) years despite being fully
aware of the petitioners adverse possession and claim over the subject property.

The RTC dismissed the respondents appeal and affirmed the MTCs Decision
dated August 22, 2000. In a Decision11[11] dated April 2, 2001, the RTC found the
respondents allegations relative to the petitioners merely tolerated possession of the
subject area to be wanting. The RTC also concluded, albeit implicitly, that the
petitioners possession is a necessary consequence of their title as evidenced by their

10[10] Id. at 110-111.

11[11] Id. at 112-116.

occupation in the concept of an owner for a significant period of time. The
dispositive portion thereof states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is

AFFIRMED with the modification that the annotations and the payment of
attorney[]s fees as ordered by the Court a quo be deleted. The instant appeal is
DISMISSED, for lack of merit.12[12]

Consequently, the respondents filed with the CA a petition for review under
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. This was given due course and the RTCs Decision
dated April 2, 2001 was reversed and set aside. In its Decision13[13] dated
November 26, 2007, the CA had a different view and rationalized the grant of
possession to the respondents as follows:

The rule is well-entrenched that a person who has a Torrens title over the
property is entitled to the possession thereof. In like manner, prior physical
possession by the plaintiff is not necessary in unlawful detainer cases as the same
is only required in forcible entry cases. Moreover, the allegations in the answer of
[the] defendant as to the nullity of plaintiffs title is unavailing and has no place in
an unlawful detainer suit since the issue of the validity of a Torrens title can only
be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. This may be gleaned
from Spouses Apostol vs. Court of Appeals and Spouses Emmanuel, where the
Supreme Court held that:

xxx

In the case at bench, petitioners are the registered owners of Lot No. 3517
and, as a consequence of such, are entitled to the material and physical possession
thereof. Thus, both the MTC and RTC erred in ruling that respondents prior
physical possession and actual possession of the 980-square meter disputed portion

12[12] Id. at 116.

13[13] Id. at 31-41.

 of Lot No. 3517 should prevail over petitioners Torrens title over the said property.
Such pronouncement contravenes the law and settled jurisprudence on the
matter.14[14] (Citation omitted)

The CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration in its Resolution

dated April 28, 2008.15[15]

As earlier intimated, the petitioners anchor their possession of the subject

property on their fathers right thereto as one of his parents heirs. The petitioners
insist on the nullity of the respondents title, TCT No. T-4773, as the inclusion of the
contested area in its coverage was never intended. The petitioners accuse Maria of
fraud for having registered Lot No. 3517 in her name, including the portion that their
father allegedly inherited from his parents, thus, reneging on her promise to cause
the registration of such portion in his name. It was their father who had a legitimate
claim over the subject area and Maria never acquired any right thereto. Therefore,
respondents purchase of Lot No. 3517 did not include the portion occupied by the
petitioners, who succeeded to Jose Sr.s rights thereto.

On the other hand, the respondents cause of action is based on their ownership
of Lot No. 3517, which is evidenced by TCT No. T-4773, and on their claim that
they merely tolerated the petitioners occupation thereof. According to the
respondents, their being registered owners of Lot No. 3517, including the portion

14[14] Id. at 37-38.

15[15] Id. at 49-50.

possessed by the petitioners, entitles them to the possession thereof and their right
to recovery can never be barred by laches. They also maintain that the petitioners
cannot collaterally attack their title to the subject property.

The point of inquiry is whether the respondents have the right to evict the
petitioners from the subject property and this should be resolved in the respondents
favor. Between the petitioners unsubstantiated self-serving claim that their father
inherited the contested portion of Lot No. 3517 and the respondents Torrens title,
the latter must prevail. The respondents title over such area is evidence of their
ownership thereof. That a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible
and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein and that a person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to the
possession thereof16[16] are fundamental principles observed in this jurisdiction.
Alternatively put, the respondents title and that of their predecessors-in-interest give
rise to the reasonable presumption that the petitioners have no right over the subject
area and that their stay therein was merely tolerated. The petitioners failed to
overcome this presumption, being inadequately armed by a narration that yearns for
proof and corroboration. The petitioners harped that the subject area was their fathers
share in his parents estate but the absence of any evidence that such property was
indeed adjudicated to their father impresses that their claim of ownership is nothing
but a mere afterthought. In fact, Lot No. 3517 was already registered in Marias name
when Jose Sr. built the house where the petitioners are now presently residing. It is

16[16] Esmaquel v. Coprada, G.R. No. 152423, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 429, 438, citing
Caa v. Evangelical Free Church of the Philippines, G.R. No. 157573, February 11, 2008, 544
SCRA 225, 238-239.
rather specious that Jose Sr. chose inaction despite Marias failure to cause the
registration of the subject area in his name and would be contented with a bungalow
that is erected on a property that is supposedly his but registered in anothers name.
That there is allegedly an unwritten agreement between Maria and Virginia that Jose
Sr.s and the petitioners possession of the subject area would remain undisturbed was
never proven, hence, cannot be the basis for their claim of ownership. Rather than
proving that Jose Sr. and the petitioners have a right over the disputed portion of Lot
No. 3517, their possession uncoupled with affirmative action to question the titles
of Maria and the respondents show that the latter merely tolerated their stay.

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed
to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to
the possession of the property involved. The avowed objective of actions for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer, which have purposely been made summary in nature,
is to provide a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged
illegal possessor of property from unjustly continuing his possession for a long time,
thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace and order in the community.17[17] The
said objectives can only be achieved by according the proceedings a summary
nature. However, its being summary poses a limitation on the nature of issues that
can be determined and fully ventilated. It is for this reason that the proceedings are
concentrated on the issue on possession. Thus, whether the petitioners have a better
right to the contested area and whether fraud attended the issuance of Marias title
over Lot No. 3517 are issues that are outside the jurisdiction and competence of a

17[17] Salandanan v. Mendez, G.R. No. 160280, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 195, citing Five Star
Marketing Co., Inc. v. Booc, G.R. No. 143331, October 5, 2007, 535 SCRA 28, 43-44.
trial court in actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry. This is in addition to
the long-standing rule that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked, to which
an ejectment proceeding, is not an exception.

In Soriente v. Estate of the Late Arsenio E. Concepcion,18[18] a similar

allegation possession of the property in dispute since time immemorial was met with
rebuke as such possession, for whatever length of time, cannot prevail over a Torrens
title, the validity of which is presumed and immune to any collateral attack.

In this case, the trial court found that respondent owns the property on the
basis of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12892, which was issued in the name of
Arsenio E. Concepcion, x x x married to Nenita L. Songco. It is a settled rule that
the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.
Hence, as the registered owner of the subject property, respondent is preferred to
possess it.

The validity of respondents certificate of title cannot be attacked by

petitioner in this case for ejectment. Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be
altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in
accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can
only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not
petitioner has the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power
of the trial court to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.19[19] (Citations
omitted)

18[18] G.R. No. 160239, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 315.

19[19] Id. at 329-330.

 In Salandanan,20[20] the prohibition against the collateral attack of a Torrens
title was reiterated:

In Malison, the Court emphasized that when [a] property is registered under
the Torrens system, the registered owners title to the property is presumed and
cannot be collaterally attacked, especially in a mere action for unlawful detainer. In
this particular action where petitioners alleged ownership cannot be established,
coupled with the presumption that respondents title to the property is legal, then the
lower courts are correct in ruling that respondents are the ones entitled to possession
of the subject premises.21[21] (Citation omitted)

Given the foregoing, the petitioners attempt to remain in possession by casting

a cloud on the respondents title cannot prosper.

Neither will the sheer lapse of time legitimize the petitioners refusal to vacate
the subject area or bar the respondents from gaining possession thereof. As ruled in
Spouses Ragudo v. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc.,22[22] laches does not
operate to deprive the registered owner of a parcel of land of his right to recover
possession thereof:

It is not disputed that at the core of this controversy is a parcel of land

registered under the Torrens system. In a long line of cases, we have consistently
ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse

20[20] Supra note 17.

21[21] Id. at 198.

22[22] 503 Phil. 751 (2005).

 possession. So it is that in Natalia Realty Corporation vs. Vallez, et al., we held that
a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is a registered
land because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code, in relation to Act 496 (now, Section
47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529).

xxxx

Petitioners would take exception from the above settled rule by arguing that
FETA as well as its predecessor[-]in[-]interest, Don Dionisio M. Fabella, are guilty
of laches and should, therefore, be already precluded from asserting their right as
against them, invoking, in this regard, the rulings of this Court to the effect that
while a registered land may not be acquired by prescription, yet, by virtue of the
registered owners inaction and neglect, his right to recover the possession thereof
may have been converted into a stale demand.

While, at a blush, there is apparent merit in petitioners posture, a closer look

at our jurisprudence negates their submission.

To start with, the lower court found that petitioners possession of the subject
lot was merely at the tolerance of its former lawful owner. In this connection,
Bishop vs. Court of Appeals teaches that if the claimants possession of the land is
merely tolerated by its lawful owner, the latters right to recover possession is never
barred by laches.

As registered owners of the lots in question, the private

respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying their
property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that
they were aware of the petitioners occupation of the property, and
regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have
a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as
the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This
right is never barred by laches.23[23] (Citations omitted)

It is, in fact, the petitioners who are guilty of laches. Petitioners, who claimed
that Maria fraudulently registered the subject area inherited by their father, did not
lift a finger to question the validity of OCT No. 543, which was issued in 1929.
Petitioners waited for the lapse of a substantial period of time and if not for the
respondents demands to vacate, they would not have bothered to assert their fathers

23[23] Id. at 763-764.

supposed successional rights. The petitioners inaction is contrary to the posture taken
by a reasonably diligent person whose rights have supposedly been trampled upon
and the pretense of ignorance does not provide justification or refuge. Maria was
able to register Lot No. 3517 in her name as early as 1929 and respondents acquired
title in April 5, 1968 and knowledge of these events is imputed to the petitioners by
the fact of registration.

In fine, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse and set aside the findings
and conclusions of the CA.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the

Decision dated November 26, 2007 and Resolution dated April 28, 2008 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64775 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Senior Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
 CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Senior Associate Justice

(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as Amended)

 Today is Saturday, December 09, 2017

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

ERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEALOSA, PETITIONERS,

TER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

, through a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising a pure question of law. In particular, pe

The Facts

n of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso
. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.6 Claiming to
e under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdalenos collateral relatives and successors-i
ficate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport.9 Further, by way of
est, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdalenos lawful heirs.10

The RTC Ruling

int failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationshi
trary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdalenos son and hence, his compulsory heir through the doc
d) a passport.13

011 due to the counsels failure to state the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance

urse to the Court through the instant petition.

of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.

The Courts Ruling

ell-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint
ent basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be av

ey are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudios
iefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedents lawful heirs should be made in the correspon
ing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are the decedents lawful heirs must be made in the proper spec

in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property.1w
on for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised R
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship c

ade in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x

atters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding institute
ld not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.22 (Emphasis and undersc

ship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to
had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.24

e lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resu
a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it.25 Thus, concor
gether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudiosos heirship which should, as herein dis

ED, without prejudice to any subsequent proceeding to determine the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights con

Elena Yntig, Cerelo Ypon, Esterlita Y. Sereo, Alvaro Ypon, Rogelio Ypon, Simplico Ypon, Jr., Monaliza B. Judilla, Lilia B. Q
mao, Egnacia Y. Cavada, Serafin Ypon, Victor Ypon, Prudencio Ypon, Jr., Allan Ypon, Raul Ypon, Rey Rufo Ypon, Galicursi Y
Arthur Ypon, Yolanda Ypon, Lilia Y. Cordero, Ester Y. Hinlo, Lydia Ypon, Percival Ypon, Esmeralda Y. Baron, Emelita Y. Ch
Clarita P. Lopez, Vicente Y. Pealosa, Jr., Columbus Y. Pealosa, Jose Y. Pealosa, Alberto Y. Pealosa, Teodoro Y. Pealosa

Letter of Administration, Minda Ypon Libre, Cristobal E. Ypon, and Agnes P. Veloria, petitioners v. City Registrar of Deeds and
 complainant in Civil Case No. T-2246.

8, G.R. No. 147058, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 272, 281.

xxxx

eceased person or as the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and de

he contending parties as their inheritance x x x [i]t would be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for th
evidence regarding the issue of heirship in these proceedings [and] the RTC [had] assumed jurisdiction over the same and conse

minated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can
a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased." (Republic v. Mangotara, G.R. No. 170375, July 07, 2010, 624