JURISPRUDENCE ON EXCEPTIONS TO EXECUTIONS OF FINAL AND EXECUTORY

JUDGMENTS

DY vs, BIBAT-PALMOS, G.R. No. 196200, September 11, 2013

This Court is not unaware of the doctrine of immutability of judgments. When a judgment becomes final
and executory, it is made immutable and unalterable, meaning it can no longer be modified in any respect
either by the court which rendered it or even by this Court. Its purpose is to avoid delay in the orderly
administration of justice and to put an end to judicial controversies. Even at the risk of occasional errors,
public policy and sound practice dictate that judgments must become final at some point.31

As with every rule, however, this admits of certain exceptions. When a supervening event renders the
execution of a judgment impossible or unjust, the interested party can petition the court to modify the
judgment to harmonize it with justice and the facts.32 A supervening event is a fact which transpires or a
new circumstance which develops after a judgment has become final and executory. This includes matters
which the parties were unaware of prior to or during trial because they were not yet in existence at that
time.33

SAMPAGUITA GARMENTS CORP. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 102406 June 17, 1994

We hold for the petitioner.

It is true that once a judgment has become final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed except only
for the correction of clerical errors or where supervening events render its execution impossible or unjust.
8
In the latter event, the interested party may ask the court to modify the judgment to harmonize it with
justice and the facts. 9

There is no dispute in the case at bar that the decision of the respondent NLRC ordering the private
respondents reinstatement with back wages had indeed become final and executory. Even so, we find, in
light of the subsequent developments, that the NLRC was not correct in sustaining the implementation of
that decision.

In Heirs of Francisco Guballa, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 10 this Court held that "the power of the NLRC to
issue a writ of execution carries with it the right to look into the correctness of the execution of the
decision and to consider supervening events that may affect such execution."

The affirmance by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals of the private respondents
conviction for theft is justification enough for the NLRC to exercise this authority and suspend the
execution of its decision. Such conviction, which was also upheld by this Court in G.R. No. 100929, is a
supervening cause that rendered unjust and inequitable the decision mandating the private respondents
reinstatement, and with back wages to boot.
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GSIS vs. GMC and LLDHC, G.R. No. 167000, June 8, 2011

DISCUSSION

First Issue:
Supervening Event

It is well-settled that once a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It
may not be changed, altered or modified in any way even if the modification were for the purpose of
correcting an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. This is referred to as the doctrine of finality of
judgments, and this doctrine applies even to the highest court of the land.1[82] This Court explained its
rationale in this wise:

The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations

of public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors, the
judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law;
otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus setting to naught the main role of
courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the
maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.2[83]

This Court has, on several occasions, ruled that the doctrine of finality of judgments admits of
certain exceptions, namely: the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which
cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality
of the decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable.3[84]

Both GSIS and LLDHC claim that the execution of the decision and orders in Civil Case No.
2203-L should be stayed because of the occurrence of supervening events which render the execution
of the judgment impossible, unfair, unjust and inequitable.4[85] However, in order for an event to be
considered a supervening event to justify the alteration or modification of a final judgment, the event
must have transpired after the judgment has become final and executory, to wit:

Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment has become final and
executory or to new circumstances which developed after the judgment has acquired
finality, including matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial
as they were not yet in existence at that time.5[86]
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The Lapu-Lapu RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 2203-L was promulgated on February 24,
1992, while the Manila RTC Decision in Civil Case No. R-82-3429 was promulgated on May 10, 1994.
As early as December 6, 1993, both GSISs and LLDHCs appeals of the Lapu-Lapu RTC Decision were
dismissed by the said RTC.6[87] Only GSIS moved to reconsider this dismissal, which was denied on
July 6, 1994.7[88] Strictly speaking, the Lapu Lapu RTC Decision should have attained finality at that
stage; however, LLDHC filed with the Court of Appeals its Petition for Annulment of Judgment (CA-
G.R. SP No. 34696) on July 27, 1994 and it used therein the Manila RTC Decision as its main ground for
annulment of the Lapu-Lapu RTC decision.

The Court of Appeals nonetheless dismissed LLDHCs Petition for Annulment of Judgment, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 34696,8[89] and that became final and executory on January 28, 1995,9[90] after
LLDHC interposed no appeal. The entry of judgment in this case was issued on August 18, 1995.10[91]
Moreover, the similar petition of LLDHC before this Court in G.R. No. 118633 was decided on
September 6, 1996 and became final and executory on December 23, 1996. Therefore, the ruling by the
Manila RTC is evidently not a supervening event. It was already in existence even before the decision in
Civil Case No. 2203-L attained finality.

Just as LLDHC and GSIS, as the losing parties, had the right to file their respective appeals
within the prescribed period, GMC, as the winning party in Civil Case No. 2203-L, equally had the
correlative right to benefit from the finality of the resolution of its case,11[92] to wit:

A final judgment vests in the prevailing party a right recognized and protected by
law under the due process clause of the Constitution. A final judgment is a vested
interest which it is right and equitable that the government should recognize and protect,
and of which the individual could not be deprived arbitrarily without injustice.12[93]
(Citations omitted.)

Since the Manila RTC decision does not constitute a supervening event, there is therefore neither
reason nor justification to alter, modify or annul the Lapu-Lapu RTC Decision and Orders, which have
long become final and executory. Thus, in the present case, GMC must not be deprived of its right to
enjoy the fruits of a final verdict.
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It is settled in jurisprudence that to stay execution of a final judgment, a supervening event must
create a substantial change in the rights or relations of the parties which would render execution of a final
judgment unjust, impossible or inequitable making it imperative to stay immediate execution in the
interest of justice.13[94]

However, what would be unjust and inequitable is for the Court to accord preference to the
Manila RTC Decision on this occasion when in the past, the Court of Appeals and this Court have
repeatedly, consistently, and with finality rejected LLDHCs moves to use the Manila RTC Decision as a
ground to annul, and/or to bar the execution of, the Lapu Lapu RTC Decision. To be sure, in the Decision
dated September 9, 2002 in G.R. No. 141407, penned by former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban,
the Court already passed upon the lack of effect of the Manila RTC Decision on the finality of the Lapu
Lapu RTC decision in this wise:

The records of the case clearly show that the Lapulapu Decision has become final and
executory and is thus valid and binding upon the parties. Obviously, petitioner [LLDHC]
is again trying another backdoor attempt to annul the final and executory Decision of
the Lapulapu RTC.
First, it was petitioner that filed on March 11, 1992 a Notice of Appeal
contesting the Lapulapu RTC Judgment in Civil Case No. 2203-L rendered on February
24, 1992. The Notice was however rejected by the said RTC for being frivolous and
dilatory. Since petitioner had done nothing thereafter, the Decision clearly became final
and executory.

However, upon receipt of the Manila RTC Decision, petitioner found a new
tool to evade the already final Lapulapu Decision by seeking the annulment of the
latter in a Petition with the CA. However, the appellate court dismissed the action,
because petitioner had been unable to prove any of the grounds for annulment; namely
lack of jurisdiction or extrinsic fraud. Because no appeal had been taken by petitioner, the
ruling of the CA also became final and executory.

Second, the Supreme Court likewise recognized the finality of the CA

Decision when it threw out LLDHCs Petition for Certiorari in GR No. 118633. This
Court ruled thus:

Instead of filing this petition for certiorari under Rule 65,

which is essentially another Petition to Annul Judgment, petitioner
LLDHC should have filed a timely Petition for Review under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court of the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
December 29, 1994, dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Judgment
filed by the petitioner LLDHC before the court a quo. But this is all
academic now. The appellate courts decision had become final and
executory on January 28, 1995.

Jurisprudence mandates that when a decision becomes final and executory, it

becomes valid and binding upon the parties and their successors in interest. Such decision
or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may have
been. Petitioners failure to file an appeal within the reglementary period renders the
judgment final and executory. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period prescribed by law is mandatory. Failure to conform to the rules regarding appeal
will render the judgment final and executory and, hence, unappealable. Therefore, since
the Lapulapu Decision has become final and executory, its execution has become
mandatory and ministerial on the part of the judge.

The CA correctly ruled that the Lapulapu Judgment is binding upon

petitioner [LLDHC] which, by its own motion, participated as an intervenor. In fact,
the latter filed an Answer in Intervention and thereafter actively took part in the trial.
Thus, having had an opportunity to be heard and to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling it complained of, it cannot claim that it was denied due process of law. What the
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law prohibits is the absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard. Jurisprudence

teaches that a party cannot feign denial of due process if it has been afforded the
opportunity to present its side.

Petitioner likewise claims that Private Respondent GMC cannot escape the
adverse effects of the final and executory judgment of the Manila RTC.

Again, we do not agree. A trial court has no power to stop an act that has been
authorized by another trial court of equal rank. As correctly stated by the CA, the
Decision rendered by the Manila RTC -- while final and executory -- cannot bind
herein private respondent [GMC], which was not a party to the case before the said
RTC. A personal judgment is binding only upon the parties, their agents,
representatives and successors in interest.

Third, petitioner grievously errs in insisting that the judgment of the Manila
RTC nullified that of the Lapulapu RTC. As already adverted to earlier, courts of
coequal and coordinate jurisdiction may not interfere with or pass upon each
others orders or processes, since they have the same power and jurisdiction. Except
in extreme situations authorized by law, they are proscribed from doing
so.14[95](Emphases supplied.)

It likewise does not escape the attention of this Court that the only reason the Manila RTC
Decision was implemented ahead of the Lapu Lapu RTC Decision was that LLDHC successfully secured
a TRO from the Court of Appeals through its petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44052,
which was eventually dismissed by the appellate court. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Manila RTC
Decision did not constitute a supervening event that would forestall the execution of the Lapu Lapu RTC
Decision. This decision of the Court of Appeals likewise became final and executory in 1998.

It bears repeating that the issue of whether or not the Manila RTC Decision could nullify or
render unenforceable the Lapu Lapu RTC Decision has been litigated many times over in different fora.
It would be the height of inequity if the Court were to now reverse the Court of Appeals and its own final
and executory rulings and allow GSIS to prevent the execution of the Lapu Lapu RTC Decision on the
same legal grounds previously discredited by the courts.

DAMASO vs. FLORES, G.R. No. 97556. July 29, 1996

Of course, it is true that it is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that, where a decision on the merits in a case is
rendered and the same has become final and executory, the action on procedural matters or issues
becomes moot and academic.i[37]

In the instant case, the decision sought to be enforced by petitioner is not one on the merits; it is one
merely adjudicating upon the legality and propriety of execution pending appeal The decision on the
merits was rendered in CA-G.R. CV No. 10259. There, the Court of Appeals found, and we affirm, that
petitioner has a due and demandable obligation to private respondent in the amount of P1,619,700.00,
plus accrued interest at 4% per month from October 1, 1985 until full payment thereof. Petitioner having
been judicially declared so indebted to such an extent to private respondent and the latter having
purchased the stadium from its former owners, there remains no legal or equitable basis for petitioner to
possess the said stadium.
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And, there are settled exceptions to the aforecited general rule. One of these exceptions is when facts
and/or events transpire after a decision has become executory, which facts and/or events present a
supervening cause or reason which renders the final and executory decision of the court, no longer
enforceable. Thus, we ruled in the case of City of Butuan vs. Ortiz:ii[38]

x x x the 5-year period within which a decision of the court may be enforced by motion had not yet
expired, but as it was alleged and shown in the motion for the reconsideration of the order granting
execution, that the Commissioner of Civil Service had already affirmed the decision of the Municipal
Board finding Soriano guilty on November 29, 1954, the right to reinstatement was barred by the
decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service. This decision of the Civil Service Commissioner finding
Soriano guilty was a valid impediment to the execution of the aforesaid decision for reinstatement. In
other words, a supervening cause or reason had arisen which has rendered the decision of the court
ordering reinstatement, no longer enforceable.

Obviously a prevailing party in a civil action is entitled to a writ of execution of the final judgment
obtained by him within five years from its entry (Section 443, Code of Civil Procedure). But it has been
repeatedly held, and it is now well-settled in this jurisdiction, that when after judgment has been rendered
and the latter has become final, facts and circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible
or unjust, the interested party may ask the court to modify or alter the judgment to harmonize the same
with justice and the facts (Molina vs. De la Riva, 8 Phil. 569; Behn, Meyer & Co. vs. McMicking, 11 Phil.
276; Warner, Barnes & Co. vs. Jaucian, 13 Phil. 4; Espiritu vs. Crossfield and Guash, 14 Phil. 588; Flor
Mata vs. Lichauco and Salinas, 36 Phil. 809). In the instant case the respondent Cleofas alleged that
subsequent to the judgment obtained by Sto. Domingo, they entered into an agreement which showed that
he was no longer indebted in the amount claimed of P995, but in a lesser amount. Sto. Domingo had no
right to an execution for the amount claimed by him. (De la Costa vs. Cleofas, 67 Phil. 686-693).

For the foregoing considerations, the writ prayed for is hereby granted, and the order for the execution of
the judgment of the Court of First Instance in Special Civil Action No. 16 Soriano vs. Pizarro is hereby
set aside.iii[39]

Shortly after promulgating the Butuan vs. Ortiz case, we reiterated our ruling therein in the subsequent
case of Candelario vs. Caizares.iv[40] We added that, not only may the court, after judgment has become
final, allow presentation of evidence of events or circumstances affecting the rights of parties and
accordingly suspend the execution of the judgment but the court may also grant relief as the new facts and
circumstances warrant.v[41] We had the occasion to rule avowedly in the same manner in the cases of
Abellana vs. Dosdosvi[42] and The City of Cebu vs. Mendoza.vii[43]

Other exceptions to the general rule pertain to cases of special and exceptional nature where it becomes
imperative in the higher interest of justice to direct the suspension of its execution.viii[44]
We consequently hold that, as an exception to the general rule on immutability of final judgments, the
supervening event that private respondent has become the owner of the mortgaged premises has rendered
the judgment in the main case impossible of execution.

Petitioner at this point must concede the fact that his invocation of the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 09061 to support his stubborn assertion of his possessory rights over the Paraaque
Cockpit Stadium, is also the Achilles heel in his advocacy of such rights. The order of the Court of
Appeals for the reversion of said stadium to him, was issued under the premise that he had rights thereto
as lessee-operator and that private respondent had nary a basis to possess the same because the special
order granting him execution pending appeal (i.e., possession of the stadium pending appeal) was null and
void. The Court of Appeals ordered such reversion of possession over the stadium to petitioner because
at the time he had the right to continue to be in possession thereof and such right was violated when the
court a quo ordered execution pending appeal. The appellate court was thus only acting in accordance
with, and in consequence of, petitioners right which existed at that time. That order by the appellate
court was not an order for its own sake. It was a result of the fact that the Court took into consideration
the situation at hand at that time and the legal questions that needed resolution then. It was not an
adjudication in isolation but one within certain spacio-temporal considerations that justified such an
adjudication.

Now, those considerations no longer exist. At best, significantly, consequential events have transpired
that changed the situation and rendered unenforceable that order of reversion. Petitioner thinks that just
because an order of the court directs a particular action, that action, by all means and regardless of any
and all pertinent circumstances, must be undertaken. Petitioner lost sight of the fact that obedience to
judicial orders is rooted not merely on the bare fact that it is the court that issued the same but more
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importantly on the essential premise that the court issued such orders because it has determined what is
right and just under the set of circumstances before it, and its orders are the affirmative and tangible
consequences of its abstract exercise in determining judicial truth and serving the ends of justice.

It is not disputed that private respondent is now the owner of the Paraaque Cockpit Stadium. Neither is
it disputed that petitioner was found by final and executory judgment to be obligated to private respondent
in the amount of more than a million pesos. Petitioner cannot deny that he had already benefited from the
proceeds of the loans that he obtained from private respondent, nor can he dispute the right of private
respondent as present owner of the said stadium to possess the same and terminate the lease contract of
petitioner with the stadiums former owners. Ultimately, all petitioner has is an order by the Court of
Appeals directing private respondent to return the stadium to petitioner because the latter was lessee-
operator thereof and private respondent came to possess the same through a void order granting execution
pending appeal. As we earlier said, the force of such order or any court order for that matter, profoundly
lies not so much in its factual existence as a judicial imperative but in its inherent essence as a judicial
determination of what is right and just under the particular circumstances under consideration by the
court. We so hold, as it cannot be denied, that petitioner no longer has any right to possess the Paraaque
Cockpit Stadium, and that without such right, the court order, even one that is final and executory, has
become baseless and of no further force and effect.