A.C. No. 7472. March 30, 2010.

LIGAYA MANIAGO, complainant, vs. ATTY. LOURDES I.

DE DIOS, respondent.

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Suspension of Lawyers; As much as

the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer, it should,
at the same time, also ensure that a lawyer may not be deprived of
the freedom and right to exercise his profession unreasonably.It
must be remembered that the practice of law is not a right but a
mere privilege and, as such, must bow to the inherent regulatory
power of the Supreme Court to exact compliance with the lawyers
public responsibilities. Whenever it is made to appear that an
attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his
clients and of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the
duty of the Supreme Court, which made him one of its officers and
gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw
that privilege. However, as much as the Court will not hesitate to
discipline an erring lawyer, it should, at the same time, also
ensure that a lawyer may not be deprived of the freedom and
right to exercise his profession unreasonably.
Same; Same; Same; Guidelines in the Matter of Lifting an
Order of Suspending a Lawyer from the Practice of Law.In light
of the foregoing, it is hereby resolved that the following guidelines
be observed in the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a
lawyer from the practice of law: 1) After a finding that respondent
lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court
shall render a decision imposing the penalty; 2) Unless the Court
explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon
receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a
motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall
render the decision final and executory; 3) Upon the expiration of
the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement
with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating
therein that he or she has desisted from the practice of law and
has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her
suspension; 4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished
to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the
courts where respondent has pend-
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*EN BANC.

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Maniago vs. De Dios

ing cases handled by him or her, and/or where he or she has

appeared as counsel; 5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered
as proof of respondents compliance with the order of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the
lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more
severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.

Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:
The instant case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint
dated April 2, 2007 filed by Ligaya Maniago, seeking the
disbarment of Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios for engaging in the
practice of law despite having been suspended by the
Court.
Complainant alleged that she filed a criminal case
against Hiroshi Miyata, a Japanese national, before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Olongapo City, Branch 73, for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 603, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 699-2002. The accused was represented
by Atty. De Dios, with office address at 22 Magsaysay
Drive, Olongapo City. Complainant then learned from the
RTC staff that Atty. De Dios had an outstanding
suspension order from the Supreme Court since 2001, and
was, therefore, prohibited from appearing in court.
Complainant further alleges that there is a civil case (Civil
Case No. 355-0-2005) and another case (Special Proceeding
No. M-6153) filed against Miyata before the RTC, Makati
City, Branch 134, where Atty. De Dios appeared as his
counsel. Complainant averred that Atty. De Dios ought to
be disbarred from the practice of law for her flagrant
violation and deliberate disobedience of a lawful order of
the Supreme Court.
 In her Comment, Atty. De Dios admitted that there were
cases filed against her client, Miyata. She, however, denied
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144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maniago vs. De Dios

that she was under suspension when she appeared as his

counsel in the cases.
Respondent explained that an administrative case was
indeed filed against her by Diana de Guzman, docketed as
A.C. No. 4943, where she was meted the penalty of 6-
month suspension. She served the suspension immediately
upon receipt of the Courts Resolution on May 16, 2001 up
to November 16, 2001. In a Manifestation filed on October
19, 2001, respondent formally informed the Court that she
was resuming her practice of law on November 17, 2001,
which she actually did.
A problem arose when Judge Josefina Farrales, in her
capacity as Acting Executive Judge of the RTC, Olongapo
City, erroneously issued a directive on March 15, 2007,
ordering respondent to desist from practicing law and
revoking her notarial commission for the years 2007 and
2008. Knowing that the directive was rather questionable,
respondent, nonetheless, desisted from law practice in due
deference to the court order. Thereafter, respondent filed a
Motion for Clarification with the Supreme Court on
account of Judge Farrales letters to all courts in Olongapo
City and to some municipalities in Zambales, which gave
the impression that Atty. De Dios is not yet allowed to
resume her practice of law and that her notarial
commission for the years 2007 and 2008 is revoked. Acting
on the said motion, the Court issued a resolution on April
23, 2007 in this wise:

A.C. No. 4943 (Diana de Guzman v. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios)

Respondents Urgent Motion for Clarification dated 14 March
2007 praying that the Court declare her to have served her six (6)
months (sic) suspension and her resumption of law practice on 17
November 2001 onwards as proper is NOTED.
Considering the motion for clarification, the Court resolves to
DEEM Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios to have SERVED her six (6)
month suspension and her recommencement of law practice on 17
November 2001 as PROPER pursuant to the Resolution dated 30
January 2002.

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Maniago vs. De Dios

Respondent averred that for the period stated in the

affidavit of complainant Maniago, during which she
allegedly practiced law, she was neither suspended nor in
any way prohibited from practice. The complaint, she
added, was baseless and malicious, and should be
dismissed outright.
In the Resolution dated September 12, 2007, the Court
referred the matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
Initially, the OBC directed the complainant to file a
supplemental affidavit, stating therein the exact period of
appearances of Atty. De Dios and the particular courts
where respondent appeared as counsel in the following
cases: (1) Criminal Case No. 699-2002; (2) Civil Case No.
355-0-2005; and (3) Sp. Proc. No. M-6153.
In compliance therewith, complainant submitted a
Supplemental Affidavit in the vernacular, which reads:

2. Sa Criminal Case No. 699-2002 entitled People of the

Philippines vs. Hiroshi Miyata ay [nagsimulang] mag[-]appear si
Atty. Lourdes de Dios mula April 9, 2003, na [naka-]attach ang
Certification mula sa Branch 73[,] Regional Trial Court[,]
Olongapo City.
3. Sa Civil Case No. 355-0-2006 ay [nagsimulang]
mag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios noong October 10, 2005, nakasaad
din ito sa Certification mula sa Branch 73, Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City. At sa Sp. Proc. No. M-6153 ay ito ay na[-]ifile ni
Atty. de Dios noong September 26, 2005 at hanggang ngayon ay
pending pa sa Court of Appeals.
4. Bilang karagdagan po ay naka[-]attach ang Certified Xerox
Copy ng Minutes of the Session ng Subic Municipal Trial Court
na kung saan ay nag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios sa Civil Case No.
042-01 entitled Andrea Lorenzo, plaintiff, -versus- Simeon Pullido
noong December 14, 2001.
5. At makikita rin po sa Annex A-5 ng Comment ni Atty. de
Dios, x x x
5. [a.] Nag file ng kaso si Atty. Lourdes de Dios
noong May 17, 2001 entitled Shirley Pagaduan vs. Danilo
Pagaduan[,] Civil Case No. 234-0-2001. Ito ay ginawa ni
Atty. de

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146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maniago vs. De Dios
 Dios isang (1) araw pa lamang mula magsimula ang
kanyang suspension noon[g] May 16, 2001.
5. b. Nag file din ng kaso si Atty. de Dios noong May
18, 2001 entitled Filmixco versus Dr. Ma. Perla
Tabasondra-Ramos and Dr. Ricardo Ramos Civil Case No.
236-0-2001. Ito ay dalawang (2) araw mula magsimula ang
suspension ni Atty. de Dios noong May 16, 2001.
5. c. At nag notaryo si Atty. de Dios ng isang (a)
affidavit executed by Carolina C. Bautista noong May 16,
2001, (b) Affidavit executed by Jessica Morales-Mesa on
May 17, 2001 at (c) isang Statement of non-liability of
Alfredo C. Diaz on May 16, 2001. Ang mga pag notaryo na
ito ay ginawa noong nagsimula na ang suspension ni Atty.
de Dios noong May 16, 2001.
6. Ginawa ko ang Supplemental Affidavit na ito bilang
patunay sa mga nakasaad base sa aking personal na kaalamanan
at mga dokumentong hawak ko upang ipakita na nilabag ni Atty.
de Dios ang kanyang suspension base sa sulat ni Deputy Clerk of
Court and Bar Confidant Ma. Cristina B. Layusa na may petsang
12 February 2007 at sa admission ni Atty. de Dios na nagsimula
ang kanyang suspension noong May 16, 2001.

A Supplemental Comment was thereafter filed by

respondent, stating that there were no new matters raised
in the Supplemental Affidavit, and asserting that the
opinion of Bar Confidant, Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa, as
contained in her letter dated 12 February 2007, cannot
supersede the Resolution dated April 23, 2007 of this
Honorable Court. According to her, the resolution should
be the final nail to the coffin of this case.
On November 18, 2008, the OBC submitted its
Memorandum for the Courts consideration.
The OBC explained that the letter adverted to by
complainant in her affidavit was the OBCs reply to an
inquiry made by the Office of the Court Administrator
regarding the status of Atty. De Dios.1 Therein, the OBC
made it clear that

_______________

1 Letter signed by Atty. James D.V. Navarrete Assistant, Officer-in-

Charge, Legal Office, Office of the Court Administrator.

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Maniago vs. De Dios
the lifting of the suspension order was not automatic,
following the pronouncement of the Court in J.K. Mercado
and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. and Spouses Jesus
and Rosario K. Mercado, complainants v. Atty. Eduardo de
Vera and Jose Rongkales Bandalan, et al. and Atty.
Eduardo C. de Vera v. Atty. Mervyn G. Encanto, et al.,
which states:

The Statement of the Court that his suspension stands until he

would have satisfactorily shown his compliance with the Courts
resolution is a caveat that his suspension could thereby extend for
more than six months. The lifting of a lawyers suspension is not
automatic upon the end of the period stated in the Courts decision,
and an order from the Court lifting the suspension at the end of
the period is necessary in order to enable [him] to resume the
practice of his profession.2

Thus, according to the OBC, a suspended lawyer must

first present proof(s) of his compliance by submitting
certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and from the Executive Judge that he has indeed desisted
from the practice of law during the period of suspension.
Thereafter, the Court, after evaluation, and upon a
favorable recommendation from the OBC, will issue a
resolution lifting the order of suspension and thus allow
him to resume the practice of law. The OBC alleged that it
was unfortunate that this procedure was overlooked in A.C.
No. 4943, where Atty. De Dios was able to resume her
practice of law without submitting the required
certifications and passing through the OBC for evaluation.
In order to avoid confusion and conflicting directives from
the Court, the OBC recommended that the Court adopt a
uniform policy on the matter of the lifting of the order of
suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law.

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2 See A.C. No. 3066, entitled J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural
Enterprises, Inc. v. Eduardo de Vera, et al., and A.C. No. 4438, entitled
Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera v. Atty. Mervyn G. Encanto, et al.;
Memorandum dated November 14, 2008 addressed to Justice Consuelo
Yares-Santiago, Chairperson, Third Division.

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148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maniago vs. De Dios
 The Court notes the Report and Recommendation of the
OBC.
It must be remembered that the practice of law is not a
right but a mere privilege and, as such, must bow to the
inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact
compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities.3
Whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no
longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and
of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty
of the Supreme Court, which made him one of its officers
and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to
withdraw that privilege.4 However, as much as the Court
will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer, it should, at
the same time, also ensure that a lawyer may not be
deprived of the freedom and right to exercise his profession
unreasonably.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby
RESOLVED that the following guidelines be observed in
the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer
from the practice of law:
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be
suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall
render a decision imposing the penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the
decision is immediately executory upon receipt
thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a
motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said
motion shall render the decision final and executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of
suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement
with the Court, through the Office of the Bar
Confidant, stating therein

_______________

3 Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., Requesting Exemption from

Payment of IBP Dues, B.M. No. 1370, May 9, 2005, 458 SCRA 209, 216.
4Hernandez v. Go, A.C. No. 1526, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 1, 9.

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Maniago vs. De Dios

that he or she has desisted from the practice of law

and has not appeared in any court during the period
of his or her suspension;
 4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be
furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the
Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has
pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where he
or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as
proof of respondents compliance with the order of
suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the
statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a
ground for the imposition of a more severe
punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.
SO ORDERED.

Carpio,** Corona, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr.,

Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Puno (C.J.), On Official Leave.

Guidelines in lifting an order suspending a lawyer from

the practice of law.

Note.There is no need to stretch ones imagination to

arrive at an inevitable conclusion that a lawyer gravely
abused the confidence that a person reposed in him and
committed dishonesty when he did not turn over the
proceeds of the sale of the latters property. (Nuez vs.
Ricafort, 382 SCRA 381 [2002])
o0o

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** Acting Chief Justice in lieu of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno per

Special Order No. 826 dated March 16, 2010.

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