Energy Policy 46 (2012) 135143

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

Energy Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol

Japans energy security predicament post-Fukushima

Vlado Vivoda n
Grifth Asia Institute, Grifth University, N50, Room 1.33, Nathan, QLD 4111, Australia

a r t i c l e i n f o abstract

Article history: If energy security is dened as the availability of energy at all times in various forms, in sufcient
Received 21 October 2011 quantities and at affordable prices, without unacceptable or irreversible impact on the economy and
Accepted 16 March 2012 the environment, Japan is facing an energy security predicament. For a country that was already uneasy
Available online 17 April 2012
about energy security, the March 11, 2011 earthquake and tsunami, which caused a nuclear catastrophe
Keywords: in TEPCOs Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, turned this unease into outright anxiety. With the
Japan temporary and/or permanent closure of many nuclear reactors Japan has had to replace lost power.
Energy security Tokyo has had no choice but to secure additional fossil fuels, a strategy that has negatively affected
Fukushima Japans economy due to rising fuel costs. The increase in Japans fossil fuel consumption has also caused
a signicant increase in greenhouse gas emissions, and affected Tokyos commitment to Kyoto targets.
This paper analyzes the consequences of the 2011 nuclear disaster for Japans energy security.
Recognizing that Japans future energy policy choices are constrained and path dependent, the paper
outlines energy policy recommendations for Japans government.
& 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction issues was triggered by record oil prices in 2008, it was brought to
the forefront of public debate in the aftermath of March 11, 2011
Japan is the worlds fth largest energy consumer, and a (hitherto referred to as 3/11) earthquake and tsunami, which
resource-poor country, which imports close to all of its fossil fuel caused a nuclear catastrophe in TEPCOs Fukushima Daiichi
requirements. Large demand for energy and high import depen- nuclear power plant. Such was the extent of the shock caused
dence has made energy security as one of the priorities of any by the events on 3/11 on Japans economy, the existing energy
government in Tokyo, particularly since the two oil crises in the system and energy security, that in 2011 Japan recorded its rst
1970s. The 1973 and 1979 oil crises caused the Japanese economy trade decit (f2.5 trillion) since the aftermath of the oil crisis in
to record negative growth rates for the rst time in its post-war 1980. This trade decit was mainly caused by a jump of 25.2%
history. Their impact on the lives of ordinary Japanese remains (f4.3 trillion) in fossil fuel imports, which in 2011 made up close
deeply etched on peoples minds. As a result, the Japanese to one-third of Japans import spending (World Nuclear News,
government adopted policies aimed at improving energy ef- 2012).
ciency and reducing the demand for oil. These policies have Consequently, largely absent since the two oil crises in the
resulted in unprecedented success. Consequently, Japan is now 1970s, the energy security debate in Japan has been revived in the
the most energy-efcient country in the world (The Economist, aftermath of the 3/11 disaster. Some analysts have suggested that
2011). In addition, Japans oil demand dropped from 5.4 million Japan should move away from nuclear energy citing safety
barrels per day (bpd) in 1979 to 4.4 million bpd in 2010, due to concerns in an earthquake prone country which lies on several
vehicle efciency gains and conversion to other electricity fault lines. For example, the Japanese government has claimed it
sources. The share of oil in total energy consumption has declined is scrapping plans to build as many as 14 new nuclear reactors
from about 72% in 1979 to 40% in 2010 (BP, 2011). over the next two decades. It is worth recalling that the govern-
Today after three decades, energy security is once again at the ment-stated plans were to increase nuclears share of total
center of attention among Japanese policy-makers and the gen- electricity generation from 24% in 2008 to 4050% by 2030,
eral public. However, unlike in the 1970s, when the focus was on according to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)
affordability and security of oil supplies, the current challenge is (Ferguson, 2011). The former Prime Minister (PM) Naoto Kan
multidimensional. While the renewed interest in energy security announced that the government would have to start from
scratch in devising a new energy policy for the country. He has
announced a major energy policy review that would promote
n
Tel.: 61 7 373 54251. solar and other alternative energies, stating that Japan should
E-mail address: [email protected] increase the share of renewable energy in power generation to

0301-4215/$ - see front matter & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.03.044
136 V. Vivoda / Energy Policy 46 (2012) 135143

20% by the early 2020s (Johnston, 2011). In September 2011, the up for the lost nuclear power. With atomic stations providing
new PM Yoshihiko Noda, conrmed previous PMs decision, and close to 30% of Japans electricity before the Fukushima disaster,
decided to review energy policy with a mind to possibly reducing utilities have been forced to rely more on oil- and gas-red power
future dependence on nuclear power. plants to make up the difference. The increased use of thermal
Building on previous studies of Japans energy security policy plants to make up for the loss of nuclear output caused higher fuel
and other relevant literature this paper evaluates Japans current import costs, borne by Japanese consumers and industries, and
energy security situation and places future energy policy options leading to a rst trade decit since 1980. This trade decit was
in the appropriate context. As such, the paper contributes to the mainly caused by an increase of 25.2% (f4.3 trillion) in the value
literature on Japans energy security and policy. While acknowl- of fossil fuel imports (The Japan Times, 2012). With Fukushima
edging the polysemic nature of the concept (Chester, 2010), the and other nuclear plants ofine, the value of Japans imports of
paper adopts UNDPs (2004) denition of energy security as the LNG, crude oil and petroleum products increased by 37.5%, 21.3%
availability of energy at all times in various forms, in sufcient and 39.5%, respectively (IEEJ, 2012). This increase in import cost
quantities and at affordable prices, without unacceptable or occurred in a year in which the overall energy consumption
irreversible impact on the economy and the environment. When dropped by 3.7%. LNG prices have also risen as Japan buys more,
this conceptualization is applied in the present Japanese context, with spot prices reaching $15 per million British thermal units
the analyses indicate that Japan is facing an energy security (Btu) in January 2012, up over 40% from before 3/11. Regional
predicament. The countrys energy policy has to address chal- suppliers, such as Australia, are already reaping the benets of
lenges related to the future availability of diverse energy sources, Japans increased demand for coal and LNG (Wallace, 2011).
increasing cost of fuels, and adverse impact of its energy and All of Japans power utilities reported a net loss for the April
power demand trajectory on the economy and the environment. December 2011 period, due to higher fuel costs for thermal power
Japan is the key case not only because of pressure on the existing generation (Inajima, 2012). According to Medlock and Hartley
energy system caused by 3/11 but it is also a resource-poor (2004), in the event of a 25% shock to oil price, the pre-Fukushima
country, which has an established track record of reacting to nuclear capacity in Japan reduced electricity prices by 6.55%. As a
energy crises in the 1970s. consequence of a nuclear shutdown and increased cost of energy
Numerous studies focus on Japans energy policy. Some studies imports, corporate customers in and around Tokyo will pay up to
focus broadly on Japans energy security (Atsumi, 2007; Evans, 18% more for their electricity beginning April 2012 (Soble, 2012).
2006; Hideaki, 2000; Nakatani, 2004; Toichi, 2006; Yokobori, In 2012, a regular households electricity bill is predicted to
2005). Other studies focus on single issue-areas such as overseas increase by f1,049, or 18%, and the rate for industrial consumers
oil development policy (Koike, 2006; Koike et al., 2008), energy by 36% per month on average due to rise in fuel costs (IEEJ, 2011).
diversication (Lesbirel, 2004); oil import diversication (Vivoda Residential and industrial electricity prices are already consider-
and Manicom, 2011), public perception of energy security ably higher in Japan than in most G-20 economies (IEA, 2011). The
(Valentine et al., 2011), the role of nuclear power in energy economic burden associated with these higher electricity costs is
security (Suzuki, 2000; Lidsky and Miller, 2002; Medlock and increasing for Japan as the competitiveness of other countries is
Hartley, 2004), nuclear politics (Lesbirel, 2003), electricity and enhanced due to deregulation of their electricity sectors.
petroleum industry regulatory reform (Hartley, 2000; Oyama, If Japans nuclear reactions do not resume operations in 2012,
2000; Asano,2005; Hosoe, 2006) and improved energy efciency there will be severe consequences for the Japanese economy.
(Morita, 2010; Stewart, 2009). Under such a scenario, Japanese demand for thermal coal is
While relevant in their own way, previous work overlooks the expected to increase by 8.3% (Tsukimori, 2012), and Japan will
social, political and economic context within which Japans need to boost its crude oil and petroleum products consumption
energy choices are embedded. In addition, the existing literature by 4.7% and LNG consumption by 6.9% (IEEJ, 2012). The IEEJ
pre-dates 3/11. Dufeld and Woodall (2011) have analyzed (2012) predict that the cost of fossil fuel imports will increase by
Japans 2010 Basic Energy Plan (BEP) and argued that even prior f4.6 trillion (US$61 billion), resulting in GDP growth of only 0.1%.
to 3/11, achievement of many targets was likely to be challenging. They also estimate that the electricity supply decit could
This is exacerbated in the aftermath of 3/11. In many ways, the amount to 12.2% during the summer peak demand season,
scale of the Fukushima disaster is the equivalent of 9/11 in the severely hampering industrial production (only 1.6% growth over
energy sector, and previous energy security thinking needs to be 2011). Another study found that Japans GDP would decrease by
reassessed in lieu of a changed environment. Consequently, 1% if nuclear-based power generation is at 20% below pre-3/11
Section 2 analyzes the consequences of 3/11 on Japans economy levels, with very little effect of substituting fossil fuels for nuclear.
and energy security. While recognizing the signicance of 3/11, Moreover, the deeper the cut in nuclear use for power generation,
Japans energy future is path dependent. It is embedded in a the larger the negative impact on GDP (Itakura, 2011). Alterna-
specic political, economic and social context, constrained by tively, if nuclear power plants restart by mid-2012, the IEEJ
Japans existing energy system, but also affected by changes in the predict that Japans economy and industry will not suffer from
global energy system. Therefore, Section 3 examines historical the electricity shortage. Under such a scenario, the cost of Japans
energy demand trends in Japan and globally in order to illustrate fossil fuel imports will increase by f2.6 trillion (US$35 billion),
that substantial changes in proportions of energy use from resulting in GDP growth of 1.9%. Industrial production is expected
various sources take decades. Section 4 highlights the three main to increase by 5.0% (IEEJ, 2012).
sources of path dependency, which affect and/or constrain Japans The challenge associated with Japans increased demand for
future energy policy choices. The nal section discusses the imported fossil fuels is exacerbated by the fact that major
feasibility of various energy policy options for Japan. economies in the Asia-Pacic region are competing for supplies
of fossil fuels, and particularly oil. The Asia-Pacic regions energy
demand, especially Chinas and Indias, has grown rapidly over the
2. Consequences of 3/11 for Japans energy security past two decades and most projections suggest their voracious
thirst for energy will further expand in the coming decades
After 3/11, when considering relative cost, feasibility of (Vivoda, 2010). In the past decade, Japan has been competing
increased production and availability of fuels, it comes as no with China, India and South Korea to secure long-term oil supply
surprise that Japan increased consumption of fossil fuels to make contracts with suppliers in the Middle East and other regions,
 V. Vivoda / Energy Policy 46 (2012) 135143 137

often failing to outbid Chinese national oil companies who are 300
backed by deep pockets of their home government. What further

million tons of oil equivalent (mtoe)

limits the security of Japans oil imports is Tokyos close security 250
alliance with the US, which constrains Japans relations with oil
exporters that are at odds with the US. In 2010, Japanese oil 200
company Inpex, which was to be a major developer of Irans Oil

Azadegan oil eld, abandoned its stake in the project facing the 150 Natural Gas
prospect of being denied access to US nancial institutions. In Coal
January 2012, Washington applied pressure on Tokyo to reduce 100 Nuclear
dependency on Iranian oil and natural gas. This would be a
Hydroelectricity
further blow to Japans already low diversied oil import portfolio 50
(Vivoda and Manicom, 2011). In 2011, Iranian crude oil made up Other
Renewables
10% of Japans oil imports. PM Yoshihiko Nodas government has 0
indicated its desire to cooperate (Smith, 2012). Yet, cutting 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Iranian imports carries risks for Japan as the countrys reliance year
on imported energy has increased since the 3/11 disaster.
Fig. 1. Japans energy demand structure, 19652010.
There are also severe consequences for Japans environmental Source: BP, 2011) (Note: Other Renewables from 1990).
policy following a reduction in nuclear output. Japans CO2
emissions increased by 2.1% in 2011, and if nuclear reactors
remain shut down in 2012, CO2 emissions are expected to grow
4500
by further 5.5%. If there are no restrictions on resuming opera-
tions in Japans nuclear reactors, a 5.3% drop in CO2 emissions is 4000

million tons of oil equivalent (mtoe)

predicted for 2012 (IEEJ, 2012). Before 3/11, nuclear power 3500
reduced Japans CO2 emissions by 14% per year (EIA, 2011; Oil
Nakano, 2011). Increased emissions make it virtually impossible 3000
Natural Gas
for Japan to reach the Kyoto Protocol 2020 target of reducing CO2 2500
Coal
emissions by 25% of 1990 levels. Japanese leaders have been frank
2000 Nuclear
in dismissing any hopes of meeting Japans climate change targets
(World Nuclear News, 2012). It is worth noting that Tokyo has 1500 Hydroelectricity
been a world leader in pushing for greater use of very low carbon Other
1000 Renewables
emission sources.
500
If we are to dene energy security as the availability of energy
at all times in various forms, in sufcient quantities and at 0
affordable prices, without unacceptable or irreversible impact 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
year
on the economy and the environment (UNDP, 2004), Japan is
facing a serious predicament and a dilemma regarding the Fig. 2. Global energy demand structure, 19652010.
direction of its future energy policy. As a consequence of 3/11, Source: BP, 2011) (Note: Other Renewables from 1990).
the Japanese people are paying more for energy, the supply of
which is less secure. Moreover, the higher cost of the energy mix, An examination of historical energy demand trends in Japan
which is heavier on the fossil fuel side, has an adverse effect on (Fig. 1) and globally (Fig. 2) reveals that substantial changes in
both the economy and the environment. Consequently, the proportions of energy use from various sources take decades.
nuclear crisis poses a serious challenge to the nations economy Having said this, the discovery of superior sources of energy has
and its energy security in terms of affordability, supply security, sometimes resulted in a relatively rapid transition to a new
and the environment. energy source, as in the case of coal and oil. Occasional supply
shocks, such as the 1970s oil crises, only marginally affect the
historical pattern, with return to pre-shock shares within two
3. Energy transitions decades. Currently, fossil fuels make up 87% of global and 82% of
Japans energy demand, with no serious competitors on the
The global energy system is in the early stages of a transition horizon.
from carbon intensive fossil fuels to a variety of substitutes, Japan is the worlds largest importer of liqueed natural gas
bringing economic, strategic, and environmental risks. Scholar- (LNG) and coal and the third-largest importer of oil. As Japan is
ship on energy transitions suggests that these transitions have heavily dependent on energy imports, the government has been
been both gradual and complex. As Grubler (1991) notes, Along promoting nuclear energy as a means to diversify its energy
its growth trajectory, an innovation interacts with existing sources. Re-evaluation of energy policy in the aftermath of the
techniques y and changes its technological, economic, and 1973 oil crisis resulted in diversication and, in particular, a
social characteristicsy. Decades are required for the diffusion of major nuclear construction program. A high priority was given to
signicant innovation, and even longer time spans are needed to reducing the countrys dependence on oil imports and more
develop infrastructures. Smil (2008) makes the point even more broadly curbing oil demand. Consequently, with improvements
concisely: Energy transitions are prolonged affairs that take in energy efciency and substituting natural gas and nuclear
decades to accomplish and the greater the scale of prevailing power for oil in electricity generation, Japans oil demand dropped
uses and conversions the longer the substitutions will take. Coal signicantly by the mid-1980s, only to return to pre-crises levels
had been in use for thousands of years, but it was not until by the mid-1990s. The Japanese government has treated nuclear
growing urbanization led to a shortage of wood that the use of power as a semi-indigenous form of energy supply. As a country
coal became more commonplace. Similarly, oil derivatives were with virtually no natural resources, it perceived nuclear power as
used in lamps throughout the nineteenth century, decades before a central pillar in reducing dependence on imported oil and
they became the worlds dominant source of energy. enhancing energy security (Lesbirel, 2003). Since the 1980s,
138 V. Vivoda / Energy Policy 46 (2012) 135143

Oil Oil

1.10% 7.10% 1.0%

LNG Natural Gas
3.9% 13.2%
Coal Coal
29.30% 40.2%
29.30%
Hydroelectric 24.7% Hydroelectric

8.30% 24.90% Nuclear 17.0% Nuclear

Other Other
Renewable Renewable

Fig. 3. Japans electricity demand (left) and primary energy demand (right) by source.
Sources: The Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan, 2011; BP, 2011).

nuclear energy has been an integral part of Japans energy supply major disruption has been the 3/11 disaster. This event has
system (Fig. 1). As illustrated in Fig. 3, it provides close to 30% of shaken the foundations of Japans energy system and has affected
electricity and 13% of primary energy supply (BP, 2011); World its path dependency.
Nuclear Association, 2011a).
The realities of energy transitions and the particularities of 4.1. Beliefs and perceptions
Japans energy system hinder any quick move away from fossil
fuels. Japan has reduced its nuclear power output and this There is a strong commitment in Japan that a move from
reduction is likely to remain for the foreseeable future. In January nuclear power toward other sources of energy is desired, both in
2012, only 3 out of 54 of Japans commercial nuclear reactors have terms of public opinion and government policy. While public
been operating. Japan will lose its last nuclear- generated power opposition to nuclear energy is not a new phenomenon, the
in April at the current rate of shutting down reactors for safety change of government policy is. Driven by high dependency on
checks (Bloomberg, 2012). Although many of these reactors might imported fossil fuels and negative impact of the two oil crises, the
restart once the government and regulators reassure the public government has been committed to nuclear power as a preferable
that operation can safely recommence, the only viable short to energy source because it is domestically produced, and thereby
medium term alternative to nuclear power is fossil fuels. There is, more secure. As outlined in Japans New National Energy Strategy
in fact, nothing on the energy horizon in Japan to displace fossil of 2006, the aim has been to increase the share of nuclear from
fuels (Smil, 2010). approximately 30% to up to 50% by 2030 (ANRE, 2006).
In addition, short of a major technological breakthrough, At the same time, the Japanese public has been opposed to
which makes renewable energy competitive with other energy nuclear power since a series of nuclear accidents in the 1990s, and
sources on a large scale, it will take decades before renewable the public has also been opposed to Japans ambitious nuclear
energy becomes competitive with fossil fuels in electricity gen- expansion policy (Fesharaki and Hosoe, 2011). The 3/11 nuclear
eration and transportation sectors. A glance at past energy disaster, although most severe, has not been the only nuclear
consumption trends (Fig. 2) indicates that, with the exception of accident in Japan. In fact, several reactor accidents occurred
hydroelectric power, renewable energy is a newcomer. Other during the 1990s (documented in Beder, 2003; World Nuclear
renewable energy sources are negligent as sources of energy in Association, 2011a), the most serious of which was the 1999
the current global energy system. The same applies for Japan, accident in Tokaimura, which killed two workers. These accidents
where they start from a very small base (see Fig. 1; Fig. 3). In have contributed greatly to negative public condence in govern-
Japan, they account for only 1% of both electricity and primary ment and corporate nuclear oversight. The share of Japanese
energy supply. While the share of renewable energy in global people feeling very uneasy about nuclear power grew from
terms and Japans energy mix will grow, this will happen at a very 21% before the 1999 Tokaimura accident to 52% afterward. In an
slow pace due to relative higher costs and other structural October 1999 Japan Public Opinion Company survey, only 11%
impediments (discussed below) that inhibit a fast uptake of supported government plans to increase the share of nuclear
renewables. power, 51% favored maintenance of current plans, while another
33% wanted to see a reduction in, or end to, nuclear power. Given
a choice, the public preferred non-nuclear options (solar/wind
4. Path dependence generation 62%, conservation 55%, compared to 20% for nuclear
power). In a survey released in March 2000 by the Japan
Path dependence can be referred to as the constraints on the Productivity Center for Socio-Economic Development (JPC-SED),
choice set in the present that are derived from historical experi- 64% of energy experts surveyed expressed strong concerns about
ences. Understanding the process of change entails confronting the risk to energy security posed by limitations to securing sites
the nature of path dependence in order to determine the nature of for nuclear power plants; and 49% about risks posed by large
the limits of change that it imposes in various settings (North, accidents at nuclear power facilities (JPC-SED(Japan Productivity
1990). A movement away from the present pattern of energy use Center for Socio-Economic Development), Energy and Environ-
is constrained by a combination of three sources of path depen- mental Policy Section, Special Committee of Energy Issues, 2000;
dency: beliefs and perceptions; institutions and organizations; and Kotler and Hillman, 2000). This survey data shows that both the
relative prices and structural constraints. These constraints make public and the experts did not accept the governments argument
energy transitions slow. At the same time, a signicant disruption that nuclear power is safe well before 3/11.
to any of these sources of path dependency comes at an enormous However, after 3/11, this opposition has become even more
cost to energy and economic security. In Japans case, one such pronounced. In the Asahi Shimbun poll in June 2011, 74% of
 V. Vivoda / Energy Policy 46 (2012) 135143 139

Japanese respondents favored a gradual phase-out of nuclear Japans nuclear regulators are also not independent of industry
energy and only 14% were against such a gradual reduction. The inuence. In the aftermath of 3/11, the government largely left
poll also showed 64% of respondents believed natural energy, the response up to the plants operator, TEPCO, which demon-
such as wind and solar power, would replace nuclear power in the strates a cozy relationship between government and the utilities.
future (The Australian, 2011). Over the months since the accident TEPCO, the largest of the regional monopolies, supplies over one-
there have also been several public protests against nuclear third of Japans electricity (The Federation of Electric Power
power. Mirroring public opinion, in early July 2011, former PM Companies of Japan, 2011). Some of Japans most densely popu-
Kan has urged a nuclear-free future for Japan, stating that the lated and economically important regions get their power supply
country should aim to develop alternative energy sources such as from TEPCO. Yet, the company has lost much credibility and trust
solar, wind and biomass (BBC News, 2011). More recently, the from the Japanese public in its handling of nuclear crises follow-
new PM Noda backpedaled from such a strong commitment to ing the 3/11 disaster (Asahi Shimbun, 2011). It has a track record
nuclear-free future, yet suggested reduction in future dependence of safety cover-ups, helped by soft regulation by a government
on nuclear power. Nevertheless, this is a signicant policy shift organization tasked with promoting nuclear power. From autumn
and a clear indication that the Japanese government and key 2002 to the middle of 2003, TEPCO closed all seventeen of its
policy-makers are starting to judge the future of nuclear energy in nuclear reactors as a consequence of falsied reports in which the
Japan dispassionately, rather than primarily on supply security company concealed scars on the shrouds or supporting devices of
grounds. fuel rods inside the reactor. This situation suggested negligence in
safety and security by TEPCO (Yokobori, 2005).
In fact, the string of nuclear accidents in Japan in the 1990s has
4.2. Institutions and organizations revealed a lack of regulatory oversight and preparedness. Over a
decade ago experts have called for an adversarial regulatory
Institutions are commonly dened as the rules of the game, culture with appropriate laws and institutions. They called for
or the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. an effective nuclear safety and regulatory commission, which is
They are made up of formal constraints (such as rules, laws, independent, transparent and encourages public participation
constitutions), informal constraints (such as norms of behavior, (Kral, 2000). Yet the Nuclear & Industrial Safety Agency (NISA)
conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement within the METI remained responsible for nuclear power regula-
characteristics. Organizations comprise a group of individuals bound tion, licensing and safety (World Nuclear Association, 2011a). The
by some common purpose to achieve objectives. Organizations fact that the Japanese government did not restructure its nuclear
include political bodies (political parties, regulatory agencies), eco- regulatory framework since the accidents in the 1990s is an
nomic bodies (rms, trade unions), social bodies and educational indication of the strength of nuclear lobby in the country.
bodies (North, 1990). Japanese energy policy and its future direction In early 2012 most of Japans nuclear reactors were ofine. In
are embedded in the countrys institutional and organizational what mirrors public opinion, after 3/11, many local governments
structure, with the METI as the energy policy-making hub, the nuclear have been vehemently opposed to nuclear power. Before reactors
industry, and the utility monopolies at the center. This energy policy- can restart, METI needs agreements from local governments, even
making structure has remained remarkably stable for almost four after routine inspections. Yuhei Sato, governor of Fukushima,
decades (Moe, 2012). However, as argued above, post-3/11 societal where TEPCO has two nuclear stations including the wrecked
pressure to move away from nuclear power has translated into a Daiichi plant, has vowed to make the region a nuclear-free zone.
signicant force for change. Hirohiko Izumida, the governor of Niigata, where TEPCOs Kashi-
Traditionally, energy policy has been the purview of METI, wazaki Kariwa plant is located, will never negotiate with the
which has close ties to the business community. Among METIs power utility on restarts until all of the deciencies exposed by
chief private-sector allies are the 10 regional utility monopolies. the Fukushima accident are explained and corrected (Bloomberg,
These utilities monopolize control over Japans major electricity- 2012). In any case, and regardless of societal and local opposition
usage regions and collectively produce more than 85% of Japans to nuclear power, it is hard to imagine that the powerful nuclear
electricity. Given their regional monopoly status, these utilities lobby and its allies will relinquish their cause. The structural
charge much higher electricity prices than those in the US and adjustment in the coal industry in Japan serves as an important
Europe (Hosoe, 2006). Nuclear energy generation differs with precedent. In 1968, a decision was made to gradually phase out
each of the ten utilities in Japan, but ranges between 21% and 45% Japans inefcient coal industry in response to the increased costs
(EIA, 2011). Except for Okinawa Electric Power Company, all of of domestic coal. Yet two decades later, for its Eighth Coal
the utilities own and manage nuclear power plants and prefer a Program (19861991), the government had only agreed to some
marginal role for renewables (Scalise, 2012). Nuclear power is one minor adjustments and decided to maintain price differentials
of their preferred sources in the energy mix as it is relatively and protect the industry more heavily with subsidies for domestic
cheap. producers and tariffs on imported coal (Lesbirel, 1991). It was only in
Consequently, they are unlikely to simply give in to societal 2002 that Japan stopped domestic coal mining (Ferguson, 2011).
pressure to move away from nuclear power. These deep-pocketed
monopolies and industrial energy users have cultivated salu-
brious ties with inuential politicians through generous campaign 4.3. Relative prices and structural constraints
contributions (Dufeld and Woodall, 2011). Their size, de facto
monopoly position, control over pricing data, and privately A glance at Table 1 reveals that nuclear power is the cheapest
owned assets put them at an advantage to comparable companies source of electricity in Japan, followed by coal and LNG. Renew-
in most other industrial democracies (Scalise, 2012). Lobbyists able alternatives are considerably more expensive. In their survey
from large power utilities have in the past opposed more of energy security perceptions in Japan, Valentine et al. (2011)
ambitious renewable energy goals. They have substantial inu- found that most Japanese citizens are acutely aware of the need to
ence at the local and national governmental levels (Ferguson, minimize energy costs both to support industrial competitiveness
2011). Given the relative cost of nuclear power, any future plan to and household energy expenditure. Their preferences for afford-
downsize or eliminate nuclear energy is certain to face consider- able energy services temper any policies that might commit Japan
able opposition from the utilities. to costly low-carbon technological transition initiatives in the
140 V. Vivoda / Energy Policy 46 (2012) 135143

Table 1
Power generation cost in Japan for major energy sources (f per kW h).
Sources: Dale, 2011; IAE, 2009; METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry), Government of Japan, 2010; Scalise, 2011.

Nuclear Coal LNG Oil Solar Wind Geothermal Hydro

METI 5.06.0 y 7.08.0 y 49.0 10.014.0 8.022.0 y

IAE 4.86.2 5.07.1 5.77.1 10.017.3 37.046.0 10.014.0 y 8.213.3
TEPCO 6.1 9.1 30.5 y
Scalise y 8.8 13.1 19.6 30.045.0 14.0 10.0 y

energy sector (Valentine et al., 2011). Any increased cost of reasons, METI predicted in 2009 that the share of the primary
electricity caused by the uptake of renewable energy will be energy supply provided by renewables in 2030 would reach only
distributed among consumers, who already pay among the high- 11.6%, even with maximum introduction of technology
est electricity prices in the world. This is a clear indication that (Dufeld and Woodall, 2011).
there may be little public support or economic incentive for The government has also been promoting energy efciency
utilities to move away from traditional energy sources to renew- since the 1970s oil crises. Further increases in energy efciency in
able energy. Yet, besides high direct cost, renewable energy faces order to reduce dependence on fossil fuels are desirable, yet
other structural constraints in Japan, all of which add to indirect unrealistic. Japan is the most energy-efcient country in the
costs related with the uptake of these sources of energy. There- world with its energy efciency enhanced by over 30% since the
fore, renewable energy cannot be regarded as the next silver 1973 oil crisis (Masaki, 2006; The Economist, 2011; Valentine,
bullet for Japans energy woes. 2011). The energy consumption per unit of output in America and
Since Japans hydroelectric potential is largely exploited, Europe is around twice that of Japans, and China and Indias is
geothermal power would appear to be an attractive option given eight times as much, making Japan the most energy efcient
that there are more than 100 active volcanoes and thousands of among the worlds major economies (IEA, 2011). In fact, the
hot springs. But some of the best locations are in national parks, Japanese industry uses a similar amount of energy as it did during
which have strict limits on their development, and hot springs, the oil shock of 1973. From the 1990s, Japan has also attained the
which are attractive for tourists. The Japanese onsens spas highest level of efciency in thermal power generation, a level it
which rely on underground hot water are opposing the devel- still maintains (Sano, 2011). Given that the easiest gains to energy
opment of geothermal energy because of concerns it will reduce efciency have already been made (Dufeld and Woodall, 2011),
the availability of hot water. Consequently, the ability for Japan to there are particular challenges ahead for Japan to develop
develop this energy source is constrained, as geothermal power technologies, which may further improve energy efciency. With-
faces political opposition from environmental activists and small out a doubt, while minor efciency gains are possible, any
business owners alike, who disapprove of unpredictable explora- signicant gains are highly unlikely in all sectors.
tion prospects in environmentally fragile locations.
Most of the increase in renewable energy is expected to come
from solar energy by encouraging the installation of solar panels 5. Conclusions and policy recommendations
on roofs and developing larger-scale solar facilities. Solar power is
quiet and clean, but its prohibitive cost per kW h and low The analyses above indicate that future energy choices for
utilization rate ensure its marginalization for energy-intensive Japan are constrained and/or affected by three sources of path
industries requiring stable baseloads to operate efciently during dependency. They are constrained by (1) the public opinion,
business hours. Without adequate subsidies for lower income which is predominantly anti-nuclear in the aftermath of the
households to install solar power, Japans promotion of solar Fukushima disaster; (2) by energy-policy making apparatus
power will be economically regressive as mainly businesses and centered around the METI and the powerful utilities and nuclear
wealthier households will be able to afford to install solar power industry that are pro-nuclear; and (3) by relative energy prices
and to sell the surplus energy back to the grid (Meltzer, 2011). In and other structural constraints which make nuclear energy and
addition, the existing power system could accommodate enough fossil fuels the most economically feasible energy choices for the
photovoltaic generating capacity to provide only about 6% to 8% of already weak Japanese economy. Given these constraints, what
the electricity supply (Dufeld and Woodall, 2011). are the future energy policy options for Japan?
In contrast, the cost of wind power in Japan is largely Japans energy policy is at a crossroads. Japan prioritized
economically viable. Consequently, offshore wind farms appear resource diversication, with a nuclear emphasis, after oil shocks
worthy of consideration. Yet, they are likely to draw the ire of in the 1970s; it prioritized Chinas resource nationalism, global
shermen and environmentalists as they pose a danger to sh warming awareness, and one last oil price spike between in the
habitats and avian wildlife. In addition, the most productive sites last two decades. Japan now needs an integrated energy policy
for wind power are located far from where the electricity is that is grounded in a new post-Fukushima reality. Such an energy
needed, necessitating the construction of new power lines often policy will require a reassessment of priorities for Japan. Japanese
in the face of local resistance. Moreover, the capacity for Japan to policy-makers are faced with the difcult test of building a new
signicantly expand its wind power is limited by a lack of space energy policy that can appease growing anti-nuclear public
and frequent hurricanes which can damage wind turbines sentiment without adverse effects to the powerful nuclear lobby,
(Meltzer, 2011). regional utility monopolies and industry. Energy security, the
Given the intermittent nature of many renewables, the environment and the economy have long been the three pillars of
amount of capacity that must be built to produce every kW h Japanese energy policy. The new energy policy cannot overlook
of electricity will be several times greater than for other sources, any of these three pillars. Yet, as discussed in this paper, there are
greatly reducing their cost-effectiveness. According to one esti- signicant challenges associated with each of the pillars, and the
mate, even 100 GW of installed photovoltaic capacity, or the government is in an extremely difcult position of nding the
equivalent of nearly 40% of current power generating capacity, best policy with which to tackle a multitude of interconnected
would meet only 12% of Japans electricity demand. For all these challenges.
 V. Vivoda / Energy Policy 46 (2012) 135143 141

One of the origins of Japans ambitious nuclear policy lies in regulatory structure was proposed that would be separated from
the concerns of Japanese leaders who have interpreted history as the METI and would report to the Ministry of the Environment.
a series of unreasonable assaults on an island nearly devoid of This regulator would have the combined functions of the old NISA
natural resources. They perceive Japan as exposed to inexplicable and a special Cabinet advisory board known as the Nuclear Safety
supply disruptions and argue that Japan would be too weak Commission. The transition to the new structure is due to take
without recourse to an independent energy supply (Samuels, place in April 2012 (World Nuclear News, 2011). As the next step,
1994). Nuclear energy has been an integral part of Japans energy the Japanese government should also reassess the value of
supply system. The benets of nuclear energy for Japan have been preserving Japans regional electricity monopolies, who some
manifold. Nuclear energy adds to energy diversication (Lesbirel, have blamed for relatively high relatively electricity prices in
2004), reduces dependency on oil, can be produced at a stable Japan. One of the key issues that the government will need to
price, and is a clean fuel in terms of emissions. consider when formulating its energy policy is the already high
In late January 2012, only 3 out of 54 nuclear facilities in Japan cost of energy in Japan and the adverse impact this has had on the
were operating. The assertion by former PM Kans government competitiveness of the Japanese economy and which has already
that sufcient electricity can be conserved seems a touch naive. contributed to the trend for Japans heavy industry to relocate
Savings can denitely be made, but not to the extent to offset all overseas (Meltzer, 2011). Japans regional power companies
of the loss from nuclear power. Without nuclear reactors, Kansai dominate the electricity business from generation to transmission
Electric Power Co. (KEPCO), the main supplier to Japans second- and distribution, with a full monopoly over supply to households
largest industrial region, may see demand exceed generation in their areas of operation and a near-monopoly to commercial
capacity by 9.5% in February 2012, the biggest shortfall among customers. The government should engage in a comprehensive
suppliers. KEPCO, which serves a region with an economy the size reassessment of this structure and the future operations of the
of Mexicos and hosts Sharp Corp. and Panasonic factories, is power industry while developing its new energy policy. A specic
asking customers to voluntarily reduce consumption by more challenge is the need for power grid alignment between electric
than 10% during the winter of 2012. Kyushu Electric Power Co. power companies between eastern and western Japan.
will also be short of capacity after it shuts down its last operating Japans traditional energy security concerns do not disappear
reactor for maintenance. after 3/11 and some have been exacerbated in the aftermath of
Removing up to 30% of Japans electricity generating capacity the disaster. Even before the earthquake, there was recognition
is not possible without inicting serious harm to Japans already that the nuclear energy expansion would not save Japan from oil
vulnerable economy. If industries are required to cut electricity dependency in the transportation sector (Barrett, 2011). Japans
demand in summer 2012, some Japanese manufacturers may energy situation begins and ends with structural constraints.
relocate their operations overseas, where electricity is in stable Because Japan is a resource-poor industrial giant, it imports much
supply and cheaper, ushering in higher unemployment and of its primary energy supply (Vivoda and Manicom, 2011). The
further squeezing public funds. In fact, some have suggested, lessons that Japan has learnt from the 1970s oil crises attest to the
electricity restraint is the largest issue for the growth of Japans dangers of increased reliance on imported fossil fuels, which
economy (World Nuclear Association, 2011b). In this context, the remain today. In fact, they are exacerbated by the increased
future of nuclear energy must be weighted wisely if Japan is to imports of oil to fuel thermal plants; zero-sum competition for
remain an economic power. oil with China, India and South Korea; and the US pressure to
Convincing Japanese people that nuclear power is safe will be reduce oil imports from Iran. Yet, the reactor shutdown post-3/11
a major challenge. This is not just because of the distrust of showed that Japan is as vulnerable to an internal energy disrup-
TEPCO, but also the governments perceived mishandling of the tion as it is to an external disruption associated with the security
nuclear crisis. Yet, even if public opposition to nuclear power and affordability of oil supplies. This would suggest that the
could be overcome, the scale of the Fukushima crisis will policymakers should rethink their traditional assumption of
undoubtedly delay the expansion of existing nuclear plant capa- energy security risk arising only from an interruption of foreign
cities and the construction of new plants. The 1999 Tokaimura sources of oil. They should consider the cost of enhancing the
nuclear accident slowed down the rate of subsequent nuclear reliability of domestic energy sources and the degree to which
development. Various projects were delayed or canceled. In 2001, Japan needs domestic emergency response measures.
the Japanese government planned to increase the number of While the Japanese leaders have been frank in dismissing any
nuclear power plants from 52 to between 62 and 65 by 2010 hopes of meeting Japans climate change targets, they still remain
(Lesbirel, 2003). Yet, by 2010, only two new power plants have committed to increasing the role of renewable energy in Japans
been in operation. Given its scale, the Fukushima disaster will future energy mix. A recently passed feed-in tariff (FIT) will go
result in a drop in the number of operational nuclear reactors some way in supporting the governments renewable energy
in Japan. targets. Yet, an inability to overcome public opposition to nuclear
Yet, energy policy cannot be relegated to industry either. There power would likely counteract any gains achieved by the FIT.
is a growing perception that the revolving door of nuclear ofcials More generally, it is unrealistic to expect that the renewables take
going into nuclear power companies has created a culture where up the nuclears share. Renewable sources start from a very low
Japanese nuclear regulators were too close to the nuclear opera- base. Renewables cannot meet the demand and are prohibitively
tors, compromising their independence. Moreover, the agency expensive. If we also consider other limitations to renewable
responsible for regulating Japans nuclear sector (NISA) is part of energy in Japan, discussed in the previous section, the idea that
the agency responsible for promoting nuclear power (METI), renewable energy can replace nuclear energy could not be further
creating the perception of conicting interests (Meltzer, 2011). from reality. Renewables can contribute, but to make up for most
A rewall needs to be created between regulators, government of lost nuclear power would take massive investment, probably
and industry. Only when regulators are independent from gov- too much for a country where government net debt is close to
ernment and industry-capture will Japans nuclear industry 200% of GDP. Although former PM Kan spoke of replacing the
receive proper oversight, which will likely prevent future canceled reactors with renewable energy systems such as wind
accidents. and solar, this policy option will remain wishful thinking unless
It is commendable that in August 2011, the Japanese govern- Japan is ready to forego economic growth for the foreseeable
ment has taken a rst step in this direction. A new independent future. This has been recognized by new PM Yoshihiko Noda, who
142 V. Vivoda / Energy Policy 46 (2012) 135143

just over six months after the earthquake, acknowledged that IAE (Institute of Applied Energy, Japan). 2009.
while public safety concerns will make it tough to build new [Cost Comparison of Different Power Generation Systems]. 7 July, available:
/http://www.iae.or.jp/energyinfo/energydata/data1012.htmlS (accessed 18 Octo-
reactors, decisions on operational reactors and those already ber 2011).
under constructions will be made on a case-by-case basis IEA (International Energy Agency). 2011. Key World Energy Statistics Paris: OECD/
(Saoshiro and Sieg, 2011). EIA.
IEEJ (Institute of Energy Economics, Japan). 2011. Analysis of electricity supply and
The evidence in this paper indicates that the most feasible demand through FY2012 regarding restart of nuclear power plants. Special
option for Japan to remain economically competitive is that, if Bulletin, 13 June.
public opposition can be overcome, as many nuclear reactors are IEEJ (Institute of Energy Economics, Japan). 2012. Japan Energy Brief. No. 17,
January.
restarted as soon as possible. In the short-to-medium term,
Inajima, Tsuyishi. 2012. Japan utilities losses reach $6 billion after Fukushima
energy expansion should come from more imported oil, coal, crisis. Bloomberg, 17 January.
and LNG, with gradual reduction in the share of nuclear power in Itakura, Ken. 2011. The economic consequences of shifting away from nuclear
Japans energy mix. The commitment to emissions-intensive fossil energy. Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), Policy
Brief, No. 2011-04, December.
fuels will result in a difcult-to-accept increase in greenhouse gas JPC-SED (Japan Productivity Center for Socio-Economic Development), Energy and
emissions that can be minimized by restarting nuclear reactors. Environmental Policy Section, Special Committee of Energy Issues. 2000.
Japans new national energy plan is also likely to place emphasis Enerugii sekyuriti no kakuritsu to 21 seiki no enerugii seisaku no arikata
yushikisha ankeeto chosa ni motozuite [The Establishment of Energy Security
on increasing the share of renewable energy. The long-term and Ideal Energy Policies in the 21st century Based on a Survey of Learned
commitment to renewable energy will result in severe conse- Persons]. Tokyo, 30 March.
quences for the already struggling economy, with higher electri- Johnston, Eric, 2011. Sons quest for sun, wind has nuclear interests wary. The
Japan Times. 12 July.
city prices making Japanese corporations less competitive and Koike, Masanari, 2006. Japan looks for oil in the wrong places. Far Eastern
fueling the movement of jobs offshore. Positive news is that Economic Review 169 (8), 4447.
Japans energy consumption is set against a declining population, Koike, Masanari, Mogi, Gento, Albedaiwi, Waleed H., 2008. Overseas oil-develop-
ment policy of resource-poor countries: a case study from Japan. Energy Policy
which is expected to decrease by one-third by 2060 (The
36 (5), 17641775.
Guardian, 2012). This will also reduce the growth in energy Kotler, Mindy L.,and Hillman, Ian T.. 2000. Japanese nuclear energy policy and
demand in Japan. In any case, if any lessons are to be taken from public opinion. Japanese Energy Security and Changing Global Energy Mar-
previous energy transitions as witnessed by economic depression kets: An Analysis of Northeast Asian Energy Cooperation and Japans Evolving
Leadership Role in the Region. Prepared in Conjunction with an Energy Study
in former major coal-mining regions, the government needs to Sponsored by The Center for International Political Economy and The James A.
manage Japans energy transition with extreme caution in order Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, May.
to minimize the socioeconomic dislocation. Kral, Alexei, 2000. Are Japans energy security ambitions misguided? Nuclear
policy in Japan. Event Summary, Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars. 29 February.
Lesbirel, S.Hayden, 2004. Diversication and energy security risks: the Japanese
References
case. Japanese Journal of Political Science 5 (1), 122.
Lesbirel, S.Hayden, 2003. Markets, transaction costs and institutions: compensat-
ANRE (Agency for Natural Resources and Energy). 2006. New national energy ing for nuclear risk in Japan. Australian Journal of Political Science 38 (1),
strategy. Press Release, 31 May. 523.
Asahi Shimbun. 2011. TEPCO Safety Management at Nuclear Plants Described as Lesbirel, S.Hayden, 1991. Structural adjustment in Japan: terminating old king
Lax. 26 March. coal. Asian Survey 31 (11), 10791094.
Asano, Hiroshi, 2005. Regulatory reform of the electricity industry in Japan: what Lidsky, Lawrence M., Miller, Marvin M., 2002. Nuclear power and energy security:
is the next step of deregulation? Energy Policy 34 (16), 24912497. a revised strategy for Japan. Science and Global Security 10 (2), 127150.
Atsumi, Masahiro, 2007. Japanese energy security revisited. Asia-Pacic Review 14 Masaki, Hisane, 2006. Japans new energy strategy. Asia Times Online. 13 January.
(1), 2843. Medlock, Kenneth B.,and Hartley, Peter. 2004. The role of nuclear power in
Barrett, Brendan, 2011. Can Nuclear Power Save Japan from Peak Oil?. United enhancing Japans energy security. Prepared in Conjunction with an Energy
Nations University, Tokyo. Study Sponsored by Tokyo Electric Power Company Inc. and The James Baker
BBC News. 2011. Japan PM Naoto Kan Urges Nuclear-Free Future. 13 July. III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, March.
Beder, Sharon, 2003. Power Play: The Fight to Control the Worlds Electricity. Meltzer, Joshua, 2011. After Fukushima: whats next for Japans energy and
W.W. Norton & Company, New York. climate change policy? Global Economy and Development at Brookings
Bloomberg. 2012. Atomic-free Japan by April Roils Debate on Economic Risks. 27 7 September.
January. METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry), Government of Japan. 2010. 2010
BP (British Petroleum), 2011. BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2011. British Annual Report on Energy. June.
Petroleum, London. Moe, Espen, 2012. Vested interests, energy efciency and renewable in Japan.
Chester, Lynne, 2010. Conceptualizing energy security and making explicit its Energy Policy 40 (1), 260273.
polysemic nature. Energy Policy 38 (2), 887895. Morita, Yuji, 2010. Energy saving in the Japanese industrial sector and interna-
Dale, Craig. 2011. Energy Angst: Japans Post-Tsunami Power Crisis. CBC News, 30 tional cooperation.. In: Virendra Gupta, Kwa, Ching Guan (Eds.), Energy
May. Security: Asia Pacic Perspectives. Manas Publications, New Delhi, pp. 85108.
Dufeld, John S., Woodall, Brian, 2011. Japans new basic energy plan. Energy Nakano, Jane, 2011. Japans energy supply and security since the March 11
Policy 39 (6), 37413749. earthquake. Center for Strategic & International Studies, Commentary. 23
The Economist. 2011. Powerful Savings. 27 April. March.
EIA (Energy Information Administration), US Department of Energy. 2011. Japan Nakatani, Kazuhiro, 2004. Energy security and Japan: the role of international law,
Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis. March. domestic law, and diplomacy.. In: Barton, Barry, Redgwell, Catherine, Rnne,
Evans, Peter C. 2006. Japan. The Brookings Foreign Policy Studies, Energy Security Anita, Zillman, Donald N. (Eds.), Energy Security: Managing Risk in a Dynamic
Series. December. Legal and Regulatory Environment. Oxford University Press, Oxford,
Ferguson, Charles D. 2011. The need for a resilient energy policy. Bulletin of the pp. 413427.
Atomic Scientists. 16 March. North, Douglass, 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Perfor-
Fesharaki, Fereidun, and Hosoe, Tomoko. 2011. The Fukushima crisis and the mance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
future of Japans power industry. Asia Pacic Bulletin, No. 106, EastWest Oyama, Kosuke. 2000. Trends and prospects of deregulation in Japan. Japanese
Center, 12 April. Energy Security and Changing Global Energy Markets: An Analysis of North-
Grubler, Arnulf, 1991. Energy in the 21st century: From resource to environmental east Asian Energy Cooperation and Japans Evolving Leadership Role in the
and lifestyle constraints. Entropie 164/165, 2933. Region. Prepared in Conjunction with an Energy Study Sponsored by The
Hartley, Peter. 2000. Reform of the electricity supply industry in Japan. Japanese Center for International Political Economy and The James A. Baker III Institute
Energy Security and Changing Global Energy Markets: An Analysis of North- for Public Policy, Rice University, May.
east Asian Energy Cooperation and Japans Evolving Leadership Role in the Samuels, Richard, 1994. Rich Nation, Strong Army. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.
Region. Prepared in Conjunction with an Energy Study Sponsored by The Sano, Toshihiro, 2011. Improving efciency of thermal power generation in Japan.
Center for International Political Economy and The James A. Baker III Institute Journal of Power and Energy Systems 5 (2), 146160.
for Public Policy, Rice University, May. Saoshiro, Shinichi,and Sieg, Linda. 2011. Nuclear seeps back into favor as Japan
Hideaki, Fujii, 2000. Japan. In: Stares, Paul B. (Ed.), Rethinking Energy Security in begins energy debate. Reuters, 3 October.
East Asia. Japan Center for International Exchange, Tokyo, pp. 5978. Scalise, Paul J. 2011. Rethinking national energy policy: Japans electricity crisis,
Hosoe, Nobuhiro, 2006. The deregulation of Japans electricity industry. Japan and nuclear power, and the fate of TEPCO, Temple University, Institute of
the World Economy 18 (2), 230246. Contemporary Asian Studies, 27 May.
 V. Vivoda / Energy Policy 46 (2012) 135143 143

Scalise, Paul J. 2012. Japanese energy policy after Fukushima. Policy Innovations. Tsukimori, Osamu. 2012. China overtakes Japan as worlds top coal importer,
Smil, Vaclav, 2010. Energy Transitions. Praeger, Santa Barbara, CA. Reuters, 26 January.
Smil, Vaclav. 2008. Moores curse and the great energy delusion. The American UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), 2004. World Energy Assessment,
Magazine, 9 November. 2004 Update. UNDP, New York.
Smith, Sheila A. 2012. Japans Iran sanctions dilemma. Council on Foreign Valentine, Scott V., 2011. The fuzzy nature of energy security. In: Sovacool,
Relations, Asia Unbound, 31 January. Benjamin K. (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Energy Security. Routledge,
Soble, Jonathan. 2012. Tepco raises electricity price by up to 18%. The Financial New York, pp. 5673.
Times, 17 January. Valentine, Scott V., Sovacool, Benjamin K., Matsuura, Masahiro, 2011. Empowered?
Stewart, Devin, 2009. Japan: the power of efciency.. In: Gal Luft, Korin, Anne Evaluating Japans national energy strategy under the DPJ administration.
(Eds.), Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century: A Reference Handbook. Energy Policy 39 (3), 18651876.
Praeger Security International, Santa Barbara, CA, pp. 176190. Vivoda, Vlado, 2010. Evaluating energy security in the Asia-Pacic region: a novel
Suzuki, Tatsujiro. 2000. Nuclear power generation and energy security: the methodological approach. Energy Policy 38 (9), 52585263.
challenges and possibilities of regional cooperation. Japanese Energy Security Vivoda, Vlado, Manicom, James, 2011. Oil import diversication in Northeast Asia:
and Changing Global Energy Markets: An Analysis of Northeast Asian Energy a comparison between China and Japan. Journal of East Asian Studies 11 (2),
Cooperation and Japans Evolving Leadership Role in the Region. Prepared in 223254.
conjunction with an Energy Study Sponsored by The Center for International Wallace, Rick. 2011. Japans energy loss, our LNG gain. The Australian, 20
Political Economy and The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice September.
University, May. World Nuclear Association. 2011a. Nuclear Power in Japan. 27 May.
The Australian. 2011. Japanese Back Nuke Free Future Poll. 14 June. World Nuclear Association. 2011b. Policy Responses to the Fukushima Accident.
The Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan. 2011. Electricity Review 7 October.
Japan. World Nuclear News. 2011. Regulatory Shake-up in Japan. 16 August.
The Guardian. 2012. Japan Population to Shrink by a Third by 2060. 30 January. World Nuclear News. 2012. Trade Figures Reveal Cost of Japans Nuclear Shutdown. 25
The Japan Times. 2012. A Worrisome Trade Decit. 31 January. January.
Toichi, Tsutomu. 2006. International energy security and Japans strategy. Yokobori, Keiichi, 2005. Japan.. In: Kalicki, Jan H, Goldwyn, David L. (Eds.), Energy
Presented at the Conference on Indias Energy Security, Jointly Organized by & Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy. Woodrow Wilson Center
TERI and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Goa, India, 2930 September. Press, Washington, D.C, pp. 305328.