EN BANC

ANTONIO C. CARAG,

Petitioner,

- versus -

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ISABEL G. PANGANIBAN-ORTIGUERRA, as Executive

Labor Arbiter, NAFLU, and MARIVELES APPAREL CORPORATION LABOR UNION,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 147590

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,

QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

CALLEJO, SR.,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

GARCIA,

VELASCO, JR., and

NACHURA, JJ.

Promulgated:

April 2, 2007

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision dated 29 February 2000[2] and
the Resolution dated 27 March 2001[3] of the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. SP
Nos. 54404-06. The appellate court affirmed the decision dated 17 June 1994[4] of Labor Arbiter
Isabel Panganiban-Ortiguerra (Arbiter Ortiguerra) in RAB-III-08-5198-93 and the resolution dated
5 January 1995[5] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CA No. L-007731-
94.

Arbiter Ortiguerra held that Mariveles Apparel Corporation (MAC), MACs Chairman of the Board
Antonio Carag (Carag), and MACs President Armando David (David) (collectively, respondents)
are guilty of illegal closure and are solidarily liable for the separation pay of MACs rank and file
employees. The NLRC denied the motion to reduce bond filed by MAC and Carag.

The Facts

National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) and Mariveles Apparel Corporation Labor Union
(MACLU) (collectively, complainants), on behalf of all of MACs rank and file employees, filed a
complaint against MAC for illegal dismissal brought about by its illegal closure of business. In
their complaint dated 12 August 1993, complainants alleged the following:

2. Complainant NAFLU is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent representing all rank and file
employees of [MAC]. That there is an existing valid Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
executed by the parties and that at the time of the cause of action herein below discussed
happened there was no labor dispute between the Union and Management except cases
pending in courts filed by one against the other.

3. That on July 8, 1993, without notice of any kind filed in accordance with pertinent provisions
of the Labor Code, [MAC], for reasons known only by herself [sic] ceased operations with the
intention of completely closing its shop or factory. Such intentions [sic] was manifested in a
letter, allegedly claimed by [MAC] as its notice filed only on the same day that the operations
closed.

4. That at the time of closure, employees who have rendered one to two weeks work were not
paid their corresponding salaries/wages, which remain unpaid until time [sic] of this writing.

5. That there are other benefits than those above-mentioned which have been unpaid by [MAC]
at the time it decided to cease operations, benefits gained by the workers both by and under the
CBA and by operations [sic] of law.

6. That the closure made by [MAC] in the manner and style done is perce [sic] illegal, and had
caused tremendous prejudice to all of the employees, who suffered both mental and financial
anguish and who in view thereof merits [sic] award of all damages (actual, exemplary and
moral), [illegible] to set [an] example to firms who in the future will [illegible] the idea of simply
prematurely closing without complying [with] the basic requirement of Notice of Closure.[6]
(Emphasis supplied)

Upon receipt of the records of the case, Arbiter Ortiguerra summoned the parties to explore
options for possible settlement. The non-appearance of respondents prompted Arbiter
Ortiguerra to declare the case submitted for resolution based on the extant pleadings.

In their position paper dated 3 January 1994, complainants moved to implead Carag and David,
as follows:

x x x x In the present case, it is unfortunate for respondents that the records and evidence clearly
demonstrate that the individual complainants are entitled to the reliefs prayed for in their
complaint. However, any favorable judgment the Honorable Labor Arbiter may render in favor of
herein complainants will go to naught should the Office fails [sic] to appreciate the glaring fact
that the respondents [sic] corporation is no longer existing as it suddenly stopped business
operation since [sic] 8 July 1993. Under this given circumstance, the complainants have no
option left but to implead Atty. ANTONIO CARAG, in his official capacity as Chairman of the
Board along with MR. ARMANDO DAVID as President. Both are also owners of the respondent
corporation with office address at 10th Floor, Gamon Centre, Alfaro Street, Salcedo Village[,]
Makati[,] Metro Manila although they may be collectively served with summons and other legal
processes through counsel of record Atty. Joshua Pastores of 8th Floor, Hanston Bldg., Emerald
Avenue, Ortigas[,] Pasig, Metro Manila. This inclusion of individual respondents as party
respondents in the present case is to guarantee the satisfaction of any judgment award on the
basis of Article 212(c) of the Philippine Labor Code, as amended, which says:

Employer includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. It does
not, however, include any labor organization or any of its officers or agents except when acting
as employer.

The provision was culled from Section 2, Republic Act 602, the Minimum Wage Act. If the
employer is an artificial person, it must have an officer who can be presumed to be the
employer, being the person acting in the interest of the employer. The corporation is the
employer, only in the technical sense. (A.C. Ransom Labor Union CCLU VS. NLRC, G.R. 69494,
June 10, 1986). Where the employer-corporation, AS IN THE PRESENT CASE, is no longer existing
and unable to satisfy the judgment in favor of the employee, the officer should be held liable for
acting on behalf of the corporation. (Gudez vs. NLRC, G.R. 83023, March 22, 1990). Also in the
recent celebrated case of Camelcraft Corporation vs. NLRC, G.R. 90634-35 (June 6, 1990),
Carmen contends that she is not liable for the acts of the company, assuming it had [acted]
illegally, because Camelcraft in a distinct and separate entity with a legal personality of its own.
She claims that she is only an agent of the company carrying out the decisions of its board of
directors, We do not agree, said the Supreme Court. She is, in fact and legal effect, the
corporation, being not only its president and general manager but also its owner. The
responsible officer of an employer can be held personally liable not to say even criminally liable
for nonpayment of backwages. This is the policy of the law. If it were otherwise, corporate
employers would have devious ways to evade paying backwages. (A.C. Ransom Labor Union-
CCLU V. NLRC, G.R. 69494, June 10, 1986). If no definite proof exists as to who is the responsible
officer, the president of the corporation who can be deemed to be its chief operation officer
shall be presumed to be the responsible officer. In Republic Act 602, for example, criminal
responsibility is with the manager or in his default, the person acting as such (Ibid.)[7] (Emphasis
supplied)

Atty. Joshua L. Pastores (Atty. Pastores), as counsel for respondents, submitted a position paper
dated 21 February 1994 and stated that complainants should not have impleaded Carag and
David because MAC is actually owned by a consortium of banks. Carag and David own shares in
MAC only to qualify them to serve as MACs officers.

Without any further proceedings, Arbiter Ortiguerra rendered her Decision dated 17 June 1994
granting the motion to implead Carag and David. In the same Decision, Arbiter Ortiguerra
declared Carag and David solidarily liable with MAC to complainants.

The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

In her Decision dated 17 June 1994, Arbiter Ortiguerra ruled as follows:

This is a complaint for illegal dismissal brought about by the illegal closure and cessation of
business filed by NAFLU and Mariveles Apparel Corporation Labor Union for and in behalf of all
rank and file employees against respondents Mariveles Apparel Corporation, Antonio Carag and
Armando David [who are] its owners, Chairman of the Board and President, respectively.

This case was originally raffled to the sala of Labor Arbiter Adolfo V. Creencia. When the latter
went on sick leave, his cases were re-raffled and the instant case was assigned to the sala of the
undersigned. Upon receipt of the record of the case, the parties were summoned for them to be
able to explore options for settlement. The respondents however did not appear prompting this
Office to submit the case for resolution based on extant pleadings, thus this decision.

The complainants claim that on July 8, 1993 without notice of any kind the company ceased its
operation as a prelude to a final closing of the firm. The complainants allege that up to the
present the company has remained closed.

The complainants bewail that at the time of the closure, employees who have rendered one to
two weeks of work were not given their salaries and the same have remained unpaid.

The complainants aver that respondent company prior to its closure did not even bother to
serve written notice to employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at least one
month before the intended date of closure. The respondents did not even establish that its
closure was done in good faith. Moreover, the respondents did not pay the affected employees
separation pay, the amount of which is provided in the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement
between the complainants and the respondents.

The complainants pray that they be allowed to implead Atty. Antonio Carag and Mr. Armando
David[,] owners and responsible officer[s] of respondent company to assure the satisfaction of
the judgment, should a decision favorable to them be rendered. In support of their claims, the
complainants invoked the ruling laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of A.C. Ransom
Labor Union CCLU vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 69494, June 10, 1986 where it was held that [a] corporate
officer can be held liable for acting on behalf of the corporation when the latter is no longer in
existence and there are valid claims of workers that must be satisfied.

The complainants pray for the declaration of the illegality of the closure of respondents business.
Consequently, their reinstatement must be ordered and their backwages must be paid. Should
reinstatement be not feasible, the complainants pray that they be paid their separation pay in
accordance with the computation provided for in the CBA. Computations of separation pay due
to individual complainants were adduced in evidence (Annexes C to C-44, Complainants Position
Paper). The complainants also pray for the award to them of attorneys fee[s].

The respondents on the other hand by way of controversion maintain that the present complaint
was filed prematurely. The respondents deny having totally closed and insist that respondent
company is only on a temporary shut-down occasioned by the pending labor unrest. There being
no permanent closure any claim for separation pay must not be given due course.

Respondents opposed the impleader of Atty. Antonio C. Carag and Mr. Armando David saying
that they are not the owners of Mariveles Apparel Corporation and they are only minority
stockholders holding qualifying shares. Piercing the veil of corporate fiction cannot be done in
the present case for such remedy can only be availed of in case of closed or family owned
corporations.

Respondents pray for the dismissal of the present complaint and the denial of complainants
motion to implead Atty. Antonio C. Carag and Mr. Armando David as party respondents.
This Office is now called upon to resolve the following issues:

1. Whether or not the respondents are guilty of illegal closure;

2. Whether or not individual respondents could be held personally liable; and

3. Whether or not the complainants are entitled to an award of attorneys fees.

After a judicious and impartial consideration of the record, this Office is of the firm belief that
the complainants must prevail.

The respondents described the cessation of operations in its premises as a temporary shut-
down. While such posturing may have been initially true, it is not so anymore. The cessation of
operations has clearly exceeded the six months period fixed in Article 286 of the Labor Code. The
temporary shutdown has ripened into a closure or cessation of operations for causes not due to
serious business losses or financial reverses. Consequently, the respondents must pay the
displaced employees separation pay in accordance with the computation prescribed in the CBA,
to wit, one month pay for every year of service. It must be stressed that respondents did not
controvert the verity of the CBA provided computation.

The complainants claim that Atty. Antonio Carag and Mr. Armando David should be held jointly
and severally liable with respondent corporation. This bid is premised on the belief that the
impleader of the aforesaid officers will guarantee payment of whatever may be adjudged in
complainants favor by virtue of this case. It is a basic principle in law that corporations have
personality distinct and separate from the stockholders. This concept is known as corporate
fiction. Normally, officers acting for and in behalf of a corporation are not held personally liable
for the obligation of the corporation. In instances where corporate officers dismissed employees
in bad faith or wantonly violate labor standard laws or when the company had already ceased
operations and there is no way by which a judgment in favor of employees could be satisfied,
corporate officers can be held jointly and severally liable with the company. This Office after a
careful consideration of the factual backdrop of the case is inclined to grant complainants prayer
for the impleader of Atty. Antonio Carag and Mr. Armando David, to assure that valid claims of
employees would not be defeated by the closure of respondent company.

The complainants pray for the award to them of moral and exemplary damages, suffice it to state
that they failed to establish their entitlement to aforesaid reliefs when they did not adduce
persuasive evidence on the matter.

The claim for attorneys fee[s] will be as it is hereby resolved in complainants favor. As a
consequence of the illegal closure of respondent company, the complainants were compelled to
litigate to secure benefits due them under pertinent laws. For this purpose, they secured the
services of a counsel to assist them in the course of the litigation. It is but just and proper to
order the respondents who are responsible for the closure and subsequent filing of the case to
pay attorneys fee[s].

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring respondents jointly

and severally guilty of illegal closure and they are hereby ordered as follows:

1. To pay complainants separation pay computed on the basis of one (1) month for every year
of service, a fraction of six (6) months to be considered as one (1) year in the total amount of
P49,101,621.00; and

2. To pay complainants attorneys fee in an amount equivalent to 10% of the judgment award.

The claims for moral, actual and exemplary damages are dismissed for lack of evidence.

SO ORDERED.[8] (Emphasis supplied)

MAC, Carag, and David, through Atty. Pastores, filed their Memorandum before the NLRC on 26
August 1994. Carag, through a separate counsel, filed an appeal dated 30 August 1994 before
the NLRC. Carag reiterated the arguments in respondents position paper filed before Arbiter
Ortiguerra, stating that:

2.1 While Atty. Antonio C. Carag is the Chairman of the Board of MAC and Mr. Armando David is
the President, they are not the owners of MAC;
2.2 MAC is owned by a consortium of banks, as stockholders, and Atty. Antonio C. Carag and Mr.
Armando David are only minority stockholders of the corporation, owning only qualifying shares;

2.3 MAC is not a family[-]owned corporation, that in case of a close [sic] corporation, piercing
the corporate veil its [sic] possible to hold the stockholders liable for the corporations liabilities;

2.4 MAC is a corporation with a distinct and separate personality from that of the stockholders;
piercing the corporate veil to hold the stockholders liable for corporate liabilities is only true [for]
close corporations (family corporations); this is not the prevailing situation in MAC;

2.5 Atty. Antonio Carag and Mr. Armando David are professional managers and the extension of
shares to them are just qualifying shares to enable them to occupy subject position.[9]

Respondents also filed separate motions to reduce bond.

The Ruling of the NLRC

In a Resolution promulgated on 5 January 1995, the NLRC Third Division denied the motions to
reduce bond. The NLRC stated that to grant a reduction of bond on the ground that the appeal is
meritorious would be tantamount to ruling on the merits of the appeal. The dispositive portion
of the Resolution of the NLRC Third Division reads, thus:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, Motions to Reduce Bond for both respondents are hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit. Respondents are directed to post cash or surety bond in the amount of forty
eight million one hundred one thousand six hundred twenty one pesos (P48,101,621.00) within
an unextendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof.

No further Motions for Reconsideration shall be entertained.

SO ORDERED.[10]

Respondents filed separate petitions for certiorari before this Court under Rule 65 of the 1964
Rules of Court. Carag filed his petition, docketed as G.R. No. 118820, on 13 February 1995. In the
meantime, we granted MACs prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin
the NLRC from enforcing Arbiter Ortiguerras Decision. On 31 May 1995, we granted
complainants motion for consolidation of G.R. No. 118820 with G.R. No. 118839 (MAC v. NLRC,
et al.) and G.R. No. 118880 (David v. Arbiter Ortiguerra, et al.). On 12 July 1999, after all the
parties had filed their memoranda, we referred the consolidated cases to the appellate court in
accordance with our decision in St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC.[11] Respondents filed
separate petitions before the appellate court.

The Ruling of the Appellate Court

On 29 February 2000, the appellate court issued a joint decision on the separate petitions. The
appellate court identified two issues as essential: (1) whether Arbiter Ortiguerra properly held
Carag and David, in their capacities as corporate officers, jointly and severally liable with MAC for
the money claims of the employees; and (2) whether the NLRC abused its discretion in denying
the separate motions to reduce bond filed by MAC and Carag.

The appellate court held that the absence of a formal hearing before the Labor Arbiter is not a
cause for Carag and David to impute grave abuse of discretion. The appellate court found that
Carag and David, as the most ranking officers of MAC, had a direct hand at the time in the illegal
dismissal of MACs employees. The failure of Carag and David to observe the notice requirement
in closing the company shows malice and bad faith, which justifies their solidary liability with
MAC. The appellate court also found that the circumstances of the present case do not warrant a
reduction of the appeal bond. Thus:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are DISMISSED. The decision of Labor Arbiter Isabel
Panganiban-Ortiguerra dated June 17, 1994, and the Resolution dated January 5, 1995, issued by
the National Labor Relations Commission are hereby AFFIRMED. As a consequence of dismissal,
the temporary restraining order issued on March 2, 1995, by the Third Division of the Supreme
Court is LIFTED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.[12] (Emphasis in the original)

The appellate court denied respondents separate motions for reconsideration.[13]

In a resolution dated 20 June 2001, this Courts First Division denied the petition for Carags
failure to show sufficiently that the appellate court committed any reversible error to warrant
the exercise of our discretionary appellate jurisdiction. Carag filed a motion for reconsideration
of our resolution denying his petition. In a resolution dated 13 August 2001, this Courts First
Division denied Carags reconsideration with finality.

Despite our 13 August 2001 resolution, Carag filed a second motion for reconsideration with an
omnibus motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration. This Courts First Division
referred the motion to the Court En Banc. In a resolution dated 25 June 2002, the Court En Banc
resolved to grant the omnibus motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration,
reinstated the petition, and required respondents to comment on the petition. On 25 November
2003, the Court En Banc resolved to suspend the rules to allow the second motion for
reconsideration. This Courts First Division referred the petition to the Court En Banc on 14 July
2004, and the Court En Banc accepted the referral on 15 March 2005.

The Issues

Carag questions the appellate courts decision of 29 February 2000 by raising the following issues
before this Court:
1. Has petitioner Carags right to due process been blatantly violated by holding him personally
liable for over P50 million of the corporations liability, merely as board chairman and solely on
the basis of the motion to implead him in midstream of the proceedings as additional
respondent, without affording him the right to present evidence and in violation of the accepted
procedure prescribed by Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, as to render the ruling null and
void?

2. Assuming, arguendo, that he had been accorded due process, is the decision holding him
solidarily liable supported by evidence when the only pleadings (not evidence) before the Labor
Arbiter and that of the Court of Appeals are the labor unions motion to implead him as
respondent and his opposition thereto, without position papers, without evidence submitted,
and without hearing on the issue of personal liability, and even when bad faith or malice, as the
only legal basis for personal liability, was expressly found absent and wanting by [the] Labor
Arbiter, as to render said decision null and void?

3. Did the NLRC commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to reduce
appeal bond?[14]

The Ruling of the Court

We find the petition meritorious.

On Denial of Due Process to Carag and David

Carag asserts that Arbiter Ortiguerra rendered her Decision of 17 June 1994 without issuing
summons on him, without requiring him to submit his position paper, without setting any
hearing, without giving him notice to present his evidence, and without informing him that the
case had been submitted for decision in violation of Sections 2,[15] 3,[16] 4,[17] 5(b),[18] and
11(c) [19] of Rule V of The New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC.[20]

It is clear from the narration in Arbiter Ortiguerras Decision that she only summoned
complainants and MAC, and not Carag, to a conference for possible settlement. In her Decision,
Arbiter Ortiguerra stated that she scheduled the conference upon receipt of the record of the
case. At the time of the conference, complainants had not yet submitted their position paper
which contained the motion to implead Carag. Complainants could not have submitted their
position paper before the conference since procedurally the Arbiter directs the submission of
position papers only after the conference.[21] Complainants submitted their position paper only
on 10 January 1994, five months after filing the complaint. In short, at the time of the
conference, Carag was not yet a party to the case. Thus, Arbiter Ortiguerra could not have
possibly summoned Carag to the conference.

Carag vigorously denied receiving summons to the conference, and complainants have not
produced any order of Arbiter Ortiguerra summoning Carag to the conference. A thorough
search of the records of this case fails to show any order of Arbiter Ortiguerra directing Carag to
attend the conference. Clearly, Arbiter Ortiguerra did not summon Carag to the conference.

When MAC failed to appear at the conference, Arbiter Ortiguerra declared the case submitted
for resolution. In her Decision, Arbiter Ortiguerra granted complainants motion to implead Carag
and at the same time, in the same Decision, found Carag personally liable for the debts of MAC
consisting of P49,101,621 in separation pay to complainants. Arbiter Ortiguerra never issued
summons to Carag, never called him to a conference for possible settlement, never required him
to submit a position paper, never set the case for hearing, never notified him to present his
evidence, and never informed him that the case was submitted for decision all in violation of
Sections 2, 3, 4, 5(b), and 11(c) of Rule V of The New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC.

Indisputably, there was utter absence of due process to Carag at the arbitration level. The
procedure adopted by Arbiter Ortiguerra completely prevented Carag from explaining his side
and presenting his evidence. This alone renders Arbiter Ortiguerras Decision a nullity insofar as
Carag is concerned. While labor arbiters are not required to conduct a formal hearing or trial,
they have no license to dispense with the basic requirements of due process such as affording
respondents the opportunity to be heard. In Habana v. NLRC,[22] we held:
The sole issue to be resolved is whether private respondents OMANFIL and HYUNDAI were
denied due process when the Labor Arbiter decided the case solely on the basis of the position
paper and supporting documents submitted in evidence by Habana and De Guzman.

We rule in the affirmative. The manner in which this case was decided by the Labor Arbiter left
much to be desired in terms of respect for the right of private respondents to due process

First, there was only one conciliatory conference held in this case. This was on 10 May 1996.
During the conference, the parties did not discuss at all the possibility of amicable settlement
due to petitioners stubborn insistence that private respondents be declared in default.

Second, the parties agreed to submit their respective motions petitioners motion to declare
respondents in default and private respondents motion for bill of particulars for the
consideration of the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbitration Associate, one Ms. Gloria Vivar, then
informed the parties that they would be notified of the action of the Labor Arbiter on the
pending motions.

xxx

Third, since the conference on 10 May 1996 no order or notice as to what action was taken by
the Labor Arbiter in disposing the pending motions was ever received by private respondents.
They were not declared in default by the Labor Arbiter nor was petitioner required to submit a
bill of particulars.

Fourth, neither was there any order or notice requiring private respondents to file their position
paper, nor an order informing the parties that the case was already submitted for decision. What
private respondents received was the assailed decision adverse to them.

It is clear from the foregoing that there was an utter absence of opportunity to be heard at the
arbitration level, as the procedure adopted by the Labor Arbiter virtually prevented private
respondents from explaining matters fully and presenting their side of the controversy. They had
no chance whatsoever to at least acquaint the Labor Arbiter with whatever defenses they might
have to the charge that they illegally dismissed petitioner. In fact, private respondents presented
their position paper and documentary evidence only for the first time on appeal to the NLRC.

The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and
to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense. Where, as in this case, sufficient
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or position paper and other pleadings is
not accorded a party to a case, there is undoubtedly a denial of due process.

It is true that Labor Arbiters are not bound by strict rules of evidence and of procedure. The
manner by which Arbiters dispose of cases before them is concededly a matter of discretion.
However, that discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of due
process. They are mandated to use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts of each case,
speedily, objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest
of justice and for the purpose of accuracy and correctness in adjudicating the monetary awards.

In this case, Carag was in a far worse situation. Here, Carag was not issued summons, not
accorded a conciliatory conference, not ordered to submit a position paper, not accorded a
hearing, not given an opportunity to present his evidence, and not notified that the case was
submitted for resolution. Thus, we hold that Arbiter Ortiguerras Decision is void as against Carag
for utter absence of due process. It was error for the NLRC and the Court of Appeals to uphold
Arbiter Ortiguerras decision as against Carag.

On the Liability of Directors for Corporate Debts

This case also raises this issue: when is a director personally liable for the debts of the
corporation? The rule is that a director is not personally liable for the debts of the corporation,
which has a separate legal personality of its own. Section 31 of the Corporation Code lays down
the exceptions to the rule, as follows:

Liability of directors, trustees or officers. - Directors or trustees who wilfully and knowingly vote
for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or
bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest
in conflict with their duty as such directors or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for all
damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members and other
persons.

xxxx

Section 31 makes a director personally liable for corporate debts if he wilfully and knowingly
votes for or assents to patently unlawful acts of the corporation. Section 31 also makes a
director personally liable if he is guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of
the corporation.

Complainants did not allege in their complaint that Carag wilfully and knowingly voted for or
assented to any patently unlawful act of MAC. Complainants did not present any evidence
showing that Carag wilfully and knowingly voted for or assented to any patently unlawful act of
MAC. Neither did Arbiter Ortiguerra make any finding to this effect in her Decision.

Complainants did not also allege that Carag is guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing
the affairs of MAC. Complainants did not present any evidence showing that Carag is guilty of
gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of MAC. Neither did Arbiter Ortiguerra make
any finding to this effect in her Decision.

Arbiter Ortiguerra stated in her Decision that:

In instances where corporate officers dismissed employees in bad faith or wantonly violate labor
standard laws or when the company had already ceased operations and there is no way by
which a judgment in favor of employees could be satisfied, corporate officers can be held jointly
and severally liable with the company.[23]

After stating what she believed is the law on the matter, Arbiter Ortiguerra stopped there and
did not make any finding that Carag is guilty of bad faith or of wanton violation of labor standard
laws. Arbiter Ortiguerra did not specify what act of bad faith Carag committed, or what
particular labor standard laws he violated.

To hold a director personally liable for debts of the corporation, and thus pierce the veil of
corporate fiction, the bad faith or wrongdoing of the director must be established clearly and
convincingly.[24] Bad faith is never presumed.[25] Bad faith does not connote bad judgment or
negligence. Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose. Bad faith means breach of a known duty
through some ill motive or interest. Bad faith partakes of the nature of fraud.[26] In Businessday
Information Systems and Services, Inc. v. NLRC,[27] we held:

There is merit in the contention of petitioner Raul Locsin that the complaint against him should
be dismissed. A corporate officer is not personally liable for the money claims of discharged
corporate employees unless he acted with evident malice and bad faith in terminating their
employment. There is no evidence in this case that Locsin acted in bad faith or with malice in
carrying out the retrenchment and eventual closure of the company (Garcia vs. NLRC, 153 SCRA
640), hence, he may not be held personally and solidarily liable with the company for the
satisfaction of the judgment in favor of the retrenched employees.

Neither does bad faith arise automatically just because a corporation fails to comply with the
notice requirement of labor laws on company closure or dismissal of employees. The failure to
give notice is not an unlawful act because the law does not define such failure as unlawful. Such
failure to give notice is a violation of procedural due process but does not amount to an unlawful
or criminal act. Such procedural defect is called illegal dismissal because it fails to comply with
mandatory procedural requirements, but it is not illegal in the sense that it constitutes an
unlawful or criminal act.

For a wrongdoing to make a director personally liable for debts of the corporation, the
wrongdoing approved or assented to by the director must be a patently unlawful act. Mere
failure to comply with the notice requirement of labor laws on company closure or dismissal of
employees does not amount to a patently unlawful act. Patently unlawful acts are those
declared unlawful by law which imposes penalties for commission of such unlawful acts. There
must be a law declaring the act unlawful and penalizing the act.

An example of a patently unlawful act is violation of Article 287 of the Labor Code, which states
that [V]iolation of this provision is hereby declared unlawful and subject to the penal provisions
provided under Article 288 of this Code. Likewise, Article 288 of the Labor Code on Penal
Provisions and Liabilities, provides that any violation of the provision of this Code declared
unlawful or penal in nature shall be punished with a fine of not less than One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00) nor more than Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than
three months nor more than three years, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion
of the court.

In this case, Article 283[28] of the Labor Code, requiring a one-month prior notice to employees
and the Department of Labor and Employment before any permanent closure of a company,
does not state that non-compliance with the notice is an unlawful act punishable under the
Code. There is no provision in any other Article of the Labor Code declaring failure to give such
notice an unlawful act and providing for its penalty.

Complainants did not allege or prove, and Arbiter Ortiguerra did not make any finding, that
Carag approved or assented to any patently unlawful act to which the law attaches a penalty for
its commission. On this score alone, Carag cannot be held personally liable for the separation
pay of complainants.

This leaves us with Arbiter Ortiguerras assertion that when the company had already ceased
operations and there is no way by which a judgment in favor of employees could be satisfied,
corporate officers can be held jointly and severally liable with the company. This assertion
echoes the complainants claim that Carag is personally liable for MACs debts to complainants on
the basis of Article 212(e) of the Labor Code, as amended, which says:

Employer includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. The
term shall not include any labor organization or any of its officers or agents except when acting
as employer. (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, complainants seek to hold Carag personally liable for the debts of MAC based solely on
Article 212(e) of the Labor Code. This is the specific legal ground cited by complainants, and used
by Arbiter Ortiguerra, in holding Carag personally liable for the debts of MAC.

We have already ruled in McLeod v. NLRC[29] and Spouses Santos v. NLRC[30] that Article 212(e)
of the Labor Code, by itself, does not make a corporate officer personally liable for the debts of
the corporation. The governing law on personal liability of directors for debts of the corporation
is still Section 31 of the Corporation Code. Thus, we explained in McLeod:

Personal liability of corporate directors, trustees or officers attaches only when (1) they
assent to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when they are guilty of bad faith or gross
negligence in directing its affairs, or when there is a conflict of interest resulting in damages to
the corporation, its stockholders or other persons; (2) they consent to the issuance of watered
down stocks or when, having knowledge of such issuance, do not forthwith file with the
corporate secretary their written objection; (3) they agree to hold themselves personally and
solidarily liable with the corporation; or (4) they are made by specific provision of law personally
answerable for their corporate action.

xxx

The ruling in A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU v. NLRC, which the Court of Appeals cited,
does not apply to this case. We quote pertinent portions of the ruling, thus:

(a) Article 265 of the Labor Code, in part, expressly provides:

Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful

lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages.

Article 273 of the Code provides that:

Any person violating any of the provisions of Article 265 of this Code shall be punished by
a fine of not exceeding five hundred pesos and/or imprisonment for not less than one (1) day
nor more than six (6) months.

(b) How can the foregoing provisions be implemented when the employer is a
corporation? The answer is found in Article 212 (c) of the Labor Code which provides:

(c) Employer includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. The
term shall not include any labor organization or any of its officers or agents except when acting
as employer.

The foregoing was culled from Section 2 of RA 602, the Minimum Wage Law. Since
RANSOM is an artificial person, it must have an officer who can be presumed to be the employer,
being the person acting in the interest of (the) employer RANSOM. The corporation, only in the
technical sense, is the employer.

The responsible officer of an employer corporation can be held personally, not to say even
criminally, liable for non-payment of back wages. That is the policy of the law.

xxxx

(c) If the policy of the law were otherwise, the corporation employer can have devious
ways for evading payment of back wages. In the instant case, it would appear that RANSOM, in
1969, foreseeing the possibility or probability of payment of back wages to the 22 strikers,
organized ROSARIO to replace RANSOM, with the latter to be eventually phased out if the 22
strikers win their case. RANSOM actually ceased operations on May 1, 1973, after the
December 19, 1972 Decision of the Court of Industrial Relations was promulgated against
RANSOM. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, in A.C. Ransom, RANSOM, through its President, organized ROSARIO to evade
payment of backwages to the 22 strikers. This situation, or anything similar showing malice or
bad faith on the part of Patricio, does not obtain in the present case. In Santos v. NLRC, the
Court held, thus:

It is true, there were various cases when corporate officers were themselves held by the
Court to be personally accountable for the payment of wages and money claims to its
employees. In A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU vs. NLRC, for instance, the Court ruled that under
the Minimum Wage Law, the responsible officer of an employer corporation could be held
personally liable for nonpayment of backwages for (i)f the policy of the law were otherwise, the
corporation employer (would) have devious ways for evading payment of backwages. In the
absence of a clear identification of the officer directly responsible for failure to pay the
backwages, the Court considered the President of the corporation as such officer. The case was
cited in Chua vs. NLRC in holding personally liable the vice-president of the company, being the
highest and most ranking official of the corporation next to the President who was dismissed for
the latters claim for unpaid wages.

A review of the above exceptional cases would readily disclose the attendance of facts
and circumstances that could rightly sanction personal liability on the part of the company
officer. In A.C. Ransom, the corporate entity was a family corporation and execution against it
could not be implemented because of the disposition posthaste of its leviable assets evidently in
order to evade its just and due obligations. The doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction
was thus clearly appropriate. Chua likewise involved another family corporation, and this time
the conflict was between two brothers occupying the highest ranking positions in the company.
There were incontrovertible facts which pointed to extreme personal animosity that resulted,
evidently in bad faith, in the easing out from the company of one of the brothers by the other.

The basic rule is still that which can be deduced from the Courts pronouncement in Sunio vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, thus:

We come now to the personal liability of petitioner, Sunio, who was made jointly and
severally responsible with petitioner company and CIPI for the payment of the backwages of
private respondents. This is reversible error. The Assistant Regional Directors Decision failed to
disclose the reason why he was made personally liable. Respondents, however, alleged as
grounds thereof, his being the owner of one-half () interest of said corporation, and his alleged
arbitrary dismissal of private respondents.

Petitioner Sunio was impleaded in the Complaint in his capacity as General Manager of
petitioner corporation. There appears to be no evidence on record that he acted maliciously or
in bad faith in terminating the services of private respondents. His act, therefore, was within the
scope of his authority and was a corporate act.

It is basic that a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct
from those of the persons composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it
may be related. Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or
nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself sufficient ground for disregarding
the separate corporate personality. Petitioner Sunio, therefore, should not have been made
personally answerable for the payment of private respondents back salaries.

Thus, the rule is still that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only when the
corporate fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend
crime. In the absence of malice, bad faith, or a specific provision of law making a corporate
officer liable, such corporate officer cannot be made personally liable for corporate liabilities.
Neither Article 212[e] nor Article 273 (now 272) of the Labor Code expressly makes any
corporate officer personally liable for the debts of the corporation. As this Court ruled in H.L.
Carlos Construction, Inc. v. Marina Properties Corporation:

We concur with the CA that these two respondents are not liable. Section 31 of the
Corporation Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 68) provides:

Section 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. - Directors or trustees who willfully
and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of
gross negligence or bad faith ... shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting
therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders and other persons.

The personal liability of corporate officers validly attaches only when (a) they assent to a
patently unlawful act of the corporation; or (b) they are guilty of bad faith or gross negligence
in directing its affairs; or (c) they incur conflict of interest, resulting in damages to the
corporation, its stockholders or other persons.[31] (Boldfacing in the original; boldfacing with
underscoring supplied)

Thus, it was error for Arbiter Ortiguerra, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals to hold Carag
personally liable for the separation pay owed by MAC to complainants based alone on Article
212(e) of the Labor Code. Article 212(e) does not state that corporate officers are personally
liable for the unpaid salaries or separation pay of employees of the corporation. The liability of
corporate officers for corporate debts remains governed by Section 31 of the Corporation Code.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision dated 29 February 2000 and
the Resolution dated 27 March 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 54404-06 insofar
as petitioner Antonio Carag is concerned.

SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

[2] Rollo, pp. 66-87. Penned by Associate Justice Teodoro P. Regino, with Associate Justices
Conchita Carpio Morales (now Associate Justice of this Court) and Jose L. Sabio, Jr., concurring.
[3] Id. at 89-90. Penned by Associate Justice Teodoro P. Regino, with Associate Justices Conchita
Carpio Morales (now Associate Justice of this Court ) and Jose L. Sabio, Jr., concurring.

[4] Id. at 169-175.

[5] Id. at 201-204.

[6] Id. at 149-150.

[7] Id. at 153-155.

[8] Id. at 169-175.

[9] Id. at 193-194.

[10] Id. at 203.

[11] 356 Phil. 811 (1998).

[12] Rollo, p. 86.

[13] Id. at 89-90.

[14] Id. at 15.

[15] Section 2. Mandatory Conference/Conciliation. Within two (2) days from receipt of an
assigned case, the Labor Arbiter shall summon the parties to a conference for the purpose of
amicably settling the case upon a fair compromise or determining the real parties in interest,
defining and simplifying the issues in the case, entering into admissions and/or stipulations of
facts, and threshing out all other preliminary matters. The notice or summons shall specify the
date, time and place of the preliminary conference/pretrial and shall be accompanied by a copy
of the complaint.

Should the parties arrive at any agreement as to the whole or any part of the dispute, the same
shall be reduced to writing and signed by the parties and their respective counsels, if any before
the Labor Arbiter. The settlement shall be approved by the Labor Arbiter after being satisfied
that it was voluntarily entered into by the parties and after having explained to them the terms
and consequences thereof.

A compromise agreement entered into by the parties not in the presence of the Labor Arbiter
before whom the case is pending shall be approved by him if, after confronting the parties,
particularly the complainants, he is satisfied that they understand the terms and conditions of
the settlement and that it was entered into freely and voluntarily by them and the agreement is
not contrary to law, morals, and public policies.

A compromise agreement duly entered into in accordance with this Section shall be final and
binding upon the parties and the Order approving it shall have the effect of a judgment rendered
by the Labor Arbiter in the final disposition of the case.

The number of conferences shall not exceed three (3) settings and shall be terminated within
thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the first conference.

[16] Section 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. Should the parties fail to agree
upon an amicable settlement, either in whole or in part, during the conferences, the Labor
Arbiter shall issue an order stating therein the matters taken up and agreed upon during the
conferences and directing the parties to simultaneously file their respective verified position
papers.

These verified position papers shall cover only those claims and causes of action raised in the
complaint excluding those that may have been amicably settled, and shall be accompanied by all
supporting documents including the affidavits of their respective witnesses which shall take the
place of the latters direct testimony. The parties shall thereafter not be allowed to allege facts, or
present evidence to prove facts, not referred to and any cause or causes of action not included
in the complaint or position papers, affidavits and other documents. Unless otherwise requested
in writing by both parties, the Labor Arbiter shall direct both parties to submit simultaneously
their position papers/memorandum with the supporting documents and affidavits within fifteen
(15) calendar days from the date of the last conference, with proof of having furnished each
other with copies thereof.

[17] Section 4. Determination of Necessity of Hearing. Immediately after the submission by the
parties of their position papers/memorandum, the Labor Arbiter shall motu proprio determine
whether there is need for a formal trial or hearing. At this stage, he may, at his discretion and for
the purpose of making such determination, ask clarificatory questions to further elicit facts or
information, including but not limited to the subpoena of relevant documentary evidence, if any,
from any party or witness.

[18] Section 5. Period to Decide Case. x x x x

xxxx

b) If the Labor Arbiter finds no necessity of further hearing after the parties have submitted their
position papers and supporting documents, he shall issue and Order to that effect and shall
inform the parties, stating the reasons therefor. In any event, he shall render his decision in the
case within the same period provided in paragraph (a) hereof.

[19] Section 11. Non-appearance of Parties at Conference/Hearings. x x x x

xxxx

c) In case of two (2) successive unjustified non-appearances by the respondent during his turn to
present evidence, despite due notice, the case shall be considered submitted for decision on the
basis of the evidence so far presented.

[20] Promulgated on 31 August 1990 and took effect on 9 October 1990.

[21] Section 3, Rule V of The New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC.

[22] 372 Phil. 873, 877-879 (1999).

[23] Rollo, p. 173.

[24] McLeod v. NLRC, G.R. No. 146667, 23 January 2007, citing Lim v. Court of Appeals, 380 Phil.
60 (2000) and Del Rosario v. NLRC, G.R. No. 85416, 24 July 1990, 187 SCRA 777.

[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] G.R. No. 103575, 5 April 1993, 221 SCRA 9, 14.

[28] Art. 283. Closure of Establishment and Reduction of Personnel. The employer may also
terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices,
redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the
establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the
provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and
Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due
to the installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be
entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1)
month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent
losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not
due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one
(1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.
A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole year.

[29] See note 24.

[30] 354 Phil. 918 (1998).

[31] McLeod v. NLRC, supra note 24.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 114764. June 13, 1997]

WILFREDO T. PADILLA, petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and SAN
BEDA COLLEGE, respondents.

DECISION

ROMERO, J.:

This petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR Case No. 10-03520-84, which reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter, and its resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The factual antecedents in this case are not disputed.

Petitioner was a faculty member of the College of Arts and Sciences of San Beda College (SBC)
from June 1980 up to his dismissal.

Sometime in November 1983, petitioner approached co-professor Leopoldo Martinez in behalf

of his alleged nephew, a student by the name of Luis Santos, whom Martinez failed in History I.
Petitioner apparently disagreed with the grading system of Professor Martinez and urged the
latter to change the grade of Santos. On November 10, 1983, an urgent meeting was called to
deliberate on Santos case. However, prior to said meeting, petitioner initiated a whispering
campaign among the faculty members and students who failed in the same subject against
Martinez, the obvious purpose of which was to exert pressure and influence on the latter
regarding the proposed changing of the grades.

Petitioner admittedly approached the members of the Deans Council[1] to lobby for the
reconsideration of Santos failing grade.[2] In several instances, he also acknowledged that Santos
was not actually his nephew but he said so only to add weight to his request.
On ground of serious misconduct, petitioners services were terminated on July 23, 1984. In a
complaint for illegal dismissal against SBC, Labor Arbiter Isabel T. Ortiguerra rendered a decision
dated October 10, 1991, the dispositive portion of which reads thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the respondent guilty
of illegal dismissal and ordering it to reinstate the complainant to his former position of full time
professor without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages computed from the time he
was dismissed up to the time he will actually be reinstated but not to exceed 3 years.

The claim for moral and exemplary damages are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

This decision was, however, reversed on appeal by the NLRC in its decision dated July 26, 1993.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied on February 23, 1994, petitioner filed the
instant petition for certiorari.

The petition must be dismissed.

This Court is convinced that the pressure and influence exerted by the petitioner on his
colleague to change a failing grade to a passing one, as well as his misrepresentation that Santos
is his nephew, constitute serious misconduct, which is a valid ground for dismissing an employee.
[3]

Petitioner asserts that he facilitated the request of Santos because he believed it was
meritorious and that he did it in his capacity as teaching evaluator.

We are not persuaded. As aptly observed by the NLRC, it became petitioners personal crusade to
help Santos, which he did not exhibit with the other students who failed. It further stated, (a)
teacher evaluator can, at best, advise a student as to how he can finish his course but certainly
not to act as his lobbyist.[4]

With respect to the issue of whether petitioner was afforded due process, we rule in the
affirmative.

Before an employee can be validly dismissed, the employee must be afforded due process and
his dismissal must be for any of the causes specified in Article 282 of the Labor Code.[5]

Labor Arbiter Ortiguerra mentioned in her decision[6] that SBC failed to afford petitioner an
impartial investigation, imputing to Father Odilardo Arceo, Dean of the College of Arts and
Sciences, an obvious predisposition to dismiss him. This was, however, refuted by Fr. Arceo who
declared in his sworn statement that he merely recommended the termination of petitioners
employment to the Fr. Rector of SBC who, after an official investigation, adopted his
recommendation.

Petitioner was indeed duly notified of the charges levelled against him. The records show that on
June 7, 1984, he was officially informed that SBC was considering his dismissal on charges of
serious misconduct, an investigation of which was scheduled on June 28, 1984. A postponement
was requested and the hearing was moved to July 5, 1984. While the hearing was being
conducted at the Fr. Rectors office, petitioner suddenly walked out just as Professor Martinez
was about to commence giving his testimony.

The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain ones side
or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[7] Thus, the Labor
Code requires the employer to furnish the employee with a written notice containing a
statement of the cause for termination and to afford said employee ample opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires. The
employer is also required to notify the worker in writing of the decision to dismiss him, stating
clearly the reasons therefore.[8] In the instant case, SBC amply complied with the
abovementioned requisites.

Petitioner also alleges that he was denied due process, as well as the thirty-day prior written
notice when he was dismissed. He even cited in his memorandum the case of RCPI v. NLRC[9] to
support his contentions. The aforementioned case, however, does not mention any thirty-day
period. Petitioner erred in relying on the procedural requirement outlined in Article 283 of the
Labor Code which applies only when termination of the employment is due to the installation of
labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of
operation of the establishment or undertaking.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED and the July 26, 1993 decision
of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Regalado, (Chairman), J., No part; formerly connected with private respondent.

Torres, Jr., J., No part; member of the faculty (on leave).

[1] Fr. Odilardo Arceo, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, Don Clement Ma. Roque, Area
Chairman for Social Sciences and Dr. Teresita Pedrajas, Assistant Head, College Guidance Office.

[2] Rollo, p. 47.

[3] Article 282(a), Labor Code, as amended.

[4] Rollo, pp. 52-53.

[5] Comsavings Bank v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 98456, June 14,
1996.

[6] Rollo, p. 39.

[7] Pizza Hut v. National Labor Relations Commission, 252 SCRA 531 (1996).

[8] Mirano, et al., v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121112, March 19, 1997.

[9] 223 SCRA 656 (1993).

List of objections

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

An objection is a formal protest raised in court during a trial to disallow a witness's testimony or
other evidence which would be in violation of the rules of evidence or other procedural law.

Objections by body of law[edit]

United States[edit]

This is a list of objections in American law:[1] Proper reasons for objecting to a question asked to
a witness include:

Ambiguous, confusing, misleading, vague, unintelligible: the question is not clear and precise
enough for the witness to properly answer.

Arguing the law: counsel is instructing the jury on the law.

Argumentative: the question makes an argument rather than asking a question.

Asked and Answered: when the same attorney continues to ask the same question and they
have already received an answer. Usually seen after direct, but not always.

Asks the jury to prejudge the evidence: the jury cannot promise to vote a certain way, even if
certain facts are proved.

Asking a question which is not related to an intelligent exercise of a peremptory challenge or

challenge for cause: if opposing counsel asks such a question during voir dire (i.e. the jury
selection process.)

Assumes facts not in evidence: the question assumes something as true for which no evidence
has been shown.
Badgering: counsel is antagonizing the witness in order to provoke a response, either by asking
questions without giving the witness an opportunity to answer or by openly mocking the
witness.

Best evidence rule: requires that the original source of evidence is required, if available; for
example, rather than asking a witness about the contents of a document, the actual document
should be entered into evidence. Full original document should be introduced into evidence
instead of a copy, but judges often allow copies if there is no dispute about authenticity. Some
documents are exempt by hearsay rules of evidence.[2]

Beyond the scope: A question asked during cross-examination has to be within the scope of
direct, and so on.

Calls for a conclusion: the question asks for an opinion rather than facts.

Calls for speculation: the question asks the witness to guess the answer rather than to rely on
known facts.

Compound question: multiple questions asked together.

Hearsay: the witness does not know the answer personally but heard it from another. However,
there are several exceptions to the rule against hearsay in most legal systems.[2]

Incompetent: the witness is not qualified to answer the question.

Inflammatory: the question is intended to cause prejudice.

Leading question (Direct examination only): the question suggests the answer to the witness.
Leading questions are permitted if the attorney conducting the examination has received
permission to treat the witness as a hostile witness. Leading questions are also permitted on
cross-examination, as witnesses called by the opposing party are presumed hostile.

Narrative: the question asks the witness to relate a story rather than state specific facts. This
objection is not always proper even when a question invites a narrative response, as the
circumstances of the case may require or make preferable narrative testimony.

Privilege: the witness may be protected by law from answering the question.

Irrelevant or immaterial: the question is not about the issues in the trial.

Misstates evidence / misquotes witness / improper characterization of evidence: this objection is

often overruled, but can be used to signal a problem to witness, judge and jury.[3]

Counsel is testifying: this objection is sometimes used when counsel is "leading" or

"argumentative" or "assumes facts not in evidence".

A few of the foregoing objections may also apply to the witness's response, particularly hearsay,
privilege, and relevance.

Proper reasons for objecting to material evidence include:

Lack of foundation: the evidence lacks testimony as to its authenticity or source.

Fruit of the poisonous tree: the evidence was obtained illegally, or the investigative methods
leading to its discovery were illegal. Can be circumvented; see inevitable discovery

Incomplete: opposing party only introducing part of the writing (conversation/act/declaration),

taken out of context. Under the evidence rule providing for completeness, other party can move
to introduce additional parts.[4] If any documents presented for the review, the judge and other
party entitled to a complete copy, not a partial copy, of the document. When a witness is
presented with a surprise document, he should be able to take time to study it, before he can
answer any questions.

Best evidence rule or hearsay evidence: requires that the original source of evidence is required,
if available. However, some documents are self-authenticating under Rule 902, such as (1)
domestic public documents under seal, (2) domestic public documents not under seal, but
bearing a signature of a public officer, (3) foreign public documents, (4) certified copies of public
records, (5) official publications, (6) newspapers and periodicals, (7) trade inscriptions and the
like, (8) acknowledged documents (i.e. by a notary public), (9) commercial paper and related
documents, (10) presumptions under Acts of Congress, (11) certified domestic records of
regularly conducted activity, (12) certified foreign records of regularly conducted activity.[2]

More prejudicial than probative: Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, a judge has the discretion
to exclude evidence if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury."

Proper reasons for objecting to a witness's answer include:

Narrative: the witness is relating a story in response to a question that does not call for one. Not
all witnesses' answers are susceptible to this objection, as questions can and often do call for a
narrative response, especially on direct examination.

Non-responsive: the witness's response constitutes an answer to a question other than the one
that was asked, or no answer at all

Nothing pending: the witness continues to speak on matters irrelevant to the question.

Example: Did your mother call? Yeah. She called at 3:00." Opposing counsel can object to the
latter part of this statement, since it answers a question that was not asked. With some concern
for annoying the court, counsel will selectively use this to prevent a witness from getting into
self-serving answers.

PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE

I. INTRODUCTION.

1. Rule 132 governs the manner by which Testimonial and Documentary evidences are to be
presented in Court.

2. Principles in the presentation of evidence by the parties:

a). A case is won or lost depending upon how effective was the presentation of evidence,
particularly as to what evidence were presented and how they were presented

b). Parties should be allowed a certain latitude in the presentation of their evidence otherwise
they might be so hampered that the ends of justice may eventually be defeated or appear to be
defeated. The court should not limit the evidence to be presented.

c). The parties should be allowed to maintain their own way or style of presenting evidence
when these can be done without injury to the speedy disposition of the case and to the best
interest of the administration of justice

d) The court should liberally receive all evidence offered in the trial to be able to render its
decision with all the possibly relevant proof in the record and to assure the appellate court to
have a good judgment and to obviate remanding the case for re-trial or reception of evidence

Section 1. Provides the manner of presenting testimonial evidence to be as follows:

By presenting the witness personally in open court

a). The witness must appear in person so that the court and the opponent may observe him and
hear his testimony

b). His personal presence cannot be substituted by the submission of written statements or
audio testimony

c) There is also no secret testimony and it must always be in the presence of the adverse party,
except when the presentation is allowed to be ex parte, or testimony through interrogatories or
depositions in advance of trial before a hearing officer but upon prior approval of the court and
with proper notice to the adverse party

d). CHILD WITNESSES: the witness may testify inside a room but the child must be visible and can
be heard through the medium of facilities appropriate for the purpose such as a mirror

QUESTION: May the witness testify wearing masks to preserve his identity?

To be examined under oath or affirmation

a). To answer questions as may be asked by the proponent, the opponent and by the court

(i). Oath: an outward pledge by the witness that his testimony is made under an immediate
sense of responsibility to a Supreme Being. An appeal is made to the almighty that he will tell
the truth.

(ii.) Affirmation: a solemn and formal declaration that the witness will be truthful

iii). The purpose of an oath or affirmation are : (i) to affect the conscience of the witness and
compel him to speak the truth and (ii) to lay him open to punishment for perjury. But it is not
essential that he knows what or how he will punished.
iv). If the opponent believes the witness is not aware of his obligation and responsibility to tell
the truth and consequences of telling a lie, the party may ask for leave to conduct a VOIRE DIRE
examination ( PP. vs. Alma Bisda, July 17, 2003)

v). Effect of lack of oath: If the opponent fails to object then the testimony may be given weight
as the party would be estopped or, the party may move to disallow the witness from testifying,
or move to strike the testimony after he found the lack of oath. The proponent however may ask
that the witness be placed under oath. . .

The form of testimony must be :

a). Oral answers to questions unless (i) the question calls for a different form of answer such as
by bodily movements or demonstrable actions, (ii) or the witness is a deaf mute (iii) in case of a
child witness

b) Not in a narrative (i) in order to prevent the witness from testifying and narrating facts which
are irrelevant and thus he will testify straight to the point in issue, as well as (ii) to give the
opponent an opportunity to raise an objection.

Sec. 2. The Proceedings must be recorded.

Courts of the Philippines are courts of record. Anything not recorded is deemed not to have
transpired or taken-up and will not be considered in the resolution of the case. The matter to be
recorded include:

a). Questions by the proponent, opponent and the court, which are propounded to the witness

b). The answers of the witness to the questions

c). Manifestations, arguments, and statements of counsel

d). Statements of the court to the counsel

e). Instructions or statements of the court to the court personnel

f). Demonstrable actions, movements, gestures or observations asked to be described and

recorded

g). Observations during the conduct of ocular inspections

Matters not recorded:

Off-the-records statements

Statements which were ordered or requested to be stricken from the record such as those which
are improper, irrelevant or objectionable. Example: hearsay direct testimony

Sec. 3. Rights and Obligations of Witnesses

The obligation of a witness is to answers all questions which are asked of him. He cannot choose
which questions to answer and to answering others.

The witness however has the right to be protected against tactics from the opponent which are
intended to brow beat, badger, insult, intimidate, or harass him.

He has the right not to be detained longer that is necessary.

He may refuse to answer the following questions:

a). Those which are not pertinent to the issue

b). Those which are self-incriminatory except in the following cases:

(i) where the accused is testifying as a witness in his own behalf, as to questions relating only to
the offense upon which he is testifying

(ii) where the witness was granted immunity from prosecution as when he is under the Witness
Protection Program or was discharged to be used a s a state witness, or he is a government
witness in Anti-Graft Cases.

c). Those which are self-degrading, unless it is to discredit the witness by impeaching his moral
character

EXAMINATION OF A WITNESS

A. INTRODUCTION: Meaning of terms:

1. Examination to find out facts from the witness or to test his memory, truthfulness or
credibility by directing him to answer appropriate questions.
2. Proponent - the party who owns or who called the witness to testify in his favor. Opponent-
the party against whom the witness was called.

3. Friendly Witness- one who is expected to give testimony favorable to the party who called for
him. Hostile Witness, one whose testimony is not favorable to the cause of the party who called
him as a witness. Party witness and accused-witness refer to the plaintiff, defendant or the
accused, testifying as witness for themselves, as opposed to ordinary witnesses

B. ORDER OF EXAMINATION

Direct examination by the proponent

Cross-examination by the opponent

Re-direct examination by the proponent

Re-cross examination by the opponent

C. ORDER OF PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE

Presentation of Evidence in Chief by the Plaintiff

Presentation of Evidence in Chief by the Defendant

Presentation of Rebuttal Evidence by the Plaintiff

Presentation of Sur rebuttal Evidence by the Defendant

Section 5. Direct Examination. Direct examination is the examination-in-chief of a witness by the

party presenting him on the facts relevant to the issue.

A. Procedural Requirement

Offer of Testimony- the proponent shall state the substance of the intended testimony of the
witness ( an outline of the major points) and the purpose of said testimony ( what the
proponent intends to prove by said testimony)

a). Importance of the Offer- (i) The direct examination may be objected to by the opponent (ii)
Matters not included in the offer may not be allowed to be testified on upon proper objection
and (iii) to shorten the proceedings as the opponent may admit or stipulate on the matters to be
testified on.

In cases under the Rules on Summary Procedure, the sworn statement of the witness must have
been submitted to the court before hand

B. Importance of the Direct Examination

This is the only opportunity for the proponent to elicit from the witness all the facts which are
important and favorable to him. The witness should be considered as a sponge heavy with facts.
By the time the direct examination is over, all favorable facts should have been squeezed from
the witness. The examination must be clear, forceful, comprehensive, and must efficiently
present the facts of the case.

Effective Direct Examination

a). KEEP IT SIMPLE. Avoid these two pitfalls (i) too little time on critical points and (ii) too much
time on unimportant points
b). ORGANIZE LOGICALLY. Determine the key points and organize them in a logical order. If
possible resort to a chronological presentation of testimony.

c). INTRODUCE THE WITNESS AND DEVELOP HIS BACKGROUND

d). USE PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS WHICH ARE INTRODUCTORY, TRANSITION OR ORIENTING

QUESTIONS

e). ELICIT SCENE DESCRIPTION

f). ELICIT GENERAL FLOWING DESCRIPTION. Let the witness paint a picture. Avoid excessive
detail.

g). USE PACE IN DESCRIBING ACTION. Control the speed of the examination by eliciting testimony
in small segments at the most advantageous rate. SLOW DOWN THE ACTION.

h). USE SIMPLE LANGUAGE. Choose simple words and phrases. Word choice affects answers.
Avoid jargons, idioms and technical words. WHAT MATTERS AND WHAT WILL BE REMEMBERED
IS NOT HOW BEAUTIFUL AND IMPRESSIVE THE LAWYER PHRASED HIS QUESTIONS BUT WHAT
THE WITNESS NARRATED.

i). HAVE THE WITNESS EXPLAIN.

j). USE NONLEADING OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS

k). USE EXHIBITS TO HIGHLIGH AND SUMMARIZE

l). PRACTICE WITH THE WITNESS.

Sec. 6. Cross Examination.

A. Concept: The examination of the witness by the opponent after the direct examination.

B. Nature:

1. An essential part of the right to procedural due process i.e. the right of a party to confront
witnesses against him face-to-face. The essence however is not actual cross examination but
that a party be given the opportunity to cross examine. Hence the consequences are as follows:

a). If the opponent was never given the opportunity to cross examine a witness, the direct
testimony may, on motion of the opponent, be stricken off as hearsay.

b). All assertions of facts not based on the personal knowledge of the witness may also be
stricken off as hearsay since the source cannot be subjected to the opportunity of cross-
examination
2. :Limitations:

a). The right may however be waived expressly

b). It may be lost through the fault or negligence of the opponent.

c). After a witness has been cross-examined and discharged, further cross-examination is no
longer a right but must be addressed to the sound discretion of the court

d). The Court may limit the cross-examination if its needlessly protracted, or is being conducted
in a manner which is unfair to the witness or is inconsistent with the decorum of the court, as
when it degenerates into a shouting match with the witness

3. Effect of the Loss or non-completion of the cross examination

a). If the loss, in whole or in part, was due to the fault of the adverse party, the testimony of the
witness is to be taken into consideration

b). If the cross-examination cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party
offering the witness, the testimony is rendered incompetent
c). If the loss or non-completion was due to the death or unavailability of the witness then that
part of the testimony which was subjected to cross-examination remains admissible.

4. Character of Cross Examination: It is both an Art and a Science

a). It is an Art because it requires consummate skill which is acquired and developed. There is no
standard method as it is highly personalized, subjective and be adaptive to who the witness is
and to the subject of the cross examination. The length, style of questioning or approach to a
witness requires intuition and understanding of human nature; of the habits, weaknesses, bias
and prejudices of people; their reactions to situations, their perception of matters, and such
other factors that vary according to circumstances of time, place, people and occasions.

It requires the ability to think quickly, read quickly and to know when to quit. The lawyers
antennae must ever be tuned in to the witness: his character, personality; mannerism, and all
traits which will give a favorable clue; to the adverse counsel and to the Court.

b). Should a party cross examine or not depends on a full understanding of what to expect. The
following must be considered before a party attempts to cross-examine:
i). Whether the witness has hurt the case or the impact of his testimony on the case

ii). Whether the witness is important, as for example an eye witness, or a party witness

iii). Whether the testimony is credible

iv). The risks that the party undertakes

2. It is a science. It requires a thorough preparation and mastery of certain rules/jurisprudence

on procedure in the presentation of evidence.

C. Importance and Purpose of Cross Examination

Cross examination is both a weapon to destroy or weaken the testimony of the opponents
witness and a tool to build up or strengthen a partys case. The conduct of cross-examination
must always be directed towards achieving a specific purpose or purposes.

Constructive Cross-Examination, where the purposes are: (a) to amplify or expand the story of
the witness so as to place the facts in a different light which is favorable to the party. Note that
the witness of the opponent seldom volunteer facts favorable to the cross-examiner, hence the
manner of questioning should be insinuating, and (b) To obtain favorable or establish
additional facts favorable to the cross-examining party.

Destructive Cross-Examination The purposes are: (a) to discredit the testimony of the witness by
showing its absurdity, or that it is unbelievable or contrary to the evidence (b) To discredit the
witness by showing his bias, interest, lapse of or selective memory, incorrect or incomplete
observation of event, and similar situations.

D. Scope of Cross Examination

1. Under section 6 the witness may be examined: (a) As to any matter stated in the direct
examination (b) or any matter connected therewith (c) as to the accuracy and truthfulness and
freedom of the witness from interest or bias, or the reverse and (d) upon all important facts
bearing upon the issue.

2. The English Rule is followed in the Philippines: the cross examination is not confined to
matters subject of the direct examination but extends to other maters, even if not inquired in
the direct examination but are material to the issues. This is distinguished from the American
Rule which holds that the scope of the cross-examination is confined to the facts and
circumstances brought out, or connected with, matters stated in the direct examination
D. Questioning by the Court:

1. The Court may ask questions : 1. To clarify itself on certain points 2. To call the attention of
counsel to points at issue that are overlooked and 3.To direct counsel to questions on matters to
elicit facts and clarify ambiguous answers

2. However, the questioning by the court should not be confrontational, probing and insinuating.
It should not be partisan and not over extensive. The court is not to assume the role of an
advocate or prosecutor.
BASIC RULES ON CROSS EXAMINATION

1. PREPARE. Know what the witness has testified on and its relation to the case and how it
affects your own evidence

2. KNOW YOUR OBJECTIVE. What are the points in the testimony of the witness which are critical
and are these points to be brought out and emphasized

3. OBSERVE PACING AND PATIENCE . Do not rush the witness and avoid being over eager in
bringing out an important point.

4. LEAD THE WITNESS. State the facts and let the witness ratify. Know how to lead. Use variation
in the phraseology of the questions.

5. HAVE A STYLE AND ADAPT IT TO THE OCCASION. Be true to yourself and develop an approach
or style suited to your personality and character. Be able to vary your style and know when is it
effective to use either a booming or soft voice; to move around or to stay put; to be
conversational or confrontational or tough and confident..
6. KNOW WHEN TO QUIT. Stop when (1) the witness has been discredited or made a
monumental concession. There is no need for an over kill. or when the witness is killing the case
or the counsel.

7. KNOW WHAT MATERIALS TO TAKE TO CONFRONT THE WITNESS. Have them be ready and
easily accessible.

8. KNOW THE JUDGE. Are you making an impact or are you boring, antagonizing or confusing the
Judge?

9. KNOW THE RULES OF EVIDENCE

ADDITIONAL PRACTICAL TIPS

1. BE BRIEF. Confine to the strongest points.

2. SHORT QUESTIONS. Use plain words and avoid fancy words or elaborate syntax.

3. NEVER ASK A QUESTION to which you do not already know the answer.

4. LISTEN TO THE WITNESS. Tune in if he was contradicted by another witness or prior testimony;
is the testimony contrary to human experience or completely inconsistent with nature.

5. DO NOT QUARREL WITH THE WITNESS.

6. DO NOT PERMIT THE WITNESS TO EXPLAIN

7. DO NOT REPEAT HIS TESTIMONY ON DIRECT.

8. AVOID QUESTIONS TOO MANY

9. SAVE THE EXPLANATION FOR THE MEMORANDUM. Questions should not be explanations of
your position.

Sec. 7. Redirect Examination by the proponent

A. Purpose and Scope:

To afford the party calling the witness to explain or amplify the testimony given on cross-
examination; to explain apparent contradictions, or inconsistencies, and to rehabilitate the
testimony.

The scope is confined to matters taken up in the cross-examination, not those outside, which
may be objected to on the ground that it is improper for redirect.

But, new matter may be inquired into provide the prior approval of the court was obtained and
the testimony on the new matter must be subject to cross-examination by the opponent.

Sec. 8. Re-cross examination by the opponent.

A This is confined to matters subject of the re-direct examination.

Sec. 9. Recalling Witnesses.

A. On Motion By a party: This is not a right but the recall must be addressed to the discretion of
the court and the recall must be on justifiable grounds.
B. By the Court: If there be matter it wishes to clarify

Sec. 10. Leading and Misleading Questions.

A. Introduction. The examination of a witness is by asking questions the answers to which will
bring out facts from the witnesses. However a lawyer is subject to certain rules such as to what
questions he is allowed to ask, how they are to be phrased or worded so that facts known only
to the witness through his own perception are revealed, or so that facts which are suppressed or
forgotten may be forced out from the witness.

Some of these limitations consist of the prohibition on leading and misleading questions.

B. Leading Questions. Section 10 defines it as a A question which suggest to the witness the
answer which the examining party desires. It is also known as Suggestive Question.

1. Witnesses are to give data spontaneously from there own memory, according to their own
perception and interpretation. The role of the lawyer is simply to ask questions which will help
the witness recall events. The question should be framed in such a manner that the lawyer does
not in any way suggest or influence the answer to be given, otherwise the fact or answer
becomes merely the product of the suggestion, and not what the witness personally knows.
2. If the witness is asked simply to confirm or deny, then in effect it is the lawyer who is
supplying the facts through the mouth of the witness who is reduced to being merely the echo
and mouthpiece of the lawyer.

3. Test : The form or phraseology and the contents of the question in that whether it contains a
statement of a fact which the witness is asked to affirm or agree to. In such case the witness
contributes no substantial data. The lawyer is coaxing.

The tone, inflection, mannerism or body language of counsel, may also indicate if the
counsel is leading his witness.

C. General Rule On Direct: The witness being a friendly witness and having been called by the
proponent, he is naturally expected to be sympathetic to the cause of the proponent. Thus there
is great danger that he would just confirm any and all facts suggested to him by the proponent.
Hence leading questions are not allowed.

The following instances are the exceptions when leading questions are allowed to be asked
during direct:
On preliminary matters

a. those pertaining to the personal circumstances of the witness and which are asked at the start
of the cross-examination

b. those which are intended to bring the witness directly to the point in issue; they are referred
to as orienting, introductory or transitory questions

When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from the witness who by reason
of the any of the following: is immature; aged and infirm; in bad physical condition; ignorant of,
or unaccustomed to, court proceedings; inexperienced; unsophisticated; feebleminded;
confused and agitated; terrified; timid or embarrassed while on the stand; lacking in
comprehension of questions or slow to understand; deaf and dumb; or unable to speak or
understand the English language or only imperfectly familiar therewith ( PP. vs. Dela Cruz, July
11, 2002)

is suffering from some mental deficiency, or where the intelligence of the witnesses is impaired,
thereby making necessary the making of suggestions:

For example: witnesses who are ignorant, feeble minded deaf-mutes, minors or uneducated
In case of unwilling or hostile witnesses: they are uncooperative and will not readily supply the
facts desired by the examiner. The approach to these witnesses is to conduct a direct
examination as if it were a cross-examination

a. unwilling witnesses include (i) those who have to be compelled to testify by the coercive
processes of the court (ii) or those who, at the time of their presentation at the witness stand,
become evasive, reluctant or unfriendly

b. hostile-may refer to (i) a witness who manifest so much hostility and prejudice during the
direct examination that the party who called him is allowed to cross-examine, i.e to treat him as
if he had been called by the opposite party or (ii) one who surprises the party and unexpectedly
turns against him

In either case, the party calling the witness must present proof of either adverse interest on
the part of the witness, his unjustified reluctance, or of his misleading the party into calling him
a witness, and on the basis of which the court shall declare the witness to be a hostile witness.
Thereafter leading questions are asked.

In case the witness is the adverse party, or representative or officer of a juridical entity which is
the adverse party. Said witnesses is expected to resist any attempt to obtain favorable data,
hence the direct examination is in the nature of a cross-examination and the most effective
manner of forcing favorable data, or of destroying his credibility, would be through leading
questions

When the witness is not voluntarily offered but is required by law to be presented by the
proponent, as in the case of subscribing witnesses to a will.
When the witness lacks the power of recollection a leading question is allowed in order to
refresh the memory.

To identify persons or things.

In case of an expert witness as to his opinion.

D. Leading and Misleading Misleading Questions on Cross.

A. Rule on Leading Questions: During cross-examinations leading questions are allowed for the
reason that the witness is not expected to be sympathetic to the cause of the opponent and
would not volunteer important facts favorable to the opponent, or that he would resists to
testify on facts adverse to the party who called him. Thus it becomes necessary that the
opposing counsel has to force the facts from the witness thru leading questions.

The opponent states a fact favorable to him and forces the witness to confirm it.

B. Misleading Questions are not allowed. They are of two kinds:

1. A question which assumes a fact not yet testified to by a witness or still unproven or by
putting words into the mouth of the witness

2. A question premised on a fact which is contrary to that testified to or proven or those which
distort or do not accurately state the true facts. This is akin to twisting the words of the witness

IMPEACHMENT

A. Concept: The process of showing that a witness is not credible or that his testimony is not
worthy of belief, i.e. casting doubt as to the credibility of the witness or credibility of his
testimony. Note that credibility of the witness is different from credibility of testimony

B. Impeachment of the witness of the adverse party

Generally the witness may be impeached during his cross-examination or during the
presentation of evidence by the party. Thus the witness of the plaintiff may be impeached at the
time he is cross-examined by the defendant and/or during the presentation of evidence in chief
by the defendant. On the other hand, the witness of the defendant may be impeached by the
plaintiff during the cross examination of said witness and/or during the presentation of evidence
during the rebuttal stage.
C. Specific Modes pursuant to section 11 and jurisprudence

1. By presenting evidence or facts which contradict the version of the witness

2. By proving the bad general reputation of the witness for truth or honesty or integrity.

a). He cannot be impeached by the direct testimony of witnesses of the adverse party as to
particular instances of immoral acts, improper conduct, or other evidence of misconduct.

b). The person who is called by the adverse party to testify to the bad general reputation of the
witness of the opponent is called the Impeaching witness who himself may also be
impeached.

3. By proof of prior inconsistent statements in that a truthful person will be consistent with his
statement even on different occasions and to different persons

4. By introducing evidence of his bias or interest, such as his relationship to a party, or financial
gain as well as of his motive or intent.

5. By showing his social connections, occupations and manner of living in that he voluntarily
associates with those who are engaged in disreputable activities, or if he is addicted to
disgraceful or vicious practices, or follows an occupation which is loathsome and vile, even if not
criminal, as all these affects his credibility.
6. By proof of prior conviction: the moral integrity of a person is placed in doubt by reason of a
conviction for violation of the law, but not by the fact that there are pending cases against him

7. By showing the improbability of his testimony or that it is not in accordance with ordinary
human experience. Example: (i) the claim of an accidental firing of a caliber gun is not believable
because the mechanism of the gun which requires that pressure be applied on the trigger for the
gun to fire (ii) the claim of four big able men having been attacked and mauled by one person
who is who is much smaller in height and heft

8. By showing defects in his observation, or that he has a faulty or selective memory

9. By showing that this actions or conduct is inconsistent with his testimony.

Example: A rape victim was shown to have been partying with the alleged rapist after the rape

10. By engaging the witness in contradictions and discrepancies as to the material facts testified
by him.

D. Impeachment of ones own witness.

1. General Rule: It is not allowed pursuant to section 12. The reason is that a party calling a
witness is supposed to vouch for the truthfulness of the witness and of his testimony, which he is
assumed to know before hand, and is therefore bound by whatever the witness testifies to in
court. A party is not permitted to let the witness be believed as to facts favorable to him, but to
impeach him as to facts not favorable.
2. Exceptions: If the witness presented is any of the following:

a). An unwilling witness

b). He turns out to be a hostile witness or a treacherous witness and the party was mislead into
calling him as a witness

c). An adverse party witness

E. Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statement.

1. The procedure or Laying the Foundations is outlined by section 13. To be effective the steps
should follow the following sequence:

a). Recommit: Confront the witness with his prior statements narrating the circumstances of
time, place, persons or occasion, or by showing him the prior written statement. Get the witness
to affirm he made the statements
b). Build-Up. Let the witness affirm he made the prior statements freely, knowingly and that he
stood by the accuracy and truthfulness of said statements

c). Contrast: Confront the witness by the fact that his prior statement contradicts or deviates or
is materially different from his present statement

d). Demand an explanation why he made a different statement from his previous statements

2. Reason for the Procedure:

a). Fairness to the witness and avoid surprising him, so that he may recollect the facts, and to
give him the opportunity to explain the reason, nature, circumstances, or meaning, of his
statements. Example: He might have been too emotional then, or was improperly influenced, or
wanted to avoid embarrassment, and similar reasons.

b). To save time if he admits his prior statements

3. Exceptions when there is no need to lay the foundation:

a). In case of statements made by a deceased which contradicts his dying declarations

b). If the contradictory statements are testified to by another person as an admission

Section 14. Exclusion and separation of witness.

A. Concept: The act of excluding a future witness from the court room at the time another
witness is testifying or, of ordering that witnesses be kept separate from one another to prevent
them from conversing with one another.

1. This is upon the courts own motion or on motion of the adverse party.

2. A disobedient witness may be testify but his (a) testimony may be excluded or (b). his
disobedience may be considered to affect his credibility and (c) he maybe punished for contempt
of court

B. Purpose: To ensure the witnesses testify to the truth by preventing them from being
influenced by the testimony of others; to prevent connivance or collusion among witnesses

(Note: the practical purpose of this rule is defeated by the reservations for cross examination or
resetting to present another witness, such that the counsel and other witness have the
opportunity to go over the testimony of the witnesses).
C. Who may not be excluded.

1. Parties to an action even if they are numerous.

a) In criminal cases, the presence of the accused is indispensable and he may not be excluded.

b). The private offended party should not also be excluded even if he will be a witness. As such
he has a right to be present because it is his interest which is involved and also to assure that the
proceedings are conducted properly. Besides he is party to the civil aspect of the case.

2. Expert witnesses as they testify to their opinions based on facts of their own knowledge, or on
hypothetical facts

3. Witnesses on rebuttal

4. Character witnesses

5. Spectators unless they behave in a manner which is against the proper decorum of the court
or when the evidence to be presented are sensitive
REVIVING THE MEMORY OF WITNESSES

A. Introduction: A witness may suffer from lapses of memory or loss of recollection as to

material facts so that there is a need for him to recollect the facts. The remedy of reviving
applies more appropriately to the adverse party conducting a cross-examination rather than to
the proponent. The reasons are: (i) because a party presenting a witness is presumed to know
what the witness is to testify on and is expected to have prepared him for the direct examination
and (ii). matters favorable to the cross-examiner may have been forgotten by the witness.

B. Modes of reviving

1. By asking leading questions

2. By the Process of Association i.e. calling the attention of a person to a material connected with
a certain event so it would trigger the brain to associate the material with the event and thereby
enable the person to remember the event.

Examples:

a). Presenting a pictorial representation of a person, thing, place, object or person

b). Playing the record of a conversation

c). Presenting physical objects such as trinkets, or other memorabilia

d). By allowing the witness to refer to a memorandum under section 16

Section 16. When witness may refer to a memorandum.

A. Two Methods of Revival under Section 16. (These are useful methods to the opposing counsel
when conducting his cross examination. The proponent is supposed to have already gone over
the testimony of his witness and briefed him hence, resorting to these methods reflect badly on
the proponent).

1. Present Recollection Revived: the witness is presented the memorandum or record with the
expectation that it will pull a switch in the brain and enable the witness to put aside the
memorandum and testify on what he now recalls.

Thus the evidence is not the memorandum or writing but what the testify remembers as now
testified
Provided

a). The written record/memorandum was written by him or by someone under his direction
( who wrote it?)

b). It was written at the time the fact/event occurred or immediately thereafter or at any time
when the facts was still fresh in his mind ( when was it written?)

c). The record/memorandum is presented to the adverse party who may cross-examine on it,
and it may be read into the evidence.

2. Past Recollection Recorded. The same procedure is followed but the witness is still unable to
recollect the event but he can assert that the facts therein narrated are true. The evidence
therefore is the writing itself.

3. Examples: (a). Filing clerks who record conversations then forget all about it (b) Diaries (c)
Letters

Section 17. The Rule of Completeness.

A. Concept: When a part of an act, declaration or conversation, writing or record, is given in
evidence by one party, the adverse party may : (i) ask or inquire into the whole or (b) introduce
evidence on the remainder, and in case of writing he may have the other portion or even the
entire writing be read in evidence.

As a matter of procedure, in case of documents already in court, a party merely underscores only
those portions which are material to his case. It is for the opposing party to inquire as to the
rest.

The other portions is limited to those which tend to qualify or explain the part first given and
which were given at the same time.

B. Examples:

1. As the issue is the nature of the transaction between the parties, where plaintiff presented
his letter, it was proper for defendant to introduce all the other letters which passed between
them

2. Where a letter is presented on direct examination, it is proper on cross to ask if there be any
reply to it
3. Where a witness testified to the occurrence of a fight, it is proper to inquire on the
antecedents and details thereof, past altercations between those involved or any bad blood
between them

4. Where the Prosecution presented only a part of the records of the Preliminary Investigation,
the defense may introduce the whole record

C. Need for Precision of Statements:

1. The general rule is that verbal accuracy is not required but the substance or effect of the
actual words spoken will be sufficient so that the witness may testify to the substance as best as
he can from his recollection

2. However, in case of oral defamation, there is a need for verbal accuracy

RULE ON EXAMINATION OF CHILD WITNESS

I. INTRODUCTION: The Supreme Court, in an en banc Resolution adopted the so called-Rule on

Examination of a Child Witness which became effective on December 15, 2000. The rule applies
to child witnesses who are victims of crimes, accused of a crime, and witnesses to a crime. It
shall apply to criminal proceedings and non-criminal proceedings involving child witnesses.

A. Child Witness- any person who, at the time of giving testimony, is below the age of 18 years.
In child abuse cases, a child includes one over 18 years but is found by the court as unable to
fully take car of himself or protect himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.

SALIENT FEATURES

I. Creates a Presumption of Competency in favor of a child-witness subject to a Competency Test.

A. Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. However the court shall conduct a
competency examination o a child moto proprio or on motion of a party, when it finds that
substantial doubt exist regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate,
distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court. ( Sec. 6).

B. A party seeking a competency examination must present proof of necessity of competency

examination. The age of a child shall not by itself is not a sufficient basis for a competency
examination.
II. Allows the Court to, motu proprio or on motion, appoint certain persons to help in the
testimony of the child-witness:

A. Guardian Ad Litem- a person to protect the best interest of the child whose appointment took
into consideration his familiarity with the judicial process, social service programs, and child
development. The parent if preferred, if qualified. Has the right to be present in all proceedings,
to obtain copies of documents, interview witnesses, make recommendations to the court, and to
do all to protect the child.

B. Interpreter- one, other than the regular court interpreter, whom the child can understands
and who understands the child.

C. Facilitator- one who poses the questions to the child who may be a child psychologist,
psychiatrist, social worker, guidance counselor, teacher, religious leader, parent or relative.
Counsels shall pose questions only through the facilitator.

D. Support Person- person chosen by the child to accompany him to testify at or attend a judicial
proceeding or deposition to provide emotional support to the child

III. Contains Child Centered Provisions during the actual testimony such as :
A. A separate waiting area furnished to make the child comfortable

B. To create a more comfortable courtroom environment, the court may direct and supervise the
location, movement, deportment of all person in the court room;

C. The child may testify from a place other than the witness chair; child is not required to look at
the accused

D. To testify during the time of day that the child is well rested

E. Reasonable periods of relief is allowed as often as is necessary

F. The child is allowed to use testimonial aids, such as dolls, puppets, drawings, mannequins or
any other appropriate devise to assist in the testimony of the child.

G. Child is allowed to have an Emotional Security Item of his own choosing as a blanket, toy, doll.

IV. Manner of Questioning and Objections

1. Leading Questions are allowed

specially des for Child-Directs

AUTHENTICATIONS AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS

I. INTRODUCTION. Per section 2 of Rule 130, documents are writings or any material containing
letters, words, symbols, numbers, figures, or other modes of written expressions offered as proof
of their contents. They are either paper based or other solid surfaced based documents. These
are what are referred to by Rule 132.

As to Electronic documents, the manner of their authentication is as provided for by the

Electronics Evidence Law.

II. CLASSIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS.

A.. Section 19 provides that for purposes of their presentation in court they are either (i) public
or (ii) private

Importance of the classification:

 a) As to the need for authentication: public documents are admissible without further proof
of their due execution whereas private documents must be authenticated

b). As to the persons bound: public documents are evidence even as against third persons as
to the fact which gave rise to their execution whereas private documents bind only the parties
thereto and their privies

c) As to the validity of certain transactions: certain transactions are required by law to be

public documents in order to be valid and/or enforceable. E.g.: the law on donations of real
properties, Statute of Frauds

B. Classification into Domestic and Foreign Public Documents

The following are public domestic documents:

a). Written Official acts of sovereign authority, official bodies, tribunals and public officers: such
as decisions or courts or quasi-judicial bodies, legislative enactments, executive orders, directive
from superior officers or memoranda, written appointments, warrants issued by court,
subpoenae, ships log book
b). Record of the official acts of said bodies or officers: e.g: the marriage contract embodies the
act of solemnizing a marriage; records of birth and death; written oaths; returns and reports,
congressional records of the deliberations in congress

c). Acknowledged documents such as contracts and conveyances

d). Public record (i) kept in the Philippines of private writings (ii) or required by law to be kept
therein. Example of the first would be documents affecting registered lands which are submitted
to the Register of Deeds, Assessors Office, Letters of acknowledgement submitted to the Local
Civil Registrar. Example of the second: Personal Bio Data or Information Sheets submitted to
form part of the 201 File of government officials

III. AUTHENTICATION.

A. Concept: As to documents, it is the process of proving that the document presented in court is
not spurious, falsified, or questionable, or that it is not a different document. As to objects, it is
the process of proving that the object presented in court is the very object involved in the case
without any alteration or substitution.
B. Rule as to private documents: Section 20 provides that in order for a private document to be
admissible, it is necessary to prove the due execution and authenticity of the document in
that it is not spurious, counterfeit or a different document. This is because private documents
are not self-authenticating.

IV. How to prove a private document is authentic or genuine

A.. By direct evidence consisting of the testimony of witness such as (i) the parties to the
document (ii) by an attesting /subscribing witness (iii) by a person who was present and saw its
execution and (iv) by the person before whom it was executed and acknowledged

B. By proof or evidence of the genuiness of the handwriting or signature of the maker or of the
parties thereto. It may be by any of the following:

1. Direct evidence consisting of the testimony of the maker or party affirming his own
handwriting or signature

2. By the testimony of the attesting/subscribing witnesses or of witnesses to the execution

thereof

3. By the use of Opinion Evidence pursuant to the Section 22 of Rule 131 such as (a) by one
who has obtained sufficient familiarity (b) by an expert (c) based on a comparison with a genuine
handwriting

4. By the contents of the document

5. By the style of writing

V. When Authentication Not Necessary

A. In case of ancient documents: referring to private document which are more than 30 years
old, produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found in genuine and unblemished
by nay alteration or circumstance of suspicion

1. The reason is the possible unavailability of witness due to the passage of time. Age is to be
reckoned from the execution to the date it is offered

2. Requirements for Ancient Documents

(a) Proof of age: to be counted backwards from the time of offer to its date of execution

(b) Proof that on its face it is free from any circumstance of suspicion, as when it bears
signatures which are not counter-signed, deletions, insertions, a missing page, a page which is
new or recent, use of different inks, or it bears different handwritings, or suspicious tears

Proof of proper custody: this removes the suspicion of fraud and suggest the document is
genuine. Proper custodian/depository includes one who is entitled to the possession such as a
party and his successors in interest, privies or agents; as well as one who is connected to the
document that he may reasonably be inferred to be in [possession thereof, such as a common
witness.

B. When the due execution and genuiness has been admitted either expressly or by provision of
law, as in failure to deny under oath

C. When the due execution and authentication is immaterial , as in documents which arte used
as annexes or attachments

D. When the document need only to be identified

E. In case of public documents

V. PROBATIVE VALUE AND PRESENTATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

A. Requirement of authentication does not apply because of (a) necessity in that it is difficult and
inconvenient to require the attendance of the public officer to appear in court (b)
trustworthiness of the documents

B. Probative Value Under Section 23.

1. Written Official Acts are conclusive because it is the act which is recorded

2. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a

public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein

This does not include those made in excess of official duty and they are limited to those
facts which the public.
Examples

(i) Entries in the Records of Birth, Marriage, or Death of a person, as entered by the Local Civil
Registrar

(ii) Data in the Police Blotter

(iii) Return of Search Warrants

(iv). Entries in the time record

(v) Entries in the Community Tax Certificate or Tax Declaration of Property

(vi) The terms, conditions or consideration in a contract

3. The recitals in a public instrument, executed with all the legal formalities are evidence against
the parties thereto and their successors in interest, and a high degree of proof is necessary to
overcome the presumption that such recitals are true.

4. In order to overcome the documentary evidence, the oral testimony must be clear, strong
and convincing
c) All other public documents are evidence of the act which gave rise to their execution and date
of execution. They are proof why they were executed and the date thereof.

5. Examples: Certifications issued by a public officer. Recommendations and endorsements by a

public official.

C. How to Prove a Public Document (Section 24)

1. In case of written official acts or records of official act of public or sovereign bodies

(i). By presenting the Official Publication thereof

(ii) By presenting a certified true copy i.e. attested by the proper custodian and bearing the
certification by him, his signature, and the seal of his office. A certified copy is allowed by reason
of the principle of Irremovability of Public records under Section 26.

Example: Laws of national application are proved by a certified copy thereof or a copy appearing
in the official publication. In case of publication other than the Official Gazette, the copy must be
accompanied by the Certificate of the Publication by the publisher
2. As to written foreign public documents

(i) By an Official Publication thereof

(ii) By a Copy attested by the official custodian and accompanied by a certificate by the proper
officer of the Philippine foreign service stationed in the country where such foreign document is
kept

Thus a Special Power of Attorney executed abroad, must be bear the Red Ribbon coming from
the Phil. Embassy or Consul

QUESTION: How is a foreign law proven in the Philippines?

Ans. If it is written it is proved by: (i) the Official Publication thereof (ii) An official copy issued by
the custodian (iii) certified true copy accompanied by the certification of the Phil. Foreign official
and (iii) By the testimony of an expert .
D). In case of the public record of a private writing

(i) By the original record i.e. the very private document kept in official custody

(ii) By a copy duly certified by the custodian

d). Summary of Rules in presenting proof of the existence and contents of documentary
evidence

(i) The Original of public record can not be presented by reason of the Rule on the Irremovability
of Public Records under section 26. Hence secondary evidence is allowed which consist either of
the Official Publication, if so published, or a certified true copy thereof, unless if is extremely
necessary that the original of the public record be produced in court, but only upon lawful order
of the court.

(ii).If the documents be in a non-official language, i.e not in English or Pilipino, it must be
accompanied by a translation in either r said language

(iii). In case of notarized documents . the acknowledgment suffices to authenticate the

document and there is no need to present the notary public
(iv). Private documents need not be sealed

(v). If the documents contain alterations, the party offering the document must explain the
alteration was: made by another without his concurrence; as consented by all the parties, was
innocently made, or that it does not change the meaning, or any other valid reason. Said
explanation must be made a the time of the presentation of the document.

(vi) If the document presented consist of judicial record, such as decisions or orders, they are
conclusive and the only grounds to impeach said records are (a) want of jurisdiction of the court
which issue them (b) there was collusion between the court and the prevailing party and (c)
extrinsic fraud was practiced by the winning party

e). If what is sought to be proven is the lack of records in a certain public office, there must be a
certificate to that effect

Examples: 1. Certifications from the National Statistics Office that no marriage ever took place
between two people; or (2) from the POEA in illegal recruitment cases and the (3) FEU in
prosecutions for illegal possession of firearms.
NEED FOR FORMAL OFFER:

The purpose for which evidence is offered must be specified because such evidence maybe
admissible for several purposes under the doctrine of multiple admissibility, or may be
admissible for one purpose and not for another, otherwise the adverse party cannot interpose
the proper objection ( Uniwide vs. Titan-Ikeda 511 SCA 335)

A legal objection is raised by an attorney within a trial, with regard to a specific question or a
piece of evidence introduced into that trial. Lawyer raises objection when they want that
question or evidence to be disallowed from the trial as a whole. Objections generally have to be
made on specific grounds, according to specific rules for procedure and conduct.

Misleading

One objection which a lawyer might raise is an objection based on the grounds that the question
being objected to was ambiguous, misleading, confusing, vague, or unintelligible. All of these
terms mean generally similar things, although they do have some nuance between them.
Ultimately, however, an ambiguous, misleading, confusing, vague, or unintelligible question is a
question without a clear, obvious, succinct, factual answer.

Argumentative

A lawyer is not permitted to be argumentative with a witness in any given trial. This means that a
lawyer is not permitted to repeatedly ask the same question of a witness, nor is the lawyer
allowed to directly dispute what the witness says in the manner of an argument. Any such
questions might be objected to on the grounds that they are argumentative.

Asked and Answered

Once a question has been asked and answered, it is generally not allowed for that question to be
asked again. If the question is asked again, then the opposing lawyer might object based on the
grounds that the question has been asked and answered. Sometimes, lawyers will attempt to
repeat questions for the sake of emphasis, and this is disallowed through asked and answered
objections.

Speculation

A speculative question or speculative evidence is normally disallowed from a trial on the grounds
that it is not based in fact. Speculation arises when a witness is asked to answer a question to
which he or she does not know the immediate, factual answer, or when a witness provides an
answer which is not based on immediate facts of his or her experience. A lawyer can object to
speculation to have it disallowed.

Hearsay

When a lawyer objects to evidence based on hearsay, the lawyer is objecting to a type of
evidence which is related secondhand, from questions asked or answers given outside of the
court. If, for example, an individual is relating evidence based on what he or she was told by
another person outside of court, then that would be hearsay evidence, and could be objected to.

Incompetent

An attorney might raise an objection based on grounds of incompetence if a witness were not
considered to be competent for providing answers to questions. A witness might be considered
incompetent if he or she were not mentally competent and stable, or if he or she were
particularly young, for example.

Inflammatory
An inflammatory statement or question is a question which is designed to produce a reaction
within the jury, particularly in terms of inflaming the jury against a witness or the defendant. An
inflammatory statement or question is normally grounds for an objection and for the disallowing
of the question or the evidence, as it is manipulative and irrelevant.

Leading Questions

Leading questions are questions which are designed to suggest an answer within the question.
Leading questions are often yes or no questions, though not all yes or no questions could be
accused of leading the witness. Leading the witness is objectionable only if the lawyer asking the
leading questions is examining his or her own witness, and is not asking questions of a hostile
witness.

Privilege

Objections based on privilege are objections based on the notion that a witness does not have to
give testimony or evidence in certain areas if that witness holds privilege of particular types. For
example, a doctor witness might not have to provide answers to questions that violate the
privilege of doctor patient confidentiality.

Immaterial

Immaterial questions, or irrelevant questions, can be objected to by the opposing counsel within
a trial on the grounds that they are not important to the matter at stake in the trial. Immaterial
questions are often designed for another, manipulative purpose, which is why they are made
objectionable.

Narrative

An objection to questions which might result in narration on the part of the witness is allowed
because narrative answers do not give opposing counsel the opportunity to object to questions
or evidence prior to the introduction of those questions or evidence.

RULES OF EVIDENCE

Evidence the means, sanctioned by the Rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth
respecting a matter of fact.

Relevant evidence evidence which has a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence; evidence which tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability or improbability of the fact in issue.

Material evidence evidence which is directed to prove a fact in issue as determined by the
rules of substantive law and pleadings; evidence of such quality of substantial importance to the
particular issue, apart from its relevance

The terms relevant and material are practically the same. They are used interchangeably by
the SC.

Competent evidence evidence which is not excluded by the law or by the Rules of Court

Direct evidence evidence which proves a fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or
presumption

Circumstantial evidence proof of facts from which, taken collectively, the existence of the
particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or probable consequence

Expert evidence testimony of a witness regarding a question of science, art or trade, when he
is skilled therein
Prima facie evidence evidence which suffices for the proof of a particular fact until
contradicted and overcome by other evidence

Conclusive evidence evidence which is incontrovertible and which the law does not allow to be
contradicted

Cumulative evidence evidence of the same kind and character as that already given and tends
to prove the same proposition

Corroborative evidence evidence of a different kind and character tending to prove the same
point

Best evidence evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the fact in question

Secondary evidence evidence which is necessarily inferior to primary/best evidence and shows
on its fact that better evidence exists

Factum probans the evidentiary fact by which the factum probandum is to be established;
material evidencing the proposition, existent, and offered for the consideration of the tribunal

Factum probandum the ultimate fact sought to be established; proposition to be established,

hypothetical, and that which one party affirms and the other denies

Factum probandum

Factum Probans
Proposition to be established Material evidencing the proposition

Conceived of as hypothetical; that which one party affirms and the other denies Conceived of
for practical purposes as existent, and is offered as such for the consideration of the court

Collateral facts matters other than facts in issue and which are offered as a basis merely for
inference as to the existence or non-existence of the facts in issue

Real evidence evidence furnished by the things themselves, or view or inspection as

distinguished from a description by them of a witness; that which is addressed directly to the
senses of the court without the intervention of a witness

Rebuttal evidence evidence which is given to explain, repel, counteract or disprove facts given
in evidence by the adverse party

Positive evidence when a witness affirms that a fact did or did not occur

Negative evidence when a witness states that he did not see or know the occurrence of a fact

Admissibility of evidence

Weight of evidence

Pertains to the ability of the evidence to be allowed and accepted subject to its relevancy and
competence Pertains to the effect of evidence admitted

Substantive essence or characteristic feature of evidence as would make it worthy of

consideration by the court before its admission The probative value of evidence which the court
may give to admit after complying with the rules of relevancy and competency
Proof

Evidence

Effect and result of evidence Medium of proof

End Result Means to the end

Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-
existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any
reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.

RULE 129 WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED

Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of
government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of
the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts
of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of
public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions.

When court takes judicial notice

During trial, on any matter allow the parties to be heard thereon

After trial, and before judgment or on appeal any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case

Hearing is necessary when

During the trial, the court

motu propio, on request of a party

announces its intention to take judicial notice of any matter

After trial

before judgment or on appeal

motu propio, on request of a party

takes judicial notice of any matter, and

if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case

Hence, the court can take judicial notice of any matter during the trial as long as there is a
hearing. If trial is already over, the court can take judicial notice only of matters decisive of a
material issue in the case as long as there is a hearing.

Instances of Judicial admissions

the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document copied or attached to a pleading,
when the other party fails to specifically deny under oath (Rule 8 8)

material allegations in the complaint, when the other party fails to specifically deny it (Rule 8
11)

admissions in superseded pleadings, when offered in evidence (Rule 10 8)

act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact (Rule 130 26)

implied admission of guilt in an offer of compromise by the accused in criminal cases, except
quasi-offenses and those allowed by law to be compromised (Rule 130 27)

admission by silence (Rule 130 32)

RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY (RULE 130)

Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court. When an object is relevant
to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court.

Documents as evidence consist of writings or any material containing letters, words, numbers,
figures, symbols or other modes of written expressions offered as proof of their contents.

Best Evidence Rule When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself

Exceptions: When the original

has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror;

is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without
great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of
the whole; and

the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office

Original documents

one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry.

When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical
contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.

When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at
or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals

Requisites for admission of secondary evidence, according to grounds

the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court

prove execution or existence

prove cause of unavailability without bad faith of the offeror

proof of contents in the following order

1) copy

2) recital of its contents in

a) some authentic document, or

b) testimony of witnesses

the original is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party

adverse party had reasonable notice to produce the original (Subpoena duces tecum)

proof of the originals existence

adverse party fails to produce the original

proof of contents in the following order

1) copy

2) recital of its contents in

a) some authentic document, or

b) testimony of witnesses

the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and

the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office
contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof

Rule 132 25: What attestation of copy must state

1) the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof

2) under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court
having a seal, under the seal of such court

Rule 132 27: Public record of a private document may be proved by

1) the original record, or

2) by a copy thereof

a) attested by the legal custodian of the record

b) with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody

Parol Evidence Rule: When the terms of an, agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and
their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.

Exceptions: a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading

An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement

failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties

validity of the written agreement; or

The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement

If the ground is subsequently-agreed terms, the subsequently-agreed terms must also be put in
issue in the pleadings.

The rule applies only to the terms of an agreement. If the evidence sought to be admitted refers
to matters other than the terms of the agreement (e.g. statement of facts), then the PER does
not apply, such evidence is admissible.

PER applies only to the parties to the agreement. It does not apply where PER is invoked against
a litigant who is a stranger to the agreement.

Requisites for mistake as exception to PER

mutual between the parties

of fact, not of law

alleged and put in issue in the pleadings

proved by clear and convincing, not merely preponderance of, evidence

Parol Evidence Rule

Best Evidence Rule

No issue as to the contents of a writing Issue is contents of a writing

Parol evidence is offered Secondary evidence is offered

Presupposes that original is in court Applies when the original is not available

Effect is can not add, subtract, or explain the contents Effect is can not present any evidence
on the contents other than the original

Invoked only if the controversy is between parties to the agreement Invoked by anybody,
whether a party to the instrument or not

Applies only to agreements and wills Applies to all kinds of writing

The following persons cannot be witnesses:

(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that
they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;

(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.

For a mentally defective person to be a witness, he must be mentally capable at the time of
production, even if he was not so at the time of perception. A child must be mentally mature
both at the time of perception and at the time of production. With regards to the subject matter
of the testimony, we must make a distinction between absolute disqualifications and relative
disqualifications. Objections based on absolute disqualifications may be raised upon the calling
of the disqualified witness. Objections based on relative disqualifications may be raised when it
becomes apparent that the subject matter of the testimony covers inadmissible matters.
Marital Disqualification (Sec. 22)

Marital Communications (Sec. 24)

Covers all matters regardless of source Covers only those communicated by one spouse to
another

Applies during the marriage Applies during and after the marriage

A spouse must be a litigant A spouse need not be a litigant

Invoked when a spouse is called to testify Invoked when the testimony appears to cover
privileged matters

Requisites for dead mans statute (Sec. 23)

the witness sought to be disqualified is the plaintiff

Executor, administrator or representative of a deceased person, or the person of unsound mind

is the defendant

upon claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of
unsound mind

as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such
person became of unsound mind.

[no counterclaim is filed]

Privileged Communication (Sec. 24)

The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent
of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants or ascendants;

An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication
made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment, nor can an attorneys secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined,
without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which
has been acquired in such capacity;

A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the
consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any
information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity,
which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken
the reputation of the patient;

A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making the confession, be
examined as to any confession made to or any advice given by him in his professional character
in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest belongs;

A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to

communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest
would suffer by the disclosure.

In civil cases, an offer of compromise is inadmissible regardless of the cause of action. In criminal
cases, the general rule is an offer of compromise is admissible. However, it is inadmissible under
the following cases:

quasi-offenses (criminal negligence)

cases allowed by law to be compromised (e.g. BIR can compromise tax cases)

plea of guilty later withdrawn

unaccepted offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense

offer to pay or payment of expenses occasioned by an injury

[the offer is made only to avoid the consequences of litigation]

Note that the inadmissible offer to pay refers only to expenses occasioned by an injury. It does
not include offers to pay other expenses. Ergo, an offer to pay for damages to property is
admissible in criminal cases.

Further note that an offer to pay for expenses other than those occasioned by an injury is
inadmissible in civil cases. Though the 3rd paragraph of 27 excludes in civil cases offers to pay
only for expenses occasioned by an injury, offers to pay for other expenses fall under the general
rule that an offer to compromise in civil cases is not admissible. The exclusion in civil cases of
offers to pay for expenses occasioned by an injury is merely a superfluity. Even if the exclusion
was expressly applied to only criminal cases, an offer to pay for expenses occasioned by an injury
is in the nature of an offer to compromise which is undoubtedly admissible in civil cases. The
bottomline is: an offer to pay for any expense in civil cases is inadmissible.

Requisites for admission by silence

The act or declaration is made in the presence and within the hearing or observation of a party

The party does or says nothing

The act or declaration naturally calls for action or comment if not true

Such action or comment is proper and possible on the part of the party.

Requisites for the admissibility of a confession

1. the confession must be voluntary;

2. the confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel;

3. the confession must be express;

4.. the confession must be in writing.

Testimonial Knowledge (Hearsay Rule Sec. 36)

A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is,
which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.

Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule (Secs. 37-47)

1. Dying declaration the declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as
evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

2. Declaration against interest The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was
made so far contrary to declarants own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not
have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against
himself or his successors in interest and against third persons.

3. Act or declaration against pedigree The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be
received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the
two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word pedigree
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places
where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.

4. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree The reputation or tradition existing in a

family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be
received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on
rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.

5. Common reputation Common reputation existing previous to the controversy, respecting

facts of public or general interest more than thirty years old, or respecting marriage or moral
character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be
received as evidence of common reputation.

6. Parts of the res gestae Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking
place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof,
may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of
the res gestae.
7. Entries in the course of business Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to
which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the
facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in
his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.

8. Entries in official records Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

9. Commercial lists and the like Evidence of statements of matters of interest, to persons
engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation
is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is
published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon
by them therein.

10. Learned treatises A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law,
science or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court
takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies that the writer of the statement
in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the
subject.

11. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding The testimony or deposition of a witness

deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse
party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

GR: The opinion of a witness is not admissible. (Sec. 48)

Exceptions: Admissible opinion evidence

a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess,
may be received in evidence.

the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;

a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity

the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.

his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or the appearance of a person

GR: Character evidence not generally admissible (Sec. 51)

Exceptions

In Criminal Cases:

accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the
offense charged.

In rebuttal, the prosecution may prove the bad moral character of the accused which is pertinent
it to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.

moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable
degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.

In Civil Cases only when pertinent to the issue of character involved in the case.

good character of an impeached witness

BURDEN OF PROOF (RULE 131)

Burden of proof the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law

Instances of conclusive presumptions

a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another
to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising
out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it:

The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of
the relation of landlord and tenant between them.

Statutory instances of estoppel

non-owner transferor who later acquires title passes ownership to the transferee by operation of
law (Art. 1434 NCC)

agent who alienates can not claim title against the transferee (Art. 1435 NCC)

a lessee or a bailee is estopped from asserting title to the thing leased or received, as against the
lessor or bailor. (Art. 1436 NCC)

in a contract between 3rd persons concerning immovable property, one of them is misled by a
person with respect to the ownership or real right over the real estate, the latter is precluded
from asserting his legal title or interest therein, provided all these requisites are present:

fraudulent representation or wrongful concealment of facts known to the party estopped;

party precluded must intend that the other should act upon the facts as misrepresented;

party misled must have been unaware of the true facts; and

party defrauded must have acted in accordance with the misrepresentation. (Art. 1437 NCC)

One who has allowed another to assume apparent ownership of personal property for the
purpose of making any transfer of it, cannot, if he received the sum for which a pledge has been
constituted, set up his own title to defeat the pledge of the property, made by the other to a
pledgee who received the same in good faith and for value. (Art. 1438 NCC)

Disputable presumptions The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but

may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;

(b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;

(c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act;

(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;

(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;

(f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter;

(g) That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter;

(h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid;

(i) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the later ones is produced;

(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the
taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or
exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him;

(k) That a person in possession of an order on himself for the payment of the money, or the
delivery of anything, has paid the money or delivered the thing accordingly;

(1) That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it;

(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;

(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in
the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;

(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed
upon by it; and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for
arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them;

(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;

(q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed;

(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;

(s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration;

(t) That an indorsement of a negotiable instrument was made before the instrument was
overdue and at the place where the instrument is dated;

(u) That a writing is truly dated;

(v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail;

(w) That after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, he is considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five
years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the division of the estate
among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft which is missing, who has
not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;

(2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities, and has been missing
for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and whose existence
has not been known for four years;

(4) If a married person has been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present may
contract a subsequent marriage if he or she has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is
already dead. In case of disappearance, where there is danger of death under the circumstances
hereinabove provided, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient for the purpose of
contracting a subsequent marriage. However, in any case, before marrying again, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Family Code and in the rules for
a declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.

(x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the
law or fact;

(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life;

(z) That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of copartnership;

(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage;

(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other
and who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry.

(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each
other and who have acquired property through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry, such contributions and their corresponding shares including joint deposits
of money and evidences of credit are equal.

(dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three
hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rides shall govern in the
absence of proof to the contrary:

(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent
marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born
within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage;

(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent
marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born
within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage.

(ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature;

(ff) That the law has been obeyed;

(gg) That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed or published by public authority,
was so printed or published;

(hh) That a printed or published book, purporting to contain reports of cases adjudged in
tribunals of the country where the book is published, contains correct reports of such cases;

(ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular
person has actually conveyed it to him when such presumption is necessary to perfect the title
of such person or his successor in interest;

(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same calamity, such
as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular
circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the
probabilities resulting from the strength and age of the sexes, according to the following rules:

1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have survived;

2. If both were above the age of sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived;

3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have survived;

4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to have
survived; if the sex be the same, the older;

5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is deemed
to have survived.

(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each
other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall
prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same time.

PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE (RULE 132)

The order in which an individual witness may be examined is as follows:

1. Direct examination by the proponent the examination-in-chief of a witness by the party

presenting him on the facts relevant to the issue.

2. Cross-examination by the opponent Upon the termination of the direct examination, the
witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct
examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy
and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important
facts bearing upon the issue.

3. Re-direct examination by the proponent After the cross-examination of the witness has been
concluded, he may be re-examined by the party calling him, to explain or supplement his
answers given during the cross-examination. On re-direct examination, questions on matters not
dealt with during the cross-examination, may be allowed by the court in its discretion.

4. Re-cross-examination by the opponent Upon the conclusion of the re-direct examination,

the adverse party may re-cross-examine the witness on matters stated in his re-direct
examination, and also on such other matters as may be allowed by the court in its discretion.

Leading questions a question which suggests to the witness the answer which the examining
party desires

GR: Leading questions not allowed.

Exceptions

cross examination;

Preliminary matters;
difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is

ignorant, or

a child of tender years, or

feeble mind, or

a deaf-mute;

unwilling or hostile witness; or

witness is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private

corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party.

Misleading question one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the witness, or
contrary to that which he has previously stated.

Misleading questions are never allowed. No exceptions.

Sec. 11. Impeachment of adverse partys witness. A witness may be impeached by the party
against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation
for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except
that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he
has been convicted of an offense.

GR: The party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility.

Exceptions: When party may impeach his own witness (except evidence of bad character)

an unwilling or hostile witness; or

a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private
corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party.

Grounds for declaring a witness unwilling or hostile

adverse interest

unjustified reluctance to testify, or

misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.

Consequences of being an unwilling, hostile, or adverse witness

may be impeached by the proponent, except by evidence of bad character

may also be impeached by the opponent

may be cross-examined by the opponent, only on the subject matter of his direct examination

proponent may ask leading questions

Sec. 36. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made.

Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be
made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.

An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer
unless a different period is allowed by the court.

In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.

Grounds for objection Hearsay, argumentative, leading, misleading, incompetent, irrelevant,

best evidence rule, parol evidence rule, question has no basis

When evidence considered offered

People v. Franco, 269 SCRA 211 (1997) The court shall consider no evidence, even an extra-
judicial confession, which has not been formally offered. Mere fact that evidence has been
identified and marked in the course of the examination of a witness, without the contents being
recited in his testimony, does not mean that it has been formally offered as evidence.
Identification of documentary evidence is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by
the marking of the evidence as an exhibit, while the formal offer of documentary evidence is
done only when the party rests its case.

Philippine Bank of Commerce v. CA, 195 SCRA 567 (1991) Where the genuineness and due
execution of documents of an instrument attached to a complaint are deemed admitted by
failure to specifically deny it under oath, such instruments are considered as evidence although
they were not formally offered.

Rule 8, Sec. 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is founded upon a
written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the
preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed
admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he
claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party
does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an
inspection of the original instrument is refused.

When objection should be made

People v. Java, 227 SCRA 668 (1993) Objection to testimony on the ground of lack of a formal
offer of the testimony should be done when the witness was called to testify.

Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, 186 SCRA 385 (1990) Objection to documentary evidence must
be made at the time it is formally offered (i.e. when the party rests its case) as an exhibit and not
before. Objection prior to that time (e.g. identification of the evidence) is premature. Mere
identification and marking is not equivalent to a formal offer of the evidence. A party may decide
to not offer evidence already identified and marked.

WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE (RULE 133)

In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues
involved lies, the court may consider
all the facts and circumstances of the case

the witnesses manner of testifying

their intelligence

their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying

the nature of the facts to which they testify

the probability or improbability of their testimony

their interest or want of interest

their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial.

number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.

A cause of action on the ground of reformation of instrument must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.

In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

A defense of self-defense must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.

In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if
it is supported by substantial evidence

Substantial evidence that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion

Generally, the motive of the accused is immaterial in a criminal case, not being an essential
element of the crime, hence, it does not need to be proved.
Exceptions:

1. when there is no eyewitness and the suspicion is likely to fall on a considerable number of
persons;

2. when there is doubt as to whether the accused is or is not the person who committed the
offense;

3. when it is necessary to determine the sanity of the accused or the voluntariness of the act,
the specific nature of the crime committed, or whether the shooting was intentional or
accidental;

4. when the accused interposes self-defense or defense of stranger.

Proffer of evidence vs. Offer of evidence

A proffer of evidence is proper whenever a court disallows or refuses to permit counsel to

present testimony which he thinks is competent, material and necessary to prove his case. It is
the proper method of preserving the record to the end that the question may be saved for the
purpose of review.

An offer of evidence is done so that the court may consider the evidence presented by counsel.
Under the Rules of Court, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

Material evidence vs. Relevant evidence

According to eminent jurists there is no distinction between materiality and relevancy. Both
terms have been used interchangeably in numerous cases. Evidence is relevant when it has a
tendency in reason to establish the probability or improbability of a fact in issue.

Adverse witness vs. Hostile witness

A hostile witness is one who manifests so much hostility or prejudice under examination-in-chief
that the party who has called him, or his representative, is allowed to cross-examine him, that is
to treat him as though he had been called by the opposite party.

An adverse witness is one who must be adverse to the party calling him, and be actively seeking
a recovery against, or opposing a recovery by, such party, or a person for whose immediate
benefit the action was brought or defended.

Objection vs. Continuing objection

Every objection to the admissibility of evidence shall be made at the time such evidence is
offered, or as soon thereafter as the objection to its admissibility shall have become
apparent;otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived. The grounds for the objection
must be specified.

Under the Rules of Evidence, when it becomes reasonably apparent in the course of the
examination of a witness that the questions being propounded are of the same class as those to
which objection has been made, whether such objection was sustained or overruled, it shall not
be necessary to repeat the objection, it being sufficient for the adverse party to record his
continuing objection to such class of questions.

Leading Questions and Misleading Questions

A question which suggests to the witness the answer which the examining party desires, is a
leading question.

A misleading question is a question which assumes the truth of facts which are in issue or
assumes material facts which have not been proved, or certain answers to have been given to
prior questions, when such answers have not been given. It is not allowed.

Subpoena duces tecum vs. Subpoena ad testificandum

A subpoena ad testificandum is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to

testify at the hearing or trial of an action or at any investigation conducted under Philippine laws
or for the taking of his deposition.

A subpoena duces tecum is a process directed to a person requiring him to bring with him any
books, documents, or other things under his control.

Objection: Relevance

The evidence is relevant because it tends to show [fact of consequence].

Objection: Prejudice

The danger asserted does not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.

Objection: Impermissible Propensity Evidence. [or] Improper attempt to use character to show
action in conformity therewith.

The evidence is not offered for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith.
Objection: Lack of Personal Knowledge

This witness has actual personal knowledge of the facts to which he testified.

Objection: Speculation

This witness has actual personal knowledge of the facts to which he testified.

Objection: Hearsay

The statement is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but for another purpose. (And
a lot of others!)

Objections: Narrative

Argue that the witness is answering the question.

Objections: Improper Lay Opinion

Argue that the witness is qualified to answer or qualify the witness or just move on.

Objections: Lack of Foundation

Lay your foundation!!!

Objections: Improper Characterization

Argue that this is your witness' opinion based on observations, not a real characterization.

Objection: Leading Question

No real argument. Say, "Your honor, may I rephrase the question?" and fix the problem.
Objections: Facts not in Evidence

Either argue that the necessary foundation has been laid or lay the foundation then re-ask the
question.