Topoi (2017) 36:445455

DOI 10.1007/s11245-015-9335-2

Enactive Affectivity, Extended

Giovanna Colombetti1

Published online: 12 July 2015

 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Abstract In this paper I advance an enactive view of theories, for example, regard emotional episodes as usually
affectivity that does not imply that affectivity must stop at involving bodily processes, such as facial expressions or
the boundaries of the organism. I first review the enactive patterns of activation of the autonomic nervous system
notion of sense-making, and argue that it entails that (e.g., James 1884; Damasio 1999; Prinz 2004). On the
cognition is inherently affective. Then I review the proposal, other hand, cognitive theories see emotions as cognitive
advanced by Di Paolo (Topoi 28:921, 2009), that the states or processes (Solomon 1993; Nussbaum 2004); given
enactive approach allows living systems to extend. that cognition is usually seen as underpinned by brain
Drawing out the implications of this proposal, I argue that, if processes, in the absence of further qualifications these
enactivism allows living systems to extend, then it must also theories thus favour the brain (or even some part of it) as
allow sense-making, and thus cognition as well as affectiv- the seat of emotions. In spite of their differences, these
ity, to extendin the specific sense of allowing the physical approaches are all internalist, in the sense that they con-
processes (vehicles) underpinning these phenomena to ceive of emotions as underpinned by material processes, or
include, as constitutive parts, non-organic environmental vehicles, located inside the organism.1 Although exist-
processes. Finally I suggest that enactivism might also allow ing theoretical discussions of moods and motivational
specific human affective states, such as moods, to extend. states are less developed and systematic, it is fair to say that
these states are also typically regarded as underpinned by
Keywords Enactivism
Extended mind
Extended life
material processes that remain within the organism.
Affectivity
Emotion
Mood In this paper I challenge this mainstream internalist
framework, and argue that it is possible to conceive of
affective states as underpinned not only by organic pro-
1 Introduction cesses, but also by hybrid processes involving organic and
non-organic elements. In this sense, I defend an externalist
Affectivitybroadly construed to include emotions, view of affectivity. I do so, however, not by drawing on the
moods and motivational states (such as desires, needs, influential Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC), but
fatigue, pain)is typically regarded as a state of the from the perspective of the enactive approach originally
organism, a state the organism is in. Scholars disagree advanced by Varela et al. (1991) and further developed by
on what components are necessary for affective states, but
whatever components they include, these are usually states 1
There are different versions of both internalism and externalism
or processes that remain within the organism. Some
(see Hurley 2010). In this paper I am concerned only with vehicle
internalism/externalism (as opposed to content internalism/exter-
nalism), which is about the location of the material vehicles taken to
& Giovanna Colombetti underpin mental states. I also adopt a relatively broad characterization
[email protected] of internalism, according to which vehicles outside the brain but
within the organism still count as internal (whereas sometimes
1
Department of Sociology, Philosophy and Anthropology, internalism is limited to the view that the vehicles of mental states are
University of Exeter, Exeter EX4 4RJ, UK brainbound, i.e., remain within the brain).

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446 G. Colombetti

Thompson (2007, 2011) and others (e.g., Di Paolo 2005).2 explicating the related notions of autonomy and adaptivity.
It has been argued (see Wheeler 2010) that enactivism As we will see, enactivism holds that all living organisms,
entails an internalist view of the mind, and that it is as autonomous and adaptive, are sense-making systems and
therefore incompatible with HEC. In this paper I offer a that, as such, they are cognitive. Sense-making, in other
different view. I do not deny that HEC and the enactive words, is the basic mark of the cognitive (Thompson
approach provide contrasting accounts of the nature of the 2011: 211). In this section I first provide a summary of the
mental, but I argue that enactivism is not internalist. arguments behind this proposal,5 and then argue that the
Rather, it is possible to identify cases in which, from an enactive notion of sense-making entails that living organ-
enactive perspective, physical processes outside the isms are not only cognitive, but simultaneously also
organism ought to be regarded as vehicles of mental pro- affective.
cesses. It is thus possible to say that the enactive mind also Let us begin, then, with the enactive conception of
extendsalthough, as we shall see, on the basis of autonomy. This notion has its roots in Maturana and Var-
different criteria from those posited by HEC. More elas (1980) theory of autopoiesis (first published in
specifically, in this paper I aim to show that enactivism Spanish in 1972), and was developed further by Varela
allows not just cognition, but also affectivity, to extend. If (1979). Maturana and Varela aimed first and foremost to
my arguments are on the right track, they will illustrate at provide an operational characterization of life. Living
least one way in which one can challenge the traditional systems, they proposed, are physical autopoietic systems
internalist view of affectivity.3 (or autopoietic machines), i.e., literally, physical self-
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 I first making systems. In their definition, an autopoietic system
review the enactive idea that cognition is sense-making, is
and then argue that this idea entails that cognition is
A network of processes of production (transformation
inherently affective. In Sect. 3 I turn to the charge that
and destruction) of components that produces the
enactivism entails an internalist view of cognition, and
components which: (i) through their interactions and
review how enactivists have replied to this charge. In
transformations continuously regenerate the network
particular I focus on the proposal that living systems can
of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii)
extend by allowing mediating structures into their
constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the
organization (Di Paolo 2009). In Sect. 4 I draw out the
space in which they (the components) exist by
implications of this proposal, arguing that if, from an
specifying the topological domain of its realization as
enactive perspective, life can extend, then sense-making
such a network. (Maturana and Varela 1980: 79)
can too, and with it cognition and affectivity (enactively
characterized). I then go on to illustrate this view in more This characterization was meant to be formal, like the
detail at the phenomenological level, with reference to the one of a Turing machine. Maturana and Varela then went
notions of Umwelt and affordances. Finally, in Sect. 5 I on to characterize living systems as physical instantiations
offer some (very) preliminary ideas on how the consider- of autopoietic machines. The paradigmatic physical
ations developed previously may apply to human moods. autopoietic system is the living cell. A cell is a network of
interacting processes of production that continually
regenerates itself and that constitutes itself as a unity (self-
2 Enactive Affectivity identifies). In a further section of their work, Maturana and
Varela also stated that living systems, as autopoietic, are
We need first of all to clarify the enactive perspective on cognitive systems: The domain of all the interactions in
affectivity.4 This clarification requires introducing the which an autopoietic system can enter without loss of
enactive notion of sense-making, which in turn requires identity is its cognitive domain (199).
It is undeniable that these elements of the theory of
2
In recent years, the term enactivism has come to refer to a variety autopoiesis have influenced the enactive approach. How-
of related but different approachessuch as Noes (2004) dynamic
ever, recent developments of the latter have also distanced
sensorimotor approach, and Hutto and Myins (2013) radical
enactivism. For the purposes of this paper I focus on the canonical themselves from the original formulation of this theory,
version of enactivism, and in particular on its account of the modifying parts of it, adding various qualifications, and
relationship between life and mind.
3
For different ways of challenging this view, see Stephan, Walter Footnote 4 continued
and Wilutzky (2014) and Colombetti and Roberts (2015) on how HEC otherwise has been written about affectivity from an enactive
can be applied to the affective domain. perspective.
4 5
In what follows I summarize my own viewpoint (see Colombetti Thompson and Stapleton (2009) and Di Paolo and Thompson
2010, 2014). Other relevant discussions can be found in Varela and (2014) also provide useful succinct introductions. For the full
Depraz (2005) and Thompson (2007, chapter 12). Not much treatment, see Thompson (2007).

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Enactive Affectivity, Extended 447

developing it in new directions.6 One shift has been the make is that only a network of precarious processes can be
abandonment of the distinction between physical and literally self-enabling (72), because only such a network
abstract (formal) autopoietic systems, and its replacement would have to continually work to maintain itself, to
with the distinction between autopoietic systems and (for- counteract the unstable and decaying nature of its pro-
mally defined) autonomous systems. In Varelas (1979: 15) cesses. And the restless (ibid.) character of such a net-
characterization, autopoiesis is one possible form of work is also what makes the network seek interactions with
autonomy, and the term should be restricted to systems its surroundings, to get the necessary energetic and material
(natural or artificial) characterized by a chemical network resources.
(or something very close to it). He also maintained that the In sum, then, recent versions of enactivism define
idea of autopoiesis is restricted to relations of production autonomy in terms of operational closure and precarious-
of some kind, and refers to topological boundaries (54). ness. The next step towards the enactive characterization of
This characterization does not apply to systems that lack sense-making is provided by the notion of adaptivity.
these relations and boundaries, but that nevertheless can be Adaptivity refers to the capacity of certain autonomous
said to exhibit autonomy, such as insect societies (ibid.). systems to regulate themselves with respect to conditions
Similarly, Thompson (2007: 44) characterizes autopoietic registered as improving or deteriorating, viable or unviable
systems as instantiations of autonomous systems in the (Di Paolo 2005). To take a much-cited example, think of a
chemical domain, and points out that whereas all motile bacterium that, to maintain itself, swims toward
autopoietic systems have an autonomous organization, not higher concentrations of sugar and away from noxious
all autonomous systems are autopoietic (e.g., complex substances. In doing so, it regulates its network of pro-
living systems such as multicellular metazoan systems, cesses with respect to its conditions, registered as unviable
nervous systems, insect colonies are autonomous but not (when the system meets the noxious substance) or as viable
autopoietic). (when the system meets the higher concentrations of
What, then, are autonomous systems? Thompson (2007: sugar). Importantly, enactivism emphasizes that this regu-
44) defines them as systems whose constituent processes lation is at the same time an evaluation of the systems
(i) recursively depend on each other for their generation surroundings, in the sense that, as the system regulates its
and their realization as a network, (ii) constitute the system conditions of viability, its surroundings acquire meaning
as a unity in whatever domain they exist, and (iii) deter- for it: the noxious substance is for the bacterium something
mine a domain of possible interactions with the environ- to be avoided, and more sugar is something to be sought.
ment. This definition entails that autonomous systems are This process of evaluation, which is made possible by the
operationally closed. Operational closure refers to a autonomous and adaptive nature of living organisms, is
specific kind of organization in which the results of the what enactivists call sense-making. It entails the transfor-
operations performed by the constituents of the system mation of the physiochemical environment of the organism
remain within the system itself. Importantly, an opera- into an Umwelt: a world that is meaningful for the organ-
tionally closed system is not causally isolated from its ism.7 This process, enactivists hold, is already a form of
surroundings; it can still be influenced by, and influence, cognitionalthough a basic one.8 It is a form of cognition
processes that are not part of it. because it entails the appearance of a perspective or point
Operational closure is necessary for autonomy; how- of view on the side of the organism, from which its sur-
ever, as Di Paolo and Thompson (2014) have recently roundings have meaning. As Varela (1991: 85) stressed, we
emphasized, it is not sufficient. Some systems, like cellular
automata, are operationally closed but not autonomous in
7
the wider sense Di Paolo and Thompson wantwhere The term Umwelt as is used here comes from Jacob von Uexkull
(1934/2010), where it refers to the world from the perspective of
this wider sense needs also to include implications con-
living organisms that inhabit it, or their lived environment. Uexkull
veyed by notions such as spontaneity, immanent pur- distinguished between Umwelt and Umgebung, where the latter refers
posiveness, intrinsic teleology, and the self-generation to the physical surroundings of the organism. Varela (1991) draws a
of norms (7172). Here is where precariousness enters parallel distinction between the world that is enacted or brought
forth by the organism in sense-making, and the physiochemical
the story. A component process of an operationally closed
environment in which the organism is situated. In this and other
network is precarious if it stops, runs down or ceases to earlier works, Varela used the term world-making (rather than
exist in the absence of the enabling relations established by sense-making) to refer to the process of enacting a world of
the network. The point Di Paolo and Thompson want to meaning.
8
The qualification basic (Thompson 2011: 211; Di Paolo and
Thompson 2014: 73) is meant to allow for the appearance of more
6
It is thus not exact to call this strand of enactivism autopoietic, as complex forms of cognition in more complex organisms, including
Hutto and Myin (2013) do. Note also that the theory of autopoiesis forms of human cognition dependent on organisms being situated in
does not feature in Varela et al. (1991). cultural symbolic contexts.

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448 G. Colombetti

have to posit such a point of view if we want to make any Uexkulls terminology, it is not just an Umgebung). The
sense of the bacteriums behaviour: Umwelt is the world from the perspective of the organism;
in sense-making, the physical world is transformed into a
The entire bacterium points to [its sucrose gradient
world of significance for the organism. Thus, the organism
and flagellar beat] as relevant: the specific signifi-
is not, and cannot, be indifferent to its Umwelt. The
cance as components of feeding behavior is only
Umwelt is by definition the world as it is relevant for the
possible by the presence and perspective of the bac-
organism, as it touches, strikes or affects the organism as
terium as a totality. Remove the bacterium as a unity,
significant.
and all correlations between gradients and hydrody-
Another way to draw out the affective character of
namic properties become environmental chemical
enactive sense-making is with reference to the claim that
laws, evident to us as observers but devoid of any
the perspective of living beings is concerned (Weber and
special significance.
Varela 2002; Di Paolo 2005; Thompson 2007: 152162).
Varela also talked of a surplus of signification (86) to Enactivists explicitly import this idea from Jonas (1966),
refer to the supplementary meaning that is generated by together with his notion of the immanent purposiveness of
any living organisms activity of sense-making, as the living beings. Briefly, since Weber and Varela (2002)
physical world becomes a meaningful environment for it. enactivists have depicted living organisms as having
The generation (enactment) of this supplementary meaning natural purposes immanent to their organization. A pri-
is a cognitive activity. mary natural purpose of organisms is to maintain them-
This account thus departs significantly from the one selves, to keep being, to affirm life (op. cit., 117). This
provided by approaches in cognitive science and analytic purpose is not imposed from the outside but is intrinsic to
philosophy of mind that characterize cognition as a com- the self-maintaining organization of the living system.
putational process operating over representational items. Thanks to their adaptive nature, living systems also have
For present purposes, an important consequence of the more specific purposes depending on their structure (the
enactive characterization of cognition as sense-making is bacterium will aim to get more sugar, for example,
that cognition turns out to be, from its roots, intrinsically because of the way its metabolism is realized) and on the
affective, and accordingly that there are no cognitive sys- structure of their surroundings (the sugar gradient must
tems that are not at the same time also affective. By af- contain different concentrations of sugar for the bacterium
fective here I do not mean necessarily emotional, to move in it). Because of this immanent purposiveness,
where emotion refers to the capacity to experience or Weber and Varela talk of the organism as being an au-
manifest specific emotions (fear, anger, joy, envy, sad- tonomous centre of concern (98); the precarious nature
ness, pride, and so on). I mean something more general, of life entails that it is always menaced by concern
which can be characterized as a lack of indifference, and (Sorge), the need to avoid perishing (113). As Thompson
rather a sensibility, interest, or concern for ones existence. (2007: 153) puts it,
This characterization is consistent with the etymology of
The organisms concern, its natural purpose, is to
the term: affectivity refers to the capacity or possibility
keep on going, to continue living, to affirm and
of having something done to one, of being struck or
reaffirm itself in the face of imminent not-being.
influenced (the term comes from the past participle of the
Incessant material turnover and exchange with the
Latin verb afficio, to strike, to influenceitself a com-
environment is both a reason for this concern and the
pound of ad, to, and facio, to do). This influence is
only way to meet it. Such is the immanent teleology
not merely physical or mechanical (as when one says that
of life.
the daily amount of sunlight affects the air temperature) but
psychological. It refers to the capacity to be personally The proposal, note, is not that simple organisms such as
affected, to be touched in a meaningful way by what is bacteria experience concern as we or other animals do.
affecting one. In this broad sense, it is not necessary to be There is little reason to believe that bacteria are phenom-
in a specific emotion or mood to be in an affective state; enally or even pre-reflectively conscious (see Thompson
one is affected when something merely strikes one as 2007: 162). The notion of concern at stake here is meant to
meaningful, relevant, or salient. make the point that living beings are not indifferent to their
Assuming this characterization of affectivity, it should existence (in the way that a stone for example is). Rather
be straightforward to see that sense-making is not just a they strive to maintain themselves, and this striving sets
cognitive but also an affective phenomenon. Sense-mak- them apart from non-living things. Here is where, again,
ing, as we just saw, is the enactment of an Umwelt, and the the affective dimension of enactive sense-making should
Umwelt is not just the physical surrounding with which the be apparent. The notions of concern and natural purposes
organism interacts and from which it differentiates itself (in denote affective characteristics, an interest of living

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systems for their existence, a basic sensitivity or irri- its material vehicles within the head. As I shall argue, I
tabilityto keep to Jonass terminology.9 think that this is possible.
We can identify two enactive responses to Wheelers
internalist charge. The first one emphasizes the relational
3 Extending Life nature of enactive cognition, and rejects Wheelers accusation
of internalism by retorting that cognition, as relational, strictly
A question raised in recent years about the enactive speaking has no location (see Di Paolo 2009: 19; Thompson
approach is whether or not it is compatible with HEC and Stapleton 2009: 26; Thompson 2011: 218). Thompson and
(Hypothesis of Extended Cognition), according to which Stapleton (2009: 26) elaborate on this point by noting a par-
under certain circumstances the material vehicles that allel with the phenomenological notion of intentionality:
underpin cognition need to be located not just in the brain, Intentionality is always a relation to that which transcends the
or even the body, but also in the material environment. This present state of the system In saying that the mind is
thesis was originally formulated by Clark and Chalmers intentional, phenomenologists imply that the mind is rela-
(1998) and has been further elaborated in subsequent works tional. They draw on Heidegger to note that a living being is
by Clark (e.g., 2003, 2008) and others (see for example the in its world in a completely different sense from that of water
papers collected in Menary 2010). being in a glass (ibid.). I do not find this reply satisfying
According to Wheeler (2010), enactivism and HEC are not because, it seems to me, to the extent that enactivism posits the
compatible. This is because, in his view, enactivism entails existence of mind-enabling material processes or vehicles (and
that cognition and life are co-located: the boundaries of the does not just characterize mentality at a phenomenological-
living organism are also the boundaries of the cognitive existential level), it cannot entirely sidestep the question of
system; because the living system cannot extend (Wheeler which and where these processes are. Thompson (2011: 218)
takes this to be a highly plausible claim, p. 35, emphasis in writes that it does not make sense to think of cognition as
original), the cognitive system cannot either. According to spatially located in the way that the vehicles enabling cog-
Wheeler, then, enactivism remains an internalist position; nitive processes are spatially located, but HEC and the debate
even though it entails that cognition is not just in the skull, it around it are precisely about the location of such vehicles.
does not allow cognition to spill over into the world. Unless enactivism intends to reject the idea of material vehi-
Enactivists have responded to Wheeler (see Di Paolo cles of the mind altogether, it seems possible to talk about their
2009; Thompson and Stapleton 2009; Thompson 2011), location within an enactivist framework.10
pointing out that whereas there are undeniable tensions In the rest of my discussion I then focus and elaborate on
between enactivism and HEC, enactivism is not internalist another enactive response to Wheelers charge. This
about cognition. A source of tension between enactivism response, found in Di Paolo (2009), emphasizes that
and HEC is that the latter assumes a computational-func- enactivism allows life to extend (Di Paolos term), more
tionalist view of cognition that the former rejects. For specifically that it allows organisms to integrate mediat-
HEC, cognitive processes are computational processes over ing structures into their (precarious) adaptive autonomous
representations. HECs distinctive claim is that in some organization. Di Paolo offers the example of aquatic insects
cases the relevant computational work is done over repre- that can breathe underwater by trapping air bubbles on their
sentations that are located not just in the brain or body, but tiny abdominal hairs (plastrons).11 As the insect consumes
also in the worldas when we rely on written numbers to
perform complex calculations. Here, even if some repre- 10
Radical enactivists (Hutto and Myin 2013) do reject the notion of
sentations are stored in the world, they are still part of the vehicles of cognition, together with the one of content, because
cognitive process, on the basis of a criterion of functional they see both notions as going hand-in-hand with computational-
representationalist accounts of cognition. However, it is not clear that
equivalence (also known as the parity principle; see
canonical enactivism needs to reject all talk of vehicles and contents.
Clark and Chalmers 1998). Enactivism, as we saw, offers a This is a point that promoters of canonical enactivism will need to
very different account of cognitionone that rejects clarify in the future. Here I only note that Thompson (2007: 59) seems
computational functionalism in favour of a view of the willing to talk of vehicles in the sense of the structures or
processes that embody meaning, provided we keep in mind that
mind based on a specific account of the organization of
these are temporally extended patterns of activity that can crisscross
living systems. So the question here is whether and how the brain-body-world boundaries, and the meanings or contents they
enactivism, and not just computational functionalism, can embody are brought forth or enacted in the context of the systems
offer a view of the mind that does not necessarily enclose structural coupling with its environment.
11
There are several species of aquatic insects, commonly called
water boatmen, that use this or other similar underwater respiration
9
Jonas (1966: 99) talked of the irritability of life to refer to its methods. Di Paolo refers to Thorpes (1950) study, which described
sensitiveness to the stimulus, and wrote that irritability is the amongst others the genus Aphelocheirus, which apparently has
germ, as it were the atom, of having a world. perfected this system of respiration.

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450 G. Colombetti

the oxygen contained in these bubbles, a partial pressure autonomous structuresnew forms of life that are ex-
deficit is created in them, which is then compensated by tended relative to the traditional conception of the
dissolved oxygen that diffuses in from the water, so that the organism.
process can continue indefinitely. Di Paolo characterizes Note that something like the idea of an extended
this as a new form of life involving a structure (the air organism can be found already in the original formulation
bubbles) that mediates the organisms regulatory activity of of the theory of autopoiesis. Maturana and Varela (1980:
its coupling (i.e., reciprocal interactions) with the envi- 107111) discussed higher-order autopoietic systems.
ronment. As he notes, the mediation in cases like this is so These are composite autopoietic systems, i.e., autopoietic
intimately connected with vital functions that the living systems constituted by either (i) two or more coupled
system itself might be called extended (2009: 17). Inti- autopoietic systemsas in the case of the multicellular
mate connection refers here to the integration or assimi- pattern of organization (110); or (ii) one or more
lation of the mediating structure into a new adaptive autopoietic systems coupled to non-autopoietic systems. In
autonomous systemthe system insect-plus-air-bub- composite autopoietic systems, the component autopoietic
bles. This is a system underdetermined by metabolism, systems are subordinated to the maintenance of the higher-
but it is a (new) form of life in that its structure exhibits the order autopoietic unity. The only difference between
proper organization. This is tantamount to saying that the (i) and (ii) is that in (ii) the non-autopoietic system, as such,
air bubbles are not external to the living form, merely does not have the capacity autonomously to maintain its
allowing the insect to stay alive underwater; they are, identity; nevertheless, it still participates in the autopoietic
rather, constitutive parts of the new form of life. organization of the higher-order unity. The subordinate
We can find innumerable other cases in nature of component autopoietic system (or systems), because of its
mediating structures that are intimately connected with coupling with a non-autopoietic system, undergoes struc-
vital functions. Consider for example the many microbes tural changes but maintains its autopoietic organization,
prions, plasmids, organelles, etc.that reside in complex and at the same time becomes a constituent part of a dif-
organisms and contribute to a variety of functions, ferent and larger autopoietic system. In what follows, I
including gene expression and the maintenance of cell shall adopt the terminology of composite systems to
function (see Dupre and OMalley 2009). According to refer to adaptive autonomous (rather than autopoietic)
Dupre and OMalley, life indeed ought to be seen as a systems constituted by two or more coupled adaptive
collaborative phenomenon that includes a multitude of autonomous systems, or one or more adaptive autonomous
micro-organisms coupled to the organism (traditionally systems coupled to non-autonomous ones. The system
understood). Note that Dupre and OMalley present their composed by the aquatic insect and the air bubbles trapped
view as diverging from traditional accounts of living sys- on its hair is an instance of the latter.
tems that characterize them in terms of autonomy; in their
opinion, the dependence of biological individuals on
symbiotic associations with many other micro-organisms 4 Extending Sense-Making
makes such an emphasis on autonomy problematic. Yet, as
we saw, enactivism characterizes autonomy in terms of If the preceding analysis is correct, then the enactive
operational closure, which does not entail that living sys- approach does not entail that living beings are necessarily
tems have to be identified via their physical boundaries; bounded by the organisms skin (or other material bound-
rather, living forms are individuated by operational ary). Living beings can be extended, as in the case of
boundaries, i.e., boundaries established by relations of composite systems made of organic and non-organic pro-
reciprocal influences among components (such that, as we cesses. I now want to draw out some of the implications of
saw, the results of the operations of the various components this point that so far have remained implicit in the enactive
of the system remain within the system, thus forming a approach. In particular, in this section I first elaborate the
closed network). As such, operational boundaries need not claim that cognition as sense-making can also extendin
coincide with physical boundaries (although they might, as the sense that it can be brought forth by hybrid organic/
in the case of the cell). A consequence of this account is non-organic composite systems. Then I elaborate the point
that an operationally closed organization can be realized that, because sense-making is also inherently affective (as
physically in a variety of ways, including ways that do not we saw), affectivity as well can extend.
require the generation of a membrane (recall that, for Let us stay with the example of aquatic insects. Recall
enactivism, ant colonies and nervous systems count as that the enactive notion of sense-making refers to the living
autonomous systems). Thus, from an enactive perspective, organisms activity of enacting or bringing forth a world of
symbiotic associations of the kind Dupre and OMalley significance (an Umwelt) in virtue of the organisms
discuss are best understood as generating new adaptive (precarious) adaptive autonomy. So what about, say, a

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Enactive Affectivity, Extended 451

diving beetle? As a living being, it is a sense-making offers to the submerged ant and beetle respectively. As is
system that enacts a certain Umwelt characterized by a well known, the notion of affordance was introduced by
graded landscape of values. This is the case both when the Gibson (1979) and is central to ecological psychology. It
beetle walks on the ground, and when it dives underwater refers to possibilities of action offered by the environment
into a pond. In the latter case, the air bubbles that the beetle to an organism. What the environment affords, in this
traps on its hair are a mediating structure integrated into a sense, to any specific organism, depends on the latters
new type of agent (a new form of life). Here the underwater sensorimotor structure and abilities. To organisms like us, a
Umwelt of the beetle is enacted thanks to the mediation of chair, for example, typically affords sitting on (whereas it
the air bubbles, as these are integrated into the new adap- affords jumping on or scratching to a cat, crawling up to an
tive autonomous structure. As such, the underwater beetle ant, etc.); a flight of stairs affords stepping up and down,
(in effect, the composite system beetle-plus-air-bubbles) and so on.
brings forth a new (compared to the beetle-on-the-ground, Now, affordances have been referred to primarily to
or the underwater-beetle-with-no-air-bubbles) set of norms account for the active nature of (mainly visual) perception.
for self-maintenance. In enactive terminology, this is the However, talk of affordances can also help characterize the
same as saying that the underwater beetle makes sense of, affective nature of our lived environments. An organisms
or cognizes, the world in a new way. Umwelt can be seen as a landscape of valued objects and
We can illustrate this point with a comparison. The events that invite to relate to them in different waysnot
Umwelt of the diving beetle is quite different from the one just motorically, but also psychologically, as forces that
of a non-aquatic insect that happens to find itself under- attract or repel in an affective sense (see also Dreyfus
water. A non-aquatic ant, for example, can survive and Kelly 2007; Withagen et al. 2012). Thus, for example,
underwater for some time by reducing its oxygen intake a predator is something that compels the organism to run
and by closing its spiracles to keep water off. Unlike away, but also a desire to keep a distance, to stay away.
plastron respiration, this strategy cannot go on indefinitely. Similarly, a source of food affords the action of moving
The same pond thus has a different value for the submerged towards it, but also a desire to ingest the item, and more
ant than it has for the diving beetle. For the ant, the pond generally a state of enticement and attraction. Again, this
invites a certain protective behaviour; it is a threatening idea can be found already in Jonas (1966). In his com-
environment, one that needs to be left. For the beetle, it is a parison of vegetable life with animal life, he pointed out
comfortable, even enticing, environment where it can that whereas in the case of plants the organism and the
thrive and choose to dwell. This is another way of saying world are contiguous (the plant takes what it needs directly
that the ant and the beetle enact different worlds, i.e., they from the soil, the air, and the sunlight), animal life is
make sense of, or cognize, their surroundings in different characterized by a distance between the organism and what
ways. Importantly, this difference depends on the integra- it needs (e.g., food) or what it needs to avoid (e.g.,
tion, within the organization of the beetle, of the air bub- predators). This distance is not just spatial, it is also tem-
bles; in this sense, we have here a case of extended sense- poral: the animal is here and the food it needs is over there,
making. hence the animal now does not have that food. For Jonas,
Given the affective nature of sense making (see Sect. 2) whereas in the history of life spatial distance is at the origin
we also, then, have a case of extended affectivity. The of perception and action, temporal distance is at the origin
different affective character of the Umwelt enacted by the of emotion. Because spatial distance always also implies a
ant and the beetle respectively should be apparent by now. temporal distance, in animals perception, action and emo-
I said that the pond is threatening to the ant, and tion are linked and always present together. The animal
comfortable and enticing to the beetle. In other needs sensory organs to perceive distant sources of food
words, the pond affects (strikes as significant) the diving and potential predators. To fill the distance between itself
beetle differently from how it affects the ant. We can also and the food, the animal needs to move toward the food, but
say that, correlatively, the underwater ant wants to get it also needs to keep wanting the food; similarly, to keep
away from the pond and is frightened, worried, defensive, the distance between itself and a chasing predator, it needs
whereas the beetle does not want to get away from the to move away from it but also to keep wanting to do so.
pond, and is comfortable and confident in it. Unlike the Jonas (1966) calls this prolonged desire an emotional
ants, the beetles affective condition (of confidence) is intent, and sees more specific emotions as manifestations
extended, in the sense that it is realized by the composite of it:
hybrid system beetle-plus-air-bubbles.
The very span between start and attainment must
A useful way of characterizing the affective nature of
be bridged by continuous emotional intent. The
this scenario in some more detail at the phenomenological
appearance of directed long-range motility (as
level is in terms of the different affordances that the pond

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452 G. Colombetti

exhibited by the vertebrates) thus signifies the Umwelt of the beetle-plus-air-bubbles has an attractive
emergence of emotional life. Greed is at the bottom demand character. In both cases, each Umwelt will also be
of the chase, fear at the bottom of flight. (101) structured further in a finer-grained way, containing areas
of attraction (such as sources of food and specific levels of
This important idea can be found also in the work of the
water pressure) and more repelling areas (other levels of
social psychologist Kurt Lewin (e.g., Lewin 1935), who
water pressure, toxins, predators, etc.). These demand
described the lived environment as a landscape of im-
characters will be experienced not just in terms of ten-
perative environmental facts (77) that prompt or stimulate
dencies to move in one way or another, but also in terms
the organism to act and feel in a variety of ways.12 These
of psychological tensions away from or towards aspects of
imperative environmental facts create a field of forces
the environment. For present purposes, the point of interest
that constitute the world for the agent not just as a physical
is that, in the case of the underwater beetle, the demand
world but as a psychobiological environment. The latter
characters of its Umwelt are brought forth by the composite
always depends, in each moment, on the needs of the
system beetle-plus-air-bubbles. Take the air bubbles away
organism. Interestingly, long before the introduction of the
from the underwater beetle, and its Umwelt rapidly takes
English notion of affordances, Lewin had characterized
on a different profile of demand characters, with many
these imperative environmental facts as Auf-
lines of force reversing their direction and repelling the
forderungscharaktere, which the translators chose to ren-
insect from the pond. The addition of a mediating structure
der as demand characters or valences (now a key term
changes the psychobiological environment of the beetle,
in affective science; see Colombetti 2005). The term could
thus also changing its affective condition.
just as well be translated as affordance characters, as the
It is important to emphasize that the proposal here is not
verb auffordern in German means to prompt, invite or
that the mediating structure simply enables a new or
stimulate. In any case, the important point is that Lewin
altered affective state, but that it constitutes it. We saw in the
already emphasized that an organisms psychobiological
previous section that mediating structures that are integrated
environment does not just prompt or afford certain kinds of
into a new adaptive autonomous organization or form of life
motor actions (such as sitting, grasping, pinching), but also
are not simply enabling but constitutive of the latter. This
affective states of attraction and repulsion (including
logic is maintained when it comes to sense-making, and thus
mixtures of the two). These affective states do not always
to cognition as well as affectivity. The proposal here is that
coincide with behaviour of approach or withdrawal,
mediating structures that extend a living system into a new
respectively: When the child fetches a tool or applies to
form of life are also mediating structures that extend
the experimenter for help, the action does not mean, even
affectivityin the sense that they extend the material pro-
when it involves a physical movement in a direction
cesses or vehicles that underpin sense-making, and thereby
opposite to the goal, a turning away from the goal but an
affective episodes. The affective condition of the diving
approach to it (Lewin 1935: 84). The attractive or repel-
beetle is extended in that its vehicles have integrated
ling character of items in the environment always depends,
mediating structures into a new form of life. The mediating
for Lewin, on the organisms state of tension and what it
structure is now part of the material processes that realize a
needs at each moment, such that the same physical space
new cognitive-affective sense-making activity.14
can have very different demand characters for organisms
with different needs.13 14
Some readers will find this constitutive claim counterintuitive. One
Going back to our submerged ant and beetle, we can referee queried why I did not settle for the more intuitive view that
now say that their Umwelten differ in what they afford, or the air bubbles causally support, or scaffold, both living and affective
better in the field of forces they exhibit. The Umwelt of processes (but are not themselves part of the living system). The
answer is that it is not the goal of this paper to settle the causal-
the ant has mostly a repelling demand character, which the constitution debate. This paper is structured so as to draw out
Umwelt of the system beetle-plus-air-bubbles lacks; the logically (what I think are) the implications of the enactive approach
for the material underpinnings of affectivity. As explained in the
12
previous section, I think that enactivisms characterization of life
Equivalent notions can be found in Tolman (1932), Uexkull (1934/ entails that living systems can extend, i.e., that appropriately
2010) and Koffka (1935). integrated mediating structures can be part of living systems. My
13
Gibson (1979) mentions Lewins notion of demand character as a further point in this and the next section is that, if enactivism entails
precursor of his notion of affordances, but also emphasizes a main that life extends, then it also entails that affectivity extends.
difference between the two: unlike Lewins demand characters, Personally, I do not find these claims counterintuitive, but in any
Gibsons affordances do not depend on the organisms needs (op. cit., case intuitions should not matter here, because in this paper the
129131). Relatedly, Gibson also claims that affordances should be constitutive claims are derived logically as implications of enac-
characterized in terms of behaviour and biology, rather than tivisms characterization of life and sense-making. In other words, the
experience or phenomenology. I think this claim is problematic, arguments of this paper should be construed as a conditional: given
although I shall not develop this point here. See also Dreyfus and enactivisms account of life and cognition, it follows that affectivity
Kelly (2007) for a phenomenological take on affordances. can extend.

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Enactive Affectivity, Extended 453

5 Extending Moods coupling of one or more sense-making systems. Thus two

human beings engaged in reciprocal postural adjustments
The discussion so far has focused on affectivity broadly as they strive to walk past each other in a narrow corridor
characterized, and on how it can be realized by simple are coupled (mutually influencing) and together instantiate
extended living systems. In this final section I briefly and a system that has its own adaptive autonomous organiza-
tentatively start to consider whether and how, from an tion. This latter system is characterized by its own modality
enactive perspective, specific human affective states may of sense-making, and as such counts as an extended cog-
also extend. I focus in particular on moodssuch as having nitive-affective system.
the blues, being down, being elated, cranky, up or down. I Much more could be said about affectivity in coupled
suggest that it is possible, at least sometimes, to regard systems of this kind (see for example Krueger 2013 for the
these episodes, enactively construed, as underpinned by idea that emotions can be jointly owned). My aim here,
composite systems made of organic and non-organic however, is to consider how moods can be extended via the
processes. integration, into their vehicles, of non-organic mediating
Let us begin by noting that, at the subpersonal level, items (case (i) above). For a start, consider the case of the
enactivism characterizes moods dynamically as global self- (solo, for now) improvising jazz musician, and more
organizing patterns of the organism, with a specific specifically an instrumentalist, e.g., a saxophone player. As
topology of attractors, each of which corresponds to a Cochrane (2008) has argued, we should think of the
specific emotional state (Lewis 2000; Thompson 2007: musician and his saxophone as coupled: as the musician
378380; Colombetti 2014: 7782). In other words, when a improvises, he makes some changes to the instrument
person is in a certain mood, its organism is in a global state (presses keys, breathes air into it), which produce sounds,
that makes it more likely to assume the (neural, physio- which influence what the musician plays next, and so on.
logical, and expressive) profile characteristic of some We can say that it is thus in the act of playing, through the
emotional states rather than that of others. For example, (temporally extended) interaction with the instrument, that
someone in an irritable mood is more likely to be entrained the musician (or rather, the system musician-plus-instru-
into a state of anger than someone in a joyful mood, who ment) achieves a certain mood. The saxophone can be seen
on his part is more likely to be entrained into a state of as a mediating structure that has become part of the
happiness or amusement. Phenomenologically, the enactive adaptive autonomous organization of a new, higher-order
approach characterizes moods as experiential states that, composite system constituted by the musician and his
unlike emotions, are not directed at any specific (nor, for instrument (in other words, the relationship is analogous to
that matter, general) object, but are nevertheless open to the one between the underwater beetle and its air bubbles).
the world (see Thompson and Zahavi 2007 for this broad In particular, we can say that this is an extended mood
sense of intentionality; see also Colombetti 2014, chap. 3). because the saxophone has become integrated within the
A depressed mood, for example, is not about anything in network of physical processes that realize the topology that
particular, but it still comes with an appearance of the determines the kind of emotional states the system is more
world as flat, oppressive, deprived of possibilities. Differ- likely to get into. We can imagine, for example, that
ent moods come with different appearances of the world (in improvising on the saxophone realizes a mood of longing
irritability, the world is obstructive, in the way, annoying; that makes the system more likely to undergo an emotion
in optimism, the world is enticing, wide, enabling, etc.). of nostalgia for a specific person or moment of life. As the
This openness is the condition of possibility for having musician plays, the network of processes that realize the
emotions, namely affective states with specific intentional relevant topology is the composite system made up by his
objects (see also Ratcliffe 2010, whose work is inspired by brain, body, and instrument.15
Heideggers account of mood).
Given this account, what could count as extended
moods? I suggest that they would be all those instances of 6 Final Considerations and Questions
mood realized by a composite adaptive autonomous system for the Future
involving an organism and either (i) an extra-bodily item,
or (ii) another organism (or other organisms), or (iii) a In this paper I have argued that the enactive approach has
combination of these. Case (ii) has already been explored room for extending both cognition and affectivity.
in the enactive approach and has been dubbed participatory Specifically, I have argued that if life, enactively charac-
sense-making (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007). Participa- terized, can extend (as suggested by Di Paolo 2009), then
tory sense-making is sense-making realized by a higher-
order adaptive autonomous system resulting from the 15
For related discussions of this example, see Colombetti and
Roberts (2015) and Roberts (2015).

123
454 G. Colombetti

so can sense-making, which is simultaneously cognitive Thompson and Stapleton (2009: 25), that enactivism is
and affective. I have also briefly suggested that enactivism neither internalist nor externalist because the internal-
allows specific human affective states, such as moods, to ist/externalist debate rests on assumptions that are foreign
extend. Overall, I have thus delineated one possible sense to the enactive approach. As briefly mentioned earlier
in which affectivity is not enclosed within the organism. (Sect. 3), I think that this claim needs elaboration, in par-
This analysis should be taken as preliminary as there are ticular one question for the future is whether enactivism
several questions that still need to be addressed to establish needs to reject all talk of vehicles of mental states (as
whether and how an enactive perspective can challenge Hutto and Myin 2013 for example recommend). In this
internalist accounts of affectivity. Addressing these ques- paper I have taken enactivism to be compatible with the
tions will require enactivists to clarify and develop a notion of vehicles, broadly understood to refer to the
variety of issues. For example, a question I did not address physical processes that underpin (enact) mental activity.
here concerns whether and how enactivism allows for the In any case, for now, I hope that the considerations
extension of human emotional states, which are typically advanced here will stimulate discussion and additional
characterized as intentional states about specific objects (I elaborations of the enactive approach, further clarifying the
am afraid of the dog, angry at John, etc.). Answering this latters stance toward recent accounts of how the mind
question would require discussing and elaborating on relates to the world.
enactivisms treatment of the notion of intentionality (see
Thompson 2007: 2227). Further consideration needs to be Acknowledgments I am grateful to participants of the AISB 2014
symposium on enactivism, and to Ezequiel Di Paolo, Tom Roberts,
given to how extra-bodily items that are integrated into a and two anonymous referees for their comments on early versions of
new form of life are experienced: are they phenomeno- this paper. Any remaining misunderstanding is entirely my respon-
logically incorporated, i.e. experienced like other parts sibility. This work was partially supported by the European Research
of ones own body (see Merleau-Ponty 1945/2012)? If so, Council under the European Communitys Seventh Framework Pro-
gramme (FP7/20072013), project title Emoting the Embodied
what does this experience amount to? Does it require a Mind (EMOTER), ERC Grant agreement 240891.
sense of ownership, or only a feeling of extension (see
discussion in De Preester and Tsakiris 2009)? Does it
require caring or feeling concern for the mediating References
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