Chapter Four

TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
TOPICS PER SYLLABUS
B. Dismissal from employment
1. Just Causes
2. Authorized Causes
3. Due Process
a) Twin-notice requirement
b) Hearing; meaning of opportunity to be heard

B.
DISMISSAL FROM EMPLOYMENT
1. TWO-FOLD DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT.1
Dismissal of employees requires the observance of the two-fold due process requisites, namely:
1. Substantive aspect which means that the dismissal must be for any of the (1) just causes provided under
Article 282 of the Labor Code or the company rules and regulations promulgated by the employer; or
(2) authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284 thereof; and
2. Procedural aspect which means that the employee must be accorded due process, the elements of which
are notice and the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. 2
2. JUST CAUSES VS. AUTHORIZED CAUSES.
A dismissal based on a just cause means that the employee has committed a wrongful act or omission;
while a dismissal based on an authorized cause means that there exists a ground which the law itself allows or
authorizes to be invoked to justify the termination of an employee even if he has not committed any wrongful act or
omission such as installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment, closure or cessation of business
operations3 or disease.4

1.
JUST CAUSES
1. JUST CAUSES UNDER THE LABOR CODE.
The just causes in the Labor Code are found in the following provisions thereof:
(1) Article 282 - (Termination by the Employer) which provides for the following grounds:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
(2) Article 264(a) - (Prohibited Activities) which provides for the termination of the following:
 (a) Union officers who knowingly participate in an illegal strike and therefore deemed to have lost their
employment status.
(b) Any employee, union officer or ordinary member who knowingly participates in the commission of
illegal acts during a strike (irrespective of whether the strike is legal or illegal) , is also deemed to
have lost his employment status.
(3) Article 263(g) - (National Interest Cases) where strikers who violate orders, prohibitions and/or
injunctions as are issued by the DOLE Secretary or the NLRC, may be imposed immediate disciplinary
action, including dismissal or loss of employment status. 5
(4) Article 248(e) - (Union Security Clause) where violation of the union security agreement in the CBA
may result in termination of employment. Under this clause, the bargaining union can demand from the
employer the dismissal of an employee who commits a breach of union security arrangement, such as
failure to join the union or to maintain his membership in good standing therein. The same union can
also demand the dismissal of a member who commits an act of disloyalty against it, such as when the
member organizes a rival union.6
2. JUST CAUSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE.
In addition to the just causes mentioned in the Labor Code, just causes are also found in prevailing
jurisprudence.7 The following may be cited as just causes in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence:
1. Violation of company rules and regulations. 8
2. Theft of property owned by a co-employee9 as distinguished from company-owned property which is
considered serious misconduct.
3. Incompetence, inefficiency or ineptitude.10
4. Failure to attain work quota.11
5. Failure to comply with weight standards of employer. 12
6. Attitude problem.13
3. DISMISSAL BASED ON COMPANY RULES AND REGULATIONS NOT ILLEGAL.
If the ground cited is based on the Company Rules and Regulations or Code of Conduct or Code of
Discipline, it is to be expected that the same is not to be found in Article 282 of the Labor Code since the latter
merely enumerates the just causes or grounds in general terms.
In the 2013 case of Sampaguita Auto Transport Corporation v. NLRC,14 the Supreme Court
pronounced that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the dismissal of private respondent, a bus driver of
petitioner, was illegal because the grounds upon which petitioners based respondents termination from
employment, viz: hindi lahat ng schedule nailalabas,[]mababa ang revenue ng bus, laging kasama an[g] asawa
sa byahe and maraming naririnig na kwento tungkol sa kanya, nag-uutos ng conductor para kumita sa hindi
magandang paraan[,] xxx are not among thoseenumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code as just causes for
termination of employment. The irregularities or infractions committed by private respondent in connection with
his work as a bus driver constitute serious misconduct or, at the very least, conduct analogous to serious misconduct,
under the above-cited Article 282 of the Labor Code. The requirement in the company rules that: 3. to obey traffic
rules and regulations as well as the company policies. 4. to ensure the safety of the riding public as well as the
other vehicles and motorist (sic) is so fundamental and so universal that any bus driver is expected to satisfy the
requirement whether or not he has been so informed.
4. DISCUSSION OF THE JUST CAUSES UNDER ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR CODE.
The grounds mentioned in Article 282 shall be discussed herein seriatim.
I.
SERIOUS MISCONDUCT15
1. REQUISITES.
For misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, the following requisites must concur:

1. It must be serious; and

 2. It must relate to the performance of the employees duties; and
3. It must show that he has become unfit to continue working for the employer.16
All the above three (3) requisites must concur.17
2. SOME PRINCIPLES ON SERIOUS MISCONDUCT.
Serious misconduct implies that it must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial
or unimportant.18
Simple or minor misconduct would not justify the termination of the services of an employee. 19
The charge for serious misconduct must not be a mere afterthought. 20
Series of irregularities, when put together, may constitute serious misconduct. 21
Acts destructive of the morale of co-employees constitute serious misconduct.22
Committing libel against an immediate superior constitutes serious misconduct. 23
Possession or use of shabu or other drugs is a valid ground to terminate employment. 24
Immorality, as a general rule, is not a just ground to terminate employment. The exception is when such
immoral conduct is prejudicial or detrimental to the interest of the employer. 25
Immoral act committed beyond office hours is a valid ground to terminate employment. 26
Sexual intercourse inside company premises constitutes serious misconduct.27
The act of a 30-year old lady teacher in falling in love with a 16-year old student is not immoral.28
Fighting is a ground for termination but only the instigator or aggressor and not the victim who was
constrained to defend himself should be dismissed.29
Filing of criminal case by an employee does not indicate his innocence. 30
Challenging superiors to a fight is a just cause for termination. 31
Assaulting another employee is a just cause for termination.32
Utterance of obscene, insulting or offensive words constitutes serious misconduct. 33
Disrespectful conduct is not serious misconduct if provoked by superior or employer. 34
Gambling within company premises is a serious misconduct. 35
Rendering service to business rival is a just cause to terminate employment.36
Selling products of a competitor is a just cause for termination. 37
Organizing a credit union by employees in a bank is a serious misconduct. 38
Deceiving a customer for personal gain is a just cause for termination. 39
Contracting work in competition with employer constitutes serious misconduct.40
Employer need not suffer any damages resulting from a serious misconduct committed by an employee
against a customer.41
Intoxication which interferes with the employees work constitutes serious misconduct. 42
The act of a teacher in pressuring a colleague to change the failing grade of a student is serious
misconduct.43
Sexual harassment is a just ground to dismiss.44
Sleeping while on duty is a ground for termination. 45
Dismissal is too harsh a penalty for eating while at work. 46
Pilferage or theft of company-owned property is a just cause to terminate.47
Theft of funds or property not owned by employer is not a ground to terminate.48
Act of falsification is a valid ground to terminate employment. 49
Punching-in of time cards of other employees is a just cause for termination. 50
Circulating fake meal tickets is a just cause for termination.51
II.
INSUBORDINATION
OR WILLFUL DISOBEDIENCE OF LAWFUL ORDERS52
1. REQUISITES.
One of the fundamental duties of an employee is to obey all reasonable rules, orders and instructions of the
employer. In order to validly invoke this ground, the following requisites must be complied with, to wit:
 1. The employees assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the willfulness being
characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and
2. The order violated must be based on a reasonable and lawful company rule, regulation or policy and
made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties for which he has been engaged to
discharge.53
2. SOME PRINCIPLES ON INSUBORDINATION.
Filing of a case questioning the validity of rules and policies does not prevent employer from enforcing them. 54
Making false allegations in complaint does not constitute insubordination. 55
Failure to answer memo to explain constitutes willful disobedience. 56
Another notice is required in case of termination on the ground of failure to answer memo to explain. 57
Willfulness of conduct may be deduced from the manner the reply is written. 58
Refusal to undergo random drug testing constitutes both serious misconduct and insubordination. 59
Prolonged practice, not an excuse for commission of wrongful acts. 60
Refusal to render overtime to meet production deadline constitutes insubordination. 61
Refusal to comply with a lawful transfer constitutes insubordination. 62
III.
GROSS AND HABITUAL NEGLECT OF DUTIES63
1. REQUISITES.
The following are the requisites:
(1) There must be negligence which is gross and/or habitual in character; and
(2) It must be work-related as would make him unfit to work for his employer.
2. SOME PRINCIPLES ON GROSS AND HABITUAL NEGLECT OF DUTIES.
Simple negligence is not sufficient to terminate employment.64
The negligence must be gross in character which means absence of that diligence that an ordinarily prudent
man would use in his own affairs.65
As a general rule, negligence must be both gross and habitual to be a valid ground to dismiss. 66
Habituality may be disregarded if negligence is gross or the damage or loss is substantial. 67 Habitual
negligence implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time, depending upon the
circumstances.68
Negligence is a question of fact.69
In the absence of any form of negligence, the dismissal is illegal. 70
Actual damage, loss or injury is not an essential requisite. 71
Higher degree of diligence is required in the banking industry.72
Gross negligence may result to loss of trust and confidence. 73
No negligence if the act alleged to be so is in accordance with standing company practice. 74
No negligence if the act is in accordance with management-sanctioned deviations from the company policy.75
Absences, if authorized, cannot be cited as a ground to terminate employment. 76
Tardiness or absenteeism, if not habitual, cannot be cited as a ground to terminate employment. 77
Tardiness or absenteeism, if habitual, may be cited as a ground to terminate employment.78
Tardiness or absenteeism, if habitual, may be tantamount to serious misconduct. 79
Absences or tardiness due to emergency, ailment or fortuitous event are justified and may not be cited as just
cause to terminate employment.80
 Mere allegation of absences or tardiness is not sufficient; the burden of proof is on the employer. 81
Unblemished record belies allegation of gross and habitual neglect. 82
Unsatisfactory or poor performance, inefficiency and incompetence are considered just causes for dismissal
only if they amount to gross and habitual neglect of duties. 83
IV.
ABANDONMENT OF WORK84
1. CONCEPT.
Abandonment is a form of neglect of duty; hence, a just cause for termination of employment under Article
282 [b] of the Labor Code.85
2. REQUISITES.
To constitute abandonment, two (2) elements must concur, namely:
1. The employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable
reason; and
2. There must have been a clear intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee
relationship manifested by some overt act.86
3. SOME PRINCIPLES ON ABANDONMENT.
Mere absence is not enough to constitute abandonment.87
Clear intention to sever employment relationship is necessary. 88
An employee who stopped working because of her mistaken belief that she has been dismissed is not guilty of
abandonment.89
Abandonment is a factual issue.90
Employer has the burden of proof to prove abandonment. 91
There is no abandonment when it was the employer who prevented the workers from reporting for work. 92
Due process in abandonment cases consists only of the service of 2 notices to the employee, viz:
a. First notice directing the employee to explain why he should not be declared as having abandoned his job;
and
b. Second notice to inform him of the employers decision to dismiss him on the ground of abandonment.93
No hearing is required to validly dismiss an employee for abandonment. 94
Notices in abandonment cases must be sent to employees last known address per record of the company. The
employer need not look for the employees current whereabouts.95
Service of the notices of abandonment of work after the six-month period of floating status is not valid.96
Immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal praying for reinstatement negates abandonment. 97

Lapse of time between dismissal and filing of a case is not a material indication of abandonment. Hence, lapse
of 2 years and 5 months98 or 20 months99 or 9 months100 or 8 months101 before filing the complaint for illegal
dismissal is not an indication of abandonment. Under the law, the employee has a 4-year prescriptive period
within which to institute his action for illegal dismissal.102
The fact that an employee filed a complaint for illegal dismissal is not by itself sufficient indicator that he had
no intention of deserting his employment if the totality of his antecedent acts palpably display the contrary. 103
Filing of a case to pre-empt investigation of the administrative case is tantamount to abandonment. 104
When what is prayed for in the complaint is separation pay and not reinstatement, the filing of complaint does
not negate abandonment.105
 It is abandonment when what is prayed for in the complaint is separation pay and it was only in the position
paper that reinstatement was prayed for.106
Employment in another firm coinciding with the filing of complaint does not indicate abandonment. 107
There is no abandonment when it was the employer who prevented the workers from reporting for work. 108

Offer of reinstatement by employer during proceedings before Labor Arbiter and refusal by employee does not
indicate abandonment but more of a symptom of strained relations between the parties. 109
Subcontracting for another company indicates abandonment. 110
An employee may be absolved from the charge of abandonment of work but adjudged guilty of AWOL. 111
These two grounds are separate and distinct from each other.
An employee who failed to report for work after the expiration of the duly approved leave of absence is
considered to have abandoned his job.112
An employee who failed to comply with the order for his reinstatement is deemed to have abandoned his
work.113
An employee who, after being transferred to a new assignment, did not report for work anymore is deemed to
have abandoned his job.114
An employee who deliberately absented from work without leave or permission from his employer for the
purpose of looking for a job elsewhere is deemed to have abandoned his work. 115
Imprisonment or detention by military does not constitute abandonment. 116
Absence to evade arrest is not a valid justification. To do so would be to place an imprimatur on the
employees attempt to derail the normal course of the administration of justice. 117
Requesting for a Certificate of Employment is not evidence of abandonment. 118
Employers insistence on commission of wrongful acts like estafa and/or qualified theft by the employees
negates the charge of abandonment. Rather, it strengthens the finding of petitioners discrimination,
insensibility and antagonism towards the employees which gave no choice to the latter except to forego their
employment.119
V.
FRAUD120
1. CORRELATION OF FRAUD AND LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE.
Fraud is separate and distinct from the other ground provided in the same paragraph, that is, loss of trust
and confidence (willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative) .121
However, the commission of fraud by an employee against the employer will necessarily result in the
latters loss of trust and confidence in the former. On the other hand, the ground of willful breach by the employee
of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the employer may not necessarily involve fraud but some other acts
that would similarly result in the loss of such trust and confidence.
2. REQUISITES.
The following are the requisites of this ground:
1. The employee has committed an intentional deception and used dishonest methods for personal gain
or to damage the employer; and
2. The fraud is work-related and rendered him unfit to work for his employer.122
3. SOME PRINCIPLES ON FRAUD.
 Failure to deposit collection constitutes fraud.123
Lack of damage or losses is not necessary in fraud cases. The fact that the employer did not suffer losses from
the dishonesty of the dismissed employee because of its timely discovery does not excuse the latter from any
culpability.124
Lack of misappropriation or shortage is immaterial in case of unauthorized encashment of personal checks by
teller and cashier.125
Restitution does not have absolutory effect.126
VI.
WILLFUL BREACH OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE127
1. REQUISITES.
For the doctrine of loss of trust and confidence to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied:
(1) The employee holds a position of trust and confidence;
(2) There exists an act justifying the loss of trust and confidence, 128 which means that the act that betrays
the employers trust must be real, i.e. , founded on clearly established facts; 129
(3) The employees breach of the trust must be willful, i.e. , it was done intentionally, knowingly and
purposely, without justifiable excuse;130 and
(4) The act must be in relation to his work which would render him unfit to perform it.
2. GUIDELINES.
As a safeguard against employers who indiscriminately use loss of trust and confidence to justify
arbitrary dismissal of employees, the Supreme Court, in addition to the above elements, came up with the
following guidelines for the application of the doctrine:131
(1) The loss of confidence must not be simulated;
(2) It should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are illegal, improper or unjustified;
(3) It may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; and
(4) It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought, to justify earlier action taken in bad faith. 132
The foregoing guidelines have been prescribed by the Supreme Court due to the subjective nature of this
ground which makes termination based on loss of trust and confidence prone to abuse. 133
3. SOME PRINCIPLES ON THE DOCTRINE OF LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE.
Employees position must be reposed with trust and confidence. 134
Position of trust and confidence is one where a person is entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or
with the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employers property.135
Two (2) classes of positions of trust. 136 The first class consists of managerial employees or those who, by the
nature of their position, are entrusted with confidential and delicate matters and from whom greater fidelity to
duty is correspondingly expected. They refer to those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees or to effectively recommend such managerial actions.137 Their primary duty consists of the
management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or a subdivision thereof.138
The second class includes cashiers, auditors, property custodians, or those who, in the normal and routine
exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of [the employers] money or property. 139
They are fiduciary rank-and-file employees who, though rank-and-file, are routinely charged with the custody,
handling or care and protection of the employer's money or property, 140 or entrusted with confidence on delicate
matters,141 and are thus classified as occupying positions of trust and confidence. 142
Rules on termination of managerial and supervisory employees different from those applicable to rank-
and-file employees. As a general rule, the doctrine of trust and confidence is restricted to managerial
employees.143 This means that the rules on termination of employment applicable to managerial or fiduciary
employees are different from those involving ordinary employees not holding positions of trust and confidence.
In the latter case, mere accusations by the employer will not be sufficient. 144 Thus, with respect to rank-and-
file personnel, loss of trust and confidence as a ground for valid dismissal requires proof of involvement in the
alleged events in question and that mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not
 be sufficient. But as regards a managerial employee, the mere existence of a basis for believing that he has
breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal. 145
There must be some basis for the loss of trust and confidence which means that there is reasonable ground to
believe, if not to entertain the moral conviction, that the concerned employee is responsible for the misconduct
and that the nature of his participation therein rendered him absolutely unworthy of trust and confidence
demanded by his position.146
In termination for loss of trust and confidence, the fact that the employer did not suffer losses is of no
moment.147
Employer has burden of proof.148
Dismissal due to feng shui mismatch is not a valid ground to lose trust and confidence. 149
Command responsibility of managerial employees is a ground to dismiss. 150
Confidential employee may be dismissed for loss of trust and confidence. 151
Grant of promotions and bonuses negates loss of trust and confidence.152
Long years of service, absence of derogatory record and small amount involved are deemed inconsequential
insofar as loss of trust and confidence is concerned.153
Dropping of criminal charges or acquittal in a criminal case arising from the same act does not affect the
validity of dismissal based on loss of trust and confidence. 154
Full restitution does not absolve employee of offense which resulted in the loss of trust and confidence.155
VII.
COMMISSION OF CRIME OR OFFENSE156
1. REQUISITES.
The following are the requisites for the valid invocation of this ground:
1. A crime or offense was committed by the employee;
2. It was committed against any of the following persons:
(a) His employer;
(b) Any immediate member of his employers family; or
(c) His employers duly authorized representative.
2. SOME PRINCIPLES ON THE COMMISSION OF CRIME OR OFFENSE.
Because of its gravity, work-relation is not necessary. Neither is it necessary to show that the commission of
the criminal act would render the employee unfit to perform his work for the employer.
The phrase immediate members of the family refers to those persons having family relations under Article
150 of the Family Code, to wit:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.157
VIII.
OTHER ANALOGOUS CAUSES158
1. ANALOGOUS CAUSES UNDER ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
The following may be cited as analogous causes:
 1) Violation of company rules and regulations.159
2) Theft of property owned by a co-employee, as distinguished from theft of property owned by the
employer.160
3) Incompetence, inefficiency or ineptitude.161
4) Failure to attain work quota.162
5) Failure to comply with weight standards of employer. 163
6) Attitude problem is analogous to loss of trust and confidence.164
IX.
TERMINATION DUE TO ENFORCEMENT OF
UNION SECURITY CLAUSE165
1. NATURE OF STIPULATION.
The union security clause is a stipulation in a CBA166 which allows the parties thereto to enter into an
agreement requiring membership in the exclusive collective bargaining agent which successfully negotiated said
CBA as a condition for continued employment with the exception of employees who are already members of
another union at the time of the signing of the CBA.
The validity of dismissal based on this ground which jurisprudentially is considered a just cause, has lately
been reiterated in the case of Alabang Country Club, Inc. v. NLRC,167 where the Supreme Court declared that in
addition to the grounds mentioned in Articles 282, 283, 284 and 285 of the Labor Code, another just cause for
termination is dismissal from employment due to the enforcement of the union security clause in the CBA.
2. EFFECTS OF THE APPLICATION OF THE UNION SECURITY CLAUSE.
The following are the effects:
a. On members of the bargaining union/agent. They are not allowed to resign or terminate their
membership therefrom. Any member of the bargaining agent who resigns or is expelled therefrom may
be recommended to the employer by the bargaining agent for termination of his employment.
b. On non-members of the bargaining union/agent but members of the minority union/s. They are not
bound by the union security clause if they are members of the minority or other unions at the time of the
signing of the CBA. Hence, they cannot be compelled to resign from their union/s in order to join the
bargaining agent.
c. On non-members of the bargaining union/agent or of any minority union/s. If not a member of the
bargaining agent or any other unions in the bargaining unit at the time of the signing of the CBA by
reason of the fact that he is excepted from the coverage of the bargaining unit, the employee cannot be
compelled to join the bargaining agent.
d. On new employees hired after the signing of the CBA containing the union security clause. They can
be compelled to join the bargaining agent. If they refuse, they can be recommended for termination.
3. EXCEPTION TO APPLICATION OF THE UNION SECURITY CLAUSE.
Religious ground is the only exception that may effectively be invoked against the application of the union
security clause.168 For example: members of the Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) cannot be compelled to join a union; hence,
they are not bound by the union security doctrine.169
4. REQUISITES FOR THE VALID TERMINATION DUE TO ENFORCEMENT OF UNION SECURITY
CLAUSE.
(1) The union security clause is applicable;
(2) The bargaining union is requesting for the termination of employment due to enforcement of the union
security provision in the CBA; and
(3) There is sufficient evidence to support the unions decision to expel the employee from the union.
All the foregoing requisites should be complied with to justify the termination of employment. 170
5. SOME RELEVANT PRINCIPLES.
Dismissal effected by the employer pursuant to a labor unions demand in accordance with a union security
agreement does not constitute an unfair labor practice. 171
 Employer is obligated to act upon being demanded by the union to terminate the employment of its errant
members.172
Employer should afford due process to the expelled unionist. 173
The employee sought to be terminated should be afforded an independent and separate hearing which means
that the employer is not duty-bound to immediately implement the recommendation to terminate made by the
union. It has to conduct its own hearing independent and separate from any hearing conducted by the union. 174
Employer has the liability for reinstatement, full backwages, damages and attorneys fees in illegal dismissal
cases based on the union security clause.175
The employer has the right to be reimbursed for payment of any claims arising out of dismissals made upon
demand of the union under the union security clause. 176

2.
AUTHORIZED CAUSES177
1. TWO (2) CLASSES.
Under the Labor Code, authorized causes are classified into two (2) classes, namely:
(1) Business-related causes. Referring to the grounds specifically mentioned in Article 283, to wit:
a. Installation of labor-saving device;
b. Redundancy;
c. Retrenchment;
d. Closure or cessation of business operations NOT due to serious business losses or financial reverses;
and
e. Closure or cessation of business operations due to serious business losses and financial reverses.
(2) Health-related causes. Referring to disease covered by Article 284 of the Labor Code.
2. COMMONALITY OF REQUISITES OF THE AUTHORIZED CAUSES UNDER ARTICLE 283.
Notably, there are certain requisites that are common to the five (5) grounds in Article 283. To simplify the
discussion, the following five (5) common requisites are applicable to the said grounds:
1. There is good faith in effecting the termination;
2. The termination is a matter of last resort, there being no other option available to the employer after
resorting to cost-cutting measures;
3. Two (2) separate written notices are served on both the affected employees and the DOLE at least one
(1) month prior to the intended date of termination;
4. Separation pay is paid to the affected employees, to wit:
(a) If based on (1) installation of labor-saving device, or (2) redundancy. - One (1) month pay or at
least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher, a fraction of at least six (6)
months shall be considered as one (1) whole year.
(b) If based on (1) retrenchment, or (2) closure NOT due serious business losses or financial
reverses. - One (1) month pay or at least one-half () month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher, a fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole year.
(c) If closure is due to serious business losses or financial reverses, NO separation pay is required to be
paid.
(d) In case the CBA or company policy provides for a higher separation pay, the same must be followed
instead of the one provided in Article 283.
5. Fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be affected by the termination, such
as, but not limited to: nature of work; status of employment (whether casual, temporary or regular) ;
experience; efficiency; seniority; dependability; adaptability; flexibility; trainability; job performance;
discipline; and attitude towards work.178 Failure to follow fair and reasonable criteria in selecting who to
terminate would render the termination invalid.179
I.
INSTALLATION OF LABOR-SAVING DEVICE
1. ADDITIONAL REQUISITE UNIQUE TO THIS GROUND.
 In addition to the five (5) common requisites above, the unique requisite for this ground is that the purpose
for such installation must be valid, such as to save on cost, enhance efficiency and other justifiable economic
reasons.180
2. SOME RELEVANT PRINCIPLES.
The installation of these devices is a management prerogative and the courts will not interfere with its exercise
in the absence of abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or malice on the part of management. 181
Redundancy results from installation of labor-saving device. The installation of labor-saving device will
result in making the positions being held by employees who will be adversely affected thereby redundant and
unnecessary.182
Modernization program through introduction of high-speed machines is valid.183
Proof of losses is not required.
II.
REDUNDANCY
1. ADDITIONAL REQUISITE UNIQUE TO THIS GROUND.
The fact of redundancy must be proved. Redundancy exists under any of the following circumstances:
(1) Where the services of employees are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual
requirements of the enterprise.184
(2) Where the position is superfluous because of a number of factors, such as over-hiring of workers,
decreased volume of business, dropping of a particular product line or service activity previously
manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise or phasing out of service activity priorly
undertaken by the business.185
(3) Where there is duplication of work. Indeed, in any well-organized business enterprise, it would be
surprising to find duplication of work and two (2) or more people doing the work of one person.186
(4) Where it is validly resorted to as a cost-cutting measure and to streamline operations so as to make
them more viable. Positions which overlapped each other, or which are in excess of the requirements
of the service, may be declared redundant.187
2. SOME PRINCIPLES ON REDUNDANCY.
The wisdom, soundness or characterization of service as redundant by the employer is not subject to
review. The only exception is when there is a showing that the same was done in violation of law or
attended with arbitrary and malicious action.188
Burden of proof in redundancy rests on the employer. 189
Evidence of losses is not required.190
Elimination of undesirables, abusers and worst performers through redundancy is not an indication of bad
faith.191
The act of the employer in hiring replacements is not an indication of bad faith if the positions have no
similar job descriptions.192
Redundancy to save on labor costs is valid.193
Redundancy resulting from use of high technology equipment is valid. 194
Abolition of positions or departments is valid.195
Reorganization through redundancy is valid.196
Contracting out of abolished positions to independent contractors is valid. 197
Hiring of casuals or contractual employees after redundancy is valid. 198
 Where two or more persons are performing the same work which may be effectively accomplished by only
one, the employer may terminate the excess personnel and retain only one. 199
Even if there is a seniority rule, such as the LIFO (Last In, First Out) rule, the nature of work and
experience of the employees should still be taken into account by the employer. 200
The LIFO or FILO (First In, Last Out) rule has no basis in law. 201
LIFO rule is not controlling as employer has the prerogative to choose who to terminate. 202
III.
RETRENCHMENT
1. RETRENCHMENT, DEFINED.
Retrenchment has been defined as the termination of employment initiated by the employer through no
fault of the employees and without prejudice to the latter, resorted by management during periods of business
recession, industrial depression, or seasonal fluctuations; or during lulls occasioned by lack of work or orders,
shortage of materials; or considerable reduction in the volume of the employers business, conversion of the plant
for a new production program or the introduction of new methods or more efficient machinery, or of automation. 203
2. ADDITIONAL REQUISITE UNIQUE TO THIS GROUND.
Proof of losses or possible imminent losses is the distinctive requisite of retrenchment. This is the only
statutory ground in Article 283 which requires this kind of proof. The other grounds of closure or cessation of
business operations may be resorted to with or without losses. 204
3. STANDARDS TO DETERMINE VALIDITY OF LOSSES AS JUSTIFICATION FOR
RETRENCHMENT.
The general standards in terms of which the act of an employer in retrenching or reducing the number of its
employees must be appraised are as follows:
1. The losses expected should be substantial and not merely de minimis or insubstantial and inconsequential
in extent.
2. The substantial loss apprehended must be reasonably imminent, as such imminence can be perceived
objectively and in good faith by the employer.
3. Retrenchment must be reasonably necessary and likely to effectively prevent the expected losses. The
employer should have taken other measures prior or parallel to retrenchment to forestall losses, i.e. , cut other costs
than labor costs.
4. The alleged losses, if already realized, and the expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled, must
be proved by sufficient and convincing evidence through presentation of externally audited financial statements. 205
4. SOME PRINCIPLES ON RETRENCHMENT.
If said standards are present, wisdom to retrench cannot be questioned.206
The retrenchment must be done in good faith.207
Notoriety of the employee is a valid criterion.208
The progressive manner of implementing the streamlining and downsizing of operations resorted to by a
construction company in order not to jeopardize the completion of its projects is valid. Thus, several
departments like the Civil Works Division, Electro-mechanical Works Division and the Territorial Project
Management Offices, among others, were abolished in the early part of 1996 and thereafter, the Structural Steel
Division by the end of year 1997.209
The fact that there has been economic or other crisis besetting a particular sector or the country as a whole is
not sufficient justification for retrenchment.210
Article 283 applies only to permanent retrenchment or lay-off.211
 Cost-reduction or cost-saving measures prior to retrenchment are required.212
The phrase retrenchment to prevent losses means that retrenchment must be undertaken by the employer
before the losses anticipated are actually sustained or realized. The employer need not keep all his employees
until after his losses shall have materialized. Otherwise, the law could be vulnerable to attack as undue taking of
property for the benefit of another.213
Employer bears the burden of proof to show business losses or financial reverses. 214
Best evidence of losses - financial statements audited by independent auditors (not by internal auditors) .
215

Best evidence of losses in a government-controlled corporation - financial statements audited by COA. 216
Period covered by financial statements, material.217
Income tax returns, not valid since they are self-serving documents. 218
Mere affidavit on alleged losses is not sufficient.219
Mere notice of intention to implement a retrenchment program is not sufficient. 220
Rehabilitation receivership presupposes existence of losses.221 However, the fact that the employer is
undergoing rehabilitation receivership does not by itself excuse it from submitting to the labor authorities copies
of its audited financial statements to prove the urgency, necessity and extent of its retrenchment program. 222
Audited financial statements should be presented before the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC but not belatedly
before the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.223
Retrenchment effected long after the business losses is not valid. 224
Profitable operations in the past do not affect the validity of retrenchment. 225
Compulsory retirement to prevent further losses is valid. 226
Early Retirement Program (ERP) to prevent further losses and implemented prior to retrenchment is valid. 227
Rotation of work may be tantamount to constructive dismissal or retrenchment. 228
Retrenchment due to liquidity problem is not valid.229
Sharp drop in income is not a ground to justify retrenchment. A mere decline in gross income cannot in any
manner be considered as serious business losses. It should be substantial, sustained and real.230
Litany of woes, in the absence of any solid evidence that they translated into specific and substantial losses that
would necessitate retrenchment, will not suffice to justify retrenchment. 231
Rehiring of retrenched employees does not necessarily indicate illegality of retrenchment.232
In an enterprise which has several branches nationwide, profitable operations in some of them will not affect
the validity of the retrenchment if overall, the financial condition thereof reflects losses. 233
IV.
CLOSURE OR CESSATION OF BUSINESS OPERATIONS
1. CONCEPT.
Closure or cessation of business is the complete or partial cessation of the operations and/or shutdown of
the establishment of the employer. It is carried out to either stave off the financial ruin or promote the business
interest of the employer.234
Closure involves two (2) situations:
(a) When NOT due to serious business losses or financial reverses; or
(b) When due to serious business losses or financial reverses
It is only in the first that payment of separation pay is required. No such requirement is imposed in the
second.235
2. SOME PRINCIPLES ON CLOSURE.
Employer may close its business whether it is suffering from business losses or not; court cannot order
employer to continue its business.236
Principle of closure under Article 283 applies in cases of both total and partial closure or cessation of
business operations. Management may choose to close only a branch, a department, a plant, or a shop. 237
Closure of department or section and hiring of workers supplied by independent contractor as replacements is
valid.238
Relocation of business may amount to cessation of operations. 239
The burden of proving that the closure or cessation of business operations is bona-fide falls upon the
employer.240
Closure may constitute an unfair labor practice if it is resorted to as a ruse or scheme to get rid of employees
on account of their union activities.241
Closure by reason of enactment of a law is valid. Example: The closure of the Philippine Veterans Bank by
operation of law (R.A. No. 7169 [An Act to Rehabilitate the Philippine Veterans Bank Created Under
Republic Act 3518, Providing the Mechanisms Therefor and for other Purposes] 242 or closure of the
employers business because a large portion of its estate was acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform
pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under R.A. No. 6657. 243
Closure of business to merge or consolidate with another or to sell or dispose all of its assets, held valid. 244
Audited financial statements necessary only in closure due to losses. 245
Evidence of losses in a closure case should not be presented for the first time on appeal with the Court of
Appeals or Supreme Court.246
For closure to be a valid basis, it must be invoked at the time of termination and not after.247
Closure of a department or section due to losses amounts to retrenchment. 248
V.
DISEASE249
1. REQUISITES.
Disease is one of the authorized causes to terminate employment. The following requisites must be
complied with before termination of employment due to disease may be justified:
1. The employee is suffering from a disease;
2. His continued employment is either:
a) prohibited by law; or
b) prejudicial to his health; or
c) prejudicial to the health of his co-employees;
3. There is a certification by a competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such
stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment;
4. Notice of termination based on this ground should be separately served both to the employee and the
Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month prior to the effectivity of the
termination;250 and
5. Separation pay should be paid to the employee in an amount equivalent to at least one (1) month salary
or to one-half () month salary for every year of service, whichever is greater, a fraction of at least six
(6) months being considered as one (1) whole year. 251
2. SOME PRINCIPLES ON DISEASE.
Burden of proof rests on the employer.252
 If the disease or ailment can be cured within the period of six (6) months with proper medical treatment, the
employer should not terminate the employee but merely ask him to take a leave of absence. The employer
should reinstate him to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health. 253
In case of death, Article 284 does not apply.254
In case the employee unreasonably refuses to submit to medical examination or treatment upon being
requested to do so, the employer may terminate his services on the ground of insubordination or willful
disobedience of lawful order.255
A medical certificate issued by a companys own physician is not an acceptable certificate for purposes of
terminating an employment based on Article 284, it having been issued not by a competent public health
authority, the person referred to in the law.256
A competent public health authority refers to a government doctor whose medical specialization
pertains to the disease being suffered by the employee. For instance, if the employee suffers from
tuberculosis, the medical certificate should be issued by a government-employed pulmonologist who is
competent to make an opinion thereon. If the employee has cardiac symptoms, the competent physician in
this case would be a cardiologist.
Medical certificate is an indispensable requisite.257 It is the best evidence of illness.258
The medical certificate should be procured by the employer and not by the employee.259
The employer has the burdent to prove existence of the medical certificate.260
Employee dismissed without the medical certificate is entitled to moral and exemplary damages. 261
Separate notices of the termination to the affected employee and to the DOLE is necessary. 262
Hearing is not required, disease being an authorized cause.

3.
DUE PROCESS263

(a) Twin-Notice Requirement

(b) Hearing; Meaning of Opportunity to be Heard

1. JOINT DISCUSSION.
The foregoing topics will be discussed herein jointly in the light of their close interrelation.
2. THE AGABON DOCTRINE: DUE PROCESS IN TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT REFERS TO
STATUTORY, AND NOT CONSTITUTIONAL, DUE PROCESS.
Per Agabon doctrine,264 it is now the prevailing rule that it is not the due process provided in the
Constitution265 that is required in termination of employment but the statutory due process provided under Article
277[b] of the Labor Code.
Constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and assures him of his rights in
criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; while statutory due process protects employees from being unjustly
terminated without just cause after notice and hearing. Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked
against acts of private individuals like employers. Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the
constitutional guarantees.
3. THE ABBOTT LABORATORIES DOCTRINE: CONTRACTUAL DUE PROCESS.
a. New doctrine.
The norm since Agabon is that compliance with the statutorily-prescribed procedural due process under
Article 277(b) 266 would suffice. Whether there is an existing company policy which also enunciates the procedural
due process in termination cases need not be considered nor given any weight in determining the validity of the
termination.
However, under the latest doctrinal en banc ruling in the 2013 case of Abbott Laboratories, Philippines
v. Pearlie Ann F. Alcaraz, 267 it is now required that in addition to compliance with the statutory due process, the
employer should still comply with the due process procedure prescribed in its own company rules. The employers
failure to observe its own company-prescribed due process will make it liable to pay an indemnity in the form of
nominal damages, the amount of which is equivalent to the P30,000.00 awarded under the Agabon doctrine.
It was found in this case of Abbott Laboratories that respondent Alcaraz,268 who was hired as a
probationary managerial employee, was afforded both the statutorily-mandated substantive and procedural due
process, when she was terminated269 for failure to qualify as a regular employee. Nonetheless, despite the existence
of a sufficient ground to terminate Alcarazs employment and Abbotts compliance with the Labor Code
termination procedure, it was found that petitioner Abbott breached its contractual obligation to Alcaraz when it
failed to abide by its own procedure in evaluating the performance of a probationary employee. Company
personnel policies create an obligation on the part of both the employee and the employer to abide by the
same.
Records show that Abbotts PPSE270 procedure mandates, inter alia, that the job performance of a
probationary employee should be formally reviewed and discussed with the employee at least twice: first, on the
third month and second, on the fifth month from the date of employment. Abbott is also required to come up with a
Performance Improvement Plan during the third month review to bridge the gap between the employees
performance and the standards set, if any. In addition, a signed copy of the PPSE form should be submitted to
Abbotts HRD as the same would serve as basis for recommending the confirmation or termination of the
probationary employment.
In this case, it is apparent that Abbott failed to follow the above-stated procedure in evaluating Alcaraz.
For one, there lies a hiatus of evidence that a signed copy of Alcarazs PPSE form was submitted to the HRD. It was
not even shown that a PPSE form was completed to formally assess her performance. Neither was the performance
evaluation discussed with her during the third and fifth months of her employment. Nor did Abbott come up with
the necessary Performance Improvement Plan to properly gauge Alcarazs performance with the set company
standards.
While it is Abbotts management prerogative to promulgate its own company rules and even subsequently
amend them, this right equally demands that when it does create its own policies and thereafter notify its employee
of the same, it accords upon itself the obligation to faithfully implement them. Indeed, a contrary interpretation
would entail a disharmonious relationship in the work place for the laborer should never be mired by the uncertainty
of flimsy rules in which the latters labor rights and duties would, to some extent, depend.
b. Proper sanction for lack of contractual due process.
In imposing the penalty of indemnity in the form of nominal damages upon petitioner Abbott, it was held
that while there lies due cause to terminate Alcarazs probationary employment for her failure to meet the standards
required for her regularization, and while it must be further pointed out that Abbott had satisfied its statutory duty to
serve a written notice of termination, the fact that it violated its own company procedure renders the
termination of Alcarazs employment procedurally infirm, warranting the payment of nominal damages.
Evidently, the sanctions imposed in both Agabon271 and Jaka272 proceed from the necessity to deter
employers from future violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. In similar regard, the Court
deems it proper to apply the same principle to the case at bar for the reason that an employers contractual breach of
its own company procedure albeit not statutory in source has the parallel effect of violating the laborers rights.
Suffice it to state, the contract is the law between the parties and thus, breaches of the same impel recompense to
vindicate a right that has been violated. Consequently, while the Court is wont to uphold the dismissal of Alcaraz
because a valid cause exists, the payment of nominal damages on account of Abbotts contractual breach is
warranted in accordance with Article 2221273 of the Civil Code.
c. Proper amount of nominal damages.
Anent the proper amount of damages to be awarded, the Court observes that Alcarazs dismissal proceeded
from her failure to comply with the standards required for her regularization. As such, it is undeniable that the
dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee, akin to dismissals due to just causes
under Article 297274 [282] of the Labor Code. Therefore, the Court deems it appropriate to fix the amount of
nominal damages at the amount of P30,000.00, consistent with its rulings in both Agabon275 and Jaka. 276
4. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS VARIES DEPENDING ON THE GROUND/S INVOKED.
Based on law and jurisprudence, it is clear that the procedural due process required to validly terminate an
employee depends on the ground invoked. There is no uniform procedural due process that should be applied in all
cases.
5. THE KING OF KINGS TRANSPORT DOCTRINE: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN JUST CAUSE
TERMINATION.
a. Procedural steps.
In just cause termination, the twin-notice requirement applies. More particularly, the following procedure
in the order presented below should be followed:
1. Service of first written notice;
2. Conduct of hearing; and
3. Service of second written notice.
b. The King of Kings Transport doctrine.
Based on this doctrine which was enunciated inKing of Kings Transport, Inc. v. Mamac, 277 the
following requirements should be complied with:
(1) First written notice.
The first written notice to be served on the employee should:
a) Contain the specific causes or grounds for termination against him;
b) Contain a directive that the employee is given the opportunity to submit his written explanation
within the reasonable period of FIVE (5) CALENDAR DAYS from receipt of the notice:
1) to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense;
2) to study the accusation against him;
3) to consult a union official or lawyer;
4) to gather data and evidence; and
5) to decide on the defenses he will raise against the complaint.
c) Contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge
against the employee. This is required in order to enable him to intelligently prepare his explanation
and defenses. A general description of the charge will not suffice.
d) Specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds
under Article 282 is being charged against the employee.
(2) Hearing required,
After serving the first notice, the employer should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference wherein
the employee will be given the opportunity to:
1) explain and clarify his defenses to the charge/s against him;
2) present evidence in support of his defenses; and
3) rebut the evidence presented against him by the management.
During the hearing or conference, the employee is given the chance to defend himself personally, with the
assistance of a representative or counsel of his choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing could be used by the
parties as an opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.
(3) Second written notice.
After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employer shall serve the employees a
written notice of termination indicating that:
1) all circumstances involving the charge/s against the employee have been considered; and
2) grounds have been established to justify the severance of his employment. 278
c. The foregoing rule does not apply in case of abandonment.
 Abandonment is a just cause to terminate employment. It is considered a form of gross neglect of duties
under Article 282[b] of the Labor Code. However, the procedural due process is different from the process described
above. For obvious reason, due process in abandonment cases does not involve the conduct of hearing. Compliance
with the following two (2) notices suffices, viz:
1) First notice asking the employee to explain why he should not be declared as having abandoned his job;
and
2) Secondnotice informing him of the employers decision to dismiss him on the ground of abandonment.
d. The Perez doctrine.
The 2009 Perez doctrine279 enunciates the newguiding principles on the hearing aspect of procedural due
process. This dramatically modified the concept of hearing in just cause termination. (See separate discussion in No. 9
below) .
6. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN AUTHORIZED CAUSE TERMINATION.
Due process in authorized cause termination is deemed complied with upon the separate and simultaneous
service of a written notice of the intended termination to both:
(1) the employee to be terminated; and
(2) the appropriate DOLE Regional Office, at least one (1) month before the intended date of the
termination specifying the ground/s therefor and the undertaking to pay the separation pay required
under Article 283 of the Labor Code.
7. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN DEFINITE-PERIOD EMPLOYMENT.
Procedural due process is not required in termination of the following:
1. Project employment which automatically terminates upon completion of the project;
2. Seasonal employment which automatically terminates upon the end of the season;
3. Casual employment which automatically terminates upon the lapse of the agreed period;
4. Fixed-term employment which automatically terminates upon the expiration of the fixed period.
8. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN TERMINATION OF PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT.
Probationary employment may be terminated prior to the lapse of the probationary period fur just or
authorized cause; in which case, the appropriate, applicable procedural due process should apply.
However, if the ground invoked is the failure of the probationary employee to qualify as a regular
employee based on the reasonable standards made known to him at the time of his engagement, no due process is
required. it is sufficient that a written notice of termination is served to the probationary employee within a
reasonable time from the effective date thereof setting forth the justification of such termination. 280
Per Abbott Laboratories doctrine, 281 however, if the employer has prescribed in its company rules a certain
procedure for the termination of probationary employment, the same should be complied with; otherwise, the
employer will be penalized with an indemnity in the form of nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00.
9. THE PEREZ DOCTRINE: NEW GUIDING PRINCIPLE ON THE HEARING REQUIREMENT.
The concept of hearing as part of due process has been significantly changed by the Perez doctrine.282 It
enunciates the newguiding principles on the hearing aspect of procedural due process. It has interpreted the term
ample opportunity to be heard in a new light, thus:
(a) Ample opportunity to be heard means any meaningful opportunity (verbal or written) given to the
employee to answer the charges against him and submit evidence in support of his defense, whether in
a hearing, conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way.
(b) A formal hearing or conference is no longer mandatory. It becomes mandatoryonly under any of the
following circumstances:
(1) When requested by the employee in writing; or
(2) When substantial evidentiary disputes exist; or
(3) When a company rule or practice requires it; or
(4) When similar circumstances justify it.
(c) the ample opportunity to be heard standard in the Labor Code prevails over the hearing or
conference requirement in its Implementing Rules and Regulations. This is how the Supreme Court
resolved the conflict in the following provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules:
 1) Under Article 277(b) of the Labor Code, the employer is required to afford the employee ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so
desires; while -
2) Under Section 2(d) , Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, the employer is
required to afford to the employee a hearing or conference during which the employee
concerned, with the assistance of counsel, if he so desires, is given opportunity to respond to
the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him.
The Perez doctrine is now the prevailing rule as shown by a catena of cases 283 which cited it after its
promulgation.
10. SOME PRINCIPLES ON HEARING REQUIREMENT.
If employee does not answer, hearing should still proceed. 284
Outright termination violates due process.285
Investigation still required even if incident was witnessed by many. 286
Meeting, dialogue, consultation or interview is not the hearing required by law. It may not be a substitute for
the actual holding of a hearing.287
Prior consultation with union is not part of the due process requirement. 288
Cross-examination or confrontation of witnesses is not necessary in company investigations. 289
Co-conspirators confession is not sufficient to merit dismissal. 290
If a party was not initially given a chance to be heard at the company level, but later was given full
opportunity to submit position papers or present his case and arguments before the Labor Arbiter, this defect is
cured.291 But if the dismissal is not justified, this principle does not apply. 292
11. INSTANCES WHERE HEARING IS NOT REQUIRED.
Hearing is not required in the following cases:
1. Termination of project, seasonal, casual or fixed-term employment.
2. Termination of probationary employment on the ground of failure of the probationary employee to
qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known to him at the start
of the employment.293
3. Termination due to abandonment of work.
4. Termination due to authorized causes under Article 283 (installation of labor-saving device, redundancy,
retrenchment or closure of business or cessation of operations) . In such cases, there are no allegations
which the employees should refute and defend themselves from. 294
5. Termination due to disease under Article 284.295
6. Termination by the employee (resignation) under Article 285.
7. Termination after 6 months of bona-fide suspension of operation under Article 286. For purposes of
satisfying due process, what is required is simply that the notices provided under Article 283 be served
to both the affected employees and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month
before the termination becomes effective.296
8. Termination due to retirement under Article 287.
9. Termination due to expiration of tenure made coterminous with lease. 297
10. Termination due to closure or stoppage of work by government authorities when non-compliance with
the law or implementing rules and regulations poses grave and imminent danger to the health and
safety of workers in the workplace.298
11. Termination due to expiration of contractual employment in a legitimate contracting or subcontracting
arrangement.299
12. Termination of employee who has admitted his guilt for the offense charged. 300
12. SEVEN (7) STANDARD SITUATIONS IN TERMINATION CASES.
 The rules on termination of employment in the Labor Code and pertinent jurisprudence are applicable to
seven (7) different situations, namely:
1. The dismissal was for a just cause under Article 282, for an authorized cause under Article 283, or for
health reasons under Article 284, and due process was observed This termination is LEGAL.301
2. The dismissal was without a just or authorized cause but due process was observed This termination is
ILLEGAL.302
3. The dismissal was without a just or authorized cause and due process was not observed This termination
is ILLEGAL.303
4. The dismissal was for a just or authorized cause but due process was not observed This termination is
LEGAL.304
5. The dismissal was for a non-existent cause This termination is ILLEGAL.305
6. The dismissal was not supported by any evidence of termination This termination is NEITHER LEGAL
NOR ILLEGAL as there is no dismissal to speak of. 306 Reinstatement is ordered not as a relief for illegal
dismissal but on equitable ground.
7. The dismissal was brought about by the implementation of a law This termination is LEGAL.307
13. INDEMNITY IN THE FORM OF NOMINAL DAMAGES.
a. Application of the Agabon and Jaka doctrines.
Termination for a just cause or authorized cause but without affording the employee procedural due process
should no longer be considered illegal or ineffectual308 but legal.
Consequently, the employee will not be ordered reinstated but will be awarded an indemnity in the form of
nominal damages the amount of which will depend on whether the termination is grounded on just cause or
authorized cause, thus:
1. If based on just cause P30,000.00 per Agabon doctrine.309
2. If based on authorized cause P50,000.00 per Jaka doctrine.310

According to Jaka, the indemnity is stiffer in case of authorized cause termination because, unlike in the
case of just cause termination where the employee has committed a wrongful act, an employee dismissed based on
authorized cause has not committed any blameworthy act nor any delinquency or culpability on his part. Instead,
the dismissal process is initiated by the employers exercise of his management prerogative, i.e. , when the employer
opts to install labor saving devices, when he decides to cease business operations or when, as in this case, he
undertakes to implement a retrenchment program
b. Some principles under the Agabon doctrine.
1. Measure of penalty or indemnity - no longer full backwages but nominal damages.
2. Since the dismissal is considered legal, any award of backwages must be deleted and replaced by award
of indemnity.311
3. Amount of nominal damages may be reduced.312 But as far as the upping of the amount is concerned, a
survey of Supreme Court decisions indicates that there has yet been no decision increasing the
indemnity beyond what has been prescribed in Agabon and Jaka.

------------oOo------------

Endnotes:
1 Relevant Provisions: Articles 277 [b], 279, 282 and 283, Labor Code.

2 Pascua v. NLRC, G.R. No. 123518, March 13, 1998; Manila Electric Co. [MERALCO] v. NLRC, G.R. No. 153180,
Sept. 2, 2005; St. Lukes Medical Center, Inc. v. Notario, G.R. No. 152166, Oct. 20, 2010; Lima Land, Inc. v.
Cuevas, G.R. No. 169523, June 16, 2010.

3 Article 283, Labor Code.

4 Article 284, Ibid.

5 See also No. 33, NCMB Primer on Strike, Picketing and Lockout, 2nd Edition, Dec. 1995.

6 Inguillo v. First Philippine Scales, Inc. , G.R. No. 165407, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 471; Alabang Country Club, Inc.
v. NLRC, G.R. No. 170287, Feb. 14, 2008, 545 SCRA 351, 361; Del Monte Philippines, Inc. v. Saldivar, G.R. No.
158620, Oct. 11, 2006, 504 SCRA 192; Lirag Textile Mills v. Blanco, G.R. No. L-27029, Nov. 12, 1981, 109 SCRA
87.

7 Inguillo v. First Philippine Scales, Inc. , supra.

8 Sampaguita Auto Transport Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 197384, Jan. 30, 2013; Suico v. NLRC, G.R. Nos.
146762, 153584 and 163793, Jan. 30, 2007, 513 SCRA 325; Norkis Trading Co. , Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 168159,
Aug. 19, 2005, 467 SCRA 461, 470-471; Philcom Employees Union v. Philippine Communications and Philcom
Corporation, G.R. No. 144315, July 17, 2006.

9 John Hancock Life Insurance Corp. v. Davis, G.R. No. 169549, Sept. 3, 2008; M.F. Violago Oiler Tank Trucks v.
NLRC, G.R. Nos. 56950-51, Sept. 30, 1982 , 117 SCRA 544, 202 Phil. 872 and A. Marquez, Inc. v. Leogardo, G.R.
. No. L-63227, March 15, 1984, 213 Phil. 217; Oania v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 97162-64, June 1, 1995, 244 SCRA 669,
674.

10 Reyes-Rayel v. Philippine Luen Thai Holdings Corp. , G.R. No. 174893, July 11, 2012; Realda v. New Age
Graphics, Inc. , G.R. No. 192190, April 25, 2012; Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. Maguad, G.R. No. 166363, Aug.
15, 2006; Cuaresma v. Enriquez, A.M. No. MTJ-91-608, Sept. 20, 1995, 248 SCRA 454; Suroza v. Honrado, A.M.
No. 2026-CFI Dec. 19, 1981, 196 Phil. 514.

11 Aliling v. Feliciano, G.R. No. 185829, April 25, 2012; Lim v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118434, July 26, 1996, 259 SCRA
485; Buiser v. Leogardo, Jr. , G.R. No. L-63316, July 13, 1984, 131 SCRA 151; Leonardo v. NLRC, G.R. No.
125303 June 16, 2000, 333 SCRA 589; Philippine American Embroideries v. Embroidery and Garment Workers,
G.R. No. L-20143, Jan. 27, 1969, 26 SCRA 634, 639.

12 Yrasuegui v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. , G.R. No. 168081, Oct. 17, 2008.

13 Reyes-Rayel v. Philippine Luen Thai Holdings Corp. , G.R. No. 174893, July 11, 2012; Heavylift Manila, Inc. v. The
CA, G.R. No. 154410, Oct. 20, 2005.

14 G.R. No. 197384, Jan. 30, 2013.

15 Relevant provision: Article 282(a) , Labor Code.

16 Yabut v. Manila Electric Company, G.R. No. 190436, Jan. 16, 2012, 663 SCRA 92; Nissan Motor Phils. , Inc. v.
Angelo, G.R. No. 164181, Sept. 14, 2011, 657 SCRA 520, 530; Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Keihin v.
Keihin Philippines Corporation, G.R. No. 171115, Aug. 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 179, 188; Marival Trading, Inc. v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 169600, June 26, 2007, 525 SCRA 708, 727; Lopez v. NLRC, G.R. No. 167385, Dec. 13, 2005;
Roquero v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc. , G.R. No. 152329, April 22, 2003; Philippine Aeolus Automotive United
Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124617, April 28, 2000, 387 Phil 250, 261; Austria v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124382, Aug.
16, 1999, 371 Phil 340, 360.
17 Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils. , Inc. v. Kapisanan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Coca-Cola-FFW, G.R. No. 148205,
Feb. 28, 2005.

18 Philippine National Bank v. Velasco, G.R. No. 166096, Sept. 11, 2008; Colegio de San Juan de Letran - Calamba
v. Villas, G.R. No. 137795, March 26, 2003; See also Ballao v. CA, G.R. No. 162342, Oct. 11, 2006, 504 SCRA
227, 236 citing Fujitsu Computer Products Corporation of the Philippines v. CA, G.R. No. 158232, March 31, 2005,
454 SCRA 737, 767-768; Villamor Golf Club v. Pehid, G.R. No. 166152, Oct. 4, 2005, 472 SCRA 36, 48; St.
Michaels Institute v. Santos, G.R. No. 145280, Dec. 4, 2001.
19 Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113178. July 5, 1996.

20 Coca-Cola Export Corp. v. Gacayan, G.R. No. 149433, Dec. 15, 2010.

21 Piedad v. Lanao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. , G.R. No. 73735, Aug. 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 500; See also
Quiambao v. Manila Electric Company, G.R. No. 171023, Dec. 18, 2009.

22 Citibank, N.A. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 159302, Feb. 6, 2008.

23 Torreda v. Toshiba Information Equipment [Phils. ], Inc. , G.R. No. 165960, Feb. 8, 2007.

24 Roquero v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc. , G.R. No. 152329, April 22, 2003]; Plantation Bay Resort and Spa v. Dubrico,
G.R. No. 182216, Dec. 4, 2009.

25 Santos, Jr. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 115795, March 6, 1998, 287 SCRA 117.

26 Navarro III v. Damasco, G.R. No. 101875, July 14, 1995.

27 Stanford Microsystems, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-74187, Jan. 28, 1988.

28 Chua-Qua v. Clave, G.R. No. L-49549, Aug. 30, 1990, 189 SCRA 117.

29 Garcia v. NLRC, G. R. No. 116568, Sept. 3, 1999; Supreme Steel Pipe Corp. v. Bardaje, G.R. No. 170811, April
24, 2007.

30 Flores v. NLRC, G.R. No. 109362, May 15, 1996, 256 SCRA 735.

31 Luzon Stevedoring Corporation v. CIR, G.R. No. L-18683, Dec. 31, 1965.

32 Haverton Shipping Ltd. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 65442, April 15, 1985, 135 SCRA 685.

33 Echeverria v. Venutek Medika, Inc. , G.R. No. 169231, Feb. 15, 2007; Solid Development Corporation Workers
Association (SDCWA-UWP) v. Solid Development Corporation, G.R. No. 165995, Aug. 14, 2007.

34 Golden Thread Knitting Industries v. NLRC, G.R. No. 119157, March 11, 1999.
35 Dimalanta v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 83854, May 24, 1989.

36 ABS-CBN Employees Union v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111211, July 24, 1997, 276 SCRA 123.

37 Elizalde International [Phils. ], Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. L-40553, Feb. 26, 1981, 103 SCRA 247.

38 Aboc v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. Nos. 170542-43, Dec. 13, 2010.

39 PLDT v. NLRC, G.R. No. 74562, July 31, 1987.

40 Lopez v. NLRC, G.R. No. 167385, Dec. 13, 2005, 477 SCRA 596, 602.

41 Panuncillo v. CAP Philippines, Inc. , G.R. No. 161305, Feb. 9, 2007.

42 Sanyo Travel Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121449, Oct. 2, 1997; Club Filipino, Inc. v. Sebastian, G.R. No.
85490, July 23, 1992, 211 SCRA 717.

43 Padilla v. NLRC, G.R. No. 114764, June 13, 1997, 273 SCRA 457.

44 R.A. No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act) ; Villarama v. NLRC and Golden Donuts, Inc. , G.R. No. 106341,
Sept. 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 280.

45 First Dominion Resources Corp. v. Pearanda and Vidal, G.R. No. 166616, Jan. 27, 2006.

46 Tanduay Distillery Labor Union v. NLRC, G.R. No. 73352, Dec. 06, 1995.

47 Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Keihin (NLMK-OLALIA-KMU) v. Keihin Philippines Corp. , G.R. No. 171115,
Aug. 9, 2010.

48 Villamor Golf Club v. Pehid, G.R. No. 166152, Oct. 4, 2005.

49 Ramoran v. Jardine CMG Life Insurance Co. , Inc. , G.R. No. 131943, Feb. 22, 2000.

50 San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 82467, June 29, 1989.

51 Ibarrientos v. NLRC, G.R. No. 75277, July 31, 1989.

52 Relevant provision: Article 282(a) , Labor Code.

53 Dongon v. Rapid Movers and Forwarders Co. , Inc. , G.R. No. 163431, Aug. 28, 2013; Mirant [Philippines]
Corporation v. Sario, G.R. No. 197598, Nov. 21, 2012; Realda v. New Age Graphics, Inc. , G.R. No. 192190, April
25, 2012; Nissan Motor Phils. , Inc. v. Angelo, G.R. No. 164181, Sept. 14, 2011, 657 SCRA 520, 530; Equitable
PCI Bank v. Dompor, G.R. Nos. 163293 & 163297, Dec. 8, 2010; St. Lukes Medical Center, Incorporated v.
Fadrigo, G.R. No. 185933, Nov. 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 728, 738; R.B. Michael Press v. Galit, G.R. No. 153510, Feb,
13, 2008; Micro Sales Operation Network v. NLRC, G.R. No. 155279, Oct. 11, 2005, 472 SCRA 328, 335-336;
Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils. , Inc. v. Kapisanan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Coca-Cola-FFW, G.R. No. 148205,
Feb. 28, 2005; Acesite Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 152308, Jan. 26, 2005; Dimabayao v. NLRC, G.R. No.
122178, Feb. 25, 1999, 303 SCRA 655, 659; Carlos A. Gothong Lines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 96685, Feb. 15,
1999, 303 SCRA 164, 170; Escobin v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118159, April 15, 1998, 289 SCRA 48; Lagatic v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 121004, Jan. 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 251, 257; Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services [Phils. ], Inc. v. NLRC, G.R.
 No. 109156, July 11, 1996, 258 SCRA 643; Maebo v. NLRC, G.R. No. 107721, Jan. 10, 1994, 229 SCRA 240,
249-250.

54 Alcantara, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. 143397, Aug. 6, 2002.

55 Petron Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 154532, Oct. 27, 2006.

56 Ace Promotion and Marketing Corp. v. Ursabia, G.R. No. 171703, Sept. 22, 2006.

57 Id.

58 ePacific Global Contact Center, Inc. v. Cabansay, G.R. No. 167345, Nov. 23, 2007.

59 Kakampi and Its Members v. Kingsport Express and Logistic, G.R. No. 194813, April 25, 2012.

60 Santos v. San Miguel Corporation, G.R. No. 149416, March 14, 2003.

61 R.B. Michael Press v. Galit, G.R. No. 153510, Feb. 13, 2008.

62 San Miguel Corp. v. Pontillas, G.R. No. 155178, May 7, 2008; Westin Philippine Plaza Hotel v. NLRC, G.R. No.
121621, May 3, 1999.

63 Relevant provision: Article 282(b) , Labor Code.

64 St. Lukes Medical Center, Inc. v. Notario, G.R. No. 152166, Oct. 20, 2010; Talidano v. Falcon Maritime & Allied Services,
Inc. , G.R. No. 172031, July 14, 2008.

65 Chavez v. NLRC, G.R. No. 146530, Jan. 17, 2005; Union Motor Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 159738, Dec. 9,
2004; Sec. 4343.01[2], Department of Labor Manual.

66 International School Manila v. International School Alliance of Educators (ISAE) , G.R. No. 167286, Feb. 5, 2014;
Cavite Apparel, Inc. v. Marquez, G.R. No. 172044, Feb. 6, 2013; Abel v. Philex Mining Corporation, G.R. No.
178976, July 31, 2009; Nissan Motor Phils. , Inc. v. Angelo, G.R. No. 164181, Sept. 14, 2011, 657 SCRA 520, 530;
Genuino Ice Company, Inc. v. Magpantay, G.R. No. 147790, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 195, 205; Union Motor
Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 159738, Dec. 9, 2004; Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 124617, April 28, 2000; Judy Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111934, April 29, 1998, 289 SCRA 755;
352 Phil. 593; Sec. 4343.01[2], Department of Labor Manual.

67 Fuentes v. NLRC, G.R. No. 75955, Oct. 28, 1988; Associated Bank v. NLRC, G.R. No. 86023, June 29, 1989.

68 Premiere Development Bank v. Mantal, G.R. No. 167716, March 23, 2006, 485 SCRA 234, 239.

69 School of the Holy Spirit of Quezon City v. Taguiam, G.R. No. 165565, July 14, 2008; Reyes v. Maxims Tea
House, G.R. No. 140853, Feb. 27, 2003.

70 St. Lukes Medical Center, Inc. v. Notario, supra.

71 Sec. 4343.01[2], Department of Labor Manual.

72 Dycoco, Jr. v. Equitable PCI Bank (now Banco de Oro) , G.R. No. 188271, Aug. 16, 2010.
73 Id.

74 Ramos v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. , G.R. No. 203186, Dec. 04, 2013.

75 Llosa-Tan v. Silahis International Hotel, G.R. No. 77457, Feb. 5, 1990,260 Phil. 166.

76 Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111905, July 31, 1995; Atlas Consolidated Mining
and Development Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 75751, Oct. 17, 1990, 190 SCRA 505.

77 Genuino Ice Company, Inc. v. Magpantay, G.R. No. 147790, June 27, 2006.

78 Valiao v. Hon. CA, GR. No. 146621, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 543; Philippine Geothermal, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No.
106370, Sept. 8, 1994; Sajonas v. NLRC, G.R. No. 49286, March 15, 1990; Manila Electric Company v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 114129, Oct. 24, 1996.

79 Quiambao v. Manila Electric Company, G.R. No. 171023, Dec. 18, 2009.

80 PLDT v. Teves, G.R. No. 143511, Nov. 15, 2010; Navarro v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. , Inc. , G.R. No. 162583, June 8,
2007.

81 Erector Advertising Sign Group, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 167218, July 2, 2010.

82 Union Motor Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 159738, Dec. 9, 2004.

83 Miranda v. Carreon, G.R. No. 143540, April 11, 2003, 401 SCRA 303, 309.

84 Relevant Provision: Article 282 [b], Labor Code.

85 Forever Security & General Services v. Flores, G.R. No. 147961, Sept. 7, 2007; Remington Industrial Sales Corporation
v. Castaneda, G.R. Nos. 169295-96, Nov. 20, 2006.

86 CRC Agricultural Trading v. NLRC, G.R. No. 177664, Dec. 23, 2009; RBC Cable Master System v. Baluyot, G.R.
No. 172670, Jan. 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 668.

87 New Ever Marketing, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 140555, July 14, 2005.

88 CRC Agricultural Trading v. NLRC, G.R. No. 177664, Dec. 23, 2009.

89 Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club v. NLRC, G.R. No. 154503, Feb. 29, 2008.

90 Premiere Development Bank v. NLRC, G.R. No. 114695, July 23, 1998.

91 Northwest Tourism Corp. v. Former Special Third Division of the Hon. CA, G.R. No. 150591, June 27, 2005.

92 Pasig Cylinder Mfg. , Corp. v. Rollo, G.R. No. 173631, Sept. 8, 2010.

93 Kingsize Manufacturing Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 110452-54, Nov. 24, 1994; Cebu Royal Plant [San Miguel
Corporation] v. Hon. Deputy Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 58639, Aug. 12, 1987, 153 SCRA 38 1987.

94 Intertranz Container Lines, Inc. v. Bautista, G.R. No. 187693, July 13, 2010.

95 Agabon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, Nov. 17, 2004.

96 Malig-on v. Equitable General Services, Inc. , G.R. No. 185269, June 29, 2010.

97 Pasig Cylinder Mfg. , Corp. v. Rollo, G.R. No. 173631, Sept. 8, 2010; Unicorn Safety Glass, Inc. v. Basarte, G.R.
No. 154689, Nov. 25, 2004; See also Cosmos Bottling Corp. v. Nagrama, Jr. , G.R. No. 164403, March 4, 2008.

98 Reno Foods, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 116462, Oct. 18, 1995, 249 SCRA 379, 387.

99 Angeles v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 160213, Jan. 30, 2007.

100 NS Transport Services, Inc. v. Zeta, G.R. No. 158499, April 4, 2007.

101 Padilla Machine Shop v. Javilgas, G.R. No. 175960, Feb. 19, 2008.

102 Pare v. NLRC, G.R. No. 128957, Nov. 16, 1999,

103 Leopard Integrated Services, Inc. v. Macalinao, G.R. No. 159808, Sept. 30, 2008, 567 SCRA 192; Philippine Rural
Reconstruction Movement [PRRM] v. Pulgar, G.R. No. 169227, July 5, 2010.

104 Intertranz Container Lines, Inc. and Tumibay v. Ma. Teresa Bautista, G.R. No. 187693, July 13, 2010.

105 Jo v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121605, Feb. 2, 2000; Bombase v. NLRC, G.R. No. 110889, June 30, 1995, 245 SCRA 496,
500.

106 Calipay v. NLRC, G.R. No. 166411, Aug. 3, 2010.

107 Hda. Dapdap I v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120556, Jan. 26, 1998; NS Transport Services, Inc. v. Zeta, G.R. No. 158499,
April 4, 2007.

108 Pasig Cylinder Mfg. Corp. v. Rollo, G.R. No. 173631, Sept. 8, 2010.

109 Hantex Trading Co. , Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 148241, Sept. 27, 2002.

110 Agabon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, Nov. 17, 2004.

111 Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 119724, May 31, 1999.

112 Ramo v. Elefano, G.R. No. L-55629, July 39, 1981, 106 SCRA 221.

113 East Asiatic v. CIR, G.R. No. L-29068, Aug. 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 521.

114 Castillo v. CIR, G.R. No. L-26124 and L-32725, May 29, 1971, 39 SCRA 75.

115 Sandoval Shipyard v. Clave, G.R. No. L-49875, Nov. 21, 1979, 94 SCRA 472.

116 Magtoto v. NLRC, G.R. No. 63370, Nov. 18, 1985; Pedroso v. Castro, G.R. No. 70361, Jan. 30, 1986.

117 Camua, Jr. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158731, Jan. 25, 2007.

118 City Trucking, Inc. v. Balajadia, G.R. No. 160769, Aug. 9, 2006.

119 Romys Freight Service v. Castro, G.R. No. 141637, June 8, 2006.
120 Relevant provision: Article 282(c) , Labor Code.

121 Sanden Aircon Philippines v. Rosales, G.R. No. 169260, March 23, 2011.

122 De la Cruz, Jr. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 145417, Dec. 11, 2003.

123 Aldeguer & Co. , Inc. /Loalde Boutique v. Tomboc, G.R. No. 147633, July 28, 2008.

124 Villanueva v. NLRC, G. R. No. 129413, July 27, 1998; Diamond Motors Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 151981, Dec.
1, 2003.

125 Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Macaraeg, G.R. No. 145800, Jan. 22, 2003.

126 Gonzales v. NLRC and Pepsi-Cola Products, Phils. , Inc. , G.R. No. 131653, March 26, 2001.

127 Relevant provision: Article 282(c) , Labor Code.

128 Baguio Central University v. Gallente, G.R. No. 188267, Dec. 02, 2013; Alvarez v. Golden Tri Bloc, Inc. , G.R. No.
202158, Sept. 25, 2013; Philippine Plaza Holdings, Inc. v. Flora Episcope, G.R. No. 192826, Feb. 27, 2013.

129 Baguio Central University v. Gallente, supra, citing Bristol Myers Squibb (Phils. ) , Inc. v. Baban, G.R. No. 167449,
Dec. 17, 2008, 574 SCRA, 198, 206.

130 Baguio Central University v. Gallente, supra, citing Baron v. NLRC, G.R. No. 182299, Feb. 22, 2010, 613 SCRA
351, 360; See also Torres v. Rural Bank of San Juan, Inc. , G.R. No. 184520, March 13, 2013; Philippine Plaza
Holdings, Inc. v. Episcope, G.R. No. 192826, Feb. 27, 2013; Prudential Guarantee and Assurance Employee Labor
Union v. NLRC, G.R. No. 185335, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 375, 386; Jerusalem v. Keppel Monte Bank, G.R. No.
169564, April 6, 2011, 647 SCRA 313, 323-324; Aliviado v. Procter & Gamble Phils. , Inc. , G.R. No. 160506, May
9, 2010; Alcantara v. The Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, G.R. No. 151349, Oct. 20, 2010.

131 Villanueva, Jr. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 176893, June 13, 2012.

132 Lopez v. Keppel Bank Philippines, Inc. , G.R. No. 176800, Sept. 5, 2011, 656 SCRA 718, 729; Baguio Central
University v. Gallente, supra; The Coca-Cola Export Corp. v. Gacayan, G.R. No. 149433, Dec. 15, 2010;
Equitable PCI Bank v. Dompor, G.R. Nos. 163293 & 163297, Dec. 8, 2010 ; Rubia v. NLRC, G.R. No. 178621, July
26, 2010; Bibiana Farms and Mills v. Lado, G.R. No. 157861, Feb. 2, 2010.

133 Torres v. Rural Bank of San Juan, Inc. , G.R. No. 184520, March 13, 2013; Wah Yuen Restaurant v. Jayona, G.R.
No. 159448, Dec. 16, 2005.

134 Panday v. NLRC, G.R. No. 67664, May 20, 1992, 209 SCRA 122, 125-126.

135 Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. v. CA, G.R. No. L-15171, April 29, 1961, 1 SCRA 1251.

136 Abel v. Philex Mining Corporation, G.R. No. 178976, July 31, 2009; Mabeza v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118506, April 18,
1997, 271 SCRA 670, 682.

137 See Article 212(m) of the Labor Code.

138 Bristol Myers Squibb [Phils. ], Inc. v. Baban, G.R. No. 167449, Dec. 17, 2008; See also Alvarez v. Golden Tri Bloc,
Inc. , G.R. No. 202158, Sept. 25, 2013; Philippine Plaza Holdings, Inc. v. Episcope, G.R. No. 192826, Feb. 27,
2013; M+W Zander Philippines, Inc. v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 169173, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA, 590, 604; Mabeza v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 118506, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 670.

139 Lopez v. Keppel Bank Philippines, Inc. , G.R. No. 176800, Sept. 5, 2011, 656 SCRA 718, 727.

140 Bristol Myers Squibb [Phils. ], Inc. v. Baban, supra; See also Alvarez v. Golden Tri Bloc, Inc. , supra; Philippine
Plaza Holdings, Inc. v. Episcope, supra; Abel v. Philex Mining Corporation, supra; M+W Zander Philippines, Inc. v.
Enriquez, supra; Mabeza v. NLRC, supra.

141 Moya v. First Solid Rubber Industries, Inc. , G.R. No. 184011, Sept. 18, 2013; Abel v. Philex Mining Corporation,
supra, citing Panday v. NLRC, G.R. No. 67664, May 20, 1992, 209 SCRA 122, 125.

142 Ibid.

143 The Coca-Cola Export Corp. v. Gacayan, G.R. No. 149433, Dec. 15, 2010.

144 Lamsan Trading, Inc. v. Leogardo, G.R. No. 73245, Sept. 30, 1986; Metro Drug Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No.
72248, July 22, 1986; Gonzales v. NLRC and Pepsi-Cola Products, Phils. , Inc. , G.R. No. 131653, March 26,
2001.

145 Alcantara v. The Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, G.R. No. 151349, Oct. 20, 2010; PLDT v. Buna, G.R. No.
143688, Aug. 17, 2007.

146 Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Macaraeg, G.R. No. 145800, Jan. 22, 2003; See also Sagales v.
Rustans Commercial Corp. , G.R. No. 166554, Nov. 27, 2008.

147 Ang v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 178762, June 16, 2010.

148 Felix v. NLRC, G.R. No. 148256, Nov. 17, 2004.

149 Wensha Spa Center, Inc. v. Yung, G.R. No. 185122, Aug. 16, 2010.

150 Muaje-Tuazon v. Wenphil Corp. , G.R. No. 162447, Dec. 27, 2006.

151 PLDT v. Buna, G.R. No. 143688, Aug. 17, 2007.

152 Easycall Communications Phils. , Inc. v. King, G.R. No. 145901, Dec. 15, 2005.

153 Etcuban, Jr. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc. , G.R. No. 148410, Jan. 17, 2005.

154 Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 142133, Nov. 19, 2002.

155 Santos v. San Miguel Corp. , G. R. No. 149416, March 14, 2003, 447 Phil. 264.

156 Relevant provision: Article 282(d) , Labor Code.

157 See Department Order No. 18 issued by the DOLE Secretary on May 18, 1994, promulgating the Rules and
Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7658 entitled An Act Prohibiting the Employment of Children Below Fifteen
 (15) Years of Age in Public and Private Undertakings, amending Section 12, Article VIII of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise
known as the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, June 17,
1992.

158 Relevant provision: Article 282(e) , Labor Code.

159 Sampaguita Auto Transport Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 197384, Jan. 30, 2013.

160 John Hancock Life Insurance Corp. v. Davis, G.R. No. 169549, Sept. 3, 2008; See also M.F. Violago Oiler Tank
Trucks v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 56950-51, Sept. 30, 1982 , 117 SCRA 544, 202 Phil. 872 and A. Marquez, Inc. v.
Leogardo, G.R. . No. L-63227, March 15, 1984, 213 Phil. 217; Oania v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 97162-64, June 1, 1995,
244 SCRA 669, 674.

161 International School Manila v. International School Alliance of Educators (ISAE) , G.R. No. 167286, Feb. 5, 2014;
Reyes-Rayel v. Philippine Luen Thai Holdings Corp. , G.R. No. 174893, July 11, 2012; Realda v. New Age
Graphics, Inc. , G.R. No. 192190, April 25, 2012; Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. Maguad, G.R. No. 166363, Aug.
15, 2006.

162 Aliling v. Feliciano, G.R. No. 185829, April 25, 2012; Philippine American Embroideries v. Embroidery and
Garment Workers, G.R. No. L-20143, Jan. 27, 1969, 26 SCRA 634, 639; Buiser v. Leogardo, Jr. , G.R. No. L-
63316, July 13, 1984, 131 SCRA 151, 158.

163 Yrasuegui v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. , G.R. No. 168081, Oct. 17, 2008.

164 Reyes-Rayel v. Philippine Luen Thai Holdings Corp. , G.R. No. 174893, July 11, 2012; See also Heavylift Manila,
Inc. v. The CA, G.R. No. 154410, Oct. 20, 2005. However, in this case of Heavylift, petitioners have not shown
sufficiently clear and convincing evidence to justify respondent employees termination for her attitude
problem. The mere mention of negative feedback from her team members regarding her low performance rating
and her work attitude is not proof of her attitude problem. Likewise, her failure to refute petitioners allegations of
her negative attitude does not amount to admission. See also Navarro III v. Damasco, G.R. No. 101875, July 14,
1995, 246 SCRA 260, 265.

165 Relevant Provision: Article 248 [e], Labor Code.

166 Based on the second sentence of paragraph [e] of Article 248.

167 G.R. No. 170287, Feb. 14, 2008.

168 Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, G.R. No. L-25246, Sept. 12, 1974, 59 SCRA 54.

169 Id. ; See also Basa vs. Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de Filipinas (FOITAF) ,
G.R. No. L-27113, Nov. 19, 1974, 61 SCRA 93, 102-113; Kapatiran sa Meat and Canning Division [Tupas Local
Chapter No. 1027] v. The Hon. BLR Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja,G.R. No. L-82914, June 20, 1988;Alexander
Reyes v. Trajano, G.R. No. 84433, June 2, 1992.

170 Picop Resources, Inc. v. Taeca, G.R. No. 160828, Aug. 9, 2010; Alabang Country Club, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No.
170287, Feb. 14, 2008.
171 Malayang SamahanngManggagawasa M. Greenfield v. Ramos, G.R. No. 113907, Feb. 28, 2000.

172 National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries Manila Hotel Pavilion Chapter v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 179402, Sept. 30, 2008.

173 Cario v. NLRC, G.R. No. 91086, May 8, 1990, 185 SCRA 177; Del Monte Philippines, Inc. v. Saldivar and Timbal,
G.R. No. 158620, Oct. 11, 2006.

174 Alabang Country Club [supra.

175 Del Monte Philippines, Inc. v. Saldivar, G.R. No. 158620, Oct. 11, 2006.

176 Id.

177 Relevant Provisions: Articles 283 and 284, Labor Code.

178 Culili v. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. , G.R. No. 165381, Feb. 9, 2011; Lopez Sugar Corporation v.
Franco, G.R. No. 148195, May 16, 2005; Asufrin, Jr. v. San Miguel Corp. , G.R. No. 156658, March 10, 2004, 425
SCRA 270, 275; Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 115414, Aug. 25, 1998.

179 Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry Corp. v. Binamira, G.R. No. 170464, July 12, 2010.

180 Philippine Sheet Metal Workers Union v. CIR, G.R. No. L-2028, April 28, 1949, 83 Phil. 453.

181 Magnolia Dairy Products Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 114952, Jan. 29, 1996, 252 SCRA 483.

182 Soriano, Jr. v. NLRC and PLDT, G.R. No. 165594, April 23, 2007.

183 Abapo v. CA, G.R. No. 142405, Sept. 30, 2004. This case involves introduction of high-speed machines to be
used in the manufacture of beer by San Miguel Corporation in its Mandaue plant.

184 Nippon Housing Phil. , Inc. v. Leynes, G.R. No. 177816, Aug. 3, 2011, 655 SCRA 77; Edge Apparel, Inc. v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 121314, Feb. 19, 1998, 286 SCRA 302, 311.

185 Nippon Housing Phil. , Inc. v. Leynes, supra; AMA Computer College v. Garcia, G.R. No. 166703, April 14, 2008,
551 SCRA 254, 264; Dusit Hotel Nikko v. NUWHRAIN - Dusit Hotel Nikko Chapter, G.R. No. 160391, Aug. 9, 2005;
Philippine Carpet Employees Association [PHILCEA] v. Hon. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 168719, Feb. 22, 2006; Asufrin,
Jr. v. San Miguel Corporation, G.R. No. 156658, March 10, 2004.

186 Caltex [Phils. ], Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 159641, Oct. 15, 2007; Becton Dickinson Phils. , Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. Nos.
159969 & 160116, Nov. 15, 2005, 475 SCRA 123; Wiltshire File Co. , Inc. v. G.R. No. 82249, Feb. 7, 1991, 193
SCRA 665, 672.

187 Maya Farms Employees Organization v. NLRC, G.R. No. 106256, Dec. 28, 1994.

188 Smart Communications, Inc. v. Astorga, G.R. No. 148132, Jan. 28, 2008; Caltex [Phils. ], Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No.
159641, Oct. 15, 2007.

189 Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines,Inc. v. Del Villar, G.R. No. 163091, Oct. 6, 2010.
190 Sebuguero v. NLRC, G.R. No. 115394, Sept. 27, 1995; Escareal v. NLRC, G.R. No. 99359, Sept. 2, 1992, 213
SCRA 472.

191 Dole Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120009, Sept. 13, 2001.

192 Santos v. CA, G.R. No. 141947, July 5, 2001.

193 De Ocampo v. NLRC, G.R. No. 101539, Sept. 4, 1992, 213 SCRA 652.

194 Soriano, Jr. v. NLRC and PLDT, G.R. No. 165594, April 23, 2007.

195 San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 99266, March 2, 1999; Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 106516, Sept. 21, 1999.

196 International Harvester Macleod, Inc. v. IAC, 149 SCRA 641 [1987]; See also Dole Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 120009, Sept. 13, 2001.

197 Serrano v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117040, Jan. 27, 2000.

198 Dole Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120009, Sept. 13, 2001.

199 Wiltshire File Co. , Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 82249, Feb. 7, 1991, 193 SCRA 665; See also Becton Dickinson Phils. ,
Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 159969 & 160116, Nov. 15, 2005, 475 SCRA 123.

200 Maya Farms Employees Organization v. NLRC, G.R. No. 106256, Dec. 28, 1994.

201 Asian Alcohol Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 131108, March 25, 1999.

202 De la Salle University v. De la Salle University Employees Association, G.R. No. 109002, April 12, 2000.

203 F. F. Marine Corporation v. The Hon. Second Division, NLRC, G.R. No. 152039, April 8, 2005; See also Anabe v.
Asian Construction, G.R. No. 183233, Dec. 23, 2009; Manatad v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corp. , G.R.
No. 172363, March 7, 2008; Tanjuan v. Philippine Postal Savings Bank, Inc. , G.R. No. 155278, Sept. 16, 2003.

204 Precision Electronics Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 86657, Oct. 23, 1989.

205 Andrada v. NLRC, G.R. No. 173231, Dec. 28, 2007; Oriental Petroleum and Minerals Corp. v. Fuentes, G.R. No.
151818, Oct. 14, 2005; Clarion Printing House, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 148372, June 27, 2005.

206 NDC-Guthrie Plantations, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 110740, Aug. 9, 2001.

207 Sentinel Integrated Services, Inc. v. Remo, G.R. No. 188223, July 5, 2010.

208 Shimizu Phils. Contractors, Inc. v. Callanta, G.R. No. 165923, Sept. 29, 2010.

209 Id.

210 Central Azucarera de la Carlota v. NLRC, G.R. No. 100092, Dec. 29, 1995, 251 SCRA 589.

211 Sebuguero v. NLRC, G.R. No. 115394, Sept. 27, 1995.

212 Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry Corp. v. Binamira, G.R. No. 170464, July 12, 2010.
213 Asian Alcohol Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 131108, March 25, 1999, 305 SCRA 416; TPI Philippines Cement
Corp. v. Cajucom VII, G.R. No. 149138, Feb. 28, 2006.

214 Emco Plywood Corporation v. Abelgas, G.R. No. 148532, April 14, 2004.

215 Danzas Intercontinental, Inc. v. Daguman, G.R. No. 154368, April 15, 2005; Composite Enterprises, Inc. v.
Caparoso, G.R. No. 159919, Aug. 8, 2007.

216 NDC-Guthrie Plantations, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 110740, Aug. 9, 2001.

217 Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines [FASAP] v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. , G.R. No. 178083, July
22, 2008.

218 Casimiro v. Stern Real Estate, Inc. , Rembrandt Hotel, G.R. No. 162233, March 10, 2006; Favila v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 126768, June 16, 1999, 367 Phil. 584, 595.

219 Polymart Paper Industries, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118973, Aug. 12, 1998.

220 Composite Enterprises, Inc. v. Caparoso, G.R. No. 159919, Aug. 8, 2007.

221 Clarion Printing House, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 148372, June 27, 2005.

222 Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines [FASAP] v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. , G.R. No. 178083, July
22, 2008.

223 Id.

224 Taggat Industries, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120971, March 10, 1999.

225 Manatad v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corp. , G.R. No. 172363, March 7, 2008.

226 Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Federation of Free Workers, G.R. Nos. 75700-01, Aug. 30, 1990.

227 Korean Air Co. , Ltd. v. Yuson, G.R. No. 170369, June 16, 2010.

228 International Hardware, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80770, Aug. 10, 1989; See also Unicorn Safety Glass, Inc. v.
Basarte, G.R. No. 154689, Nov. 25, 2004.

229 Hernandez v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co. , NLRC-NCR Case No. 3-1223-83, July 26, 1985.

230 Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry Corp. v. Binamira, G.R. No. 170464, July 12, 2010.

231 Central Azucarera de la Carlota v. NLRC, G.R. No. 100092, Dec. 29, 1995, 251 SCRA 589, 321 Phil. 989, 997.

232 Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. [AG & P], v. NLRC, G.R. No. 127516, May 28, 1999.

233 Manatad v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corp. , G.R. No. 172363, March 7, 2008.

234 Eastridge Golf Club, Inc. v. Eastridge Golf Club, Inc. Labor Union Super, G.R. No. 166760, Aug. 22, 2008; Espina v.
CA, G.R. No. 164582, March 28, 2007.

235 North Davao Mining Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 112546, March 13, 1996, 254 SCRA 721, 727.
236 Peafrancia Tours and Travel Transport, Inc. v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 178397, Oct. 20, 2010.

237 Edge Apparel, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121314, Feb. 12, 1998, 286 SCRA 302; Phil. Engineering Corp. v. CIR,
G.R. No. L-27880, Sept. 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 89.

238 Association of Integrated Security Force of Bislig [AISFB] - ALU v. Hon. CA, and PICOP, G.R. No. 140150, Aug. 22,
2005.

239 Cheniver Deco Print Technics Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 122876, Feb. 17, 2000.

240 J.A.T. General Services v. NLRC, G.R. No. 148340, Jan. 26, 2004; Industrial Timber Corporation v. NLRC, G. R.
Nos. 107302-107306 & 108559-10860, June 10, 1997, 339 Phil. 395, 404.

241 St. John Colleges, Inc. v. St. John Academy Faculty and Employees Union, G.R. No. 167892, Oct. 27, 2006.

242 Cornista-Domingo v. NLRC, G.R. No. 156761, Oct. 17, 2006.

243 National Federation of Labor v. NLRC,G.R. No. 127718, March 2, 2000.

244 Espina v. Hon. CA, G.R. No. 164582, March 28, 2007.

245 Danzas Intercontinental, Inc. v. Daguman, G.R. No. 154368, April 15, 2005.

246 Me-Shurn Corporation v. Me-Shurn Workers Union - FSM, G.R. No. 156292, Jan. 11, 2005.

247 Sapitan v. JB Line Bicol Express, Inc. , G.R. No. 163775, Oct. 19, 2007.

248 San Miguel Corp. v. Aballa, G.R. No. 149011, June 28, 2005.

249 Relevant Provision: Article 284, Labor Code.

250 Per Agabon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, Nov. 17, 2004.

251 See also Section 8, Rule I, Book VI, Rules to Implement the Labor Code.

252 Phil. Employ Services and Resources, Inc. v. Paramio, infra; Crayons Processing, Inc. v. Pula, G.R. No. 167727,
July 30, 2007; ATCI Overseas Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 143949, Aug. 9, 2001, 414 Phil. 883, 893.

253 Section 8, Rule I, Book VI, Rules to Implement the Labor Code; Sevillana v. I.T. [International] Corp. , G.R. No.
99047, April 16, 2001.

254 Gomez v. Central Vegetable Oil, G.R. No. L-22702, July 28, 1969, 28 SCRA 845.

255 Article 282[a], Labor Code.

256 Cebu Royal Plant [San Miguel Corporation] v. Hon. Deputy Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 58639, Aug. 12, 1987, 153
SCRA 38 [1987.

257 Manly Express, Inc. v. Payong, Jr. G.R. No. 167462, Oct. 25, 2005; Cruz v. NLRC, G.R. No. 116384, Feb. 7, 2000.

258 Union Motor Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 159738, Dec. 9, 2004.
259 Tan v. NLRC, G.R. No. 116807, April 14, 1997, 271 SCRA 216; Duterte v. Kingswood Trading Co. , Inc. , G.R. No.
160325, Oct. 4, 2007.

260 ATCI Overseas Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 143949, Aug. 9, 2001; Cebu Royal Plant [San Miguel Corporation] v.
Hon. Deputy Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 58639, Aug. 12, 1987, 153 SCRA 38.

261 Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 141702-03, Aug. 2, 2001.

262 Agabon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, Nov. 17, 2004.

263 Relevant Provision: Article 277[b], Labor Code.

264 Enunciated in the 2004 en banc decision in the case of Agabon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, Nov. 17, 2004.

265 Section 1, Article III [Bill of Rights], 1987 Constitution which states that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. ; Per
Agabon v. NLRC, supra.

266 As provided in Article 277(b) of the Labor Code and as interpreted in the case of King of Kings Transport, Inc. v.
Mamac, G.R. No. 166208, June 29, 2007.

267 G.R. No. 192571, July 23, 2013.

268 Respondent Alcaraz was hired as Medical and Regulatory Affairs Manager (Regulatory Affairs Manager) of
petitioner, subject to a 6-month probationary employment. Upon being terminated, she filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and damages claiming that she should have already been considered as a regular and not a probationary
employee given Abbotts failure to inform her of the reasonable standards for her regularization upon her
engagement as required under Article 296 [281] of the Labor Code. In this relation, she contended that while her
employment contract stated that she was to be engaged on a probationary status, the same did not indicate the
standards on which her regularization would be based. She further averred that the individual petitioners
maliciously connived to illegally dismiss her when: (a) they threatened her with termination; (b) she was ordered not
to enter company premises even if she was still an employee thereof; and (c) they publicly announced that she
already resigned in order to humiliate her. On the contrary, petitioners maintained that Alcaraz was validly
terminated from her probationary employment given her failure to satisfy the prescribed standards for her
regularization which were made known to her at the time of her engagement.

269 As the records show, Alcaraz's dismissal was effected through a letter dated May 19, 2005 which she received on
May 23, 2005 and again on May 27, 2005. Stated therein were the reasons for her termination, i.e. , that after
proper evaluation, Abbott determined that she failed to meet the reasonable standards for her regularization
considering her lack of time and people management and decision-making skills, which are necessary in the
performance of her functions as Regulatory Affairs Manager. Undeniably, this written notice sufficiently meets the
criteria set forth above, thereby legitimizing the cause and manner of Alcarazs dismissal as a probationary
employee under the parameters set by the Labor Code.

270 Short for Probationary Performance Standards and Evaluation (PPSE) .

271 Agabon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, Nov. 17, 2004.

272 Jaka Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot, G.R. 151378, March 28, 2005.

273 Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for
any loss suffered by him.

274 This was referred to in the decision as Article 296 referring to Article 282 of the Labor Code. This author
renumbers it as Article 297 with legal reason, pursuant to R.A. No. 10151, June 21, 2011.

275 Agabon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, Nov. 17, 2004.

276 Jaka Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot, G.R. 151378, March 28, 2005.

277 G.R. No. 166208, June 29, 2007.

278 King of Kings Transport, Inc. v. Mamac, supra; See also Lima Land, Inc. v. Cuevas, G.R. No. 169523, June 16, 2010;
Inguillo v. First Philippine Scales, Inc. , G.R. No. 165407, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 471, 491.

279 Based on the en banc decision in the 2009 case of Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company, G.R.
No. 152048, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 110.

280 Section 2, Rule I, Book VI, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, as amended by Article III, Department Order No.
10, Series of 1997.

281 Abbott Laboratories, Philippines v. Pearlie Ann F. Alcaraz, G.R. No. 192571, July 23, 2013 (En Banc) .

282 Based on the en banc decision in the 2009 case of Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company, G.R.
No. 152048, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 110.

283 Gatus v. Quality House, Inc. , G.R. No. 156766, April 16, 2009; New Puerto Commercial v. Lopez, G.R. No.
169999, July 26, 2010; Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Keihin (NLMK-OLALIA-KMU) v. Keihin
Philippines Corp. , G.R. No. 171115, Aug. 9, 2010; Pharmacia and Upjohn, Inc. v. Albayda, Jr. , G.R. No. 172724,
Aug. 23, 2010; Lopez v. Alturas Group of Companies, G.R. No. 191008, April 11, 2011, 647 SCRA 568; Prudential
Guarantee and Assurance Employee Labor Union and Vallota v. NLRC, Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc.
, G.R. No. 185335, June 13, 2012; Esguerra v. Valle Verde Country Club, G.R. No. 173012, June 13, 2012; Reyes-
Rayel v. Philippine Luen Thai Holdings Corp. , G.R. No. 174893, July 11, 2012; Surigao del Norte Electric
Cooperative, Inc. v. Gonzaga, G.R. No. 187722, June 10, 2013.

284 Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 122075, Jan. 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 297.

285 Robusta Agro Marine Products, Inc. v. Gorombalem, G.R. No. 80500, July 5, 1989.

286 Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80587, Feb. 8, 1989.

287 Maneja v. NLRC, G. R. No. 124013, June 5, 1998.

288 Century Textile Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 77859, May 25, 1988.
289 Alcantara v. The Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, G.R. No. 151349, Oct. 20, 2010; PLDT v. Honrado, G.R.
No. 189366, Dec. 8, 2010.

290 Century Textile Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 77859, May 25, 1988.

291 Pepsi-Cola Distributors of the Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 100686, Aug. 15, 1995.
292 Hellenic Philippine Shipping, Inc. v. Siete, G.R. No. 84082, March 13, 1991.

293 Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. v. Magtibay, Jr. , G.R. No. 164532, July 24, 2007.

294 Wiltshire File Co. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 82249, Feb. 7, 1991.

295 Agabon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, Nov. 17, 2004.

296 Sebuguero v. NLRC, GTI Sportswear Corporation, G.R. No. 115394, Sept. 27, 1995.

297 Hilado v. Leogardo, G.R. No. L-65863, June 11, 1986.

298 Under Article 128 [c] of the Labor Code.

299 Section 5, Rule VIII-A, Book III, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, as amended by Article I, Department Order
No. 10, Series of 1997 [30 May 1997.

300 Philippine Pizza, Inc. v. Bungabong, G. R. No. 154315, May 9, 2005; Roche [Philippines] v. NLRC, G.R. No.
83335, Oct. 5, 1989, 178 SCRA 386, 394.

301 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 115785, Aug. 4, 2000.

302 ACD Investigation Security Agency, Inc. v. Daquera, G.R. No. 147473, March 30, 2004; Pioneer Texturizing
Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118651, Oct. 16, 1997; Oania v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 97162-64, June 1, 1995, 244
SCRA 668.

303 Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry Corp. v. Binamira, G.R. No. 170464, July 12, 2010; JGB and Associates, Inc.
v. NLRC, G.R. No. 109390, March 7, 1996.

304 Agabon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, Nov. 17, 2004.

305 Standard Electric Manufacturing Corporation v. Standard Electric Employees Union-NAFLU-KMU, G.R. No.
166111, Aug. 25, 2005; Magtoto v. NLRC, G.R. No. 63370, Nov. 18, 1985; Pepito v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No.
L-49418, Feb. 29, 1980, 96 SCRA 454; Pedroso v. Castro, G.R. No. 70361, Jan. 30, 1986.

306 Ledesma, Jr. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 174585, Oct. 19, 2007.

307 St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City v. Palacio, G.R. No. 164913, Sept. 8, 2010; St. Lukes Medical Center
Employees Association-AFW and Santos v. NLRC, G.R. No. 162053, March 7, 2007.

308 Per Serrano v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117040, Jan. 27, 2000.

309 Based on the case of Agabon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, Nov. 17, 2004.
310 Based on Jaka Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot, G.R. 151378, March 28, 2005.

311 Electro System Industries Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 165282, Oct. 5, 2005.

312 Business Services of the Future Today, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 157133, Jan. 30, 2006; Industrial Timber Corp. v. Ababon,
G.R. No. 164518, March 30, 2006.