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JavaScript Deobfuscation (Spiffy)

This document discusses the need for tools and techniques to analyze malicious web content and JavaScript obfuscation, as more malware is delivered through the web. It describes Websense's approach of emulating a browser without rendering content, to allow pages to decode themselves and log all activity. This involves implementing an HTML parser, DOM, and JavaScript engine. Their system analyzes over 100 million URLs daily, detecting infections through DOM element combinations and signatures within eval and document.write calls. Limitations include other languages, errors preventing execution, denial of service risks, and lack of user interaction modeling.

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mohamed harir
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651 views

JavaScript Deobfuscation (Spiffy)

This document discusses the need for tools and techniques to analyze malicious web content and JavaScript obfuscation, as more malware is delivered through the web. It describes Websense's approach of emulating a browser without rendering content, to allow pages to decode themselves and log all activity. This involves implementing an HTML parser, DOM, and JavaScript engine. Their system analyzes over 100 million URLs daily, detecting infections through DOM element combinations and signatures within eval and document.write calls. Limitations include other languages, errors preventing execution, denial of service risks, and lack of user interaction modeling.

Uploaded by

mohamed harir
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Spiffy:

Automated
JavaScript Deobfuscation
Stephan Chenette Alex Rice
Principle Security Researcher Sr. Security Researcher
Malcode analysis
Current malcode research is focused on binary analysis.

Multiple tools to assist researchers in analysis.


IDA
OllyDbg

Fact: More delivery of malware is moving to the web.

A new set of skills and tools are required.


What you know
What you need to know
Malicious binary analysis
Languages: Assembly, C, C++, vb, delphi, etc.
Concepts: PE file format, win32 function usage, unpacking, anti-
disassembling tricks, etc.
Tools: IDA, OllyDbg, PEiD, Imprec

Malicious web content analysis


Languages: (D)HTML, VBScript, JavaScript, Perl/Python/Ruby
Concepts: HTTP Protocol, XMLHTTPRequest, Document Object
Model (DOM), Browser Security Models, JSON,
Tools: ???
Those Who Forget History Are
Doomed to Repeat It
Malcode authors will protect malicious web content the
same way they protected malicious binaries.

Signature evasion
Anti-analysis techniques
Pain in the #*&#$! for all researchers!!
Unpacking and anti-debugging
Packing/Protecting/Anti-reversing
Compression, Encryption, CRC protection
Anti-debugging
Virtualization detection
Anti-emulation
XOR stubs
Obfuscation Evolution
String splitting:
AD + ODB.S + treAM
String encoding/escaping:
%41\u0044 + O\x44%42\u002ES + t%72eAM
Closing html tags (e.g. </TEXTAREA>)
Code length dependant obfuscation:
arguments.callee.toString()
Server-side [poly|meta]-morphic obfuscation
Malicious JavaScript
What we actually see
Our Approach
Emulation: a browser without a browser
HTML Parser
DOM Implementation
Scripting Engine(s)/Interpreter(s)
Allow the page to decode itself
Dont render content, just log everything!
HTML Parser
The first step in emulating a browser: HTML.

Retrieve all the content needed by the page:


external SCRIPTs, IFRAMEs, etc.

Side effect basic HTML obfuscation is defeated:


<iframe src=&#104;&#116;&#116;&#112;
&#58;&#47;&#47;%77%77%77%2E%74.
A Little DOM, Please
Modern browsers are dynamic, so our emulator
must also be.

Implement Document Object Model

Attempting to detect all instances of an element by


simply parsing static HTML is not enough.
createElement(IFRAME);
Coming At You Like A Spider Monkey
Integrate scripting engine(s) with our DOM to
execute scripts as they are discovered

Scripts are [mostly] safe for execution

Firefoxs SpiderMonkey JavaScript Engine


(MPL/GPL/LGPL)
The Missing Pieces
Implement all of the objects/functions that the
browser provides:
Native JavaScript Browser Supplied
eval() alert()
String.fromCharCode() document.write()
escape() location.href
Math.random() window.status

Few internal tweaks to mimic JScript (IE)


e.g., arguments.callee.toString()
Automated Usage
Integrated with our miners
Lots and lots of tuning (Dec 06)

100,000,000+ URLs analyzed every 24 hrs

Even after the initial decoding, string matching is still


futile: AD + ODB.S + treAM
New Technique, New Signatures
Detect specific DOM element + attribute combinations
1. New <OBJECT> created
2. <OBJECT>.classid = BD96C556-65A3.
3. <OBJECT>.CreateObject(adodb.stream)

Can still match old fashion signatures *inside*


document.write() and eval() calls
24 Hours 111M URLs
124,232 Infected (0.11%)
Limitations JavaScript Only?
Other Languages?
Same concepts apply!
VBScript
vbscript.dll under WinE!
Currently working on experimental version
ActionScript
Partially implemented when Adobe open sourced
the engine; now part of Mozillas Tamarin Project
Limitations variable is not defined!
Attackers can potentially use intentional errors to
prevent code execution
Identical input/output is very important
Easy: document.width
Hard: window.open()
Really hard: XMLHTTPRequest
Centralized verbose error logging!
Limitations Denial of Service
JS_SetBranchCallback
Look familiar?

Separate thread monitoring execution time


Limitations User Interaction
Malicious code could potentially rely upon a users
action before execution begins
We implemented some basic event handling:
body onload
window focus
document onmouse___
Not foolproof!
CaffeineMonkey
Ben Feinstein & Daniel Peck @ SecureWorks
Released Open Source
Excellent tool for manual reverse engineering of
obfuscation; needs HTML/DOM!
Promising research that attempts to identify malicious
activity based on behavior, not static signatures.
http://secureworks.com/research/tools/caffeinemonkey.html
Other Resources
Tutorials from ISC, excellent starting point
http://handlers.sans.org/dwesemann/decode/

Jose Nazarios CanSecWest presentation


http://www.cansecwest.com/slides07/csw07-nazario.pdf

Websense Blogs
http://www.websense.com/securitylabs/blog/blog.php?BlogID=86
http://www.websense.com/securitylabs/blog/blog.php?BlogID=98
http://www.websense.com/securitylabs/blog/blog.php?BlogID=142
The End
Stephan Chenette Alex Rice
Principle Security Researcher Sr .Security Researcher
schenette || websense com arice || websense com

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