PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE, ROXAS BOULEY ARD, INC.

,
vs.
FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY, NOW BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
AND HECTOR I. GALURA
G.R. No. 159926 January 20, 2014

BERSAMIN, J.:

NATURE OF THE CASE: This appeal seeks to undo the dismissal by the Court of
Appeals (CA) of the petitioner's action for annulment of judgment through the assailed
resolution promulgated on July 31, 2003,1 as well as the denial of its motion for
reconsideration on September 12, 2003.

FACTS: Bonier, then the President of petitioner corporation (Pinausukan, for short),
executed four real estate mortgages involving the petitioners parcel of land situated in
Pasay City in favor of Far East Bank and Trust Company (Bank). The parcel of land was
registered under the name of Pinausukan. When the unpaid obligation secured by the
mortgages had ballooned, the Bank commenced proceedings for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgages in the Office of the Ex Officio Sheriff, Regional Trial Court
(RTC), in Pasay City. Two weeks thereafter, the sheriff issued the notice of sheriffs sale,
setting the public auction.

Learning of the impending sale of its property by reason of the foreclosure of the
mortgages, Pinausukan, represented by Zsae Carrie de Guzman, brought against the
Bank and the sheriff an action for the annulment of real estate mortgages in the RTC,
averring that Bonier had obtained the loans only in his personal capacity and had
constituted the mortgages on the corporate asset without Pinausukans consent through
a board resolution. The case was assigned to Branch 108. Pinausukan applied for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
Bank and the sheriff from proceeding with the extrajudicial foreclosure and the public
auction.

In the ensuing trial, Pinausukan presented Zsae Carrie de Guzman as its first witness.
However, the subsequent hearing dates were reset several times. After some time the
parties informed the RTC about their attempts to settle the case. The counsels of the
parties did not appear in court on the hearing scheduled despite having agreed thereto.
Accordingly, on October 31, 2002 the RTC dismissed the action for the annulment of real
estate mortgages for failure to prosecute. The order of dismissal attained finality.

Then the sheriff issued a notice of extrajudicial sale concerning the property of
Pinausukan. The notice was received by Pinausukan a week later.
Claiming surprise over the turn of events, Pinausukan inquired from the RTC and
learned that Atty. Villaflor, its counsel of record, had not informed it about the order of
dismissal.

Pinausukan brought the petition for annulment in the CA seeking the nullification of the
order of October 31, 2002. Its petition, under the verification of Roxanne, who was one of
its Directors, and concurrently its Executive Vice President for Finance and Treasurer,
stated that its counsel had been guilty of gross and palpable negligence in failing to keep
track of the case he was handling, and in failing to apprise Pinausukan of the
developments on the case.

CA dismissed the petition for annulment, citing the failure to attach the affidavits of
witnesses attesting to and describing the alleged extrinsic fraud supporting the cause of
action; and observing that the verified petition related only to the correctness of its
allegations. CA denied Pinausukans motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the petitioners action for annulment of
judgment and the denial of its motion for reconcideration?

HELD:
The appeals lack merit.
Given the extraordinary nature and the objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment
or final order, Pinausukan must be mindful of and should closely comply with the following
statutory requirements for the remedy as set forth in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

The first requirement prescribes that the remedy is available only when the petitioner can
no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies through no fault of the petitioner.

The second requirement limits the ground for the action of annulment of judgment to either
extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction.

The third requirement sets the time for the filing of the action. The action, if based on
extrinsic fraud, must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud;
and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or
estoppel.

The fourth requirement demands that the petition should be verified, and should allege
with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those
supporting the petitioners good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case
may be. The need for particularity cannot be dispensed with because averring the
circumstances constituting either fraud or mistake with particularity is a universal
requirement in the rules of pleading.

The purpose of these requirements of the sworn verification and the particularization of
the allegations of the extrinsic fraud in the petition, of the submission of the certified true
copy of the judgment or final order or resolution, and of the attachment of the affidavits of
witnesses and documents supporting the cause of action or defense is to forthwith bring
all the relevant facts to the CAs cognizance in order to enable the CA to determine
whether or not the petition has substantial merit. Should it find prima facie merit in the
petition, the CA shall give the petition due course and direct the service of summons on
the respondent; otherwise, the CA has the discretion to outrightly dismiss the petition for
annulment.

A review of the dismissal by the CA readily reveals that Pinausukans petition for
annulment suffered from procedural and substantive defects. The procedural defect
consisted in Pinausukans disregard of the fourth requirement mentioned earlier
consisting in its failure to submit together with the petition the affidavits of witnesses or
documents supporting the cause of action.

Pinausukans failure to include the affidavits of witnesses was fatal to its petition for
annulment. Worthy to reiterate is that the objective of the requirements of verification and
submission of the affidavits of witnesses is to bring all the relevant facts that will enable
the CA to immediately determine whether or not the petition has substantial merit. In that
regard, however, the requirements are separate from each other, for only by the affidavits
of the witnesses who had competence about the circumstances constituting the extrinsic
fraud can the petitioner detail the extrinsic fraud being relied upon as the ground for its
petition for annulment. This is because extrinsic fraud cannot be presumed from the
recitals alone of the pleading but needs to be particularized as to the facts constitutive of
it. The distinction between the verification and the affidavits is made more pronounced
when an issue is based on facts not appearing of record. In that instance, the issue may
be heard on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, subject to the
court directing that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.
 The substantive defect related to the supposed neglect of Atty. Villaflor to keep track of
the case, and to his failure to apprise Pinausukan of the developments in the case, which
the CA did not accept as constituting extrinsic fraud, because based solely on these
allegations, we do not see any basis to give due course to the petition as these allegations
do not speak of the extrinsic fraud contemplated by Rule 47.

We concur with the CA. Verily, such neglect of counsel, even if it was true, did not amount
to extrinsic fraud because it did not emanate from any act of respondent Bank as the
prevailing party, and did not occur outside the trial of the case. Moreover, the failure to be
fully aware of the developments in the case was Pinausukan's own responsibility. As a
litigant, it should not entirely leave the case in the hands of its counsel, for it had the
continuing duty to keep itself abreast of the developments if only to protect its own interest
in the litigation. It could have discharged its duty by keeping in regular touch with its
counsel, but it did not. Consequently, it has only itself to blame.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on July 31, 2003 and September 12, 2003; and ORDERS the petitioner
to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
 EDITHA PADLAN
vs.
ELENITA DINGLASAN and FELICISIMO DINGLASAN
G.R. No. 180321 March 20, 2013

PERALTA, J.:

NATURE OF THE CASE: This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision1 dated June 29, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86983,
and the Resolution2 dated October 23, 2007 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.3

FACTS: Elenita was the registered owner of a parcel of land. While on board a jeepney,
Elenitas mother, Lilia, had a conversation with one Maura regarding the sale of the said
property. Believing that Maura was a real estate agent, Lilia borrowed the owners copy
of the TCT from Elenita and gave it to Maura. Maura then subdivided the property into
several lots under the name of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo.

Through a falsified deed of sale bearing the forged signature of Elenita and her husband
Felicisimo, Maura was able to sell the lots to different buyers. Maura sold a portion of the
lot to one Lorna Ong, who later caused the issuance of a TCT for the subject property
under her name. A few months later, Lorna sold the lot to petitioner Editha Padlan for
4,000.00. Thus, a TCT was issued in the name of petitioner.
After learning what had happened, respondents demanded petitioner to surrender
possession of the lot sold to the latter, but refused. Respondents were then forced to file
a case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan for the Cancellation of
Transfer Certificate of Title issues to petitioner.Summons was, thereafter, served to
petitioner through her mother, Anita Padlan. Respondents moved to declare petitioner in
default and prayed that they be allowed to present evidence ex parte.

After some time, petitioner, through counsel, filed an Opposition to Declare Defendant in
Default with Motion to Dismiss Case for Lack of Jurisdiction Over the Person of
Defendant. Petitioner claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her, because
the summons was not validly served upon her person, but only by means of substituted
service through her mother. Petitioner maintained that she has long been residing in
Japan and only comes to the Philippines for a brief vacation once every two years.

Charlie Padlan, the brother of petitioner, testified that his sister is still in Japan and
submitted a copy of petitioners passport and an envelope of a letter that was allegedly
sent by his sister. Nevertheless, RTC issued an Order denying petitioners motion to
dismiss and declared her in default. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner to be a buyer in good faith and,
consequently, dismissed the complaint. Not satisfied, respondents sought recourse
before the CA.

The CA rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent. Consequently, the CA reversed

and set aside the Decision of the RTC and ordered the cancellation of the TCT issued in
the name of Lorna and the petitioner, and the revival of respondents own title.

The CA found that petitioner purchased the property in bad faith from Lorna. The CA
opined that although a purchaser is not expected to go beyond the title, petitioner should
have conducted further inquiry before buying the disputed property. The fact that Lorna
bought a 5,000-square-meter property for only 4,000.00 and selling it after four months
for the same amount should have put petitioner on guard.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner argued that not only
did the complaint lacks merit, the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case and the person of the petitioner.
CA issued a Resolution denying the motion. It reasoned that when the RTC denied
petitioners motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, petitioner neither moved for
a reconsideration of the order nor did she avail of any remedy provided by the Rules.
Instead, she kept silent and only became interested in the case again when the CA
rendered a decision adverse to her claim.
Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Honorable Court has jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner and over the subject matter of the case?

HELD:
None. Respondents filed the complaint in 1999, at the time Batas Pambansa Blg.
(BP) 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, was already amended.

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
Twenty Thousand Pesos (20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (50,000.00), except actions for forcible
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over
which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x x x

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of
the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos
(20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does
not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in
cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall
be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.

Respondents filed their Complaint with the RTC; hence, before proceeding any further
with any other issues raised by the petitioner, it is essential to ascertain whether the RTC
has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case based on the above-quoted
provisions.

What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character
of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.

In the present controversy, before the relief prayed for by the respondents in their
complaint can be granted, the issue of who between the two contending parties has the
valid title to the subject lot must first be determined before a determination of who between
them is legally entitled to the certificate of title covering the property in question.
In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the
assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to
determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. In the case at bar, the only basis
of valuation of the subject property is the value alleged in the complaint that the lot was
sold by Lorna to petitioner in the amount of 4,000.00. No tax declaration was even
presented that would show the valuation of the subject property.

To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property,
it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the
property subject thereof. Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents for
the disputed lot is only 4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the
action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. CV No. 86983, dated June 29, 2007, and its Resolution dated October 23,
2007, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
dated July I, 2005, is declared NULL and VOID. The complaint in Civil Case No. 438-
ML is dismissed without prejudice.
 SAN JOSE & ANGCAO VS. OZAMIZ
G.R. NO. 190590, JULY 12, 2017

CARPIO, J:

NATURE OF THE CASE: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Petitioners challenge the decision of CA which reversed RTCs order to
dismiss the complaint for inspection of books filed by respondent for lack of jurisdiction.

FACTS: Petitioner San Jose was elected as member of the Board of Directors then
served as Corporate Secretary of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation (PHC) while Petitioner
Angcao served as Corporate Secretary after San Jose resigned. Ozamiz was a
stockholder of PHC. Ozamiz requested from petitioners a copy of all the Minutes of the
Meetings of the Board of Directors and Executive Committee of PHC from 2000 to 2007
and a certification as to the completeness thereof. Petitioners disregarded the request of
Ozamiz. Ozamiz later on filed a complaint for inspection of books with the RTC.
Petitioners argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint as the subject
matter thereof is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan since PHC is
subject of a standing sequestration order issued by PCGG. RTC rendered its Order
dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Ozamiz filed with CA a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court to assail the Order of RTC. He argued that the RTC,
and not the Sandiganbayan, had jurisdiction over the case because it only involves an
intra-corporate controversy. CA agreed with the contention of respondent and reversed
and set aside the Order of the RTC. CA also denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by petitioners.

ISSUE: a) Whether or not the appeal to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court was proper.
b) Whether or not the CA erred in remanding the case back to RTC after finding that the
complaint was within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

HELD: a) The case involves an intra-corporate dispute. It is a conflict between a

stockholder and the corporation and it involves the enforcement of the right of Ozamiz,
as a stockholder, to inspect the books of PHC and the obligation of the latter to allow its
stockholder to inspect its books. Because of this, the matter was properly elevated to the
CA. The order of the RTC dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction was a final order
under the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under RA
No. 8799. Thus, the proper remedy was to appeal the order to the CA through a petition
for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
b) CA was correct in remanding the case to RTC. The subject matter of the case does
not arise from, or is incidental to, or is related to recovery by PCGG of the ill-gotten wealth
of former President Marcos, his relatives, dummies and other agencies which would vest
jurisdiction with the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS DENIED. THE ASSAILED DECISION AND

RESOLUTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE AFFIRMED.
 FRENCH VS. CA
GR No. 220057, July 12, 2017

CARPIO, J:

FACTS: Magdalena, an American citizen residing in U.S.A., through her attorney-in-fact

Thomas 0' dell (Thomas), filed a complaint for ejectment against Rene. Magdalena
alleged that she is one of the owners of a parcel of land located in the City of Passi.
Magdalena alleged that sometime in the 1980s, Henry French, Rene's father, sought her
permission to cultivate a portion of the land without paying any rental. She and Henry had
an agreement that he would pay some of her loans with the PNB and would vacate the
land once she needs it. However, Magdalena alleged that upon Henry's death, Rene took
over possession of the land without her permission. As such, Rene was occupying the
land by mere tolerance of the owner. Magdalena sent a letter demanding Rene to vacate
the land but he failed to comply, prompting Magdalena to file a case against him.
Rene countered that his father Henry and French-Solinap Development Corporation had
been in possession and acted as owners of the land. Rene alleged that Magdalena and
Thomas obtained a loan from PNB and used the land as collateral. Magdalena and
Thomas defaulted in their payment and asked Henry to redeem the land. In tum, Henry
redeemed the land through the corporation. PNB released the land from mortgage and
turned over the original owner's copy to Henry. Rene alleged that upon his parents' death,
he succeeded as the administrator, owner, and President of the corporation. Rene alleged
that Magdalena and Thomas assigned, abandoned, and waived their rights and interests
over the land in favor of Henry and his successors in- interest who had been in open,
continuous, notorious, and public possession of the land in the concept of an owner for
23 years. Rene further alleged that Henry and his successors-in-interest had been paying
the land's real property taxes from 1976 until 2007. Both Trial Court and Court of Appeals
ruled in favour of Magdalena.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipal Trial Court in Cities had jurisdiction over the case
filed by Magdalena against Rene?
HELD: YES. PETITION DENIED. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical
possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth
whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The
two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the
defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto
possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but
became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
A complaint for an action for unlawful detainer is sufficient if the following allegations are
present:
1. Initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance
of the plaintiff; 2. Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; 3. Thereafter, the
defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and 4. Within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate
the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
All the allegations in the complaint constitute a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
Magdalena allowed Henry to occupy the land subject to certain conditions. Among the
conditions is that Henry will vacate the land when the time comes for Magdalena to use
it. When Henry died and Rene took over the property, Magdalena, sent a demand letter
to Rene to vacate the land but the latter failed to comply. Rene's refusal to vacate the
land prompted Magdalena to file the complaint for unlawful detainer. Thus, the
requirements for an action for unlawful detainer have been sufficiently shown in the
complaint.
 CORPUZ vs SPS. AGUSTIN
G.R. No. 183822. January 18, 2012

SERENO, J.:

NATURE: This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the Decision dated 08 January 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 90645, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City
and its Resolution dated 15 July 2008 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC,
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, affirmed the Decision of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Laoag City, which had dismissed the unlawful detainer case filed by herein
petitioner.

FACTS: Parcels of land subject of the case were formerly owned by Elias Duldulao in
whose name Original Certificate of Title No. O-1717 was issued. Duldulao sold said
properties on August 27, 1951 to Francisco D. Corpuz, father of Ruben C. Corpuz.

The elder Corpuz allowed spouses Agustin to occupy subject properties, the latter being
relatives. Despite demand to vacate, the Agustins refused to leave the premises.
Petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment against Spouses Hilarion and Justa Agustin
which claimed that has the better right to possess subject property having acquired the
same from his father, Francisco, who executed a Deed of Quitclaim in his favor on March
15, 1971. And that the occupation of the Spouses were merely tolerated. Respondent
interposed the defense that Francisco Corpuz, disposed of subject property by executing
a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor.

The Quitclaim, which was subsequently inscribed at the back of Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. O-1717 on 29 October 1976, resulted in the issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-12980 in the name of petitioner. The Deed of Sale
executed with respondents was, however, not annotated at the back of OCT No. O-1717
and remained unregistered.

The MTCC favored the spouses Agustin and dismissed the complaint which later on
affirmed by the RTC. Subsequently, Corpuz sought relief to the Court of Appeals (CA).
However, CA dismissed the appeal noting that petitioners father engaged in a double
sale when he conveyed the disputed properties to petitioner and respondents.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not between the parties has the right to possession of the disputed
properties petitioner, who is the registered owner under TCT No. T-12980; or
respondents, who have a notarized yet unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale over the same
properties?

RULING: The right of possession belongs with Spouses Agustin since their possession
has been established as one in the concept of ownership. CA was correct to dismiss the
unlawful detainer case of Corpuz.

In ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve the basic question of who is entitled to
physical possession of the premises, possession referring to possession de facto, and
not possession de jure. It is obvious that petitioner has not complied with the
requirements sufficient to warrant the success of his unlawful detainer complaint against
respondents. The lower courts and the CA have consistently upheld the entitlement of
respondents to continued possession of the subject properties, since their possession
has been established as one in the concept of ownership. Thus, the courts correctly
dismissed the unlawful detainer case of petitioner.
The SC concurred the appellate court's findings that petitioner's father engaged in a
double sale of the disputed properties. The records of the case show that it took petitioner
more or less five years from 1971 when he acquired the property from his father to 1976
when petitioner registered the conveyance and caused the issuance of the land title
registered in his name under the Torrens system. But it did not sustain the CAs
conclusion that petitioner's failure to initiate any action to annul the sale to respondents
and oust them from the disputed properties had the effect of registration of respondents'
unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale.

In this case, the Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in favor of petitioner was
executed ahead of the Deed of Sale of respondents. Thus, the sale of the subject
properties by petitioner's father to respondents cannot be considered as a prior interest
at the time that petitioner came to know of the transaction.

The Spouses Agustin do not dispute the existence of TCT No. T-12980 registered in the
name of petitioner. They allege, though, that the land title issued to him was an "act of
fraud" on his part which is an equivalent to a collateral attack against the Torrens title of
petitioner. It is settled in jurisprudence that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be the
subject of collateral attack. Such attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for lack of
merit. The Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90645 (dated
January 08, 2008), of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 3111-
13293-65, as well as of the Municipal Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No.
3111 -- all dismissing the unlawful detainer case of petitioner are AFFIRMED.

We make no pronouncements as to attorney's fees for lack of evidence.

 RIZAL et.al vs NAREDO et.al
G.R. No. 151898. March 14, 2012

REYES, J.

NATURE: Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 13, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 26109,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36, Calamba, Laguna
which dismissed the Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 1153-87-C[3] for partition,
recovery of shares with damages of Lot No. 252 on res judicata.
FACTS: Petitioners Ricardo, Potenciana, Elena, Saturnina and Benjamin, all surnamed
Rizal, commenced Civil Case No. 7836 against Matias Naredo (Matias), Valentin Naredo
(Valentin) and Juana de Leon (Juana) before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Laguna involving the accretion of two (2) hectares of land to Lot No. 454 of the Calamba
Estate. In a decision rendered on May 22, 1947, the CFI ruled in favor of
the petitioners. The CFI awarded the ownership of the two-hectare accretion to the
petitioners and ordered the defendants therein to vacate the said land and to pay P500.00
a year from 1943 as reasonable rent for their occupancy thereof. Both the CA and the
Supreme Court upheld the decision.

To satisfy the money judgment in Civil Case No. 7836, the provincial sheriff of Laguna
levied upon Lots Nos. 252 and 269 of the Calamba Estate, together with the house
erected on Lot No. 252. This Lot No. 252, which is the subject of the controversy, was
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-488 (RT-3377 No. 12206)
in the name of the Legal Heirs of Gervacia Cantillano, of Parian, Calamba,
Laguna. Several third-party claims were filed. After the petitioners posted the required
bond, the provincial sheriff proceeded with the auction sale. The petitioners were declared
the highest bidders. A final deed of sale was issued to them.

Marcela, Leoncia, Matias, Valentin, and Juana instituted Civil Case No. 9908 before the
CFI Branch 1, Laguna, questioning the validity of the execution sale of Lots Nos. 252 and
269 and the house of mixed materials on Lot No. 252. They claimed that these properties
were exempt from execution. The CFI declared valid the execution sale of Lots Nos. 252
and 269 of the Calamba Estate in favor of the petitioners, with a qualification that the
petitioners only acquired whatever rights, title or interests Matias, Valentin and Juana had
in Lot No. 252.

After the aforesaid judgment in Civil Case No. 9908, the petitioners filed Civil Case No.
36-C against Marcela and Leoncia for partition, accounting and recovery of possession
of Lot No. 252. The parties then entered into a Compromise Agreement with a partition
of 3/5 for the petitioners and the other 2/5 for the defendants which was approved by the
CFI Branch VI, Laguna.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the appeal on the ground of
prescription and res judicata.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the petitioners action is dismissible for res
judicata and lack of cause of action.
The petitioners vehemently deny that the partition of Lot No. 252 has already been settled
in Civil Case No. 36-C. They insist that the mere determination of the proportionate
shares of the parties, as well as their respective portions of the aforesaid lot in the
Compromise Agreement is not enough. They assert that there must be an actual and
exclusive possession of their respective portions in the plan and titles issued to each of
them accordingly.

Article 484 of the New Civil Code provides that there is co-ownership whenever the
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Also ursuant to
Article 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner is obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and
his proper remedy is an action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, which he
may bring at anytime in so far as his share is concerned. It has been held that the fact
that the agreement of partition lacks the technical description of the parties' respective
portions or that the subject property was then still embraced by the same certificate of
title could not legally prevent a partition, where the different portions allotted to each were
determined and became separately identifiable.

The partition of Lot No. 252 was the result of the approved Compromise Agreement in
Civil Case No. 36-C, which was immediately final and executory. It is axiomatic that a
compromise agreement once approved by the court settles the rights of the parties and
has the force of res judicata. It cannot be disturbed except on the ground of vice of
consent or forgery.

Of equal significance is the fact that the compromise judgment in Civil Case No. 36-C
settled as well the question of which specific portions of Lot No. 252 accrued to the parties
separately as their proportionate shares therein

Nonetheless, it must be made clear that nothing in this decision shall be understood to
mean that the petitioners have lost their title or interest in the subject
property. Subsequent decision in 1955 in Civil Case No. 9908, the respondents 2/5
interest in the property was recognized, thereby amending the extent of the petitioners
title. The judgment on Civil Case 9908 has not been registered, and neither was the
compromise judgment of partition in Civil Case No. 36-C dated December 1, 1971, which
established the parties respective specific portions in Lot No. 252. Thus, as a
prerequisite to the issuance of a new title in the name of the petitioners over their 3/5
allocated portion, we believe that Section 81 of P.D. No. 1529 does not bar the belated
registration of the compromise judgment in Civil Case No. 36-C.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated July 13, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 26109 is AFFIRMED.
 ELIZA ZUNIGA-SANTOS vs. MARIA DIVINA GRACIA SANTOS-GRAN and
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA CITY
G.R. No. 197380 October 8, 2014

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of sale and revocation of title against
respondents stating therein that: (a) she was the registered owner of three parcels of land
located in the Municipality of Montalban, Province of Rizal; (b) she has a second husband
by the name of Lamberto, with whom she did not have any children; (c) she was forced
to take care of Lambertos alleged daughter, Gran, whose birth certificate was forged to
make it appear that the latter was petitioners daughter; (d) pursuant to void and voidable
documents, i.e., a Deed of Sale, Lamberto succeeded in transferring the subject
properties in favor of and in the name of Gran; (e) said Deed of Sale could not be located;
and (f) she discovered that the subject properties were transferred to Gran. Petitioner
prayed that Gran surrender to her the subject properties and pay damages, including
costs of suit.
Gran filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that (a) the action filed by petitioner had
prescribed since an action upon a written contract must be brought within ten years from
the time the cause of action accrues, or in this case, from the time of registration of the
questioned documents before the Registry of Deeds; and (b) the Amended Complaint
failed to state a cause of action as the void and voidable documents sought to be nullified
were not properly identified nor the substance thereof set forth.
The RTC dismissed the case due to petitioners failure to state a cause of action.
Petitioner elevated the case to the CA. The CA sustained the dismissal but on the ground
of insufficiency of factual basis.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of petitioners Amended Complaint should be
sustained?
HELD: Yes. RTCs dismissal was proper for the petitioner failed to state the cause of
action under Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. CAs decision, though, was based
on the insufficiency of factual basis which under the Rules of Court is not a ground for a
motion to dismiss. The three essential elements of a cause of action must be present
namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (b) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect; and (c) an act or omission on the part of the defendant violative of
the right of the plaintiff. Similarly, the claim that the sale was effected through "voidable
and void documents" partakes merely of a conclusion of law that is not supported by any
averment of circumstances that will show why or how such conclusion was arrived at.
Furthermore, Art. 1456 provides that, If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the person from whom the property comes. Thus, it prescribes in ten years.
 LETICIA NAGUIT AQUINO v. CESAR B. QUIAZON +
GR No. 201248, Mar 11, 2015

FACTS: A complaint for Annulment and Quieting of Title was filed before the RTC by the
petitioners. They alleged that they were the heirs of the late Epifanio Makam and Severina
Bautista, who acquired a by virtue of a Deed of Sale. They received various demand
letters from the respondents claiming ownership over the subject property and came to
now that the property had been titled in the name of respondents. Respondents asserted
that they were the absolute owners of the subject land. They raised the settled rule that
a title registered under the Torrens system could not be defeated by adverse, open and
notorious possession, or by prescription. And the action was also barred by res judicata
and violated the prohibition against forum shopping.
RTC dismissed the petitioners complaint since it found that respondents' predecessors-
in-interest were declared the absolute owners of the subject property and ruled that the
deed of sale had become invalid by virtue of the June 28, 1919 decision. It denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration stating that the complaint was properly dismissed
for failing to state a cause of action.
CA dismissed petitioners' appeal. It explained that under Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules
of Court, a court is allowed to conduct a preliminary hearing on the defendant's affirmative
defenses, including the ground of "lack of cause of action or failure to state a cause of
action.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of petitioners' complaint on the
ground of lack of cause of action or failure to state a cause of action?
HELD: Yes. The SC stressed the distinction between the two grounds for dismissal of an
action: failure to state a cause of action, on the one hand, and lack of cause of action, on
the other hand. The former refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the pleading, the
latter to the insufficiency of factual basis for the action. Failure to state a cause may be
raised in a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 16, while lack of cause may be raised any time.
Dismissal for failure to state a cause can be made at the earliest stages of an action.
Dismissal for lack of cause is usually made after questions of fact have been resolved on
the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented. Decisions of both the trial
court and the CA that respondents' defense of "lack of cause of action" was actually
treated as a "failure to state a cause of action," which is a ground for a motion to dismiss
under Rule 16. Section 6, therefore, does not apply to the ground that the complaint fails
to state a cause of action. The trial court, thus, erred in receiving and considering
evidence in connection with this ground. Evidence should have been received not during
a preliminary hearing under Section 6 of Rule 16, but should have been presented during
the course of the trial.
 AMADA ZACARIAS VS. VICTORIA ANACAY ET. AL
GR NO. 202354 September 24, 2014

FACTS: The plaintiff owned a parcel of land with an area of 769 square meters situated
at Barangay Lalaan, Silang Cavite. Plaintiff was in lawful possession and control over the
subject property. She planted Bananas and fruit bearing trees. However, sometime in
May 2007, she discovered that the defendants have entered the subject property and
occupied the same. Consequently, plaintiff demanded that they leave the premises.
Inspite of several repeated demands, defendants unjustifiably refused to vacate the
subject premises.
ISSUES:
1. Whether unlawful detainer is the proper action to be instituted by the plaintiff; and
2. Whether or not MCTC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
1. No. Unlawful detainer is not the proper action to be instituted. To justify an action
for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance
must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought
to be recovered. It is correctly found by the MCTC and CA that respondents
entered the land and built their houses thereon clandestinely and without
petitioners consent, which facts are constitutive of forcible entry not unlawful
detainer.
2. MCTC has no jurisdiction over the case. It was held that that the allegations of the
complaint failed to state the essential elements of an action for unlawful detainer
as the claim that petitioner had permitted or tolerated respondents occupation of
the subject property was unsubstantiated. Forcible entry should have been within
one year from the discovery of the alleged entry. Since petitioner was deprived of
the physical possession of her property through illegal means and complaint was
filed after the lapse of one year from her discovery thereof, the MCTC ruled that it
has no jurisdiction over the case and Supreme Court affirmed such decision.
 PNB VS. SPOUSES RIVERA
G.R. NO. 189577 APRIL 20, 2016

FACTS: The respondents executed a real estate mortgage in favor of petitioner over a
parcel of land. The mortgage was eventually foreclosed and the land was sold at a public
auction. The respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sheriff's Sale with Damages.
Petitioner prayed that the Complaint be dismissed with prejudice for lack of cause of
action. The RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action. The petitioner filed
a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied. The Spouses Rivera then filed
an appeal to the CA. The CA set aside the assailed Orders and remanded the case to
the trial court for further proceedings. PNB filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the CA. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in setting aside the Orders of the RTC and
remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
HELD: No. The CA correctly set aside the RTC Orders and remanded the case to the
trial court for further proceedings. Like the CA, we find that there is an apparent confusion
over the ground relied upon for the dismissal of the case, as shown by the parties'
pleadings, as well as the challenged Order of the RTC. In this case, the RTC could not
have dismissed the Complaint due to lack of cause of action for as stated above, such
ground may only be raised after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence.
REBECCA PACAA-CONTRERAS and ROSALIE PACAA, Petitioners, vs. ROVILA
WATER SUPPLY, INC., EARL U KOKSENG, LILIA TORRES, DALLA P.
ROMANILLOS and MARISSA GABUYA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 168979 December 2, 2013

BRION, J.:

NATURE OF THE CASE: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS: Petitioners Rebecca Pacaa-Contreras and Rosalie Pacaa, children of Lourdes Teves
Pacaa and Luciano Pacaa, filed the present case against Rovila Inc., Earl, Lilia, Dalla and
Marisa for accounting and damages.

The petitioners claimed that their family has long been known in the community to be
engaged in the water supply business; they operated the "Rovila Water Supply" from their
family residence and were engaged in the distribution of water to customers in Cebu City.
The petitioners alleged that Lilia was a former trusted employee in the family business
who hid business records and burned and ransacked the family files. Lilia also allegedly
posted security guards and barred the members of the Pacaa family from operating their
business. She then claimed ownership over the family business through a corporation
named "Rovila Water Supply, Inc." (Rovila Inc.) Upon inquiry with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), the petitioners claimed that Rovila Inc. was surreptitiously
formed with the respondents as the majority stockholders. The respondents did so by
conspiring with one another and forming the respondent corporation to takeover and
illegally usurp the family business registered name.

In forming the respondent corporation, the respondents allegedly used the name of
Lourdes as one of the incorporators and made it appear in the SEC documents that the
family business was operated in a place other than the Pacaa residence. Thereafter, the
respondents used the Pacaa familys receipts and the deliveries and sales were made
to appear as those of the respondent Rovila Inc. Using this scheme, the respondents
fraudulently appropriated the collections and payments.

The petitioners filed the complaint in their own names although Rosalie was authorized
by Lourdes through a sworn declaration and special power of attorney (SPA). The
respondents filed a first motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction
over an intra-corporate controversy.The RTC denied the motion.

The petitioners sister, Lagrimas Pacaa-Gonzales, filed a motion for leave to intervene
and her answer-in-intervention was granted by the trial court.

On January 23, 2002, the respondents again filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds,
among others, that the petitioners are not the real parties in interest to institute and
prosecute the case and that they have no valid cause of action against the respondents.

RTC RULING: The RTC denied the respondents motion to dismiss. It ruled that, save
for the grounds for dismissal which may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, a
motion to dismiss based on the grounds invoked by the respondents may only be filed
within the time for, but before, the filing of their answer to the amended complaint.

The respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the
CA, invoking grave abuse of discretion in the denial of their motion to dismiss. They
argued that the deceased spouses Luciano and Lourdes, not the petitioners, were the
real parties in interest.
CA RULING: The CA granted the petition and ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion as the petitioners filed the complaint and the amended complaint as
attorneys-in-fact of their parents. As such, they are not the real parties in interest and
cannot bring an action in their own names; thus, the complaint should be dismissed
pursuant to the Courts ruling in Casimiro v. Roque and Gonzales. Neither are the
petitioners suing as heirs of their deceased parents.

That the motion to dismiss was filed after the period to file an answer has lapsed is of no
moment. The Court held that the ground of lack of cause of action may be raised in a
motion to dismiss at anytime.

THE PARTIES ARGUMENTS

In annulling the interlocutory orders, the CA unjustly allowed the motion to dismiss which
did not conform to the rules. Specifically, the motion was not filed within the time for, but
before the filing of, the answer to the amended complaint, nor were the grounds raised in
the answer. Second, even if there is non-joinder and misjoinder of parties or that the suit
is not brought in the name of the real party in interest, the remedy is not outright dismissal
of the complaint, but its amendment to include the real parties in interest.

Third, the petitioners sued in their own right because they have actual and substantial
interest in the subject matter of the action as heirs or co-owners, pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Their declaration as heirs in a special proceeding is not
necessary, pursuant to the Courts ruling in Marabilles, et al. v. Quito. Finally, the sworn
declaration is evidentiary in nature which remains to be appreciated after the trial is
completed.

The respondents reiterated in their comment that the petitioners are not the real parties
in interest. They likewise argued that they moved for the dismissal of the case during the
pre-trial conference due to the petitioners procedural lapse in refusing to comply with a
condition precedent, which is, to substitute the heirs as plaintiffs. Besides, an
administrator of the estates of Luciano and Lourdes has already been appointed. The
respondents also argued that the grounds invoked in their motion to dismiss were timely
raised, pursuant to Section 2, paragraphs g and i, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not petitioners are the real parties in interest?

2. Whether or not the petitioners had legal right to institute the action in behalf of
their parents?

HELD: YES.

Indispensable Parties Without the inclusion of the indispensable parties, there can be no
final determination of the case.
At the inception of the present case, both the spouses Pacaa were not impleaded as
parties-plaintiffs. The Court notes, however, that they are indispensable parties to the
case as the alleged owners of Rovila Water Supply. Without their inclusion as parties,
there can be no final determination of the present case. They possess such an interest in
the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts
cannot proceed without their presence. Their interest in the subject matter of the suit and
in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined with that of the other parties.

Pursuant to Section 9, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, parties may be added by order of the
court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action.
The Court is of the view that the proper remedy in the present case is to implead the
indispensable parties especially when their non-inclusion is merely a technical defect. To
do so would serve proper administration of justice and prevent further delay and
multiplicity of suits. Pursuant to Section 9, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, parties may be
added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of
the action. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of
the court, then the court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiffs failure to comply with
a lawful court order. The operative act that would lead to the dismissal of the case would
be the refusal to comply with the directive of the court for the joinder of an indispensable
party to the case.

In Orbeta, et al. v. Sendiong, 463 SCRA180 (2005), the Supreme Court acknowledged
that the heirs, whosehereditary rights are to be affected by the case, are deemed
indispensable parties who should have been impleaded by the trial court.
Obviously, in the present case, the deceased Pacaas can no longer be included in
the complaint as indispensable parties because of their death during the pendency of
the case. Upon their death, however, their ownership and rights over their properties were
transmitted to their heirs, including herein petitioners, pursuant to Article 774 in relation
with Article 777 of the Civil Code. In Orbeta, et al. v. Sendiong , 463 SCRA 180 (2005),
the Court acknowledged that the heirs, whose hereditary rights are to be affected by the
case, are deemed indispensable parties who should have been impleaded by the
trial court.

Rule 16 of the Rules of

Court provides for the grounds for the dismissal of a civil case, particularly, failure to
state a cause of action and failure to comply with a condition precedent (substitution of
parties), respectively.
Applying Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which provides for thegrounds for the
dismissal of a civil case, the respondents grounds for dismissal fall under Section 1(g)
and (j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, particularly, failure to state a cause of action and
failure to comply with a condition precedent (substitution of parties),respectively. The first
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides for the period within which
to file a motion to dismiss under the grounds enumerated. Specifically, the motion should
be filed within the time for, but before the filing of, the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim. Equally important to this provision is Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules
of Court which states that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except for the following grounds: 1) the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter 2) litis pendencia 3) res judicata and
4) prescription. Therefore, the grounds not falling under these four exceptions may
be considered as waived in the event that they are not timely invoked. As the
respondents motion to dismiss was based on the grounds which should be timely
invoked, material to the resolution of this case is the period within which they were
raised.

The petition is GRANTED. The heirs of the spouses Luciano and Lourdes Pacaa,
except herein petitioner and Lagrimas Pacaa-Gonzalez, are ORDERED
IMPLEADED as parties plaintiffs and the RTC is directed to proceed with the trial
of the case with DISPATCH.
 HEIRS OF FAUSTINO MESINA and GENOVEVA S. MESINA, rep. by NORMAN
MESINA VS HEIRS OF DOMINGO FIAN, SR., rep. by THERESA FIAN YRAY, ET. AL
G.R. NO. 201816, April 8, 2013

VELASCO, JR. J.:

NATURE: This case is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Decision dated April
29, 2011 of the Court of Appeas in CA-G.R. CV NO. 01366 and it Resolution dated April
12, 2012 denying reconsideration.

FACTS: Spouses Mesina bought two parcels of land from the Spouses Fian. The
properties were described as a parcel of land, having Cadastral Lot No. 6791-Rem and
6737-Rem both situated at Brgy. Gungab, Poblacion, Albuera, Leyte.

Upon the death of the Spouses Fian, their heirs, whose names do not appear on the
records, claiming ownership of the parcels of land and taking possession of them refused
to acknowledge the payments for the lots and denied that their late parents sold the
property to the spouses Mesina.

Repeated demands were made by the heirs of spouses Mesina however the heirs of Fian
refused to vacate the lots and to turn possession to the heirs of the spouses Mesina.
Thus, on August 8, 2005, Norman, as attorney-in-fact of the heirs of the petitioner filed an
action for quieting of title and damages before the Regional Trial Court against the heirs
of the respondent naming only Theresa Fian Yray as the representative.

The respondent then filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint arguing that the complaint
states no cause of action and that the case should be dismissed for gross violation of
Sections 1 and 2, Rue 3 of the Rules of Court. It claims that the heirs of the petitioners
could not be considered as a juridical person or entity authorized by law to file a civil
action. Neither could the heirs be made as defendant, not being a juridical person as well.
It also added that the heirs of the late spouses petitioners and respondent were not
individually named, the complaint is infirmed, warranting its dismissal.

Finding merit in the motion to dismiss, RTC granted the motion and dismissed the
complaint, ruling that the Rules of Court is explicit that only natural or juridical persons
or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. Certainly, the heirs of the
parties, do not fall within the category as natural or juridical persons as contemplated by
law to constitute or defend civil actions and not having been individually named could
not be the real parties in interest.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the order of the RTC however, the motion for
reconsideration was denied. Aggrieved, it then appealed to the Court of Appeals.

CA rendered its decision affirming the ruling of the RTC. It explained that this failure to
implead the other heirs of the late spouses Fian is a legal obstacle to the trial courts
exercise of judicial power over the case and any order or judgment that would be rendered
is a nullity in view of the absence of indispensable parties.

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in affirming the order and resolution of RTC in dismissing
the case on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action?

RULING: NO. Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading.
A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential
elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) The legal right of the plaintiff; (b) the correlative
obligation of the defendant; and(c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said right.

By a simple reading of the elements of a failure to state a cause of action, it can be readily
seen that the inclusion of Theresas co-heirs does not fall under any of the above
elements. The infirmity is, in fact, not a failure to state a cause of action but a non-joinder
of an indispensable party.

Non-joinder means the "failure to bring a person who is a necessary party or in this case
an indispensable party into a lawsuit." An indispensable party, on the other hand, is a
party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of the action, and who
shall be joined either as plaintiff or defendant.

Thus, the dismissal of the case for failure to state a cause of action is improper. What the
trial court should have done is to direct petitioner Norman Mesina to implead all the heirs
of Domingo Fian, Sr. as defendants within a reasonable time from notice with a warning
that his failure to do so shall mean dismissal of the complaint.
 PHILIP L. GO, PACIFICO Q. LIM and ANDREW Q. LIM vs. DISTINCTION
PROPERTIES DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION, INC.
G.R. No. 194024 April 25, 2012

FACTS: Philip L. Go, Pacifico Q. Lim and Andrew Q. Lim (petitioners) are registered
individual owners of condominium units in Phoenix Heights Condominium located at H.
Javier/Canley Road, Bo. Bagong Ilog, Pasig City, Metro Manila.
Respondent Distinction Properties Development and Construction, Inc. (DPDCI) is a
corporation existing under the laws of the Philippines with principal office at No. 1020
Soler Street, Binondo, Manila. It was incorporated as a real estate developer, engaged in
the development of condominium projects, among which was the Phoenix Heights
Condominium.

In February 1996, petitioner Pacifico Lim, one of the incorporators and the then president
of DPDCI, executed a Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions (MDDR)[3]of Phoenix
Heights Condominium, which was filed with the Registry of Deeds. As the developer,
DPDCI undertook, among others, the marketing aspect of the project, the sale of the units
and the release of flyers and brochures.

Thereafter, Phoenix Heights Condominium Corporation (PHCC) was formally organized

and incorporated. Sometime in 2000, DPDCI turned over to PHCC the ownership and
possession of the condominium units, except for the two saleable commercial
units/spaces:

1. G/F Level BAS covered by Condominium Certificate of Title

(CCT) No. 21030 utilized as the PHCCs administration office, and

2. G/F Level 4-A covered by CCT No. PT-27396/C-136-II used as

living quarters by the building administrator.
Although used by PHCC, DPDCI was assessed association dues for these two
units.

Meanwhile, in March 1999, petitioner Pacifico Lim, as president of DPDCI, filed

an Application for Alteration of Plan[4] pertaining to the construction of 22 storage units in
the spaces adjunct to the parking area of the building. The application, however, was
disapproved as the proposed alteration would obstruct light and ventilation.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the petitioners;
2. Whether PHCC is an indispensable party; and
3. Whether the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies applies in this case.
HELD:
1. The petition fails. Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body
has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the
complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein.[17] Thus, it was ruled that the jurisdiction of the HLURB
 to hear and decide cases is determined by the nature of the cause of action, the
subject matter or property involved and the parties

2. As it is clear that the acts being assailed are those of PHHC, this case cannot
prosper for failure to implead the proper party, PHCC. An indispensable party is
defined as one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that
a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting
that interest.

3. As to the alleged failure to comply with the rule on exhaustion of administrative

remedies, the Court again agrees with the position of the CA that the
circumstances prevailing in this case warranted a relaxation of the rule.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our

judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative
agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence.[42] It has been held, however,
that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction are not ironclad rules. In the case of Republic of the Philippines
v. Lacap,[43] the Court enumerated the numerous exceptions to these rules,
namely: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively
so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question
involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of
justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the
doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts
violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo
warranto proceedings.
 SPOUSES CLAUDIO AND CARMENCITA TRAYVILLA
VS. BERNARDO SEJAS AND JUVY PAGLINAWAN, REPRESENTED BY JESSIE
PAGLINAWAN,
FEBRUARY 1, 2016 G.R. NO. 204970

FACTS: Petitioners claimed that Sejas sold the land to them in 1982 through private
document; that they took possession of the land and constructed a house and resided
therein; and that Sejas later reasserted his ownership over said land and was guilty of
fraud and deceit. In an amended complaint, petitioners impleaded respondent
Paglinawan as additional defendant, claiming that Sejas subsequently sold the subject
property to her. Now, they sought an execution of the deed of sale and transfer of title to
them. However, the additional docket fees for the moral damages prayed for in the
Amended Complaint were not paid. Respondents moved for dismissal of the case,
claiming lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and prescription. Respondents filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.

Respondents filed an original Petition for Certiorari before the CA. The CA rendered a
decision in favor of respondents whereby under Section 1, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules
of Court which provides that the prescribed fees shall be paid in full to the effect that a
court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing and
docket fees. The ultimate purpose then of private respondents in filing the complaint
before the RTC is to secure their vaunted ownership and title to the subject land which
they claimed was purchased from petitioner Sejas. Hence, a real action.

Section 7, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, prior to its amendment provides that, in a real
action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof
shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees. In the
absence of such allegation, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners action. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the amended complaint sufficiently divested and
ousted the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case that had initially validly attached by
virtue of the Original complaint for specific performance?
HELD: Yes. Since the case is a real action made so by the Amended Complaint later
filed, petitioners should have observed the requirement under A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC28
relative to declaring the fair market value of the property as stated in the current tax
declaration or zonal valuation of the BIR.The SC ruled the CA failed to consider that in
determining jurisdiction, it could rely on the declaration made in the Amended Complaint
that the property is valued at P6,000,00. For purposes of filing the civil case against
respondents, this amount should be the stated value of the property in the absence of a
current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the BIR under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC and Supreme Court Amended Administrative
Circular No. 35-2004. The RTC did not have jurisdiction over petitioners' case in the first
instance. In continuing to take cognizance of the case, the trial court clearly committed
grave abuse of discretion.
 DE PEDRO VS. ROMASAN DEVT. CORP.
G.R. NO. 194751 NOVEMBER 26, 2014

FACTS: This case originated from separate complaints for nullification of free patent and
original certificates of title. Respondent Romasan Development Corporation alleged in its
complaints that it was the owner and possessor of a parcel of land. It was discovered that
the DENR issued free patents covering portions of respondents property. Respondent
alleged that the government could not legally issue the free patents because the land was
already released for disposition.
The Regional Trial Court issued an order declaring as nullity the titles and free patents
issued to all defendants in respondents complaint, including the free patent issued to De
Pedro. She filed before the Regional Trial Court a motion for new trial which was denied.
She filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals that was dismissed for lack
of merit. She filed before this court a Rule 45 petition seeking reversals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court decision was void for failure of the trial court to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner Aurora N. De Pedro.
HELD: No. Petitioner erroneously filed her motion for new trial and petition for certiorari
instead of an action for annulment of judgment, she was deemed to have voluntarily
participated in the proceedings against her title. The actions and remedies she chose to
avail bound her. Petitioners failure to file an action for annulment of judgment at this time
was fatal to her cause.