Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No.

101083, July 30, 1993)

FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed as
a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial
Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR).
Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is
the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations
yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological
balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action
against him and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set
aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the
action.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent
Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one
fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of
the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among
many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly
mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the
exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of
E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and
Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or
respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim
was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full
protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie,
the claimed violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the
Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature
and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of
the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights,
neither is it property or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-
impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.

MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (Environmental Law)

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
GR No. 171947-48
December 18, 2008

FACTS:

The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way
below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or
the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily liable
and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming,
diving, and other forms of contact recreation.

ISSUES:

(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations,
envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.

APPLICABLE LAWS:

PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.

Where the quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s state will adversely affect its best u
sage, the government agencies concerned shall
take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed
water quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain
, remove and clean - up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the
government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses
incurred in said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities responsible for such pollution.

HELD:

(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies
concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when
a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary,
Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality
has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage. Section 17 & 20 are of general
application and are not for specific pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such
magnitude and scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the
line between a specific and a general pollution incident.

(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the implementation of the
MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the
very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may
be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes as continuing mandamus , the
Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that
its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.

NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized in the rules of procedure for
environmental cases.

20 days Temporary restraining order

Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine

GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing
the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the
IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that
grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural
resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the
natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their
large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private
lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any
royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains
is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

WILFREDO MOSQUEDA v. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION, GR No. 189185, 2016-08-16
Facts:
After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao
City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by
all agricultural entities within Davao City
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members, namely: Davao Fruits
Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to
challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance
They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal protection
clause; amounted to the confiscation of property without due process of law; and lacked publication pursuant] to
Section 511[6] of Republic Act No. 7160
On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid and
constitutional
The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power[13] under the General Welfare Clause of the
Local Government Code;[14] that the ordinance, being based on a valid classification, was consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause; that aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of pesticides application because it exposed
the residents to a higher degree of health risk caused by aerial drift;[15] and that the ordinance enjoyed the
presumption of constitutionality, and could be invalidated only upon a clear showing that it had violated the
Constitution.
On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC.[22] It declared Section
5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional for being unreasonable and oppressive;
The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of protecting the public and the environment against
the harmful effects of aerial spraying, on one hand, and the imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of all forms
of substances, on the other.
Issues:
whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal protection grounds for being
unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power: (a) in imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an
agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-month transition-period to shift to other modes
of pesticide application under Section 5; and (c) in requiring the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under
Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao City.
Ruling:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao Cityenacted Ordinance No. 0309-07under its corporate powers... the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications. It is under this milieu that the questioned ordinance should be appreciated.
Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health risks due to their exposure to
pesticide drift justifies the motivation behind the enactment of the ordinance. The City of Davao has the authority to
enact pieces of legislation that will promote the general welfare, specifically the health of its constituents. Such
authority should not be construed, however, as a valid license for the City of Davao to enact any ordinance it deems
fit to discharge its mandate. A thin but well-defined line separates authority to enact legislations from the method of
accomplishing the same.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause
A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and passed according
to the procedure prescribed by law.[108] In order to declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also comply
with the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it
must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate
trade; (5) it must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.[109]In the State's
exercise of police power, the property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
fulfill the objectives of the Government.[110] A local government unit is considered to have properly exercised its
police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive.[111] The first
requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; the second, to the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution.[112]Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the
Government's action.[113] This means that in exercising police power the local government unit must not arbitrarily,
whimsically or despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance realistically
serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose
without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process challenge.
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume considerable time
and financial resources given the topography and geographical features of the plantations.[117] As such, the
conversion could not be completed within the short timeframe of three months. Requiring the respondents and other
affected individuals to comply with the consequences of the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty
like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse
of police power.
The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of the ordinance violates
due process for being confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all agricultural landowners within Davao
City of the beneficial use of their property that amounts to taking without just compensation.
The position of the respondents is untenable.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[118] we have thoroughly explained that taking only becomes confiscatory if it
substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause
The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat
similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty equal protection secures every person within the State's
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or
by its improper execution through the State's duly constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law
demands that the State governs impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences
that are irrelevant to the legitimate governmental objective.
Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things without distinction,[120] nor
intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to
operate.[121] The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among equals determined according to a valid
classification.[122] If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class
may be treated and regulated differently from another.[123] In other word, a valid classification must be: (1) based
on substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4)
equally applicable to all members of the class.
In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach appropriately applies herein. Under the
rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern the reasonable relationship between the means and the purpose of the
ordinance; and (2) examine whether the means or the prohibition against aerial spraying is based on a substantial or
reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification includes all persons or things similarly situated with respect to the
purpose of the law.
Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the occurrence of drift causes inconvenience
and harm to the residents and degrades the environment. Given this justification, does the ordinance satisfy the
requirement that the classification must rest on substantial distinction?We answer in the negative.
The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of any mode of pesticide
application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift that may bring about the same
inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the community and to the environment.[141] A ban against
aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the ordinance seeks to achieve.[142] In the process, the ordinance
suffers from being "underinclusive" because the classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same
mischief that the law seeks to eliminate.[143] A classification that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the
purpose or end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended purpose of
the law.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the
decision promulgated on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN. declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07
UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
Principles:
Constitutional Law... the right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications.
Political Law... taking only becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property