People-V-Caguioa (Rule 113)

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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. EDUARDO P.

CAGUIOA Judge, Court of First


Instance of Bulacan, Branch VII, and PAQUITO YUPO, respondents.

G.R. No.L-38975, January 17, 1980, EN BANC, (Fernando, C.J.)

FACTS:

The Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed on September 14, 1973, in the CFI of Bulacan, an information for murder against
Paquito Yupo y Gonzales, with the case, being assigned to Branch VIII, presided by respondent Judge.
Upon arraignment on October 5, 1973, the accused pleaded not guilty. The trial of the case then proceeded; the
prosecution having presented six witnesses, including the father of the deceased, Miguel Tribol, and his common-law
wife, Lydia Begnotia who allegedly received the ante mortem statement of the victim, Rodolfo Tribol.
Then, at the hearing on June 3, 1974, the prosecution presented Corporal Conrado Roca of the Meycauayan Police
Department, before whom a written statement of the accused PaquitoYupo and his alleged waiver of his right to remain
silent and to be assisted by a counsel of his own choice was taken.
After this witness had Identified the statement of the accused and the waiver, he was questioned on the incriminating
answers in such statement to the police, but there was an objection on the part of the defense counsel based on the
ground of such statement being inadmissible in evidence, as the statement was taken by the police without any counsel
assisting the accused in the investigation.
Respondent Judge sustained the objection of the defense on the view that such judicial confession of the accused is
inadmissible in evidence for being unconstitutional, it appearing that the accused was not assisted by a counsel when it
was given. He likewise stated that such right could not be waived. Upon his refuse to reconsider such ruling, this
petition was filed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Yupos judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence for being unconstitutional.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative.


It was not shown that the alleged waiver was given freely and voluntarily. The questioning was rather perfunctory.
Private respondent, a native of Samar, then nineteen years old, was interrogated extensively in Tagalog, no showing
having been made that his acquaintance with the language was such that he could fully understand the import of what
was asked him.
On the specific question of whether or not the right to counsel during custodial interrogation interrogation may be
waived, the Court rules that there is no bar to such a waiver if made intelligently and voluntarily, with full
understanding of its consequences.
While there could be a waiver of the rights of an accused, it must be intelligently waived; otherwise a court's jurisdiction
starting at the banning of the trial may be lost in the course of the proceeding.
Statements made during the period of custodial interrogation to be admissible require a clear intelligent waiver of
constitutional rights, the suspect being warned prior to questioning that he has a right to remain silent, that any
utterance may be used against him and that he has the right to the presence of a counsel, either retained or appointed.
(Miranda v. Arizona)
The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of
the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination.
Custodial interrogation - questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused
persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are
required:
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he
does not make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed.
The defendant may waive effectuation of those rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult
with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning.
If the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may
not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on
his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted
with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. (Miranda v. Arizona)
Tested by such a clear and unequivocal standard, the alleged waiver falls far short. Even the very annex submitted to
the petition merely stated that there were signatures of private respondent Yupo, Roca, Roberto Sales. The day when it
was subscribed and sworn to, allegedly before Municipal Judge Mariano Mendieta was not even specified. Again, there
was a statement that it was a certified true copy by a certain Teresita M. Tecson, whose connection with the case or
with the court was not even shown. There was no signature.
It was stressed in the brief filed on behalf of the accused that he is an ignorant and illiterate person, a neophyte in the
national penitentiary, and one fully conversant [only] with his native Visayan. We cannot expect the accused to have
fully understood the legal signification of these qualifying circumstances.

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