Napolean D. Valeriano, Charles T.R. Bohannan Counter-Guerrilla Operations The Philippine Experience PSI Classics of The Counterinsurgency Era

Counter-Guerrilla
Operations
PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice
David Galula
Communist Revolutionary Warfare: From the Vietminh to the Viet Cong
George K. Tanham
Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency
Roger Trinquier
Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience
Napolean D. Valeriano and Charles T.R. Bohannan
COUNTER-GUERRILLA
OPERATIONS
The Philippine Experience
Napolean D. Valeriano
and
Charles T.R. Bohannan
Foreword by Kalev Sepp
PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era
Praeger Security International

Westport, Connecticut London
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Valeriano, Napoleon D.
Counter-guerrilla operations : the Philippine experience / Napolean D. Valeriano and
Charles T.R. Bohannan; Foreword by Kalev Sepp.
p. cm. (PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-275-99265-9 (alk. paper)ISBN 0-275-99266-7 (pbk : alk. paper)
1. Guerrilla warfare 2. Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (Philippines). I. Title II. Series
U240.V3 1962 62022024
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available.
Copyright 1962, 2006 by Praeger Security International
All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be
reproduced, by any process or technique, without the
express written consent of the publisher.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 62022024
ISBN: 0-275-99265-9
0-275-99266-7 (pbk.)
First published in 1962
Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881
An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.
www.praeger.com
Printed in the United States of America
@r
The paper used in this book complies with the
Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National
Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984).
10 9 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
CONTENTS
Foreword vii
by Kalev Sepp
Prologue xi
1. What and Why Is a Guerrilla? 1

2. Characteristics of Guerrilla Movements and Operations 11
3. Approaches to Counter-Guerrilla Warfare 17
4. The Situation and the Terrain 25
5. Know Thine Enemy: Estimate of the Enemy Situation 37
6. Know Thyself: Analysis of Friendly Forces 53
7. The Mission 73
8. TargetThe Guerrilla 91
9. Fool'Em 113
10. Find 'Em 125
11. Fight'Em 147
12. TargetThe Civilian 161
13. TargetThe Nation 183
VI CONTENTS
Appendix I. Patrol SOP for Counter-Guerrilla Operations 197

Appendix II. Suggested Special Warfare Battalion 205
Appendix III. Recommended Reading 214
Index 219
FOREWORD
It was the start of the age of the guerrilla, but almost no one realized it. The
year was 1946 and crises loomed on the world stage. George Kennan dis-
patched his "long telegram" from Moscow that shaped thinking about the
Cold War. Civil war resumed in China, after simmering while the Japanese
interrupted the contest between communists and nationalists.
The Greek civil war also intensified in 1946, and President Harry Truman
conferred with his cabinet on the consequences of abandoning that country to
the communists. Turkey and Iran were threatened by the Soviet Union. And
Prime Minister Winston Churchill grimly warned of an "iron curtain" descend-
ing in Europe between the forces of democracy and communism.
The events of 1946 also included atomic tests on Bikini Atoll that raised the
possibility of conflicts that could bring an end to the human race. And the
threat of World War III, which was expected to be similar to World War II with
the added horror of nuclear weaponry, dominated military strategy. Yet another
form of warfare was being widely practiced, insidious and subtle but just as
threatening to the fragile post-war governments of the Free World.
Guerrilla warfare was not a novelty to those who studied World War II and
the conflicts that led up to it. But with the end of the global conflict between
armies and navies of sovereign nations, irregular forcespartisans, insur-
gents, and guerrillasstood out in stark relief.
On the island of Luzon in 1946 one of the armed bands that had been formed
deep in the mountains to resist the Japanese turned against the Filipino gov-
ernment. Almost eight years of civil war would follow before Manila put
down the rebellion. It took the first half of the war to discover how to effec-
tively fight the guerrillas and the remainder of the time to implement hard-
Vlll FOREWORD
learned political, military, economic, and social lessons needed to convince

the local population to cast their lot with the legitimate government and for-
sake the Huk rebels.
The Huks formed one of the long-standing insurrectionist gangs that had
coalesced into guerrilla units after the Japanese invasion of the Philippines
in 1941. Luis Taruc, a Filipino of peasant stock, helped lead this mixed band
of communists, socialists, intellectuals, politicians, and soldiers. They
assumed a Tagalog name, Hukbo Na Bayan Laban Sa Hapon (literally, the
People's Army [To Fight] Against Japan) and were popularly known as
Hukbalahap.
General Douglas MacArthur, commander of Far Eastern Forces and son of
the military governor of the Philippines at the time of the 1899-1901 insurrec-
tion, refused to arm the Huks during the Japanese occupation because of their
communist sympathies. In turn, the Huks refused to cooperate with Allies or
their sponsored guerrilla units. By mid-1944, U.S. advisors reported renegade
Huks were fighting the Japanese as well as other Filipino resistance groups,
and were robbing and killing their countrymen. At the end of World War II,
Manila's relations with the Huks deteriorated even further. At demobilization
negotiations, officials shunned the Huks and denied them the occupation-
period "back pay" given to other Filipino guerrillas.
The post-war leadership of Philippine might have staved off the insurrec-
tion in 1946 by integrating representatives of the Huk minority into the newly
established legislature. Instead, the new government jailed Taruc and his dep-
uty on trumped-up war-crime charges, after their legitimate election to the
national congress.
Taruc was eventually released, and he and other Huks literally fled to the
hills, armed with weapons cached after the Japanese defeat. They reverted to
their wartime organization, established an underground politburo in Manila,
and reactivated their potent auxiliary force, renamed Pambansang Kaisahan
Ng Mga Magbubuked or the National Peasant Union (PKM). It soon claimed
half a million members, supporting some 10,000 to 20,000 armed Huks.
The National Peasant Union posed a serious threat to the traditional land-
owners who had exploited the tenured peasantry since before the Spanish
colonization. The Huks seized on this deep-seated peasant grievance that had
been the cause of their dissent before World War II, and held as their chief aim
"land for the landless."
Manila's reaction was the "mailed fist" policy of President Manuel Roxas.
The peasant population was caught between government ineptitude and brutal
repression reminiscent of the Japanese occupation and Huk intimidation-
through-terror, which generally benefited the Huks. The guerrillas changed
their name to Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan or People's Liberation Army.
Between 1946 and 1950 most of central Luzon fell under their control, even
becoming known as Huklandia.
FOREWORD IX
The ineffective level of support being provided by the United States improved
after the invasion of South Korea, when communist threats in Asia suddenly
appeared real and powerful. Washington tripled aid to the Philippines and
strengthened the U.S. military advisory group. In addition, the Central
Intelligence Agency also dispatched an Air Force officer, Colonel Edward
Lansdale, to advise the new Philippine Secretary of Defense, Ramon Magsay say,
who had been appointed at the insistence of the U.S. ambassador.
Magsaysay and Lansdale made an excellent team. In consultations on the
poor socio-economic situation of the Filipino peasantry that fostered support
of the Huk movement, they developed programs to redress injustices that
fueled peasant support of the rebels. These were primarily keyed to a sophis-
ticated psychological warfare campaign that identified various target audi-
ences, particularly part-time or soft-core Huk supporters who could be
proselytized to join the government side.
There were many facets of the overall counterinsurgency effort. Magsaysay
reformed and professionalized the army. The government placed bounties on
the heads of Huk leaders, gave rewards for surrendering firearms, and elimi-
nated free-fire zones that often caused civilian casualties. The Ministry of
Defense assigned judge advocate general lawyers as free counsels for peas-
ants in filing court cases against wealthy landlords. Manila subsidized "ten-
centavo telegrams" that could be sent by any citizen to report grievances
directly to the government.
Another indirect action program designed to undermine Huk political objec-
tives was the economic development corps (EDCOR), which was named for
an element of the pre-war army corps of engineers. In contrast to British
efforts in Malaya to resettle segments of the populace away from communists,
the economic development corps resettled former guerrillas away from their
base of support. Rather than punishing Huks, the Philippine government reha-
bilitated them. To redress grievances about inequality in land distribution,
EDCOR usurped the Huk slogan of "land for the landless" to compete with
the guerrilla's political agenda.
The civil affairs office of the Philippine army carefully managed national
and local media as well as psychological warfare activities. As a result, the
perception of the success of EDCOR exceeded the actual commitment of gov-
ernment resources and the number of people resettled. In a dramatic move in
1953, a resettlement camp was established in Taruc's home town of San Luis
on Luzon. At this point, the Huks acknowledged the loss of their mass base.
Dispirited, Taruc surrendered one year later, effectively ending the rebellion,
and Magsaysay resigned as Secretary of Defense to devote himself land
reform.
Korea eclipsed the success of the campaign against the Huks. Some analy-
sis of the war appeared, such as Lessons from the Huk Campaign in the
Philippines by Uldarico Baclagon in 1956, which focused on army operations
X FOREWORD
and was only published locally in Manila. An article entitled "The Philippine
Anti-Communist Campaign" by Tomas Tirona in 1954 appeared in the United
States in the Air University Quarterly Review, not in an Army or Marine Corps
journal. But it was not until eight years after the defeat of the Huks that two
veterans of the conflict, one Filipino and the other American, would produce
a definitive study of the conflict.
First published in 1962, the now-classic Counter-Guerrilla Operations:
The Philippine Experience is the result of collaboration by Colonel Napoleon
D. Valeriano, Philippine Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Charles T. R.
Bohannan, U.S. Army. Their first-hand knowledge gained in fighting against
the Huks in the bundocs (that is, the "boondocks" or mountains of Luzon) is
evident in the tone and detail of their book. As soldiers, their language is prac-
tical, direct, and unambiguous. Their credibility is enhanced by the candor
with which they admit mistakes and failed efforts as well as reveal proven,
viable procedures. Throughout, they connect the tactical to the strategic, the
conceptual to the practical, and never let the reader lose sight of the central
characters in a civil war, especially the guerrilla.
Counter-Guerrilla Operations might have had more impact on U.S. coun-
terinsurgency doctrine, and on the military and political strategy coalescing in
Vietnam, if it were not for the timing of its publication. As the Korean War
masked the Filipino victory over the Huks in 1953, the British success against
the communists in Malaya in 1960 and intensifying conflict in South Vietnam
drew attention from other events. This work by Valeriano and Bohannan
seemed dated and less relevant, which was unfortunate. In a time of global
turmoil, in the age of the guerrilla, what could have been more useful than
analysis of how a nascent democracy reformed its army and police, rallied its
people, and changed its policies to defeat an insurgency.
In the 21st century these lessons remain important. And they always will be.
Kalev I. Sepp
May 2006
Dr. Kalev I. Sepp is an assistant professor in the Graduate School of Operational and
Information Sciences at the Naval Postgraduate School and the coauthor of Weapon of
Choice: U.S. Army Special Operations in Afghanistan.
PROLOGUE
Minamahal kong Magbabasa:

Many thousands of men, and not a few women, have fought in the
Philippines, often on both sides in the same war, for what they have believed
to be the cause of freedom and democracy. We seek here to present some of
their experiences and some of the conclusions that can be drawn from them.
The result is neither scholarly history of the Philippine experience nor doc-
trine on how to fight guerrillas, but may, we hope, assist in achieving an under-
standing of both.
Guerrilla warfare in the Philippines extends far back into the dim mists of pre-
history. In the last sixty-five years, out of guerrilla and counterguerrilla war, and
out of the wise and the unwise acts of civil and military administrations, have
come situations unique in modern history:
a. Only in the Philippines have conquerors of another race succeeded in quell-

ing a nationwide indigenous rebellion while so winning the trust and respect
of the conquered that, in less than forty years,
b. Only in the Philippines, of all the "new" nations, did the Japanese in World
War II find themselves opposed by a massive popular guerrilla movement
(and one that loudly proclaimed its allegiance to the former "colonial"
power); and
c. Only in the Philippines has an elected indigenous government using only
indigenous troops succeeded in liquidating a major Communist guerrilla
movement. More remarkable, this was accomplished without massive exter-
nal assistance and without suspension of elections.
Xll PROLOGUE
These accomplishments were not accidents. Neither were they the result of
careful planning. Least of all, we believe, were they the result of any unique
inherent characteristics of the countries or the peoples involved. They were
the result of the sometimes thoughtful, sometimes unthinking, manifestations
of a creed of human relations, of a concept of the proper relationship between
government and governeda concept on the whole effectively expressed in
civil and military action.
Where guerrilla or counterguerrilla action succeeded in eliminating more
than the gross outward manifestations of opposition, it succeeded because it
was an effective implementation of acceptable concepts of government-to-
people relations. Failures in such action can be attributed to failures to equal
the opponent in establishing or implementing acceptable concepts of the
proper relationship between government and governed. Is this not true
everywhere?
The importance of successful guerrilla and counterguerrilla action is steadily
increasing. The forces unleashed by the splitting atom and the forces of
Communist imperialism alike proclaim it. In contacts with the military and
civilian circles that have recently developed interest in counterguerrilla opera-
tions, we have been surprised to learn how little is known about the Philippine
experience. We have been appalled by the misunderstanding of the reasons for
successes, and of the causes of failures.
The free world urgently needs to achieve a better understanding of the prin-
ciples and practices of successful counterguerrilla operations. We have tried to
set down here matters that will assist in achieving such understanding. We
have selected incidents that we believe illustrate basic principles, and we have
discussed conclusions drawn from many others. We have relied largely on our
memories, so we cannot guarantee complete accuracy in all details. We regret
our inability to give adequate representation to many fine units and gallant
soldiers who have participated in military actions or to many public-spirited
organizations and devoted civilians who have participated in equally impor-
tant civic actions. To do so would require many volumes and many years.
We have sought objectivity, but we cannot claim to have achieved it. The
views of every man are inevitably colored by his experience, his background,
his personal frame of reference. Our views owe as much to Kentucky hill
farms where the liquefied corn crop was hauled away on dry-land sleds, and
to Philippine Kaingins where a scanty crop is made among the tree stumps, as
they do to the sanitized, deodorized, chrome-and-enamel culture some
Americans and some Filipinos think should be the goal of human effort. They
owe more, perhaps, to discussions around guerrilla campfires and the tales of
old soldiers than to the bull sessions or the formal lectures at military and
civilian educational institutions.
Above all, our views are an outgrowth of, are our heritage from, the extraor-
dinary Fil-American relationship begun in a Hong Kong consular office,
PROLOGUE xm
forged into an unforgettable partnership after an ill-starred fratricidal strife of
sixty years ago that proved to each protagonist the worth of the other, and
finally tempered on Bataan and a thousand guerrilla battlefields. It was those
years that made clear the necessity for demonstrating to the governed the good
intentions and effectiveness of the government and its representatives, made
clear the basic strategy of counterguerrilla success. So strongly does this rela-
tionship between Filipino and American hold that it contributed greatly to the
success of operations against the Hukbalahap; so strongly does it bind both
the writers that each has chosen to spend his retirement in the birth land of the
other.
It isfittingthat we sign this letter on 12 June, the date that has been chosen
for celebration of Philippine independence. On this date, the Philippines
declared their intention to follow the path of individual freedom and govern-
ment for the governed, a path in which they were faithfully guided until the
much less significant date of 4 July 1946, when they accepted titular as well
as actual responsibility for their own destiny.
NAPOLEON D. VALERIANO
CHARLES T R. BOHANNAN
Washington, D.C.
12 June 1962
This page intentionally left blank
Chapter 1
WHAT AND WHY IS

A GUERRILLA?
You MAY be killed by a guerrilla. You may die fighting as a guerrilla.

A guerrilla is a man who willfightwithout the backing of an organized society,
who willriskdeath for his beliefs or his comrades. If the guerrilla does not meet
an enemy who has an equally firm commitment to victory, who has equal dedi-
cation, equal will to persevere in a sustained, relentless, and usually very unpleas-
ant effort against seemingly insuperable odds, the guerrilla will win.
The guerrilla must be thoroughly understood if he is to be defeated. His
reasons for being, his goals, his ways of seeking to achieve his goals must be
understood. The guerrilla goes by devious routes, part civil, part military, all
political in the broadest sense of the term. He must be met by men and by a
government equally determined and equally skilled in the use of civil and
military means, if the cause they represent is not to be irreparably damaged or
destroyed by the guerrilla.
Guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare are "irregular warfare." Perhaps a
better term would be "irregular political activity," since they represent a con-
test, a relationship between individuals that touches on every sphere, every
form of human relations. There is an infinity of seemingly applicable terms.
Probably no areas of military thought and practice are so plagued with
semantic and definitional difficulties (and misconceptions) as are the two
closely allied fields of irregular and psychological warfare. It is natural that
this should be so, for of all the ways of acting against an enemy, these two
fields of warfare appear most properly to belong to the social sciences. More
often than not, the practitioner in these fields has never formally studied the
social sciences, indeed he is probably fortunate if he has not, since he is nei-
ther tempted to apply the highly stylized jargon of the student, nor unduly
2 COUNTER-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS
concerned with finespun theories imperfectly understood. Student or not, in

these two fields of the military art, the practitioner and theoretician alike find
extreme difficulty in communicating intelligibly and precisely with others
unless each individual first defines what he means by the terms he employs.
Guerrilla literally means "small war"; the man who participates in waging
such a war is properly called a guerrillero. The terms first came to English
from the exploits of the Spanish irregulars and civilians who so fearsomely
harassed the troops of Napoleon while he was trying to expel the English from
Spain. The ferocity of this harassment, and the gruesome retaliatory measures
taken by the French, were powerfully illustrated by Goya in a series of etch-
ings entitled "The Disasters of War" ("Los Desastres de la Guerra"). The
impact of these pictures is enough to explain why the term "guerrilla" was
adopted to describe particularly the acts and actors of a people's resistance to
an invading enemy.
"Small war" is perhaps a better term; it does not have the connotations
either of the Spanish term "guerrilla" or of the same term as most recently
used for the current fighting in Vietnam. Nevertheless, the term "small war"
seems to have fallen into desuetude and the term "guerrilla warfare" has taken
its place.
By contemporary usage, too, the term "guerrilla" has come to refer to the
man who makes the small war, the protagonist on whose account the war is
small and unconventional rather than large and orthodox. Say "guerrilla"
today, and you conjure up the picture of the little man with the ragged clothes,
carrying his simple, perhaps homemade, weapons, the people's hero whom
much larger forces of well-trained, well-equipped "regular" soldiery seek
almost in vain to run down, capture, or kill.
He is the essence of individuality, in a state-ridden, automation threatened
world; the hunted man whose lonely courage appeals deeply to the outsider
particularly to the nostalgic sophisticate in his armchair, denied physical chal-
lenge and the romantic ideal of "the frontier." This small Robinson Crusoe
with his homemade weapons becomes even more appealing when he evades
the juggernaut, the trained army supported by the legitimate government.
It is not a picture arrived at accidentally. For thirty years, the Communists
have been painting this canvas: the "agrarian reformer" nobly fighting for the
"people's rights" against corrupt officials supported by evil property owners.
It has saved the Communists untold millions of dollars, it has cost untold mil-
lions dead, this Communist picture of the guerrilla.
The term "guerrilla" is loosely used in almost all the literature on the sub-
ject. Sometimes it is used to refer to untrained, disorganized, indigenous
forces; sometimes to identify members of regular military establishments
operating without the benefits of regular supply lines or conventional tactics.
Again, it has been applied to bandit gangs, just as the term "bandit" is some-
times applied to idealistic guerrillas by their detractors.
WHAT AND WHY IS A GUERRILLA? 3
Accordingly, it appears appropriate to open a work on counterguerrilla

operations by defining what is meant by "guerrilla"although no definition
can possibly cover all the connotations of the word or be in agreement with all
the points of view held by participants in guerrilla or counterguerrilla opera-
tions. (The term "insurgent," recently adopted for official U.S. use, is even
more confusing in its connotations.)
A guerrilla may be defined as an individual or a movement relying on the
support of the people,fightingthe government administering his (their) coun-
try for an ideal believed not otherwise attainable; and avoiding combat except
under circumstances of his (their) own choosing. Guerrilla warfare is charac-
terized by maximum employment of deception, concealment, intelligence, and
improvisation; by surprise attacks and quick withdrawals; above all, by the
avoidance of open tests of strength with the enemy unless success is assured.
The guerrilla usually lacks the logistic capability, the training, and the time for
unhindered preparation, for so-called conventional or regular war.
Mao Tse-tung has said that "the guerrilla must move among the people as
a fish moves in the sea." Add to this that the fish draws his support largely
from the voluntary contributions of the sea and is without the support of an
organized government in his country, and one has a fair understanding of the
guerrilla.
Quasi guerrillas may be defined as members of a regularly established mil-
itary force of a substantive government, assigned, volunteered, or required by
force of circumstances to take up a guerrilla-like role. History is replete with
examples of quasi guerrillas. Perhaps the earliest quasi guerrillas in American
history were men of the early Virginia colonials who used guerrilla tactics
while engaged in actions against the Indians. The Civil War produced many
examples: Mosby and John Morgan were both typical quasi guerrillas.
Probably such forces of World War II as Wingate's Chindits and Merrill's
Marauders should be included in this category, perhaps as a subclass. Cer-
tainly the quasi guerrilla plays an important role in modem warfare, a role that
seems destined to become even more important. Quasi guerrillas, with civilian
auxiliaries, may well be the "conventional" ground combat forces of the
future, once the devastating impact nuclear weapons can have on the conven-
tional forces of today is understood.
To continue Mao's analogy, the quasi guerrilla might be likened to a subma-
rine, moving freely in the sea, but drawing motive power, and much, if not
most, logistic support, from an outside forcemost often the government of
a country other than that in which he operates.
Bandits are persons or groups, usually in a rural setting, who seek their
livelihood by theft and extortion. Some, with more or less justification, claim
political philosophy or desperation as a motive. They fight only when it is
essential for personal gain or for survival; they look for popular support from
the impressionable, or they demand it by bribery and/or intimidation.
In some of the bandit plagues that exist today, as in Colombia, small

gangs (many of them ex-guerrillas) still seek shelter under the honored
term guerrilla. Actually they are little more than "protection squads,"
which exist primarily to further the unlawful commercial interests that
were established by politicians and businessmen at the time of the major
(and true) guerrilla troubles. (The situation in Colombia is, of course,
complicated by the existence of Communist guerrilla forces, temporarily
quiescent.)
There is some dispute between the romantically minded and the practically
minded as to whether such persons as Robin Hood and his Merry Men should
be called guerrillas or bandits. Certainly, such Robin Hoodsif one examines
the long history of banditry in Italy or in Chinabecome in retrospect the
outward indications of deep national disturbances. Similar national distur-
bances have been, and will be, exploited by Communists or other skilled tech-
nicians and made the bases for substantial guerrilla movements. But bandits
are not guerrillas.
To carry on Mao's analogy, bandits might be likened to sharks preying on
their fellow denizens of the sea, sometimes allowing small fish to snap up the
unconsidered morsels.
There is a fourth category that should be considered: the mob and its mem-
bers. Mobs are by no means solely an urban institution. The Jacqueries against
individual "lords of the manor" by which villeins and serfs sought redress of
wrongs in post-Renaissance France typify the rural mobs. Conan Doyle in "The
White Company" gives a description of a mob that is as unforgettable as the
photographs in Life magazine showing Communist-led urban mobs assailing
Vice President Nixon.
In some parts of the world, mob actions are almost an accepted means of
forcing the redress of wrongs that, for one reason or another, cannot be requited
by legal means. In the past, mobs were often born on the spur of the moment,
because of a single, final provocation (the last straw that broke the camel's
back) and had a single objectivethe death of a particular individual, the
destruction of the Bastille. More recently, they have often been manipulated
into instruments of mass destruction over a period of limited duration (as the
Nazis were, or Mussolini's Fascists). The mobs that raged in Bogota after the
assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitain, the famous Bogotazo, are an example.
Mao's analogy can scarcely be stretched to cover the mob unless it be lik-
ened to a tidal wave, a sudden upsurge of a portion of the ocean, wreaking
destruction and quickly subsiding. But as a tidal wave may alter the shoreline
it strikes, so the mob can effect an irreversible change in the body politic as
enormous as that which followed the fall of the Bastille.
All these forces have some things in common. All, except the mob, operate
primarily in rural areas. All, except the mob, require a high proportion of self-
reliant individuals among their personnel. Often, they are deficient in organized
support and in equipmentat least as compared with the forces opposing

them. Finally, all, except the mob, are usually numerically inferior to the
forces that seek to oppose and eliminate them.
Why then attempt to classify or define the various kinds of protest by vio-
lence? The immediate answer is that only by determining the true character of
the opponent can one arrive at certain general conclusions as to his strength
and weaknesses. There is some validity to this answer, particularly if one
expands it by saying that classification may indicate where the movement in
question will be most vulnerable to attack, or where the attack must be aimed
if the movement is to be extirpated.
This answer is substantially correct, but it is dangerously deceptive. It may
lead to the same disastrous self-confidence as that felt by the military man
who knows nothing of guerrilla warfare when he hears that his splendidly
trained and equipped troops are facing a guerrilla force one-quarter their num-
ber, poorly armed, short of ammunition, rations,fieldequipment, communica-
tions, and without a single motor vehicle.
Determining the character of the enemy as guerrilla, quasi guerrilla, bandit, or
mob is only the first step, and determining the generic weakness of his class is
only the second. More important is identifying the weaknesses in the govern-
ment he opposes. The existence of a viable guerrilla movement indicates a seri-
ous weakness in the political base of governmentor the lack of a political base
in the country. Identification of a guerrilla movement not confined to an ethnic
minority is a major signal that something is seriously wrong, especially when
the government attacked rests on a political base within the country.
Identification of a quasi guerrilla movement today signals the desire of an
external power to overthrow the government. This may or may not be a sur-
prise, or significant, but any continued existence of the quasi guerrilla indi-
cates a weakness in internal defenses. It also suggests that all is not well with
the political base of government.
The bandit and the mob indicate weaknesses in internal defenses and some-
where in the economic, legal, or social structures. How significant these weak-
nesses may be is not a matter susceptible to a prior determination. Their
identification and possible correction should be given early attention, since
such weaknesses may well result in erosion of the political baseor signal its
lack of breadth and stability.
There is almost as much theoretical discussion about the causes of guerrilla

movements as there is about the causes of crime. The search for first causes
often seems likely to be of little immediate value to the people concerned with
quelling a rebellion. The substance of current theory appears to be that guer-
rilla movements may arise wherever there are social tensions, strong individ-
ual anxieties and/or frustrations, and unsatisfactory or inept government
leadership.
Given an ideal and a spokesman who can relate this ideal to the ambitions,
the needs, or the frustrations of the people; given agitators who urge that the
ideal cannot be attained withoutfightingfor it; given provocateurs who create
incidents generating repressive measures; given a sufficient number of believ-
ers, and the prerequisites for a guerrilla movement have been met.
Whether or not the guerrilla movement will be viableor successful
depends largely on the art with which proponents and opponents will act. Skill
in the tactics of counterguerrilla warfare and in exploitation of the physical
and cultural environment may temporarily defeat the movement, but can never
eliminate it so long as a substantial number believe in the validity of their
cause and feel that it can be achieved only by fighting.
The motives of all members of a guerrilla movement, or of its leaders, need
not be wholly idealistic or even socially desirable. The once-thriving guerrilla
movement of a certain Papa Rios in the province of Batangas, on Luzon, well
illustrates this. It sprang up in the first years of this century, when memories
of the unsuccessful bid for independence still smoldered among many Filipi-
nos. Rios, with motives readily to be deduced from his propaganda line, "dis-
covered" a black box in which, he said, independence was locked away.
Papa Rios appointed himself "pope" of an armed pseudo-guerrilla move-
ment which he described as a crusade to drive the Americans away from the
islands in order that independence might be released from the box. Of course,
"independence" had to be related to the expectations and grievances of his
prospective recruits and supporters.
"When independence comes out, there will be no more taxes, no more work,
and no more jails," he told his supporters. Truly a cause worth fighting for!
Eventually, men of the Constabulary captured the box, publicly opened it, and
showed that it held no independence.
Having lost the confidence of his supporters, Papa Rios was soon captured,
tried for murders committed during the course of his operations, and eventu-
ally hanged.
At heart, of course, Papa Rios was hardly more than a banditbut he was
a bandit with an effective sales pitch; so are many guerrillas and so are many
of their followers. Note, however, that Papa Rios had called on men to fight
not for their personal gain but for an ideal. True, it was an ideal by which they
would profit and it was an ideal reduced to its simplest termsbut it was
expressed in terms of ambitions and hopes readily aroused in the only class
of persons whose support he could hope to win. The Communist appeal not
infrequently is expressed in just such terms to just such an audience.
At almost the opposite end of the scale of guerrilla movements was the
Philippine national resistance to the Japanese occupation. This began even
before the occupation was completedin fact, before most Filipinos had seen
a Japanese soldier, and while most Filipinos still believed that the defenders of
Bataan and Corregidor would be reinforced and take the offensive.
Most of the leaders of the Philippine resistance had either military or gov-
ernment service and training; most sought to form at least semiregular
military and civilian institutions. On Leyte, when the Americans came in,
schools had been reopened and a newspaper was again being published. Nev-
ertheless, it was a true guerrilla movement. There was some encouragement
and eventually a small trickle of suppliesfrom outside; but the movement
was basically indigenous, as was the vast majority of its support.
The motive of the anti-Japanese guerrilla was overwhelmingly idealistic:
Loyalty to country and loyalty to the concept of democracy were inextricably
intertwined. This loyalty was reinforced in many ways, ranging from fear of
death at the hands of a playful or annoyed Japanese soldier to desire to regain
a former position of authority. Some leaders and some men were bandits at
heart, just as others were impractical Utopians, but the basic motivations of
the movement, its members and supporters, were well expressed in the chorus
of a favorite song of the Leyte guerrillas:
Come andfightfor the Philippines,

Come andfightfor Uncle Sam,
Come andfightfor Democracy . . .
Come and fiiight!
What of the motivations of the individual guerrilla? Are they necessarily

purely idealistic or purely selfish? By no means; they vary as widely as human
motivations ever can; they may be so complex that an analysis would peel
away layer after layer, until there would seem to be no recognizable basic
motivation.
Field evaluations in such an "iffy" topic as the search for motives vary with
the attitudes, biases, and perceptiveness of the evaluator. There does seem,
however, to be a definite utility in classification of motivation as: personal
devotion to, or hatred for, a cause; social pressure; compulsion (conscription
by guerrillas); fear of an established authority; adventurousness; ambition
hope of personal gain. Frequently, perhaps most often among leaders, these
motivations may have grown out of a feeling of frustration, which may or may
not be a dominant characteristic of the individual. One driven principally by
his frustrations, however, is not likely to last long as a guerrilla.
An individual will initially join the guerrillas because of any one or any
combination of these motives. Continuance may result from the same motives
or mayand perhaps most often doesresult from a modification of the orig-
inal reason. The adventurer will usually get a bellyful of hardships, but may
remain in the field because he fears punishment from the authorities. The
would-be looter may find the pickings too slimbut like the adventurer, he
may fear the constituted authorities. Ideals of patriotism or service to mankind
may fade when the belly is growling for food and the back shivering in the
rain, but the idealist continues because he cannot show himself less enduring,
less determined, than his comrades. The conscript may catch fire with ideals
of service, or with lust for loot, or he may remain a guerrilla only so long as
he sees no way out. And for some, the very routine of comradely outlawry can
become a habit and a way of life.
It is important for the counterguerrilla operator to understand the motiva-
tions of his opponentsto seek to determine their proportionate representa-
tion and weight. The proper appeal to a conscript may result in his eliminating
a leader, followed by his own surrender; a similar appeal to a patriot or a con-
formist may bring only increased contempt for the forces and motivations of
the government.
Understanding of motivations and how they may be modified, aroused, or
suppressed is as important as understanding that all other motivations tend to
pale when the basic drives for food, rest, and shelter are too long denied satis-
faction. It is even more important to understand that these more basic drives
seldom take lasting control of a certain percentage of people, but may contrib-
ute to the acceptance by this group of less than complete satisfaction of all the
demands which impelled them at the outset.
An ideal attainable only by fighting the existing governmentand one that
seems worth such afightisthe essential requirement and the distinguishing
characteristic of that war of the weak against the strong which is called guer-
rilla. Usually the ideal is one of government (whether in form, in practices, or
in individuals), an ideal that is set in sharp contrast, by real or fancied griev-
ances, against the existing government. The movement may be strengthened
by external sympathizers and support; it may be weakened by too much reli-
ance on external support.
The quasi guerrilla, on the other hand, counts largely on external support;
is, in fact, often a manifestation of the interests of forces outside the area of
operations. The quasi-guerrilla movement may take on the characteristics of
a true guerrilla movement as it generates local support. Until it does, the
channels of external support will usually remain its weakest point. Cut off
this support and the movement is likely to die. This may well be the easiest
way to end the quasi-guerrilla menaceif it has been accurately character-
ized. However, it is dangerous to rely solely on this method, for the quasi
guerrilla, if he has begun to win significant popular support, may thrive and
multiply even while his external roots are being attenuated.
As an individual, the quasi guerrilla will be motivated by very much the
same forces as the true guerrilla, but the forces will be represented in different
proportions in a group. The pressure of the military society to which he
belongs may well be his major motivation at the time the group goes "under-
ground." The nature, sanctions, and effects of this social pressure will change
rapidly after the soldier has become a "guerrilla," and new pressures will be
added.
One of the more significant of these new pressures will be his evaluation of
his place in the plans of his sponsors. If he feels that he is a cheap and expend-
able tool, his effectiveness and value will be small. If, on the other hand, he
feels that he represents a laudable conservation of energy and resources, that
he personally has been honored with an opportunity to be of far greater ser-
vice than most other soldiers, his determination and effectiveness may be as
great as those of any true guerrilla, and greater than those of his opponents.
The shifts in pressures, the often greater frustration of basic drives, and the
changes in values that occur when the soldier becomes a guerrilla may make
proffered, or selfish, substitute motivations more effective. It is at this point that
the great importance of careful selection of individuals for the quasi-guerrilla
role becomes apparent. Dedicated volunteers with positive motivations will
withstand these pressures better than most guerrillas, who are often moved by
their frustrations. If selected at random, or lacking positive motivation, a quasi
guerrilla under continuing physical and psychological pressures is far more
likely to surrender, or to die unprofitable than is the true guerrilla.
Bandits who behave like guerrillas offer an interestingly different problem.
As individuals, they can be said to act from substantially the same motivations
as a guerrilla or quasi guerrillabut with bandits, practically all alleged moti-
vations can be distilled down to a search for the easiest way out. In other
words, their motivations are in general much closer to their basic drives, hence
the individuals are much more readily accessible in terms of those drives.
The key to the banditry problem, often, perhaps usually, lies in identifying
and/or neutralizing those apparently law-abiding citizens who profit by the
banditry. Make banditry unprofitable for the solid citizens, the paragons of
respectability whose pockets it so often lines; offer the bandits a better route
to satisfaction of their basic drives; and the problem can be solved.
Essentially, a guerrilla is one of a group of men of varying motivations and
desires, bound together to achieve objectives, to realize an ideal, using force
against great odds and collectively exhibiting a determination to achieve at
least a measure of success against these odds. Usually they operate in remote
rural areas, but sometimes they are exclusively in big cities. By any realistic
standards, by any evaluation of motivation in terms of basic drives, by any
assessment of material resources, facilities, organization, or training, the guer-
rillas have no chance of victory and scarcely any chance of survival. They do
survive, quite illogically and quite irrationally; and frequently they attain at
least qualified success.
Chapter 2
CHARACTERISTICS OF
GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS
AND OPERATIONS
"THERELATiONSHiPthatshouldexistbetweenthepeopleandthetroops.... The
former may be likened to water, and the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How
may it be said that these two cannot exist together?"
Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare
"The people are to the army [the guerrillas] what water is to fish."
Vo NGUYEN GIAP, People's War, People's Army
This is the central, the essential, the ineluctable characteristic of guerrilla
warfare. If it may be said that "without vision the people perish," it may
equally be said that without people the guerrillas perish.
All guerrilla movements have many characteristics in commonjust as each
has its virtually unique features. The similarities and the dissimilarities owe far
more to human similarities and differences than to the physical environment. It
is difficult to determine which is the more dangerous and expensive error for
the counterguerrilla operatorfailure to recognize the characteristics common
to most or all guerrilla movements, or failure to recognize those that are virtu-
ally unique to the movement it is his duty to oppose.
There is always a tendency to treat each guerrilla problem as though it were
a new phenomenona lusus naturae. This is especially tempting to the well-
trained, knowledgeable staff officer or senior commander without prior expe-
rience in guerrilla warfare. He knows that his forces are so much better
equipped, better trained, better fed, better treated, and better paid that at first
glance it seems utter folly for the guerrilla to challenge him. Since he is unwill-
ing to fall into the obvious trap of thinking his enemy a fool, this orthodox
soldier will believe that there must be, and will seek, the apparently missing
factor, the secret weapon, the new tactic, the concealed support, which makes
this operation new and different. While searching for it, he may well irrevoca-
bly lose the initiative to the audacious, not to say impudent, guerrilla who does
not believe that victory is necessarily to the heaviest artillery.
The numerous similarities that may exist among guerrilla movements
must be appreciated if the basic routes of attack on guerrilla movements are
to be readily apparent. Movements based on a common ideology, whether it
be Communism or Hamiltonian democracy, will certainly have many fea-
tures in common. Similarities will be particularly striking among move-
ments based on aggressively evangelical ideologies, especially if they
actively seek to encourage and propagate guerrilla warfare. The lessons
learned from one Communist guerrilla movement will have many applica-
tions to other Communist movements, especially in strategy and tactics.
Too much reliance on these similarities, too much reliance on a particular
Communist movement adhering to accepted Communist doctrine can be
fatal, however. Had Castro followed the doctrines of Mao Tse-tung and Vo
Nguyen Giap, he would still have been a guerrilla rebel on April 17, 1961,
busily converting his forces into conventional armies that could eventually
fight a conventional battle against the conventional forces of the Batista
government. Instead, he bypassed the stages of conventional warfare,
effecting a national revolution by erosion of the political base and by polit-
ical rather than military defeat of the armed forces opposing him.
Similarities in climate, terrain, religion, culture can produce similarities in
guerrilla tactics and strategy. So can the attitudes of external powers, whether
favorable to or opposing the guerrilla. Assumptions based on similarities or
dissimilarities are often most appealing but they can be most treacherous. The
similarities between Laos and Vietnam, for example, are so great that one may
be forgiven for having concluded in 1955 that Laos, having the advantage of
an indubitably securely ensconced chief of state, was much more safe from
Communist attack than Vietnam.
Despite the dangers of possible misinterpretation, an appreciation of the prob-
lems and characteristics all guerrilla movements share is essential to understand-
ing the problem of counterguerrilla operations. Some characteristics of a guerrilla
movement are so closely linked to its success or failure that they may properly be
called imperatives, which must be met or the movement is foredoomed.
Recognizing these imperatives will reveal profitable targets to the counterguer-
rilla forces, targets often far more profitable and far less costly than the physical
target presented by the guerrilla himself.
Viable guerrilla movements usually arise in one of two ways:
1. Remnants of a defeated national army ally themselves with indignant civil-

ians to carry on the war against the occupying power;
CHARACTERISTICS OF GUERRILLA 13
2. Organizations whose ideologies oppose the existing government, deliber-

ately or under pressure from the government, adopt the "armed struggle."
Like any human effort, a guerrilla movement requires organization if it is to

live and win more than transient success. Guerrilla movements of the first
category (spontaneous resistance to an occupying power) frequently lack
effective organization at their beginning. Conceivably, prompt action in isolat-
ing groups, picking up leaders, etc., can prevent or long delay their effective
organization.
Even more vulnerable are those organizations that are formed before the
adoption of the armed struggle. These organizations, typically Communist
dominated, work long and arduously to prepare the ground for revolution. An
alert government should be able to recognize this preparation and to take the
necessary measures to eliminate the organization. Governments often fail to
act at this stage, fearing political repercussions, and being unwilling or unable
to take the necessary political actions to preclude effective political reactions.
These other actions may include parliamentary logrolling and similar maneu-
vers, as well as careful election assistance.
Organization may be regarded as the first imperative of a guerrilla move-
ment, since it is essential for the success of any but a mob-type revolution,
even though it may not precede guerrilla actions.
The second imperative for a viable guerrilla movement is a cause. The
more closely this cause is allied to the religious, social, political, and per-
sonal aspirations of the society from which the movement seeks support, the
more support the movement can muster. Paradoxically, in many instances,
the more concrete the objectives of the guerrilla, the more easily he can be
defeated. So long as the cause remains an ideal, a not too sharply defined
concept, it may be difficult to rally support, but even more difficult to engen-
der opposition to it. Who can oppose the ideals of home, country, and early
motherhood?
A cause, the achievement of which is easily and factually discernible, is
a two-edged sword; its proponents lose or win, with little chance to obscure
the actuality. If the goal is one the opposition cannot effectively pretend to
support (by removing its forces, ending its occupation) it is one the coun-
terguerrilla forces will be forced to meet by indirection. If the cause of the
guerrilla is one the counterguerrilla can seem to adopt, or make more read-
ily obtainable to the citizens by their cooperation with the government, it is
not a good one for the guerrilla. If the government can, and does, give what
the guerrilla only promises, the guerrilla loses his announced reason for
being.
The third imperative for a viable guerrilla movement is obtaining minimum
essential food and shelter without devoting full time to this occupation. Guer-
rillas can live in uninhabited areas if they can grow their own food, but they
can be effective only if they can simultaneously have time left over for opera-
tions against their enemy.
Normally,fightingforces of a guerrilla movement must rely on civilian sup-
porters for their food. Sometimes the food is voluntarily given; sometimes
payment is expected. Often much, if not most, is obtained through a form of
taxation implemented by the "shadow government" composed of active civil-
ian supporters of the guerrilla movement. (In turn, for this to be effective, the
guerrillas must appear to support the shadow government whose service gives
their actions at least a pretext of legality.)
The fourth imperative for a viable guerrilla movementand it is really the
most important of allis to gain and maintain either active support or passive
toleration from a majority of the people in the area of operations. Excluding
those grass-fire (ningas cogon) movements where an entire area or community
is swept for a brief period by a sort of mass hysteria (really extended mob
action), residents of an area of guerrilla operations usually fall into three catego-
ries: (1) those actively supporting the guerrillas; (2) those actively opposing the
guerrillas; and (3) those neither supporting nor opposing the guerrillas (often by
far the largest group). Unless Group 1 is as large as Group 2, and unless Groups
1 and 3 together heavily outnumber Group 2, it is doubtful if the guerrilla move-
ment can long continue to exist. Certainly it cannot be effective, cannot offer an
active threat to established government if it does not have approximately this
degree of popular supportor at least benevolent neutrality.
Thefifthimperative of a viable guerrilla movement is visible action against
the enemy. This action need not be significant in terms of over-all defeat or
victory; it may well result in greater hardships for the supporters of the move-
ment and for "innocent bystanders"; but it must be productive of visible
results, even though these be no more than one or two enemy dead. Something
tangible must be done from time to time to convince supporters and individual
guerrillas alike that the movement is effective, is contributing to the achieve-
ment of the goal. These actions may be, often are, defensive reactions to fights
forced by the counterguerrilla, but they must show enemy casualties; they can-
not always be silent retreats to avoid actual combat.
The sixth basic imperative is hope. Characteristically and typically, it is hope
for ultimate achievement of the long-range objective of the movement. Occa-
sionally (atypically for a true guerrilla movement, much more often true for
quasi guerrillas or bandits), it is hope for a short-range, essentially selfish accom-
plishment, such as living for a while longer. Hope must be sustained, no matter
how, or the movement dies.
These six imperatives, plus the conditions that dictate a resort to guerrilla
rather than political or conventional military action, give guerrilla movements
their distinctive characteristics. The conditions that cause guerrilla warfare
might be summarized as conditions of inferiority to the enemy in almost
CHARACTERISTICS OF GUERRILLA 15
everything tangible, but an assumed superiority in ideals and determination.

As a result, the guerrilla habitually must:
Fight only at times and places of his own choosing.

Develop comprehensive intelligence and counterintelligence screens.
Rely generally on decentralized command.
Punish his enemies among the civilian population.
Rely on primitive, often improvised, communication and transportation
facilities.
Emphasize gaining popular support and good will.
Seek to overcome the enemy's will to resist more by psychological than
by physical action.
Assuming that the foregoing propositions are true, it would seem that coun-
terguerrilla operations should be easy, and so they should. As with so many
human operations, it is only the pigheadedness of the humans involved, espe-
cially on our own side, that makes them difficult.
In this connection, the authors would like to adopt for their own, the state-
ments made by the late Brigadier R. C. H. Miers in his brilliant "Both Sides of
the Guerrilla Hill," in the March, 1962, issue of Army:
Junior leaders must be trained to use guile rather than orthodox methods: brains
before sweat. .. . Ruses as old as those in the Bible will work if not repeated too
often, and . . . the guerrilla has many weak points which must be
exploited.... Other things being equal, which hat would I prefer to wear: that
of a guerrilla or [that] of a government official? Personally I would go for the
guerrilla's every time.
Chapter 3
APPROACHES TO COUNTER-
GUERRILLA WARFARE1
REVIEW AND analysis of the history of counterguerrilla operations suggests

that four basic approaches may be employed, singly or in combination. All
have been used in the last 17, as in the last 170 years; most are being employed
in one part or another of the world today. Each has repeatedly been acclaimed
as a cure-all, and each has had apologists who have attributed its failure to
everything from ineffectual application to a lack of hardware.
The oldest approach, perhaps, is extermination or resettlement of the guer-
rillas and the civilian population, which includes those who support them. The
Chinese Communists seem to have employed, to their satisfaction, the exter-
minatory approach to their guerrilla problems, effectively clearing areas by
the wholesale slaughter of everything that moves. So have the Russians, on
perhaps a somewhat less drastic scale. Outside the Communist sphere or
Africa, it is doubtful whether many commanders today would be either will-
ing or allowed to use such methods.
Employment of terror, or drastic retaliatory measures against the civilians in
the area of operations is essentially only a variation of this approach. The danger
to the user of such measures was exemplified in the war-crime trials after World
War II, and the limited success achieved by German terrorist methods suggests
that the gains are not worthwhile in any case.
In Malaya, the British employed a contemporary version of the area-
clearance system, which was acceptable and feasible under the social and
political conditions there. They resettled some 500,000 Chinese, among
whom were included most of the local supporters of the Chinese guerrillas.
In this way, they succeeded in cutting off the guerrillas' sources of supply.
The resettled Chinese were forcibly concentrated in "new villages" behind
barbed wire. Existing villages were at times placed under curfew or under
stringent food control that required whole villages to be fed from a central
kitchen and that forbade individual possession of food. Some areas were
placed under an absolute interdict; that is, people moving in them were
subject to being shot on sight by security forces.
These measures, coupled with active patrolling, a major intelligence effort,
and a psychological-warfare campaign that leaned heavily on a reward system,
eventually suppressed the guerrillas, whose number probably never exceeded
5,000. Most important, perhaps, was the British promise of independence for
Malaya by 1957 if the situation was under control. This brought the Malays into
an action they had previously regarded as being an affair between the British
and Chinese; the action succeeded and independence was granted as promised.
Success in such an operation seems possible only where the political base of
the government does not include the affected elements of the population. In
Malaya, for instance, the people involved had no direct ties with the indigenous
government; both the guerrillas and their supporters were Chinese in a non-
Chinese country under British administration. Further, success is possible only
if the government determination is so great, and so well supported that it can
afford to use, in the counterguerrilla effort, forty to fifty soldiers and civilians
for every guerrilla in the field.
Most often, a solution to the guerrilla problem is initially sought by the

military (or police) approach, which aims at arresting the guerrillas, or if nec-
essary, destroying them in combat. Their civilian supporters are frequently
ignored, or attempts are made to seal them off physically from the guerrillas
by setting up highway checkpoints, curfews, etc. Military operations in this
category fall into two general classes, perhaps best denominated as conven-
tional and unconventional. Conventional actions are those taken by regularly
constituted elements of the military or police force, operating in accordance
with doctrine for operations against a conventional enemy.
The weakness of this approach is indicated by the experience of the Philippine
Government: From 1946 through most of 1950, as many as 25,000 government
troops and auxiliaries sought to destroy some 12,000 guerrillas. Perhaps 150,000
of the nearly 2 million people in the area (Central Luzon) were sympathizers and
supporters of the Huk. By September, 1950, there were in the area a few more
Huk, many more sympathizers, and a widespread distaste for the government
and its troops.
Conventional operations against guerrillas have met with many such failures
and some few successes. Success seems most often to have come from ade-
quate and timely intelligence about the guerrilla and/or the exploitation of a
guerrilla weakness. The weaknesses most commonly exploited have been
either slipshod security or disregard of a basic tenet of guerrilla strategy: that
guerrillas should never try to hold terrain against an enemy in possibly
equivalent or greater strength.
APPROACHES TO COUNTER-GUERRILLA WARFARE 19
It was the latter ruleor disregard of itthat gave the Japanese their one
major success against the Huk in the Philippines, when they launched an
attack on the Huk Mount Arayat "redoubt" in 1943. The attack was successful
only because the Huk foolishly sought to hold their ground.
The Huk showed how well they had learned their lesson when Philippine
troops undertook an almost identical encirclement of Mount Aray at in 1947,
with approximately the same number of well-trained troops, but with far more
popular support than the Japanese had had. Reporters, ice-cream and soft-
drink vendors, and sightseers accompanied the government troops, and all the
while, horse- and ox-drawn carts driven by guerrilla supporters carried away
the supplies of the Huk through gaps in the troop lines. Few Huk were killed,
or even seriously inconvenienced, and it appeared later that more casualties
had probably been inflicted by government troops on unidentified friendly
forces than on the Huk.
Conventional military operations are not infrequently successful against
inexperienced quasi guerrillas, against guerrillas strange to the area of opera-
tions, or against guerrillas who have not won substantial popular sympathy or
support. United Nations troops during the Korean War used substantially
conventional tactics successfully against quasi guerrillas.
Conventional military operations usually require troop strength vastly
greater than that of the guerrillas and are inordinately expensive in terms of
time and material. If troops in such numbers must be maintained for protec-
tion against a conventional enemy, their use in conventional operations against
guerrillas can be justified as a means of training. It is seldom that conventional
operations destroy a guerrilla force by causing the death, capture, or surrender
of a large proportion of its personnel, but conventional operations can make
such a force ineffectual.
Unconventional military operations may for the present purpose be defined
as operations conducted by military personnel aimed at gaining information
about, making contact with, harassing, destroying, or capturing guerrillas, in
ways for which there are no direct precedents in contemporary military doc-
trines. They range from the introduction into guerrilla channels of supplies or
information designed to harm or disadvantage them, through the employment
of soldiers disguised as guerrilla or civilian supporters, to the adoption of prac-
tices at variance with tactical doctrines for conventional warfare. Unconven-
tional military operations are limited only by the ingenuity, ethical standards,
and resources of those responsible for their use.
(Operations by the military to assist civilians are classed as "civic action"
or civilian support, even though they may also be at variance with traditional
military practices.)
Unconventional military operations against guerrillas take many pages of
Philippine history. They range from the ancient Chinese practice of using fire-
crackers or joints of bamboo thrown on thefireto simulate small-arms reports,
to the famous Filipino cannon. These were not unlike the wooden "Quaker
guns" once used on American merchant ships to give the appearance of heavy
armament. The Filipino cannon, however, had the added advantage of sound-
ing like cannon, thanks to a little kerosene poured into the breech. Its fumes
were periodically detonated by a match.
Probably no campaign in Philippine history has seen such extensive use of
unconventional operations as that against the Huk, especially after 1950. The
use of disguised troops became almost routineso much so, in fact, that on
one occasion at least, two Huk units shot it out, each under the impression that
the other was made up of "phonies." No effort was spared to make continua-
tion as a Huk guerrilla at least decidedly risky if not fatal. One device that
some might consider unsporting was to encourage civilians living in the Huk-
infested marshes to go frog-hunting by torchlight. Unknown to the civilians, a
small patrol would be following, ready to pick off any Huk attracted by the
lights and the possibility of getting food.
At times, it was desirable to persuade the Huk that an area was heavily
infested with government troops. A number offlaresfiredat intervals by a few
men spread throughout the area was both economical and convincing. Con-
versely, an area might be saturated with troops who would ostentatiously pull
out after a fruitless operation. Small parties left behind often succeeded in put-
ting an end to the relaxation of Huk who came out of hiding after the departure
of the troops.
Some of the unconventional operations in the Huk campaign were almost
incredibly successful; others failed, often through lack of adequate advance
preparation. Many of the failures, even one operation that brought in its wake
the wanton destruction of food and storage facilities, eventually assisted in low-
ering Huk morale and weakening them by increasing their suspicion of their
fellow guerrillas and creating difficulties between Huk and civilian supporters.
Dirty tricks and disguises are by no means the whole story in unconventional
warfare. The habitual use of small patrols as the major combat effort, with stand-
ing orders to attack any enemy who learns of their presence, is one of the most
useful practices in counterguerrilla operations. Departure from accepted doc-
trine, special training, and special equipment of combat personnel are often
valuable and frequently should be adopted. These, if well considered, adapted to
the terrain and the situation, will often be found to be simpler, less expensive,
and more successful than the conventional items or practices they replace.
Certainly unconventional operations are by far the most economical of per-
sonnel and materiel. Given adequate support, communications, andabove
allinformation of the enemy, a small number of trained guerrilla hunters can
kill, or force into permanent submergence among the civilian population, a far
larger number of guerrillas. Too often, such specialized forces have been
improperly used, have in fact been committed to relatively static roles in sup-
port of already static conventional troops, and their value has been lost. When
well-conceived unconventional operations fail, it is almost always because of

inadequate preparation or halfhearted and ineffectual support.
Surrender as the initial approach to guerrilla operations appeals only to

those who sympathize with the guerrillas and their objectives and to the
hopelessly woolly-witted. It will be urged from the beginning by confirmed
enemies of the administration, by secret sympathizers of the guerrilla, by the
guerrilla himselfand by his propagandists. As antiguerrilla operations
continue and become more expensive in lives and material, with success
seeming ever further away, a negotiated end to the struggle becomes appeal-
ing. As operations drag on, losses increase, and the propagandists' wiles
make secondary issues loom larger while the political, economic, and moral
purposes of the counterguerrilla blur, and demands for peace at any price
(almost) increase.
Small nations that have enlisted the support of a major power will face
increasing external pressures to either seek or refuse an accommodation. And
as these pressures become apparent, they engender a resentment that tends to
obscure the casus belli, creating a strong motive for seeking peace with those
who seem at least to share a common nationality. Major powers, fearing a pos-
sible expansion of the local struggle into a world war, or fearing that their own
troops may become involved, not infrequently urge a negotiated peace between
government and revolutionaries.
These phenomena have been repeated time and again in the past twenty
years. The latest example (at this writing) is Laos, where such negotiations, and
a reluctance for resolute action by the major power assisting the government,
have marked the troubled years since 1950. It has not been confined to small
countries. France in effect surrendered to the Vietminh at the Geneva Confer-
ence of 1954, as she has since surrendered to the Algerians. Nor has this situa-
tion been confined to guerrilla warfare. The Korean "peace" urged and accepted
by the United States is another outstanding example in recent history. Allied
policies and actions amounting to surrender in China after World War II and in
Russia immediately after World War I justify the old cynicism that the only
thing we learn from history is that we learn nothing from history.
Because of the historical precedent as well as because of the nature of the
human animal, surrender as an approach to the problems of counterguerrilla
operations must be borne in mind. And if there are no successes in the coun-
terguerrilla effort, the cry for peace will increase until the government respon-
sible for the operation may come to believe that the only alternative to its own
dissolution is an accommodation with the enemy. These are, in fact, the only
choices remaining after unsuccessful counterguerrilla operations.
There is another approach to counterguerrilla operations, one that might be

called "stealing their thunder." As the name implies, the idea is to beat the
guerrilla at his own game, to try to attract more support from the civilians in
the area of operations than can the guerrilla, while at the same time winning
combat superiority.
The guerrilla claims a moral superiority over his government enemy. He claims
a greater concern for the welfare of the people. To beat him at this, not only must
the forces of government demonstrate their own moral superiority; they must
find ways to dramatize their concern for the people.
One such drama was played out in a Huk-dominated area in 1951, after
Ramon Magsaysay's advent as Secretary of National Defense. A sector com-
mander heard that the wife of a Huk commander was in the sitio (hamlet) of
San Agustin, awaiting the birth of her baby. Into this tiny settlement (fifteen
houses, approximately fifty people), he sent a radio transmitter (and five men
for surveillance, in case the commander came to visit his wife). The radio
transmitterflashedthe word of the baby's birth, and a doctor and nurse in a jeep
ambulance were sent out to the village. Meanwhile, the sector commander flew
over San Agustin, sending messages of congratulations and telling the new
mother that medical help was on the way in case she needed it. As might be
expected, the entire population came out to wave and cheer. Soon after, the
arrival of the jeep ambulanceas promisedbrought more cheers.
When she recovered, the wife sent her thanks to the sector commander, and
at the same time her apologies that her husband should be a fugitive. Would it
be possible for him to return to government allegiance? It may be imagined
what the sector commander answered. The story of the birth circulated quickly
through all the Huk area, reaching the husband, who found himself not only a
father but part of a legend. When his wife sent word that it was possible for the
commander to surrender with honor, and that such an act would be for the
welfare of his family, he "came in," and in the days following, by twos and
threes, the twenty-five armed Huk who had been under his command followed
his lead by surrendering.
Once the new Secretary of National Defense made it possible for government
troops to carry out such unconventional tactics, the Huk claims to superiority in
trying to satisfy the people's legitimate aspirations were signally weakened.
The guerrilla's claims can only be beaten when the forces of government
forcefully demonstrate their ability and determination to satisfy the legiti-
mate aspirations of the governed, while at the same time exhibiting greater
day-to-day concern for the popular welfare. Often, the guerrilla rests his
claim to moral superiority on the behavior of the guerrilla to the people, on
the "iron discipline" of the guerrilla soldiers as compared with abusive
practices by government troops. It is virtually essential that government
forces demonstrate superiority in this field.
Although it is requisite for government forces to make a greater and more
convincing effort to win the support of the people (and to give justification for
turning from support of the guerrilla), it is also essential to beat the guerrilla
militarily. This means taking the initiative from him, forcing him to fight at
places and at times not of his own choosing as well as beating him when he
chooses tofight.It is not necessary, nor is it usually possible, to defeat the guer-
rilla decisively in combat to the point of military annihilation of his forces; it is
necessary to carry the war to him. As the campaign to win popular support,
augmented by a demonstrated desire to come to grips with the guerrilla, begins
to carry conviction, military action becomes easier and more profitable. Usually
this action will be unconventional, at least in many aspects.
Probably the first to use twentieth-century knowledge and techniques in a
deliberate, rigorous exploitation of this approach to counterguerrilla warfare
was Ramon Magsaysay, Secretary of National Defense of the Republic of the
Philippines from September, 1950, to February, 1953. He dramatically pre-
sented his program as offering to the Huk "Ail-Out Friendship or All-Out
Force." He drastically reoriented the campaign that had been carried on desul-
torily by the government for five years and achieved proof of success within
fourteen months. The techniques and principles he employed seem appropriate
to many, perhaps most, counterguerrilla operations.
NOTE
1. Much of the material in this chapter previously appeared in The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCXLI (May, 1962), 19-29.
Chapter 4
THE SITUATION AND

THE TERRAIN
"IT ALL depends on the situation and the terrain"the handiest phrase ever
thought up to give a little breathing space to the military student asked for
"Actions and Orders, please," this is one of those devilish half-truths too often
used to cover up a lack of knowledge or unwillingness to think. In any given
tactical situation, much does depend on the situation and the terrain; certainly
the commander who best understands and employs both is the commander
most likely to winif he also understands the basic principles of the type of
action he is preparing to fight.
The terrain of Europe has undoubtedly influenced the many wars that have
been fought there, but it has not been allowed to hamper the development of
principles and tactics applicable to any kind of war. The proof is that the best
tactics and principles developed there have been successful wherever they
have been applied properly. In consequence, military schools around the world
teach principles and tactics and their application to the situation and terrain
that may be encountered.
Too often, studies of guerrilla or counterguerrilla operations have so
emphasized the situation and the terrain that the generally applicable principles
have been obscured. To those on the periphery of such operations, to those
whose academic disciplines could contribute greatly to the solution of the
problem, the situation or the terrain has often overwhelmed everything else in
their thinking. Their views often becloud the issues, sometimes create crises,
sometimes end them.
This is most typical of rebels. Luis Taruc, most influential of the Huk,
achieved that position because of his love for his fellow men and his distorted
view of a society in which he was unable to work his way through school.
Ramon Magsaysay defeated him because of his love for his fellow men and
his clear view of a political system that enabled him eventually to become his
country's best-loved President, even though he, too, encountered great diffi-
culty in working his way through school.
The campaign against the Huk for a time fumbled, not for lack of knowledge
of the situation and the terrain but for want of understanding of the principles,
tactics, and applications of successful counterguerrilla action. It became a
snowballing success when these principles and tactics were applied on bases
partly theoretical but largely pragmatic.
The Philippines is an archipelago of eleven large and some 7,000 small islands
in the Western Pacific. Excluding lakes, rivers, and the many small specks of
islands, the area of the Philippine land is roughly 115,000 square miles. The
topography includesflat,irrigated rice lands, rolling grassy uplands, seasonally
flooded swamps, and many, many miles of precipitous mountains, with forest
cover ranging from great pines to the most dense tropical rain forest.
The people, of a basically Malay stock, with some admixture of Chinese
and Spanish, numbered about 21 million in 1950, at the height of the Huk
campaign. Their ways of life range from completely Americanized to the
food-gathering culture of wandering pagan bands. The strongest reminder of
their prehistoric society is the languages, about eighty-five of which are still
spoken, with English being the lingua franca of the whole archipelago.
Three-fourths of the people lived on farms in 1950. The pattern is typically
one of small farms; half the farms are less thanfiveacres. Less than a fourth of
the total area of the country is included in the farm lands. Social organization
is family oriented and strongly colored by the years of Spanish occupation.
Political attitudes and structures are patterned on those of the United States, yet
retain marks of Spanish and pre-Spanish customs.
An important element, often overlooked or misunderstood, is the great
stress placed on responsibility for and to members of the family, whether by
blood or by choice. This constitutes a real and substantial social-security
system, which goes far to ameliorate real hardship, while at the same time it
can be an excuse for laziness or a compelling reason for favoritism. The
practice of extending the family by the selection of godparents, the so-called
compadre system, is the target of much criticism, yet constitutes a valuable
means of ensuring vertical social mobility.
Manila, the de facto capital, situated on Luzon, the northernmost of the large
islands, has, with its suburbs, a population of nearly 2 million, much of which
is transient. A sprawling, bustling city, which has doubled in size since the war,
it contains the most marked contrasts between East and West, between swank
American-style suburbs, Chinese tenement slums, and sprawling shanty-towns.
Its influence on the country is great, especially in ideology. As the most
politically minded place in a politically minded nation, it is a natural hothouse
for radical movements.
THE SITUATION AND THE TERRAIN 27
More than the plains, swamps, and mountains, the conditions in the
agricultural portions of the Philippines form the terrain on which guerrilla
movements operate. The attitudes of the residents of these areas are to a large
extent the situation with which guerrillas and counterguerrillas must contend.
On some islands, like Leyte and Samar, and indeed in many parts of Luzon,
most of the farmers till their own lands, often wresting from them barely enough
for survival. Many of the children leave home to seek work in the cities as soon
as they are old enough. The hand of the government rests lightly on such men,
and the slogans of the Huk had little or no appeal.
On two islands, Negros and Panay, much of the agricultural land is in large
sugar plantations, whose laborers are paid by the day. Agitators for higher
wages have natural appeal, and radical unionists always find some followers.
The Huk managed finally to make some headway in organization in Panay,
under the leadership of two veteran labor racketeers, Nava and Capadocia.
(The latter was a Communist leader of long standing.) Neither plantation
workers nor small farmers found the appeals of the Huk compatible with their
attitudes, and the Huk movement there was soon liquidated by aggressive
intelligence and psychological operations. These latter leaned heavily on local
defense units formed largely of ex-guerrillas and on the rewards offered for
top leaders of the Huk.
Only in three areas of Central Luzon did the Huk find conditions favorable
for their type of revolution. One of these was the area to the south of Manila,
a region where farming is diversified, with perhaps half of the people working
little farms that they think they own, and the remainder divided among labor-
ers on large estates, sharecroppers, and workers in cottage industries. This
region has been systematically victimized for 150 years by land reformers and
demagogues, unscrupulous politicians and land racketeers selling what they
did not own. In consequence, there is a strong tendency to banditry, which
makes it easy for any revolutionary leader who promises good government
and land to attract followers, if he offers them good pickings. Such groups
affiliated themselves with the Huk, and for some years were a nuisance, but
never a serious menace.
Manila, similarly, is an easy place in which to recruit followers, from the
unemployed and the discontented, and from intellectuals and students in search
of a brave new world. While the Communist Party kept up its efforts in the
"legal struggle," it met considerable success in infiltrating labor unions in
Manila. Had they really worked at organization there, the danger could have
been acute. Even so, Manila offered a virtual safe haven for Huk headquarters
and leaders until the authorities cracked down, taking advantage of the feeling
of security Communist leaders in the city had long enjoyed.
It was only in Central Luzon that the Huk movement reallyflourished.This
is an area of some 6,000 square miles, much of it rich rice land. It is bordered
on the east and west by mountains, on the south by Manila Bay, swamps, and
more mountains, on the north by Lingayen Gulf and yet more mountains.
An extension of the bayside swamp, Candaba, runs far up into the eastern por-
tion of this area. It has been the granary and garden for Manila for centuries.
Well over half the farmers in the rich rice lands are sharecroppers, farming
large estates, often held by absentee landlords. So keen is the competition for
land, and so eager are the occupants to continue to farm in the same place as
their fathers, even though this means further subdividing rented lands already
too small to be economical, that the average farm runs from four acres in some
provinces to eight in others. Social customs, the village fiesta and the cockfight,
the overwhelming desire of the farmer to send his children to school, all make
heavy demands on an income barely enough for subsistence. The tendency is
to borrow, often at ruinously high rates of interest, sometimes exceeding
100 per cent per annum.
As in Southern Luzon, for more than a century, demagogues and
well-intentioned persons of little understanding have been telling the peo-
ple in these provinces that they are abused. To some extent, they have been,
but at least since the Spanish left the Islands, this abuse has always been
easy to escape, or overcome, legally. Needless to say, many were inclined
to believe that they were abused, that they had no salvation except through
revolution, and found the Huk slogans of land reform, equal justice, and
good government easy to accept. It was among these people that the Huk
grew under the Japanese, from whom they organized their shadow
government, their Barrio United Defense Corps, and their Pambansang
Kapisananng Magbubukid, or Peasants' Union.
It was in this area that the Huk had their strength and in which they had to
be destroyed. They were everywhere. They were in the poblaciones (county
seats) of the municipalities (counties). They were in the barrios (villages) and
in the sitios (hamlets). They were in the fields, the swamps, the mountains.
The cultivators of this granary seldom live on their farms. Rather they live
in sitios and barrios, going into the fields in the morning and returning at night
to their settlement. Since the barrio plays such a role in the life of the people,
it is important to have a basic picture of it. The following description of a
typical barrio in Huklandiathe nickname given to the central plain of Luzon
in recognition of its long domination by the Hukbalahapwas written by a
perceptive American artist in 1952:
The ways of life among Filipinos range from one extreme to the other, with the
city of Manila containing the heights of modernization. There wefindthe highly
sophisticated internationally educated, driving imported cars, smoking imported
cigarettes, eating imported foods. We find their counterpart also in provincial
cities or country estates, enjoying the blend of contemporary gadgetry with the
traditional gracious living of thefinanciallysolvent Filipino. Among the middle
class those things Americans now take for granted as "necessities" of life are
still luxuries greatly to be desired. Refrigerators, modern stoves, television sets,
vacuum cleaners are hard to come by and, once acquired, highly prized. Even
schooling one's children calls for sacrifice.
In the smaller settlements in the provinces, away from Manila, we find the
opposite extreme from the life of the wealthy Manilan. Here there is no electric-
ity, no piped water, or piped sewage.
San Mateo, in Pampanga Province, is just such a small village in the heart
of Huklandia, near Mount Arayat, where many encounters between Huk and
government have taken place. Even now the Army is operating in this area.
Many barrios nearby have been abandoned because of the difficulties of
carrying on life in the midst of a battlefield, but the people of San Mateo have
tried to hold on.
Barrio San Mateo is hidden in a small forest of trees made feathery by tall
bamboos. We trudge toward it on foot over a dusty road worn by the passage of
carabao (water-buffalo) carts and dry-land sleds. Rice fields stretch dry and
golden on either side. Our road edges up abruptly from the glaring riceflatsinto
the cool shade of mango trees, where carabao rest near several tall conical
stacks of unthreshed rice. We are stopped by the view. Mount Arayat stands as
a blue pyramid seemingly not too far across the fields, with a shimmer of the
river between. Close at hand is an abandoned weathered brown-thatched nipa
hut,flankedby the brilliant green of bamboo and papaya trees. It's a cloudy day.
The colors are rich. Maybe someday when the fighting is done, the owner will
come back to his nipa hut and lovely view.
Our road turns at right angles to become the main street of the village, three
kilometers (not quite two miles) long. Children come shyly closer, ready to grin
and make friends, as we turn left toward the school, the chapel, and the home of
the Teniente del Barrio.
The Teniente comes to greet us. Children trail us to his home and multiply in
number by the second. Barrio Lieutenant Anselmo Parungao is fine looking,
barefooted, and wears a sparkling clean white shirt and trim broad-brimmed
straw hat. Conversation switches back and forth between English and Tagalog.
A companion keeps me abreast of the Tagalog with running commentaries and
translations. "Parungao was appointed to his post by the Mayor of Arayat town,
and although he is supposed to receive a salary, so far it has not been paid.
Parungao is bitter, not because of his pay, but because he has not been given the
authority that goes with his post. He cannot even issue identification passes for
his people so they may move about during military operations in the area.
Anselmo, like his fellow San Mateans, is a poor man, but he does own his nipa
house and the lot on which it stands." He poses graciously before it for pictures,
then takes us on a tour of the barrio, showing us points of interest.
We stroll down the main street walled on either side by a series of woven
bamboo fences that surround each house to keep chickens and pigs from wan-
dering. A few of the houses are of wood with sliding windows of shell, but most
are built of thatch over a bamboo frame-workthatched walls, thatched roof,
thatched shutters to close down over window openings, thatched box standing
high off the ground on stilts. Pigs and chickens find shade under the house.
We climb over a stile at a gateway to visit in one of the typical nipa huts. We
climb the almost vertical bamboo ladder up to a tiny platform, or outside porch,
floored with large half-bamboos spaced slightly apart so water can drip through
to the ground. Here Lola (Grandmother) squats doing her washing; here the men
will bathe when they come from the fields. Here sits a clay jug keeping the
drinking water cool, and beside it a topless kerosene can holding water for gen-
eral use. The earthen cookstove is located here also during the dry season so that
it doesn't smoke up the house so badly.
We step inside into the one room of the house, about twelve feet square and
void of furniture, but orchids hang in coconut-shell pots in the window openings.
A small platform in one corner is the rainy-season cook spot, with an opening in
the wall above it so smoke may be persuaded outside. (Sometimes this cook spot
is a specially built balcony.) One comer of the room is screened off with sawali
(woven matting) as a dressing-changing-room. The possessions of the household
are meager, consisting of the jugs for water, clay pots for cooking, spoons and
dippers contrived from gourds or coconut shells, a few metal spoons, perhaps a
metal pot, basin, and frying pan. Knives are the handmade bolos, so important
for chopping food or chopping wood. A canister of matting several feet in diam-
eter holds the rice supply, where it will be dry.
Across a corner of the room is slung a hammock where baby can be rocked
to sleep. Woven mats stand neatly against the wall, to be unrolled at night onto
the bamboo floor for beds. A few candles and an improvised beer-bottle kero-
sene lamp provide needed light at night. Clothes are at a minimum; those not
being worn are being washed. A woven buri box holds extra items like blankets,
which are so scarce and so desirable when the nights get cold. Later in the day
we spread banana leaves on the floor and shared the lunch we had brought
along.
Strolling on through the barrio, we stop to talk to people as they work to
learn their thoughts, to let them know we care what they are thinking. We stop
to watch an elderly couple turning rice spread on mats. "This is their share in the
recent harvest. For three days, they must dry it in the sun and gather it in when
the sun gets low," the Teniente explains.
Here life depends onrice,as it does in most parts of the Philippines, wherever
rice will grow. Rice is so basic that without it, a person does not feel that he has
eaten. Rice is served for breakfast, for dinner, for supper, with fish, vegetables,
meat, or sauces on the side to vary theflavor,but always rice in as great a quan-
tity as can be afforded. There are more varieties of rice than we have kinds of
potatoes. Between meals, you reach for a leaf-wrapped pillow of gluey "sticky
rice" instead of a candy bar.
And rice farming is a very personal thing. It is not a mechanized industry.
Every blade in the fields was placed there by hand, by bent figures standing
knee-deep in water all day long, thrusting shoots firmly down into the mud, as
the folk song so truly says:
Planting rice is never fun.
Bend from morn till set of sun,
Cannot stand and cannot sit,
Cannot rest for a little bit.
The hand work does not end there. The rice is harvested by hand, stacked to
dry, threshed and winnowed, spread in the sun to dry again, turned, sacked, and
carried to market by carabao cart or stored for personal use in a dry spot in the
home. Husks must still be pounded off and grains winnowed clean before cook-
ing. All by hand, and by sweat. Being a farmer means all thisto raise rice.
Any other crops are incidental, grown only in small patches, tended in spare
time, and not really counted as farming.
"Farmers here are sharecroppers," one tells us, "splitting expenses with the
landowners 50-50 and getting 55 per cent of the crop. Without irrigation, only
one crop of rice a year is possible, and attempts at irrigation are poor and inef-
ficient. Fertilizers are seldom used and not understood, so the crop is meager. A
tenant farmer may make around 250 pesos a year (in 1952, approximately
$125), and a very few make a maximum of 300 pesos a year from the harvest.
There is not enough land available to be worked in this area."
The Teniente del Barrio estimates that a family offiveneeds at least 120 pesos
a month to get by on, so farming alone cannot support a tenant family. (Official
estimates are about half this amount.) Fishing can net an income of 50 pesos in
a good month. Early in the morning, men leave forfishpondsand streams, some
near, some many kilometers away, to return about five o'clock with the day's
catch. When there isfightingin this area, their movements are restricted, and at
times, many are prevented altogether from fishing, so that source of food and
income is cut off.
Some San Mateo men can make a few extra pesos a month cutting bamboo
and gathering buri, the leaves of a swamp palm from which the women make
strong shopping bags. This is the chief gainful occupation of the women in San
Mateo. The buri is spread in the sun to dry, then stripped into ribbons from
which the bags are woven. Working hard, one woman in one week can make
100 bags, which she takes to town and sells for 4 centavos each. It is possible to
earn 16 pesos a month making buri bags. With the husband making 30 pesos a
month from fishing, their joint income may not come to more than 45 or 50
pesos a month. Each grown son and daughter adds to the total income, helping
to fish, farm, and make buri bags.
To provide for the schooling of the 200 children in the barrio, the villagers
skimped and sacrificed to accumulate 2,500 pesos from their tiny incomes, with
which they purchased a half hectare (slightly more than one acre) of land, on
which they erected a long bamboo-and-nipa shedlike affair which is The School.
It is timeworn and outgrown, but still a monument to the quiet courage and
concern of these good people in the interests of their children, manifested not by
loud complainings but by sacrificing and laboring to build this school on their
own initiative. The government cooperated to the extent of providing a few
wooden desks, small blackboards, maps and charts, andfiveteachers at salaries
of 120 pesos a month.
A flag now flies over this little schoolhouse. Although it is traditional
for every school in the country to fly the Philippine national flag, this little
school obtained its first flag only this year. An army unit stationed near San
Mateo noticed they lacked a flag, obtained a flag for them, and presented it to
the school. On the day it was given, the schoolchildren gathered around it
in admiration. It was the first time they had actually seen the flag of their
country.
The original building is not large enough now to accommodate all of the
children of the barrio. The overflow is being taken care of in two small buildings
adjacent to the school. The Chapel, not often used as a chapel since the nearest
priest in Arayat town does not often visit the barrio, is filled with makeshift
seats and desks and makes a fairly substantial school building. The other annex
is a split-bamboo, nipa-thatched shed. A bamboo screen divides the one room
into two, each about 10 by 20 feet. Blackboards, the small portable kind, are
attached to either side of the dividing partition. Desks filled to capacity crowd
the room. Unlighted, the interior seems far too dark for small eyes to attempt to
read. The two tiny windows are almost closed in an effort to keep out the heavy
clouds of dust being whipped up by the strong wind. The floor is packed earth,
dusty in summer, muddy in the rainy season.
It is a geography class we intrude upon, taking our flash pictures. The chil-
dren and teacher carry on like troupers. The children are taking turns reading
aloud in English from the teacher's book, while the rest of the class follows the
reading from books they share at their desks. The teacher clarifies in Pampango
from time to time, or corrects pronunciation. Books are dog-eared and aged.
There are not enough to go around. Paper and pencils are luxuries. Crayons are
unknown. The children are quiet, well behaved, eager and anxious to learn,
valuing the opportunity to receive education and doing their utmost to absorb as
much as possible. One boy quietly replenishes the water supply, a kerosene can
hefilledfrom the pump across the street. No paper cups here, but a single gourd
dipper from which everyone could drink. There are no balls or bats or sports
equipment for these children, either.
Classes end at the fifth grade here in San Mateo. The nearest school for
advanced classes is in the town of Arayat, nine kilometers (about five and a half
miles), or two hours' walk, away, where enrollment fees are prohibitive for the
small wages of San Mateans. Older boys, therefore, spend their days not in
school but in caring for the carabaos, transporting rice, fishing, and similar
jobs.
Little twelve-year-old Filomena, carrying her year-old baby brother, follows
us throughout our visit. She cannot go to school because there is no one to look
after her baby brother, with Mother busy making buri bags all day long and
Father either in the fields or fishing. Her one dress has already lasted many
months and will continue to be worn until it falls to pieces in spite of the mend-
ing. "But," she says, "I wash it once a week." Baby brother has a shirt (pants are
too much of a luxury) and a sardine can for a toy. He also has a bad cold. There
is no doctor nearer than Arayat, where there is only one to care for its 15,000
people. There is no clinic available, and the nearest hospital is at San Fernando,
a ten-hour trip by bull cart from San Mateo.
There are two privately owned pumps in San Mateo, but in a town of this size,
this water supply is neither adequate nor convenient, so the families near the
river obtain their water from the river. After all, the pump water may be no bet-
ter for drinking. No one knows. It has never been tested.
The river is an integral part of the daily life in a barrio. In San Mateo, the
women gather there on bamboo rafts to wash their clothes, while men bathe and
children frolic, and carabaos are rejuvenated with many daily dips and soaks.
When the carabaos enter the cool water, nature takes its customary course, and
they promptly relieve themselves, the waste matter dropping unnoticed and for-
gotten, polluting the water above it, where soon someone may befillingcontain-
ers with drinking water. It is so common an occurrence and health awareness so
lacking that no attention or thought is given to this dangerous situation. Even
dead animals are brought to the river to be disposed of.
"Across the river and extending on to Mount Arayat is no man's land," we are
told. "Once this was a thriving fertile land, with healthy barrios and farming.
Now the Huk situation, the constantfighting,has made it a dead land."
As we watch one man drive his carabao up the shady lane from the river
bank, the stillness is suddenly broken by the wild clamor of a bell from the other
end of the barrio. All is sudden motion as the cry of "Fire!" is taken up!
The Teniente leaves us on a dead run down the road, his white shirttail flying.
We hurry after him. There is a strong wind blowing, and the whole barrio may
be threatened. Women are already emerging with bundles of possessions. Unless
thefirecan be brought under control quickly, it may spread too far to be stopped.
Bucket by slow bucketful, water must be carried or passed to the fire, no matter
how far, and it takes a minimum of forty seconds tofillone bucket at the pump.
We reach thefire.A stack of precious palay (rice) representing many days of
labor, and food supply for months, is going up in smoke. It is one of two stacks
in a bamboo grove shading thatched sheds and houses. There is no hope of actu-
ally putting the fire out, only of confining it to the one stack. Men have already
cleared afirebreakof sorts and are doling out the scarce water to soak the ground
and quench theflamesthat try to spread across this break.
The bucket brigade is already in action. Fortunately, the pump is not far from
the fire but the pump, like the houses, is up on stilts and climbing the six-foot
ladderup with the empty, down with the full, nearly a minute between to fill
the bucketrather slows operations Meanwhile, men positioned on the adja-
cent stack of palay pour their rations of water carefully to quench the flames
licking at its base. Nearby, inflammable sheds of nipa are lifted bodily from
their bamboo frames and carried out of spark range; animals are led away to
safety. Fortunately, the wind fanning the flames suddenly dies down, so that
after about thirty minutes, it is possible to get the fire under control. "Someone
was very careless," said one tired man reprovingly.
This is barrio life. No television, no refrigerators, no electricity, for that matter.
We talked to many people during our visit about their problems and their thoughts.
Here are a few of the comments made by residents of San Mateo, in a Huk-rav-
aged area, wherefightinggoes on around them as they live and try to work.
F. G., farmer, says: "There is a big piece of land near our barrio that belongs to
the Catholic Church. It has been left idle for so many years and is now covered
with tall grasses. The government could buy or lease this property and turn it over
to us for cultivation. There are more than 200 men among us who are jobless."
J. K.,fisherman:"I don't know what to do. Many times I cannot fish because
the army has operations and they might shoot thinking I'm a Huk. I keep bor-
rowing money to support my family and I already owe so much because I have
to pay 10 per cent interest every month. Soon I may lose my house, even my
fishing equipment."
L. K., farmer: "The Huks are even better treated than we by the government.
When a Huk surrenders, he is given a house and a piece of farm land in Mindanao.
And when he is captured, he is fed and given shelter and does not have to work and
worry about his next meal. I might as well become a Huk and then surrender."
P. K., basket-maker: "Why is it that in Manila, where our government
stays, the people have hospitals with free wards and free medical attention,
while we here who cannot afford to buy medicine, much less pay for a doc-
tor, do not get anything free at all for our sick? Even a small clinic could
help us very much."
L. P., farmer-fisherman: "I suppose leadership is what we need here. Someone
who can show us how to get up. But is not the government supposed to be our
leader? How can they expect us to see their guiding hand when they are always
in Manila, which is just as far as one can be? To tell you the truth, I wouldn't
even know our own President if I met him face to face!"
The barrio Lieutenant: "We do not know much about governments. We have
been told that under the Sobiyet the people are like slaves; that if you raise pigs,
the Sobiyet gets the pigs; if you raise chickens, the Sobiyet gets all the chickens.
If that is true, we don't want the Sobiyet. What we want is a government that lets
us have what is really ours, and lets us be kings in our own home as long as we
do not do anything bad."
F. P., farmer-fisherman: "The government never comes here to see how we
live. The only man who comes to these parts is Magsaysay. Maybe he should be
President. At least he knows how badly we need help, and seems to be the only
one interested in the welfare of the barrios."
The life of the residents of San Mateo is not too different from the way
of life of some three-quarters of the population of the Philippines. It is a
better way of life than many, perhaps the majority, in the world enjoy.
Almost all in the Philippines are keenly aware of how life could be better
for them, keenly want it to be better, but understand that it can be made
better only through patient work, and the implementation of democratic
processes, fair to all.
This is their strength, a strength that is shown most clearly when they feel
that due democratic process is denied them for the unreasonable personal ben-
efit of an individual or a group. The people of the Philippines have often been
the target of unscrupulous demagogues, just as have the people of the United
States, or of any other free country. They have also had the benefits of having
among them perhaps a higher percentage of practicing idealists than has
existed in any other country in modern history. Since it is often difficult, at
even a very little distance, to distinguish between demagogue and idealist, the
people of the Philippines listen readily, but are slow to believe. When they do
believe, they act.
There seems to be only one factor, significant to successful guerrilla or
counterguerrilla action, in which the Philippines differs from other countries
that may be faced with the necessity for such operations. Some such countries
have, perhaps more do not, a comparable degree of political awareness among

their people, a comparable broadly based structure of cherished democratic
institutions. To the extent that countries lack this structure, that their people
lack political awareness, guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations will be
slowed by the necessity for educating the people in order that they may form a
political base, the sine qua non of success.
Chapter 5
KNOW THINE ENEMY:

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY
SITUATION
"KNOW THINE ENEMY" IS so ancient and basic an axiom of war that it would
seem to need no elaboration. The fact is, however, that lack of knowledge and
understanding of the enemyof who he is and how he operates, of his true
objectives and his announced goals, of his actual and supposed capabilities, of
his plans and of his intentions, and above all, of the reasons he gains support
from the peoplehas repeatedly hampered, and not infrequently hamstrung,
antiguerrilla operations. Sometimes (especially at combat levels) this lack is the
result of poor intelligence work. More often (especially at national levels) it
arises from misconceptions, unwarranted assumptions, or, often unwitting accep-
tance of propaganda.
"Agrarian reformers," a label applied to Communist insurgents by their own
propagandists, and adopted by well-meaning but uncritical individuals, has
become a byword for, as well as a classic illustration of, refusal to know an
enemy. Its concealment of the true motives and objectives of Communist-led
guerrilla movements contributed greatly to their success in China and elsewhere.
The French assumption that Communist indoctrination and ideology (rather
than the desire for an end to foreign, i.e., French, domination) was the main-
spring of the Vietminh movement contributed substantially to the disaster in
Indochina.
Many antiguerrilla operations have failed because of lack of pertinent data;
some have succeeded despite lack of knowledge of the enemy. These suc-
cesses may in general be attributed to the guerrilla's ignorance of his trade, or
to the literally overwhelming strength of the antiguerrilla forces.
The counterguerrilla at every echelon from squad leader to chief executive of
the nation, needs to know the answers to two compound, complex (and not
infrequently confusing) questions, one offensive, the other defensive in its appli-
cation. First, he needs to know "What can the enemy do to me, what does he
intend to do, and when will he try it?" Second, he must find out "Where is the
enemy, in what numbers? What are his strengths that I must avoid, and what are
his weaknesses that I can exploit?"
To answer those questions, many others must be asked and data from
many sources must be analyzed. Securing the needed information requires
detailed planning and devoted effort, which is far from ended when the
information is obtained; it must then be placed in the hands of the users.
This never-ending "intelligence effort" is, in the tripartite counterguerrilla
operation, an equal partner with combat operations and psychological
operations.
When insurgency flares into open guerrilla warfare (or when planning for a
specific counterguerrilla operation is first begun), the counterguerrilla must
have certain information immediately. How strong are the guerrilla forces? Do
they seek combat with government forces, and if so, in what strength, on what
terrain, under what conditions? If not, why not? What is the basic motivation
of the guerrilla leaders and what are the appeals they use to get support from
guerrillas and from civilians? What is the basic plan of the guerrilla leadership?
Is it to build strength in order to engage government forces in open combat; or
is it to weaken government forces and fan popular discontent until the guerrillas
can seize power in a short, sudden national revolution? How and where do the
guerrillas get their suppliesespecially food? Do they have any reserve stocks
of supplies? To what extent do civilians in the guerrilla areas actively sympa-
thize with, passively tolerate, or fear to oppose the guerrillas? What is the
nature of the area of operations?
Answers to these questions will often be found in the daily newspapers, in
troop reports, in enemy propaganda, and in intelligence information. How
accurate the answers arehow much is fact, how much rumor, and how
much surmiseis another matter. Continuous verification, cross-checks, and
healthy skepticism are always desirable. The answers immediately available
can usually serve as a lead in deciding on immediate actionsor inactions
and little more.
Traditionally, intelligence (knowledge about the enemy) is broken down into
categories of strategic and tactical, based on its presumptive ultimate use. There
are, of course, nearly as many ways of categorizing intelligence as there are
categorizers. In the intelligence field, as in others, counterguerrilla operations
tend to make conventional classifications less meaningful. Perhaps the most
useful classification of intelligence applicable to counterguerrilla operations is
that which divides it into basic and tactical.
Basic intelligence can be considered as information concerning the things
the guerrilla must have and must do if he is not to be defeated in the initial
military action against him. What is his organization, his cause? What are his
KNOW THINE ENEMY 39
sources of supply, his support (or tolerance) from civilians in the area of opera-
tions? How does he demonstrate effective action? How can he sustain hope for
victory?
Basic intelligence must also be at least equally, perhaps more, concerned with
the reverse of these questions, i.e., with the weaknesses in the society, the polit-
ical base, and the administrative machinery of government that have allowed the
guerrilla to organize in the first place. True, this is knowledge about yourself,
but the enemy is an enemy only because of you.
The enemy is the best source of knowledge about himself, and often one of the
best guides to information about oneself. Of all the things the enemy says and
does, the most important for basic intelligence, the easiest to tap, and in some
ways the most reliable (and easiest to misinterpret) is the information he gives
through his propaganda. The statements of aims and objectives, claims of accom-
plishment, and outlines of future plans made in his propaganda give clues to the
bases on which he claims the popular support he must have (but perhaps not to
what he really seeks).
In the Philippines, the Hukbalahap made much use of such campaign slo-
gans as "Land for the Landless" and "Equal Justice for All." These were not,
of course, their only appeals; they used many. They decried "feudal landlord-
ism," "government inefficiency and corruption"; they charged the highest offi-
cers of government with holding office illegally. The Huk fought, they said,
for the "New Democracy," with land, food, and justice for all. Sometimes
although this did not work for very longthey charged that government offi-
cials were the "running dogs of the American imperialists." Another familiar
tactic was threatening local officials and residents who "failed to cooperate
with the People's forces"threats occasionally backed up by audacious assas-
sinations and kidnapings.
This propaganda was significant in many ways. To anyone familiar with the
international Party line, to anyone familiar with Communist techniques, its
phraseology, no less than its themes, clearly showed that the Hukbalahap move-
ment was under Communist direction.
Of course, propaganda lines were not the only source of such identification.
Since 1943, intelligence services in the Philippines had been reporting the
Communist inspiration and domination of the Huk movement; great masses of
documentation and firsthand testimony had been gathered and sent on to all
who would listen. Even so, when an American correspondent, Jim Halsema,
interviewed the popularly proclaimed "Supremo" of the Hukbalahap, it was a
shock to manyin fact the authenticity of the whole interview was denied in
many quartersbecause he quoted the Supremo, Luis Taruc, as saying, "I am
now and long have been a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines."
Even after that statement, many continued to consider the Huk movement as
striving primarily for agrarian reform.
The most important knowledge obtained from Huk propaganda came from
an assessment of which themes were successful (as shown by their continuing
use) and which themes were dropped because they were not acceptable to the
people from whom the Hukbalahap drew their support. Perhaps the most star-
tling was the contrast between the two themes embodied in the slogans: "Land
for the Landless" and "Yankee, Go Home." "Land for the Landless" was a
continuing slogan always successful, so long as it went unopposed, because it
touched a universal and fundamental desire of the Filipino. "Yankee, Go
Home," on the other hand, flopped with a dull thud every time it was intro-
duced. It was simply impossible to persuade the people of rural areas in the
Philippines that the Americans were other than their friends. No counterpro-
paganda was ever launched or ever needed. To the ordinary Filipino, this
appeal was so patently spurious that it discredited those who sponsored it.
Again and again, politicians have used the basic theme to gain political noto-
riety but they have never succeeded in getting it accepted by the common man
in the Philippines.
It was significant that the lasting and successful themes (the basic concepts,
either negative or positive, to which their slogans related) were "land for the land-
less," "equal justice for all," and "inefficiency and corruption in government."
That these themes were effective in rallying popular support was early recog-
nized by the Philippine Government. The widespread and deep entrenchment of
the attitudes to which these themes appealed was less well appreciated. Worst of
all, superficial analysis of the conditions that gaveriseto these attitudes often led
to actions that served only to reinforce doubt of the government's effectiveness
and intentions.
Thus, when Huk propaganda called for a "fair share" of the rice harvest for
tenant farmers, the government sought to prove its concern for the governed by
passing a crop-sharing law. Traditionally, the rice harvests in the Philippines
had been shared by tenant and landlord on a 50-50 basis. Legislation before
World War II had set the landlord's share at a maximum of 40 per cent. In 1947,
President Roxas, seeking political support, and hoping to alleviate the Huk
menace by meeting their demands, obtained enactment of a law restricting the
landlord's share of the rice crop to 30 per cent. This law totally failed to have
the desired effect.
There were two reasons for its failure, both significant. First of all, it was an
unworkable and unenforceable attempt to solve a problem that has no single or
simple solution. The reason that sharing the harvest is an anguishing problem
in the Philippines (and in many other places) is not that the landlord's share (as
rent) under the contract is exorbitant; it is because the tenant has so little rice
left after the harvest settlement. This is partly because the average tenant farm
is small and partly because small rice farmers are chronically in debt, often to
their landlords, and often at high interest rates. Small tenant farms, and indebt-
edness partly due to the small crops, reflect cultural patterns whose change
KNOW THINE ENEMY 41
would be most fiercely opposed by the small farmer. Not realizing his own
contribution to his troubles, he tends to attribute exclusively to the malice of the
ricos, or the bias of the government, the fact that often he does not have enough
rice left to feed his family until the next harvest.
The new law, dividing thericecrop 70-30 in the tenant's favor, only alienated
the landlords without contributing to the basic solution. It was a fatuous and
obvious effort at political appeasement. The tenant farmer cared little about his
rent. He merely wanted enough rice left over to feed his family and provide a
few of the "nice-to-have" things of life as well. Lacking this satisfaction, he was
an easy prey to guerrilla propagandists.
Secondly, the law was an attempt to placate those who would not be
placatedthe leaders of the Huk. They demanded the law as the price for
their political support. They half-promised to give up their rebellion if the
lawwhich they could hold up as proof of their power and influencewas
passed. Of course, they had no intention of settling for anything less than total
victory. Passing a law because guerrilla leaders demand it is like any other
means of paying blackmail, an expensive and foreordained failure. Taking an
effective action to demonstrate to the people who support or tolerate the guer-
rilla that their problems are recognized and that the government is trying to
meet themthis is a far different matter.
For the government to adopt the slogans of the guerrilla is neither a suffi-
cient nor a desirable response. What the government must do is make the
slogans ineffective for the purposes of the guerrilla.
The primary propaganda target of the guerrilla is the civilian population that
feeds and shelters him and gives him information about the antiguerrilla forces,
yet denies information about him to his enemy. Identifying successful guerrilla
themes enables one to discern deeply rooted and significant attitudes of the
civilian population; attitudes to which the counterguerrilla operator must appeal
successfully, must modify, or replace, if he is to win support away from the
guerrilla. The campaign against the guerrilla can scarcely succeed until this is
accomplished.
Also useful, even in the early planning stages, is the information about
guerrilla leaders and heroes that may be obtained from their direct or indirect
propaganda. What public images of them does the guerrilla seek to create? It
must be an image that symbolizes one or more of the appeals of the move-
ment. Obviously, the principal value of this knowledge is its application in
psychological operations designed to destroy or discredit the leader. However,
a man proclaimed to be a hero may feel that he must maintain this image of
braveryand it may be possible to use that feeling to lure him into suicidal or
at least tactically unwise combat.
At least one Huk, Commander Rollin, was lured out of a strong defensive
position, into the open, by taunts. "Come out and show that you are as brave as
you claim to be!" He did, and he died. The value to guerrilla and counterguerrilla
alike of an intimate linking of psychological and combat operations can scarcely

be overestimated, and must never be overlooked.
Does terrorand the threat of terrorappear to constitute a major portion of
the guerrilla effort in a particular area? If so, the guerrilla is obviously having
difficulty obtaining support in that region and is particularly vulnerable to attack
there. These and many other facts that can be put to use against him may be
readily deduced from the guerrilla's employment of the terror themes.
Whom does the guerrilla threaten? How often does he carry out his threats?
Is he aiming primarily at local officials who presumably are duty-bound to
cooperate with antiguerrilla forces? If so, any officials in the area of opera-
tions who do not take strong precautions against being kidnapped or murdered
must be suspected at least of having established a modus vivendi with the
guerrilla, if not of being his active supporter.
There is the story of the Mayor of a little agricultural community situated in
the very heart of Huklandia and the Colonel whofinallysolved the problem the
Mayor presented. The Mayor was an influential politician, and also a notorious
supporter of the Communist guerrillas. For four years, the Colonel had been
struggling tofinda solution, some way to neutralize this Mayor, who made this
town a safe haven for the enemy. Hefinallyevolved a plan and one day in early
June, 1950, made a ceremonious visit to the Mayor's office.
"Oh no, Colonel," the Mayor responded to the Colonel's opening question.
"There are no guerrillas hiding in our town. Those Communists who call them-
selves Hukbalahap have not dared to come into our town since you became mili-
tary commander of the area. It is true that some of them have relatives here but
they never bother us. I cannot permit you to make any investigations or searches
here. I will go to the Governor and the President if you do! Everybody knows we
do not permit guerrillas to come into our town."
The Colonel knew that wounded Huks were being cared for in that town at
that very moment, even though the Mayor denied it. He also knew the Mayor
was not lying about the political repercussions he would precipitate if action
was taken. So he bowed himself out, but first, before leaving, he made it a
point to have a very private talk with the Mayor, noticeably distant from all
other ears. Actually nothing was said that had not already been said, but who
was to know that?
Two mornings later, the Colonel's jeep, with siren screaming to attract a crowd,
sped into the busy plaza of the town. It was followed by an open truck bearing the
bodies of four dead guerrillas and by a truckload of soldiers armed to the teeth.
"Bring the Mayor here at once," shouted the Colonel as the townfolk rap-
idly gathered. "I want to talk to the Mayor." Soldiers rushed to the Mayor's
office before he could leave in a different direction, and led the bewildered
man to the plaza.
The citizens were terrified. They knew the Colonel's reputation for ruthless-
ness. They knew the Mayor to be an ardent Huk supporter. But the Colonel
met the Mayor with a broad smile and shook his hand enthusiastically.
KNOW THINE ENEMY 43
So that all could hear, the Colonel spoke loud and clear. "I want to thank
you very much, Mr. Mayor. On behalf of the army, I thank you for your won-
derful cooperation and for the fine information you gave me two mornings
ago. Here are the results. I am going to leave these bodies here in the plaza so
everyone can see that Huk are no longer welcome in your town."
Before the Mayor could answer, the jeep siren started to scream again as the
Colonel jumped in with a wave of his hand, and the convoy minus corpses
took off, leaving the Mayor expostulating in vain.
Shortly after dark, a truck loaded with the Mayor, his family, and household
belongings pulled up in front of the Colonel's tent. The Mayor was miserable.
"Please, Colonel, you have to take me in. You must protect me. I will tell
everything I know and do anything you want. After what you did this morn-
ing, the Huk will never believe I am not a traitor."
The conclusions as to enemy motivations, capabilities, strengths, and weak-
nesses that can be drawn from this propaganda are almost limitless. There are
difficulties and dangers in such deductions. It will be found that there are a
host of self-appointed propaganda analysts both in and out of government
service. For example, it is obvious that the enemy's propaganda line is an
important aid to assessing the number, influence, and identity of sympathiz-
ers. Each repetition, each "replay" of enemy propaganda is significant, but its
meaning may well be misinterpreted. The repetition may signify sympathy, or
it may identify an enemy supporter. On the other hand, repetition may indicate
no more than that the theme appeals to the attitudes of a certain individual or
segment of the population.
Thus there were many in the Philippines who echoed the Huk cry for land
reform, for equal justice, for an end to inefficiency and corruption in govern-
ment. Many who echoed the Huk line were far from being Communists. Some
representatives of the United States Government in the Philippines were
accused of Communist sympathies because they repeated publicly or privately
these demands of the Huk as being desirable, if not essential, objectives. They
are still desirable in the Philippines as in the United States, or in any other
country. Nowhere have they been fully achieved to the satisfaction of all, nor
will they ever be.
The fascinating business of propaganda analysis must not be allowed to
divert attention from basic intelligence needs. Of these, perhaps the most
important is knowledge of enemy capabilities. The size and composition of the
forces the enemy can muster and what he can do with these forces is obviously
essential information. The significance of enemy capabilities is much more
than a knowledge of what points he can attack or what strength he can muster
for an operation at a specific location.
Estimation of enemy capabilities is an important and highly sophisticated
intelligence activity in conventional warfare. Many types of information,
ranging from the nature and amount of road and radio traffic to the number of
desertions and the type of rations last issued, can be collated and combined to
yield surprisingly accurate deductions as to strength, capabilities, and inten-

tions of the enemy.
There are similar possibilities for refined deductions in counterguerrilla war-
fare, but the criteria and their significance are often quite different. Adequate,
reliable information may seem difficult or initially impossible to obtain. What
is obtained may be wrongly interpreted. For example, if it is known or strongly
believed that the enemy has 5,000 men in a given area, it might be assumed that
he can muster a force of 3,000 and conduct an operation lasting for several
days. As a matter of fact, the need for these men to spend much of their time in
gathering food and their difficulties in transportation and communications may
make an operation in more than company strength utterly impossible.
Enemy capabilities are as likely to be overestimated as underestimated and
with almost equally serious results. If his capabilities are underestimated, unan-
ticipated attacks may occur and severe losses be sustained. If his capabilities are
overestimated, offensive measures may not be adopted, feasible and desirable
operations may be abandoned. Overestimation of guerrilla capabilities will
inevitably be seriously inimical to the morale of troops and civilians alike.
The situation in the Philippines in mid-1950 abundantly illustrated the
adverse effects of overestimation of guerrilla capabilities. It was believed that
the Huk numbered at least 15,000 (some estimates were 50,000) armed men
within 85 miles of the national capital. Consequently, Manila was ringed
with troops; checkpoints and barricades were emplaced on every road. Troops
not in the vicinity of the city were guarding, in strength, the main arteries of
transportation. The morale of civilians and troops can well be imagined. The
information as to enemy strength, coupled with inadequate appreciation of
his capabilities, led to an erroneous estimate (not by intelligence personnel)
and consequent actions that came close to giving the guerrilla the capacity to
overthrow the government.
For strategic-planning purposes, a great deal about guerrilla capabilities can
be correctly deduced from information readily available. His successful oper-
ations give very fair evidence of his minimum capacity. His unsuccessful
operations, although a less reliable source, may give accurate evidence of his
maximum capabilities.
Essential information about his military capabilities can be deduced from
the weapons captured from him or which he has been known to use. Are his
weapons of the same type as those used by forces opposing him? If so, he
probably has a capability for acquiring weapons from the counterguerrilla
forces. Do they include a relatively high proportion of sporting arms or obso-
lete military weapons of diverse kinds and calibers? Are these weapons of
types known to exist in reasonable numbers in the area of operations or in the
country of operations? If so, his capability for procuring standard military
weapons is limited. Are they standard weapons but of a kind known not to be
readily available in the area of operations? If so, he obviously has an external
KNOW THINE ENEMY 45
supply capacity. Is there an appreciable percentage of nonfactory weapons? If

so, an arsenal capability may be indicated. The condition of captured weapons
can yield invaluable data not only on enemy logistic resources but on his mil-
itary capabilities insofar as these derive from the state of training, morale, and
discipline of his troops.
The enemy's own estimate of his capabilities is probably more important
to strategic planning than his actual capabilities. Does the enemy believe he
can hold ground? If so, what ground and where? The answer to this may be
found, in part at least, in the propaganda he disseminates. Does he boast of
secure base areas, of places where government troops dare not come?
Such boasting is invaluable information to the antiguerrilla forces if it is
correctly appreciated and acted upon. Almost invariably, the correct action
will be to hit such areas, hard. If the guerrilla does indeed stand and fight, he
may be seriously crippled. At the least, the killed, wounded, captured, or per-
manently discouraged guerrillas resulting from the operation will no longer
need to be patiently chivied from place to place.
An unsuccessful attack, properly exploited, will be better than none. It will
demonstrate at least the gravity of the situation and bring home to government
troops and civilians alike the necessity for choosing between effective anti-
guerrilla operations and surrender.
Whether the guerrilla stands to fight and is dislodged, or employs sound
guerrilla strategy and fades away before the attacking forces, his actions give
valuable propaganda material to the antiguerrilla forces. The guerrilla can be
charged with bluffing, with cowardice, or with ineffectiveness as his moves
dictate. Whatever the charge may be, he has clearly and demonstrably lost the
initiative, and prestige.
The significance of guerrilla propaganda threats to indicate attitudes and
possible loyalties of persons in the area of operations has already been dis-
cussed. Threats may also reflect his capabilities; if he threatens death or pun-
ishment to civilians who cooperate with counterguerrilla forces, are such
civilians actually captured and punished or killed? Does he boast that small
detachments or large detachments of his enemy will be attacked, and does he
indeed attack them?
If the attacks are made successfully, they obviously demonstrate a capability.
If not, it must be determined why the threats were made and not carried out. Was
the guerrilla seeking to cause the counterguerrilla forces to overestimate his
capabilities, or is he now seeking to cause their underestimation? Was he seek-
ing to deceive others or was he deceiving himself when he made the threats?
Again, what is the enemy known to have said and done about his supplies? Do
his troops approach villages and humbly request rations? Do his tax collectors
levy rations? Does he take food from villagers by force and threat? Are harvest
parties attacked? Can the food staple of the country move along its normal paths
of transportation unmolested? If not, what is the nature and extent of the
interruption of its movement? Answers to these questions indicate the enemy's

own estimate of his capabilities as well as his true capabilities.
If he does not appear pressed to secure food, he obviously is securing food
without such actions. If he collects food by levying taxes but without an undue
show of force, he believesand with justicethat he exercises a substantial
measure of control over the population of the area. If, on the other hand, he
obtains his food by threats of violence or by force, it indicates that he is not
receiving adequate support from the population of the area and sees no pos-
sibility for winning adequate voluntary support there in the near future. (Or, it
may mean that he is incompetent, or acting under the orders of persons either
incompetent or not desirous of his success.)
All these indications can and should be supplemented to the maximum
extent possible by secret intelligence. They have been enumerated here, how-
ever, because they may supply the most reliable information available in the
early planning stages of an effective antiguerrilla operation.
Probably of an importance nearly equal to knowledge of enemy capabilities

and his own estimate of his capabilities is knowledge of basic, long-range enemy
intentions, of the kind of war this particular guerrilla intends to fight. Even
though he may be a Communist, or under Communist domination, the guerrilla
leader will not necessarily follow the pattern of any one specific Communist-led
guerrilla movement of the past. Successful Communist seizures of power have
followed many different patterns.
The necessity for seeking accurate information about the long range plans
of a specific guerrilla movement is made even greater, curiously enough, by
the recent wide interest in counterguerrilla warfare and the many valuable
books on the subject that have recently appeared. Many of these stress what
may be called the Sino-Vietnamese concept of guerrilla warfare.
Briefly, this concept envisions a war in three stages. The first is true guer-
rilla warfare, where small, irregular forces relying on popular support seek to
organize themselves and the civilians among whom they move in order to gain
support and control of the civilians. This stage, in the Sino-Vietnamese con-
cept, should as soon as possible give way to the second stage, where semi-
regular troops are formed, trained, and employed to attack counterguerrilla
forces wherever possible. Special emphasis is placed on establishing secure
base areas to be denied to the counterguerrilla forces, resolutely defended by
the semiregular troops whenever they are threatened. The third stage envisions
the formation of a regular army, based in the liberated areas, which can engage
and defeat the counterguerrilla forces in regular battle.
Contemporary writing seems to depict this as the probable course of an
indigenous guerrilla force attacking the established indigenousor colonial
government. This is indeed the doctrine of the Chinese and Vietnamese
Communist leaders, Mao Tse-tung and Vo Nguyen Giap, and is in sharp contrast
KNOW THINE ENEMY 47
to the traditional guerrilla role of harassing the enemy, collecting intelligence,

and spreading propaganda while waiting for decisive action by friendly regular
forces.
There is, however, a course for guerrilla warfare, an approach to successful
revolution, that closely parallels the traditional guerrilla practice. In this, the
guerrilla seeks to weaken counterguerrilla forces and the government they sup-
port by petty actions and petty harassments, inducing the government to waste
its strength and lower the morale of its people by futile blows at the guerrilla,
who is not there to receive them. Meanwhile, the guerrilla and his political
leaders concentrate on building up popular support, organized and unorga-
nized. At an opportune time, a quick blow, a quick "national revolution" spear-
headed by the guerrilla force or, as in Russia, by political leaders, can capture
or seduce the key officials of government, leaving the armed forces leaderless
and the instrumentalities of government open to guerrilla control.
Because of the wide dissemination of the Sino-Vietnamese concept, it appears
especially important that the intentions of the guerrilla forces be quickly and
correctly recognized. It is critically important that counterguerrilla forces not be
lulled by misconceptions, that an intended national revolution not be mistaken
for the early stage of the Sino-Vietnamese pattern. If this mistake is made, a
successful revolution can occur while counterguerrilla forces rest secure in the
belief that an attempt at overthrow of the government is yet far away.
The consequences of a mistake in the other direction seem far less dangerous.
A mistake in appreciation of the ability or intention of the enemy to hold ground
or to attack government forces may cost extra casualties and embarrassment to
the military. It is not likely to cause the overthrow of the government.
The guerrillas themselves may not be too clear or united on the course their
efforts should pursue. In the Philippines, in 1950, the Hukbalahap and their
political allies probably had the capability to seize the seat of power and capture
the President and chief officers of the government. The principal field com-
manders might have been tempted to essay the adventure had the controlling
Party organ, the Politburo, concurred and been prepared, through organization,
to exploit such a coup de main.
The Politburo, however, was obsessed with following the Chinese pattern
of expanding and "regularizing" military and civilian forces. It had been sin-
gularly unsuccessful and neglectful of building up a covert organization
capable of operating the instruments of power that it and the guerrilla forces
might have seized. As a result, a coup de main by the guerrilla might have
wreaked havoc on the national government but would not have brought Com-
munists or Huk to positions of lasting power or influence. Those responsible
for planning effective counterguerrilla operations in the Philippines were
profoundly relieved when they learned, authoritatively (late in 1950), that the
Politburo was irrevocably committed to the Chinese concept of a build-up of
massive force.
Knowledge of enemy intentions has many benefits. If it is known that the

enemy plans to expand, or to attack, or not to attack, tactical and strategic deci-
sions may be made accordingly. There are many facets, too, to the knowledge of
enemy intentions. If known enemy intentions and plans far outrun his known
capability, it may mean his capabilities have been erroneously assessed either by
himself or by friendly forces. Rigorous scrutiny is in order and if it is discovered
that his estimate of his capabilities is erroneous, numerous opportunities may be
found to exploit his errors or to gauge correctly his future capabilities.
The wide overlapping of basic and tactical intelligence must be obviousin
fact, more obvious than the reason for any distinction between themfor there
is scarcely a conceivable item of basic intelligence that will not lend itself to
tactical exploitation someplace or sometime. Perhaps the distinction might be
more clear if it were said that basic intelligence is concerned properly with ideas
and ideals; tactical intelligence with actual persons, places, and things. (The
believer in the scientific nature of war will object to "enemy capabilities" being
considered an idea; the believer that war is an art will insist that capabilities are far
more than statistics on personnel and supplies, more than march tables, are in fact
more idea and ideal than enumeration. He will cite guerrilla victories as proof.)
Tactical intelligence helps the counterguerrilla hit the enemy and his pos-
sessions. The first requirement in tactical intelligence is knowledge about the
physical environment in which the guerrilla operates. This means knowledge
about the topography and terrain, the road and river networks, the vegetation
and population patterns of the guerrilla area. If the guerrilla is operating in
open country, that means he is susceptible to aerial observation if he moves by
day in large force. It means further that if he moves at night in large force, the
traces of his movements can be detected by aerial observation, both visual and
photographic, and, possibly, by more sophisticated means.
What facilities of food, communications, and travel does his physical
environment afford the guerrilla? What limitations of movement or com-
munications, of strategy and tactics does it impose on the counterguerrilla
forces? All these represent minimal essential knowledge for planning and
conducting antiguerrilla operations.
If the guerrilla is operating in an inhabited open area, the frequency and
reliability of reports of enemy movements are extremely significant. If such
reports are few and/or unreliable, either the enemy is not moving in large
groups or the inhabitants of the area are not reporting enemy sightings to
government forces. Determination of the reason reports are few or unreliable
is a priority requirement. Is it because the residents are motivated by sympa-
thy for the guerrilla, or are afraid of him? Are the residents hostile toward the
government, toward specific government representatives, or are they merely
apathetic? Are government representatives not receptive to reports of the
enemy? If government personnel do not want reports, is it because they do
not want to take sides or do not want to be bothered?
KNOW THINE ENEMY 49
Knowledge of the enemy's intelligence and communication capabilities is

important. Some idea of his tactical intelligence capabilities may usually be
gained from past experience. Have parties sent out to contact the enemy actu-
ally been able to contact him or has the guerrilla received early warning of
their coming and either retreated or set up an ambush?
To gain critically needed information about the enemy's intelligence and
counterintelligence system, it will frequently be necessary to mount special
operations. Radio monitoring may be necessary to find out if the enemy has
radio transmitters. Messages offering apparently attractive opportunities for
enemy exploitation of the activities of friendly troops can be planted to
determine if the enemy is monitoring the communications of friendly forces.
Possible enemy penetration of friendly headquarters must be tested by start-
ing rumors or loose talk of opportunities for exploitation by the enemy, and
determining if he has indeed sought to exploit these seeming opportunities.
Accurate information on the nature of enemy propaganda media is imperative.
It is particularly necessary to determine to what extent those who operate the
public mass-communications media are actually sympathetic to, dupes of, or
willing agents of the enemy. A test of the sympathies of mass-communications-
media personnel and of guerrilla communications facilities may be incorporated
in the test of guerrilla intelligence capabilities.
A message planted to test guerrilla intelligence capabilities can be so
worded as to tempt the guerrilla into making a recognizable propaganda play.
If such propaganda promptly appears in press or radioparticularly if it
appears without prior check as to its truthit is justifiable to suspect sympa-
thy with the guerrilla. The time that elapses between planting the message/
rumor and its reappearance in the public media can give a good idea of guer-
rilla communications capabilities.
The foregoing suggests the scope of information needed in order to plan
and act most effectively against the guerrilla. Literally, there is nothinghis
motivation; his capability; his intentions; his supporters; his knowledge; his
training; his beliefs, superstitions, customs, dress, songs; or even his dreams
that cannot be used by the counterguerrilla forces.
This is true on the national level, and it is equally true on the local scene. No
commander can ever know enough about his enemy. Take, for example, this
story by Major Vicente Z. Opilas:
"Tapahan" is a Tagalog term for kilns used in drying coprax in copraxproduc-
ing provinces. These are excavated and provided with earthen tunnels. They are
aplenty in II MA (AFP)1 and can be seen wherever coconut plantations are
located. These the HMBs2 (Huk) use to advantage as refuge during patrols or
mopping-up operations of forces.
"Tapahan warfare" is apparently an everyday mystery to our troops, although
very commonplace and simple. Huks are encountered in a certain sitio [hamlet]
or barrio [village]. They are seen by our patrols. Token encounter takes place.
Our troops advance and start chasing the Huks. They are no longer where they
were when the encounter began. The Huks vanished into thin air, because,
unobserved during the brief encounter, they have left by twos or threes at a time,
and sought refuge in the tapahans scattered all around the locality. The careless
troops, meantime, are chasing the wind and by-passing the Huks, crouching,
perhaps sweating, but smiling inside one of these kilns. Not only tapahans are
availed to but also bushes or boulders or anything, for that matter, which can
afford cover and concealment. The only risk here on the HMBs is when the
troops are seasoned, well trained, and discreet in scouring areas of operation
which by the way, is wanting among the troops today who instead prefer to take
it easy, as if they were under a beautiful silvery moon.
This is what might be called local intelligence. It can profitably include any
minutiae, from the date the wife of a guerrilla leader is expected to give birth
(and whether or not the true father is the presumptive one) to knowledge of an
abandoned homestead in a remote area where fruit will be ripe at a certain date
(and, therefore, signal a probable guerrilla rendezvous).
For tactical, and local, intelligence, knowledge of enemy organizations and
order of battle (OB, identification of units and personnel belonging to them) is
a primary objective. Guerrillas developing according to the Mao-Giap pattern
normally seek to establish three strata of military organization (which often are
paralleled by civilian support or "shadow government" levels of organization).
The basic stratum, and this is true of most sound guerrilla efforts, is composed
of home-guard units (BUDC, Barrio United Defense Corps, in Huk terminol-
ogy), the famous "farmers by day, guerrillas by night." These units ordinarily
operate almost entirely in their own locality, attacking targets of opportunity,
assisting or reinforcing forces from the higher strata, or simply maintaining the
"guerrilla presence," their domination of the local citizens. In some guerrilla
operations, these units have habitually drawn off to pull night surprise attacks in
another area, allowing the local unit to establish individual or collective alibis.
The next higher stratum is that of the area forces, nominally full-time guer-
rillas who are training, attacking targets that require forces larger, better
trained, or better equipped than the homeguard units, or traveling. Ordinarily
these unitssquadrons, the Huk called themof the area forces will have
their own subareas in which they are based and normally operate. They may,
of course, move to other portions of the area or to other areas, as the exigen-
cies of the situation require. Activities of these squadrons in the Philippines
varied according to the situation, the seasons, and the commander. Some con-
centrated on looking for trouble, others on avoiding it; still others emphasized
training. Some practiced leave policies so liberal that their personnel could
scarcely be called full-time guerrillas.
In the Philippines, the Huk divided their theater of operations into Regional
Commands (Recos), each a virtually autonomous unit responsible in prac-
tice to the Politburo, the "steering committee" of the Communist Party of the
KNOW THINE ENEMY 51
Philippines. These area commands, with their full-time troops, were the prin-
cipal combatant force of the Huk. In practice, the full strength of a well-
developed area force was seldom concentrated for an operationprobably
not more than three or four times in the entire campaign.
The highest stratum under the Mao-Giap doctrine is composed of the regular
forces, the national-liberation army, directly under the supreme commander, to
be utilized wherever needed. This element was only rudimentarily developed
by the Huk for many reasons. There were no "safe" areas where substantial
forces could be maintained securely for extended periods. The relatively good
road nets in the cultivated areas made any large forces stationed there vulner-
able to attack. Each of the top leaders, especially the nonmilitary ones, was
unwilling to allow anyone (other than himself) to have full command. Taruc,
popularly known as the Supremo, was such for only brief periods and never
exercised effective over-all command. Probably the most important reason was
that the experienced guerrilla leaders felt instinctively that they did not need
such a force for the type of revolution they were attempting.
Since these are recurrent problems in guerrilla warfare, the tactical impor-
tance of knowing units and leaders, and their placeboth geographically and
in the guerrilla schemebecomes apparent. Really good OBand ideally,
the counterguerrilla forces should be able to develop more complete rosters of
guerrilla units and their members than the guerrillas themselves havewill
make each prisoner, even each recovered enemy dead, a gold mine of informa-
tion on the locations and probable intentions of one or more unit.
Continuing relentless command emphasis at all echelons on the production,

dissemination, and utilization of adequate timely intelligence is probably
more important in guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations than in any other
form of warfare. Not infrequently dissemination is the weakest link in the
intelligence chain. This is unforgivable, because it is the aspect of the intelli-
gence process in which the technologically superior counterguerrilla can most
easily excel his enemy. This was repeatedly demonstrated in the Philippines.
"Sergeant, why the devil did you bring these three men in as prisoners?
They say they were walking home from working in their fields when you
picked them up and brought them in without even giving them a chance to tell
you who they were. Now get them out of here, apologize to them, and let them
go before 'the man' [i.e., Magsaysay] hears about this and gives me a 'sham-
poo.'" The speaker might be almost any newly joined officer in the Huk cam-
paign, 1951-54.
"Sir, if the Lieutenant pleases, these men are Huk. See the red fingernail
polish on the littlefingerof the left hand. Report received from MIS [Military
Intelligence Service] in Manila yesterday, sir. Battalion standard operating
procedure, sir, that all men carrying Huk identification who see a patrol
before we identify them are to be brought in and not given a chance to talk
until each has been interrogated separately by the MIS team, sir." The
speakerold Sergeant Tigulang.
NOTES
1. Second Military Area, Armed Forces of the Philippines.
2. Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (People's Liberation Army), name adopted in
1950 by the Huk.
Chapter 6
KNOW THYSELF:
ANALYSIS OF FRIENDLY FORCES
"DAMN IT, Sergeant! Why did you bring in those three guerrilla prisoners? We'll
have to turn them over to the Fiscal, and then tomorrow, or the next day, or when-
ever they get rested, they'll berightback shooting at us again. Now, take them out
of here without any nosy civilians seeing you and when you find someplace
where they won't stink up the area too badly, shoot them."
Time: 1946-50; place: the Philippines; operation: the campaign against the
Hukbalahap, with all civilian law on the side of the guerrilla.
Does the order "Shoot them!" mean that these officers and their men were, as
one columnist charged, pithecoid savages or pseudoNazi gangsters? Were they
"Filipino storm troopers making war with pitiless ferocity against the civilian
population of Luzon"? Did the officers and men of the Philippine Armed Forces
deserve the epithets applied to them by many elements of the Philippine press
and radio? By no means. They were soldiers, good soldiers for the most part,
fighting a clever and pitiless enemy who had no regard for the rules of war, but
an enemy entitled to the same legal safeguards as a housebreaker, bigamist, or
other petty criminal. Legally, they were supposed to arrest him and were to
shoot him only if they could not otherwise effect arrest or were forced tofirein
self-defense. This enemy, if arrested, was only a lawbreaker, entitled to full
protection from the legal system he was endeavoring to destroy. Consequently,
a Huk captured in the field or a Huk supporter picked up by the army enjoyed
the same legal status as any other civilian. That legal status? He must be taken
before a judge within six hours after arrest, if physically possible; within
twenty-four hours a prima facie case for common crime must be made against
him. If it were not, he would automatically be released. If he were formally
charged and the crime were anything short of murder, he would have arightto
demand release on bail. It was literally true that a Huk, captured in afirefight,
could be free and back with his unit within seventy-two hours or less.
This anomalous situation arose from a realistic appraisal by high civilian
authorities of a political problem that appeared insoluble. The legal system of the
country was designed to protect the public from the criminal activities of single
individuals and, at the same time, to afford its citizens the fullest protection
against arbitrary or unjust treatment. By principle and training, the civil authori-
ties were bound to the strict application of those laws. The press, perhaps the
most free in the world, wasfiercelyprotective of the deeply ingrained principles
of a free society and was largely hostile to the administration.
The only legal action that could stop the virtually automatic release of cap-
tured guerrillas and their supporters was suspension of the writ of habeas cor-
pus. This was clearly, and correctly, seen as political suicide under the
conditions then prevailing. This new breed of criminal lived within the law, as
well as outside it. Unless and until convicted of a crime under the existing
code, the guerrilla remained a voter, a full member of the body politic. His
family and his friends were also voters.
Members of the legally elected government, which held office only by a small
majority, were naturally and properly concerned about the next electionsnever
more than two years away. Political opponents, always virulently critical, cer-
tainly would capitalize successfully on any admission that sporadic raids by a
few thousand armed menwhose votes they wanted and who claimed to be
seeking only their just rightsconstituted a state of civil war and a critical
national emergency.
Similar dilemmas have faced, and will in the future face, many governments.
Few legal systems can effectively protect the social body from organized attack
by large groups whose members individually can only be charged with com-
mon crimes, and even the measures provided in their codes can usually be
implemented only when the government has the overwhelming support of the
effective members of the body politic.
The politicians' dilemma became the soldier's. If he took prisoners and
treated them according to law, he was failing to accomplish his mission,
which was to suppress the rebellion. If he shot his prisoners or took other
measures to convince them of their wrongdoing, he was called a brute and a
savage; he might find himself facing a charge of murder before a hostile
civilian judge. Whichever course he took, he played into the hands of the
enemy. Liquidation or even intimidation of prisoners supplied political
ammunition for attacks on the government. It also made the Huk guerrilla
fight better, knowing that to be captured was almost surely to be executed.
There were, then, two interrelated problems: first, the government's prob-
lem of providing a means by which troops could deal with prisoners and sus-
pects in an acceptable, civilized way without releasing them. Politically
speaking, this problem could not be solved unless the government enjoyed
KNOW THYSELF 55
substantial public confidence. Second, the troops' inability to put down the
rebellion effectively without the authority to hold prisoners. Neither military
nor civilian authorities actually recognized the gravity of their predicament,
but they did recognize that it was an apparently insoluble one, so, humanly,
they sought to ignore it.
This problem was by no means unique to the Philippines. It is one that has
repeatedly faced the British, from South Africa in the Boer War to Malaya and
back to Kenya. Wherever there is articulate political opposition to the govern-
ment in power, wherever rebels and their supporters (real or suspected) are
genuinely believed to be entitled to the rights of citizens, this difficulty over
treatment of captives will arise.
The impasse in the Philippines was broken by a spectacular development that
emphasizes the effectiveness of a government spokesman who can be the guar-
antor of the government's good intentions. A minor Huk leader, one Taciano
Rizal, was ordered to assassinate the newly appointed Secretary of National
Defense, Ramon Magsaysay, who, by his past exploits and early actions in
office, seemed to the Huk command to afford them a substantial threat. Rizal
took advantage of Magsaysay's public statement that he was willing to meet
with anyone who wanted to contribute to the campaign against the Huk. Rizal
arranged for a secret rendezvous with Magsaysay at which he intended to assas-
sinate him. But out of curiosity, he talked to Magsaysay. He was persuaded that
Magsaysay meant what he said, meant to deal honestly with the Huk, meant to
do all in his power to ensure good government.
Rizal, an idealist, became convinced that the best thing he could do to help
his country would be to help Magsaysay. He gave information that led to iden-
tifying and locating the members of the Politburo, the directing organ of the
Communist Party in the Philippines. A surprise raid resulted in the capture of
about 150 Party members, their families, their assistants, informers, couriers,
etc., together with virtually complete records of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, including minutes of the meeting in which the Hukbalahap were
originally organized, in March, 1942.
This dramatic event, the favorable public reaction to it, and the seizure of so
many prisoners who obviously had to be detained pending complete
interrogationand review of the truckload and a half of documentsgave
Secretary of National Defense Magsaysay the chance to request, and obtain,
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. For the first time, it was politically
feasible to do this. Even so, the reaction would have been strongly unfavorable
if Magsaysay had not set up extensive safeguards against abuse of this privilege
of holding prisoners without placing charges against them. There was, indeed,
a briefflurryof opposition to the request, but it soon died and could not be revived
by even the most devout Huk sympathizer among members of the press.
Not every country nor every administration faced with the need to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus or to declare martial law can hope for the good
fortune of seizing the administrative headquarters of the guerrillas as a justifi-

cation for the action. However, in planning actions against guerrillas in a
country where the disposition of prisoners poses a political problem, serious
consideration should be given to the early execution of a coup that will make
it politically feasible to hold prisoners without formal charges.
It is often difficult to find out exactly what is being done with captured
guerrillas, and what is being done with suspected guerrillas and/or guerrilla
supporters. Are they being brought in, or are they being liquidated? If they
are brought in, are they placed in civilian jails or in special camps? Who are
the custodians? Who authorizes their detention, and who reviews the indi-
vidual cases? In what ways are they interrogated, and how well? How are
they exploited in psychological or military operations? This may not be the
information the counterguerrilla needs most, but these answers may be
most useful in evaluating the answers he receives to other, more important
questions.
Possibly most critically needed are the answers to the most sensitive
questions, questions concerning the status of the chief executive of the
country. Clausewitz said that war is a form of political intercourse, imply-
ing that it is the final means of reaching a political decision. Guerrilla and
counterguerrilla war may very properly be said to be politics submitted to
the court of last resort. The political chief who is responsible for the coun-
terguerrilla effort may well be the decisive factor in determining whether
the war is to be won or lost.
What is the stature, attitude, and probable tenure in office of the chief exec-
utive? Is he determined tofightthe guerrilla, to eliminate the guerrilla menace,
or is he lukewarm, belittling the struggle, perhaps even secretly in sympathy
with the guerrilla? Is he reasonably in control of his armed forces or are they
in fact virtually autonomous? Is he likely to be ousted by a coup, by the guer-
rilla, by the armed forces, or by third parties? When are the next elections, and
will he be a candidate? Answers at least temporarily valid, and at least reason-
ably accurate, to these and many similar questions are essential to realistic
evaluation of counterguerrilla strength and weaknesses.
To the fervent partisan, these questions may smack of treason; to the indoc-
trinated soldier (especially of a stable major power), they may seem irrele-
vant. The chief executive and his close advisers may not know the answers
themselvesworse, they may be wrong in what they think they know.
At no time during the Philippine campaign against the Huk were there serious
problems about the sincerity and security of the chief executive. Each of the
postwar incumbents was determined not to allow the Communists to take power,
even though all offered amnesties, in fact if not in name, to Huk who would
return to peaceful law-abiding lives. During the terms of office of thefirstthree
Presidents, political considerations viewed as unavoidable did, at times, affect
KNOW THYSELF 57
the prosecution of campaigns against the Huk and their supporters. This was
inevitable, for the Huk could influence many votes, and elections were at no
time suspended.
The Huk offered the only real extralegal threat to any of the Presidents.
Supporters of the defeated Presidential candidate in the 1949 elections did
launch a "rebellion," in which they hoped for active support from the armed
forces and the Huk. The expected Huk supportfizzled,while the armed forces
moved quickly against the rebels, demonstrating effectively their loyalty to con-
stitutional government, even if many did not like the Presidential incumbent.
(There were of course many rumors of impending revolts or of virtually
treasonable dealings between high government officials and the insurgents.
Rumors of revolt, especially "a military revolt in the southern provinces,
between Christmas and New Year's" are endemic in the Philippines, a sort of
annual flying-saucer craze. Dealings between government and Huk leaders
were undoubtedly sincere, if sometimes misguided, efforts to end the seem-
ingly interminable war.)
It cannot be expected that every chief executive faced with a guerrilla prob-
lem will have a secure tenure of office. Neither can it be expected that he will
have positive control of the armed forces. Further, the chief executive himself
may sadly misjudge the security of his position or the extent of his control
over his armed forces. Recommendations for actions directly designed to
enhance the security of the President's position or to strengthen his control
over the armed forces might seem outside the responsibilities (and perhaps the
capabilities) of the counterguerrilla. But they should not be so considered, for
the chief executive, his real status, and his own assessment of it are most
important to the counterguerrilla effort. Plans for counterguerrilla operations
that will not have the effect of strengthening the chief executive's position and
control are unlikely to win his approval.
A parallel series of answers to equally sensitive questions about the chief
executive must be secured almost simultaneously. What is the attitude of the
people in the country to their chief executive? Is he regarded as a man of integ-
rity and ability, legitimately holding office, using his power wisely? Is one or
both of these qualities believed to be lacking? Is the opposition to the chief
executive based on political affiliations or does it cross party lines, being based
on his own record? How strong are the feelings and attitudes toward the chief
executive? Do adverse opinions about him as a personor as a political
symboloutweigh the respect the people feel is due to his office?
(Of course, in some countries these questions may be less important than
the question, Do people know or care who is their chief executive? The ques-
tion may even be whether they have any feeling of allegiance to a national
government, or any interest in it. If the answer to these is No, the problem
takes on new dimensions, especially in thefieldsof psychological warfare and
political actions.)
If a chief executive is not respected, if significantly large segments of the

public actively dislike him, sincerely disbelieve his statements, or believe that
he holds office illegally, these facts must be taken into account in planning
actions to build up government prestige, to win support for the government,
and to establish credence for government statements. Since a government has
several spokesmen, it will be advisable to select from them one with a reputa-
tion for honesty and efficiency to be the voice of government on matters of or
affecting counterguerrilla operations.
Obviously, the chief executive is not the only individual whose attitudes,
ability, and public image may critically influence the counterguerrilla effort.
Virtually the same information is required about the other high officials of the
country and the unofficial close advisers of the chief executive. Their strengths
and weaknesses, their loyalties and interests are certain to affect the prosecu-
tion of the counterguerrilla effort. This is especially true of officials in the
ministries of defense, interior, social welfare, and agriculture.
Almost as much attention needs to be given to the situation in the national
legislature, if there is one, to determine the relative strength of political sup-
port for the administration and for its opposition. The key issueswhether
political theory, national policy or action, or simply the perquisites of office
dividing the major parties and administration supporters and opponents should
be identified and weighed in terms of their direct and indirect effects on the
national and counterguerrilla missions.
Three questions about legislators' attitudes are of especial importance to
the counterguerrilla. To what extent will administration actions be attacked on
purely political grounds? What types of action (either by the government or
by the guerrilla) are most likely to generate effective political opposition to
the administration? How well will the legislature support the antiguerrilla
effort per se, especially with appropriations for the armed forces and/or legis-
lation supporting armed-forces efforts? This legislation may vary from such
apparently minor matters as the statutory requirements for promotion (or lim-
itations on promotion) of officers and noncommissioned officers to such major
matters as instituting resettlement programs for guerrilla prisoners.
Above all, the counterguerrilla must understand the nature of political power
in the country. He must understand the forms of power, and he must seek to
know where power truly resides. Many students of Philippine society firmly
believed that political power rested in the "ilustrados," the small group of
wealthy, usually highly educated individuals whose names are literally house-
hold words. Two guerrilla movements,firstthat against the Japanese, then that
against the national government, the Hukbalahap movement, failed to change
the opinions of the many acknowledged and unacknowledged believers in the
ilustrado theory. The sweeping victory of Ramon Magsaysay as a Presidential
candidate shook, but failed to change, their views. Actually, in the Philippines,
KNOW THYSELF 59
as in far more countries than is generally realized, political power rests in the
people. They may tolerate its exercise by an elite group, but woe betide the elite
that believes it owns, rather than enjoys the loan of, political power.
The way in which power, or the right to use it, is traditionally transferred in
the country is especially significant to the counterguerrilla. Is this transfer
authorized through elections? Is there a relatively small group of candidates
who exchange positions at election time, with those in power reluctant to take
action against the "outs" because of their personal relationships and their game
of musical chairs? Or, is there an elite group that chooses and controls the can-
didates, an elite group that can and does change officeholders when it becomes
displeased with them? How do the members of this group obtain their power,
and how do they hold it? Do the voters take elections seriously? If not, why
not? Are the symbols of power usually transferred peacefully, in accordance
with legally established procedures, or are they often transferred by violence?
If the country has a democratic tradition, that is to say, is one where the mem-
bers of government are traditionally elected by the governed, there are many
more questions to be asked. Who is entitled to vote? How many do? Are their
votes counted? What are the political parties and what is their role? Are they, as
in the Philippines, primarily a grouping, with an eye to the next campaign, of
individuals who through accepted practices of the country appear to control
blocs of votes? If so, how significant are these individuals, and howfirmlyare
they in control of votes? Or are the political parties virtually sacred symbolic
groups, as in Colombia, where a man is "born a blue [the Conservative Party
color], lives a blue, and must die a blue"? If so, all considerations of the actual
or potential influence of a leader must take his party affiliation as an unalterable
fact. What are the traditional ways of influencing voters, and how, if at all, may
they be changed or used?
Many of these questions may seem to touch on matters far removed from
the duties of the counterguerrilla, but they affect nearly every action he may
take or even consider. The officer of counterguerrilla forces who does not take
them into account can play only a limited role, and is likely soon to find him-
self unemployed, or forced to take up for himself the role of guerrilla.
The counterguerrilla, whether indigenous or a foreign adviser, must be
keenly aware of the contemporary political situation, and as keenly aware that
it did not develop in a vacuum. He must know its antecedents and its sources
in the history, traditions, cultural facts and ideals, past and present policies of
the nation. The guerrilla movement that it is his duty to combat, and the other
political factors that may affect his operations are, like the government and the
armed forces, the result of the societal and ideological environments. They
probably owe more to them than to the physical environment.
Formulating a fully adequate appreciation of all these intangible but signifi-
cant factors might well be the life work of a dozen imported social scientists;
the information may or may not be available from residents of the country who
have culled the people's knowledge of their heritage. Information from both
sources can be of value, but neither source should be relied on exclusively. It is
essential to make an objective and pragmatic analysis that seeks significant fac-
tors and evaluates them properly. Seldom can such an analysis be wholly accu-
rate; there is some question as to which is likely to be least inaccuratean
analysis by well-informed members of the indigenous population or an analy-
sis by foreign residents with long experience in the country. Perhaps the ulti-
mate evaluation should be done by those familiar with similar situations in
other countries.
The experience of the Philippines certainly tends to confirm this view.
For five years, men with personal experience as guerrillas and as students
of Communist tactics sought vainly to persuade Philippine "experts" in and
out of government, indigenous and foreign, that the Communists and their
guerrillas posed a serious threat; a threat that could neither be ignored nor
removed by routine pacification operations. Some of those "experts" are
still unconvinced. The fact remains that the danger increased until respon-
sibility for meeting it was given to a vigorous ex-guerrilla leader who had
a thorough understanding of the political base required for action, and a
vivid awareness of the very real threat to the stability of government posed
by the Huk movement. Within fifteen months after Raman Magsaysay's
appointment as Secretary of National Defense, it was apparent that the Huk
had lost their war.
If a major foreign power is assisting the threatened government in its coun-

terguerrilla effort, an understanding of the implications of its aid is essential.
An analysis similar in many ways to that made of the political situation of the
threatened country is required. The attitudes of the assisting power, the kinds
and amounts of aid given, and restrictions on it, may largely determine, or at
least influence, adoption and implementation of counterguerrilla measures.
Obviously this is a delicate and difficult task. Certain a priori guidelines may
be drawn: Torture or liquidation of prisoners or accused, without trial or after
summary trial, will be so strongly disapproved that it will not be feasible if
further aid is to be expected. There may be strong pressure for land and social
reforms based on theoretical concepts, not necessarily significant in terms of
their effects either on the counterguerrilla efforts or on the conditions that
brought the guerrilla into being. Major reforms in government administrative
practices will be strongly recommended. The armed forces will be expected
generally to follow patterns and practices of organization, doctrine, training,
and equipment similar to the assisting power. A strong centralized command
will be considered essential.
Aid, other than strictly military, will tend to concentrate on long-range projects
enhancing the industrial or agricultural productivity of the country. Short-term
local projects will be discouraged, both officially and by unofficial observers.
KNOW THYSELF 61
Money or supplies will ordinarily not be available for specific "spot" requirements
outside the conventional pattern. Extensive and detailed planning will usually be
required before funds are appropriated or released for major projects.
Military materiel may require a lead time of at least a year for even conven-
tional items. Nonstandard items will be extremely difficult to obtain, espe-
cially if the request for them reflects any reluctance, however reasonable, to
accept the standard. For example, an effort to get tennis shoes instead of com-
bat boots might meet strong opposition. If there is a simultaneous request that
steel helmets not be procured and not be charged against funds available for
military aid, serious, if unacknowledged, repercussions are possible.
The foregoing guidelines will not be valid in all cases; some may already
lack validity. To some extent, they typify United States assistance in the past;
they are, accordingly, considerations that are likely to be borne in mind, and
quite possibly given undue emphasis, by those seeking U.S. assistance. Some,
such as the treatment of prisoners, represent immutable policy, which must be
accepted; others, which may seem to pose insurmountable obstacles in some
situations, can be modified.
What cannot and must not be overlooked are the political facts of life in
the country faced with a guerrilla problem, and in the assisting country.
Always, and for each country, the internal political situation, the national
politics, the method of and speed in formulating national policies must be
considered. Tacit alliances between politicians of the countries involved are
by no means impossible. Two countries having a long history of close rela-
tionships are apt to find that traces of such relations enter into the apparently
domestic problems of both countries. Ties between elements of international
organizationschurch or civicmay have significant effects. Few appreci-
ate the amount of assistance given as a result of the ties between U.S. and
Philippine organizations, or the extent of at least quasi-official Philippine
interference in U.S. politics.
There is always a possibility that actions taken in one country may have
serious political repercussions in the other. One field in which this is particu-
larly common is that of nonmilitary aid, always a controversial issue. If aid
funds have been spent with the blessing of the administration then in power on
projects whose utility is not readily apparent or must be concealed, the whole
aid program may be the object of violent partisan attacks. These may cause
termination or reduction of further aid. The counterguerrilla must take these
facts of life into consideration.
Operations in the Philippines were blessed by an unusual absence of critical
aid problems. The traditional relationship between the Philippines and the
United States and the great good will on both sides (extending not only to
officeholders, but also to common citizens in both countries) largely precluded
serious difficulties. In some instances, problems seemed briefly significant,
but they were never a real handicap to the counterguerrilla. Indeed, the
prevailing spirit of cooperation, and the aid given and used as a result, contrib-
uted decisively to the success of the counterguerrilla effort.
Analysis of the composition, strength, equipment, and state of training of

the armed forces is usually not difficult. Evaluation of strong and weak points
is more difficult, since it so largely depends on the evaluator's appreciation of
the requirements for successful counterguerrilla warfare. Most difficult of all
is using and developing strength for counterguerrilla operationssecuring
the cooperation of the members of the armed forces while overcoming their
weaknesses.
Often problems will arise from the past training and possibly the past
experience of the senior officers in the armed forces. They are almost cer-
tain to be indoctrinated to a considerable extent in military theories appli-
cable to conventional warfare. They may or may not be equally well trained
in the implementation of these theories, but any recommended action that
falls outside the inculcated theoretical principles is certain to meet with
strong opposition. No matter how cogent the reasons are for departing from
accepted doctrine, they are likely to be unacceptable if they were not taught
at the same level and with the same emphasis as was the doctrine. Worse,
recommending departure from orthodox doctrine will convict the advocate
of heresy, at the least, and quite possibly of ignorance and willful sabotage.
Although it may be hard to persuade the U.S. military-assistance group to
provide tennis shoes, it is likely to be far harder to persuade the army being
helped to do away with such traditional symbols as heavy boots and steel
helmets. Nor is this phenomenon by any means peculiar to the so-called
military mind. It is even more marked among such professions as medicine
and law, to say nothing of such academic disciplines as economics and
sociology.
Matters especially to be considered in evaluating the armed forces' strengths
and weaknesses, more or less in order of importance, are: (1) disciplinethe
speed, extent, and reliability with which orders are carried out promptly and
to the best of the receivers' ability; (2) basic military attitudes, i.e., predilec-
tion for offensive or for defensive tactics; (3) morale; (4) basic training of
troops; (5) effectiveness of basic logistics organizationhow well and regu-
larly troops are fed and paid; (6) appreciation at all echelons of the importance
to successful counterguerrilla operations of good relations with civilians;
(7) basic military materielshoulder-fired weapons, etc.; (8) transport, other
than air; (9)fieldequipment and replacements; (10) air support, especially for
supply purposes; (11) initiative, extent of training, morale of junior leaders;
(12) medical services; (13) staff planning ability.
In some instances, political affiliations or attitudes of senior officers and of
the rank and file may be of critical importance. In other situations, in other
countries (as in the Philippines), this may be virtually irrelevant.
KNOW THYSELF 63
Analysis of the armed forces must take into consideration the military
requirements of the nation; the size and type of armed forces it needs to repel
external aggression. These requirements must be considered both in theoreti-
cal and practical terms, because planning for counterguerrilla operations must
often compromise between the requirements for external defense and for
internal defense, that is, counterguerrilla operations. Funds and resources will
seldom seem adequate for both missions, especially if preparations for defense
against external aggression rely primarily on conventional forces and doc-
trines. Frequently, it will be found that the importance of defense against
internal aggression is so little understood that otherwise available military
forces are not employed in counterguerrilla operations. This was true for
a time in the Philippines; it is true today in other countries.
Consideration must also be given in this evaluation to the police forces of
the country and to the nation's potential for fielding useful auxiliary forces.
A country that has recently experienced a major guerrilla movement, such as
that developed in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, obviously
can provide many experienced guerrillas who, if not actually in the armed
forces, can be of great value in auxiliary, or so-called home-defense units. The
possible dangers in the formation of auxiliary units must be carefully calcu-
lated and guarded against; however, such potential dangers will seldom out-
weigh the advantages to be gained from the proper organization and
employment of such units.
Scarcely less important than knowledge of the abilities and weaknesses of
the armed forces is knowledge about the national intelligence organization
or organizations. What intelligence services are in operation? How good are
they? How do they compete? To what extent have they been infiltrated by
the enemy? Who gets their reports? How are they checked? What use is
made of them?
These questions will be difficult to answer. Intelligence services will try to
maintain maximum secrecy about everything except their triumphs and their
need for funds. However, the procurement and use of intelligence cannot be
delayed pending the development of the best possible national intelligence
service. Planning for counterguerrilla operations must envision securing the
maximum from existing services, realizing the importance of getting and
using the best available information as quickly as possible. (It should also
envision improving those services, but not at the cost of even a temporary loss
of information.)
Popular attitudes toward the armed forces and the intelligence agencies are
an essential element in the over-all strength and weakness of these critical
services. What do farmers, teachers, petty government officials, reporters,
businessmen think about the soldiers? Why? What type and kind of newspa-
per stories appear about members of the armed forces, both as a class and as
individuals? What is said about intelligence agents and about the agencies
they represent? Are they called Gestapo or NKVD, or are they laughed at?
Why? To a very considerable extent, especially in counterguerrilla operations,
a government service is only as good as it is believed to be by the people it is
supposed to serve and to defend.
Analysis of the organization and effectiveness of other government depart-

ments is necessary for an adequate appraisal of strengths and weaknesses.
Inadequacies in these agencies from want of funds, personnel, planning,
knowledge, ability, or purposefulness have contributed to the conditions that
enabled the guerrilla movement to come into being. Possibly, these conditions
can be altered without changes in the departments responsible for the needed
actions, but the unsatisfactory conditions can certainly be eliminated much
more readily and efficiently if the appropriate departments actively participate
in the effort. Particularly important in counterguerrilla operations are the
departments or ministries of interior, justice, agriculture, labor, and social
welfare. Inadequacies in matters under the jurisdiction of these agencies are
perhaps the most common and the most serious factors predisposing the peo-
ple toward guerrilla activity.
The ministries of agriculture, education, and social welfare can be espe-
cially useful in sponsoring and conducting activities to demonstrate that sup-
port of the guerrilla is no longer justified. How these ministries can and should
be employed in a given situation will depend primarily on an assessment of
their personnel, secondarily on their past history and the national policy, and
tertiarily on theirfinancing.Problems of personnel may or may not be suscep-
tible of solution, but they must be recognized and reckoned with.
The more the established agencies of government enter into the counter-
guerrilla effort, the easier it will be to eliminate the guerrilla problem. In
many instances, it may not be feasible to employ all the machinery of gov-
ernment. In other instances, some element of the government machinery
may be so much more efficient, so much more effective, so much more able
to collaborate intelligently in the counterguerrilla effort that it can and
should be employed in fields properly appertaining to other government
agencies.
Under Magsaysay, agencies of the Department of National Defense per-
formed many functions properly belonging to other departments of govern-
ment. Troops built schools and roads, normally functions of the Department
of Education or the Bureau of Public Works. Lawyers in the military service
defended civilians in civil suits over land tenure and aided in the criminal
prosecution in civilian courts of military personnel accused of common
crimesboth functions of the Department of Justice. The Armed Forces
sponsored resettlement projects, and so on and on, until there was virtually no
agency of government that did not, at one time or another, receive the often
unwanted assistance of members of the military services.
KNOW THYSELF 65
This seemingly unwarranted usurpation of functions was neither a matter

of empire-building nor politically inspired, although both charges were
often made. These actions in question were needed actions, actions that
contributed to defeating the Huk. The only way Magsaysay saw of getting
action when, and how, he wanted it (yesterday, and effectively, without
argument) was to have the forces under his control act. Similar situations
may often occur when the individual responsible for the counterguerrilla
effort is not the chief executive.
So far, the estimate of the friendly situation has considered only what might
be called the existing official elements: the nation's political leadership, which
is ultimately responsible for the counterguerrilla effort and the armed forces
as the arm or force (primarily military) to be employed against the guerrilla,
a force, also, that will either gain or lose popular support for the government.
Other important elements, essentially neutral, that can be made friendly or
unfriendly, depending on whether they are wisely or unwisely used, have not
been considered.
The element that will first come to the mind of the soldier, perhaps, is the
physical one: the terrain, the geography, the climate, the road net, the cover
(vegetation cover or lack of it) in the area of operation. The effect of this com-
plex on the enemy was discussed in the preceding chapter. Their effect on
operations against the guerrilla must also be considered.
Spencer Chapman entitled his classic account of action against the Japanese
in Malaya The Jungle Is Neutral. The jungle may be neutral, but the soldier or
guerrilla who regards it as a friend will find it indeed a friend if he is dealing
with an enemy who considers the jungle his enemy. The same may be said of
all aspects of the physical environment in the area of operations. Terrain in
general, jungle in particular, is neutral only if both contenders employ it with
equal skill, knowledge, and understanding.
If practices and tactics are adopted that make the best possible use of the
elements of physical environment, it may be taken as certain that the environ-
ment will seem to help. If on the other hand, the elements of the physical
environment are regarded as enemies, if the flooded paddy fields or the thick
rain forest are regarded as nuisances because they inhibit the use of armor, the
advantage passes to the unarmored enemy. Much more than in conventional
war, in guerrilla war skillful use of the physical environment marks the
successful fighter.
The national economy of the country is an important consideration
particularly that portion of the national product at the disposition of the
government through taxation. In the simplest possible terms, a government
with an annual budget of $100 million cannot afford very many helicopters
with which to chase guerrillas. It cannot afford a really elaborate commu-
nications network. In fact, the extraordinary expenses incurred in antiguerrilla
operations usually must be met at least in part through outside aid, and as
has already been pointed out, this aid may impose many limitations and
restrictions.
Aside from the question of the funds available, there is also the question of
how much of these funds should be allotted to the counterguerrilla operations
and how much should be allocated to other functions of government. Take, for
example, the situation in the Philippines in 1946: Four years of enemy occu-
pation had ravaged the country; Japanese foragers and hungry guerrillas had
eaten most of the livestock, including the essential farm work animals.
Schoolhouses without number had been burned down, and military units
occupied many of those which remained. Inflation had very nearly quadrupled
the cost of living, but the salaries of government employees remained basi-
cally at prewar levels. Under such circumstances, it was indeed difficult to
determine what proportion of the available funds should be put into restoring
the essential services of governmentdesperately needed by all of the
Philippinesand what proportion could be properly expended in the subjuga-
tion of a guerrilla movement that seemed to affect directly only about 5 to 10
per cent of the population of the country. American aid was sufficient to pre-
vent utter destitution and perhaps chaos. Even so, there was little money left
for action against the guerrillas (whom many Americans, like many Filipinos,
did not see as constituting a clear and present danger).
The ability of the national economy to produce, or to improvise, in support
of the counterguerrilla effort may be even more important than its ability to
support the government with tax monies. The way in which productive sup-
port is manifested and the items which may be produced depend to a very
large extent on the ingenuity and effort applied.
Napalm was not available in the quantity desired by the armed forces at
one period during the Huk campaign. Thanks to the ingenuity and effort
of the Research and Development Division of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, a very effective substitute, largely composed of gasoline,
coconut husks, and rubber from discarded tires, was developed. During
their struggle against the Japanese, some guerrillas developed an excellent
field uniform made from hemp fiber woven on home looms. Match heads
were substituted, not very satisfactorily, for primers in reloaded
cartridges.
Civic organizations can make contributions to the counterguerrilla effort
that are nothing short of awe-inspiring. They can also contribute in ways as
ordinary and as valuable as supplying meat and potatoes (or fish and rice).
Churches are an obvious potential source of support, but their role in the soci-
ety, and popular attitudes toward them, must be carefully analyzed. Mass
communications media are the most conspicuous of the civil assets or liabili-
ties. What are they? What do they say? Why? What kinds of people, and how
KNOW THYSELF 67
many, pay attention to them? What credibility is given them? Are their words
for sale?
Probably more important than the personnel in government, than the train-
ing and quality of the armed forces, than the physical environment or the
economic situation of the country, are the attitudes and opinions of its peo-
ple and the means by which these are formed, guided, and expressed. The
importance of popular attitudes and opinions about the chief executive,
about the administration and about the armed forces has already been touched
upon. Equally important are the popular attitudes toward government: the
concepts of government, the ambitions and aspirations for it held by most
citizens of the country.
Sometimes the attitudes of small groups that in one way or another are
involved in the antiguerrilla operations have particular significance. One
such small group were the Negritos, the pygmy blacks who inhabit the
grassy uplands and rain forests of the western part of Central Luzon (then
the western boundary of Huklandia). The Negritos lived in the vicinity of
an American Army base set up early in the century. The Negritos always
avoided contact with other Filipinos, but they knew and respected the
United States Army. From 1946 to 1950, they were of little help either to
the guerrillas to government forces. Since the guerrillas (the Huk) were
roaming in their area and could not always be avoided, the Negritos some-
times acted as guides and couriers for them. They knew only the Huk side
of the story; they had little interest in it, but they had no interest in the
Philippine Government, no interest in anything but continuing their nomadic
life with as little interruption as possible.
Magsaysay knew these Negritos, knew their attitude, and decided to change
it. He arranged a conference at which many Negritos were present. He also
arranged, unofficially, for a captain of the United States Army to address the
Negritos, telling them that Secretary of National Defense Magsaysay and his
soldiers now represented the government of their country and that it was their
duty to assist these soldiers as they had in years gone by assisted the soldiers
of the United States Army. From that time on (thanks to careful instructions
Magsaysay gave on how to maintain the liaison thus begun), the Negritos
proved a valuable source of intelligence and of warnings about the Huk.
Much of the success of the operations to win the people's loyalty and to
eliminate the Huk was achieved by Magsaysay, owing directly to his under-
standing of the attitudes and opinions of the people and the ways in which
their attitudes were formed, guided, and communicated. The Negrito inci-
dent is only one example.
The disposition of captured or surrendered guerrillas and their supporters
has been discussed at great length, insofar as it affects attitudes toward
government and the reaction of people who learn about the treatment. There
are other significant aspects. Captured or surrendered guerrillas may be a valu-
able resource. One value is the intelligence, the information about the enemy,
that can be obtained by proper handling of them. Another is that prisoners
whose loyalty to the government has been won can be used to take action
against their former comrades. The possibilities for such use are almost infi-
nitely varied. Perhaps the most outstanding example comes not from the
Philippines but from Kenya, where Ian Henderson organized captured and con-
verted Mau Mau into "pseudo-gangs" that effectively cleared the die-hard rem-
nants of the Mau Mau and their leaders from the forests of Kenya.
The most obvious and the safest use of prisoners is in psychological war-
fare, in the preparation of surrender leaflets and testimonials addressed to
their former comrades, pointing out how well they, the prisoners, are treated
and inviting their former comrades to join them. Erstwhile Huk evangelists
were particularly useful in making speeches on behalf of the government in
the very areas where they had once attacked and denigrated that very same
government. Often, their "come to the mourners' bench" technique worked
nearly as well on Huk and sympathizers as when they had been proselytizing
for the guerrillas.
One particularly valuable human resource in the Philippines was the vast
reservoir of experienced guerrillas who learned their trade in the widespread
anti-Japanese resistance movement during World War II. In the years 1946-50,
little use was made of them, although some individual ex-guerrillas made out-
standing contributions during this period. Actually, this resource was little
tapped for action directly against the Huk, even in the period 1950-53, when
Magsaysay (himself an ex-guerrilla) was in charge. They simply were not
needed.
Some units of the armed forces, it is true, were organized from ex-guerrillas.
Other ex-guerrillas in the area of operations were used as intelligence agents
and guides, or to serve in local defense units against the Huk. The principal
service of ex-guerrillas, and it was of great value, was in generating popular
support for the revitalized armed forces and for reviving faith in government.
Using the special skills of primitive peoples against guerrillas operating
in uninhabited areas has long been a feature of counterguerrilla operations.
This was little done in the campaign against the Huk. Operations were con-
ducted, for the most part, in areas where special skills were not required. In
some instances, and in some places outside the main areas of operation,
mountain peoples did yeoman service by rounding up or eliminating Huk
stragglers. Much greater use might have been made of these people had the
circumstances been different. One skill (not especially developed in the
Philippines) that can be of great assistance is that of trackers, who follow
guerrillas who have dispersed after an action.
TOP URGENT
Copy Nr1
National Headqtrs
FREE COUNTRY
010001 New New
U&I2
OPORD 1 (FRAGMENTARY)
References: National Constitution, Gettysburg
Address
1. SITUATION
a. Enemy hold Obj G in strength, deny access Obj N; capable reinf from
undet pos beyond PL FREEDOM; reinf fr outside natlbdry.
b. Friendly forces
2. MISSION
Nation atk immed; achieve, prep defend Obj N (Government of, by, for
people)
3. EXECUTION
a. Concept of operation. Main atk, Dept Natl Def reduce Obj G; as assist
achievement Obj N; prevent en reinf. Other forces atk desig init obj; prep
assist reduce Obj G or cont to Obj N; prevent en reinf Obj G; prevent en
establishing new pos beyond PL FREEDOM.
Accomplishment of mission dependent on:
(1) Reduction Obj G
(2) Prevention en establishing new pos beyond PL FREEDOM
b. Dept Natl Def:
(1) Reduce Obj G; prevent en reinf, new pos, beyond PL FREEDOM.
(2) Natl Res on order.
c. DeptEduc
d. Dept Just
xxxxx
1. Coordinating instructions:
(1) Effective for planning and execution on receipt.
(2) Priority support Dept Natl Def until PL FREEDOM reached.
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
Acknowledge
MAALAM
President
TOP URGENT
KNOW THYSELF 71
In summation, it must be realized that as guerrilla and counterguerrilla war-

fare are in a very real sense total warfare, the winner will be the one who best
uses the totality of resources available. Note the phrase "the totality of
resources." There is a difference between using all resources and using all
methods. The methods chosen must be scrutinized carefully for possible unde-
sired effects. They may achieve the immediate effect desired but have conse-
quences harmful to the over-all effortlike a successful operation on a patient
who then dies of shock. Thus, shooting prisoners, although doubtless the most
effective way to dispose of themand surely the most economicalwill
almost invariably produce greater hostility and strengthen the enemy forces.
What is essential is for those charged with responsibility for counterguer-
rilla operations to decide what must be, what should be, and what can be,
doneand then to do it, by the most effective means at hand. It may be charged
that this is a disorganized, even a subversive, approach; it will be said that the
director of the counterguerrilla efforts (the Secretary of National Defense, for
instance) has no business meddling in the affairs of other departments of gov-
ernment. It is entirely true that the counterguerrilla effort, broad as it must be,
must not become the only object of attention; the other functions of govern-
ment must be performed as well. But if the counterguerrilla operations fail,
the success of other activities is of purely academic interest.
Chapter 7
THE MISSION
MISSION:
1. The objective; the task together with the purpose, which clearly indicates
the action to be taken and the reason therefor.
2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a
duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task.1
HAVING DETERMINED as well as he may the enemy and friendly situation, the
counterguerrilla must next turn his attention to the mission. It has been
assumed that the mission, the objective, is the elimination of the guerrilla
enemy, the liquidation of the guerrilla movement.
This is indeed a mission; it is, in fact, probably the mission that the counter-
guerrilla is supposed to have. But it is not the mission of the government that
is threatened by the guerrilla; it is not even the mission of the armed forces of
that government. Their basic mission is the protection of the people of the
country and/or the government.
The mission of the government is to represent its people and to defend their
interests. It is this simple and reasonable purpose that is often obscured,
twisted and fragmented under the assault of a guerrilla movement. Frequently,
one of the first objectives of an insurrection is to draw the government into a
position that makes elimination of the guerrilla seem its chief, if not its only,
mission.
The man or men charged with and feeling the urgent responsibility for
terminating a guerrilla movement that threatens the national existence will see
very little relevance in the abstract national mission stated above. Discussion
of the ultimate purpose of governmentits missionis likely to seem as
ridiculous as a thoughtful consideration of "Why is a house?" when one's

dwelling is on fire.
The importance of the ultimate objective of government, and its pertinence
to counterguerrilla operations, becomes apparent only after analysis of the
opposing forces at work in a nation under guerrilla attack. On one side is the
guerrilla, who has a simple, practical program: to stay close to the people,
using them at once as his support and his shield, rousing them to "self-defense"
based on their known ills and the remedies he has promiseda relationship as
intimate as a family council. On the other side is the government, concentrated
in a national capital, obligated to provide security, economic and social health,
protection for its wealthiest as well as its poorest citizen, and obligated, too,
to provide a place and a voice in world affairs for the nation. What the guer-
rilla is promising for some distant day the government is boundby its very
existenceto provide immediately. And the rise of the guerrilla movement
brings a new and heavy duty to destroy the guerrilla before his activities force
a newand untestedsystem on the people. That duty is further complicated
by the government's obligation to maintain some measure of freedom for its
individual citizens.
The guerrilla, on the other hand, is fighting for a cause. His leaders may
have misstated that cause, they may have concealed their true objectives, but
they have provided an ideal for the fighting man. They have provided a cause
so appealing that men are willing to fight for it, to show the tenacity of purpose,
the willingness to work, to endure, and to suffer that is the essential character-
istic of the guerrilla. Supporters of the guerrilla must sympathize with that
ideal and share in the motivation for its achievement, since they deprive
themselves in order to support the guerrilla and are quite possibly risking their
lives and those of their families as well.
To cope with men so motivatedunless they are to be over borne by sheer
weight of numbers, which is a strategy not so easy as it might appearthe
members of government, the defenders of government, and the supporters of
government must muster a comparable determination, a comparable tenacity, a
comparable capacity for self-sacrifice in the pursuit of victory.
For most people, liquidation of the guerrilla movement does not in itself
constitute a sufficient motive to rouse them to match the efforts of the guerrilla.
It may be enough for single-minded, well-indoctrinated soldiers or policemen,
for alert, patriotic civilians. But even these individuals often are motivated in
fact by a personal idealloyalty to the state, to a leader, or to their squadmates.
Most people need something more than a tenuous loyalty to an abstract ideal;
they need a cause they can recognize as worth struggling, working, even suffer-
ing to accomplish. They need to have that cause explained in terms they can
understand. They need to understand how they, as individuals, can participate.
That this cause must be an effective government seems obvious, yet, like many
obvious things, it is easily overlooked. Under the pressures of a guerrilla
THE MISSION 75
movement, obstacles to recognition of the basic mission exist in all segments

of the population.
Curiously enough, it is the military who are often the most difficult to
convince of the overriding importance of the ultimate objective, the necessity
for seeking always the furtherance of the mission of government. The better
trained the military are in conventional doctrine, the greater will be the
difficulty in convincing them. Curiously, because from the beginning of his
military career to the end, the soldier is taught the ultimate and overriding
importance of achieving the objective. Unfortunately, in contemporary
Western culture, apparently through fear of the military's achieving undue
dominance in civil spheres, there has been and is a continuous effort to make
the members of the military think only of military objectives. The real
significance of the dictum of Clausewitz that war is only a form of political
intercourse is seldom understood or, if understood, is largely forgotten. It
frequently requires major retraining to make the soldier understand that not
only is his ultimate objective a political one, but that it is his duty to contribute
to the achievement of that objective by all the means at his disposal.
The politician is the least difficult to convince of the importance of the
mission of government, of the importance of creating an effective government
the people will support. However, the politician must, periodically, secure the
support of enough people to keep himor place himin office. It is difficult,
therefore, for him to lose himself in a cause. Viewed cynically, the politician's
objective must always be capture of the next hillthe winning of the next
election. If he is to help the cause of good government, he must use all means
at his disposal to become part of that government. So he must forever be caught
between the ideal the people seek and the practical means he must resort to.
At best, it is more difficult for the politician than for the soldier to engage in a
sustained effort clearly intended to further the mission of government.
The personnel of government must understand not only the mission of
government, they must understand also the necessity for making their every
action further that mission. Finally, they must convince the governed that they
are effectively seeking to advance that mission. This has perhaps never been
better demonstrated than in the Philippines during the years 1946-52. Those
were the years when the vicious guerrilla rebellion, the Hukbalahap movement,
sought to overthrow the democratically constituted government in the name of
the "New Democracy"; years when the government fumbled and nearly failed
in its attempts to quell the rebellion; years when the governmentfinallysolved
the problem.
To the Philippines, and to the Filipino, the ultimate objective of government
was clearly stated in 1900 by William Howard Taft. Summarized, it is the
establishment of a stable, popular government, ruling in accordance with the
needs and desires of the majority while protecting the rights of the minority.
That objective has never changed appreciably. Schools, free press, free speech,
and all mass communications had made the purpose of government widely
known for more than forty years, to such an extent that the overwhelming
majority of Filipinos believed in a democracy as the only acceptable purpose
of any government.
It was Japan's ruthless contempt for this concept that set tens of thousands
of Filipinos marching as guerrillas even before the Japanese completed
their occupation of the islands, in 1942. The chorus of the favorite marching
song of one large unit was, "Come and fight for democracy." Tens of
thousands died between 1942 and 1945 for the (to them) inextricably
intertwined ideals of patriotism and democracy, for government "of the
people, by the people, and for the people." It cannot be doubted that this
was the original motivation of many of the followers of the Hukbalahap
Supremo, Luis Taruc.
If the purpose of government was as stated and was so widely understood,
how then were the Hukbalahap able to launch a thriving rebellion in the name
of "New Democracy"? How could they so long disguise their Communist ties?
It cannot be explained by the fact that the Communist Party of the Philippines
and the Communist International had a long-range plan ready to put into effect
calling for the overthrow of the established government and the installation of a
Communist state. That is true. They did have such a plan. But the desire to
achieve these objectiveswhich Communists in every country desireis not in
itself a sufficient base from which to launch an effective guerrilla movement.
Perhaps the real reason their guerrilla movement achieved viabilityand was
well on the way to successwas that nearly all that the Huk publicly said and
did was compatible with their claim of trying to attain the kind of government
all Filipinos wanted.
Why were the Huk slogans"Land for the Landless," "Equal Justice,"
"Honesty and Efficiency in Government"so appealing, so immediately
effective with the people? For one thing, these were slogans deeply rooted
in political history, dating back to the days of Spanish occupation. That
Hukbalahap leaders believed these were ideals that could best be achieved
through the establishment of a Communist form of government was not gen-
erally understood by their sympathizers. Filipinos supporting the rebellion
were not fighting over details of administration, over the right to putor not
to putthe significant label "People's" before the title "Republic of the
Philippines." Relatively few of the Hukbalahap would have been willing to
fight for Communist dialectics or Mother Russia.
Was it failure ofor betrayal bythe legally constituted government that
gave strength to the Huk guerrilla movement? It was not, despite widespread
Huk charges. Basically, the long record of the government's failure to eliminate
the Huk was due to the failure of men at all levels of government to understand
their mission, their failure to concentrate on the main objective of government
and to make their actions clearly compatible with service to the people. There
THE MISSION 77
were sins, but they were sins more of omission than of commission, a situation
that threatened at one time to give the Huk victory by default.
There was a breakdown in communications between people and officials. The
officials' words were not always consonant with their deedsand where there
was a conflict, the people believed the deeds rather than the words. Huk
propagandists seized on every misdeed within government, proclaiming the
occasional dishonest or inefficient official typical of the men in government.
The many worthwhile achievements of the government were not effectively and
convincingly brought to the attention of the people. The press and radio were
largelyfilledwith charges and defenses, with promises and denunciations.
More deep-seated and far-reaching than the failure in communications,
however, was the failure to clarify the mission and the urgency of that mission,
a failure that very nearly caused the collapse of the government. The mission
to protect, represent, and defend the interests of the peoplewas taken for
granted. Stress was placed instead on the myriad secondary objectives, each
treated as a crisis, with any success hailed as the end of crisis. None of these
"crises" had the broad appeal that would have opened the way for a crusade
the appeal necessary to engage the people and to persuade them to subordinate
their individual aims.
Those individual aims differed widely, as human objectives must, since
they are directly related to the interests and beliefs of the individuals
themselves. Essentially, the concern of the individual in government was to
ensure the well-being of himself and his family. To the soldier, this meant
compliance with orders. To the politician, it meant securing his appointment
or re-election to an office. To the lesser government employee, it seemed that
his very presence on the job should be regarded as contributing in some
measure to the general welfare.
The Filipino soldier and politician may or may not have realized how
important liquidation of the Huk movement could be, but no one was reminding
him of this from 1946 to 1950. No one was impressing on him the importance
of his individual contribution or delineating the areas of that contribution.
Inevitably, the power and capability of the government were progressively
weakened as the years passed.
The individual citizen not actively concerned in the Huk movement found
himself in a morass. In a culture that placed great emphasis on democratic
government, he often had the reaction that there was little difference between
the existing government and the government the Huk professed to offer. Weren't
their claims almost the same? To put the welfare of the people above all else?
Possibly one was better, possibly the other, but by and large, the ordinary
Filipino cared little for either one. He was not convinced of the sincerity of
either, so his natural inclination was to pursue his own interests and hope that
both sides would leave him alone. In this he was not unlike the average man in
any country, at any time, whose emotions and instincts for self-preservation
have not yet been aroused by either protagonist in a national struggle. To be

stable and popular, above all to be successful in eliminating a guerrilla
movement that threatens its very existence, government, and the people who
compose it, must do three things:
1. Understand the primary missionthe provision of effective government that

represents the wishes of the governed and respects their rights.
2. Ensure that all actions of the government, and its personnel, clearly further
the primary mission.
3. Convince the governed that the government is earnestly and effectively seek-
ing to accomplish the functions stated.
The blunt fact is that because it failed to do these three things, the government
of the Philippines from 1946 to 1950 failed to suppress the Huk movement.
Success in these three things was the greatest contribution of Ramon
Magsaysay to the Philippines and to the operations against the Huk. To him, the
mission was clear and unmistakable: The establishment of government of, by,
and for the people was the single major objective to which everything else must
contribute. He never let anyone forget this or permit secondary objectives to
appear more important than the primary one. He realized, of course, that many
things must be done to achieve this objective, and that one of the most immediate
tasks was elimination of the threat to the stability of government and to the
welfare of the governed that the Huk movement presented.
More, he sought by every means possible to make it clear to everyone from
President to uncommitted citizen, from Senator to General to private soldier
and individual voter, that the real ultimate objective of government was the
one to which his and their energies must be devoted. Once the people of the
country were convinced that the government earnestly and effectively pursued
the mission, was indeed seeking honestly and intelligently to promote the
welfare of the people, the Huk movement became scarcely more than a petty
nuisance.
Nevertheless, it still demanded the accomplishment of many difficult tasks.
These tasks involved, for the most part, changing the ways in which things
were done; securing the adoption of tactics consonant with the mission and
with the necessity for securing public support. Many military practices had to
be changed radically to secure popular acceptance of the concept that the
military were the protectors of the civil population.
Obviously, such practices as area clearance by slaughtering every moving
thing could never be employed against the Huk, for this was only the most
stringent of various techniques that would have inflicted undue hardship on
people not proved to be guerrillas or guerrilla supporters. The suspension of
civil liberties traditional to the culture was similarly excluded, unless the people
could be persuaded that such measures were needed for their own protection.
THE MISSION 79
Typical of practices that had created widespread ill will for the forces of
government in the Philippines was the establishment of checkpoints, where all
traffic might be stopped along main arteries of travel and commerce.
Theoretically, these were a safeguard to civiliansa method of making the
highways more hazardous for guerrillas and their supporters.
In reality, checkpoints became collection points; too often the soldier found
that by collecting a "toll," he could increase his scanty pay and allowances. The
commanding General of the Armed Forces, traveling in civilian clothes, was
asked for "coffee money" by a soldier who did not recognize him. Before it
wasfinallyabandoned, the permanent checkpoint not only had proved utterly
inadequate as a limitation on Huk movement, but had created widespread
corruption among troops and commercial truckers. What was almost as serious
was the fact that the militaryrepresenting the governmenthad worsened
relations between the people and the government.
Even military measures directed solely against the enemythe guerrilla and
his supportersmust be weighed for their effect on the attitude of the people
toward their government as well as for their military value. For example, from
1946 to 1949, some of the most effective military action against the Hukbalahap
was taken by the Nenita unit and its successor organizations under the same
commander. The Nenita unit was organized as a small semi-independent hunter-
killer detachment to seek out and destroy top leaders of the Huk. Openly based
in the heart of the strongest Huk area, it sought by disciplined, ruthless action to
strike terror into the guerrillas and their supporters. It was popularly (but
erroneously) thought to take no prisoners, to grant no quarter. By dint of hard
intelligence work and clever ruses, the unit did succeed in capturing or killing
many Huk, in substantially dampening thefightingspirit of many more, and in
reducing the effectiveness of local support organizations. The Nenita unit
certainly contributed in no small measure to the Huk decision to acceptor
pretend to accept-an amnesty proffered by the Philippine Government in 1948.
But the over-all effect of the Nenita operation, and of the reputation it
established throughout the country was, on the whole, to increase support for
the Huk. How could a government claiming concern for the welfare of the
people and protection of their interests support a gang of ruthless killers, many
of whose victims were not proved traitors? The political repercussions were
serious, as might be expected in a democratic country. Even more damaging
to the government was the condemnatory attitude of the press, cunningly
intensified by Huk propagandists. In the end, many Filipinos were convinced
that the government, by the use of such a force showed itself to be at least as
bad as the Huk, and perhaps less deserving of support than the "agrarian
reformers."
There were other practices of the military, such as the zona, or village-
screening operation, which created great ill will toward the armed forces, yet
were undeniably effective means of hitting active guerrillas. It was essential to
make the armed forces more effective in hitting them, and this could scarcely
be done if techniques of proven utility were summarily abandoned.
The answer lay in changing the attitudes of the soldiers toward the civilians,
toward the guerrillasin fact, toward the war. The lack of success in suppressing
the Huk movement had adversely affected the morale of members of the armed
forces as much as it had that of other government servants and the governed
themselves. The armed forces were thoroughly committed to conventional
doctrine and to conventional methods of waging war. To the military theoreti-
cian, the purpose of the armed forces was to repel, or to prepare to repel, exter-
nal aggression. The Huk campaign appeared no more than a lengthy and
tiresome diversion from that objective. To many of those in thefieldagainst the
Huk, in a campaign that the government seemed unwilling to support suffi-
ciently to make possible its successful conclusion, a state of desultory combat
had become a way of life. Worst of all, soldiers in the field had come to look
upon the civilian population in the area of operations as composed largely of
enemies or enemy supporters, people whose protection was no part of their
mission.
These attitudes had to be changed. They werein many ways. Essentially,
the changes meant instilling in the soldier, at all echelons, an understanding
of the mission of government, and the true mission of the armed forces. This
was not a simple process, for it involved convincing the soldier that the gov-
ernment was dedicated to, and aggressively pursuing, its mission, which nec-
essarily included effective support for the soldier. It involved, too, demanding
that the soldier effectively accomplish his mission in all its aspects, from
protecting civilians to aggressively pursuing and imposing his will on the
guerrilla.
One of the moves that convinced the soldier was the emphasis the government
placed on neutralizing support for the enemy by actions other than military. The
soldier realized, at least intuitively, that the wide acceptance won by Huk slogans
(he was at least tempted to believe some of them himself) meant that the
government itself was generally disliked and distrusted. There were many reasons
for this, but at the time Magsaysay became Secretary of National Defense, the
greatest single cause was widespread indignation over the last Presidential
election.
The 1949 election was marked by many fraudulent actions. To what extent
these occurred at the direction of, or with the knowledge of, the highest offi-
cials of the country cannot be determined and is not really important. Political
analysts have found it probable that whatever frauds were committed, they did
not significantly affect the outcome of the election. However, knowledge of
fraud was sufficiently widespread, the protests of losers were so loud and so
persistent, and the propaganda by the Huk so effective, that the people of the
Philippines were to some degree persuaded that the chief executive had stolen
his office. And the chief executive himself believed that nothing he could say
THE MISSION 81
or do, nothing except his re-election, would convince the people of hisrightto
hold office.
Throughout the government, officials had reached a state of mind com-
pounded in roughly equal parts of frustration, justifiable indignation, defeatism,
and self-justification. So many of the charges made against them by the press
(and the Huk, whose purposes were very often served by the press) appeared
palpably untrue to those in a position to know, and so many imputations of evil
intentions were known by the accused to be false, that responsible officials had
concluded that efforts to disprove the charges against them would be construed
as a tacit admission of their truth.
A wholesale change in attitudes was clearly necessary. This might have
been effected much more efficiently, with much better utilization of government
resources, had the leader of the counterguerrilla movement been the chief
executive or if there had been a master plan. Only in an antiguerrilla effort
directed or, at least, wholeheartedly supported by the chief executive is it
possible to use all existing government agencies. In the very propaganda
slogans the guerrillas find successful, one may often find the clue to which
department of government should take countering action.
For instance, when the guerrillas make profitable use of the slogan "Land
for the Landless," then the ministry responsible for allocating and/or developing
land should proclaim the government's intention of making land available
within the limits of its resources for those who honestly desire it and will work
for it.
If an effective slogan of the guerrillas is a demand for "Equal Justice for
All," then the ministry of justice must find some dramatic way of demonstrat-
ing that justice is in fact dispensed equally to all.
In the Philippines, no Cabinet minister denied the desirability of such actions
when Ramon Magsaysay took office as Secretary of National Defense. But
none of the high officials in government understood the urgency for action in
his own department. Their situation was not easy. The Secretary of Agriculture,
for instance, was concerned with restoring normal agricultural production in a
country largely devoted to agriculture, a country whose agricultural productiv-
ity had been greatly reduced, even to the extent of rendering manyfieldsunus-
able, during the period of Japanese occupation. The enormity of these tasks
blinded the Secretary of Agriculture to the urgency, if his government was to
survive, of responding to the desires, to the demands so skillfully elaborated
and exacerbated by the Huk, for land for the landless. The Secretary's answer
was truthful and totally inadequate: A resettlement program was in progress,
but it was not important in comparison with other agricultural emergencies.
The same sort of reaction came from the Department of Justice. That
department was staggering under an overwhelming work load. Officials were
for the most part sincere, even efficient, but they were much too busy to expend
time and attention on petty cases, much less on publicizing their actions on
such cases. And the occasional instances of dishonesty or inefficiency in the

administration of justice did not warrant the broadside attacks being made on
the whole department. The Secretary was not inclined to dignify such attacks
by any dramatic action.
Into this atmosphere of dissatisfaction and recriminations, the new Secretary
of National Defense swept with no planned action beyond his sincere and
dedicated conviction that the people must be assured of the intention of the
government to promote their welfare and of the effectiveness of the government
in doing so.
What were the resourcespolitical and militaryon which Ramon
Magsaysay could draw in 1950, when he was appointed Secretary of National
Defense and charged with eliminating the Huk guerrilla movement?
The Philippines had a government and a people universally committed to
the objective of a government elected by the people, dedicated to their welfare
and protection, based on widespread democratic institutions. There was a
fairly well-developed system of communications, a relatively high standard of
literacy, and a tradition of political discussion and of popular participation in
government. There was a notably free-spoken press of large circulation,
which, whatever its faults, could not seriously be suspected of being under
government control or even of being susceptible to control. The Philippines
had a small but relatively well-trained and well-disciplined armed force. Not
least, the individual Filipino was accustomed to taking personal action, to
fight, if need be, for the establishment and the maintenance of liberty.
The situation in the Philippines will not have an exact parallel in any other
country. However, a surprising number of similarities will probably be found
to exist in greater or lesser degree in any country faced with a serious guerrilla
problem. Perhaps the greatest difference, likely to be found in some of the
newly emerged nations, will be a general lack of understanding of the
institutions essential to representative government (i.e., a free press, schools,
means to guarantee civil liberties, civilian-military balance, etc.). Any such
lack of understanding or appreciation of the necessity for these institutions
will offer a real challenge, but one that can be turned to the advantage of the
(presumably) better-equipped counterguerrillas, if they can understand these
requirements.
The basic plan for counterguerrilla action must provide for immediate and
effective action to: ensure national security and effective administration; keep
actions of government compatible with the objectives of government; inform and
convince the people (including the guerrillas) that the Administration has a cause
and that they should help that cause (an effective and desirable government).
At various times and under certain circumstances, one of these three
elements may take precedence over the others, but none can be forgotten. The
task becomes one of organizing and employing all available resources for
translating these elements into positive action, positive achievement.
THE MISSION 83
Magsaysay was the only high official in the Philippine Government who
realized the necessity foror could implementthese three approaches. Others
in the Administration unanimously agreed on the validity and the desirability of
the mission, but they failed to relate it to their own activities.
To obtain the balanced effort necessary to win for the government the
necessary popular support, especially from the apathetic or uncommitted
majority, Magsaysay was forced to use the armed forces, the press, public-
spirited citizens. Everyone and everything possible was made to serve this
purpose.
It was not coincidence that most of the private citizens who joined his effort
were men who had themselves fought as guerrillas (against the Japanese) and for
the same objectives. Further, as a former guerrilla, Magsaysay realized not only
the necessity for obtaining maximum commitment to the struggle, he realized
also the basic imperative of successful counterguerrilla war: the need to seize the
initiative from the guerrilla on all fronts, psychological as well as military.
Understanding also that only active reform in the government could win the
people to its support, Magsaysay himself became the most convincing argument
that reform was in process. His youth, his exuberance, his decisiveness, his
confidence in himself and in his country, the humorous temperament that kept
him from self-aggrandizementall these helped to convince the people that a
new era, their era, had dawned. No one, seeing him in action, could doubt his
determination to make good the claim that the soldiers were the protectors of
the people, the members of government the servants of the public. He inspired,
as well as required, those under his leadership to prove their dedication and
sense of mission.
This rededication to the ultimate mission of government obviously imposed
limitations on the actions that could be taken. Protectors of the people could
scarcely operate checkpoints to extort coffee money. More, it imposed stiffer
requirements for effective actionaction to demonstrate effective protection
against those whom he denounced as enemies of the people. Otherwise, his
claims were but empty words, he himself another demagogue, and the Huk
virtually assured of easy victory.
To dramatize the intention to afford the maximum assistance and protection
to those who wished to be good citizens, and its corollary of relentless action
against those who wished harm to good citizens, Magsaysay announced the
policy of "Ail-Out Friendship or All-Out Force." The Hukbalahap who would
work for, rather than against the people, i.e., who would surrender, would
receive a friendly welcome and the help he might need to rehabilitate himself.
The Hukbalahap who continued to fight against the people and their govern-
ment would be repaid in his own currencyforce.
The color and magnetism of a Magsaysay are not an essential prerequisite
to success as a counterguerrilla leader, although they are very helpful. It is
essential that he understand, and pursue, the mission of government, as well
as the immediate political and military actions necessary to defeat the guerrilla.
It is imperative that military actions contribute to the over-all mission of
convincing people of the good faith of their government.
In counterguerrilla warfare, as distinguished from conventional operations,
the military is thrown into close contact with the civilians in the area of
operationssince the guerrillas use the civilians as a shield and as a source of
supplies. Whether his mission is to attack the guerrillas, or to protect the people
from guerrilla attacks, the soldier must act in such close proximity to the peo-
ple that the most significant part of the environment of antiguerrilla warfare is
neither the terrain nor the weather; it is the ever present "sea" of civilians.
In moving in this sea, military personnel must, of course, be effective if
they encounter guerrillas. More, they must so act as to carry conviction to the
civilians that they are not sharks seeking to snap up guerrillas and any other
"fish" that come their way; but that, instead, they are seeking to drive away
the guerrilla sharks, and to help in other ways as well.
Militarily, this makes sense when it is put to the test of practice. The critical
military need in antiguerrilla operations is to obtain information about the
guerrillas, and to deny them information about friendly forces. This is most
effectively and economically accomplished by securing civilian cooperation.
With such cooperation, military forces need not greatly exceed the numbers of
the guerrillas. Without cooperation, an overwhelming numerical superiority
(historically, sometimes as high as 200 soldiers to 1 guerrilla) must be achieved.
A form of military organization must be provided capable of effective
acceptance of responsibility in a given region for operations against the
guerrillas, and for the inhabitants. Whatever form of organization is chosen, it
must be one that will prove to the local citizens that the primary mission of the
troops is the welfare of the nation and the protection of its citizenry. Effective
action against the guerrillas is essential, but effective action against the
guerrillas that simultaneously alienates the people is self-defeating. However,
effective action that gains the support of the people for the armed forces will
almost certainly lead to effective action against the guerrillas.
Planning and organizing effective action to gain the support of the people
for the armed forces parallels the steps needed to gain the support of the
people for the government. Both may often be achieved by dramatic attack on
conditions that have given rise to effective slogans of the guerrillas.
A popular grievance that was once prevalent in the Philippines, and is usually
to be found in countries subjected to prolonged guerrilla and antiguerrilla effort,
is the behavior of the troops. Troop misbehavior under these conditions results
not alone from lack of discipline; more often, it is traceable simply to inadequate
appreciation by the command of the requirements of antiguerrilla operations.
This last has many aspects, all of them militating against troop success.
Food for soldiers, especially for troops on patrol or actively engaged in
operations, is often a problem that generates unnecessary civilian hostility.
THE MISSION 85
Frequently, soldiers are forced for want of supplies to forage, to levy on the
inhabitants of the area, for their food. Usually, this food is neither gra-
ciously sought nor willingly given; rather, it is taken and yielded in ways
creating ill will on each side. Foraging and stealing by counterguerrillas
must be stopped if popular support for them is to be achieved. It can easily
be stopped, if the command will take the trouble to supply them with rations
or money.
Magsaysay said that every member of the Armed Forces had two missions:
He must be an ambassador seeking to build good will for his outfit and his gov-
ernment; he must also be a fighter seeking to kill or capture at least one enemy.
Effective action to gain popular support usually necessitates many activities

not in the normal role of the armed forces. Some of these should be under-
taken by other more appropriate agencies of government, were it not advanta-
geous to highlight the accomplishments and dramatize the role of the armed
forces. These actions (although often prompted by grievances exploited by the
guerrillas) must not appear to be taken because of guerrilla demands, but must
rather seem to prove the futility or malice of the guerrillas.
Thus, for example, "Land for the Landless" was an effective battle cry for
the Huk. The reaction to this was so highly emotional that the slogan could not
be countered; it had to be captured by dramatic government action. The need
for land-settlement programs, at least as a political measure, had long been
acknowledged by the government and a program of land settlement was actu-
ally under way. But the program lacked emphasis, drama, and popular appeal.
The officials in charge of the program could see no need for exploiting their
tasks as part of the antiguerrilla effort. Ideally, they should have expanded this
program with a coordinated publicity program to drive home the realization
that anyone who claimed to be fighting to get land of his own needed only to
surrender, and demonstrate his sincerity, in order to be helped to his own farm.
This the officials could not, or would not, do, so an agency of the Armed Forces
did it. It is not a recommended solution, but it was one that was necessary then
and it succeeded. It may be that other governments will find the same solution
the most feasible.
Another plea, "Equal Justice for All," had found widespread support.
Traditionally, there were complaints that the agencies of government, and
especially the courts, listened only to the rich and influential. Peasants believed
that they could not hope for a fair hearing, much less justice, in court unless
they could hire an expensive lawyer. Obviously, an effective, aggressive, pub-
lic defender program, such as had been initiated many years before, was in
order. Obviously, too, if this program was really to pay off in terms of winning
support for the government, it must be effectively publicized. Such a program
could not be initiated by the Secretary of National Defense, and he could not
get other agencies of government to implement it.
Magsaysay's solution was this: He made it known that the services of the
Judge Advocate General's Corps, the legal branch of the Armed Forces, were
available to peasants who had substantive grievances and could not afford
adequate representation in court.
It was widely believed that government officials in general were not respon-
sive to the needs of the poor and those without influence, that more often than
not, the poor man was abused by military and civilian officials alike. Magsay-
say announced that any man who believed he had a legitimate grievance
against an official of government, civilian or military, need only go to the
nearest telegraph office and send a telegram to him, the Secretary of National
Defense, in order to receive fair play. Since this cost was often regarded as
prohibitive, Magsaysay arranged that these telegrams could be sent to him for
the equivalent of five cents. Further, he promised, and made good on it, that
each telegram would be answered within twenty-four hours and that an inves-
tigation of the complaint would be initiated within the same period. This was
so successful that when Magsaysay became President, he established a special
agency within the Office of the President to continue the practice.
The Philippines is a country where people have a passion for education.
Many of the schoolhouses had been destroyed during the Japanese occupation.
Many of those that were left, especially in Huklandia, were either destroyed
during the campaigns against the Huk or were used by the military as troop
headquarters. Realizing the importance placed on education, Magsaysay
ordered the troops out of the schoolhousesexcept for those soldiers who
could act as teachers. More than that, he encouraged troop units to build
schoolhouses in their spare time, and when the national situation permitted, he
organized a special unit of Army Engineers that prepared 4,000 prefabricated
schoolhouses to be erected by troops or civilians.
Who gave the Secretary of National Defense these many missions? As he
saw it, the limited mission given him of eliminating the guerrilla rebellion was
inextricably linked with the national mission. Accordingly, he felt free to do
anything that, in his judgment, would advance the national mission.
In his letter of resignation from the post of Secretary of National Defense,
written to the President February 28,1953, after it had become apparent that he
could no longer act freely in improvising solutions to existing needs, he said:
Under your concept of my duties as Secretary of National Defense, my job is

just to go on killing Huk. But you must realize that we cannot solve the problem
of dissidence simply by military measures. It would be futile to go on killing
Huk, while the Administration continues to breed dissidence by neglecting the
problems of our masses.
The need of a vigorous assault on these problems I have repeatedly urged
upon you, but my pleas have fallen on deaf ears. To cite an instance, some
eight months ago I informed you that the military situation was under control,
and I offered to leave the Department of National Defense in order to speed
THE MISSION 87
up the land-settlement program of the government. My purpose was to shift

our attack on Communism to one of its basic causes in our country, land
hunger.
This letter was obviously written with a shrewd eye to its use later when he
announced his candidacy for the Presidency, but nevertheless it hit too close to
home. For two and a half years, Magsaysay had been free-wheeling, taking
actions far outside the scope of his normal duties, with the result that in less
than two years, the rebellion had been brought under control. If the value of
these actions had by that time been still so little realized that such a letter
could be written and used with telling effect, it may be safely assumed that no
one else would have undertaken them.
The leader of antiguerrilla operations in a nation should be the chief executive.
Only he can assure that the necessary actions are taken by the appropriate
agency of government, that existing organizations, plans, and assets are used to
the best effect. If undertaken in this way, the actions necessary to counter the
guerrilla threat can better be fitted into the long-range programs of govern-
ment, and presumably assigned to the men best fitted for the tasks. There will
be less waste motion and duplication of effort; and there will be far better
assurance of a continuation of long-range programs, such as land settlement.
The accomplishments of the Secretary of National Defense of the Philippines
and the wide range of action he undertook have been stressed to emphasize the
truth of the old adage that there are more ways than one to skin a cat, an adage
which could well be emblazoned on the escutcheons of the effective guerrilla
and of the effective counterguerrilla warrior alike. If one agency of govern-
ment cannot accomplish a function necessary to successful prosecution of the
counterguerrilla effort, another agency, or even a civilian organization, must
do it. If no organization for a purpose exists, one may be improvised, or the
task accomplished without organization. If a needed law does not exist, and
cannot be secured, there may be ways to accomplish the task with no other law
than the consent of the people.
There has been much discussion of the proper relationships between military
and civilian authorities at provincial and lower levels, in "counterinsurgency"
situations. The British have evolved a system, apparently their standard, of
formal committees, chaired by the civilian executive, including military,
police, and intelligence chiefs of the area, augmented by civilians. This is
undoubtedly effective under the conditions of respect for law and mutual trust
found in their territories. In many parts of the world, such a set-up would be
almost a guarantee of delay and ineffectiveness.
Counterguerrilla operations in the Philippines were carried out without any
formal arrangements governing military and civilian relationships on the
working level. Local executives, military or civilian, possessed police powers.
The judiciary was, often fiercely, independent. To the extent judged practical
by local leaders, civilian functions of government were carried on in normal
fashion. Since the local executives were either elected by the people under
their jurisdiction or appointed by the next higher elected official, the civilians
had political influence that they did not hesitate to use. The military officials
might or might not have political influence, depending on their inclinations
and on their family connections.
Until the end of 1950, the soldier without powerful political connections was
almost sure to lose in any disagreement with the politicians. The Huk leader,
Taruc, probably escaped capture on at least one occasion when an operation
was summarily called off at the request of a provincial Governor. After Mag-
saysay became Secretary of National Defense, the officer who was trying to do
a job was assured of political backing if he was right in what he was doing.
That backing was not always enough to ensure that the officer won, however.
One incident demonstrates the difficulties inherent in such an informal situation
when politics rears its ugly head. A town Mayor was proved to be supporting the
Huk. He was arrested, formally charged with offenses ranging from illegal asso-
ciation to murder, and placed in jail without bail pending trial. In spite of this, he
was believed to be such an effective vote-getter that the provincial Governor,
together with the National Chairman of the party in power, decided that he should
be released and become an endorsed candidate for re-election. Learning of the
plan, the military commander responsible for the province visited the Governor,
warned him that the man could not be legally released, and secured a verbal
agreement that no attempt to do so would be made.
A day or so later, the officer learned that the man had been released and
was, in fact, about to appear at a political rally. With a few trusted officers, he
went to the scene, found the Mayor on the speakers' platform together with
the Governor and the Chairman of the party. Forthwith, he rearrested the
Mayor. To the barely concealed chagrin of the military at the scene, the politi-
cians confined their reactions to threats.
Almost immediately, the commander, then a lieutenant colonel highly
esteemed by Secretary Magsaysay, was ordered by him to return to Manila, in
tones that boded no good. Once assured of the facts in the matter, the Secretary
visited the President and worked out a compromise. The officer was relieved
of his command and "exiled" to the United States for a time, in lieu of the
drastic action on which the politicians were insisting. The Mayor stayed in jail,
was convicted on some of the lesser charges, and was only recently pardoned
coincidentally, shortly before an election.
This incident is typical of the problems that exist when there is no formal divi-
sion of authority between civilian and military commanders. It emphasizes even
more the problems that may arise in a democratic society when the military com-
mander (who has no interest in votes, especially those of guerrilla sympathizers)
is placed under the authority of one who must seek votes wherever they exist.
There is another side to the coin. Had the Governor been under the com-
mand of the Colonel, the incident might well have caused a rupture that would
THE MISSION 89
have placed the majority of the residents of the province in active political
opposition to the local army chief, perhaps on the side of the guerrillas. All in
all, the ad hoc solution reached in the Philippines, where military command-
ers and provincial Governors had approximately equal political influence with
the chief executive (after the Constabulary was attached to the armed forces)
was perhaps the best possible for their situation. It may well be the best solu-
tion in other areas faced with an insurgency problem that is complicated by
popular respect for formal, elective government. The important thing is the
accomplishment of the mission by means not inconsistent with national
purpose, with the mission of government.
Who does what, and how the activities are organized (in counterguerrilla or
guerrilla warfare), is far less important than understanding the mission and
being determined to accomplish it by means not inconsistent with the mission.
So long as a sufficient number understand the mission and what it implies,
seek to accomplish it with a dedication and an intelligence not substantially
inferior to that of the enemy, and receive adequate political support, the coun-
terguerrilla effort should not usually be difficult. The counterguerrilla, whether
working on the national or the local level, must assess the resources available
and employ them as may be necessary to accomplish the mission.
The mission: to establish a political base, to protect it from the physical and
psychological assaults of the guerrilla, and absorb within it the political base
of the guerrilla.
NOTE
1. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint
Usage (Washington, D.C.: JCS Pub. 1, February, 1962), p. 144.
Chapter 8
TARGETTHE GUERRILLA
THE AVERAGE guerrilla met personally is so unimpressive that mounting a

conventional military operation against him seems as unfair, as inappropriate, as
sending a platoon of soldiers to shoot an overgrown tomcat wandering in 10,000
acres of forest. And one operation is about as likely to succeed as the other. Like
the tomcat, the guerrilla may be more a nuisance than a threat, a nuisance con-
stantly renewed if the conditions that permit him to develop and go wild are not
changed, if his habitat is not rendered hostile to him.
Action with the guerrilla as the immediate, direct target will seldom if ever
eliminate a viable guerrilla movement. However, some success in hunting the
guerrilla must be achieved for the government he opposes to be able to make
plausible its claim to be an effective guardian of the popular welfare. Effective
action against the guerrilla target is essential.
Initially, actions against the guerrilla are likely to be full-dress hunting trips,
conventional military (or police) operations. After a few such hunting trips, in
which the guerrilla (or tomcat) has probably not been seen, although he may
have been felt, the target begins to take on the attributes of a superman (or super-
beast) in the minds of the hunters. Political authorities, and the press, begin to
regard the government forces as incompetent sub humans, too lazy and too stu-
pid tofindanything except, perhaps, their rations.
Until a record of continuing success in killing or capturing guerrillas is estab-
lished, public and government opinion will probably oscillate between viewing
the guerrilla as a pitiful victim and as a superman. The image projected will vary
with the interest of the projector, but denigration of guerrilla capabilities will be
useless until the hunters can point to victories.
The truth is, of course, that the guerrilla is a man, capable of acting boldly in
concert with other men (i.e., as a member of a military organization) or of act-
ing singly or in small packs like a wild animal, capable of killing but interested
most keenly in self-preservation. The competent guerrilla when hunted will
usually adopt the animal role, striking back viciously if given a chance.
The hunter must understand and accept these facts of life. He must expect
contumely until he has established a record of success. He must understand
also that the guerrilla, if allowed the initiative, may attack him or his charges
in overwhelming strength. On the other hand, if the guerrilla is not allowed to
concentrate his forces, he will be as elusive as the cat in the forest. Understanding
this, the guerrilla hunter will be prepared to meet an attack made by a (usu-
ally) poorly organized, poorly equipped force numerically superior to his own,
even while he is dispatching parties of qualified hunters.
Action directly against the enemy is usually thought of as being designed to
kill or capture him, or to make him surrender. In antiguerrilla operations (as well
as in the last stage of conventional warfare), one other form of action must be
added: action intended to make the enemy quit and go homepermanently.
To kill an enemy, it is necessary to use a weapon on him. To capture him usu-
ally requires demonstrating the imminent effective use of a weapon. To cause
his surrenderor resignation from the warit is necessary only to overcome
his will to continue tofight.This may be the easiest and cheapest solution, like
luring the cat out of the forest with a trail of valerian or scaring him out with
dogs. So with the guerrilla. He may be persuaded that he can better serve his
purpose by giving up the fight, or he may be convinced by words and deeds
(reducing his rations and arms supply, lessening his choice of targets or his
mobility, increasing the skill and numbers of hunters) that continued guerrilla
activity will be increasingly unpleasant, unprofitable, and, ultimately, fatal.
Actions taken by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) against the
Hukbalahap between 1946 and 1950 cannot properly be considered failures.
Accuratefiguresare not available, but during thosefiveyears, the AFP undoubt-
edly killed, captured, or caused the permanent submergence into the civilian
population of at least half the guerrillas originally in thefieldagainst them. The
AFP's own losses during that period were negligible. For an armed force with
relatively little logistic support, operating against a guerrilla enemy at least half
its own strength, that is not a record of failure.
Conversely, its actions cannot be called successful. The AFP, during this
period, eliminated only two top leaders of the Huk. They permitted the Huk
guerrillas to inflict heavy casualties and heavy losses on the people. Worst of
all, the guerrillas gained in strength; during that period their number increased
by probably 3,000-4,000.
The forces initially arrayed against the Huk were Philippine Constabulary1
companies, with a nominal strength of ninety-eight officers and men, armed at
first only with billy clubs, side arms, and carbines. These companies could not,
TARGETTHE GUERRILLA 93
militarily speaking, engage an armed, organized, hostile group. Politically as

well as militarily, the Constabulary was restrained from initiating action against
the Huk. After the Constabulary secured more adequate weapons (rifles, some
machine guns, and mortars) and was encouraged to seek and destroy Huk units,
it was still fettered by political considerations. Most damaging of these were
calls to protect villages, towns, and large estates by garrisoning them. As a
result, most of the personnel of each company were more or less permanently
tied down by guard duty, in detachments of five tofiftymen.
From one to fifteen Constabulary companies were assigned to each prov-
ince, under the command of a Provincial Provost Marshal, later called the
Provincial Commander, who was the chief military authority of the province
and had a small staff. Not directly under the control of the provincial Governor,
he was, nevertheless, under a practical compulsion to cooperate with him and
win his good will. If the Governor belonged to the political party of the
Administration, or if the Governor's support for that party was desired by
the Administration, military considerations often had to defer to political
realities (nowhere more real than in the Philippines).
Under these circumstances, the offensive capabilities of the armed forces
were substantially diluted; in fact, they often seemed nonexistent. Worse, the
troops pinned down to guard duty were, for the most part, unable to secure
tactical information about the guerrillas since the civilian populationthe
best source of such intelligencehad been antagonized by the troops' behav-
ior, which reflected the lax supervision and discipline inevitable when small
detachments are long in one place. Although the troops encountered intel-
ligence problems, the guerrillas had no difficulty obtaining information about
the troops. Patrols usually neither saw nor heard of guerrillas, unless the guer-
rillas decided to ambush them.
Such conditions are not conducive to aggressive patrolling or to aggressive
action of any kind against the nominal enemy. The psychological hazard of
the defensive, so often cited by past military writers, is seldom greater than in
counterguerrilla warfare. If the enemy is aggressive, troops on the defensive
begin to picture him as ten feet tall, with a magic cloak of invisibility. If the
enemy is not aggressive, why pick a fight? Building morale, esprit de corps,
an aggressive attitude, is the problem that every commander at every echelon
must face and solve many times in any continuing counterguerrilla war. This
was one of the difficult tasks in the early period in the Philippines.
The situation was discouraging. Patrols were seldom successful. Demands
for troops to act as guards were too heavy. There seemed to be neither a reason
nor a capability for antiguerrilla action. The civil branch of government
appeared to have no real determination to defeat the Huk, at least no determina-
tion expressed in terms of moral support and materiel for the men arrayed
against them. More and more, the troops took a defensive attitude. They went
through the motions; they maintained garrisons. At times, they furnished heavy
escorts for rice harvests being moved from the field to town. They investigated
reports of Huk concentrations if the source seemed reasonably reliable and if
there was a chance of making contact. Aside from these sporadic efforts, the
Constabulary and the army units attached to them were sitting out the war.
This was not true of all units at all times, of course. Some units took up an
aggressive posture immediately. Sometimes this was successful. Sometimes
when they seemed on the verge of success, they were called off by civilian
authorities. Sometimes the aggressive commander caused so much trouble for
the politicians or committed so many abuses against civilians in his efforts to
get information that he was relieved of his command.
This pattern had begun to be quite recognizable by the end of 1946. Then,
near the end of that year, the assistant intelligence chief of the Philippine
Constabulary obtained permission to form a hunter-killer team and take it into
the field to "find and finish" the Supreme Commander, Luis Taruc. This team
was the Nenita unit.
The commander did not manage to catch Taruc, but in the next two years,
his group operated aggressivelya group at times augmented by two or three
companies of Constabulary, at other times made up of only forty to fifty men.
They pursued the hunt relentlessly, seeking information about Huk units,
contacting them by one ruse or another and then destroying as many as they
could. Militarily, this effort was an unqualified success, in comparison with
what was accomplished by other forces in this period. Politically, it was less
than successful.
Most armed-forces action against the Huk was still confined to garrison duty,
some patrol activity (not infrequently carried out in company strength), and
more or less routine police activities. Checkpoints were set up along the main
highways; occasional screening, or zona, operations were carried out. These
actions seldom met with success, but they did at least keep some pressure on the
guerrillas. There were several large-scale operations during this periodthe
encirclement of Mount Arayat, already described, which involved around 3,000
troops. Usually, these resulted from pressures generated by the chiding of a high
government official or from scathing newspaper comments. As might be imag-
ined, they did not meet with much success, nor did the participants really expect
to do more than make a show of force in order to ameliorate what they felt to be
unjust criticism.
The first effective large operation against the Huk developed in reaction to
an ambush. The rich central plain of Luzon is bordered on the east by a range
of extremely rugged mountains, the Sierra Madres, which extend for twenty
to fifty miles to the east coast of the islands. On April 28, 1949, Dona Aurora
Quezon, widow of President Manuel Quezon, was motoring with a large party
on the northernmost road traversing the mountains from west to east. About
midway through the mountains, the ambushers struck, killing Dona Aurora,
her daughter and son-in-law, and several others of the party.
For the first time, widespread popular wrath flared against the Huk. The
armed forces were told in no uncertain terms that they must eliminate the
ambushers, and the officer placed in charge was virtually told not to come back
unless he accomplished his mission. Fortunately, he was given a free hand and
overriding authority throughout the whole area of operations.
To this operation were assigned nearly 4,000 men, organized as two provi-
sional battalions of Constabulary and one army battalion. The ambushers were
reported to have withdrawn northward into the mountains, an area never before
penetrated by troops. There was, of course, no assurance that the Huk would
continue to move north; in fact, there was every likelihood that they would try
to evade the troops and get back down to the lowlands, where food and shelter
would be available from local sympathizers.
Accordingly, the command was divided into three task forces, with sectors
roughly corresponding to the areas delineated by the principal east-west highway
across the mountains and the principal north-south highway, which skirts the
west side of the mountains from Manila almost all the way to the northern end of
the island. One task force was assigned the inhabited, cultivated area west of the
north-south highway, in which it was to block the escape of the Huk, prevent
supplies getting to them in the mountains, and forestall possible diversionary
attacks by other Huk elements seeking to relieve the pressure on the ambushers.
This mission was assigned to the Second Battalion, First Infantry, Philippine
Army, with attached reconnaissance-car company andfield-artillerybattery.
The mountainous area south of the principal east-west highway was assigned
to a hastily organized provisional Philippine Constabulary battalion with a com-
posite reconnaissance-car company.
There remained the northeastern sector, into which the ambushers had with-
drawn, a solid mass of mountains shown on most maps as a blank (unexplored)
space. The pursuit mission in this difficult area was given to the First Provisional
Battalion, Philippine Constabulary. To it was attached many of the nearly 2,000
civilian-guard auxiliaries from the province of Nueva Ecija who had also been
mobilized for the vengeance operation. Since the emphasis was on covering this
portion of the Sierra Madres with experienced, hard-fighting foot troops, they
were given a commander known for determined, aggressive leadership, Major
Mariano Escalona.
Initial emphasis was on patrolling, especially in the western and southeastern
sectors. Intelligence activities were also pushed in an unprecedented manner.
Great emphasis was placed on personal inspection of the task forces at all hours
of the day and night to determine if patrols had performed their assigned tasks
and had actually reached designated objectives, and if all available personnel
were assigned to patrolling as continuously as humanly possible. Each group
was required to keep a detailed account showing how many patrols were out,
how many men on each and how long the patrol took. There were, in effect,
daily time sheets for every officer and enlisted man.
For two weeks, the task groups concentrated on patrol activities and on gath-
ering intelligence about Huk activities in the area. It was learned that a little
north of the ambush site there was a base supported by a regular supply route
from the lowlands. It was further determined that many members of the ambush
party had been fed by three Chinese storekeepers in a town on the mountain
fringe the day before the ambush. These Chinese confirmed the presence of a
major Huk base in the mountains and identified a key Huk liaison officer in the
lowlands, Pedro Mananta.
When he was picked up, three weeks after the ambush, Mananta was per-
suaded to disclose the location of the Huk commander, Viernes, who had com-
manded the ambush, as well as the position of the mountain base, Mount
Guiniat. He also revealed that the commander of Reco 1 (Regional Command 1,
the major Huk command, which included this area), Commander Dimasalang,
was with Viernes at the mountain base. Perhaps the most important of his dis-
closures was that Huk units in the neighboring lowlands had been ordered to
attack isolated towns to relieve the pressure the task forces were placing on the
Huk who had taken part in the ambush or who were supporting the ambushers.
Despite the lack of terrain information, the approximate position of Mount
Guiniat was determined and an operation against it initiated. The plan was for
five company-size columns to try to converge on the mountain from different
directions, launching a synchronized attack when all were in positionif pos-
sible. By extraordinary good fortune, all five companies reached substantially
the proper positions and by the agreed time. The attack was launched at dawn
on June 1. The Huk knew the troops were in the area, but one of the disadvan-
tages to guerrillas of bases in such extremely rugged and uninhabited terrain
was manifest: The Huk were unable to keep track of all the columns or even
to identify their objectives until too late.
The attack was surprisingly successful, although most of those in the objec-
tive area managed to escape. Eleven Huk were killed, five captured, at a cost
of only two casualties. It was discovered that the objective of this operation
had been only an outpost; the main base lay two miles away.
An attack on that base, covered by mortar fire, was launched on June 2. The
Huk resisted initially, to allow time for their leaders and the bulk of their party to
escape. The vegetation was extremely dense, the terrain all stood on end; these
conditions and their effect on radio communications made control difficult. The
attack was carried on into the night by small parties, squads and half-squads,
moving through the dark, seeking to push forward on a compass bearing that was
intended to bring it to the objective.
The determination with which this attack was carried on produced results.
By early morning, the task group succeeded in entering a settlement of twenty-
three shacks hidden under tall trees. This settlement actually was the buildings
and campus of a Huk "university." The area was immediately saturated with
patrols. Within a week, 37 dead Huk were tallied and several taken prisoner.
From the prisoners, it was learned that Commander Viernes, with an estimated
250 guerrillas and perhaps 200 unarmed followers, was located in another site
about 14 kilometers farther to the northeast.
Another infiltration attack by small patrols, each proceeding on an azimuth,
was launched. A mortar barrage was laid down to cover these patrols when
they came in sight of their objective. Other units followed up, seeking to throw
a cordon around the site. This rather unorthodox operation netted twenty-one
Huk dead and the capture of seventeen wounded as well as three women and
a child. Counterguerrilla casualties were one man killed by falling off a cliff
and four wounded, of whom two died while being evacuated.
Commander Viernes and Commander Dimasalang were not among those
killed or captured. Interrogation of prisoners revealed that there was supposed to
be another base some forty-odd miles farther to the north, still in the mountains,
in the vicinity of a remote valley known as Kangkong. It was determined that
the pursuit should continue, even though this appeared a tremendous task, one
which might well take a day for each of the forty or more miles to be covered.
Another provisional force, composed entirely of armored cars and vehicles,
was formed to patrol the north-south highway continuously and probe as far
as possible into the rudimentary trails running east into the mountains. The
Second and Third Task Groups, reinforced by the bulk of the civilian guards,
were deployed in the lowlands flanking the mountains to keep up maximum
pressure on the Huk there and on Huk suppliers and sympathizers. This pres-
sure was exerted largely through intensive patrolling. The operational pattern
became one of patrolling by half-squads of soldiers. Such patrols in areas
where Huk might be encountered were followed by a platoon of auxiliaries
close enough to reinforce them if a serious fight should break out.
While preparations were under way for resuming the hunt, several incidents
occurred indicating that the denial operations were indeed effective. Survivors
from the mountain bases who reached the lowlands often found their contacts
already arrested or neutralized by government forces. They also found that
anyone who might have participated in the ambush of a widely beloved old
lady was unwelcome to civilians in general. Suspected members of the ambush
party had two alternativessurrender or death.
Those who surrendered furnished information, sometimes no more than two
days old, on happenings among the armed elements of Reco 1 still in the moun-
tains. The guerrillas, they said, had broken up into small units, which, in accor-
dance with their standing orders, were working north toward Kangkong
Valley.
A small but experienced undercover intelligence team, equipped with radios,
was sent to Kangkong. The team members claimed to be lumber cruisers or
mining prospectors. By the middle of June, they began to report that residents
of small settlements in the area were becoming nervous as a result of the
appearance of many strangers from the south who posed as hunters or wood-
gatherers. A store in the principal settlement of Kangkong was identified as the
liaison and rendezvous point of these strangers and placed under surveillance.
Supplies and porters for the pursuit through the mountains were finally
assembled. On June 28, four columns, each of company size, struck north on
parallel routes through the mountains. There were no trails and few guides.
The guides who could be found were tribal inhabitants of the area who seldom
knew what lay more than one or two mountain ridges beyond their homes. The
pattern of advance along the axis assigned each company was unorthodox.
Every morning, each company sent out from four to ten small patrols, each
instructed to head generally north. The patrol that found what seemed to be
the best route for the advance of the company sent back guides to bring up the
rest of the column. This made for slow going, but had the advantage, at least,
of so blanketing the area as to discourage any guerrilla exfiltration to the south.
Not a day passed without one or two encounters with Huk who were probably
lost themselves, and each day one or two more Huk were eliminated.
It took more than two months to move forty miles in airline distance through
the mountains. Finally, the base near Kangkong was located and successfully
attacked on September 11. Commander Viernes, Commander Dimasalang, and
twenty-five of their men were killed, seven were captured, and one surrendered.
This marked the end of the pursuit, the end of the ambush squadron, and the end
of the headquarters command of Huk Regional Command 1. The list of those
killed, captured, and surrendered showed clearly that virtually every man who
had been in the ambush party was accounted for, and not one was again found
in action.
After this, anti-Huk operations slacked off somewhat until the 1949 elec-
tions were over. No politician cared to risk antagonizing any possible voter,
whether Huk or Huk-hunter.
For both government and guerrillas, 1950 proved to be the year of decision.
The guerrillas proved to be completely wrong about what the outcome of their
decision would be. The government saw itself well on the way to victory before
the end of the year, but the victory was achieved in a way it had not anticipated.
As the year began, the Armed Forces of the Philippines decided that
company-size units were no longer sufficient to cope with the Huk; larger units
capable of slugging it out with powerful enemy forces seemed necessary.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines had similar
ideas. Now, they decided, the time was ripe to follow the precepts of Mao
Tse-tung: to establish a conventional army and take the offensive against
government forces. They publicly announced their leadership of the Huk;
more, they renamed them grandiosely and in the best Communist tradition,
"People's Liberation Army" (Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, or HMB).
They established also a timetable for expansion and for the seizure of
national power.
The effects of these decisions of government and guerrillas were not deci-
sive, but they were significant. The decisions of the guerrilla leadership were
manifested in raids that seriously alarmed citizens and government and guaran-
teed that attention would be focused on the guerrilla problem. The decision of
government resulted in the building of the basic military machine for hitting
the guerrilla effectively, not through major combat actions but through many
coordinated small actions.
The Armed Forces of the Philippines decided that the answer to their organi-
zational problem was the formation of battalion combat teams (BCTs). This was
accomplished with the advice and assistance of JUSMAG (Joint U.S. Military
Advisory Group). As quickly as possible, existing units were grouped into
BCTs, retrained, and placed in thefieldwith area responsibilities. Until virtually
the end of the campaign, the BCT with area responsibility remained the basic
operational unit, although in the later stages, two or more BCTs were often
placed under so-called sector commands, comparable to brigades. As they were
required, BCTs or elements of them were assembled for special operations in
task forces.
A BCT was normally composed of a Headquarters and Service Company;
3riflecompanies, each of 110 men; a weapons company armed with mortars and
heavy machine guns; and a reconnaissance company at least partially equipped
with armored cars. Afield-artillerybattery was often attached to the BCT. Other
groups often attached, usually to the Headquarters and Service Company,
included MIS (military-intelligence) teams, Scout-Ranger teams, and, if needed
and available, scout-dog teams. Personnel of the weapons company and of the
field-artillery battery were often employed as riflemen.
This basic organization proved to have greatflexibilityand utility. It seems
well adapted to counterguerrilla operations almost anywhere, especially when
responsibility for protection and clearance of an area is to be imposed on a
commander.
As will often happen under such circumstances, several of the first BCTs
were organized in the field from companies (in this case Constabulary)
already assigned counterguerrilla missions. The 7th BCT met problems that
will often be encountered in counterguerrilla operations. Because the solu-
tions they developed have wide applicability and enjoyed enviable success,
their experiences merit consideration.
The 7th Battalion Combat Team, composed of three rifle companies,
a Headquarters and Service Company and a reconnaissance company, was
given responsibility for counterguerrilla operations in the province of Bulacan
and certain adjacent areasaltogether about 1,200 square miles. Their area
was delineated largely by political boundaries imperceptible on the ground. In
some places, the boundaries followed the natural terrain divisions made by
river or forest that offered natural paths and refuge for the guerrilla. There was
a passable network of all-weather roads, linked occasionally by secondary
roads useful only in the dry season. The province embraced swamp and
mountain, both grasscovered and forested, with lonely settlementsisolated

hummocks thrust up in the swamps, small households clinging to hillsides. In
the lowlands, there were wide expanses of rich rice lands under paddy-field
cultivation (which meant that the fields lay outside the villages of the cultiva-
tors and that they werefloodedpart of the year).
The conditions found by the commander who took over the 7th BCT in
Bulacan Province in July, 1950, will be encountered by many commanders
assigned to similar commands. Many of the actions he took will be applicable
to the problems of area control by a battalion-size unit in many counterguerrilla
situations.
The BCT was scattered throughout the province. Each company had its
headquarters in a different municipality. Each company furnished a number of
garrisons, ranging from half-squads to platoons in size, scattered throughout
the area of company responsibility. Communications were poor. Civil guards
existed but were under virtually no supervision by the Armed Forces. Municipal
police, in the larger towns, were similarly without direct contact with the army.
About 1,500 active Hukbalahap made this area their home, their training
ground, their supply center, in short, theirs. They were supported by thousands
of active civilian sympathizers. Not a few towns were under almost complete
Huk domination. Pandi, which lay in the crossroads of many access routes to
Manila, was a principal Huk rest area, under the command of its municipal
Mayor.
The 7th BCT had relatively few encounters with the Huk before the new
commander took over, and only one of these was significant. Some four
months before, when the BCT was first formed, a patrol ran into a large Huk
band which engaged them in a fire fight. The patrol fled, leaving behind one
man wounded and two dead.
Under the circumstances, with the dispersion of the command and the strength
and freedom of initiative of the Huk, there was only one reason why there were
not daily encounters with the Huk. The Huk did not want encounters. The Huk
were busy recruiting, developing their strength, setting up support systems,
extending their control of the area. The little half-squad and squad detachments
of the BCT, which they could have snapped up easily, they left unmolested.
How better could they show their contempt, their superiority over the Armed
Forces of the Philippines? In fact, this military force with an authorized strength
of 1,100 officers and enlisted men (actual strength was about 950) continued to
exist only because the Huk did not wish to eliminate it.
This situation was not entirely the fault of either officers or men of the
7th BCT, nor will such conditions often be found to be solely the fault of
any officer or group of officers, although correction must be their respon-
sibility. Such conditions arise only from the apathetic, defensive attitude
that pervades an entire command, if not the entire administration, in a
nation faced with an unchallenged guerrilla movement. When that threat
goes unchecked, it will be found elsewhere, as it was in the Philippines,

that few are imbued with a sense of mission, a sense of urgency. The sup-
ply system is usually bad. The liaison with civilian communities and civil-
ian authorities is almost inevitably poor or nonexistent. Weapons and
equipment are in poor condition, buildings are shabby, everything is marked
by failure, disintegration.
The new commander set out to reverse the process. First, he checked on the
information available about the enemy in the area. He found that a good deal
was known about them. Many of the units and commanders were identified,
and it was known that frequent visits were made by Luis Taruc, the sometime
Supremo. The most significant thing he learned was that the Huk were not on
the offensive against his command, and seemed unlikely to be, so long as his
troops offered them little threat. It was clear that his command was in no
imminent danger of being wiped out.
The commander surveyed the general condition of his troops; he visited
every detachment (many of which had never before been inspected by their
battalion commander). He looked into their tactical situation, their living con-
ditions, and their knowledge of the enemy in the immediate vicinity. He
checked on their liaison with civilians (and found it almost nonexistent). His
headquarters had little or no knowledge of the activities of municipal police
forces or of the civil guards in the area.
The commander immediately assigned an officer of his staff to establish
liaison with civilian authorities for gathering data on all agencies that might
be of assistancespecifically on the civil guard and the municipal police. The
commander wanted to know everything about themidentity, organization,
strength, armament, equipment, particularly communications equipment. And
he wanted this information yesterday.
At the same time, he ordered the withdrawal of all the small detachments
that could be swallowed up by the Huk. He clamored for transportation, for
vehicles to move the troops along the good roads available. He got transporta-
tion by every conceivable means, some of them scarcely within the purview of
army regulations.
As fast as his civilian liaison officer came up with information about the civil-
guard units, these units were brought into the tactical plan. The provincial
Governor was persuaded to give the commander authority over them. Capable
soldiers were detached as liaisons (actually as instructors and commanders) for
major civil-guard units. They were given radio communications. Whenever a
civil-guard unit became capable of putting up substantial resistance to attacks
against its town or village, of holding off an attack until it could communicate
with the army and receive needed reinforcements, troops were withdrawn from
the area.
As troop units were drawn together, they went into intensive programs of
training and patrolling. Comprehensive patrol plans were instituted and their
execution carefully supervised. Intensive intelligence operations of all types

were begun. No longer did the army exist by the toleration of the Huk.
Within three months, there was no garrison in the field smaller than a com-
pany. Within another month, there were only three companies on field-garrison
duty. The rest were assembled at headquarters, undergoing training and consti-
tuting a mobile reserve ready to be moved to any part of the area on report of
Huk incidents.
By October, it was possible to send three companies into combat operations
against the Huk, dislodging them from their lairs and guiding them into an
ambush. In December, the whole Battalion Combat Team was employed in an
operation so shrewdly planned, with three separate forces, each apparently mov-
ing independently, that the command echelons of the Huk were deceived, drawn
into a trap, and largely destroyed. Throughout the province, the only defen-
sive forces in place during this fight were civil-guard units and the munici-
pal police forces. These were able to maintain adequate security because
reinforcements for them could be detached, motorized, and dispatched to any
part of the area within hours.
No other combat-team commander faced an identical situation. Probably no

commander anywhere will face an identical situation. But any commander
ordered to fight guerrillas while protecting the citizenry in a large, partially
inhabited area willfindmany of the same problems and can apply many of the
same remedies.
This patternthe assignment of an area responsibility, and the accomplish-
ment of the mission through extensive patrolling while mobile parties are kept
ready to reinforce local defense forcesseems the best basic approach to the
guerrilla target.
Many reasons dictate maximum utilization of civil- (or home-) guard units
for defense of civilian communities. First, they represent economy of force.
One good noncommissioned officer serving as liaison, trainer, and inspector,
with half the equipment of a platoon, can make an effective combat unit of a
platoon of civiliansfightingfor their families, their homes, perhaps their very
lives. Thirty soldiers are thereby released for offensive action against the guer-
rilla. The cost in training, equipment, and supervision is negligible, but all,
especially the supervision, must be adequate.
Second, an effective civil-guard unit represents the commitment to the side
of the government of many peoplepeople who otherwise might be at best
apathetic; at worst hostile to it. The value of this commitment manifests itself
in many ways, from assistance to troops in nonmilitary aspects, such as provi-
sion of porters, to the furnishing of intelligence and guides.
There are, of course, disadvantages to the use of civil guards, but these can
usually be overcome by careful selection of personnel and adequate supervi-
sion. In the first years of the campaign against the Huk, the disadvantages
were very apparent. Although identical precedent conditions may not exist
elsewhere, similar conditions may, and the results can be virtually the same as
in the Philippines.
To understand the Philippine situation, it is necessary to know that during the
Japanese occupation of the rich rice lands of Huklandia, there were actually
four fighting forces operating. There were the Japanese troops. There were
the Japanese-sponsored (or Japanese-tolerated) Filipino units, both those of the
Bureau of the Constabulary and privately financed outfits formed to protect
the estates of landowners cooperating with the Japanese. These two groups
were proper targets of the legitimate guerrillas and of the Hukbalahap.
The legitimate guerrillas (called USAFFE because they claimed allegiance to
the United States Armed Forces in the Far East) werefightingthe Japanese and
their puppets. Frequently, they also of necessity fought the Huk, since the
Hukbalahap, under cover of their pious claims to befightingthe Japanese were
actuallyfightingto establish Communist domination of the area. This was inter-
preted to the Huk in the ranks asfighting"all those who own land," or fighting
"to establish a legitimate government." To justify their attacks on the legitimate
USAFFE guerrillas, the Huk called them "Tulisafle" (thieves) and "puppets of
the landowners."
Although the legitimate guerrillas disbanded after the liberation of the
Philippines, many small groups in Huklandia held together under arms. Some
were supported by landlords, some by municipal governments, some had no
money or visible support. In many instances this continued quasi-military pos-
ture was not so much for the protection of the landowners or the municipal
officials as it was a matter of self-protection for the ex-guerrillas. The Huk, of
course, did not disband. Not infrequently the preliberation war was continued.
In at least one instance, soon after liberation, ex-guerrillas of a civil-guard
unit rounded up a number of Huk and shot them out of hand. Perhaps this was
justified; whether it was or not, it vastly increased bitterness and tension in
Huklandia. As time wore on, some civil-defense units involved themselves
more and more in politics and in activities to promote their sponsor's welfare,
by legal means or otherwise. Some units, short of pay and equipment, turned
to levying informal taxes on those they protected. Guard-operated checkpoints
came to be toll stations for all who passed. The result was to make the home
guards highly controversial, both locally and nationally.
When Magsaysay took office as Secretary of National Defense, hefirstsought
to disband all civil-guard units. This proved to be impractical: There were not
enough troops to replace all of them, and some units had long rendered necessary
services, so the order was quietly rescinded. Soldiers were detached from army
units and assigned to train and control civilian units. The results were excellent.
Some units became models. They not only protected their own villages but went
out looking for the Huk. They performed both combat and intelligence operations
that greatly relieved the pressure on the troops.
Under Magsaysay's encouragement, some units went even further, taking

on civic-action projectsrepairing roads and building schoolhousesas part
of the duty of village civil guards. This often brought whole villages actively
to the government side.
Civil guards form part of the spiral of success (or failure) in counterguerrilla
operations. More civilian support plus better enemy information plus better
civil guards plus effective troops equal still more civilian cooperation plus still
better information, and even more effective civil defense equals more and more
effective patrolling, etc., until the final phase in the spiral: no more guerrillas.
The importance of small-unit actions in conventional warfare is greatly

enhanced by the weapons of mass destruction. These small actions reach their
greatest importance when the weapon is the ultimateman, acting largely on
his own responsibility, acting as a guerrilla.
The guerrilla is necessarily one of the principal targets of the armed forces
engaged in counterguerrilla operations. He is an elusive target, really danger-
ous only when he is allowed the initiative. To deny him the initiative, it is
necessary to get him, and keep him, off balance; to confront him as often as
possible with an enforced choice between running and accepting proffered
combat. This was accomplished in the Philippines by incessant patrolling.
Patrols always had three missions: obtaining civilian cooperation, gaining
information, looking for the Huk. Patrols proved to be by far the most effec-
tive weapon for applying force to the Huk. Obviously, saturating an area with
active patrols reduced the requirements for defensive garrisons. Reducing the
number of soldiers needed for garrison purposes made more soldiers available
for offensive action against the Huk.
Patrols were of all types, but they usually had one thing in common: They
were smallhalf-squad, squad, perhaps platoon size. The most effective patrols
were the smaller ones. There were regular patrols which passed through specified
areas almost on a schedule, following roads or trails. There were unscheduled,
unexpected patrols, sometimes following an expected one by fifteen minutes.
There were patrols following eccentric routes, eccentric schedules, moving cross-
country at right angles to normal travel patterns, which often unexpectedly inter-
cepted scheduled patrols.
In areas where the Huk could maintain or could easily concentrate strength
greater than that of the patrol, two factors prevented wholesale slaughter. One
was the routine use of reinforcing patrols, that is, patrols moving in coordination,
separated by limited space and/or time, juxtaposed so that if one patrol ran into
the enemy, the others could come to its assistance. The known use of random
patrols moving according to no discernible pattern increased Huk uncertainty as
to the number of enemy who might respond to an attack. The other factor was the
superior training and discipline of the patrolling troops, who could be counted on
to inflict heavy casualties if attacked.
By saturating an area with patrols, guerrilla intelligence nets could be par-

tially eluded, partially overloaded with patrol reports. This made it difficult
for the guerrilla commander to make any decision other than to run. Any alter-
native was likely to be too risky. Competent guerrillas are seldom willing to
attack an observed enemy who will resist, no matter how weak he may be,
unless they can be certain their victim has no chance of reinforcement.
There are many ways by which this guerrilla characteristic can be turned to
advantage. If an enemy is known to be so posted that he will receive warnings
of any approaching force, a small patrol can be used to draw him into pursuit
and into an ambush. Or patrols may be sent out in such number as to make the
guerrilla withdrawwith an ambush waiting along his anticipated route.
The classic patrol method, the use of mounted cavalry, was attempted briefly
in the Philippines and found effective. Unfortunately, it was not used until late
in the campaign and met with many difficulties, from scarcity of mounts and
lack of forage to stubborn opposition from the orthodox military. As a result,
the efficacy of horse cavalry in campaigns of this nature was not adequately
demonstrated.
Light armor was extensively used for patrolling roads. Terrain and crop consid-
erations seldom permitted it to patrol off them. Heavy armor was not used at all.
Operations against the guerrilla were by no means confined to small-unit

actions, although these were the most profitable. A number of large-scale opera-
tions were launched after Magsaysay became Secretary of National Defense.
Their principal value was in harassing the guerrilla. True, each operation resulted
in the capture and destruction of a headquarters, of supplies, of materiel, perhaps
of garden areas where the guerrilla grew some of his food. These small results
could have been accomplished equally well by much smaller units. Large
operations did, however, have the advantage of causing a major "flap" among the
Huk in the area, of increasing the psychological pressure on them. The sight of
so many well-armed, well-fed soldiers made the Huk's own chances of success
seem small. Not infrequently, the large operations also resulted in the subsequent
capture of Huk whose enjoyment of life had been sadly disrupted and who were
apprehended either accidentally, or by small stay-behind units, left in the area
after all troops had supposedly departed. This, incidentally, was the way the
American Communist William Pomeroy and his wife, Celia, were captured.
In seeking ways to hit the guerrilla, or to assist in hitting the guerrilla, a mili-
tary commander will naturally look toward the air for assistance. In some situa-
tions, as in the Philippines, air-force personnel may be eager to cooperate. All
they ask is for a target area to be designated so they can "clobber" it. Unfortunately,
"clobbering" a target area seldom does much good as far as hitting guerrillas is
concerned. Often, some presumably innocent civilians, or their crops, or their
property, are "clobbered" instead, which naturally results in public "clobbering"
of the military and the air support.
The value of air in counterguerrilla operations probably is primarily in its

use as transport, especially for supplies. In the Philippines, the L-5, an artil-
lery observation plane of World War II, was extremely effective in this role.
Two L-5s completely supported two battalions of the Philippine Army in a
month-long march through mountain areas where it was believed Huk might
be based. The effects on the enemy could not be tested, because he had never
gotten that far back in the hills, but the operation was successful because it
dramatically proved the great value of aerial resupply by light aircraft and the
great reliance that could be placed on this method.
Another highly significant use of light aircraft is for liaison and communica-
tions: telling troops on the ground where they are; picking up messagesradio,
visual, or physicalfrom troops and civilian informers.
The abundant vegetation characteristic of many areas of guerrilla operations
substantially reduces the value of direct aerial observation. This drawback can be
offset to a considerable extent by using pilots with long, and almost daily, experi-
ence in an area. It has been found that such pilots will detect signs of activity
absolutely imperceptible to a trained observer who is new to the area. This is one
of the reasons that it is desirable for pilots to be assigned permanently to the unit
(ordinarily at BCT level) they support. Another, and more important reason is
that only by such assignment will pilot,fightingman, and commander develop
the feeling of mutual support, concern, and interdependence that permits the
most effective action. Few experienced patrol leaders care to rely for their food,
their communications, their ammunition, in fact, perhaps their lives, on either a
commander or a pilot they do not know. The pilot, too, is much more likely to
make that little extra effort if he knows that it is Sergeant Paladin, of his own
outfit, who needs that radio battery.
Too often aircraft, by their flight patterns, reveal to enemy observers the
positions or probable intention of the ground troops they are supporting. This
can be avoided only by careful planning and pilot indoctrination. Preferably, an
area of operations should be saturated with aircraft, if they are to be employed
at all. In an area such as that of the 7th BCT, it is desirable that at least one light
aircraft be in the air throughout the hours of visibility. Each flight should fol-
low generally a predetermined route on which expected contact points are indi-
cated, as well as the areas where the aircraft may indulge in deceptive
maneuvers. If a supply drop is planned under circumstances that make it prob-
able that it will be observed, theflightpattern must be such that the aircraft can
make each drop behind local concealment without noticeably changing its
course, or else it must make dummy drops and engage in deceptive maneuvers
that will saturate guerrilla intelligence nets with misleading information.
Only two light reconnaissance helicopters got into action during the major
campaign. These, acting in the casualty evacuation role, had a tremendous
morale effect. Troops who know that casualties can and will be evacuated from
the most remote area act with vastly greater aggressiveness.
Troop-carrying helicopters were obtained too late to play any significant

part, and it is doubtful if they could have been of very substantial assistance.
They are too noisy to use against any guerrilla except one foolish enough to
try to hold his ground, unless available in such numbers as to permit their
almost continuous airborne operation on deception missions. Their role as
transport for reinforcements of beleaguered troops is probably less than might
be supposed, again because of their noise and because their characteristics
make them such an easy target for ground fire. Their utility in direct support
of ground forces seems limited in the present state of the helicopter art.
The value of artillery in counterguerrilla operations has been hotly debated.
From 1946 to 1950, artillery was not infrequently used to shell suspected Huk
concentrations. There were few instances when Huk concentrations were actu-
ally in the impact area. Too often, artillery bombardment, like aerial bombard-
ment, inflicts casualties and damages only upon presumably innocent civilians.
This not only brings hostility from civilians, but also develops contempt in the
guerrilla for the armed forces.
One BCT commander decided to take advantage of artillery, using it as a
deceptive measure, by which he sought to channelize the withdrawal of Huk
alerted by cannonades into routes passing prearranged ambush points. He met
with some success. However, one of his most daring opponents, Huk com-
mander Linda Bie, soon grasped this use of artillery and made it SOP in his
unit that when an artillery barrage was heard, the unit should move toward that
barrage. This action was based on the theory that when the fire ceased, they
could withdraw through that area safely and avoid ambush parties, which were
almost certain to be placed elsewhere. The BCT commander learned of this
and discouraged the practice by lifting a bombardment and then putting it
down again on the same area. Linda Bie countered by moving his troops near
the bombardment area, sending out scouts to make sure there were no troops
between the target and the batteries, and then moving in almost under the
muzzles of the guns.
When this was detected, the commander of the BCT worked out a new plan.
He would start a desultory bombardment, sufficient to alert Linda Bie. Then,
when he thought the guerrillas had drawn into their position between the
impact area and the battery, he started a "rolling" mortar barrage, moving the
impact area out from immediately in front of the mortar tubes, while drawing
the artillery barrage in even closer. The idea was to form a vise that could
squeeze Linda Bie's men into one barrage or the other. The scheme was only
partially successful, but the whole process exemplifies the constant battle of
wits that goes on between guerrilla and counterguerrilla.
In addition to actions designed to kill or capture the Hukor failing that, to
make him move, to get him and keep him on the runthere were, of course,
operations designed to cut off his supplies, and operations designed to weaken
or to destroy his will to resist.
In the early stages of the campaign, actions intended to cut off Huk supplies
were directed primarily against the civilian supply sources. Such operations
amounted to harassment of civilians and, generally, boomeranged. Actions to
protect thericeharvest, or to ambush Huk coming in to take part of the harvest,
were continuous and, on the whole, beneficial, although their direct effect on the
Huk was probably limited. These two observations seem to be characteristic of
food-denial operations. If effective, they alienate the civilian population. If they
do not seriously annoy the civilians, they do not seriously afflict the bellies of
the guerrilla (but they may be worthwhile for their effect on civilian morale).
As early as 1948, the Huk had begun to establish so-called production bases
to grow their own food. Initially, they were primarily to supply training camps
or "schools." These farms and the camps they were intended to supply were
located in areas not ordinarily cultivated, usually populated, if at all, only by
tribal people. As the anti-Huk campaign gained momentum, every effort was
made to identify production bases through the use of aircraft, intelligence
reports, and patrols. Once they were identified, attacks were made that sought
both to eliminate those tending them and to destroy the crops. In timing such
an operation, some commanders were so unsporting as to deny any knowledge
of a production base until a crop was ready to harvest.
A large-scale arms-purchasing program was launched about 1951 to cut off
Huk supplies. Civilians had long been prohibited ownership of firearms other
than shotguns or rifles and pistols of not larger than .22 caliber. In the postwar
years, however, enforcement and respect for this law had broken down to such
a degree that almost anyone could get a temporary permit for possession of
military-type weapons from some government authority. These permits were
withdrawn when the purchase program was instituted. Anyone whose license
to possess firearms was withdrawn usually claimed he had lost the weapon,
transferred it, or turned it in. Such assertions were almost impossible to dis-
prove. However, if the individual was offered a fair price for a weapon with no
questions asked, a weapon was likely to appear. Many thousands of arms were
recovered, but there is no conclusive evidence that the Huk were seriously
handicapped by this campaign. Even when arms were plentiful, some of the
Huk preferred to carry home-made weapons; others already possessed weap-
ons in abundance. Always, it seemed, there were those who could steal ammu-
nition which would get into Huk supply channels.
It is reported that one quite unorthodox, and unsanctioned, measure was prac-
ticed that substantially diminished the flow of arms and ammunition through
illicit commercial channels. This was a device dating back to the operations
against the Moros (Moslem Filipinos) in the early part of the century. During that
period, a certain platoon leader was observed to have a careless habit of dropping
cartridgesthe old 45-70 shells roughly the size of a man's thumb. The Moros
also noticed his outfit's carelessness with cartridgescartridges that were eagerly
collected, of course. However, when the Moros tried to use these cartridges, they
found that cartridge, gun, and man issued their final report simultaneously. The
cartridges had been loaded with dynamite.
No such activity was authorized during the campaign against the Huk. It
appears that in some instances, however, officers who knew of this old device
did insert into Huk supply channels cartridges that destroyed the weapon that
fired them. The psychological and physical effects of such cartridges were
reported as substantial. First of all, a weapon was destroyed, and usually, the
man firing it was seriously injured or at least rendered permanently gun-shy.
There were many secondary benefits. It was not readily clear why the weapon
was destroyed, whether it was the fault of the cartridge or of the gun. Accordingly,
everyone who knew of the incidentparticularly those in the same outfit
immediately became suspicious of his own weapon and his own cartridges. Guns
were taken apart and painstakingly cleaned two or three times a day. Inevitably,
somebody would lose a critical part of his weapon, and anotherfirearmwould be
out of action. Cartridges, too, were taken apart and examinedthat is, if they
were not simply thrown away. Taking a cartridge apart, checking its contents, and
then putting it together again can seriously reduce the reliability of the ammuni-
tion. It is almost guaranteed to cause stoppages of automatic weapons.
Finally, there is the question of where the cartridges came from. The pur-
veyor of the ammunition comes under suspicion. In one instance, it was
reported that four middlemen were eliminated because certain ammunition
had passed through their hands, and a market for stolen cartridges was put out
of business.
It must be reiterated that such operations were at no time authorized or
approved. If they did take place, it was without the sanction of the government,
which could scarcely justify the use of such indiscriminate measures. However,
there is no doubt that this tactic was effective. It may be argued that the impact
was chiefly psychological. This is probably true. It is true of most activities
targeted against guerrillas if they are successful. Their greatest value lies in
influencing the thinking of other guerrillas, potential guerrillas, and guerrilla
supporters as much as in terms of guerrillas killed or captured.
Ordinarily, guerrilla thinking may best be influenced by actions ostensibly
directed against the civilians who support the guerrillas. There is, however,
a role to be played by direct appeals, so-called tactical psychological warfare
aimed at the guerrillas in general, or at specific members of the guerrilla move-
ment. Such efforts were used with considerable success in the Philippines after
1950. Leaflets of both "canned" and "spot" varieties were extensively air-
dropped and hand-delivered. Themes ranged from appeals from mother or wife,
through safe-conduct passes, to warning or threatening messages. Portable
reproducing equipment in the field enabled battalion commanders to have
spot leaflets prepared for immediate distribution.
Loudspeakershand-carried, jeep-mounted, and airbornewere used to
advantage. Always, success in these, as in other tactical operations, depended
largely on the accuracy of the information on which the operation was based, the
intelligence with which it was prepared, and the effectiveness of its delivery.
Radio, press, and movies were sometimes used in tactical psychological
war, perhaps most often for "leaking" or "planting" stories about projected
operations or troop movements. Such stories caught the attention of the Huk,
whose leaders had found news reports their most reliable source of strategic
intelligence, and not infrequently diverted their attention from operations
actually being conducted.
These mass media (press, radio, etc.) were also used to gain credibility for
tactical psychological warfare themes, and for appeals distributed by other
means, such as surrender leaflets. Timing was important. When surrender leaf-
lets were used, their impact was substantially augmented by the appearance in
the commercial media, long hostile to the armed forces, of recognizable pictures
of Huk who had surrendered and were obviously receiving good treatment.
Psychological-warfare monies were useful in ways far beyond those ordi-
narily thought of, for they constituted one of the principal sources of the most
critically needed auxiliary weapon of counterguerrilla warfareMONEY.
Money to be spent at the discretion of unit commanders, and money for spe-
cific purposes, such as purchase of rations or information, hire of guides and
porters, emergency repairs to radios or vehicles, is very nearly as necessary as
small-arms ammunition for fighting guerrillas effectively, and almost a pre-
requisite for winning civilian support.
The company or battalion commander who does not have both discretion-
ary and specific-purpose funds legitimately at his disposal is almost irresist-
ibly tempted to acquire them illegitimately, most often as "contributions"
or "requisitions" in cash or in kind from the civilians in his area. Sometimes
the needed funds are obtained by levying on the soldiers' pay, or even by hir-
ing out the soldiers as guards or laborers. Bad as these practices are, if applied
in moderation they are probably better than trying to fight guerrillas without
money to buy critically needed items not available through normal supply
channels, or without money to make on-the-spot recompense to injured civil-
ians or emergency advances to soldiers and their dependents.
Ironically, a junior officer is routinely entrusted with 30 to 150 men, whose
time in the field he may waste for days, or whom he may expose to unneces-
sary casualties, with probably no worse punishment than a reprimand. Yet if
he is lucky enough to be entrusted with an equal number of dollars, he will
probably face court-martial if he cannot account rigorously for the expendi-
ture of each dollar. This condition must be changed if maximum effectiveness
at minimum cost is to be achieved.
A simple rule of thumb for the allocation of discretionary funds is to with-
hold (i.e., not assign) 5 of each 100 men authorized to a unit. Give the company
commander the cost (i.e., pay, allowances, etc.) of 4 of these men, and give the
battalion commander the cost of thefifth.Require only the simplest accounting,
subject to simple (and flexible) ground rules, such as that without special autho-
rization, no more than one-third of each monthly allotment may be spent for a
single purpose. Make readily available, also, specific funds for the purchase of
information, pay of guides and porters, etc. The value of these discretionary
and specific-purpose fundsused with the same discretion as is used in the
deployment of individual soldiers and on the same levelis likely to be greater
to the commander fighting guerrillas than the value of an additional platoon in
his company.
This standard of fund availability was not achieved in the Philippines,
although its desirability was well demonstrated. Enough funds were made
available, at Magsaysay's insistence, to meet the most urgent requirements
without levying on civilians. The only serious problems encountered in their
use were those created by overly meticulous finance officers, or an occasional
overenthusiastic commitment to win civilian good will, such as an officer's
overrash bid for the crown of a local fiesta queen, which had the result of put-
ting his fellow officers on short rations for some time thereafter.
There is one essential ingredient of success in hitting the guerrillaor
counterguerrillatarget which was overlooked by AFP and CPP planners
alike in the plans and decisions made at the beginning of 1950. It has scarcely
been touched on here. It is to the credit of President Elpidio Quirino that he
supplied the missing ingredient on September 1, 1950.
That ingredient? Dedicated, aggressive leadership!
To the troops, and to the nation, Magsaysay soon became the personifica-
tion of leadership. He had outstanding ability to inspire effective action by
small units, to rally to his support leaders at all echelons; and he had an equally
uncanny gift for identifying inadequate action and causing regrets among
those who were responsible for it. Most important, he had the knack of inspir-
ing emulation of the example he set. This is not to imply that there were no
capable leaders in the Armed Forces before Magsaysay. There were many. His
predecessor as Secretary of National Defense had been a capable leader of
guerrillas against the Japanese, as well as a fine officer of the old school.
Magsaysay was new, dramatic, infinitely energetic, determined to overcome,
by any means necessary, the obstacles to effective action against the Huk.
In addition to setting an inspiring example of leadership, Magsaysay made
two outstanding contributions to the military effort against the guerrilla target.
One was to put adequate military forces into the field, ensure them the best
possible support, and imbue them with a sense of urgency in effective action
against the guerrillas. Ultimately there were twenty-six BCTs activated in the
Philippine Army. Not all of these were given area responsibilities; in fact, not
all of them were needed.
Nevertheless, each received the best support he could give it, and each was
made to understand the requirement for continuing aggressive action. Better
results might have been obtained with fewer men, and at less expense, had more
emphasis been placed on specialized counterguerrilla units, and on better logis-

tical support tailored for counterguerrilla operations. Of the value of aggressive
BCTs as the basic quasi-independent formation for fighting guerrillas there
seems little doubt.
Military effectiveness against the guerrillas was enhanced more by improving
the morale, motivation, and combat techniques of the soldiers than it was by the
increase in their number. Efforts to improve supply and training had their most
significant value in raising morale and aggressiveness. Magsaysay spared no
effort to impress on the soldier the importance and urgency of his missions, and
to demonstrate to him the support the government desired to give him.
One of Magsaysay's most effective actions in this field was to require that
the designated beneficiary of a soldier receive, within twenty-four hours after
confirmation of his death, a cash payment of 1,000 pesos, less funeral costs.
This money was deducted from the benefits (insurance, arrears in pay, etc.) to
which the beneficiary was entitled and so represented little additional cost to
the government. It meant a great deal to the widow, however, to be able to get
the money when she needed it, rather than having to wait for the long, slow
bureaucratic paper mill to grind out the finished papers, perhaps after a dozen
visits from her and a lapse of six months. Later, specific provisions were
made for immediate cash assistance to the dependents of seriously wounded
soldiers. The influence these actions had on the combat aggressiveness of the
troops was surprising.
Magsaysay's second major contribution toward hitting the guerilla target
was to convince the troops that the guerrilla was not the only target; that, in
fact, the guerrilla was not a target of overriding importance. Magsaysay
emphasized, and demonstrated through the "Attraction Program" he imple-
mented, that actions designed to win the cooperation of civilians actually
increased the effectiveness of actions against the guerrilla. This idea was not
new, but impressing it on the troops, and making them act in accordance with
it, was new and effective. From the time Magsaysay became Secretary of
National Defense, to win his approval, every military operation had to have
three objectives: to get civilian cooperation, to get information, and to get
guerrillas.
NOTE
1. Called Military Police Command (MPC) from 1945 to 1949.
Chapter 9
FOOL 'EM
"FOOL 'EM, Find 'Em, Fight 'Em, Finish 'Em!"

The old motto used in training for conventional war contained only the last
three elements. The addition of "Fool 'Em," an outgrowth of experience in
guerrilla fighting in the Philippines, supplies a significant new note, one
supremely important in counterguerrilla warfare. First in importance, and first
in difficulty, is fooling the guerrilla enemy, misleading, eluding, or blinding
his information and observation screens.
His information service is often the one palpable military advantage the
guerrilla possesses. He may be inferior in training, in number, and in arma-
ment, but if he has intelligence superiority, he will be able to bring superior
force to bear on his selected targets, and he will be able to evade superior
enemy forces. The assumedand, all too often, actualgreater determina-
tion of the guerrilla to endure and to win will not save him from military
defeat if his information about enemy presence, capabilities, and intentions is
repeatedly insufficient or incorrect.
Fooling the guerrilla requires the coordination of many actions often placed
in distinctly different categories. First and foremost there must be effective
counterintelligence actiondenial to the guerrilla of accurate information
about the strength, locations, capabilities, intentions, and actions of the coun-
terguerrilla. Requisite counterintelligence actions range from detecting guer-
rilla spies who seek to penetrate high government offices to approaching
villages against the prevailing wind so that the dogs will not be alerted.
It is often useful to fool the guerrilla by letting him fool himself; it is never
useful to fool him by lying to him in the name of the government. The distinc-
tion between legitimate ruses of war and treachery must always be maintained.
If a counterguerrilla doubts the legitimacy of a deceptive action, he will usually

be wisest to abandon it. The statements of government must be credible, and the
actions of its representatives must maintain this credibility. It is legitimate and
often useful to disguise soldiers as guerrillas and to have such disguised soldiers
penetrate guerrilla elements and attack them. It is not useful, not legitimate, for
identifiable soldiers to secure surrenders under promise of good treatment and
then kill the surrenderers.
Finally, fooling the guerrilla involves defeat of guerrilla counterintelli-
gence measuresthat is, penetrating or deceiving his organizations in order
to collect information about him. Actions in this category run the gamut from
placing spies in guerrilla headquarters to establishing simple systems for the
collection of reports from informants without disclosing their role to the
guerrillas.
Very often, success in fooling, finding, and fighting guerrillas follow one
another as closely as the words follow each other. How rapidly and how
successfully this can be accomplished has seldom been better exemplified
than in the operations of the unit known as Force X. Here is the story,
and an analysis of the lessons learned, as told by the commander of that
operation:
When we organized Force X in 1948, the Huk were running freely all over Cen-
tral Luzon. Their command structure was not well organized or well understood
by the Huk themselves. Just prior to this time, the Huk in Southern Luzon had
thought themselves to be independent. When their commander, a Colonel Vil-
legas, died, some of their units tried to establish contact with the more highly
developed and organized forces in Central Luzon under Taruc, who was also
eager to contact them. This was obviously a very favorable opportunity for a
deception operation.
I assigned the 16th Philippine Constabulary Company the duty of forming
Force X. The commander, Lieutenant Marana, after receiving his instructions,
quietly screened his entire company, selected forty-four enlisted men and three
officers, and at night moved to a predesignated training base in the rain forest.
Force X was in existence and was completely isolated from the moment they
moved into that base, which only three officers from my staff were authorized
to enter.
The training given there was designed to enable the men to conduct what we
called "Large-Unit Infiltration." The basic idea was to make this specially
trained force into a realistic pseudo-Huk unit that could, in enemy guise, infil-
trate deep into enemy territory. The men in training were divested of all items
that could identify them as soldiers. They were dressed in civilian clothes and
armed only with captured weapons that had been accumulated by my S-2 [intel-
ligence officer]. They were given indoctrination booklets, propaganda publica-
tions, and other reading material of the sort carried by Huks. They were given
the things generally found on Huk dead, such as soiled handkerchiefs and love
mementoes from girl friends. During the four-week training period, all conver-
FOOL 'EM 115
sation was conducted in terms of the preassigned enemy identitiesthe enemy

ranks, aliases, and pet names commonly used in guerrilla units of Southern
Luzon. The men were addressed as comrades, brothers, members of the prole-
tariat. They were taught Huk songs. They learned how to deliver speeches in
Huk style.
They became familiar with the descriptions of the leaders of Southern Luzon
guerrillas. Some, who resembled known guerrilla leaders, posed as those indi-
viduals. All men were required to take on the appearance of hunted guerrillas
during those days. They became, and stayed, dirty, unshaven, badly in need of
haircuts. Like the enemy, these soldiers were unhappily forced to renounce
bathrooms, shaving cream, and razor blades.
Sometime during the second week, my S-2 smuggled in three ex-Huks who
had been captured in Southern Luzon and subsequently incarcerated in our
national prison. They had been tested, screened, and reindoctrinated to our side
and were brought to the training base to serve as instructors. They became
round-the-clock critics of mannerisms, speeches, customs. We knew that Huk
were taught certain methods of addressing a superior, certain ways to eat, cer-
tain general practices for their daily ablutions in the river. The same training was
now given to the men of Force X.
While this training was going on, my troops were making a reconnaissance
of the area through which Force X would supposedly pass while en route from
Southern to Central Luzon. A disguised patrol, led by a sergeant, actually cov-
ered the route. It noted the trails, observed the attitude of the inhabitants, and
identified the obstacles encountered. All this was incorporated into the cover
story of Force X to ensure that that force would be accepted when it entered the
proposed operational area, the Candaba Swamp.
When everything was set, my S-2 went to Manila to recruit several walking
wounded men from our army hospital. He finally found two rugged enlisted
men who wanted to join Force X in spite of their wounds. With the addition of
these men, the operation was ready to roll and it was launched at 1700 hours, 14
April 1948.
The force almost precipitated a pitched battle when passing near a Philippine
Constabulary company in another province while en route to the line of depar-
ture for their operational area. The operational departure was from a small town
about four miles east of the highway, where they fought a carefully staged sham
battle with two of my uniformed PC companies. From this they withdrew in
good order, carrying with them their two wounded. Four hours later, they con-
tacted thefirstHuk outpost, which was of course informed of their approach and
very curious as to the identity of this unit which had beenfightingthe PC.
They were carefully interrogated as to who they were, where they came from,
where they were going, etc. Their cover stories stood up well, and their wounded
lent an invaluable semblance of authenticity to their accounts. They were given
guides who took them on into the Candaba Swamp until they linked up with
Huk Squadrons 5 and 17, under Commanders Tomy and Vergara. There they
were again interrogated and asked about their route from Southern Luzon. Much
interest was taken in them and they were promised that top leaders, possibly the
Supremo, Luis Taruc, would see them. Force X and the two squadrons (with an
estimated strength of about 120 men) fraternized for more than a day and a half,
exchanging experiences, boasting of their respective commands. Naturally,
Force X was talking about the prowess of the South Luzon Huk. Squadrons 2
and 17 were talking of the prowess of the Huk Supremo.
During these conversations, Force X accumulated a lot of information. Indi-
viduals selected in advance deliberately engaged visitors in lively discussions
about local conditions, propaganda, supply systems, etc. They found that most
of the town Mayors and Chiefs of Police were in collusion with the enemy. They
discovered that there were enlisted men in the PC company on the other side of
the swamps who were giving information to the Huks. They learned that sup-
plies were left by women in selected spots along the road to be picked up at
sundown by the Huks.
The fourth day after they crossed the line of departure, two more Huk squad-
rons joined the combined group. These new squadrons4 and 21were spe-
cial killer groups. One in particular, under Commander Bundalian, was unique
in its organization and its assigned mission. It was called the enforcing squad-
ron, assigned by the Huk Supremo to enforce Huk justice. Actually, it was a
band of well-trained executioners; their specialty was kidnapping civilians sus-
pected of disloyalty to the movement.
By the end of the fifth day, Force X was outnumbered 1 to 3. During those 5
days, the Huk squadrons showed no indication of suspecting that Force X was
other than what it seemed to be. No one detected the 4 60-mm. mortars, 2 light
machine guns, 200 hand grenades, and complete voice radio that Force X con-
cealed. How was all this hidden? Some enterprising enlisted man found that
mortar tubes fitted inside bamboo water tubes, as did light machine guns. Others
took delight in hiding grenades and mortar shells inside watermelons, papayas,
etc. The radio was inside a sack of rice.
About breakfast time on the sixth day, according to the story of the force
commander, Lieutenant Marana, they noticed that the Huk, the real Huk,
seemed to have become cool and distant in their attitude, so much so that
breakfast was eaten in complete silence. Lieutenant Marana decided that the
time had come to strike. On a prearranged signal, the members of Force X
unobtrusively separated from the Huk groups, and Lieutenant Marana gave
the order to strike.
It was a slaughter. Two Huk squadrons were practically deactivated as of that
moment. The mortars came into play within thefirsttwo minutes after the strike.
The men were instructed to throw hand grenades before using their weapons.
And within five minutes, the radio was in operation and was in contact with me
and with three Philippine Constabulary companies that were alerted around the
operational area, ready to move in.
Such an operation is not easy, as several commanders who sought to copy it
learned too late. There are many problems to be solved, many prerequisites to
be met. Assuming that personnel are available, they must be screened for suit-
ability and carefully trained until they know enemy procedures and personali-
ties as well as the members of the enemy unit they are to impersonate. This
means that before their training is finished, a favorable situation for their
employment must exist and must be known in detail.
FOOL 'EM 117
What is a favorable situation for the use of such a unit? It is one in which
communications between enemy units are not yet well developed, or have been
thoroughly disrupted for a long period. It is a situation where the enemy knows
less about the unit to be impersonated by your men than you do. Such situations
most often arise when the enemy is expanding his organization vigorously,
when there is as yet little contact between the different centers of expansion.
Above all, the entire operation must be planned and conducted, from the start
to the moment of thefinalstrike, in absolute secrecy. Information must be given
only on the strictest "need to know" basis.
Once the tactical opportunity has been determined to exist, an appropriate
cover plan must be developed. Most often, we found, the cover story for the
infiltration unit will be that of being a known unit from a distant area with which
communications are poor, a unit which has come on a liaison and reconnais-
sance mission. Needless to say, every man in the unit must know the cover story
in great detail, must know more about his supposed unit than any enemy whom
he may contact.
To some extent, the cover story will depend on the targetor targetsselected
for the operation. Targets can be only tentatively designated and assigned priori-
ties in advance. Much should depend upon opportunities encountered. The killing
of leading enemy personalities may be far more important than the destruction of
a certain enemy unit. An appropriate order of priority might be: (1) killing enemy
leaders or outstanding fanatics; (2) destroying enemy elite organizations; and
(3) penetrating and destroying especially devoted and/or effective enemy support
elements.
All these targets may be found in the area of a single operation deep in enemy
territory. Time involved in preparation of counterguerrilla infiltration units is
variable. Don't be tempted into throwing in half-trained units. In our experi-
ence, four to six weeks of intensive training was usually necessary. Careful
screening and selection of operational personnel is of paramount importance.
Personnel selected on the basis of combat experience and physical condition are
segregated in a secret training base. Training should stress physical condition
and adoption of enemy "personalities" (of enemy units being represented) in
dress, speech, manners, customs, etc. Divested of any article of clothing identi-
fying their own force, personnel are reissued captured weapons, equipment,
personal articles, and other materiel. This is important. Where possible, cap-
tured enemy insignia, uniforms, documents, ID cards, propaganda publications,
songbooks, indoctrination booklets, etc., are freely distributed to operating per-
sonnel.
There should be no uniformity of wearing apparel, with the possible excep-
tion of the two or three ranking members of the disguised force. Armament and
equipment must show signs of wear and tear, or poor upkeep, which is charac-
teristic of guerrilla weapons. Well-kept weapons and an abundance of ammuni-
tion with the disguised force are a dead giveaway. However, the newer and
gaudier weapons, such as pistols with pearl handles, should be given to leaders.
This is common with guerrilla units.
The maximum number of ex-enemy personnel are recruited. Through careful
screening and tests to establish loyalties, the services of these individuals can be
invaluable during training and operational phases. During the training of the
troops, they are useful and instructive critics. With individual cover stories, they
are assigned to command, security, or advance elements during actual opera-
tions. After training, the disguised force should be made to undergo rigid tests
with unwitting friendly troop units. These tests will require special precautions
to prevent mistaken encounters.
We considered this activity one partial solution to a major problem of coun-
terguerrilla warfare, that of finding and finishing enemy units in large force.
Usually, guerrilla enemy-intelligence and warning systems are too efficient to
permit major encounters.
The major objectives of this activity are to effect surprise contact with the
enemy in force and to take advantage of this contact to destroy him by close
combat. There are many other obvious objectives. First in importance is to
gather intelligence, especially verification of the enemy order of battle. Second
is the penetration and study of existing enemy systems of security. Third is the
study of enemy signal communications and the extent and nature of civilian
support and liaison methods. Fourth is the appreciation and study of enemy sup-
ply methods and extent of local area support to enemy units. A special added
bonus is the final identification of local government officials secretly in collu-
sion with the enemy.
Fooling the guerrilla, like charity, begins at home, a home not infrequently
shared with the guerrilla, or at least his supporters. Since guerrilla and coun-
terguerrilla often have so much in common in cultural and physical heritage,
it follows that, much more than in any other type of war, counterguerrilla
warfare requires the strictest security consciousness at all times. It must be
taken for granted that any civilian may be an agent of the guerrilla, witting or
unwitting, and that his information can reach the guerrilla very quickly. The
fact that the most significant element of the combat environment is the
human elementthe people, people who can give information, people
whom the counterguerrilla, like the guerrilla, must seek to exploit
infinitely complicates the security problem. The difficulties are great, but
good security discipline of troops must be maintained, or all other efforts
of the campaign may fail.
The security of camps, both permanent installations and temporary bivouacs,
is a major consideration. There is a widespread tendency to locate troops in
existing facilities or at least in close proximity to them. In the early stages of
the anti-Huk campaign, the tendency invariably was to post troops in school-
houses or municipal buildings because there they had shelter, often electricity,
and water. Communications facilities were usually good. Of course, they were
right in the heart of the enemy espionage nets.
Ordinary military-security precautions are ineffective as long as the troops
are quartered among the civilians, or even near civilian installations. Ideally,
every military installation in a counterguerrilla campaign would be located
behind a wide buffer zone, where it would be invisible and where no civilians
FOOL 'EM 119
might enter. Such an encampment, on the other hand, would almost certainly
deny the troops a most important source of information, the people.
Where camps cannot be located in a position that eliminates chance contacts
with civilians and that is secure from the observation of guerrilla sympathizers,
elaborate security and deception procedures must be employed. This usually
calls for virtually continuous troop movements, fooling the guerrilla into think-
ing that the entire unit, or at least substantial portions of it, are shifting.
One BCT in a Huk area had a standard operating procedure (SOP) that
required its units to move their operational bases on a regular schedule.
Detached companies had to move at least once every five to seven days; pla-
toons every two or three days; squads or half-squads at least twice a day. This
was arduous, but it may be the only way the enemy can be fooled so that the
tactical initiative can be wrested from him.
Denying the enemy information is one way of fooling him. Another is to
saturate his intelligence nets. The frequent shifting of troops serves both
functions. If troops are security conscious, and if the commander does not
tell them of moves until the last possible minute, the soldiers cannot disclose
information to their sweet-hearts, wives, tailors, barbers, or favorite bartend-
ers. Thus, the enemy intelligence system does not learn of the proposed move
until an hour or less before it begins. The guerrilla information net may not
even learn where the unit is bound until it actually arrives at its destination.
Finally, if several units are on the move simultaneously, the number of reports
reaching the guerrilla intelligence-collecting stations, with their imprecise
data (reports from untrained informants are imprecise about time and num-
bers), may confuse rather than clarify the situation for the guerrilla. If uncer-
tain what troops are where, knowing only that troops are on the move, the
guerrilla must choose between accepting the risk of surprise attack and tak-
ing unnecessary precautions. He makes possibly unnecessary moves, which
may bring him into a surprise encounter with the enemy he has lost.
Of course, fooling the guerrilla involves far more than denying him infor-
mation about his enemy. It also means eluding his elaborate warning systems.
To understand the problems of evading his warning systems, one may look at
the fairly elementary but effective techniques commonly used by the Huk in
the Philippines.
The Huk warning system combined detection and transmission elements
in one operation, that is, everybody observed, and everybody passed on the
word. There were usually certain individuals specifically charged with
keeping watch or listening for signs of enemy approach. If the Huk were in
a village, such watchers might be posted in isolated houses or in fields two
or three miles away, apparently pursuing normal activitiesplowing, cut-
ting wood, washing clothes, etc.
In daylight hours, the signals would often be visual, compatible with the
natural occupation of the signaler. A woman washing clothes might suddenly
decide that nature was calling, step off to one side and turn around two or
three times before proceeding. A farmer plowing might observe the approach
of an army patrol, whereupon he would find it necessary to unhitch his plow
to mend one of the ropes or the plow itself. Of course, houses facilitated sig-
naling. All that was needed was to go out and open or close the gate; or to
open or close the windowsany small activity might provide the clue that
would make the next watcher in line hasten to give the alert to the guerrillas.
At night, these signals could be supplemented by the natural use of lights.
What is more natural than for a farmer to come out with a lantern to find out
if his carabao has enough feed, or needs untying, or should be moved to a new
feeding area. The Huk also encouraged the villagers to keep dogs, the maxi-
mum number possible. Naturally, when strangers approach, dogs barkand
the sound carries. It was some time before troops learned to "read the wind"
before approaching villages or houses at night. Couriers, church bells, truck
and bicycle horns, beacon fires, smoke signals, and anything else that could
transmit information or sound an alarm was used at one time or another.
Ordinarily, at least two warning "shells" were constructed by the Huk around
villages they were occupying so that signals not only would be rapidly picked
up and repeated, but would be augmented by reports from the inner ring of
watchers if the enemy (the army) approached closer to their resting place.
To some extent, slightly more sophisticated devices were adapted from
military practice. Trip wires with tin cans attached to them were strung
around or across possible avenues of approach, ready to rattle at a touch. The
Huk made relatively little use of booby traps or mines. It has never been
determined why. Probably, it was partly technical difficulties and partly the
risk of injuring civilians, with consequent loss of their support, that caused
them to neglect such antipersonnel tactics.
The Huk did use radio to some extent immediately after the close of World
War II, but this equipment was soon replaced by the famous "bamboo tele-
graph," which proved more reliable, less expensive, and moreflexible,as well
as advantageous in implicating more civilians in direct support of the guerrilla.
Such warning systems could transmit information with some accuracy and
with considerable speed over many miles. To elude them was a major chal-
lenge. Some of the methods have already been described, such as the emplace-
ment of "stay-behind" parties by troop sweeps. Surreptitious night movements
conducted with all the care one would use in stalking big game often, but not
too often, circumvented these warning nets. The bamboo telegraph at night
has its disadvantages. Alert soldiers, expecting their presence to be signaled,
can detect light signals and surmise the identity of Huk sympathizers and the
direction in which they are transmitting their information, hence the location
of the Huk elements.
Since they could seldom be effectively ehminated or disregarded, guerrilla warn-
ing systems had to be nullified whenever possible. This could be accomplished
FOOL 'EM 121
by saturating them, avoiding them, or deceiving them. Saturation was most often
accomplished by troop movements or patrols. So many patrols would operate at
such irregular times that the guerrilla intelligence nets would befilledconstantly
with reports of patrol presence. Not infrequently, a guerrilla would be so confused
by the multiplicity of reports, so tired, or so overconfident, that a patrol of which he
had learned long before wouldfindhim still at rest, or making a frantic last moment
effort at escape. At other times, the effort to avoid a patrol would take the guerrilla
into an encounter with still another patrol.
Evading the guerrilla information net, as contrasted to deceiving it, is largely
a matter of proper scouting and patrolling techniques, principally effective
under cover of darkness or where enemy observers are few (or sleepy). In
relatively uninhabited areas, the habitual use of mutually supporting small
patrols may permit one or more to avoid detection. Patrol formations that
employ existing cover or concealment to prevent elements of the patrol from
being seen from probable observation points will often be able to outflank
guerrilla units and engage them by surprise.
Minuscule patrols of especially selected and trained personnel, moving
surreptitiously, are extremely valuable in counterguerrilla as in other forms
of war. Operating in areas inhabited only by enemy personnel, especially if
these enemy are in a quasi-military status, they frequently meet amazing
success in evading observation. The value of two men on such a patrol
whether employed for collecting information, destroying enemy and their
supplies, or simply increasing psychological pressureis often greater than
that of a platoon or more of conventional troops.
Most often, penetration of the guerrilla counterintelligence and warning

screens can best be effected by deceptive measures. For this purpose, patrols
disguised as civilians are particularly effective. One BCT in the Philippines
secured several panel trucks belonging to Manila businesses (complete
with business signs on the trucks), with which they actually carried on
appropriate business activities. Usually, the drivers and the "women" riding
with them all were soldiers. Sometimes more soldiers, and certainly weap-
ons and radios, were hidden inside the truck. This, however, was disclosed
only to operatives among the civilians. Sometimes these trucks were
stopped by Huk foraging patrols. The results discouraged future Huk forag-
ers from stopping trucks.
Ordinary carts drawn by oxen or water buffalo were frequently used. Such
a cart, carrying four to eight people off to attend a fiesta or to visit relatives
or to shop in town, was a common sight in the countryside. Usually, the bed
of the cart was filled with hay to feed the animal that drew it. The hay was
an ideal place for troops to hide weapons and radios, just as it was an ideal
place for Huk supply personnel when they were making a delivery to the
guerrillas.
These disguised patrols were only too willing, as a rule, to encounter

guerrilla sympathizers. They were always eager to stop and talk with any-
one. These casual conversations yielded much information about the enemy.
Chance encounters often produced a real surprise. Not the least of those
surprised was an officer of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group who
found it difficult to believe that the pretty girls he saw leaving a BCT head-
quarters were actually soldiers, until one of them reached inside "her" blouse
and produced one of the hand grenades serving him as "falsies."
Although these patrols in disguise sought encounter with the enemy and
tried to get information through observation or talk, their principal value,
perhaps, was in transmitting instructions to informants and receiving their
reports. These informants might be local people who had volunteered their
services or who had been induced to volunteer during a village screening, or
they might be agents who had been sent in for the purpose. Not infrequently,
they were small storekeepers, whose cooperation had been enlisted after several
visits and possibly with such inducements as price reductions on supplies
furnished them by the patrols.
Actually there was a third purpose for such disguised patrols. Each time
their presence was revealed, tension was increased among the Huk. In time,
the Huk grew suspicious of everything moving in the countryside, every truck,
every oxcart, every strange vehicle. If the party looked too strong, or if for
some reason the Huk were unwilling to attack, or even to stop a party because
they feared it might be composed of soldiers who were better armed, or
who had access to reinforcements, the Huk had to leave the area lest their
presence be detected. Always, it added to their uncertainties. And if they
did stop a cart or truck, they risked losing friends and supporters in the
countryside if the party was innocent. Any way he approached this prob-
lem, the Huk lost.
Operations having possible repercussions in the form of guerrilla actions
against civilians must always be carefully considered and conducted. No
deceptive measure should be undertaken that will, of itself, harm the civilians
directly. Indirect harm, through guerrilla reprisals, cannot always be pre-
vented, and may be allowed if it is not too clearly provoked by government
forces, and is not merely a way for government forces to evade open warfare
with the guerrilla.
Efforts to deceive the guerrilla are so much a part of successful counter-
guerrilla warfare that there are few effective operations that do not include a
good deception plan. Some operations in the Philippines included a broadly
based deception operation, which ranged from making use of the everyday
commercial press and radio for planting stories to running convoys of trucks,
supposedly carrying troops on carefully timed decoy runs. Other operations
depended on no more than a sweet smile, an indiscreet word, and a careful
avoidance of impertinent hands.
FOOL 'EM 123
Flares were particularly helpful in hasty deception operations. If it was desir-

able for tactical purposes to block off possible withdrawal routes of a Huk
group, three or four men, sent in under cover of darkness withflarepistols and
a good supply of flares, could make that area seem so heavily infested with
troops as to be extremely unhealthy for a Huk unit trying to avoid combat.
At other times,flareswere used when Huk were supposed to be in the vicinity
but had not been located, and when insufficient troops were at hand to make a
proper search. A few men withflarepistols could break up the night's sleep for
a much larger number of Huk and possibly cause their withdrawal.
The use of artillery fire and of light aircraft in deception operations has
already been discussed. Combat aircraft can be similarly employed, but the
risk of injury to the nonguerrilla must always be carefully considered. The
counterguerrilla, like the guerrilla, must never stop trying tofindnew ways of
misleading his enemy.
Also, like the guerrilla, he must always consider the intangible value of
fooling the enemy, of creating and strengthening distaste or fear of continued
activity in his role. Tactical psychological warfaredirectly influencing the
behavior and attitudes of the enemyis not infrequently effected by measures
directly or indirectly intended to fool him.
The patrols that saturated guerrilla warning systems hoped to find an
enemy, but they were nearly as effective if they did not. The reports of their
presence effectively increased the psychological pressures on the guerrilla.
A band might be able to stay in an area of ten square miles for a week or two
weeks without being found by an army patrol. However, if a patrol entered
that area every night and every day, it meant an alarm every night and every
day. It meant that the Huk could never relax, must always be on the alert,
always on the move or ready to move. Always there was the risk of clash
with the patrol. The patrol might be the vanguard of a platoon or a company,
might be going to rendezvous with a patrol guerrilla informants had not
spotted, or might simply be trying to push the guerrilla into the arms of a
waiting ambush.
Appeals to superstition probably should be classified as attempts to fool the
enemy. They can be surprisingly useful, if soundly based and carefully
implemented. The field is broad, and the possibilities range from tangible
actions aided by complicated equipment to simple gimmicks.
One useful gimmick used in the Philippines consisted merely of a picture of
a staring eye enclosed in a triangle, printed on a four-by-five sheet of paper.
This was secretly posted in places Huk were known to pass or take shelter.
The picture bore connotations of ethical and/or religious groups not well
known to the average Huk, but respected by them and by most people. The
appearance of the posters was unexpected, and their purpose quite mysterious.
They seemed certainly to have more meaning than was apparent. Could it be
some strange new scientific device, possibly one that was taking a picture, or
making a report or a recording? Did it have some magical significance? Who

was doing this and why?
This little device certainly killed no Huk. It is not known to have caused,
directly, any Huk to surrender (although it did cause some Huk supporters to
surrender). It is known that it caused Huk to give up the use of favorite shel-
ters, to make detours around places where this eye could be seen. It did con-
tribute to the feeling of harassment that lessens the offensive spirit; to the
feeling of frustration and futility that can ultimately lead to the dissolution of
a guerrilla unit and the surrender or submergence of its members.
It must be emphasized that the only real limitation on fooling the guerrilla
is one that must be scrupulously observed. Measures taken in deception oper-
ations must be in clear conformance with the over-all mission of the armed
forces and the government they support. The deceptions must not be of a kind
that may harm the essential establishment of faith and confidence in the armed
forces and the government as the protectors and friends of the governed, as
honest men dedicated to the public welfare.
Chapter 10
FIND 'EM
"FINDING 'EM"learning soon enough, and in enough detail, the position and
actions of the guerrillais perhaps more essential to success in counterguer-
rilla operations than in any other type of war. "Finding 'Em" requires intelli-
gence. Intelligence in both senses of the term is necessary, but here it refers to
information about the enemy, properly assembled, evaluated, interpreted, and
disseminated.
"Fool 'Em, Find 'Em, Fight 'Em, and Finish 'Em." To the novice, "Finding
'Em" may seem the most difficult of the tetralogy, especially in trying to take
the initiative from the guerrilla. Actually, "Fooling 'Em"deceiving or escap-
ing their surveillance and getting into a position to use weapons against the
guerrillais really the most difficult.
As in other types of warfare, the primary source of combat intelligence is
the combat soldier; but in counterguerrilla operations, the soldier draws his
best information not from the enemy himself but from the civilian population,
which is also the best source of information for the guerrilla. Many civilians
are reluctant or absolutely unwilling to give information, especially in the
early stages of counterguerrilla warfare. Their reluctance may be due to sym-
pathy with the guerrilla, to distrust of the troops, or as is most often the case
when the guerrillas have been active in an area for some time, to fear of repri-
sals from the guerrillas. This is so characteristic that it is often regarded as a
virtually insurmountable barrier to the antiguerrilla forces.
There are many ways to overcome this reluctance. The best is to convince
the civilian that the armed forces can and will protect him from the guerrillas.
This is far easier said than done; until the enemy is found, the civilian cannot
be protected from him.
The most useful and reliable way to collect basic combat intelligence is
active, extensive patrolling. Every patrol is exposed to much potentially valu-
able information. Whether this information is perceived and is reported by
them so that it can form intelligence depends almost entirely upon the empha-
sis placed on intelligence by their commander. Enthusiasm and ability in
gleaning useful information will develop rapidly under guidance. A compre-
hensive standard operating procedure for the guidance of patrols, specifying
the action they must take to note down information, the information they must
seek, and the manner in which they must report it, is essential. Equally essen-
tial is a standard operating procedure that calls for proper briefing of patrols
before their departure and proper debriefing upon their return. (An example of
an appropriate SOP appears as Appendix I of this book.)
Patrols should do far more than go from Point A to Point B and return.
Obviously, all patrols should report their route, any indications of enemy
activity, any unusual incidents among civilians, and similar matters. Routine
overt patrols should visit villages and isolated farmhouses along their routes,
talking to the people in each place, reporting not only what is said, but also
how it is said, and the apparent attitude of the people contacted. Unsched-
uled overt patrols may do the same. Patrols in disguise usually follow this
procedure; covert patrols must not risk detection and compromise.
In the Philippines, a special patrol force known as the Scout-Rangers was
organized, made up of small teams, each consisting of three to ten men. These
teams were used principally for surreptitious penetration missions, entering
forests or swamps to locate reported guerrilla concentrations or installations
in so-called safe areas (areas from which no reports of guerrilla activity ema-
nated). Occasionally, these Scout-Ranger teams were engaged in combat,
most often when they were spotted and identified by the enemy. So far as
possible, however, their operations were entirely covert, designed to secure
information on which larger forces could operate. Similar missions were car-
ried out by elements of the regular forces but generally with less success than
those of the specially trained Scout-Rangers. Even the use of such units can
be futile unless the commander places continuing emphasis on the collection
of all available information and unless enthusiasm for collecting information
is generated.
There are many ways to secure information from civilians unwilling or afraid
to give it. The most obvious way is to disguise the soldier as a civilian or a
guerrilla. There are many others, appealing to the patriotism or the cupidity of
the individual or acting in a way that makes him fear the soldier more than he
fears the guerrilla. This latter approachfearadopted systematically, inevi-
tably redounds to the benefit of the guerrilla. Selectively employed, it can be of
value, but the risks of a negative effect are so great that fear-producing tactics
are better outlawed.
During the 1946-50 campaign against the Huk, the standard technique for
obtaining information from a presumably hostile village, and discovering
FIND 'EM 127
Huk or their supporters who might be hiding there, was to "screen" the popu-
lation, the practice generally called i(zona." The term originated during the
Spanish occupation of the country, and the technique was erroneously believed
to have been invented by them. Actually, it is as old and as widespread a prac-
tice as war. The zona was violently abhorred, primarily because of the high
pitch of cruelty to which it was brought by the Japanese during their antiguer-
rilla operations. Here is a victim's description:
During Japanese-conducted zonas, the people witnessed all kinds of barbarity

and butchery; those thought to be guerrillas were summarily beheaded in the
presence of their family and friends; suspected youths were used for bayonet
practice; women were abused while their husbands were forced to watch, etc.
After the Japanese occupation, zona connoted unlicensed brutality, which

Huk propaganda exploited. The uncontrolled use of the zona system during
the early years of the anti-Huk campaign did not really help the pacification
effort, even though Philippine Constabulary units did not resort to Japanese
brutalities and were, in fact, much more restrained than the Huk themselves in
collecting intelligence from those who did not wish to give it.
The following report well illustrates the value that can be derived from a
well-planned zona operation, and simultaneously illustrates why a villager
will scarcely react sympathetically to government forces after such an action.
This report was written by a participant who later became convinced that it
was imperative for such village-screening practices to be greatly modified or
completely prohibited.
In the early morning hours of 11 May 1947, Lieutenant Rizalino del Prado's
patrol flashed a radio message reeporting that the inhabitants of the barrio
[small village] of Pulong Plasan, of the municipality of Baliuag, in Bulacan
Province, were observed suddenly to have broken normal village routine.
Del Prado and a five-man patrol equipped with voice radio had for ten days
been posted secretly near the barrio with a surveillance mission. This action
was based on reports that Pulong Plasan was a heavy contributor to the Huk,
with almost all the able-bodied men serving actively in the ranks of Huk Squad-
rons 21,26, and 104. Squadron 104 had recently been activated by Huk Lieuten-
ant Colonel "Mallari," a native of the barrio. ["Mallari" was his nom de guerre;
he, like most Huk leaders, usually used a nom de guerre]. Previous observation
reports submitted by Del Prado indicated that the barrio people followed the
typical village life: rising long before dawn, attending to the work animals,
working in the fields, stopping heavy labor when the sun is high in the sky,
retrieving the animals just before dark, lights out by 8 o'clock in the evenings.
Except for the occasional barking of dogs, or babies crying, or sometimes whis-
pered conversations inside dwellings, no sign of life was to be noted in the
evenings.
But it appeared that some "visitors" had sneaked into the barrio the previous
night (May 10), probably coming from an unguarded side, without alerting Del
Prado's group. A radio conversation with Del Prado gave further details of his
impressions of the abrupt change of routine in the village. Del Prado suspected
either that the village was deeply involved in collecting and packing food sup-
plies, or that a Huk VIP had arrived to visit relatives and/or to conduct the cus-
tomary Huk indoctrination rallies.
Del Prado was ordered to stand by with his group until they could be rein-
forced. A strong patrol (about thirty men), under Lieutenant Constante Cruz,
was rushed to Del Prado's OP site, with orders that both patrols be combined
under Lieutenant Cruz and then enclose and screen the village, keeping head-
quarters posted by radio.
The combined unit conducted village screening according to the standard
operating plan, which called for the screening force to be divided into two main
elements during the first phase. During this phase, the enclosure group, which
was the larger, sealed off the village, covering all known entrances and exits,
throwing out a cordon that moved in gradually until it reached the edges of the
village itself. (All previous patrols covering the area had been instructed to
include in their reports simple, detailed sketches of villages visited, which facil-
itated screening plans and operations.)
Meanwhile, during this first phase, the second element hurried to the center
of the village (again according to standard operating procedure) to gather all the
inhabitants, regardless of age or sex. They were assembled in the open space in
front of the school building and were divided into small groups so dispersed that
conversation between villagers, or even between families, was made difficult.
The screening of Pulong Plasan commenced in the middle of the afternoon of
May 11. An ex-Huk commander, "Totoy Bondoc," who had served as a govern-
ment agent for a year and a half, accompanied Lieutenant Cruz and immediately
recognized some of his former comrades when the second element began gath-
ering the villagers in concentration. Lieutenant Cruz ordered the immediate seg-
regation of the three identified men: Guillermo Sagum, alias "Mallari,"
a lieutenant colonel of Huk Regional Command 3 and a reputed Huk combat
organizer; Jovito Maravilla, alias "Marvel," assistant squadron commander of
Squadron 104 (Maravilla enlisted in the Armed Forces two years later and,
proving to be a courageous Scout-Ranger, was decorated in 1951); and Pascual
Palma, a Bataan and Death March veteran who had joined the Huk guerrillas
originally to fight the Japanese.
As soon as the villagers had been rounded up, the operation moved into its
second phase. The enclosure element was swiftly and silently divided into three
new elementsa sentry group, a search party, and a support group. Two-man
sentry units with automatic weapons were posted around the periphery of the
village, each unit within visual range of the sentries on either side. This sentry
line was thoroughly inspected to ensure that attempted sneakouts would be
impossible or, at least, extremely hazardous.
The search party, under its leaders, reported to the force commander. He then
dispatched parties, accompanied by one or two village elders (usually the barrio
Lieutenant and the most influential citizen), to make a methodical search of all
the houses, sheds, barns, public buildings, yards, and any other places inside the
enclosure that might hide subversive materials, weapons, food caches, or even
FIND 'EM 129
people. The presence of these village representatives with the search parties was
mandatory. Past experience had shown that enemy propaganda frequently
alleged that screening forces of the government committed robberies, etc., dur-
ing this search phase. After the search, these village representatives were
required to draw up certificates, in their own handwriting, attesting to the man-
ner of the search, conduct of troops, items seized (if any), and other pertinent
details.
The security group from the first element also reported to the force com-
mander and was posted under arms at a suitable location, ready to rush to sup-
port of the sentry line or to offer protection to the civilians congregated in the
enclosure. As soon as the situation was stabilized, some of the security group
was designated to service the civilians (fetch drinking water, furnish escorts,
etc.), but most of them reinforced the activities of interrogators in order to has-
ten the screening.
As the three visiting Huk VIP's were marched away to the security group for
detention, the villagers of Pulong Plasan watched expressionlessly, evidencing
the silent resistant attitude normally encountered by government troops during
this period (1946-50). The people were obviously determined to remain silent,
were obviously afraid or unwilling to give any truthful information that might
help the government.
This attitude was expected. The force under Lieutenant Cruz had brought in
several informants, ex-Huk and others, all wearing hoods so they could not be
identified. In accordance with procedures based on experience, several interro-
gation points were set up, widely enough separated so that proceedings at one
interrogation point could not be seen from another or by those awaiting their
turn. As quickly as possible after the village search, information obtained
thereby was passed on to the interrogating personnel (who had been making
preliminary inquiries in the meantime), and the formal interrogation com-
menced.
One by one, the adult members of the village passed under the scrutiny of the
hooded "Magic Eye" informants and were brought to an interrogation point,
sometimes accompanied by one of the hooded informants. Afirmstare, a quiet,
determined voice, and evidence of knowledge about his activities persuaded
almost everyone to tell what he knew. The interrogation usually began with
questions about the activities of the individual and his family, questions suscep-
tible to confirmation or denial on the basis of observations made during the
search or by questions to others in his family. The development of contradic-
tions to his statements and the obvious determination of the interrogator to get
at the truth were usually sufficient to break down opposition. With some villag-
ers, it was necessary to resort to a dramatic action to shock them, to convince
them that the interrogator would not hesitate to use any methods necessary to
extract the truth.
Lieutenant Cruz ordered one of his interrogators to resort to a tested ruse in
order to push a particularly stubborn villager to speak frankly. The interrogating
Sergeantfirstarranged for two individuals to be marched off in sight of the stub-
bom subject, to the interrogation point; then the villager heard loud, threatening
voices coming from the interrogation point, then a few pistol shots, then silence.
Soon the Sergeant came back into sight, reloading his pistol, after which he took
the villager from those congregated and marched him off for interrogation.
There, the recalcitrant one saw two bodies, bloody, covered with banana
leaves.
Quietly, the Sergeant explained that he didn't believe in "horsing around"
with stubborn civilianshe had no time for itand that the Lieutenant would
in turn shoot him if he could not come up with the information required, etc.
Therefore, he could allow the subject only a few minutes, including time for
prayers, to determine for himself whether to cooperate with the Sergeant by
furnishing correct information.
What had really happened was that the Sergeant had the preceding individu-
als, immobilized and silent, liberally drenched with chicken blood and covered
with leaves, during the entire period of the "drama." This ruse worked success-
fully during the early period of the anti-Huk campaign, but it was too dangerous
a stunt to pull after Magsaysay became Secretary of National Defense. By no
stretch of imagination could it be considered part of his "Attraction Program."
Several villagers of Pulong Plasan were bluffed into telling the truth about
the visit of Huk Colonel Mallari and his companions by the above-described
trick. Declarations tallied with what was already known: that Mallari had made
this visit in order to organize the support system of Squadron 104 from Pulong
Plasan and to recruit for the new force pending the arrival of weapons expected
from some unknown source.
Five days later, the village was visited again by the same screening personnel,
this time accompanied by the Huk prisoners, Mallari, Marvel, and Palma, who
were by now in a cooperative mood. When the villagers saw their repentant
leaders working on the side of the government, they in turn offered information
voluntarily, which led to further apprehensions and investigations missed in the
original screening. Pulong Plasan eventually changed to a strong base of anti-
Huk resistance. An NCO, with a team of three men (later relieved from this
duty) plus Marvel, was left behind to organize local resistance. This team
successfully organized an armed volunteer group that proved to be helpful
government auxiliaries.
An interview with the detainees after two days of arrest revealed that Mallari
had been caught so unawares that he did not offer any resistance in spite of his
vows never to be taken alive by government troops because he believed that his
high rank in the Hukbalahap would ensure his execution. Further, he was
stunned tofindan intimate comrade, Totoy Bondoc, was really a trusted govern-
ment intelligence agent, who unhesitatingly identified him. Bondoc later per-
suaded Mallari to emulate him in cooperating with the government, and Mallari
contributed importantly by identifying Mayors, town councilors, and police
forces who were in secret collusion with the Hukbalahap, contributing heavily
in food, supplies, and government information.
Of special interest among Mallari's contributions to our side was the help he
gave in the solution of the Plough ambuscade-murder a year later.1 He guided
troops to secret hideouts (which on two separate occasions nearly resulted in the
capture of top Huk commanders, including the Supremo, Taruc). This informa-
tion, his descriptions of Huk tactical organizations, tactics, techniques, signal
FIND 'EM 131
and warning systems, recruiting procedures, and disposition and care of their
wounded became the basis of many operations by our organization for almost
two years.
Marvel, the youngest of the three detainees (he was eighteen when arrested),
turned out to be the normal village youth impressed into Huk service with no spe-
cial antigovemment feelings. Young, bright, and a natural leader, Marvel was being
groomed by Mallari for the eventual command of Squadron 104,a newly activated
unit at the time of their arrest. In 1949, Marvel enlisted in the Armed Forces and
served meritoriously.
Pascual Palma, a Visayan and actually a stranger in Luzon who had originally
joined the Huk in order tofightthe Japanese, showed no special desire to return to
his home province in the Visayas, to the south. When he was released, in late
1950, with admonitions to become a better citizen, he returned to the sweetheart
he had found in Arayat, in Central Luzon, married her, and settled down there as
a tenant farmer. In 1950, when he was asked to join the town defense corps, he left
the farm and led the townspeople in the defense of Arayat. On several occasions,
Palma was officially reported by the army as having led attacks with civilian
armed volunteers against Huk foraging parties. In 1953, Palma accepted a posi-
tion as a regular patrolman with the municipal police force of the town, in recog-
nition of services rendered, and he discharged his duties faithfully.
Screening operations were not always so carefully planned as the one in

Pulong Plasan, or so successfully concluded. One spur-of-the-moment opera-
tion was conducted when Huk ambushed a Philippine Constabulary jeep on a
lonely road in Pampanga Province early in 1947. The company commander of
the 26th PC and two enlisted men were riding in the jeep. Fortunately, due to
the failing light and to faulty execution of the ambush (by a party of ten or
twelve Huk), no PC personnel were hit or injured. A senior officer moving
with thirty men in a motor convoy heard the firing and, suspecting an ambush,
rushed to the scene. The ambush party withdrew precipitately upon hearing
the convoy's approach, and a chase began.
After a running fire fight of some two miles, through cultivated rice fields,
irrigation ditches, patches of tall cogon grass, and bamboo thickets, the Huk sud-
denly vanished just after pursuing elements passed the village of San Patricio,
northwest of the provincial road. The officer suspected that the Huk had melted
into the village, and he ordered an enclosure of the entire village.
All those interrogated denied the presence of any guerrillas when the
screening began. By chanceas it was not a standard item carried by Armed
Forcesthe officer had a paraffin-test kit, borrowed from friends in the
Manila Police Department. All able-bodied males were put through the par-
affin test, a standard police technique for determining if suspects have recently
fired a gun. Three people out of about seventy-five tested as "positive." As
the three were being marched off to the vehicles that would carry them to
camp, they suddenly bolted. A guard fired and killed one. A second escaped.
Another guard, startled by the maneuver, fired at the third escapee, who was
running through the assembled villagers. The shot killed one woman
bystander and wounded another seriously.
However, the open demonstration of the paraffin test on suspects, who were
told that it would pinpoint the guilty, apparently discouraged guerrillas from
seeking refuge where they might be picked up in a screening operation.
Despite the limitations and known inaccuracies of paraffin testing, it can be
used to advantage by the armed forces, especially if the people can be per-
suaded that it is infallible.
But such operations, however effective, were scarcely feasible for an army
that stressed respect for the rights of citizens and professed to be their friends
and protectors. After Magsaysay became Secretary of National Defense, he
severely limited the use, scope, and methods of the zona, which had been one of
the greatest sources of bitterness and complaints against the Armed Forces.
Nevertheless, until both intelligence and communications services are highly
developed, it will scarcely be possible to conduct active counterguerrilla opera-
tions in inhabited areas without occasional village screenings. These are espe-
cially necessary in areas where the guerrillas hold some initiative and are
capable of entering villages at night to obtain supplies and to liquidate "trai-
tors." Often, a screening operation can be combined with a major military
action as an integral, and therefore relatively justifiable, part of it. The system
adopted in the anti-Huk campaign after 1950 is described in the following
account by the officer who wrote the report above on the 1947 screening of
barrio Pulong Plasan:
On the morning of 9 May 1951, as part of a special intelligence operation con-

ducted by the 7th BCT S-7 section under Major Medardo T. Justiniano, troops
under Lieutenant Lauro del Rosario surrounded the small barrio of Balatong, in
the municipality of Plaridel, Bulacan Province. The screening force carried its
normal complement of interrogation and investigation personnel from the
S-2 section and was accompanied by the 7th BCT Civil Affairs Officer, Major
Roberto Belen, and a small group of technicians from the Civil Affairs section.
In addition, Major Belen brought a representative of the Provincial Governor,
the Mayor of Plaridel, two reporters from the Manila press, and other local civil-
government dignitaries. The presence of these representatives of civil govern-
ment followed the current 7th BCT standard operating procedure.
As soon as the cordoning force was in place, the command group entered the
village, and went to the house of the barrio Lieutenant, the village leader. He was
informed of the purpose of our visit and asked to call all the villagers together.
After they were assembled, the commanding officer of the cordoning troops
informed them that he had heard there were Huk hiding in the village and asked
if the report was true. When he was assured by several people that they knew of
no Huk or Huk-sympathizers in the village, he asked if there would be any objec-
tion to a search of the village in the presence of witnesses. The searching parties
were, accordingly, dispatched, each accompanied by a civilian representative.
FIND 'EM 133
Meanwhile, Major Belen, the Civil Affairs Officer, arranged for the villagers
to be seated in the shade, in such a way that they were not readily able to talk
with one another. He then gave a brief explanation of the mission of the troops;
their duties as the protectors of the people from the Huk. The commanding
officer directed the establishment of interrogation points and then said to the
people:
"We know that most of you are loyal to the government. We know also that
some of you have been giving assistance to the Huk. We know that some of you
would like a chance to reform. We are going to give each of you a chance to show
where your true loyalties lie. Each of you will go to one of those interrogation
points, where you can speak freely. If you have supported our enemy but now sin-
cerely repent, or if you are a loyal citizen, no harm will come to you. If you remain
loyal to the Huk, you must go to the stockade and await trial for your crimes against
the people."
The Civil Affairs Officer then asked the representative of the Governor to
speak and called on the other speakers in turn until the screening was
completed.
As soon as the searching party returned, having found evidence of visitors in
three houses, they joined the interrogation teams. During the interrogation, five
active Huk were discovered, three of them by their own spontaneous confes-
sion. In addition, the local Hukfinance-corpsrepresentative confessed, asked
for protection, and named three other active supportersall supply officers.
One of these, Juan Bantay, confessed also and was taken into custody at his own
request. The other two did not confess, so they were released.
Altogether, we took into custody the five active Huk, the two confessed sup-
ply officers, one other civilian who desired protectionour principal informant.
We released the two supply officers who did not confess and a man who had
been visited by two Huk but claimed he knew nothing about them, as well as the
other villagers. Four men volunteered to give information in the future and
arrangements were made to contact them.
When we were through, the Civil Affairs Officer again spoke to the people,
thanking them for their cooperation, especially for that given by the two Huk
supply officers, who, he said, had repented and were being released; he assured
them that the others who had been arrested would be treated fairly and asked if
there were any complaints. There being none, he informed the villagers that
since there would be an active operation in the vicinity, it would be wise for
them not to go to thefieldsthat day and that he was leaving a squad of soldiers
and the Civil Affairs representative for their protection.
There are benefits to be derived in the technique by which screening ceases

to be zona, advantages that may recommend its use even in areas where the
armed forces have already built up substantial good will. Thus, requiring all
the inhabitants to pass, singly and privately, through an interrogation station
enables those who wish to volunteer information to do so without being
detected, and allows arrangements for secure transmissions of future informa-
tion to be made. Because of the announcement that persons known to be
collaborating with the Huk would be released if they gave information to the
government troops, any Huk collaborators immediately releasedin Bala-
tong, the two unregenerate supply officersbecame suspect to the Huk. Those
who were detained were not subject to Huk suspicion, and since those who
betrayed their Huk friends were held until after action was taken, the infor-
mants could continue to function for the army.
Screening operations were also conducted through checkpoints posted

along well-traveled roads and highways. In the initial stages of the anti-Huk
campaign (1946-50), military-operated checkpoints were generally static.
Out of inertia and lack of imagination, checkpoints were often established
and operated at a fixed place, usually in or near a town. Naturally, the Huk
soon identified and found ways to bypass them. Furthermore, examination
of travelers was often so cursory that Huk documents captured in the field
spoke of these checkpoints as being operated by the military personnel pri-
marily to line their pockets rather than to detect and apprehend subver-
sives.
Mobile checkpoints were found to be effective in disrupting guerrilla cou-
rier activities and in intercepting shipments of weapons and subversive propa-
ganda. Mobile checkpoints were particularly valuable when operated on
lonely rural routes, which, during the later stages of the campaign, were often
used by guerrilla couriers, VIP's, or escapees. If these checkpoints were placed
so that the traveler suddenly stumbled into them, he had no alternative but to
go through the careful screening, which brought about the arrest of several
important guerrillas. A courier intercepted in 1951 carried documents that
contributed substantial military intelligence and aided in the conviction of the
Huk Politburo members.
One packet of intercepted documents showed plans of alternative lines of
communications, secret routes to be used in the event government pressure
made them necessary. On another occasion, vehicle inspectors found, tucked
into a piece of luggage, a map of Bulacan Province with several markings in
cipher and code. One was a map that showed four points in the Sierra Madre
mountains marked in red. This map was forwarded to battalion headquarters,
where the S-2 section discovered that the plottings coincided with known or
reported Huk "production bases." This ultimately resulted in a large operation
that ended in the destruction and deactivation of Huk Regional Command
Number 3, considered the best-equipped and the best-led Huk field force at
the time.
Usually, a mobile checkpoint was situated so that it startled travelers. It
might be near a hairpin turn, a curve, or hidden under the shadow of mango
groves, bamboo thickets, etc. No signs were posted in either direction to
indicate the imminence of the checkpoint. A security element would be posted
far enough away to intercept any who might try to turn back when they learned
FIND 'EM 135
of the checkpoint. Vehicles were directed to drive off the road, out of sight
from the highway, and park under the trees or in a neat arrangement on open
ground. Passengers, including drivers and their assistants, would then be
marched off from the parking area to the area where the interrogation team
took over the screening.
In the meantime, the search element would methodically examine the vehicles,
while cargo, including luggage, was unloaded. The luggage and other cargo were
opened in the presence of the owner. The army usually recruited volunteers
local hospital nurses, schoolteachers, and social workersto search women trav-
elers. Their services proved invaluable in raising the prestige of the Armed
Forces. The 7th BCT procedures called for certificates testifying to the proper
behavior of the searchers in order to offset possible malicious Huk allegations
and to ensure the good behavior of the troops.
There are, of course, many other ways to get information from uncoopera-
tive civilians. One technique that frequently gave good results is described in
an operation report by Sergeant Onofre Oblenida:
Sir, as directed, my patrol, consisting of seven men and myself, visited a sitio of
the barrio of Mantang Tubeg, in Candaba Municipality, Pampanga Province, 7
April 1947. In compliance with the unit procedure, we entered the sitio, after
studying it for some time, just before the men returned from thefields.We vis-
ited each of the seven houses, in each case going up the house only after we got
permission from the housewife. All seemed scared. Each was asked how many
in the family were expected home for supper, and in each house, it was noted
that more rice was being cooked than was accounted for by the number sup-
posed to be fed. In each house, we were assured that there were no Huk known
to be in the area, and that all in the sitio were peaceful, loyal farmers. We pre-
tended to accept this and marched off toward the highway without giving any
indication of our suspicions.
Before reaching the highway, we had to pass through a field of high grass,
where we believed no one could see us. So we hid there until half an hour after
dark, then moved quietly back, downwind, taking up ambush position about a
quarter of a mile outside the sitio, on a heavily traveled trail that led through the
fields to what appeared to be a clump of trees at a stream. This, of course, we
had noticed while studying this sitio and visiting it.
At about 2300 hours, three men were seen coming down the trail toward the
houses. I decided to keep our patrol hidden and risk waiting until they came
back, for I was sure that they would have to deliver the surplus rice I had seen
being cooked. When they came back, about half an hour later, they were laugh-
ing and talking, carrying what we later found to be rice for about ten men.
Since they were so noisy, we decided that we could capture them without
revealing our position to the people in the houses. We hit each one over the
head with a rifle butt. This made no more noise than they themselves had made,
and after making sure we left behind no signs of the scuffle, we reset our
ambush.
As we hoped, four more men, all armed, came in about half an hour to look
for the missing three. We could hear them talking before we saw them, argu-
ing about whether the three had decided to have a party or had run into trouble.
When they reached our position, they were proceeding very cautiously. We
challenged them and opened fire when they attempted to escape. Since it
seemed unlikely that we could cut off the escape of the others, we immedi-
ately returned to the command post, and I am reporting to you, sir, as soon as
I arrived.
Next morning, as soon after daylight as possible, while the prisoners were
still being interrogated, the assistant intelligence officer visited the sitio,
accompanied only by two interrogators and his driver-radioman. He found the
people very frightened; the men were not expecting to go to the fields, but
were discussing with their wives whether to make for the hills and hide out or
to evacuate to the town. Lieutenant Justiniano, the young intelligence officer,
called them together and said:
"You people have been very foolish and have placed yourselves in grave danger.
Our soldiers came here to see if you needed any help. You lied to them. You said
there were no Huk here. They knew you lied, and so they waited for the Huk to
come. They killed some, and captured some, but others got away.
"You know what those Huk are thinking nowthe ones who got away. They
are thinking that somebody here betrayed them. They are planning now to come
back here and take revenge on the traitors. Probably all of you will be killed, or
at least have your houses burned, because you helped your enemies instead of
the soldiers who came here to protect you. If you had told the truth, the soldiers
would have found a way to get the Huk so they would never suspect you.
"We, too, should punish you for helping the enemies of the people instead
of the friends of the people. I think the best punishment will be to make you
stay here and keep the soldiers away until your 'friends' have showed you
what they think."
This, of course, did not appeal to the people at all. The soldiers agreed to talk
with them individually; each story was compared with those of the others and
with the reports by the prisoners. It was decided that there was a substantial pos-
sibility of a Huk vengeance raid, so that night two squads of soldiers were
smuggled into the town. They remained, hiding in the houses during the day, for
two weeks, while an alert force was maintained ready to reinforce them if they
radioed the approach of the enemy. At the end of two weeks, it was decided that
chances of a raid were small, and the soldiers withdrew, over the inhabitants'
protests. A warning system was set up, by which the people could notify the
troops secretly if Huk were observed in the vicinity. Some information was later
received and patrols visiting the village afterward reported that the people
showed a marked desire to cooperate with them.
Patrols against guerrillas, like guerrilla patrols, need many skills besides
those of the diplomat, the spy, the cross-examiner, and the mess sergeant.
FIND 'EM 137
They need the skills of the soldier, especially in the estimation of terrain, of its
potentialities for concealment or disclosure, of its suitability for travel, of the
likely spots for observation posts or bivouacs.
They need also the skills of the hunter, and of the hunted. Trackers may be
invaluable, so may outdoorsmen, often tribal hillsmen or professional hunters,
who can spot a leaf turned the wrong way or interpret animal cries. Soldiers
long in the field can acquire these skills to an amazing degree. One, Felix
Jabillo, ex-Sergeant of Philippine Scouts, after two years offightingas a guer-
rilla against the Japanese twice demonstrated the ability to smell a single enemy
soldier more than fifty feet away.
Patient observation is often the key tofindingguerrillas. Frequently, getting
the observation group into position without detection poses serious problems.
One of the easiest solutions to this is the use of troop activity to cover the
observers, who form staybehind parties.
A typical operation was conducted in Pampanga Province in early Janu-
ary, 1948. Three companies of troops mounted on trucks drove into San
Luis, Pampanga, early one morning. They stopped, dismounted, crossed to
the east side of the Pampanga River, and spread out along a line of skir-
mish, moving off into the swamp (fairly passable at that season). They were
carefully observed by the citizens, many of them dedicated to the Huk
cause.
The line of skirmishers kept moving until they were sure they were well out
of sight. There they halted, with outposts in position. Three groups of four
men each changed to civilian clothes (carried in the troop's packs along with
rations). The three groups were supplied with clothes and a month's rations.
The now-empty packs were stuffed with swamp grass to make them appear
untouched. The troops assembled, marched back carrying the packs, got into
their trucks and departed. Needless to say, they had seen no Huk. The towns-
people could hardly hide their amusement at the valiant soldiers who had
marched out into the swamp and then marched back again. No one bothered
to count the men getting into the trucks.
For nearly a month, the three parties stayed in the swamp, each in radio
contact with headquarters. They were able to report the movements of couri-
ers and supply parties; in fact, as a result of their reports, the entire system of
courier-supply routes was disclosed. There were no military operations in the
area during this period, but the patrols operating to the west of the river seemed
to have uncanny success in picking up couriers. The operation as a whole was
considered markedly successful.
One of the interesting minor items of information they picked up from first-
hand observation was the system used by Huk tax collectors in the little vil-
lages that dot the hummocks near the Pampanga River. They watched Huk tax
collectors slip into the village late at night, placing under the household ladders
(of the highbuilt Filipino houses, or nipa huts) one, two, sometimes as many
as six, stones. It took a little patience to reveal the purpose. When household-
ers were found putting a one-peso bill under each stone, it became obvious
that each stone represented a one-peso tax assessment.
Obviously, "Finding 'Em" involves more than screening villagers, send-

ing out numerous patrols, or setting up observation posts. It requires infil-
tration of agents into the ranks of the guerrillas, into the midst of guerrilla
sympathizers, and getting the reports of these agents back in time to be of
use. To some extent, these too can be done by combat units, but usually
require greater resources and greater autonomy than are granted to a com-
bat unit.
The development of adequate intelligence about a guerrilla movement is far
too big a task for any combat unit. Adequate intelligence about the guerrilla
means determining what orders he takes, and the way in which he receives
them. It means tracing the possible links of the guerrilla governing body with
outside nations. It means determining whether aid is coming from outside
sources, and if so, how much, and by what channels.
Even more, adequate intelligence about a guerrilla movement means collect-
ing rapidly every bit of information that may be relevant, from the identification
of members in the smallest unit of the most remote guerrilla command to the
pattern of the propaganda. This can be done effectively only by a nationwide
organization, given full access to every scrap of information collected; more
than that, a national organization with its own means for collecting and verify-
ing information. Finally, it means that this national organization must process
this information into useful intelligence and get it as quickly as possible to those
who can use it. And that means, in many cases, getting it down to the squad
leader.
The intelligence picture in the Philippines from 1946 to 1950 would have
frightened any organization-minded intelligence officer. The Philippine Con-
stabulary was charged with police action against the Huk and maintained its
own intelligence organization. The Philippine Army, as the principal instru-
ment of national defense, had its Military Intelligence Service (MIS), with
branches for collecting intelligence about the enemy and for counterintelli-
gence. The National Bureau of Investigation (counterpart of the United States
FBI) felt that since the FBI was charged with investigation of U.S. Commu-
nists, the NBI should also have this same function in the Philippines, so it
maintained its investigating branch. Since the center of Communist activities
was in the capital, Manila, the Manila Police Department believed it had a
primary interest in collecting intelligence about the Communists. Nearly a
dozen other agencies, ranging from the special agents of the Office of the
President to the Customs Secret Service, thought they had a proper role in the
collection of intelligence about Communists, or the Huk, or both, and they too
engaged in it.
FIND 'EM 139
The overlapping was, of course, phenomenal; jealousy was rampant. Despite

this, by informal coordination, a very respectable job of intelligence collec-
tion was accomplished. The basic intelligence data on the principalfiguresin
the Communist Party and their subordinate organizations (including the
Hukbalahap) were at all times available to the President of the Philippines.
Unfortunately, dissemination downward was poor. All agencies were eager to
pass information up; they were reluctant to pass information down, especially
if it meant going through an organization other than their own.
When it was determined that the Armed Forces should take the principal
role in operations against the Huk, MIS was substantially strengthened and
reorganized. It was given primary responsibility for collecting information on
the Hukbalahap and the Communist Party, preparing it and disseminating it as
intelligence.
To do this effectively, MIS was organized to include a conventional
headquarters, a metropolitan detachment for the city of Manila, and two
major types of field units. The plan was that in each area, usually a prov-
ince, there would be an MIS team permanently stationed. This team was
responsible for setting up intelligence and information nets throughout the
province.
In addition, tactical MIS teams for attachment to BCT were organized.
These teams were attached to the BCT in the area of operations and directed
by the BCT intelligence officer. Each team included intelligence analysts,
interrogators, and agents capable of undertaking limited covert operations or
of organizing such operations through informants. They were also charged
with maintaining close liaison between the BCT intelligence officer and the
area MIS detachment. All information, in general, went both to the BCT intel-
ligence officer and to MIS headquarters in Manila. If the BCT were trans-
ferred and another BCT replaced it, the MIS-BCT team was usually detached
from the old battalion and attached to the new, although this practice was not
invariable.
There were, of course, also operations conducted directly from MIS head-
quarters in Manilalargely of the long-range, or deep penetration type. There
was considerableflexibilityin this organization, and command lines were not
always too closely drawnnor can they always profitably be closely delin-
eated in intelligence matters. The important thing was that primary responsi-
bility for intelligence was placed where it should be: with the Armed Forces,
who were responsible for defending the country against any threat, foreign or
domestic. This pattern might well serve as a model for any nation that either
has a domestic insurgency or is subject to enemy invasion. It is the only one
by which the men who do the fighting (if it comes to that) can be assured of
having the intelligence they need.
The other intelligence agencies were not taken out of the picture altogether,
and quite properly not. They were given clearly to understand that their
information effort was considered secondary and that primary responsibility

and authority went to MIS, but their reports were welcome and were indeed
often most useful. The competition that remained was far from being harmful.
True, it caused some duplication, some overlapping, some "blowing" of other
operations, but it served effectively to keep all on their toes.
Since the MIS as a really active field service came into the picture rather
late, some combat units that had long been in thefieldhad developed excellent
intelligence services of their own. Wisely, the MIS did not attempt to disrupt
their procedures; rather, they joined them. Operations undertaken after 1950,
in some units, blended MIS and unit intelligence officers to the point where no
distinction was made. This worked very well. One of the more significant
operations of such a joint effort was the penetration of the Communist National
Finance Committee, the tax-collection and supply arm of the Party and of the
Huk, by an agent from a combat unit. The following is an account by one of
the participants:
"Relatives Project" was aimed at the Huk organization in the Mount Arayat
section. We found it necessary to contact the relatives of several Huk
commanders in order to find a suitable person for infiltration. We did this,
without identifying ourselves, until we finally located a cooperative man who
was the cousin of a Huk commander. (This Huk commander, incidentally,
had joined the Huk not for ideological reasons, but for personal reasons.) The
infiltrator had about two months' intensive training. While this was in prog-
ress, arrangements were made for cover and protection. It took the burning of
his house, the imprisonment of his brother, and eventually the evacuation of
his mother and family, to ensure his cover and protect the infiltrator. We had
to fool the Huk, and the government naturally had to pay for this.
His mother did not know her son was an infiltrator. The brother did not know
he was being put in jail because we were working a scheme. But the news of
these activities made them very effective. Slowly, on the basis of his obvious
grievances against the government, our agent was able to reach the Huk.
He was made a collector of the National Finance Committee, the organiza-
tion that supplied Huk in thefieldwith money, medicine, ammunition, weapons,
and other equipment. For two months, our suppliesmedicine, ammunition,
and weaponswereflowinginto the Huk lines through this infiltrator. The pur-
pose, of course, was to enable him to implant himself firmly into the organiza-
tion. Soon he was promoted, and our effort and our supplies paid off because he
was able to reach Taruc himself.
Our man was finally appointed a bodyguard to Taruc, the Huk leader of field
forces, but for security purposes, he had this duty only on and off. Nevertheless,
this fellow was able to take secret pictures of the entire membership of the orga-
nization in the Candaba Swamp. In all, only Secretary Magsaysay and five
Filipino and American officers knew of this project.
The supply operations I mentioned went on for two monthsand we got our
reports back. Then, in the third month, it was decided the time had come to
FIND 'EM 141
strike. It was very easy to simply pick out of thefilesthe material this fellow had
submitted. From his information, we were able then and there to apprehend
1,175 members of the National Finance Committee. That destroyed the Huk
supply line.
This agent, like many other agents and informants, found that his most dif-
ficult task was communication with his true superiors. The tactic adopted to
aid in getting instructions to him is rather ingenious, as described by the same
participant:
In order to let our man know that he must pick up instructions, we used ordinary
kites. At certain prearranged points in the area where he operated, we would fly
kites simultaneously at three different places, at certain times of day exactly on
the hour. The kites were not flown continuously or at random times in order to
relieve him from having to keep constant watch for them; if he were always seen
scanning the horizon, suspicions might have been aroused. So we did things on
the hour. We wouldflythe kite at seven o'clock in the morning, eight, nine, and
ten to make sure this signal had been received. The moment he saw the kite he
would know a contact was to be made within the swamp.
The troops, of course, couldn't be told anything about the operation. As a
matter of fact, I lost two men when the area commander in this area attacked my
men, and I nearly lost my life, too, but I couldn't tell him.
Very often, there wouldn't be anyone to meet our infiltrator, but he would find
his messages concealed, perhaps in a carelessly abandoned mess, orfirstaid, kit.
Using this system, how could we make an emergency contact at night? What
we did wasflythe kite with a battery-operated light. That is one way he got the
message. The other was by the use offlares.In other words, if we believed that
he had not been able to see this small light from the kite, we supplemented it
withflaresfiredon the hour at the same designated spots. The moment our man
saw this signal, he knew it meant that he had to be very careful because the
troops were going in fast. We told him now tofinda way to save himself. It was
my biggest concern, to be sure this fellow was safe.
It is similarly difficult for the agent to have his information delivered. One
of the most effective ways of obtaining reports from informants in guerrilla-
infested areas is through the use of aircraft. It was found that the L-5 aircraft
was especially useful for picking up reports from ground observers. Operat-
ing on a flight plan prepared jointly by the S-2 and S-3 sections, the pilots
were directed to observe certain specific pointshouses occupied or used
by informants who gave their information by prearranged signals. These
signals were improvised to suit the local environment: an open gate, an ani-
mal tied in the southeast corner of the yard, two windows of a house open.
This particular combination of signals gave three items of information: the
enemy's direction was noted by the relative position of the animal to the
house; the open gate indicated that the enemy planned to stay in the area;
and the two open windows indicated there were about two hundred Huk in
the area.
When reports of this nature were received from two or three informants,
accurate plotting of the enemy position was possible and an attack could be
mounted.
Aircraft observation of ground activities must usually be confirmed on the
ground before action is taken on them. This is especially true of observations
of new plantings and similar activities in supposedly uninhabited areas. These
must be verified by ground patrols before action is taken against what may
well be the farm patches of honest citizens. Indiscriminate aerial attacks may
turn otherwise potentially valuable guides and informants into guerrilla sym-
pathizers with just cause to hate the government.
Any lover of mystery stories will remember the classic conversation between
Sherlock Holmes and Inspector Gregory:
"Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?"
"To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time."
"The dog did nothing in the night-time."
Then the memorable comment:
"That was the curious incident."
This point, so well made by A. Conan Doyle in "Silver Blaze," has remarkable
pertinence to counterguerrilla intelligence operations. It was the dog that did not
bark, the "quiet" zone, that brought about "Operation Cover-up," which was con-
ducted in Pandi, Bulacan Province.
The municipality of Pandi covers many of the back doors to Manila; it is
sparsely populated and is not as well developed as the surrounding areas. For
some timesince 1950the S-2 section had consistently found Pandi a "quiet"
sector, while neighboring municipal areas drew high operational priorities
because of frequent Huk troop concentrations and other guerrilla activities. Per-
sonal interviews with municipal authorities drew blank stares and invariably a
denial of any information about Huk or guerrilla activities in the town of Pandi
or the municipal area itself.
On the other hand, G-2 reports indicated that Huk couriers and Huk VIPs
habitually traveled through Pandi on commercial buses without being molested
or challenged. Huk wounded were sheltering and convalescing in Pandi. This
was obvious, because at this time the home guards and police forces in other
municipalities around Pandi were on the offensive against Huk foraging par-
ties. To cite one instance, an encounter took place between a civilian guard
unit led by an MIS operative of the 7th BCT and a fifteen man Huk band at
Sapang Palay, a village about eight miles east of Pandi. During this encounter,
two Huk were killed. The Huk band fled westward with the home guards in
FIND 'EM 143
pursuit. The withdrawing Huk completely disappeared, leaving no trace. As a

result, "Operation Cover-up" was launched. An elaborate report was ulti-
mately submitted on its activities:
Four teams, consisting of six to eight members of MIS and Charley Company
(a specially trained unit like Force X), with radio sets were organized, with
the ranking NCO in charge of each team. Later, six more teams of the same
composition were added. Assigned missions were varied, but essentially the
teams were dispatched to penetrate the suspect area secretly and report by
radio all observations on the people there. Contact frequency was every other
hour on the hour. S-2 rented a house in the town of Pandi and hired a family
to occupy the house as a cover for MIS operatives. The MIS group was
assigned to effect surveillance on the Mayor and the town Chief of Police,
already suspected by S-2.
It was possible for the 7th BCT to detain suspects indefinitely, if there were
good grounds, because of the temporary suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
in Huklandia since 1950. On the theory that the people were being subjected to
a deep-covered "terrorism," it was recommended that several people be
"snatched" and brought to the 7th BCT headquarters for interrogation, in the
hope that these people could be convinced of the protective intent of the govern-
ment and would tell the truth about Pandi.
The teams were able to kidnap no less than seventy people from different
parts of the area without being detected by the inhabitants. Suspicions about the
hidden power of the Huks in Pandi grew, since in not a single case did either the
Mayor or the Chief of Police report the disappearances to the Philippine Con-
stabulary or to the 7th BCT.
With good treatment, frequent appeals to the detainees (in these, the Secre-
tary of National Defense, Magsaysay, participated), and promises of rewards,
the knowledgeable eventually came up with startling information. However, all
detainees agreed on their fear of Huk reprisals. Allegations from detainees were
radioed back for verification or confirmation tofieldteams covering Pandi. The
statements were carefully classified and analyzed and compared with intelli-
gence files as far back as 1948. Out of these painstaking efforts, S-2 was able to
establish the following intelligence:
1. Pandi was important to the Huk organizations in Luzon due to its proximity
to Manila, the center of underground activity of the Communist Party of the
Philippines.
2. Therefore, it was important that Pandi should not draw the attention of the
Armed Forces or the Constabulary. To keep from being garrisoned by either,
the area must be kept a "quiet" sector, free from raids, ambuscades, or any
Huk activity that would draw troops.
3. It was commonly known in the area that Huk troop concentrations were
prohibited. The area was even supposed to be avoided by traveling units.
Foraging was done only through supply agents, specifically appointed by
the Mayor. Direct approach to houses or inhabitants was punishable by

death.
4. Huk wounded or fugitives desirous of seeking shelter in Pandifirsthad to get
proper permission from their superiors, who would in turn make proper
arrangements with Pandi authorities.
5. Huk couriers traveling to or from Manila received briefings from Pandi Huk
intelligence officers on the current situation at their destinations, were given
passwords, and were taught new countersigns.
6. Pandi inhabitants adjudged "reactionary" or recalcitrant were not disciplined
within the municipal area, but in accordance with long-standing practice,
secretly kidnapped and killed outside of Pandi. Several instances were cited
where the Mayor and the Police Chief conspired in Communist-style
kidnap-murders of those the Huk high command ordered punished.
7. During the past years, Philippine Constabulary garrisons had occasionally
been set up in Pandi. Although, because of their small size and poor security
they could have been wiped out by local Huks, these garrisons were left
unmolested to mislead government intelligence appraisals.
8. Names of individuals were submitted as active Huk agents in Pandi, starting
off with the Mayor, policemen, rich and prosperous businessmen, etc.
With several sworn statements, each corroborating others, criminal actions

were instituted against all individuals cited or involved.
The liquidation of the Pandi sanctuary broke the Huk secret refuge near
Manila, which, in a larger way, hamstrung their clandestine activities in the city
and their liaison and control lines with activefieldunits in Central Luzon. Travel
for Huk couriers and VIP's to and from Manila became, at the very least, more
difficult.
Finding the guerrilla is a dangerous and difficult task, but it must be

done. It can be done only through the continuing action of many devoted
men, plus the most intense command emphasis and unstinted command
backing.
"Finding 'Em" in the Philippines was well performed. Most of the accom-
plishments still cannot be told, nor can some of those who contributed signifi-
cantly, and at great risk of their lives, their reputations, and their families, be
identified. However, any discussion of the efforts and the accomplishments in
finding the guerrillaand more particularly, his leaderscannot be complete
without mentioning the names of three devoted men. The senior, in point of
service in this campaign, is Lorenzo "Pop" Alvarado, onetime Sergeant of
Philippine Scouts, whose attention was first directed to Communist activities
in the Philippines in 1922.
Most significant were the services of two gallant senior officers: Colonel
Agustin Gabriel and Colonel Ismael Lapus. Both were active throughout the
entire campaign against the Huk. Colonel Gabriel was active against them
FIND 'EM 145
from the days of their predecessor organization, the prewar Sakdal. Without
the efforts of these two gentlemenwhich too often seemed unappreciated
by their superiorsthe final success against the Huk might have been long,
perhaps even too long, delayed.
NOTE
1. This was a Huk ambush of an isolated vehicle, in which the wife and child of an
American officer were killed.
Chapter 11
FIGHT 'EM
FIGHTING THE guerrillathe use offeree against individuals or unitsis very

much less difficult than the two elements that have just been discussed; it is
much easier than "Fooling 'Em" or "Finding 'Em." When the counterguerrillas
have the initiative, the guerrillas they meet can only die, run, surrender, or try
to hide. They may try to postpone acceptance of one of these choices, but if the
counterguerrillas who encounter them are reasonably well led and supported,
the guerrillas must do one of these four things.
Ordinarily well-trained and well-disciplined troops with competent aggressive
leadership have a tremendous advantage over guerrillas in actual combat.
A platoon of such soldiers, armed with commercial .22-caliber sporting rifles,
should be able to drive before them a company of guerrillas, in normally
overgrown terrain.
The competent guerrilla leader knows that ordinarily he cannot hold terrain,
should not try to keep his position in the face of aggressive troops. If surprised,
he may fight long enough to determine if the troops are aggressive or to cover
the withdrawal of his main force and his auxiliaries or his VIP's. Even if not
surprised, he may offer resistance, hoping to inflict sufficient casualties on the
enemy to dampen their aggressive spirit.
"He who fights and runs away can fight again another day" is a cardinal
guerrilla axiom. Successful offensive combat tactics against the guerrilla are
those that seek to prevent him from running away, either by cutting his route
of withdrawal or overwhelming him by sudden assault. Successful defensive tac-
tics are those that lure him out to be killed (only rarely possible) or those that
cause him to run awayagain, immediate assault, or a threat to his route of
withdrawal.
These words are easy to say; the principles are easy to prove. Their
implementation is another matter, as the history of every guerrilla war shows.
Time after time, guerrillas have successfully held their ground against larger
bodies of troops, or have successfully attacked military installations. Occa-
sionally, as in the Boer War, this has been a matter of superior marksmanship
and clear fields of fire. Most often it has been due to the mental attitudes (or
incompetence) of the counterguerrilla forces.
The principal considerations limiting effective combat against guerrillas are
the attitudes of the participants. Of these, an unwillingness to accept reasonable
combat casualties in counter-guerrilla operations is the most serious drain on
the combat effectiveness of counterguerrilla forces. This tacit attitude usually
may be found to prevail at all echelons, from the troops actually engaged up
through their entire military structure to its political chiefs, the national
administration, and back down to the people that administration represents. It
is indeed rare to find counter-guerrillas willing to accept, in engagements of
their own seeking, casualties proportionate to those they can inflict on the
guerrillas.
Only the British in Malaya seem to have been wholly successful in overcoming
this attitude in modern times. Their doctrine was immediate all-out assault,
whenever, and as soon as, they were sighted by the guerrillas. Militarily, this is
probably the best tactical doctrine, but it is one not likely to be effectively
employed in most circumstances. Perhaps even the British found this tactic
feasible only because their forces usually greatly outnumbered the guerrillas
they encountered.
Sometimes it almost seems that nobody who "counts" is really mad at the
guerrilla. A large army training camp in Huklandia was, in 1948, the target of
nuisance attacks by roaming Huk. The Provincial Provost Marshal responsible
for operations against the Huk in that area, an aggressive Lieutenant Colonel,
received many complaints about these attacks from the General commanding the
camp. The Colonel suggested that the camp might contribute to its own defense;
that patrols around its boundaries would be extremely good training. The General
made it very clear that he was not mad at the Huk, and that he hoped they would
not get mad at him. One could scarcely have blamed the Colonel for being
madder at the "brass" than at the poor hard-working guerrillas.
That General's attitude was perhaps less common in the Philippines than in
many other countries with a serious guerrilla problem. When those whose
mission is tofightknow that members of the public, of the government, of the
armed forces have such an attitude, a certain reluctance to accept casualties is
inevitable and understandable. Under such conditions, the counterguerrilla
feels that he is a policeman with a lot rather worse than that characterized by
W. S. Gilbert as "not a happy one."
Basically, the counterguerrilla's reluctance to accept combat casualties
arises from a tacit realization of the worth of the guerrilla attitude, of the
FIGHT 'EM 149
desirability of living to fight another day. It is a seemingly realistic appraisal

of the situation; of the consensus that the guerrilla does not pose the threat to
national existence that would be presented by a conventional army. No matter
how brave he may be, no matter how aggressive his leadership, it is an unusual
counterguerrilla who will behave as he would in a "regular" warunless the
people for whom he fights show an enthusiasm and devotion comparable to
that shown during a "regular" war. Often, getting the people who "count" to
realize and show by their actions that the guerrillas do represent a deadly
menace to the nation is the most difficult task of the counterguerrilla.
Even the most aggressive units engaged in counterguerrilla operations find
their combat tactics almost unconsciously restricted by this unwillingness to
accept casualties. Consider the 7th BCT, Armed Forces of the Philippines, one
of the most aggressive and effective units in the campaign against the Huk, one
that has furnished many examples of how guerrillas should be fought. Any
soldier, any officer who knew that unit would be justly proud of service in it.
During thefive-yearperiod 1950-55, the men of the 7th BCT were almost
continuously in the field. They met the Huk at the height of his strength; they
broke his strength in every area to which they were assigned. Exactfiguresare
not available, but they killed more than 500 Huk, they captured nearly as many,
they received the surrender of many more. They were a fighting outfit. One
commander was twice wounded, another commander (just after the period
covered) was killed. Their total casualties during thesefiveyears: 53 men killed;
1 man missing in action, believed killed; 29 men wounded. At least half of those
killed were not on combat missions when they died; they were conducting intel-
ligence or reconnaissance operations in which they tried to avoid contact with
the enemy but were surprised and overwhelmed. Four were chopped to pieces,
and the pieces were strewn down the road as a warning to their comrades.
Counterguerrilla reluctance to engage in actions that will probably result in
the loss of men is just as real and significant a fact of life as the reluctance of
guerrillas to engage in combat unless they have an obvious advantage over
their opponents. Both must be accepted as the rule rather than the exception.
Combat tactics in counterguerrilla operations must seek to avoid friendly
casualties while concentrating on forcing the enemy to fight until he is killed
or surrenders.
The temptation always, the practice too often, is to avoid decisive aggressive
action by proceeding as though the guerrilla were an orthodox enemy determined
tofight.It is all too easy to follow the tactics and troop-leading procedures for
conventional warfare. Thefirstaction upon encounter with an enemy is usually
to establish a base offire,that is, a line of men parallel to what is believed to be
the enemy front, shooting in the direction where the enemy is believed to be.
Until the situation is clarified, most or all automatic weapons and mortars are
used to augment thisfire.The base of fire established, the commander makes a
reconnaissance, makes an estimate of the situation, and formulates his plan of
maneuver. This he communicates to his subordinates, who must make their own
reconnaissance, etc., etc., and eventually an attack may be launched.
In due course, the positions of the enemy are overrun, while the enemy
himself is reorganizing some miles away, or already moving into a position to
ambush the troops on their triumphant way home after their "victory." The
troops feel that they have proved their mettle, and demonstrated conclusively
that the guerrilla is a cowardly chap who cannot resist them. Too often, if the
unit is not ambushed on its way home, it reports that the "situation is under
control," implying that they have deprived the enemy of the initiative. They do
not realize, although Clausewitz did, that an enemy who has successfully
disengaged may still maintain both tactical and strategic initiative.
Even this is not the worst way to fight the guerrilla. The worst is to assume
that, because his initial volume of fire is great, the guerrilla is in overwhelm-
ing strength and offers a major threat to the troop unit. Withdrawal under
such circumstances might be justified when facing a conventional enemy;
withdrawal from frontal contact except as a preliminary to a flanking or
encircling movement is intolerable in counterguerrilla warfare, unless it can
be conclusively proved that the guerrilla is both overwhelming in strength
and determined to attack.
An excellent SOP was formulated as follows:
"When a patrol makes contact with guerrilla, the automatic-weapons man
(or men) immediately take the guerrilla under fire. He (they) should move
back and forth along a line parallel to the observed front of the guerrilla, firing
short bursts in his general direction. The rest of the force that has encountered
the guerrilla should immediately divide into two parties. Each party should
move to aflank,then seek to achieve a position behind the guerrilla, and drive
him to the front, into the fire of the automatic weapons."
This was the standard tactic of some units of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines for engaging the guerrilla in a surprise encounter or a meeting
engagement. Its advantages are obvious; it subjects the troops to the least
danger from the fire of the guerrilla, while at the same time forcing him either
to fight to afinishor to withdraw immediately to prevent encirclement.
The military disadvantage is equally obvious. The guerrilla, unless sure
that he possesses great superiority, will withdraw immediately he learns of
the flanking effort, usually along a route that permits withdrawal faster than
the advance of the flanking parties. An immediate all-out assault may over-
take the guerrilla before he can withdraw, especially if he is in a camp or
bivouac, whereas the time required for the encircling effort may multiply his
safety margin two or three times. Nevertheless, the tactic described above is
probably the best that can be achieved as a standard for counterguerrilla
actions.
This standard can be achieved only if the troops are imbued with an
aggressive spirit and with the self-confidence on which sustained combat
FIGHT 'EM 151
aggressiveness so often rests. The soldier must know that man for man, his
outfit for their outfit, he is better than the guerrilla in actual combat. This
knowledge is based initially on training and indoctrination; it is reinforced by
combat experience.
The conventionally trained and armed soldier, if properly led and oriented,
can outdo the active guerrilla. He is a better fighter because he is in better
physical condition, is better trained, maintained, and equipped; he is better
prepared to destroy a designated target by force and violence. Other things
being equal, the conventional soldier can move faster, react more intelligently,
and obey orders better than his guerrilla enemy.
For maximum effectiveness as a counterguerrilla, the conventionally trained
soldier needs additional training. This must emphasize and develop in the
soldier his basic military assets and a high degree of self-confidence, so that
he is prepared to fight, alone if need be, against the guerrilla on his own
ground. "Offensive-mindedness" must be inculcated to the greatest degree
possible, so that the soldier, conscious of his superior discipline, training, and
armament, is prepared to take the initiative against a hidden enemy of unknown
size, and under the most adverse conditions.
Tactical training for counterguerrillas may profitably start by pairing off
soldiers, the establishment of "buddy teams." Two-man teams, made up of
two rugged individuals accustomed to working together and trusting one
another, form the basic building block for combat against guerrillas. In
combat they advance by leapfrogging each other in short bounds, each sure
from his training and experience that the other will be covering him. As long
as he has his buddy, the soldier knows that he has someone who will support
him and whom he must support, whether it be in attack or defense, sentry-go
or patrol.
The smallest regular patrol formation taught to line troops for counterguerrilla
operations normally will consist of a pair of buddy teams. This is the smallest
patrol capable of holding ground or attacking by fire and maneuver. It enables
the use of leapfrog tactics in either forward or retrograde movements. While
patrolling, the two teams may be so separated, by distance or by cover, that
only one team is likely to be observed and engaged by the enemy. The other
team is thus left free to take the action previously assigned to the unengaged
team (usually aflankingmovement, possibly the establishment of a base of fire
that will permit disengagement by the other team).
The squad is the basic combat command and should be intensively trained
in operating as a self-sufficient team. When approaching possible enemy
contact, it should adopt a formation that will enable it to force the enemy to
fight. As practiced in the Philippines with an eight-man squad, this was usually
a formation that placed the assistant squad leader and his buddy in the lead, on
the trail or other route of approach. Flanking the lead team and slightly to the
rear, concealed if possible from probable enemy observation points, was a
team of two riflemen on either side. Bringing up the rear, and determining the
rate of advance, were the squad leader and his buddy, usually an automatic
rifleman. Since this formation may be extremely fatiguing for the flanking
parties, the squad leader and his assistant may alternate in the lead, with the
rifle teams alternating in the rear position.
If enemy were met, the team making contact would immediately establish a
base offire,and eachflankingteam would automatically seek to pass the enemy's
flanks, in order to achieve a position from which it could advance on the enemy
from his rear quarter. (All movements were normally executed in short swift
bounds, one team member covering the other.) The rear element was left free to
act in accordance with the directions of the squad leader. Closing with the enemy
was mandatory. When possible, this was done on the signal of the commander,
but if no signal was heard (often the case in afightof this nature), each element
would close in when it believed the others were in position to do so.
Uncontrolled flanking movements, especially double envelopments, are
often frowned on because of the possibility of men being hit by friendly fire.
This danger can be reduced by several means, the most effective being rigorous
insistence on identifying a target before firing at it. The adoption of distinctive
fire patterns or rhythmsrat-a-tat-tatthe habitual employment of slogans or
passwords (one commander who survived many such engagements insisted
that his men all sing the "Battle Hymn of the Republic" while advancing), and
distinctive markings (e.g., use of hunter's headgear, bright side out in combat)
are all effective in reducing unfortunate incidents.
"Talking it up" is useful in many ways. One very successful commander
insisted that all commands be loudly and clearly addressed to a unit higher
than the one actually addressed. Private Flores, signaling his buddy, Juan, to
move up, would sound off: "Juan, move your team up." The squad leader,
addressing Flores and Juan, would shout: "Flores, get forward with that
squad!" By the time he was ready to move in with his "platoon," the enemy
was likely to be feeling heavily outnumbered. One Huk unit, bluffed this way,
actually surrendered to an army squad without a shot being fired.
It is almost impossible to overestimate the capabilities of aggressive,
well-trained small units in combat against guerrillas. Encouragement of
aggressive action against superior numbers may result in occasional
disheartening losses, but it will result in more effective, sometimes even
spectacular, damage to the enemy. One such incident is told by the commander
who would have half-killed the officer responsible when he caught him, had
that officer not been then in the process of being warmly congratulated by
Secretary Magsaysay:
At midday, 9 May 1951, Lieutenant Delfin S. Castro, in command of a 15-man

reconnaissance patrol, was approaching his objective, believed to be some
4,000 yards to the northeast. The mission of his patrol was to scout the Mount
FIGHT 'EM 153
Tacbuhan area, to verify the location of the headquarters of Hukbalahap Field

Command No. 32.
The patrol rested on the side of a mountain trail, with an advance party of
4 men in front, a right-flank security party of 2 men situated 150 yards from
the trail at an elevation of perhaps 75 feet above it, and a rear party of 3 men
some 50 yards to the rear. Castro resumed the march at 1430 hours, reaching
the general vicinity of his objective area at 1700. Due to the many peaks and
military crests affording observation of his further route of advance, Castro
decided to halt for the day, establishing bivouac about 500 yards from the trail
under heavy vegetational cover.
Leaving his NCO second-in-command in charge, Castro with 3 men pushed
forward on reconnaissance to take advantage of the remaining hour and a half
of daylight. He discovered that had he continued the advance of his patrol for
another 20 minutes he would have run against what proved to be thefirstHuk
outpost guarding the only trail leading into the Huk base that was his patrol
objective. Castro bypassed this outpost and penetrated the area another
500 yards, discovering a shack that could easily have accommodated 30 men,
apparently the barracks of a second security post supporting the first one
found. Noting a trail to the right of the shack, Castro advanced parallel to it for
some 30 yards of uphill going. He found himself on the edge of the main Huk
camp, which contained 17 shacks of various sizes, a clearing about 40 yards
in diameter, and another large shack. Remaining in observation for about
15 minutes, Castro and his men estimated that no less than 200 Huk, men,
women, and children were in the area. They counted 67 armed men, and noted
a machine gun emplaced on a promontory on the southwest edge of the camp,
guarding the trail they had avoided.
Deciding to circle the outside periphery of the camp, Castro studied the
surrounding terrain carefully. He found that the camp was actually situated in
a bowl formed by elevations on the east, northwest, and north sides, and
skirted by a deep ravine on its western and southern edges. In this ravine ran
a mountain stream, where the camp inmates were seen washing and drawing
water. Castro withdrew from the camp at dark, and rejoined his patrol at
2030 hours.
Knowing that it would take 4 days to receive reinforcements, and fearing
that his presence might be discovered before then, Castro decided to attack the
Huk camp. He felt confident that a surprise attack from an unexpected direction
would make up for the Huk superiority in armed men. The patrol was allowed
to rest until midnight.
The attack formation consisted of 4 parties, each guided by a member of
the evening patrol. Castro's own group was to approach the camp directly
and attack the machine-gun post, his attack being the signal for the other
groups to openfire.The second group was ordered to seek and occupy ambush
positions to the northeast of the camp, covering any exit routes that might be
found. The 2 remaining groups were to approach the camp from the west,
cross the stream, negotiate the ravine, establish firing positions from which
they could enfilade the camp, and await the signal for the general attack.
The parties attacked almost simultaneously about 053D hours 10 May, with
Castro signaling the attack by blowing up the machine-gun post with hand
grenades. The groups assigned to cover the northwest (ravine) and the high
ground had arrived in ample time to organize their attacks.
During the height of the action, the personnel manning the by-passed first
outpost and the security post retreated up the trail in the belief that a large
government force was approaching from their front. These guerrillas were
wiped out almost to the last man when they encountered the elements of
Castro's force that had already entered the camp.
Huk losses were some 22 killed, 13 wounded (all captured), plus 9 men,
21 women, and 7 children captured. The patrol destroyed all the buildings
and several "production patches" that were found in the vicinity, and captured
several sacks full of Huk documents and propaganda material. Castro did
not lose even 1 of his 15 men.
Few small-unit actions will be as successful or as lucky as this one. However,

when a counterguerrilla campaign is successfully concluded, it will be found
that most enemy casualties will have been inflicted in actions provoked or
started by small units, and that such actions have been the immediate cause for
many guerrillas' resigning from the war.
It cannot be repeated too often that the competent guerrilla will not stand
and fight unless he is sure that he will win, or has no other alternative. It
follows that, unless he can be attacked by surprise, the only ways in which he
may be brought to combat to his disadvantage are through offering him "bait,"
cutting off his route of withdrawal, or making him lose his head. All these can
best be accomplished by a multiplicity of small, mutually reinforcing patrols.
In the Philippines, large operations were most successful when they were
essentially of this nature in their execution. When they were not, they seldom
killed many Huk, or resulted in any casualties among the attackers. They did
cause the abandonment of bases, of rations, sometimes of ammunition, and
sometimes they resulted in the capture of significant documents. They effectively
put the Huk on the run for a time, usually short, and did have some effect in
reducing his will tofight.Sometimes, as in the operations against Mrs. Quezon's
ambushers, they did result in substantial casualties among the Huk. The cost, in
terms of effort, materiel, and troop time, of that operation makes it seem scarcely
worthwhile in terms of damage inflicted on the enemy. It should have been
successful, as a psychological operation, in convincing the people and the Huk
that when the armed forces got mad they could and would succeed.
Unfortunately the people, by the end of that operation, were too absorbed in
politics, and too busy worrying about alleged plans to use the armed forces
FIGHT 'EM 155
against them in the coming election. Key Communist Party leaders similarly
ignored the lesson, and decided to open an offensive against the army.
A form of meeting engagement very common in counterguerrilla warfare is

that singularly unpleasant surprise to one side which is called an ambush. Who
ambushes whom is largely determined by the aggressiveness and the intelli-
gence support of the protagonists. Initially, as was the experience in the Philip-
pines, most of the ambushing will probably be done by the guerrillas.
Ambushes by the Huk were generally placed in one of three general
classifications: ambushes of foot troops, ambushes of military personnel riding
in vehicles, and holdup ambushes. Of the three, the last was by far the most
common. It was a standard method of replenishing supplies, especially of
money, without the necessity of begging or the obloquy which attached to
theft or robbery of homes. The Huk had a quite elaborate SOP for stopping
buses, and occasionally private cars, in isolated spots, holding them under
the guns of men stationed along the road, and rather politely relieving the
passengers of most of their possessions. They made it a point to explain that
they regretted the necessity for securing contributions in this manner,
explaining that their actions were made necessary by the failure of government
to promote properly the interests and welfare of its citizens.
The armed forces at times used decoy buses, seeking in effect to counter-
ambush the ambushers. This practice was rather frowned upon, because of the
danger it raised that Huk might no longer stop genuine civilian buses politely,
but might stop them with a hail of bullets and ensuing heavy civilian casualties.
Many tactics for preventing ambush of vehicles were developed by aggressive
commanders. Often these involved elaborate plans for the classification of roads
according to the degree of anticipated danger of ambush, and traffic-control
systems based on the classification and the terrain. Dangerous routes, if not
closed to traffic other than military vehicles looking for trouble, were often
placed under convoy restrictions. These required vehicles to stop at designated
points and wait for enough other vehicles to make up a convoy, which would be
escorted by armored cars.
Patrols were especially effective. Sometimes these were made by armored
civilian vehicles carrying troops, sometimes by military vehicles. Frequently
the patrols were made on foot,flankingthe road, with supporting road elements
linked to the footsloggers by radio. This type of patrol was particularly useful
in discouraging holdup ambushes by small Huk parties.
One counterambush tactic sometimes taught was firmly prohibited by
Magsaysay. This was the so-called reconnaissance by firefiring into areas
where guerrilla might be, without concern for the civilians who might equally
well be there. This tactic may be permissible in regions where there is known
to be no one except acknowledged enemy; it is seldom, if ever, permissible in
counterguerrilla operations.
The only consensus on tactics to be adopted when vehicles are ambushed is

that the occupants must do something. The accepted practice in the Philippines
was for the occupants of the vehicles fired on to detruck immediately and
establish a base of fire from the side of the road opposite the enemy. Vehicles
not fired on were expected to advance or retreat, out of the area of fire, and
their occupants to seek to attack the flank of the ambush party.
Some commanders insist that the only effective counteraction when vehicles
are ambushed is for all passengers, in all vehicles that are halted or likely to be
halted, to leap immediately to the attack, charging the ambush party. This
tactic seems sound. It is the only effective action when both lead and rear
vehicles of a convoy are stopped, as they are by a well-executed ambush.
Whether the attack is frontal, as in this method, or flanking, as in the more
conservative tactic, attack is the only acceptable response. It is also the only
way of discouraging future ambushes.
There is no sure and generally applicable way of preventing the ambush of foot
troops when the guerrilla is aggressive. Under the terrain conditions frequently
found in this type of warfare, the habitual use of flanking parties will often
intolerably delay the main body, and may result in the loss of these parties.
The best safeguard against ambush, of course, is sufficient knowledge of the
enemy situation to be sure that there are no enemy in the area who are bold
enough, and strong enough, to try an ambush. Next to this is the practice, already
described, of sending units or small patrols on parallel routes within reinforcing
distance of one another. So long as the guerrilla is aware of the possibility that
there may be more troops just over the hill, or just around the bend in the trail,
he is quite unlikely to attack. Needless to say, ordinary precautions, investigat-
ing likely ambush spots in advance of the arrival of the main party, using flank
guards, and so on, should always be taken if the possibility of ambush exists,
and the mission of the troop unit permits time to be taken.
The appropriate immediate action for foot troops when ambushed has
never been satisfactorily decided. Some commanders strongly advocate
immediate assault; head hell-for-leather into the fire. Others feel that a party
caught in an ambush should seek to squeeze out of the ends, to get out of the
killing zone and then execute an enveloping movement. The one point upon
which all agree is that when caught in an ambush, troops must do something,
must get out of the killing zone by advancing, retreating, charging, or autolevi-
tation. They must have a prearranged plan that is known to every man, and
that allots to every man, according to his position when the trap is sprung,
a specific immediate action.
Ambushing guerrillas successfully usually requires much patient preparation,
much painstaking gathering of information. Sometimes, prisoners will supply
the needed data, more often it will be necessary for stay-behind parties to watch
for days. Penetration agents among the guerrilla, or their civilian supporters,
often can be of assistance. So can the casual chatter of civilians to other civilians
FIGHT 'EM 157
of their acquaintance; details thus gleaned may be combined with other

information to point the probable path of small guerrilla parties. Sometimes the
information needed can be gained from spot observation and deduction, as in
the ambush of the rice carriers conducted by Sergeant Oblenida.
Ambushes of single individuals or very small groups are rather common in
counterguerrilla operations. Guerrillas visit their families or their girl friends.
The information gets around, and another guerrilla disappears, or he may be
leftas he was in some casesshowing one or more knife wounds, a mystery
for his companions possibly to investigate, and fall into the trap. A tactic
insufficiently exploited during the Huk campaign was the long-range sniping
ambush, in which small parties deep in guerrilla territory pick off individuals
in the vicinity of a base that cannot be approached, without discovery, by
forces large enough to deal with it. Had suitable weapons for this, meaning
silenced rifles, been available, the tactic could probably have contributed
much to the campaign.
One constant problem in operating against individuals or small groups is the

difficulty of positive identification of enemy. Huk on visits to their families or
friends would often conceal their weapons and appear to be innocent farmers.
Troops who claim to be the friends and benefactors of the civilian population
cannot afford to make too many mistakes in identification. The simple tactic of
knocking on the front door and running around to see who comes out the back
is not sufficiently sophisticated to be a safe way of distinguishing between a
guerrilla visitor and a casual Lothario. It was found, however, that knocking, so
to speak, on the doors of a dozen houses in an isolated barrio byfiringoff flares
or shooting a clip of M-l ammunition into the air was sufficient to justify
immediate action if a half-dozen men came bolting out of the houses in the
middle of the night. These usually were Huk, and not a few died or were
captured in this way.
The Armed Forces of the Philippines did not have occasion to develop and
test effective defensive tactics against the Huk. There were few occasions on
which the Huk actually attacked an armed forces position. When they did, it was
usually a complete surprise executed against unsuspecting forces, or else was a
probing attack that developed such stiff initial response that a full attack never
materialized. Had it not been for the Huk strategy of avoiding attack during the
first years of the campaign, it would have been much easier for the counterguer-
rillas. Ordinarily, well-trained, well-motivated troops in a rationally sited and
reasonably well-prepared position can ask nothing better than for the guerrilla
to attack their position. It will eliminate many, and thoroughly discourage the
survivors.
No consideration of ways offightingguerrillas is complete without a discussion

of weaponry. The AFP, in their campaign against the Huk, used substantially the
armament normal during that period to an infantry battalion of the U.S. Army.
The weapons for the individual soldier were about 60 per cent Garands (U.S.
rifle, .30 caliber, M-l), approximately 25 per cent carbines (U.S., .30 caliber),
perhaps 12 per cent Browning automaticriflesand .45-caliber submachine guns,
supplemented with pistols and a very few unconventional weapons. In addition,
they were well equipped with light and heavy .30-caliber machine guns, and with
60-mm. and 81-mm. mortars. There were also .50-caliber machine guns, and a
number of batteries of 75-mm. or 105-mm. howitzers. These weapons were more
than adequate. Actually, they were too heavy, and so was their ammunition.
For practical purposes, 80 per cent of the troops engaged in counterguerrilla
operations might be satisfactorily armed with commercial .22-caliber sporting
rifles. Possibly 10 per cent should be armed with M-l or '03 rifles, or a com-
parable weapon, for the occasional long-range encounter. For the rest, a mix
of noisy, fast-firing automatic weapons with a range of 20 yards or so, and a
few unconventional, that is, silenced, rifles and pistols could do the job. Hand
grenades are useful for their moral effect, as are shotguns. So are rifle grenades
and light mortars or recoilless rifles, again primarily for their moral effect.
This is really the key consideration in weaponry for counterguerrilla
operationsthe moral and morale effects of the weapons. Troops with
conventional training simply cannot be convinced, without long indoctrination,
that weapons lighter than those in the standard military mix are effective. This
goes from top to bottom of the military hierarchy. Some officers insist, in
conventional as well as in unconventional warfare, that all officers, or at least
themselves, should be armed withrifles.Actually an officer needs only a pistol
with which to defend himself against a chance short-range encounter. The aver-
age soldier, given a choice between a carbine with 30 rounds of ammunition,
weighing in all perhaps 7 pounds, and an automaticriflewith enough ammunition
to keep it in action, weighing perhaps 40 pounds, is very likely to choose the
heavier weapon if he believes there is a chance that he may have to shoot.
The principal problems in fighting guerrillas are finding them and getting
into a position to fire at them. This means walking. Weighty weapons and
ammunition cut down troops' ability to walk. Even so, unless the troops are so
well trained in practical combat realities that they can overcome the years of
conventional training, and the even more years of indoctrination by movies,
comic books, and now by television, they will unhesitatingly reduce their
effectiveness by picking the heavy weapon. If they are not permitted to pick it,
their morale, and consequently their fighting effectiveness, is likely to suffer
even more than had they been overloaded.
Warfare is a favorite realm of the gadgeteer. The campaign against the Huk
was no exception, although it was prior to popular interest in "counterinsur-
gency." Several very effective unorthodox weapons were developed, but no
one has yet come up with a really satisfactory general purpose weapon for
guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations. It is needed.
FIGHT 'EM 159
Today there is an infinite range of speculation about gadgets for fighting

guerrillas. Many of these may afford some help, but their principal value, or
deficiency, will be their effect on the morale of the troops who use them, and
on that of their opponents. Few weapons have quite the same effect on guerrilla
morale as a pair of ice picks lashed together, used to puncture a guerrilla
jugular, if the guerrilla is left for his companions to pick up. Next in
effectiveness is a well-presented bayonet.
The guerrilla believes that he possesses moral superiority over his enemy. He
feels that he is demonstrating it by being a guerrilla, by daring to stay in the
field even though his enemy is better equipped and supported. If that enemy
seizes every possible opportunity to assail him by violence, with little or no
regard for numbers or position, the guerrilla will soon become discouraged, or
dead. Persuade him that his enemy is more determined, more fearless than he,
and as long as he remains persuaded, the guerrilla is not a threat.
Chapter 12
TARGETTHE CIVILIAN
THERE IS a more certain way of eliminating the guerrilla than seeking to hunt
him down among the civilians; it is to turn the civilians against him. To return
to Mao's analogy, it is to make the civilian "sea" no longer hospitable to the
guerrilla "fish." The Communists call this sea the "mass base," including in
that term all those not actively hostile to their guerrillas. As they well appreciate,
without this mass base no guerrilla movement can long survive. Neither can
an indigenous government.
When this is realized, the attitudes of the people, heretofore taken for
granted, become suddenly as important to the government as they have been
all along to the guerrilla. The guerrilla has been working on this target, using
tactics designed to build doubts and bitterness, grievances and unrest wherever
they might be aroused. He has been changing and modifying the attitudes of
the civilian about his government, seeking to develop a suitable climate for
guerrilla growth. Now the government must win it back, must make the sea of
people unfriendly to the guerrilla, must reinforce and build new faith and
loyalty in the nation, must persuade the mass base of people to back their own
government against its would-be destroyers.
To accomplish this, the government must do many things. First, it must act
effectively to seek and destroy the guerrilla, in order to prove its own military
ability and capacity to protect the governed. Second, the government must
understand, accept, and announce a mission that will warrant support. Third,
the words and deeds of all representatives of the government must be com-
patible with the mission, or the representatives must be summarily and publicly
disavowed. Fourth (and to this end every effort should be made), the words
and actions of the government must be presented in terms readily understood

and readily believed by the people.
In other words, a soldier who steals a chicken from a farmer cannot claim
to be the farmer's protector. And a squad leader, a company commander, or a
government that does not take action to punish the chicken thief weakens the
credibility of the claim that the soldier is protecting the people.
A government official accused of enriching himself by malfeasance in
office is ipso facto evidence that government officials do not regard public
service as a public trust. Unless action is taken against such an officeholder,
the credibility of the government's claim to seek the welfare of the people is
grievously weakened.
Guerrilla warfare, far more than any other form of conflict, blends all
normal government functions with combat to serve essentially political
purposes. Every action taken has some effect on the nation, on the attitudes
of the governed toward government, and toward the guerrilla.
In seeking to build favorable attitudes, the guerrilla conducts
psychological-warfare operations. If the government is to succeed, if it is to
build popular support, it must respond, not only with counterguerrilla
psychological operations, but with operations designed to influence popular
attitudes in its favor. For a representative government that functions by the
consent of the governed, and encourages freedom of speech, thought, and
action, to acknowledge the use of measures designed to influence the
attitudes of the governed is not only difficult, but extremely sensitive.
True, seeking to influence the attitudes of people is an extremely popular
pastime, especially under democratic governments. The practitioners of the
art most often call themselves educators, statesmen, preachers, or advertising
men. Even the teacher and preacher are likely to arouse hostility when they
admit they are seeking to change attitudes; so, to a much greater degree, do
the politician and the man in the gray-flannel suit, when they admit what they
are trying to do. Call this effort "psychological warfare," and the immediate
reaction is to picture a sinister individual, half Machiavelli, half mountebank.
The mere mention of efforts to influence popular attitudes on behalf of a
government generates reactions so strong that descriptive terms become
emotionally charged, and definitions unduly limiting.
For this reason, the counterguerrilla, well aware that he must succeed in
hitting the civilian target if he is to eliminate the guerrilla, must give careful
consideration to what title he gives his efforts to influence popular thinking,
and what the opponents of government may name them. Essentially, they are
psychological operations, but because of the possible political repercussions,
great caution is necessary in formulating their public definition and in stating
the mission of the agency responsible for them. The definition should appear
not merely innocuous, it should describe an indubitably desirable purpose.
The assigned mission should not restrict operations, yet it should provide
TARGETTHE CIVILIAN 163
safeguards against obviously undesirable activities. Much greater latitude

is required by the operator in a counterinsurgency situation than in so-
called conventional war, yet it is precisely in the former that danger of
improper political use (or, at least, accusations thereof) is greatest.
Possibly an appropriate definition of psychological operations in a coun-
terinsurgency situation would be: "actions planned and conducted primar-
ily to create emotions, attitudes, and behavior favorable to the
accomplishment of the national objectives, including elimination of the
guerrilla." Now change the term defined to "national revival operations"
(instead of "psychological operations"), and the whole becomes as easy to
defend as a campaign platform based on home, mother, and opposition to
sin. Perhaps more important, if the national objectives are clearly defined
and agreed upon, improper use of the mechanism can be detected and
exposed.
Such a definition was in effect applicable to the psychological operations
undertaken in the Philippines under the direction of Magsaysay. A mission
directive formulated on the basis of this definition will give great freedom
in the choice of means. It permits actions of countless sorts, as long as their
purpose is influencing attitudes or behavior on behalf of the government. In
practice, such actions will range from those undertaken to inform the target
to those intended to terrify it. They will range from press handouts to using
a "Voice of God" loudspeaker to tell guerrilla Tarlac Tommy and his friends
that intelligence he supplied (in fact, he has not supplied it) has led to the
death of Huk Commander Keling. On-the-spot promotions for soldiers who
have killed guerrillas and the provision of an army band for a village cele-
bration may both be useful psychological operations.
Most important, this definition and the mission based on it neither
describe nor delimit the target of these operations. The reason and the
necessity for this are obvious, in light of popular distrust of any activities
designed to influence attitudes and behavior. In guerrilla and counterguer-
rilla operations alike, the target is, and must be, everyonefriends, enemies,
innocent bystanders, foreign diplomats, international correspondents. The
target is the sea, and the fish who swim in it, the birds who fly overhead, the
pseudogang shark, and the porpoise playboy whose antics may be grist to
the enemies' propaganda mill.
The definitions and missions commonly stated and primarily applicable
to conventional war are not at all suitable for counterguerrilla warfare.
Consider the latest available official United States definition of psycho-
logical operations:
This term includes psychological activities and psychological warfare, and

encompasses those political, military, economic and ideological actions planned
and conducted to create in enemy, hostile, neutral or friendly foreign groups the
emotions, attitudes, or behavior favorable to the accomplishment of U.S.

policies and objectives.1
This is a fine, carefully worded definition, in some ways broad, in others

carefully limiting, which is almost totally inapplicable to operations against
guerrillas by the government they threaten.
If the civilian population in the area of operations (the mass base, the sea)
is regarded as an enemy, or even as "friendly foreign groups," then the armed
forces and the government have no legitimate claim on their support. If they
are not regarded as enemiesand of course, the object of the exercise is to
convince them that they are notthen they are not legitimate targets for
psychological operations.
Take another definition, this one a statement of the mission of the
Psychological Warfare Branch of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, adopted
in July, 1953:
to hasten military victory of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in time of war
by reducing the enemy's will to resist military and civilian authority through the
use of propaganda and such other operational measures of military nature as
may be required.
It seems a strange definition indeed, coming from an armed force victorious

over a guerrilla forceparticularly since that victory was due, in large
measure, to successful psychological warfare; psychological warfare targeted
at everyone, from their own troops through the entire civilian spectrum to the
die-hard Communist leaders of the guerrillas.
The reasons these definitions are so limiting may be summed up in one word:
politics. Whenever a representative of government speaks to a potential voter, he
may be accused of playing politics. Nowhere is this more true than in a counter-
guerrilla effort. The use of government agencies to influence popular opinion is
not uncommon, but to admit that use is to invite the harshest political attacks.
This reaction is not entirely unwarranted. The use of government publicity
agents, the mounting, at government expense, of massive psychological
operations to benefit the incumbent of high government office has all too long
a history, all too many precedents. It has been the favorite device of dictators
from the Pharaohs to Castro.
Success in counterguerrilla operations requires outstanding leadership at all
echelons, especially at the top.
The leader of a successful indigenous counterguerrilla effort is almost certain
to become a symbol of good government. He will appear as the spokesman for
the good intentions of government, he will appear as the man who made them
effective. Actions undertaken to build support for the government will almost
inevitably build political support for the leader who, by his words and actions,
exemplifies the intentions of government and the aspirations of the governed.
Politicians who see in the counterguerrilla leader a potential political rival will
seek to destroy the leader, or at least to curtail or destroy the operations that,
seeking support for the government, create support for him.
The very restricted mission given to the Psychological Warfare Branch of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines arose from just such a situation: The
immense success of psychological operations designed to win popular
support for government had won corresponding support for the symbol of
good governmentRamon Magsaysay. At the time the quoted mission was
written, in mid-1953, Magsaysay was a candidate for the Presidency,
obviously running far ahead of his opponent, the incumbent President,
Elpidio Quirino.
Magsaysay, when he took office as Secretary of National Defense, was little
concerned about definitions, organizations, or theories. He had, in fact, a
strong aversion to all of them, and would have insisted that he had no theories.
He would have said only that he "knew" some things. He did.
He "knew" that the government must win the support of the civilians if the
soldiers were to defeat the guerrilla. He "knew" that in the operational area the
soldier is by far the most significant element of government in contact with the
civilians. He "knew" how every action of the soldier reflected on government.
Accordingly, he set out on a high run to make the actions of the soldiers
reflect and emphasize their mission as friends and protectors of the people.
One of the first things he changed was the manner in which troops entered a
town or village.
In 1947, after President Manuel Roxas had proclaimed his "mailed fist"
policy, the troops went on combat-alert status. By late 1950, under the prodding
of the high command to be "truly military," they adopted the practice of
entering every inhabited area in Huklandia in an exaggerated combat posture.
Troops would move in by truck, obviously battle-ready, weapons pointing out
in all directions as though they expected immediate assault. From their
demeanor, it was to be assumed that they felt they were among enemies, that
they anticipated momentary attack.
The psychological effect of this was deplorable. The people saw that these
representatives of their government regarded them as enemies. The obvious
effect on the troops themselves was to feel that the people were indeed their
enemies. Soon, in small villages, the people simply disappeared when the
troops came in. In larger towns and cities, soldiers were ignored or treated as
a bad smell. The very insecurity that the guerrilla feeds on was heightened
both in the protector and the protected.
Magsaysay issued orders that troops entering towns and barrios were to
make no threatening display of weapons, adopt no threatening attitude unless
there was clear and present danger. He instructed troops entering an inhabited
area to conduct themselves as though they were coming among friends who,
like themselves, might be subject to surprise attack by a common enemy.
These orders he enforced by most thorough checking of troop behavior himself

and by reports from trusted members of his staff.
Magsaysay's next action was based on his recollections of the reactions of
civilians, particularly children, to American troops who seemed always to
have candy for children. He begged, he borrowed, he scrounged, perhaps he
even stole, but he procured candy and chewing gum to issue to troops on the
move; candy they, in turn, were to distribute to children whenever they halted
in a village.
The results were prompt and far-reaching. As soon as soldiers came in
friendliness, the barrio people at least stayed to see the next move. As soon as
it became known among children that these soldiers, their own soldiers, gave
candy to the kids, a patrol or a truckload could not enter the village without
being surrounded by children coming to greet "Santa Claus."
This meant many things. First of all, the children quickly began to regard
soldiers as their friends no matter how much the elders in the family disap-
proved of soldiers in general or sympathized with the Huk. It was hard to
persuade the children that the Santa Claus with the candy was an enemy.
Eventually, this rubbed off on the older folks; it is hard to dislike those who
respond to children. Troops surrounded by children are not likely to be attacked
by a guerrilla whose support depends on people to whom the children belong.
Thus, the children formed the best possible shield for troops while they were
in the village. And if the children did not appear when soldiers came in, it was
reasonable to assume that the enemy might be nearby. The effect of the
friendship-candy approach went even deeper, since friendships started by the
children could lead to information for the soldiers.
About the same time that the wholesome effects of the "candy for kids"
program became apparent, Magsaysay issued a statement to the armed
forces declaring that every soldier had two duties: first, to act as an ambas-
sador of good will from the government to the people; second, to kill or
capture Huk. Nothing else, he said, really counted as far as he was con-
cerned. Certainly nothing would qualify a man for promotion except to be
an effective ambassador and an effective fighter. This policy would govern
all actions, and he and his staff would be checking on it. He went further.
He proclaimed it the duty and responsibility of everyonecivilian and sol-
dier aliketo submit suggestions as to how these two objectives could bet-
ter be accomplished.
Needless to say, his statements were received with considerable skepticism.
But skeptics soon found out that Magsaysay and his staff were checking con-
stantly and by every conceivable means to ensure compliance with his
policies.
No commander, even in the most isolated outpost, could go to bed at night
sure that he would not be awakened before dawn by an irate Secretary of
National Defense. The Secretary only seemed irate by habit, irate to find
anyone sleeping when he needed to talk to them. He would want to know how
much the commander, be he sergeant or colonel, knew about the situation in
his area; about the state of his command; when the troops had last been paid;
what they ate for supper last night; how many Huk they had killed in the last
week; why they hadn't killed more; what was the state of motor transport;
what were the needs of the civilians in the area; what was the attitude of the
civilians. And the commander could also be sure of a personally administered
"shampoo," a sort of verbal but violent Dutch rub, if he didn't know the
answers; it would be twice as severe if he tried to bluff.
(Of course, Magsaysay was not always an avenger. Had he been, he would
undoubtedly have "happened to an accident" on one of his visits to the field.
Just as he could be thoroughly unpleasant when someone fell short of his duty,
he could be thoroughly warm and attractive, a real pleasure to have as a visi-
tor. The senior author well remembers one morning when he was awakened
by the duty officer, saying that "the man" was paying a visit to the camp. Fear-
ing that he was due for a "shampoo," the author made his way to the officers'
mess to find the Secretary of National Defense there ahead of him, busy
preparing breakfast as a token of his esteem. The effect can readily be imag-
ined. It was not a very good breakfast, but it may well be understood how
much one appreciated the sort of chief who, finding breakfast not ready
because we were all bushed, was considerate enough to fix it for us.)
Another source of irritation between soldier and civilianand one of the
most common difficulties in counterguerrilla operationswas the inadequacy
of ration supplies for troops in thefield.The problem of getting supplies, and
of getting them distributed, frequently left troops with no alternative but the
age-old one of foraging. And troops forced to appropriate rations are not
inclined to be gracious to the farmer who supplies them. The Armed Forces of
the Philippines were no exception. Troops often ate only what they could
forageand had no money to pay for it. Secretary Magsaysay recognized that
by this practice alone the troops were placing themselves in an unfavorable
position in comparison to the Huk. True, the guerrillas depended almost
entirely for their sustenance on what they could extract from the farmers, but
they always sought to make their extractions as painless as possible. The
actual pickup of the food was often done for them by the Huk "tax collectors"
on behalf of the cause. If the food was procured by the guerrillas themselves,
it was customarily begged. The farmer was asked, politely and humbly, if he
could spare some food for the men who were fighting "for his cause, on his
behalf, and to establish the new peoples' democracy." Thus guerrilla foraging
was actually made to contribute to their propaganda campaign.
Magsaysay took several steps to rectify this situation. The procurement
and distribution of field rations was given emergency status. A new policy
was established: Troops, especially patrols to remote areas, were required to
carry more food than they needed for themselves. If this was not possible,
emergency resupply was effected, often by air drop. Where this was
impractical, troops were supplied with cash with which to pay for food
purchased from civilians. The fact that the troops were able to depend on
military resources, were self-sufficient, heightened their own morale and
increased the respect of the civilians for the army.
There was another effect, a psychological reaction of perhaps greater
importance than that induced by the self-sufficiency of the troops, by the
demonstration that they were law-abiding citizens whose presence was not a
burden on civilians. This resulted from the extra food carried by the patrols,
food they could give to those in need, especially those in need because of the
depredations of the Huk, the common enemy. In the past, the farmer who
gave food to the Huk, however unwillingly, had been treated as clearly a
sympathizer and supporter of the enemy. Now the assumption was that if he
was actually in need because of taxes levied on him by the Huk, he was
clearly a person entitled to help from his government. The troops made
common cause with him against the common enemy, they said, thus tacitly
imposing on him an obligation. It was clear that if the soldier gave a man
food to replace what the Huk had taken, the man had an obligation to help the
soldier find and eliminate the Huk.
Needless to say, there were many who could see no reason for these unusual
practices, many who considered all this as tantamount to giving aid and comfort
to the enemy. These people, if they were military, learned almost immediately
that whether or not they approved of such practices, they would be most unhappy
if they did not conform to them. It took some time, considerable organization,
and a few thoroughly unpleasant experiences to get this across to everyone.
Most soon perceived the value of these practices in terms of military accom-
plishment through achievements based on information received from civilians
who now cooperated with them, instead of with the enemy.
Magsaysay realized that he could not singlehandedly implement his
"Attraction Program," as he called his campaign to win acceptance of the soldier
as a worthy supporter of a government that deserved the support of the gov-
erned. Atfirst,he may have thought that the program was so obviously neces-
sary and useful that, once started, it would be carried forward automatically.
He did not make the mistake of thinking that simply issuing an order would be
enough.
At no time was Magsaysay a victim of the popular misconception about
armies, the idea that if an order is fed in at the top it will inevitably come out,
obeyed, at the bottom. Probably this misconception of how an army functions
is due to the equally fallacious concept of the "military mind." Many who
should know better often expound at great length on this so-called military
mind, implying, at the least, that it is a peculiarly rigid strait-jacketed response
mechanism, probably incapable of thought, but one to be conceded the
virtueor the viceof complying implicitly with orders received from
superiors. Such a mind may be the ideal of some theorists, as it is the epitome
of evil to others. Seldom can such a mind be found; certainly the robot
condition it would create does not exist.
This is due to many factors, primarily the fact that an army is composed
of human beings who must understand an order before they can carry it out;
human beings characterized by the phrase commonly circulating in many
armies that "if an order can be misunderstood, it will be misunderstood."
More than this, men of responsibility, as soldiers commonly are, must appre-
ciate the purpose of an order before they can execute it effectively. Finally,
effective execution of an order presupposes not only understanding the order
and its purpose, but having the knowledge to carry it out.
Thus, whenever new or specialfieldsof endeavor arise, when new missions
are given to an army, there must be officers especially trained in understand-
ing the meaning, the purpose, and the execution of orders in thisfield.Desirably
these officers will be especially motivated to secure the best possible
accomplishment of the mission in theirfield,even though the execution of that
mission is the responsibility of a commander whom they only advise.
The Attraction Program was, in practice, an enlargement of the mission of
the armed forcesalthough certainly the principle was inherent in their
basic mission. Effective accomplishment of this enlarged mission required
officers especially trained and motivated to assist, advise, and, not infre-
quently, do the work, in the accomplishment of this new mission given to
commanders.
An organization was created that became known as the Civil Affairs Office
of the Secretary of National Defense. Although under the direct control of,
and personally responsible to, the Secretary of National Defense, this
organization functioned in much the same way as any technical service, such
as the Chemical Corps, functions in conventional (pre-1962) U.S. military
organization. Civil Affairs Officers were assigned to each echelon of command
down to battalion level, and at each echelon functioned both as special staff
officers (advisers to the commander) and as operational officers, responsible
for duties in their specialty. In addition, there were special operational units
directly under the Civil Affairs Office, which could be attached to tactical or
administrative commands, and special sections (press, radio, etc.), which
served the entire Armed Forces.
This rather unorthodox arrangement worked well for several reasons. First, the
Joint Staff, as the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
would be called in contemporary U.S. terminology, was actually a functional
one. There was no army headquarters, and the auxiliary services (air force and
navy) bore the same relationship to GHQ as did the army military-area commands.
Second, the Secretary of National Defense, by temperament, inclination, and in
his own opinion, necessity, was in effect his own Chief of Staff. As far as he was
concerned, every officer, every soldier, certainly every member of the general
and special staff, was responsible to him personally, on exactly the same terms as
any member of his own office. Most important, Magsaysay was not interested in
organization or theory; he wanted, and got, results.
The mission of the Civil Affairs Office was never set forth fully and
explicitly. Various written directives made the CAO responsible for advis-
ing and assisting commanders in establishing the best possible relations
with civilians, a mission somewhat broader than that ordinarily given a
public-relations officer. It was generally understood that any matter that
might be expected to come within the purview of troop information and
education, psychological operations, or military government came within
the cognizance of the CAO. Finally, the CAO at higher echelons functioned
as something similar to a publicity-minded Inspector General. The lack of
clarity in the statement of mission of the CAO aroused much criticism from
organization-minded members of the military, who could not see why these
missions should not be spelled out, or why they should not be given the
more commonly used military designations.
The reasons were very simple. Magsaysay realized the public criticism that
any accurate statement of mission would arouse; he also realized the necessity
for not imposing arbitrary or formal limitations on activities designed to win
popular support for the armed forces. To his way of thinking, the duties of a
Civil Affairs Office should be sufficiently implicit in the name, and anyone who
could not understand the meaning of the words should go away andfigureit out,
not take up the valuable time of people trying to win a war. As for its position in
his office rather than in GHQ, he felt, with justification, that without maximum
command backing, his backing, the CAO could never accomplish its mission.
At its greatest strength, the CAO never totaled more than 200 officers, enlisted
men, and civilians. This is comparable to one company of psychological-warfare
troops in the U.S. Army. With little actual equipment of their own, they had to
rely heavily on their own good judgment, the cooperation of their commanders,
and a sensitive knowledge and understanding of their people and of the enemy.
Since the CAO headquarters was in the office of the Secretary of National
Defense, and was responsible for advising and assisting the Secretary in main-
taining the best possible relations with the civilians, it functioned as his
public-relations office. Reporters scouting for news about the armed forces
came to the Civil Affairs Officers for information. If it were for a follow-up
on a report casting discredit upon the armed forces, they were coming to the
officer who was not only authorized to give information about the incident,
but also responsible for seeing that if such an incident had occurred, it was
made to redound to the credit of the armed forces, if possible.
Suppose, for example, that a reporter came to the CAO asking information
about a reported chicken theft by soldiers of the Second Squad, Third Platoon,
Company B, Umpteenth Battalion Combat Team. The CAO was authorized to
require, on behalf of the Secretary of National Defense, an immediate
investigation of the incident and appropriate corrective action. It was further

charged with following up the report to ensure that the appropriate action
taken was so reported to the press as to convey the idea that an unfortunate and
exceptional incident had received sudden and condign punishment.
A major mission of the CAO was to secure the widest publicity for all laudable
accomplishments of the armed forces. Information was constantly fed to eager
newspaper reporters and radio commentators. However, they were never forced
to use any items nor to withhold any. The achievements of the armed forces and
the developments on all fronts made headline news regularly and deservedly on
their own merits. The few newshounds who remained hostile searched freely for
subjects on which to base scathing remarks, while CAO Officers scurried to
make these remarks boomerang on their makers. Public opinion about the actions
of the government and of the armed forces was constantly monitored. Every
effort was made to keep abreast of the attitudes of the Huk toward new
developments. This monitoring kept the Civil Affairs Office constantly in touch
with the impact of the various approaches tried, and gave excellent leads for
further propaganda campaigns.
Wide publicity meant more than handing out news releases. It meant
spreading the information to the people in the country, people who did not see
the newspapers or hear the radio. One of the better devices for widespread dis-
semination of information about the helpful actions and good intentions of the
troops was the publication of journals and newspapers ostensibly for the troops.
These papers included general news, gave instructions on troop behavior with
civilians, and reported commendable military activities, citing them as actions
to be emulated. These publications were issued to the troops in large quantities,
so that they might see in print what they were supposed to be doing, and what
their rewards might be. More important, the soldiers were encouraged to give
copies to the civilians, especially in the area of operations against the guerrilla.
What form of propaganda could better carry conviction on the desires of
government for proper troop behavior than official publications intended for
consumption within the armed forces, and directed to the attention of every
member of those forces?
In the Philippines, as in most countries where literacy is not (or has not long
been) virtually universal, plays, skits, and recitations are traditional entertain-
ment, and are exceptionally useful vehicles for transmitting information. This
national practice was utilized in a number of ways. Movies were made, contrasting
the laudable accomplishments of the armed forces with the deplorable actions of
the enemy, who was shown acting in ways contrary to the customs and culture
values of the country. Mobile projection units showed these movies widely in the
remote areas. The Civil Affairs Officer of each BCT had a jeep, a projector, and
a projectionist for just this purpose. Audiences came from far and wide to enjoy
the entertainment.
Radio and movies were occasionally used ostensibly, sometimes actually,

for tactical psychological operations. The mother of Luis Taruc, the most
respected of the Huk field commanders, made a tape-recorded appeal for him
to surrender. This was broadcast over the radio repeatedly, primarily to show
that this "hero" was actually a person who would not heed his mother. Taruc
did surrender shortly afterward, and claimed that this appeal, which he had
heard repeatedly, did have an effect on his actions.
It was decided that a movie short of the mother making this appeal might be
useful, but lack of suitable lighting made it impossible tofilmit "live." True to
the spirit of improvisation that marked the operations against the Huk, and
especially the operations of the CAO, the movie was made from the still portrait
taken of the mother while she was appealing to her son. This was projected on
a sheet billowing in the wind, which was photographed by the movie camera,
and the sound dubbed in. The effect was so realistic that the old lady said that
she did not know that a movie had been made while she was talking.
"Live" shows obviously offered more effective personal appeal than movies,
so a number of traveling road shows were organized. Designed to improve rela-
tions between the military and the civilians by demonstrating the interest taken
by the armed forces in the welfare of the people, they were good entertainment
and extremely effective propaganda vehicles. In one area of Huklandia where
transportation was largely by water, a "Show Boat" was rigged up and proved
a tremendous success. Its programs, in the local language, featured news,
songs, skits, and true-life stories. Ex-Huk, often former recruiters in the same
area, were featured performers. When these men revisited the community to
explain why they were no longer rebels, and made eloquent and obviously
sincere pleas for support of the government as the protector of the people, the
means by which the aspirations of the people could best be achieved, the effect
was that of an old-fashioned revival preacher. There were few occasions when
one or more Huk or Huk supporters in the audience failed to come forward to
the "mourners' bench."
No effort was spared to get the word to the people. The army distributed
pamphlets on topics from rice-growing to baby care. Comic books showing
Huk crimes and army punishment of them (and army punishment of erring
soldiers, as well) were passed out by patrols. Posters spread the word of the
new policies. They showed Magsaysay offering "my left hand in friendship,
my right hand in force," which was soon shortened to an offer of "All-Out
Friendship or All-Out Force." Surrenders became more frequent as more
opportunities and more persuasion were provided.
The Civil Affairs Office, by informing civilians and military of the actions
and intentions of both the government and the armed forces, was actually
conducting the most effective kind of strategic psychological operations
against the guerrilla. Civilians, in contact with the Huk, either directly or indi-
rectly, naturally passed along to them what they knew, or thought they knew,
about the activities and intentions of the government. Inevitably, this carried
greater credibility, greater conviction, than the same statements made directly
by government officials.
Further, if what a civilian saw and heard about the government was good,
was contrary to the Huk charges that the government was tyrannical, abusive,
corrupt, it aroused in the mind of the civilian some doubt about the justifica-
tion of further depriving himself in order to support the Huk. This doubt was
transmitted to the Huk, at least by indirection, and a gulf began to open
between him and his civilian friend. The loss of mutual confidence inevitably
presaged a loss of voluntary support for the guerrilla.
Publicity, entertainment, and direct propaganda were only part of the mis-
sion of the CAO. The basic mission was the implementation, at all echelons,
of the Attraction Program. Partly this was a matter of troop indoctrination, and
of checking on the effectiveness of the indoctrination. Partly it was a matter of
developing and securing implementation of programs by which the army
could actively and concretely demonstrate its helpfulness to the people.
Magsaysay insisted on direct action by the troops to help the little people.
Protecting them, pursuing their enemythe guerrillacame first, but when-
ever possible, the soldiers were to do more. They should actually improve the
conditions of life. Out of this belief grew the activities called "civic action."
This has now become a well-recognizedfieldof military endeavor, described
in a U.S. Army News Service release dated February 9, 1962, as:
The use of military forces on projects useful to populace at all levels in such
fields as training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications,
health, sanitation, and others helpful to economic development.
This is a subtle and useful definition, for it camouflages the real purpose,
which is to influence the thinking and behavior of all concerned, from the
troops who build the schoolhouse to the guerrilla whose son is given a chance
to go to schoolby courtesy of the army. As a means for proving to all
participants and observers the desire of government to be of service to the
governed, an effective civic-action program cannot be excelled. It is also an
effective way of accomplishing worthwhile projects with available labor.
Practically speaking, however, it is doubtful if any civic-action projects can
be afforded, in a counterguerrilla situation, which do not clearly contribute to
the operational purpose of influencing the emotions, attitudes, and behavior
of the people toward support of the government.
Too much emphasis cannot be placed on the importance, and often the
difficulty, of impressing the troops with the true purposes of civic-action
programs. In one Southeast Asian countrynot the Philippinesa military
commander was given detailed instructions on building and dedicating a bridge
urgently needed by the local inhabitants. Without it, they were forced to climb
down a precipitous slope, wade ariver,and struggle up another steep incline, to
go from their homes to the market. The commander built the bridge efficiently,
dedicated it with due pomp and ceremony, which included civilian representatives,
and then posted sentries at each end of the bridge with signs announcing "For
Military Use Only"!
In practice, effective counterguerrilla actionespecially that of troopsso
intermingles concrete useful actions, protective actions (combat against
guerrilla), and psychological operations that it is difficult to tell where one
action leaves off and the other begins. Properly performed, they blend in a
spiral, moving more and more rapidly from one success to another, from one
field to another, until the desired objective is achieved, until the fish is driven
out of the sea in which he can no longer live.
This was especially effective in the Philippines, where many ways were
devised for the soldier to demonstrate his helpfulness and his good will to
civilians. Medical-aid men were trained to accompany patrols and were pro-
vided with medicines and instructions for treating simple sicknesses and
injuries of the civilians. Troop units were encouraged to assist in solving local
problemsto evacuate persons seriously injured or threatened by Huk activi-
ties, to repair roads and bridges. This was civic action of the most basic sort.
These were also psychological operations of the most effective type.
Developing national programs, like furnishing material to the national
mass-communications media, was largely accomplished by the CAO in the
office of the Secretary of National Defense. Actual accomplishments in the
Attraction Program came primarily from the lower echelons.
The next command echelon under the General Headquarters of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines was formed by the four military area headquarters,
each with its Civil Affairs Officer and his teams. These military area head-
quarters conducted civic-action programs within their own resources. They
repaired and built roads and schools, dug wells, moved houses, did all the
thousand and one useful things that can be accomplished by troops not urgently
required to be deployed to the field.
Under the area headquarters were sometimes sector headquarters which
had much the same functions in smaller areas, and then the battalion combat
teams, the basic building blocks of the Philippine Army. In each BCT head-
quarters there was a Civil Affairs Officer with a small group of enlisted men
to assist him.
One of the most successful BCT commanders started the practice of calling
the CAO the civilian representative on his staff. The CAO was required to
know, and to maintain constant liaison with, all civilian officials in the BCT
area of responsibility. All officers were, as a matter of course, supposed to
know as many as possible of these civilian officials, but maintenance of
continuing liaison with them was the primary responsibility of the CAO.
The CAO was made an integral and essential part of the battalion staff.
He suggested operations based on information received from civilians.
More important, proposed operations were coordinated with him in order to
minimize their possible adverse effects on civilian activities. To the civil-
ians, he was their representative, not the government's. He did conduct
propaganda activities, but with his left hand, so to speak. Operations of an
obvious propaganda nature were usually made to seem the responsibility of
someone else, so that the role of the CAO as the "honest broker" between
civilians and soldiers was not compromised.
One of the most important duties of the CAO on the BCT level was to ensure
the creation and maintenance of the "image" of the troops as friends and
benefactors of the people. This was not easy. It meantfirstof all indoctrinating
the troops themselves with the concept, making them realize what it implied in
terms of their actions and behavior, and making them understand the
consequences of actions that harmed this "image." Part of his staff duty was
checking on implementation of the policy that enlisted men or officers who
committed offenses against civilians were to be tried on the spot, if possible, by
a military court-martial or by civilian courts. He was further responsible for
making certain that the results of such trials were immediately publicized in
terms which made clear that crimes against the people were also crimes against
the army and against the government. The CAO who could accomplish all this,
without being tagged as a "spy" of higher headquarters or a tattletale, was a
diplomat, teacher, and disciplinarian of high order.
In addition to seeking to indoctrinate the troops (and their leaders, and the
civilians), the CAO suggested ways in which to implement the Attraction Pro-
gram, and where appropriate and possible made the means available. It was
his duty to secure leaflets, magazines, newspapers, extra supplies of medicine-
all the things the patrols could take out with them and distribute to civilians in
need either of help or of education about the purposes of government. The real
payoff came in getting the soldiers, the patrols, to understand the importance
and value to them of establishing good relations with the civilians in their
areas of operations. How well this was eventually understood and how thor-
oughly this goal was pursued is aptly described in the following anonymous
article in the Philippine Armed Forces journal for October, 1953:
EVERY SOLDIER A PSY-WAR MAN

To the successful prosecution of psychological warfare, it is essential for
units down to the squad to win the people in their areas psychologically. Since,
under the "Three-in-One Plan,"2 each unit has a more or less permanent sector,
thefirststep is for members of the outfit in any area to get acquainted with the
people in their sector.
The approach should be friendly and informal. Every member of the team
should maintain an attitude of cordiality. He should not pretend that he is more
intelligent or more prosperous than the civilians; he should not assume an air of
superiority; he must refrain from making the civilians give information by con-
straint. On the contrary, he should treat the civilians as his equals and friends,
thereby adroitly making the civilian both an ally and an active, willing helper.
Never forgetting that he is a psy-war man, every member of the unit should
perceive the manner in which the patrol is received by the people it comes in
contact with. He should note whether the soldiers are welcomed spontaneously
or received with cold indifference. Are the people reluctant to talk? Are they
afraid of the man in uniform? Are they helpful or sympathetic to the army? Are
they antagonistic? What is their general feeling toward the conflict between
Communism and democracy? Are the people pessimistic of the country's
future?
The attitude of the people toward the Armed Forces as well as toward the
Huk is gauged in the process. The patrol, however, should be careful to make
his observations without arousing suspicion among the civilians that they (the
civilians) are under observation. He should record in his mind what he sees and
hears and put them down on paper later. He should not start any argument.
As a psy-war agent, the patrol should distribute psy-war materials in its
sector. Since it is not possible to furnish every inhabitant with psy-war materials,
it is important for the patrol to make a wise distribution. The Huk allies and the
fence-sitters (those who are indifferent) should get the patrol'sfirstattention. In
issuing the leaflets or posters or comic books he has at his disposal, the patrol
observes the reaction of the people to such material. Are they eager to receive
the leaflets, posters, etc.? Do they read these? What do they say? What is their
reaction? Do facial expressions tally with what they say?
With the knowledge he has acquired of the people and the circumstances
obtaining in his sector as his guide, the patrol should proceed, on its second
or third visit, to take positive measures to correct the attitudes of the people
toward Democracy, and toward the AFP and its efforts to bring the peace
and order campaign to an early conclusion. The BCT public-relations offi-
cer, who is also the BCT's psy-war officer, may be consulted on the mea-
sures to be taken and how they should be implemented. It is essential,
however, for the commanding officers, as well as the platoon, squad, and
patrol leaders, to make every member of their unit acknowledge the fact that
the present campaign cannot be won by bullets alone and at the same time
make every man in the outfit realize that he cannot be an effective psy-war
agent unless he enjoys the confidence of the people of his sector. To win that
confidence, the soldier has to conduct himself properly and must take sin-
cere interest in the people and their problems.
Under the "Three-in-One Plan" the soldier has three missions: operations,
intelligence, and psy-war and public relations. It is a big job. It is important that
the soldiers are thoroughly briefed by their leaders. The briefing should be
done not once but as frequently as possible and before any patrol is sent out.
This was a radical departure from contemporary doctrine on patrol missions,

but had ample (and almost forgotten) precedent in Philippine history. Routine
patrols of the Philippine Constabulary in the first thirty years of this century
had virtually identical missions, differently stated. If led by an officer into
remote areas, they often served as mobile Justice of the Peace courts, sanitary
inspectors, first-aid teams, educational inspectors, registrars of marriages,
births, and deaths, tax collectorswere, in other words, an embodiment of the
services of government, of good and concerned government.
So must it be in areas of counterguerrilla operations. Whether his commanders
like it or not, the soldier symbolizes government to many of the governed. He
must be made the best and most useful symbol possible, he must clearly
demonstrate the moral justification for the existence of the government, and thus
he will impose an obligation for the support of that government. This is a
command responsibility. Civil Affairs Officers, military-government officers,
psychological warriors, and a host of others may assist the commander in the
execution of his duties, but the responsibility is his. This was recognized in the
Philippines as it must be everywhere.
Most of the major projects of civic action were not carried on by the CAO.
It was the function of the CAO to advise on such projects, to see that they were
conducted in a manner likely to have the greatest impact on the emotions,
attitudes, and behavior of the people, and to seek for them the most effective
publicity. A plausible case could be, and was, made out that the CAO func-
tioned only as a publicity agent for those operations. This was useful, since it
helped take away the taint of "propaganda" from activities whose real utility
was as a basis for propaganda.
The most significant and the best known of these major operations was that
known as EDCOR. This was executed by the Corps of Engineers, under the
guidance of the CAO and in the glare of publicity the CAO provided at the
national level.
EDCOR (the term is an acronym for Economic Development Corps) was
originally intended to be a program for ensuring food for the armed forces by
providing homesteads for drafted and discharged soldiers. Magsaysay saw in
this program, which had been approved by the Philippine Congress, an oppor-
tunity to demolish a major Huk campaign slogan: "Land for the Landless."
Magsaysay proclaimed that if they really wanted land for the landless, if they
were sincere in their claims, the way for them to achieve this objective was to
surrender to the armed forces. If they did this, if they demonstrated a sincere
desire to be loyal citizens working their own farms, they would be given farms
of their own, and helped to get a start on them.
Captured or surrendered Huk who gave evidence of their sincerity were

placed in specially established EDCOR resettlement projects, leavened with a
number of settlers who were retired soldiers or ex-USAFFE guerrillas.
Personnel selected for these projects were transported to the site, with their
families, and given assistance in building houses and clearing land. Each was
assigned about fifteen acres of land, to which he received title after he had
done a certain amount of work on it. Until his own crops were harvested, each
received a ration allowance and, if needed, clothing, medicine, seed, and tools.
All was to be paid for when the harvest made payment possible. The effect of
the two initial projects was extraordinary and far-reaching.
The Huk, necessarily and naturally, scoffed. They distributed propaganda
leaflets showing ex-Huk in chains, slaving at bayonet point in the fastnesses
of tropical jungles. This propaganda effort had been anticipated and desired.
As soon as it was sufficiently well developed to commit the Huk leaders to the
sponsorship of this line, the counterpropaganda began.
Letters from ex-Huk, pictures of them at home and at work, were dropped as
leaflets, spread by hand, tacked up on walls and trees. News correspondents
from all over the country, in fact from all over the world, were invited to visit the
projects and see for themselves the truth about the conditions to be found in
them. The only requirement was that the visitors report on what they had seen.
Huk commanders were invited to come in, under safe-conduct passes, to
visit these projects and see for themselves the conditions under which their
former comrades were now living. The only stipulation was that they must
return to their units and tell them what they had seen. Some were reluctant to
comply with this stipulation and wanted to stay in the project they visited. The
reason for forcing them to return to their units was twofold: If they told the
truth, it would seriously reduce their comrades' will to resist. Fanatic Huk,
seeing this, might cause even more serious morale problems by actions against
the converts. Either result would have the effect of alienating more Huk from
their cause, strengthening their growing desire to give up the fight.
The direct effect on the Huk movement, in terms of government propaganda
directly causing surrenders, was strong. The indirect effects were much
stronger. The publicity given the EDCOR program, and the credibility it
achieved, made a tremendous impression on people who had been supporting,
or tolerating, the Huk. As long as the guerrilla could say that he was fighting
for something worthwhile, something that could not be achieved without fight-
ing, he had a moral claim to support, especially if he were a relative or a friend.
When it became apparent that he could achieve this objective without fighting,
that his avowed purpose for fighting had disappeared, any moral obligation to
support him disappeared also. More, if he continued to fight, his motivation
became suspect.
After the fact of EDCOR became accepted in the countryside, a Huk tax
collector, or beggar, who came asking for rice was very likely to be told: "Look,
if what you are fighting for is, as you claim, the chance to have land of your
own, why don't you go surrender to the armed forces? We can't afford to feed
you any longer. Can it be that you don't really want to work the land for a living
the way we do?" Of course, EDCOR was not the only reason the civilian had
for adopting this attitude. There were the other actions of the army and the
government: thefive-centtelegrams for stating complaints or asking for help,
the legal aid given by army lawyers, the services rendered by the troops, rea-
sons they saw themselves and reasons they heard about, all of which deflated
specific Huk claims. They all added up to one answer: The civilian could no
longer see any justification for helping the Huk, but he could see ample reason
why he should support his government.
EDCOR became a fairly large operation, with three projects in Mindanao,
and a fourth in Northern Luzon, on the fringe of Huklandia. The reason for
concentrating the projects far from the Huk area was obvious, and bitter
opposition was encountered when the one in Luzon was proposed. It was
decided that the risk of setting up a safe haven for unsurrendered Huk was
outweighed by the advantages of having a project that these same Huk might
visit surreptitiously to see for themselves the advantages of surrender.
Even before the Luzon project was started, it gave striking evidence of the
importance the Huk themselves gave to the program. Three officers and two
enlisted men, passing through Huklandia en route to help lay out the new
project, stopped in a peaceful town for lunch and were incautious enough to
discuss their mission. Word of it went out through Huk intelligence channels,
and that afternoon their jeep was ambushed and all five were killed. Needless
to say, this murder drove several more spikes into the Huk coffin. If the Huk
were fighting only for land reform, what possible justification could there be
for the assassination of these men whose mission was to establish a settlement
where the landless could receive land, where the Huk dream could be
fulfilled?
In addition to the resettlement projects, EDCOR undertook two other major
operations. One of these was a rehabilitation center right in army headquarters
outside Manila. In a warehouse, a vocational school and carpentry shop were
set up where captured or surrendered Huk who had given material assistance
to the armed forces could learn and practice a trade. Not only did they learn,
they produced, and they earned money. Several of them were able to set up
profitable businesses after their release from custody, businesses built on the
knowledge and funds garnered while they were prisoners.
Perhaps the most spectacular operation of EDCOR was one in which a whole
village was transplanted. A barrio of the municipality of San Luis, in Pampanga
Province, the home town of the Huk leader, was in dire straits. The land the
residents were supposed to farm was not their own; worse, cultivation of much
of this had been impossible for several years because of the activities of Huk and
government forces in the area. The future seemed hopeless. A battalion of army
engineers moved in to a piece of public domain not far from the barrio and
cleared it of the tough cogon grass, which forms a root mat almost impenetrable
to the plow. They cleaned it, they ditched and drained it; they built paddy-field
dikes and elevated roadways. They finished by picking up the houses of the
barrio dwellers and transferring them intact to a new location near thefields,to
which the residents received title after a short period of work on them.
This project was expensive. It was a project that could not be justified in terms
of its helpfulness to the nation, for it could not be repeated in the hundreds,
perhaps thousands, of areas where similar help was needed. As a psychological
operation, it was a tremendous success. Every member of that barrio had many
relatives in the field with the Huk, men who now, by Philippine custom, were
made to feel a sense of obligation to the government which had so dramatically
helped their relatives. Magsaysay estimated the value of this operation as greater
than that of another battalion combat team in the field.
The large EDCOR projects were valuable in convincing the people that the
government was their friend, that the government would help them achieve
their legitimate aspirations, asking only that they give in return the loyal sup-
port which any citizen owes his government. The projects did not in them-
selves make a significant contribution to the economic or social welfare of the
country. They helped a few people, perhaps all told a thousand families were
benefited directly by their assistance. Probably two or three thousand more
were benefited indirectly and unintentionally by the establishment of these
new communities which brought new business and new security to relatively
untapped areas.
Their real valueand it was tremendouswas as dramatic proof of the
intentions and desires of government, proof that lent itself to publicity, to
propaganda. They could be called advertising stunts, but their value in sell-
ing the good intentions of government to the governed was tremendous.
There do not seem to be any reliablefigureson how many counterguerrillas
are necessary to eliminate 1 guerrilla. Estimates in published works, and
computations of relative forces actually employed, suggest that from 10 to
50 government personnel are needed for each guerrilla active in the field.
Assuming that a ratio of 20 to 1 is fair (it is an average between the Malayan
and Philippine experiences) and assuming further that only 1,500 Huk left
the field, either surrendering or quitting the business, as a result of the
EDCOR program (a figure that is probably too low), EDCOR could be
credited with accomplishing the same effect as 30,000 soldiers. This seems
an extravagant figure, and it may be, but using the figures derived from
other counterguerrilla operations would make it far larger. Scarcely more
than 30,000 personnel were ever deployed against the Huk.
The strategic psychological warfare quite properly placed major emphasis

on the Attraction Program, on offering and demonstrating justification for
supporting the government rather than its enemies. Other approaches were not
neglected. These ranged from "one-shotters" designed to destroy the credibility
of a notorious opponent (such as the politician who received a commendatory
cable ostensibly from a foreign Communist source, which would have been
publicized had it not scared him into cooperation) to sustained operations
designed to create distrust or enmity between the Huk and the mass base.
Often these operations served several purposes, as did the program of
rewards for capturing or killing Huk leaders. Tens of thousands of posters
were distributed, listing individuals wanted for crimes of murder, kidnapping,
banditry, rape and offering rewards for these criminals. Emphasis was placed
on the crimes, but the fact that they were committed by Huk, and were a part
of their rebellious activity, was also mentioned. These posters deliberately
sought to tear away the glamour of political motivation, of heroic guerrilla
action, and to expose the Huk leaders as common criminals. This was most
effective in reducing sympathy for them.
The liberal rewards offered brought the death, capture, or surrender of many
Huk leaders. Sometimes these were effected by civilians, sometimes by other
Huk. Whenever possible, these incidents were publicized, always in such a
way as to protect the individual responsible while conveying the impression
that it was someone the Huk had trusted. Rumors of Huk being killed or
betrayed by their comrades were assiduously propagated, always with care
lest government credibility be impaired if the rumors were proved false. (Sur-
renders to claim the rewards were not officially countenanced, since the
government could not be a party to bribing criminals to surrender, but in
practice "arranged" surrenders were not discouraged.)
The principal value of the reward program was in widening the gulf between
civilians and guerrillas, and increasing the suspicion and hostility of the guer-
rilla toward civilians and toward his own comrades. The effect of the program
was to commit an ever-increasing number of civilians to the fight against the
Huk, and to make eventual success seem less likely to the Huk.
Not all the efforts to portray the Huk as criminals were wholly successful.
Some of the posters depicting outrages, such as the massacre of hospital patients
and nurses at Camp Makabulos and the wholesale slaughter of women and
children in the vengeance raid on Aglao, proved too frightening and backfired.
The men who committed these outrages were certainly despicable criminals,
but they were also seen to be very dangerous men. Not a few who saw these
posters took them as warnings that they had better cooperate with any Huk who
came along.
In his efforts to convince the people of the sincere concern of government
for their welfare, Magsaysay did not neglect the possibilities offered by agen-
cies of government other than the armed forces. He was able to secure control
of the "Peace Fund," a partially governmental, partially civilian, fund origi-
nated to help the victims of the fighting, but generally considered a political
"slush" fund. This he used for on-the-spot relief, as well as for rewards to
civilians who had made significant contributions to restoring peace, such as
causing the surrender or death of notorious Huk "bandits."
The Social Welfare Administration, often derided as an ineffectual dilettante
charity, although actually a part of government and ranking as a Cabinet depart-
ment, was swept into the action. When Magsaysay saw a chance for it to make
a contribution, he called the matter forcefully to the attention of Social Welfare
personnel, usually by sending transportation and an officer who obviously
expected immediate acceptance of the invitation. The SWA became a familiar
concomitant of operations designed to lessen suffering caused by Huk actions
and a useful exponent of government concern for the general welfare.
The success of the campaign to win popular support for the government
through the actions of the military derived essentially from three sources:
leadership and command emphasis; a military organization, that is, an element
within the military establishment to plan and supervise implementation; and,
finally, an effective program tailored to the attitudes and needs of the people
at whom it was targeted. All three elements are necessary to the success of
such a campaign.
Success, it must be understood, is not to be measured in terms of actual
concrete accomplishments, of numbers of people resettled, or wells dug, or
schoolhouses built. Success is not susceptible to measurement; it is qualitative
rather than quantitative. When the words of government are believed, when
the statements of the chief executive or of Private Blanco of the rear rank are
accepted as evidence of the intentions of government, success has been
achieved. It is manifested by actions of the people which show that to them the
government and the armed forces seem to be their friends and benefactors, to
whom they owe allegiance and support.
In retrospect, it is clear that the most effective psychological operations
were those targeted against everybody, for those were the operations that
tended to bring everybody into the fight, consciously or unconsciously. They
built a political base on which the government could rest with stability; a base
with an inherent capacity for resisting attack. The smaller psychological
operations were useful, and often entertaining to the operators; but the devel-
opment of confidence in government was the cement that bound the elements
of the community together, and rendered the Huk effort futile. Effective action
to win the civilian guaranteed, as it facilitated, success against the guerrilla.
NOTES
1. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage
(February, 1962), p. 173.
2. A coordinated intelligence, psychological warfare, and combat operations pro-
gram developed by Lightning Sector, II MA.
Chapter 13
TARGETTHE NATION
A GUERRILLA movement may well be likened to an infection, a malignancy

attacking the body politic. It is an infection that must be directly counterat-
tacked before it reaches a vital spot. At the same time, it must be recognized
that the infection became dangerous only because it attacked a weak point in
the body, a point which reflects, perhaps is the focus of, a weakness of the
whole body politic. Had the body been thoroughly healthy, the guerrilla infec-
tion would never have become serious. If the body politic becomes healthy, the
infection will inevitably shrink and ultimately perish.
The chief concern of the physicianthe government, the counterguerrilla
is the health (mental and physical) of the nation as a whole. It must necessarily
be hisfirstconcern because it is upon the health of a nation that his own health,
if not his continued physical existence, depends.
All actions must contribute to the health of the patientmust be consonant
with the announced and understood mission of government. These actions fall
into three categories: surgical action to excise or convert the guerrilla to stop its
debilitating or toxic effects on the body politic; topical applications to the
affected portion of the body to help it resist, if not expel, the guerrilla; and
finally, psychiatric and systemic treatment of the body politic, to assist it to stop
the spread of the infection, and to counter its effects. All, it must be emphasized,
have one ultimate objective which they promote: the health of the nation.
The guerrilla malignancy and its relation to the body politic is of a type
that is only beginning to be understood in medicine. The conditions which
give rise to it are partly specific physical conditions, but to a large extent,
they are psychosomatic. Unsatisfactory conditions of land tenure, employ-
ment, or the administration of justice or a wide disparity in the distribution
of wealth, these or other conditions may predispose the body politic to the
guerrilla infection, and their alleviation may predispose the same body to the
elimination of the guerrilla.
The essential requirement for the existence of a guerrilla movement, however,
is psychological. The weakness that enables the guerrilla malignancy to gain
lodgment and to proliferate is the result of the attitudes, the "thinking" or "feel-
ing," of people who make up the nation. The guerrilla malignancy feeds on (and
often seeks to modify) their beliefs concerning the role, the actions, desirable
and undesirable, of government, and their own reactions to the words and deeds
of government. It thrives on hostile or indifferent attitudes of members of the
government toward the governed. It spreads most rapidly when popular attitudes
favor the guerrilla rather than the government.
The successful physician, the successful counterguerrilla, is the one who
can recognize this psychological condition, and the physical factors that pre-
dispose to it, and can effectively allay the fears and encourage the aspirations
of the body politic. Physical conditions are important, but the attitudes of the
people are the key to the elimination of the guerrilla movement.
The history of the Philippines since 1895 affords the most striking proof of
the importance of attitudes toward government, and of government toward the
governed. In 1896, a few thousand Filipinos, mostly of the ilustrado class,
desired independence from their Spanish rulers. The majority of Filipinos prob-
ably wanted only to be left alone. A revolution was launched by the few thou-
sand desirous of independence, a revolution quickly ended by payment to, and
exiling of, the leaders of the movement. Two years later, as an incident of the
United States war with Spain, American troops landed in the Philippines,
accompanied by Philippine leaders of the independence movement. The leaders
claimed they had been promised immediate independence. U.S. leaders denied
this, but Filipino leaders rapidly organized forces throughout the country,firstto
oppose the Spanish, and then the Americans. Early in 1899, these Philippine
forces attacked the Americans, who had accepted the surrender of the Spanish
in Manila and were systematically assuming the responsibilities of government
for the Islands.
Some Filipino leaders and some Spanish adherents made common cause
against the Americans. They preached far and wide a creed that the Americans
were literally fiends incarnate, heretics come to make the Filipinos slaves.
Throughout the Islands, an effort was made to form forces to fight the Ameri-
cans. The success they met is well illustrated by this letter from a principal com-
mander of these forces, written fourteen months after the opening of hostilities
against the Americans:
Considering that a sufficient time has passed, and various means having been
employed as benignant as humanity counsels, to inculcate in the minds of mis-
guided Filipinos the idea of the country and to check in the beginning those
unworthy acts which many of them commit and which not only redound to the
TARGETTHE NATION 185
prejudice of the troops but also to the cause which they defend, and having
observed that such action does not produce any favorable result on this date, in
accordance with the powers vested in me I have seen proper to issue the follow-
ing Proclamation,
First and last article. The following shall be tried at a most summary trial, and
be sentenced to death:
1. All local presidentes and other civil authorities of the towns as
well as of the barrios, rancherias, and sitios of the respective
districts, who as soon as they find out any plan, direction of the
movement, or number of the enemy shall not give notice thereof
to the nearest camp;
2. Those who give information to the enemy of the location of the
camp, stopping places, movements, and directions of the revolu-
tionaries, whatever be the age or sex of the informer;
3. Those who voluntarily offer to serve the enemy as guides, except-
ing if it be with the purpose of misleading them from the right
road; and
4. Those who of their own free will or otherwise capture revolution-
ary soldiers who are alone or who should intimidate them into
surrendering to the enemy.1
The general who issued that proclamation was a patriot, sincere in his
belief that he was fighting for the freedom and welfare of his people. Why
did he feel it necessary to issue such a threat? Why did other leaders soon
after find it necessary to issue even more savage threats against their own
people?
Part of the answer is to be found in the proclamation issued in Manila
on April 4, 1899, by the First Philippine Commission, entrusted by the
United States with the government of the Islands. That proclamation is
too long to reproduce here in its entirety, but certain portions are worthy
of note:
The attention of the Philippine people is invited to certain regulative principles

by which the United States will be guided in its relations with them. The fol-
lowing are deemed of cardinal importance:. .. The most ample liberty of self-
government will be granted to the Philippine people which is reconcilable with
the maintenance of a wise, just, stable, effective, and economical administra-
tion of public affairs. . . . The civil rights of the Philippine people will be guar-
anteed and protected to the fullest extent; religious freedom assured and all
persons shall have an equal standing before the law. . . . A pure, speedy, and
effective administration of justice will be established whereby the evils of delay,
corruption, and exploitation will be effectually eradicated... . Effective provi-
sion will be made for the establishment of elementary schools in which the
children of the people will be educated. Facilities will also be provided for
higher education.2
The rest of the answer is to be found in the actions of the two forces engaged
in the conflict; in their actions toward each other and toward the people. Mili-
tarily, the U.S. forces quickly seized and consistently maintained the initiative.
Wherever they could find the Philippine forces, they sought to bring them to
battle. The Philippine forces began to adopt guerrilla tactics by September of
1899, nine months after the conflict had started; by November, all their forces
had done so. Some were capable guerrillas, some were not, but the relentless
pursuit by their opponents, the lack of support from the people gave them no
alternative except death, capture, or resignation from the struggle.
It was their actions toward the civilian population that made the difference.
The Philippine leaders felt that they had a just, natural claim on the support of
the people; by and large, they took what they needed as a matter of right; they
punished brutally those who failed to assist them. They talked of "indepen-
dence," of a "republic," but they acted like feudal lords.
The leaders of the U.S. forces realized that their only claim on the support
of the people was on the ground of good intentions; they realized that only
their actions could prove their intentions. Some of the ways they offered proof,
and the success achieved, are illustrated in this story, often heard from one of
the most distinguished senior lawyers of Manila today, told here, as nearly as
memory will serve, in his own words:
One bright morning in 1899, there were several companies of the Philippine
insurrectionary forces on the beach near my home in Iloilo. My father was the
leader of one of the platoons drawn up in formal array to oppose the landing of
the Americans. Back of the beach, where we could watch, were the families of
our soldiers.
When the American landing started, the troops were in such strength that our
forces saw resistance was useless, so they decided to take to the hills as fast as
they could. We spectators ran too. The Americans pursued us. As a little boy
seven years old, I couldn't run as fast as the rest, so I dropped down behind a log
to hide. One of the giant devils in a blue shirt jumped over the log and saw me.
Instead of eating me, as I had been told he would, he picked me up, set me on
his shoulder and continued trotting up the hill, looking for my father and his
soldiers. Whenever he paused for breath, he would take a piece of candy out of
his pocket and put it in my mouth. After a time, the pursuit was called off and
the soldiers were ordered to return to the beach. My mount returned with them
and carefully brought me along, setting me down not far from my home and
saying something that must have meant "Run along home, sonny."
Quietly, the Americans entered the town, accepted the allegiance of the local
officials, and left a small garrison before sailing away. Three days later, the school
opened and a proclamation was made that all children should attend school. I had
been going to school, but I didn't like it very much because the Spaniard who was
the instructor believed the rod was the only road to understanding. My father, who
had come home from the hills, insisted that I go back to school. Much to my sur-
prise, there was an American as the teacher, an American I knew. It was the same
soldier who had given me candy all the time he was chasing my father. From the
first day of school on, I knew, and so did my family, that the Americans were not
baby-eating devils; they had indeed come to free us and to help us to have a good
government of our own. I have never found reason to change my belief.
The best evidence of how effectively the American soldiers persuaded the
Philippine people that the United States' presence was in their interest is found
in an address to the Filipino people that Emilio Aguinaldo, chief architect and
director of the struggle against the Americans, issued on April 19, 1901. One
paragraph is especially significant:
The Filipinos have never been dismayed by their weakness nor have they fal-
tered in following the path pointed out by their fortitude and courage. The time
has come, however, in which theyfindtheir advance along the path impeded by
an irresistible forcea force which, while it restrains them, yet enlightens the
mind and opens another course by presenting to them the cause of peace. This
cause has been joyfully embraced by the majority of our countrymen, who have
already united around the glorious and sovereign banner of the United States. In
this banner, they repose their trust in the belief that under its protection our
people will attain all the promised liberties which they are even now beginning
to enjoy.
That Aguinaldo then understood who had appealed most successfully to the
attitudes of the people, that he prophesied truly and spoke at last for the people
of the Philippines, history has amply demonstrated. Less than seven years
after his address, the first Philippine Assembly met. Twenty-eight years after
that meeting, the Philippines became entirely self-governing in name as well
as in fact. The war launched by Japan in 1941 resulted in proof sufficient to
convince the most skeptical that Americans and Filipinos were as one in their
interests and their loyalty to the Philippines. It proved, too, that the Filipinos
had been so imbued with the belief in constitutional government, in govern-
ment of the people, by the people, and for the people, that they could and
would not tolerate any other form of government.
Why, then, were the Hukbalahap successful in launching, and maintaining
for some twelve years, a Communist guerrilla movement? Many factors con-
tributed to the initial successes of the Hukbalahap, but the principal ones are
clear and unmistakable. First, although the Huk were organized by a group
whose purpose was to replace democratic government by Communism, this
purpose was concealed behind a claim that their purpose was to fight the Jap-
anese. So long as their announced targets were the Japanese, and the Filipinos
who collaborated with them, the common people thought the Huk deserved
support. By this deception, the Huk built their strength while the Philippines
were governed by a brutal invader who scarcely bothered to cloak his actions
under the simulation of law proffered by a puppet Philippine Government.
Second was the priority of emphasis given immediately after liberation, in
1945 and 1946, by the restored national government and its American assis-
tants to re-establishing the normal services of government. The gravity of the
threat posed by the Communists' field army was overlooked. This grave error,
for which Filipinos and Americans must share the blame, gave the Huk an
opportunity to consolidate their position, to direct their appeals to the attitudes
most deeply rooted in the people of the area of operations.
The Huk called loudly for honest and efficient government (meaning one
that would sweep away the debris of the war). The landlords they had previ-
ously attacked as Japanese puppets were now called exploiters, and the ban-
ners of "agrarian reform" and "Land for the Landless" unfurled. While they
talked, and rebuilt their organization, the government was necessarily trying
to achieve concrete results. It did achieve much, enough to satisfy reasonable
people, but not enough to satisfy those who would not be satisfied. The gov-
ernment was handicapped in its efforts by the fact that it was an elected, con-
stitutional government, not a dictatorial one. It held office by consent of the
governed. No matter how conscientious, how patriotic, how self-sacrificing a
member of government might be, he must always think of the next election if
he was to continue in the service of the people.
Gradually, action began to be taken against the Hukbalahap. The military
action from 1946 through most of 1950 was not successful nor yet could it be
called entirely a failure.
The civilian population of Huklandia was by no means ignored by the
government during this time. Many actions were undertaken in an effort to
attract their support. After the Presidential campaign, the first significant
government action was the cropsharing act, which sought to ensure the ten-
ants a fair share of the harvest. However, since the tenant farmers did not
interpret it as effective proof of government concern for their interests because
it did not effectively improve their conditions, it was of little value in winning
support for the government. The amnesty offered to the Huk in 1948 and the
Peace Fund established to help in the rehabilitation of those suffering from
the guerrilla conflict were both proclaimed measures to prove government
concern for the welfare of the governed. Both were understood as political
ploys, neither aggressively implemented nor effective in achieving their
announced purpose. The Social Welfare Administration with great publicity
undertook direct relief activities on occasion and did render effective help in
many instances. Finally, in an effort to rally the people against the Huk, a
popular organization, the "Barangay," a name drawn from Philippine tradi-
tion, was activated.
Many other actions were undertaken, but all failed to hit the civilian target
effectively, despite wide publicity. Almost daily statements by government
officials of their concern for the people were recorded dutifully, if not con-
vincingly, by the press. Many, perhaps most, of these statements were sin-
cere, did in fact reflect concern for the popular welfare. Manuel Roxas, the
first President to understand the true nature of the Huk and seek to act effec-
tively against them, was a great statesman and patriot, but few in Manila or
in Huklandia, other than his political partisans or personal friends, were
willing to concede him the most elementary virtues. Somehow nothing con-
vinced the majority of the people of Huklandia that they should support the
government.
The failure to win support was not confined to the members of the politi-
cal party in power. The legal opposition, the party out of office, had little
better success in attracting support, except from the noisier elements of the
press. The Huk were even less successful. They, too, failed to convince the
majority of the people in Huklandia or anywhere else that they deserved
support.
The majority, in Huklandia and in Manila, unquestionably opposed,
mildly or violently, both the Communists and the people in government.
There seemed a national consensus that elected members of government
acted primarily to ensure their re-election, their continued enjoyment of the
perquisites of office. The actions of the appointive members of government,
especially the Armed Forces, were seen as motivated primarily by a desire
to keep in power the incumbent elected officials or their political heirs. In
other words, government failed to convince the governed that government
was indeed primarily concerned with and effectively advancing the welfare
of the people.
The people of the Philippines respected the form of their government; they
believed that it was the best system yet devised, but they felt completely at a
loss as to how to make it effective. The officials saw no practical solution to
the problem of holding Huk prisoners legally. The people felt themselves
faced with a similar impasse. They saw no way of obtaining action in their
interest from those who held the symbols of power. Of the problems the gov-
ernment had to solve if it was to continue to exist, that posed by the attitude of
the people was the most serious and seemed the least susceptible to satisfac-
tory solution.
By mid-1950, the situation was critical. The loud screams of the losers in
the 1949 elections had very nearly succeeded in convincing the people that
they could not change the people who made up the government by the accepted
practice of elections. The losers, and the Huk and their sympathizers and their
dupes, all screamed night and day that honest elections were impossible to
achieve.
It was in this atmosphere that Magsaysay took office as Secretary of National

Defense. The target given him was the Hukbalahap. As the civilian chief of
the Armed Forces, he was responsible for making them effective; he had to
lead them in running down, capturing, killing, or discouraging the guerrilla in
the field against the government. Magsaysay knew that the Armed Forces
could not accomplish this so long as the guerrillas had the active support of at
least a minority of the population in the area of operations, and the passive
tolerance of the majority of the population. He knew, too, that the increasing
support the Huk were receiving was a direct outcome of national dissatisfac-
tion with the actions of government.
Magsaysay acted effectively against the two obvious targets. He made
the Armed Forces an instrument for securing the support of the people
for their government; he made them also an effective instrument for pur-
suing, capturing, killing, or permanently discouraging the guerrilla.
He announced his intentions; he announced his dramatic policy of "Ail-
Out Friendship or All-Out Force," and then he acted to make good his
words.
He seemed to be everywhere, checking on the enforcement of his directives,
checking on the actions of the troops, ensuring, in short, that what he said
would be done was done. As he saw things that needed to be done, whether
they were in the sphere normally assigned to the Armed Forces or not, he said
that appropriate action would be taken and he ensured that action was taken,
if necessary by the Armed Forces. He welcomed publicity for his statements;
he sought maximum publicity for the actions taken in accordance with them.
More, he did not object to publicity for actions that were not in accordance
with the mission of the government or of the troops as he proclaimed it to be,
because he well knew that such actions, appropriately punished or redressed,
were the best means of ensuring credibility for the intentions of government,
of the Armed Forces, of himself.
The publicity given to actions directed against the guerrilla, given to actions
that demonstrated the concern and effectiveness of government for the welfare of
the governed, was the best possible approach to the national target. This public-
ity, by word of mouth, by the commercial press, the radio, the movies, went far
toward convincing the people that there were men in government who said what
they meant, who meant what they said, and who could and would act effec-
tively.
There remained, however, a major obstacle to popular support of the gov-

ernment. This obstacle was a doubt, a doubt engendered largely by the pro-
paganda of the unsuccessful candidates in the past elections and by the
propagandists of the Huk, a doubt that the people themselves would be per-
mitted to elect the officials they wanted. Magsaysay was a phenomenon;
Magsaysay was a man whom no one could doubt, but Magsaysay was an
appointive official, not an elected one. Could they elect officials like him?
That was the question.
As the time for the 1951 elections drew near, despairing voices, many of them
inspired by the Huk, began to be heard. This election would prove the failure of
democracy in the Philippines; this election would be a mockery, a farce. In their
direct propaganda, the Huk advised the people to boycott the elections because
their votes would not be honestly counted. Belief that the election would not be
honest was so widespread that it is questionable if any action or any statement
of government could have been accepted at face value.
It was at this point that ex-guerrillas, heroes of the struggle against the
Japanese, made what was probably their greatest contribution to the welfare
of the Philippines. They organized the National Movement for Free Elec-
tions (NAMFREL). This organization was endorsed by and received the
support of virtually every civic and patriotic group in the Philippines, and
especially that of the Philippines Veterans Legion. NAMFREL loudly pro-
claimed that there would be free elections; that they would act as a third
force to ensure that elections were free and were honest; that they as impar-
tial poll watchers would make known any infringements upon the honesty of
the elections.
The President of the Philippines had, as a matter of course, proclaimed that
elections would be free and honest, that the Armed Forces would ensure the
freedom of the polls. Unfortunately, the statement, however sincere, received
little credence, because most people believed that the Armed Forces had been
the principal instrument of corruption in the 1949 elections. Even the popular-
ity and credibility Magsaysay had achieved could not of themselves have over-
come the doubt about the role the Armed Forces would play in the 1951
elections.
The guarantees, the implied threats of NAMFREL, gave the needed
opportunity for Magsaysay to act with credibility. On behalf of the Admin-
istration, he announced that the Armed Forces would be employed to guard
the polls, to ensure their freedom; that they would welcome the presence of
NAMFREL watchers and would cooperate with them in every way. This
was a startling announcement. Even more startling was the announcement
that ROTC students (for the most part, high-school and junior-college stu-
dents) throughout the Islands would be mobilized and blanketed into the
army for the purpose of serving as guardians at the polls.
The results were phenomenal. The troops, including many ROTC students,
did guard the polls from interference; NAMFREL watchers, mostly respected
USAFFE guerrilla veterans, watched the official watchers and the Armed
Forces guardians. Special communications systems were set up by which
irregularities at the polls could be independently reported to the national capi-
tal, to the radio, to the watching newspaper world, immediately. The polls
were free; everybody agreed. There were a few instances of violence at the
polls; these were promptly reported and the offenders were promptly placed
under arrest. When the vote was counted, not even the most skeptical could
doubt that the election had been free, at least so far as government could make
it, because most of those elected were opponents of the incumbent Adminis-
tration.
To all intents and purposes, the 1951 election sounded the death knell of the
Hukbalahap movement. Of all the actions before or after that were taken to
convince the people that the government was indeed their government, respon-
sive to their will, effective in their interest, the 1951 election was the most
convincing. It convinced the people that they could indeed change the men in
government by the legal and morally acceptable means of election. The
national target had indeed been reached.
Many lessons can be learned from the operations that resulted in the elimi-
nation of the Philippine insurrection and the Hukbalahap insurrection. Both
were nominally indigenous rebellions. Both owed ideological allegiance to
systems of government strange to the majority of the people of the country. In
the earlier struggle, the system of government advocated by the leaders
appealed to the educated and the intellectuals; in the later, the system of
governmentnot too clearly explainedappealed to some intellectuals and
presented itself as new, modern, effective government by the people. In both
rebellions, the leaders of the revolution believed that the people owed them
loyalty and sought to impose their ideas by force on those who did not concur.
In both, the people ultimately repudiated the actions of the rebels.
The most important lesson to be learned is that success in both counterguerrilla
operations was primarily the result of one solid achievement: convincing the
people of the country that the government, the counterguerrilla, was effectively
promoting the welfare of the governed. The truth of this is strikingly emphasized
by the fact that, in the earlier operation the counterguerrilla government was
alien, imposed from outside, like the preceding Spanish government. (So, to
many Filipinos, was the government the leaders of the Philippine revolution
sought to impose.) The government that eliminated the Huk was indigenous,
elected by the people under a constitution and legal system they respected and
admired. It was a government which they were capable of changing, a govern-
ment to which they gave unstinted support when they were assured they could
change it by legal means.
The successful elimination of one rebellion took about as long as did the
successful elimination of the other. Tactics successful in one were successful
when applied in the other. The principles successful in one were successful in
the other. The lesson is that a governmentwhether it be one imposed by
force from outside or a freely elected indigenous onewhich succeeds in
convincing the governed that it is acting effectively in their interests can be
successful in eliminating a guerrilla movement. It is necessary only for it to
act intelligently and effectively for the people and against the guerrilla, always
emphasizing, always demonstrating, its effective pursuit of the ultimate goal
of governmentthe welfare of the governed. The nation is the target of the
guerrilla; it must be the target of the counterguerrilla as well.
NOTES
1. Quoted in Dean C. Worcester, Philippines Past and Present (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1914).
2. Quoted in ibid.
APPENDIXES
Appendix I
PATROL SOP FOR COUNTER-

GUERRILLA OPERATIONS
Introduction: The purpose of this SOP is to present briefly basic doctrine

governing patrolling in counterguerrilla operations. It supplements but, except
as it modifies, does not replace official doctrine and tactics for patrolling and
small-unit operations.
I. MISSIONS
A. General: All patrols have three missions:
1. To capture, kill, or harass the enemy.
2. To obtain and report information.
3. To win the support of the people to the government and the armed forces, by
demonstrating their concern for the people.
B. Specific: Each patrol will have a specific mission that is primary. This
specific mission will usually be in implementation of one or more of
the three elements of the general mission. All elements of the general
mission will be accomplished to the maximum extent possible without
serious jeopardy to success in the specific mission.
C. Typical Patrol Missions:

1. "Flag" Patrols: To demonstrate presence and intention of government to
assist and protect its citizens. Ordered to proceed to one or more designated
places along generally designated routes, seeking, recording, and, as feasible,
acting on information about the enemy, the local inhabitants, etc.
2. Combat Patrols: To determine if enemy are in an area or at a designated place;
attacking and destroying the enemy with violence. Aggressive leadership and
a desire to close with the enemy are essential to success.
3. Reconnaissance Patrols: To secure both specific and general information
about the enemy, the physical environment, and the local inhabitants. Securing
198 APPENDIX I
and reporting the information desired is the primary duty of the patrol. Destruc-
tion or harassment of the enemy will be accomplished whenever possible
without seriously jeopardizing the primary mission. Recon patrols may accom-
plish deep penetrations of enemy territory, in which case they may be directed
to avoid any actions that would reveal their presence (Class D patrols).
4. Security Patrols: Often motorized, their specific mission is to deter, by showing
military presence, enemy action on routes of communications or against friendly
installations. Essentially a form of command life-insurance, these patrols are
precautionary measures to supplement, not replace, aggressive patrol action.
5. Miscellaneous Patrols: Accomplish special purposes, including arrests, ser-
vice of court orders, emergency aid to civilians, escorting visitors, etc. Patrols
of this type may be especially successful in securing information and demon-
strating both the concern and the effectiveness of government.
II. PATROL CLASSES

A. Overt: In uniform, welcoming contact with civilians along the route.
"Flag" patrols and security patrols will usually be of this class. Other
patrols may be overt or not, depending on instructions of headquarters
ordering the patrol.
B. Attack: In uniform, but avoiding contact or identification by civilians
or enemy until the objective area is reached and combat offered. Many
combat patrols will be of this class.
C. Covert: In civilian (or enemy) clothing, with or without display of
weapons. Identification as military or government personnel usually
avoided, except in contacts with trusted informers or when the tactical
situation requires.
D. Surreptitious: In uniform or civilian clothing, seeking to avoid any
notice being taken of their presence. Deep-penetration patrols, stay-
behind parties, and observation posts will often be of this class.
E. General Notes: Patrols may shift from one class to another depending
on the situation. Patrol briefing will cover anticipated conditions
requiring such shifts, but shifts may be made, if necessary, at discre-
tion of the patrol leader.
III. PATROL PREPARATION

A. Patrol Designation: Commander of unit dispatching patrol will desig-
nate and alert leader of patrolling unit, if possible twenty-four hours in
advance. This notification will include mission, class, composition,
and any special factors affecting patrol, to the extent security consid-
erations permit. Higher headquarters, up to BCT level, will ordinarily
be notified at the same time. Smallest unit normally employed on
patrol will be half-squad; will be no smaller than one "buddy team."
Unit integrity will be maintained, to include approval of replacements
by patrol leader. Specialists may be attached. Subject to above limita-
tions, patrols will be of smallest size commensurate with the mission,
situation, and duration of the patrol.
APPENDIX I 199
B. Patrol Leader Actions: Notifies members of the patrol, inspects their

clothing and equipment, draws necessary additional equipment, rations,
and munitions. (See Section I of Patrol Report, Attachment 1, for com-
position and equipment of typical two-day Class A patrol.) Draws patrol
notebook (see Attachment 2), propaganda and welfare materials, etc.
C. Patrol Briefing: Patrols will be briefed before departure by appropriate
commander or staff officer. (When possible, all except routine security
patrols will be briefed by BCT S-2 and S-5.) Briefing will follow stan-
dardfive-paragraphfield-orderform, emphasizing specific and general
missions of the patrol and any authorized departures from general mis-
sion. It will include review of administrative details, including pass-
words, commo plan, possible or probable contacts with other friendly
forces, emergency resupply or evacuation plans, signals, etc. Briefing
officer accomplishes Section I of Patrol Report (Attachment 1).
D. Inspection: Patrols will be formally inspected in ranks by an officer,
preferably a commander. He will satisfy himself that all personnel are
physically fit, alert, properly equipped, familiar with their duties and
the patrol SOP.
E. Patrol Order: Patrol leader issues his patrol order immediately prior
to departure. An officer of the company or higher headquarters will
be present.
IV. CONDUCT OF PATROL

A. General: Will follow procedures consonant with good troopleading,
appropriate to the mission and class of the patrol, and suited to the
situation and the terrain. All-around security and a formation that will
prevent the entire patrol from offering a single target are mandatory.
In terrain affording cover or concealment, rendezvous points will be
designated hourly.
B. Reporting: Commo checks will be made as scheduled, the situation
and the equipment permitting. Patrol leader's notes will be written up
every three hours when traveling, and after every significant incident.
C. In Case of Doubt: Act! If enemy, attack; if unknown, identify; if civil-
ians, seek to assist if in need.
V. AFTER PATROL
A. Immediate Action: Upon return to base, patrol is formed and formally
presented to an officer of the unit. Immediate medical attention will be
given to those requiring it. Patrol leader will submit an oral report, in
presence of patrol, covering important points: current information of
enemy, enemy encounters, and conduct of members of patrol. Patrol
will then be given hot meal.
Subsequent Action: After patrol has eaten and been dismissed, patrol
leader, using his notes, completes Patrol Report in triplicate, and submits
it, with verbal additions, to briefing officer or intelligence officer.
200 APPENDIX I
Notebook isfiledin company headquarters, triplicate copy of report in

company Intelligence section. Original and duplicate go to BCT head-
quarters. Original, after approval by BCT CO, isfiledby AG. Dupli-
cate copy is collated by S-2, S-3, and S-5 sections, and forms back-up
for Barrio File. (See Attachment 3.)
ATTACHMENT I
HEADQUARTERS TH BATTALION COMBAT
TEAM ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
PATROL LEADER'S REPORT
SECTION I
Patrol #: C-026 Class A: MISSION (S):
Patrol Leader : CHAMALES, J.E., To proceed to
S/Sgt. Bo. MACAN STO
CRISTO, TERESA,
Organization: Plat Co and verify EN
CONC reported
Briefing Officer : LT. CARRANZA thereat.
Departure: 090340 Hrs _ 1 9 _
Scheduled Arrival: 101700 Hrs
19
Members: Weapons & Equip

1. Patrol Ldr.CHAMALES, J.E., 4 rifles M-I
S/SgtASN 218926 w/48 rds/ea.
1 Carbine M-l
2. Asst Patrol Ldr.-de la PAZ, w/60 rds
Bert, PFCASN 523141 1 BAR w/120 rds
1 Radio SCR-300
3. Rifleman-RUPERTO, A., 1 rifle grenade
PFCASN 478524 launcher
6 rifle grenades
6 hand grenades
4. BAR Man-SEGUNDINO, Q., 4 flares
PFC ASN 478524 4 bayonets
1 trench shovel
5. Radio Man-CANONIGO, A., 1 guy rope 15
PFC ASN 499873 feet
1 camera
6. Aidman-Cook-LUNA, B., 1 kit, first
PFC ASN 499871 aid, special
APPENDIX I 201
SECTION II
DATE-TIME LOG
091015 Arrived Sitio MALAKING BATO. Conferred with Bo. Lt.
ANSELMO NAGAHAS. Conditions peaceful and normal.
091630 Bivouacked at Sitio PUTIK. Conferred with store owner
PROCOPIO BITING. People afraid Huks will rob the sitio.
100630 Arrived at MATAAS NA LUPA (hill) and observed.
Obj (Bo. MACAN) guided by ANDRES REYES of Sitio
PUTIK. Observed for 1 hr. Nothing suspicious. Entered
Obj at 100810 hrs. Conditions normal and peaceful.
101300 Departed for home station.
SECTION III
INFORMATION SIGNIFICANT CLASSIFICATION
SOURCE INFORMATION
Bo. Lt. MALA- He says: "Huks u/d Nr
KING BATO passed thru night of
8-9 Sept going North A-2
but did not molest
anyone."
JOSEFAVELEZ She says : "Comdr.
TAGLE and 3 men armed
with pistol and
rifles visited Bo.
MACAN night of 2-3 B-2
Sept with promise to
return in 15 days to
pick up supplies or-
dered from Bo. Lt.
PEDRO LAHING."
MARIANO He says: "Unless AFP
REYES of Sitio will push patrols up
PUTIK to Lagundi, the Huks C-3
will continue forag-
ing at Putik."
Note: See the sketch locations of Sitios BULOG and LAGUNDI.
SECTION IV
Route Sketch (prepare on separate sheet, indicating patrol leader name,

number of patrol, date, and area covered; staple to this sheet).
202 APPENDIX I
SECTION V
S-2 PATROL LEADER CHAMALES, J.E. (S/Sgt.)
S-3 PROCESSED BY M. B. CARRANZA (1st Lt.)
EXO DATE FILED 102310 HRS.
Instructions: Use additional pages as needes. Staple together securely.
Instructions: Use additional pages as needed. Staple together securely.
APPENDIX I 203
ATTACHMENT! 2
204 APPENDIX I
ATTACHMENTS 3
THE BARRIO FILE (Maintained in company BCT headquarters):
a. This file will contain the following:

(1) Name of barrio
(2) Officials in the barrio
(3) Sketch of the barrio and vicinity
(4) Population and revenue
(5) Geographical data
(6) Economic data
(7) Known enemy personalities originating from the barrio and their
relatives
(8) Names of suspects
(9) Names of persons interrogated or investigated (detained or released)
(10) Names of foreigners and their means of livelihood
(11) List of licensed firearms and their holders
(12) Political and social information
(13) Religious organizations or sects and respective heads
(14) Local defense
(15) Names of government sympathizers
b. The Barrio File will be kept up to date and will be subjected to unannounced
inspections. At BCT level, it is a joint undertaking of the S-2 and the CAO
sections, the former being charged with the efficient maintenance of the file.
APPENDIX II
SUGGESTED SPECIAL
WARFARE BATTALION
Introduction: The Battalion Combat Team (BCT), as organized and employed

by the AFP, well demonstrated the suitability of this type of organization for
counterguerrilla operations. The British have successfully used battalions,
grouped together in brigades to suit the occasion, for many years. Even the
U.S. Army, in its "ROOD" divisions, recently sought to achieve the flexibility
and economy of force offered by the separate battalion, with its "Battle
Groups," as they were originally formed.
On the basis of the experience in the Philippines, and elsewhere, a battal-
ion especially adapted to "special warfare" is suggested here. It is designed
for area responsibility (its area may range from 200 to 2,000 square miles)
and semi-independent action under conditions likely to be found in underde-
veloped regions, where roads are few, cross-country trafficability (except by
foot) is low, and resupply a problem for both antagonists. If its personnel are
properly trained and motivated, the suggested Special Warfare Battalion is
believed suitable for operations against numerically superior enemy, either
guerrillas, who do not normally seek to hold terrain, or conventional forces,
who use conventional tactics against it. By attaching a battery of artillery (or
mortars, or rocketlaunchers) and issuing explosives (especially the Claymore
type) to the combat elements, the SWB could well be employed in more con-
ventional operations.
No attempt is here made to do more than suggest basic organization and
purposes of the elements that compose it. The utilization, tactics, and justifi-
cation for such an organization as the SWB have been covered, it is hoped, in
the main text. Basically, the suggested organization (see Chart I) consists of
a Headquarters and Service Company, to which is attached the battalion
206 APPENDIX II
headquarters complement, an Air Support Detachment, a small Medical

Detachment, and four Combat Companies.
Battalion Headquarters (Chart II): Follows conventional staff organization,
but enlarged and adapted to meet special-warfare requirements. The Intelli-
gence (S-2) section is strengthened, a Finance Officer added (in the S-l sec-
tion) to service the much larger "cashflow"requirements of successful special
warfare, and an S-5 section established for civilian affairs and psychological
operations. This S-5 section consists of one Civil Affairs Officer and four EM,
with enough transportation and special equipment (projector, public-address
system, mimeograph, portable power unit, etc.) to function effectively.
Headquarters and Service Company (Chart III): Services battalion headquar-
ters, affords administrative and logistical support to the Combat Companies,
accomplishes special operational missions for the battalion, and includes lim-
ited security forces. In addition to its company headquarters for internal
administration and supply, it has two battalion support platoons: the Commu-
nications Platoon (Chart III-A) and the Transportation Platoon (Chart III-B);
and two operational units: the Heavy Weapons Platoon (Chart III-C) and the
Intelligence Platoon (Chart III-D).
The Communications Platoon is designed to provide normal communica-
tions services, including maintenance and repair. In addition, it is intended to
have the capability of rehabilitating and supervising operation of civilian com-
munications facilities, which, in operational areas, will often be found virtu-
ally abandoned. Further, it is designed to furnish communications support to
clandestine operations conducted by intelligence or supporting units.
APPENDIX II 207
The Transportation Platoon, which operates the battalion motor pool and
performs third-echelon maintenance and repair for the battalion, has enough
transport to move one-third of the battalion to any point in the operational area
accessible to wheeled vehicles. In addition, it includes an APC (Armored Per-
sonnel Carrier) section to supply often needed armored track vehicles for road
patrolling and for essential transport over routes under enemy fire. When
operated for patrol or escort duties from Battalion Headquarters, they may be
(2.*)
208 APPENDIX II
manned by personnel of the Combat section, Heavy Weapons Platoon. Nor-

mally, under stabilized conditions, APCs will be attached to the Combat Com-
panies and manned by their personnel.
The Heavy Weapons Platoon provides the support by high-explosive shells
occasionally desirable in special-warfare actions. The Mortar section, armed
with 81 -mm. (or 4.1 -inch) mortars, has vehicular mobility, since two of the ten
(15)
APPENDIX II 209
APCs are mortar carriers. The Rifle section is shown armed with 75-mm.
recoilless rifles, which may be adapted for use either on quarter-ton trucks, or
readily hand-carried. (Heavier rifles, either 90-mm. or 105-mm., may be desir-
able under some circumstances, but their greater weight, and especially the
greater weight of the ammunition, render them less desirable for special war-
fare). The Combat section, in addition to its primary role in furnishing battalion
road-patrol personnel and headquarters-area security, may be used to augment
weapons crews, provide them local security, or act as ammunition bearers. All
210 APPENDIX II
platoon personnel should be trained on other conventional infantry-support

weapons, and the platoon should be furnished with an assortment of these,
ranging from light machine guns and mortars to pyrotechnics and demoli-
tions, all ready for immediate employment.
The Intelligence Platoon has two basic divisions, an Investigation and Infor-
mation section and a Special Operations section. The former is responsible for
supplying the Battalion Intelligence section with both overt and covert tacti-
cal, political, economic, and "societal" intelligence concerning the operational
area. This section, which should operate in close liaison with any other intel-
ligence organizations in the target area, will normally do the bulk of the work
of organizing and servicing civilian-informant nets and of conducting "under-
cover" investigations among the civilian population. Its personnel should nor-
mally operate in civilian clothing and, in many cases, be kept physically away
from the battalion area.
The Special Operations section, as its name implies, is the agency of the
Battalion Intelligence Officer for special operational missions, ranging from
penetration of enemy territory by surreptitious means to the capture of special
prisoners. Each of its teams may be broken into smaller units, if the mission
requires, or two or more teams may work together on major raids. Personnel
of this section should be trained both for long-range patrol duties and in intel-
ligence procedures.
In addition to the elements described, it is recommended that the Head-
quarters and Service Company be augmented by a non-TO replacement pool
of approximately two officers and forty-eight enlisted men, when the battal-
ion is assigned operational duties. This will not only permit keeping TO ele-
ments at strength, but also prevent the diversion of personnel from their
assigned missions. If this is not done, it is recommended that one "patrol"
(half-squad) of each Combat Platoon be deactivated, with half the personnel
so made available placed in the company overhead to provide fillers for the
squads, and half attached to the Headquarters and Service Company to be
employed as auxiliaries.
Air Support Detachment (Chart IV): An organic Air Support Detachment,
integral to the battalion, and normally attached to the Headquarters and Ser-
vice Company, is deemed essential. For maximum economy in the employ-
ment of aircraft and trained personnel, the aircraft, with one pilot for each, and
the enlisted service crews may be attached from higher echelons when the
battalion is assigned operational duties. This will be acceptable only if the
aircraft and personnel are then placed under the complete control of the bat-
talion commander and made part of his own Air Support Detachment, whose
permanently assigned personnel have trained with, and feel themselves an
integral part of, the Special Warfare Battalion.
At operational strength, the Air Support Detachment is divided into a Head-
quarters section, a Flight section, and a Maintenance section. The Flight section
A P P E N D I X II 211
is equipped with two light fixed-wing aircraft (preferably Heliocouriers),

which should be fitted to carry light armament and supplied with radio relay
equipment enabling linking PRC-10 and AN/GRC-109 radio nets. These air-
craft are capable of furnishing airlift to small parties on special missions and
of performing extensive aerial resupply and reconnaissance missions. In addi-
tion, the Flight section should have one light helicopter, to be used primarily
for air evacuation of casualties or prisoners and for command, reconnaissance,
and liaison missions.
Medical Detachment: Consisting of two officers and eight enlisted men,
this detachment operates the battalion "hospital" and its ambulance service.
A large portion of its duty will normally be the provision of medical service to
civilians in the area of operations and "back-up" of the provision of services
and supplies through the Combat Companies.
Combat Company (Chart V): There are four Combat Companies in the pro-
posed Special Warfare Battalion, of which three may normally be assigned
operational areas (ranging from 20 to 500 square miles) and one held as battal-
ion reserve. Essentially an overstrength light-rifle company, the Combat Com-
pany is augmented by personnel for the special missions characteristic of special
warfare. The company is divided into a Headquarters and Service Platoon and
four Combat Platoons.
The Headquarters and Service Platoon performs for the Combat Platoons
the services the Headquarters and Service Company performs for the Combat
Companies. It includes Administrative, Intelligence, Communications,
Transport, Medical, and Civil Affairs sections. The company commander
should normally serve as his own intelligence and operations officer, while
212 APPENDIX II
q - (HI) 200 CA&regaU)

COMBAT
COMPANY
4 !(**) (i)
CO m
11 (40)
CoHq E*OC*CA0) JLJ Combat
Pl&ioon. 21 ms^ra Platoon.
1.(8)
Adm liO
Intel! S g t
See Intell Clerk ^ 6rt (V>
o
AdmO, See 4 Intell Spec 1 J
Squ*l Ho
l-ft)
HvyWpnsSfcfc Commo O r PktLUr
Commo
SupScfcfc a R&d Mechs Plfc S*t
*Ji
Sac
Armorer. AfVificn 3 Raa Oprd
l&roU Matf-SQUbd
j ( p R*d0pr-8nr
Aidmftn
Mcs Sd*
Oerk ' Motor Motor Sfc Squ&d Ldrl&dto mw\ Cook
I Cooks V\cch BARman | Scout
Sac 2. JDrwer^ RtfU-grcrt&diar
iTTST -J*LCA^PsyWojnS^ tadm&n-cook
Med MedO CA I/4T \rW 34 PRC-10 i-WQW 50
Sec Sec CUrk
JLMedSpec V4T t r k 3 AN/<**MOq l-tA(,G>X50
2. CA Spec 2L ViT t r k
l-feOwn roork&r
COMBAT COMPANY (Spl Wfr Bn) Cttar* JET
the company executive officer assumes responsibility for civil affairs and for
the supervision of the other staff sections. The heavy-weapons sergeant
should organize and train crews, drawn from the platoon, for the heavy
weapons assigned to the company. An all-around, self-contained platoon of
this type will enable the company to accept responsibility for a relatively
large sector and to operate effectively with its organic resources, organizing
civilian-informant nets and civil-defense units, assisting the civilian popula-
tion in relief and rehabilitation activities; in short, functioning as an effec-
tive representative of government. It may well be virtually the only
representation that government has to its citizens in the area.
The Combat Platoon is the principal combat element of the SWB and may
be expected to have much the same role as a company in conventional warfare
according to contemporary doctrines. To this end, its headquarters includes a
cook (who may serve in the company kitchen when the platoon is living with
the company) and a well-trained aid man. It may undertake independent mis-
sions whose duration and range are limited only by the communications and
logistic support given them. Each of the three squads in the platoon is divisible
into two patrols, each with a radio and a rifleman with some knowledge of
basic cooking and first aid. If buddy teams are, as is desirable, the basic train-
ing and maneuver elements, the "patrols" are the basic operational elements,
and should be so trained and employed. Since in special warfare intensive,
aggressive patrolling is the principal activity, the twenty-four half-squad
"patrols," plus Headquarters and Service Platoon personnel, provide the capa-
bility for effective action from as many as five self-sufficient bases, and may
be used either in uniform or "civvies" as the situation may dictate.
APPENDIX II 213
Comments: The flexibility of the proposed organization seems apparent.

Two or more battalions can be grouped under a skeletal headquarters as a task
force or brigade, or elements as small as a platoon may be detached for special
missions.
Modifications in organization may be required for special situations. Most
often, appropriate modification will consist of augmentation by personnel
with special skills or elimination of vehicles.
Modifications in equipment, especially communications equipment, are
greatly to be desired. Desirably, basic armament might consist of Armalite
T-15 and T-7 rifles (with telescoping stocks). Individual equipment should be
reduced to the minimum, with each soldier carrying barely more than poncho,
warm underwear, and dehydrated rations.
Training, emphasizing initiative, self-reliance of buddy teams, aggressive
action, and motivation, is second in importance only to good leadership.
Finally, the proposed organization is convertible. It can be employed in the
field against guerrillas; or it may be infiltrated by increments into a denied
area, and become an effective quasi-guerrilla force itself, one that may rapidly
take on the desirable characteristics of a true guerrilla organization.
APPENDIX III
RECOMMENDED READING
A. SPECIAL WARFARE
Following is a somewhat arbitrary selection of publications pertinent to the
subject of Special Warfare, especially as practiced in the Philippines. Inclu-
sion of a title herein does not necessarily indicate that the bibliographer agrees
with any, or all, of the ideas expressed, but it does indicate that the publication
is judged significant. Works of special interest, but not readily available, are
marked with an asterisk (*).
1. Basic Readings
*CALLWELL, MAJOR C. E. Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice. London: Intel-
ligence Division, War Office, 1899.
A museum piece of real value. Many of the tactics are as obsolete as the
crossbowyet, like the crossbow, are still effective, and may be required by
tomorrow's wars.
Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare. With an Introduction by MAJOR HARRIES-CLICHY
PETERSON. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961.
Possibly this manual has the greatest current significance (in view of
Khrushchev's endorsement of the Cuban operation) of any readily available
publication from the enemy camp.
CLAUSEWITZ, CARL VON. On War. Translated by O. S. MATTHIJS JOLLES. Washington,
D. C : Combat Forces Press, 1950.
. Living Thoughts of Clausewitz. Washington, D.C.: Longmans, Green & Co.,
and The Infantry Journal Fighting Forces Series (paper), 1943.
APPENDIX III 215
FORESTER, C. S. Rifleman Dodd. Little, Brown and Company, 1943.

Fiction, but one of the best "worm's-eye" (or guerrilla's-eye) view books ever
written. Should be mandatory reading. See also The Gun and Ship of the Line, by
the same author.
GIAP, Vo NGUYEN. People's War, People s Army: The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual
for Underdeveloped Countries. With a Foreword by ROGER HILSMAN. New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.
HEILBRUNN, OTTO. Partisan Warfare. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.
This is the best of the readily available books on the theory of guerrilla war-
fare, and its practice. Unfortunately, it tends to overemphasize Mao's doctrines,
which are not in all respects basic to success in guerrilla operations.
*LANSDALE, EDWARD G. Civic Activities of the Military in Southeast Asia. Memoran-
dum, Washington, D.C., 1959.
LINEBARGER, PAUL M. A. Psychological Warfare. Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces
Press, 1954.
Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare. Translated and with an Introduction by BRIGADIER
GENERAL SAMUEL B. GRIFFITH. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961.
MARSHALL, S. L. A. Men Against Fire. New York: William Morrow and Company,
Apollo Edition, 1961 (paper).
* . Soldier's Load and the Mobility of a Nation. Washington, D.C.: Combat
Forces Press, 1950.
NEY, VIRGIL. Notes on Guerrilla War. Washington, D.C.: Command Publications, 1961.
Should be read by everyone feeling a sense of personal concern for the defense
of the U.S.
*U.S. MARINE CORPS. Small Wars Manual Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1940.
This is still by far the best official U.S. publication on the subject. Although a
new version is reported to be in preparation, this, or an earlier edition, should be
reprinted, for any new edition will probably omit the very realistic comments on
desirable U.S. actions, as well as many valuable, seemingly obsolete but still useful,
data on the use, selection, and care of animal transport, etc. The chapters on proper
U.S. policies, supervision of elections, and relations with civilians are unexcelled.
2. The Philippine Experience

BACLAGON, ULDARICO S. Lessons from the Huk Campaign in the Philippines. Manila:
M. Colcol & Co., 1960.
CHYNOWETH, B. G. "Lessons from the Fall of the Philippines," Military Engineer,
Vol. XLVI (September, 1954).
DOROMAL, JOSE DEMANDANTE. The War in Panay. Manila: Diamond Historical Pub-
lications, 1952.
ELARTH, H. S. Khaki & Red [n.p., n.d.].
FERTIG, WENDELL W., and KEATS, JOHN. They Fought Alone: Fertig and the Mindanao
Guerrillas. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, forthcoming.
An account, by the commander, of the best-organized and most successful
World War II guerrilla movement in the Philippines.
216 APPENDIX III
HOEKSEMA, RENZE L. Philippine Communism. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,

Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 1956.
HOWZE, HAMILTON H. "The Rescue of Lt. Gillmore," Army, June, 1961.
*HURLEY, Vic. Jungle Patrol. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1938.
Possibly the finest book ever published on the achievements of men of two
races fighting as one, it gives a vivid appreciation of the Filipino fighting man and
his achievements in counterguerrilla warfare. It is highly readable although badly
organized.
MOJICA, PROCULO L. The Guerrilla Movement in Rizal Province. Unpublished Mas-
ter's thesis, Far Eastern University, Manila, 1955.
SCAFF, ALVIN H. The Philippine Answer to Communism. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
University Press, 1955.
This is a very good brief history of the Communist Party of the Philippines;
rather goes overboard about EDCOR.
SHAW, HENRY J. A Study of a Communist War of LiberationThe Huk Rebellion in

the Philippines. Unpublished Master's thesis, University of Virginia, 1962.
TARUC, LUIS. Born of the People. New York: International Publishers, 1953.
Written by Taruc and William Pomeroy and edited by Jesus Lava, this is a
quasi-official Party-line history that fully satisfied none of those concerned, but
gives much insight into the propaganda line of the Huk and the Communist Party
of the Philippines, as expounded or accepted, perhaps not always too willingly,
by these leaders.
*U.S. ARMY. The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines. General Head-
quarters, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific: 1946.
Although incomplete, this is the best available general survey of the topic.
YAY, COLONEL [MARKING, YAY PANLILIO]. The Crucible. New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1950.
3. Theory and Practice Elsewhere

"Atomic War and Partisans," reviewed in Military Review (June, 1957).
CHAPMAN, FREDERICK SPENCER. The Jungle Is Neutral. New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, 1949.
DIXON, C. AUBREY, and HEILBRUNN, OTTO. Communist Guerrilla Warfare. New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954.
FRANCO ISAZA, EDUARDO. Las Guerrillas de los Llanos. Bogota, Colombia: Libreria
Mondial, 1959.
HANRAHAN, GENE Z. The Communist Struggle in Malaya. Mimeographed. New York:
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954.
HENDERSON, IAN, and GOODHART, PHILIP. Manhunt in Kenya. Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday & Company, 1958.
IND, ALLISON. Allied Intelligence Bureau. New York: David McKay Company, 1958.
Infantry. All 1962 issues of this magazine so far published contain useful material. See
especially "Characteristics of Guerrilla Operations," in May-June issue.
KRUGER, RAYNE C. Goodbye Dolly Gray. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company,
1960.
APPENDIX III 217
The last chapters are a "how-to-do-it" guide for those who believe success in
counterguerrilla operations can be achieved by physically isolating the guerrillas.
A calculation of present-day costs would be useful.
MIERS, RICHARD C.H. Shoot to Kill. London: Faber & Faber, 1949.
OGBURN, CHARLTON. The Marauders. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959.
OSANKA, FRANKLIN MARK (ed.). Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist
Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961.
This collection of articles includes the only readily available material on the
Huk movement.
PEERS, W. R. "Guerrilla Operations in Northern Burma," Military Review, Vol. XXVIII
(June, 1948).
SPECIAL OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE. Unconventional WarfareAn Interim Bibli-
ography. Washington, D.C.: The American University, 1961.
"The Three-in-One Plan," Philippine Armed Forces Journal, October, 1953.
U.S. ARMY, SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER. Readings in Counter-Guerrilla Operations.
Fort Bragg, N.C.: 1961.
U.S. ARMY. Special Warfare. Washington, D.C.: 1962. See especially "Both Sides of
the Guerrilla Hill," by R. C. H. Miers, and "Soldier of the Future," by Boyd T.
B ashore.
"Ximenes," SOUYRIS, A., et al. "La Guerre Revolutionnaire," Revue Militaire
^Information (February-March, 1957).
ZAWODNY, J. K. (ed.). Unconventional Warfare (The Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science, Vol. CCCXLI), May, 1962.
B. THE PHILIPPINES
FORBES, W CAMERON. The Philippine Islands. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1928.
SPECIAL TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC MISSION. Philippine Land Tenure Reform. Mim-
eographed. Manila: U.S. Mutual Security Agency, 1952.
One of the most opinionated and controversial official publications ever to
come to the attention of the authors, this report is of value for its large body of
data collected from many sources. These data form, in the report, the bases for
value judgments which closely follow the old line, adopted by the Huk, of critical
need for land reform in Central Luzon. These data can as readily be interpreted to
show that Central Luzon probably should not receive priority in land reform or
agricultural assistance.
TOLENTINO, ARTURO M. The Government of the Philippines. Manila: R. P. Garcia,
1950.
WORCESTER, DEAN C. The Philippines Past and Present. New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1914.
INDEX
AFP. See Armed Forces of Philippines true understanding of, 80; guerrilla
Aggressiveness: Armed Forces/ killing promotions by, 163; Hukbala-
counterguerrillas need for, 150, 151; hap leadership eliminated by, 92;
Castro, Delfin S., example of, 152- Magsaysay's use of, 83; napalm
54 usage by, 66; pamphlet distribution
"Agrarian reformers" (Communist by, 172; self-confidence required by,
insurgent label), 37, 188 151; small-unit action successes of,
Aguinaldo, Emilio, 187 154; squad as basic unit of, 151;
Aid, need for long-range, 60-61 Three-in-One Plan, 175; two
Aircraft: counterguerrilla support via, missions of, 85. See also Philippine
106; liaison/communication function Constabulary armed forces
of, 106. See also Helicopters; L-5 Armed Forces of Philippines (AFP), 53,
artillery planes 92; leadership of, 111; organiza-
Air Support Detachment (BCT), 210-11 tional problems, 99; patrol leader's
Algeria, France's surrender to, 21 report, 200-203; Psychological
"All-Out Friendship or All-Out Force" Warfare Branch of, 164, 165;
approach (Magsaysay), 23, 83, 172, weaponry used by, 157-59
190 Arms-purchasing program (1951), 108-9
Ambushes: of foot troops, 156; of Army magazine, 15
guerrillas, 156-57; of individuals/ Army News Service (U.S.), 173
small groups, 157; of vehicles, 155, Attraction Program (Magsaysay), 112,
156 130, 168, 169, 173, 174; psychologi-
Amnesty, offerings of, 56-57 cal warfare emphasis of, 180-81
Armed Forces: advantages over
guerrillas held by, 147; aggressive- Bamboo telegraph, 120
ness needed by, 150, 151; analysis Bandits: behaving as guerrillas, 9;
of, 62-63; attitudes towards, 63-64; defined, 3-4; determining character/
decoy buses used by, 155; gaining weakness of, 5; plagues of, 4
220 INDEX
Bantay, Juan, 133 Casualties: counterguerrilla's nonaccep-

Barrio (villages): EDCOR's transplan- tance of, 148-49; helicopter
tation of, 179-80; importance of, 28; evacuation of, 106-7; 7th Battalion
soldier's friendliness to, 166. See Combat Team, 149
also San Mateo barrio Chapman, Spencer, 65
Barrio file, 204 Checkpoints: Huk avoidance of, 134;
Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC): mobile, 134-35; vehicle searches at,
as "farmers by day, guerrillas by 135; village screening operations at,
night," 50; as shadow government of 134
Huks, 28 Chief executives: Huk's threat to, 57;
Bastille, destruction of, 4 knowing status of, 56; populace
Bataan Death March, 128 attitudes towards, 67; protection
Battalion Combat Teams (BCTs): measures for, 57
aircraft support of, 106; Air Support China: banditry history of, 4; Commu-
Detachment, 210-11; Barrio File nists of, 17
of, 204; Civil Affairs Officers, 171, Civic-action programs, 173-74
174; Combat Platoons, 211-12; Civic organizations, counterguerrilla
Communications Platoon, 206; warfare contributions by, 66-67
components of, 99; establishment Civil Affairs Office (CAO): advisory
of liaison teams with civilians by, function of, 177; anti-guerrilla
101; Heavy Weapons Platoon, 208; psychological warfare by, 172-73;
Huk benevolence towards, 100; as component of battalions, 175;
Huk's dislodged/ambushed by, 102; creation of, 169; mission of, 170-72;
Intelligence Platoon, 210; local monitoring responsibilities of, 171;
authority granted to, 101; Magsay- propaganda responsibilities of, 173;
say's support of, 111-12; Medical publicity generation by, 171; small
Detachment, 211; MIS tactical size strength of, 170
teams attached to, 139, 142; Civil Affairs Officers, 171, 174
organization of, 205-13; scattered Civil authorities, law's application by,
locations of, 100; search guidelines 54
of, 135; 7th Battalion Combat Civil-guard units, 102; civilian
Team, 149; Special Operations protection from, 102; counterguer-
section, 210; special warfare rilla warfare participation by, 104;
adaptation, 205; Transportation disadvantages of, 102-3; Magsay-
Platoon, 207-8 say's attempted disbanding of, 103
Beheadings, by Japanese, 127 Civilians: armed Forces pamphlet
Bie, Linda, 107 distribution to, 172; BCT's estab-
Boer War, 55, 148 lishment of liaison teams with, 101;
Bondoc, Totoy, 130 civil-guard units protection of, 102;
"Both Sides of the Guerrilla Hill" government's winning back of, 161;
(Miers), 15 against guerrillas, 161; guerrilla's
BUDC. See Barrio United Defense gaining/maintaining support of, 3,
Corps 14, 162; as information sources, 125;
interrogation of, 133-34, 135-36;
CAO. See Civil Affairs Office Magsaysay's winning support of,
Castro, DelfinS., 152-54 165; military's non-alienation of, 84;
Castro, Fidel, 12 military's partnership with, 84, 88;
INDEX 221
shooting of, 130; soldiers changing conventional warfare v., 163; costs
attitudes towards, 80; soldiers of, 21; cutting off supply strategy,
demonstrated helpfulness to, 174; 108; deductions in, 44; defensive
soldiers v., 167; terror against, 17, tactics, 147; denying enemy
41 information strategy, 119; disguises
Civil War (U.S.), 3 used for, 122; fund allocation for,
Clausewitz, Carl von, 75, 150 66; gaining support against guerril-
Colombia, bandit plagues in, 4 las as, 41; lack of organization, 87;
Combat Platoons (BCT), 211-12 Magsaysay's approach to, 23;
Commanders, problems facing, 93 military-civilians cooperation
Communications Platoon (BCT), 206 during, 84; patrol s.o.p. for, 197
Communist National Finance Commit- 204; planning for, 63; required
tee, 140 closing with enemy, 152; small-unit
Communist Party, 2, 12, 37; "Agrarian action successes in, 154; "stealing
reformers" insurgent labels, 37; of the thunder" approach, 21-22;
China, 17, 46; in Manila, 27; of supposed ease of, 15; tactical
Philippines, 13, 55, 60, 98, 138; of intelligence usage in, 48; tactical
Vietnam, 46 skills of, 6; village screening
Counter ambush tactic, Magsaysay's operations combined with, 132-33;
prohibition of, 155 weaponry used for, 157-59. See also
Counterguerrillas: advantage held by, Psychological warfare
147; aggressiveness needed by, 150, Crusoe, Robinson, guerrilla as, 2
151; casualty nonacceptance by, Cruz, Constante, 128, 129
148-49; chief executive's influence
on, 58; concern for nation of, 183; Death March, 128
doubts of, 114; legislator's attitude Del Prado, Rizalino, 127, 128
concerns of, 58; political power Democracy: Filipino's belief in, 76,
understanding of, 58, 59; questions 176; Japan's contempt for, 76. See
about enemies of, 37-38; resource also Hamiltonian democracy
usage importance to, 71; tactical Dimasalang, Sulaiman, 87, 96, 98
training for, 151. See also Philippine Dirty tricks, usage of, 20
Constabulary armed forces "The Disasters of War" (Goya etching),
Counterguerrilla strategies: all-out 2
assault, 150; cutting off supplies, Disguises: as counterguerrilla warfare,
108; decoy buses, 155; denying 122; usage of, 20
enemy information, 119; fooling Dogs, as warning system, 120
guerrillas, 113-24; "rolling" mortar Doyle, A. Conan, 4, 142
barrage, 82; weapons destruction,
107 Economic Development Corps
Counterguerrilla warfare, 1; action (EDCOR), 177-78; Huk resettle-
combinations of, 174; aircraft ment projects, 177-79; rehabilitation
support of, 106; approaches to, 17- projects, 179; village transplantation
23; artillery bombardment usage in, projects, 179-80
107; basic plan for, 82; casualty Economy, importance of national, 65-
avoidance of, 149; civic organiza- 66
tion's contributions to, 66-67; civil- EDCOR. See Economic Development
guard units participation in, 104; Corps
222 INDEX
Election fraud (1949), 80-81 Geneva Conference (1954), 21

Enemy(ies): action sequence against, Gilbert, W S., 148
149-50; assessment of, 44-46; Girl friends, of guerrillas, 157
counterguerrilla's questions about, Government: analysis of, 64; anti-Huk
37-38; denying information to, 119; propaganda of, 178; BCTs granted
difficulties identifying, 157; eluding authority by, 101; checkpoints
warning systems of, 119, 121; established by, 79; civilians won
intelligence about, 38-39; killing of, back by, 161; concern for nation of,
92; long-range intentions assessment 183; determination lacking in
of, 46, 48; radio monitoring of, 49; civilian, 93-94; frustration/justifi-
required closing with, 152; self- able indignation/defeatism/self-
assessment by, 45; as source of justification of, 81; lack of support
knowledge of, 39 for guerrillas by, 64, 161; necessary
"Equal Justice for All" slogan, 39, 76, reform of, 60; peasant's distrust of,
81,85 85; populace represented/defended
Europe, terrain influence of, 25 by, 73; prisoner problem of, 54-55;
publicity agents of, 164; ultimate
Farms, Huk attempt at maintaining, 108 mission of, 73-76
Filipino cannon, 20 Goya, Francisco de, 2
First Philippine Commission proclama- Grass-fire movements (nihgas cogon),
tion, 185-86 14
Food: guerrilla movement need for, 14; Great Britain: Malaya's area-clearance
Huk attempts at farming for, 108; by, 17-18; prisoner problems of, 55
military shortages of, 84-85; patrol's Guerrilla hunters, successes of, 20, 137
need for extra, 168; as psychological Guerrilla movements: attitude's
tool, 168 importance in eradication of, 184;
"Fool 'Em, Find 'Em, Fight 'Em, causes of, 5; characteristics of, 11;
Finish 'Em!" motto, 113, 125 difficulty eliminating, 91; food/
Fooling: as anti-guerrilla strategy, 113 shelter requirements of, 14; found-
24; as Force X unit strategy, 114-18 ing of, 12-13; gaining/maintaining
Force X unit: fooling strategy, 114-18; support of people by, 14; hope for
guerrilla appearance trickery of, 115; achievement by, 14; imperatives of,
large-unit infiltration mission of, 13-15; as infection, 183; intelligence
114-15; mingling with guerrilla gathering about, 138; necessity of
trickery of, 116; Philippine Con- support for, 81; organizational
stabulary Company formation of, requirements of, 13; psychological
114; slaughter of Huks by, 116; requirements for, 184
weaponry hidden by, 116 Guerrillas: action's planned against, 56;
France: Algerian surrender of, 21; Com- assessing capabilities of, 44-46, 4 8 -
munism assumptions of, 37; 49; automatic release of, 53, 54;
Vietminh surrender by, 21 averageness of, 91; bandits behaving
Fund allocation, for counterguerrilla as, 9; beating claims of, 22; capabili-
warfare, 66 ties of, 92; civilian's courting by, 3,
14, 162; conditions creating, 183
Gabriel, Agustin, 144-45 84; conventional operation failures
Gadgeteers, warfare favored by, 158-59 against, 18; counterguerrilla's
Gaitain, Jorge Eliecer, 4 gaining support against, 41;
INDEX 223
defeating of, 1; defined, 2, 3, 9; Hamiltonian democracy, 12

determining character/weakness of, Heavy Weapons Platoon (BCT), 208
5; eluding intelligence nets of, 105; Helicopters, casualty evacuation by,
elusiveness of, 82; extermination/ 106-7
resettlement of, 17; fooling/ Henderson, Ian, 68
misleading of, 113-24; goal of, 74; Holmes, Sherlock, 142
government's non-support of, 64, "Honesty and Efficiency in Govern-
161; images conjured by, 2; ment" slogan, 76
leadership decisions of, 147; moral Hope, as characteristic of guerrilla
superiority claims of, 22, 159; movements, 14
motivation of, 7-8; national Hukbalahap (Huk) guerrillas, 18;
revolution spearheaded by, 47; oppo- agrarian reform image of, 39; "All-
nents as understood by, 8; orthodox Out Friendship or All-Out Force"
soldiers v., 11-12; overcoming approach to, 23, 83, 172, 190;
counterintelligence of, 114; patrols ambush tactics of, 155; amnesty
against, 136-37, 150; patrols by, offered to, 56-57; attempted
136-37; people in support of, 3; placation of, 41; Barrio United
pressures of, 9; propaganda of, 41, Defense Corps as shadow govern-
43, 45; psychological warfare ment of, 28; BCT's dislodging/
conducted by, 162; qualified ambushing of, 102; benevolence
successes of, 9; quasi-, 3; resource towards BCTs by, 100; Bie, Linda,
usage importance to, 71; as Robin- commander of, 107; buses/cars
son Crusoe, 2; rural operations of, 5, stopped by, 155; campaign (1946-
9; spying on, 137; as superman, 91; 1950) against, 53, 126; checkpoints
sympathy for cause of, 74; turning avoided by, 134; chief executives
civilians against, 161; as victim, 91; threatened by, 57; defeat of, 60;
winning certainty of, 154; with- EDCOR resettlement of captured/
drawal by, 150; worst way of surrendered, 178; eliminating
fighting, 150. See also Hukbalahap leaders of, 92; "fair share" rice
(Huk) guerrillas; Philippine Leyte harvest propaganda of, 40; fighting
guerrillas; Quasi guerrillas for "New Democracy" by, 39; food
Guerrillas, legitimate (USAFFE), 103 farm attempts by, 108; Force X unit
Guerrilla warfare: aircraft usage in, slaughter of, 116; fumbles in
106; conditions causing, 14-15; campaign against, 26; importance of
fooling strategy, 113-24; insurgen- liquidating, 77; local sympathy for,
cy's eruption into, 38; as irregular 43, 88; Magsaysay's contributions to
warfare, 1; large-scale operations, overthrow of, 23, 78, 82; Mount
105; limitations of, 148; military/ Arayat "redoubt" (1943), 19; Nenita
police solution to, 18, 19; motives hunter-killer unit action against, 79;
of, 6; need for patience in, 137; "New Democracy" of, 76; 1951
pattern approach to, 102; political election as death knell of, 192; 1946
purposes seen in, 162; spying rebellion by, 75; operational
methods of, 137; surrender as initial divisions of, 50-51; "Operation
approach to, 21 Cover-Up" against, 143-44;
patrolling's effectiveness against,
Habeas corpus, suspension of, 55-56 104; as "People's Liberation Army,"
Halsema, Jim, 39 98; Philippine Constabulary armed
224 INDEX
forces action against, 92-93, 95-98, Philippines by, 6, 76, 103; school-
138; Philippine's failure to suppress, houses destroyed by, 86; village
78, 80, 92; press' influence on screening operation barbarities of,
attitudes towards, 79; reasons for 127; World War II resistance against,
growth of, 76-77; "Relatives 68
Project" aimed against, 140; supply Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group
difficulties of, 108; surrender of, 22; (JUSMAG), 99
surrender of leaders, 181; tax The Jungle is Neutral (Chapman), 65
collection by, 137-38, 140, 167; Justice Ministry, justice demonstration
unconventional operations against, of, 81
20; USAFFE's attacked by, 103;
village screening (zona) abuses by, Kenya: Mau Mau of, 68; prisoner
127; warning system of, 119-20. See problems of, 55
also Dimasalang, Sulaiman; "Know Thine Enemy" war axiom, 37
Mananta, Pedro; Rizal, Taciano;
Slogans/mottos; Viernes, Alexander L-5 artillery planes, 106
Huklandia: guerrilla's nuisance attacks "Land for the Landless" slogan, 39, 40,
against, 148; psychological opera- 76.81,85,188
tions in, 165; support asked of, 188; Laos, 12, 21
water transportation of, 172 Lapus, Ismael, 144
Hunter-killer teams, formation of, 94 Law, civil authorities application of, 54
Hunters, of guerrillas, 20, 137 Leadership, Magsaysay as personifica-
tion of, 111
Illustrados, 58 Life magazine, 4
Informants: Magic Eye, 129; obtaining Loudspeakers, as psychological
reports from, 141 warfare, 109-10
Information: citizen's as sources of, Luzon (Philippines): Huk's flourishing
125; military's need for, 84 in, 27-28; Negritos of, 67
Insurgency, guerrilla warfare eruption
from, 38 Magic Eye informants, 129
Intelligence (about enemy): categories Magsaysay, Ramon, 22; accomplish-
of, 38-39; counter-guerrilla tactical, ments of, 87; administration style of,
48; local, 50; methodologies of, 138; 64-65, 87; "All-Out Friendship or
military's problems regarding, 93; All-Out Force" approach of, 23, 83,
sources of, 125 172, 190; armed forces used by, 83;
Intelligence Platoon (BCT), 210 Attraction Program of, 112, 130,
Intelligence services: attitudes towards, 168, 169, 173, 174; as avenger, 166-
63-64; secrecy maintenance by, 63 67; BCT's support of, 111-12;
Interrogations: of civilians, 135-36; charge to eliminate Huk guerrilla
Huks discovered via, 133; methodol- movement of, 82; civil-guard units
ogy of, 129-30 attempted disbanding by, 103;
Interrogation stations, 133-34 civilian support won by, 165;
Italy, banditry history of, 4 counter ambush tactic prohibition of,
155; electoral victory of, 58, 81;
Jabillo, Felix, 137 military contributions of, 78, 111-
Japan: beheadings by, 127; contempt 12; Negritos and, 67; Peace Fund
for democracy by, 76; occupation of partial control by, 181-82; peasant's
INDEX 225
aided by, 86; as personification of Military operations: defined, 19; dirty

leadership, 111; as phenomenon, tricks/disguises used for, 20;
190; populace inspired by, 83; failures/successes of, 20; against
psychological warfare undertaken Huk guerrillas, 20; Philippine's use
by, 163; resignation of, 86-87; of, 19-20
results orientation of, 170; Rizal's MIS. See Military Intelligence Service
rendezvous with, 55; schoolhouses Mobile checkpoints, 134-35
rebuilt by, 86; statement to soldiers Mobs, 4
by, 166; supply solutions of, 167-68; Money, as psychological warfare, 110-11
Taruc's defeat by, 26, 140; village Morgan, John, 3
screening operations limited by, 132 Moros (Moslem Filipinos), 108
Malaya: British area-clearance system Mottos. See Slogans/mottos
in, 17-18; prisoner problems of, 55 Mounted cavalry patrols, 105
Mallari. See Sagum, Guillermo Mount Guiniat, synchronized attack on,
Mananta, Pedro, 96 96
Manila (Philippines): Communist Party Movies, as psychological warfare, 110,
success in, 27; as hothouse for 172
radical movements, 26; Huk's Mussolini, Benito, 4
recruitment success in, 27; Police
Department of, 131; Spain's NAMFREL. See National Movement
surrender in, 184 for Free Elections
Mao-Giap doctrine, 51 Napalm, 66
Mao Tse-tung, 3, 4, 11, 12, 46, 98, 161 National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
Maravilla, Jovito, 128 138
Martial law, 55-56 National Finance Committee, 140-41
Mau Mau (of Kenya), 68 National Movement for Free Elections
Medical Detachment (BCT), 211 (NAMFREL), 191
Merrill's Marauders, 3 Nations: guerrilla threat v. conventional
Miers, R. C. H., 15 army threat, to, 149; political facts
Military: civilian's partnership with, 84, of life of, 61
88; fear of undue dominance by, 75; NBI. See National Bureau of Investiga-
food/supplies problems of, 84-85; tion
guerrilla warfare solution of, 18; Negritos (pygmy blacks of Central
information need of, 84; intelligence Luzon), 67
problems encountered by, 93; Nenita hunter-killer unit, 79
Magsaysay's contributions to, 111; Nifigas cogon. See Grass-fire move-
need for changing practices of, 78; ments
non-alienation of citizens by, 84; Nixon, Richard M., 4
security issues of, 118; village
screening operation of, 79-80; zona Oblenida, Onofre, 135
practice of, 79-80 Officers, specialized training for, 169
Military Intelligence Service (MIS), "Operation Cover-Up," 143
138; BCTs attached to, 139-42; Opilas, Vicente Z., 49
formation/organization of, 139; late
arrival of, 140 Palma, Pascual, 128, 130, 131
Military material, delayed procurement Papa Rios (of Batangas), capture/
of, 61 execution of, 6
226 INDEX
Paraffin-test, 131-32 service of, 39; Japan's occupation

Parungao, Anselmo (barrio lieutenant), of, 6, 76, 103; Leyte guerrillas of,
29 7; military/police action in, 18;
Patrol leaders: actions of, 199; report National Finance Committee, 140-
of, 200-203 41; 1950s overestimation of
Patrols: actions after, 199-200; armored enemies by, 44; 1946 Hukbalahap
vehicle, 155; briefings before, 199; guerrilla rebellion, 75; Presidential
classes of, 198; conduct on, 199; election fraud in, 80-81; prisoner
duties/responsibilities of, 126; as problems of, 54-55; rice harvest of,
effective measure against Huks, 40-41; small, well-trained armed
104-5, 122, 123; extra food carried force of, 82; Social Welfare
on, 168; formation for, 151; against Administration of, 182; tenant
guerrillas, 136-37, 150; by guerril- farms of, 40-41; unconventional
las, 136-37; miscellaneous, 198; military operations of, 19-20;
mounted cavalry, 105; by Philippine United States attacked by, 184;
Constabulary, 177; preparation for, United States attack on, 186; U.S.
198-99; propaganda distribution by, ties to, 61. See also Luzon; Manila
176; by Scout-Ranger units, 126; Police: analysis of, 63; guerrilla warfare
security, 198; as source of intelli- solution of, 18; of Manila, 131;
gence, 126; typical patrol missions, paraffin-test usage by, 131-32
197-98 Political power: counterguerrilla's need
Peace Fund, 181-82 for understanding of, 58, 59;
Peasants: distrust of government by, 85; illustrados and, 58; transference of,
Magsaysay's aid to, 86 59
People's Liberation Army, 98 Politicians: counterguerrilla's concern
Philippine Constabulary armed forces: for attitudes of, 58; dilemmas of, 54;
action against Huks by, 92-93, 95- garnering support of populace by, 75
98, 138; Force X formation, 114; Politics, of guerrilla warfare, 162
hunter-killer teams formed by, 94; Pomeroy, Celia, 105
patrols by, 177; task force divisions Pomeroy, William, 105
of, 95; village screening (zona) non- Populace: attitude importance of, 67;
brutal methods of, 127; weapons dissatisfaction of, 82; Magsaysay's
secured by, 93 inspiration of, 83; politician's
Philippine Leyte guerrillas: motives of, garnering support of, 75
7; resistance to Japanese occupation Presidential election fraud (1949), 80-
by, 6-7 81
Philippines: agriculture of, 26-27; Press: populace attitude influenced by,
anti-Huk operations of, 19; 79; as psychological warfare, 110
Communist Party of, 55, 60, 98, Prisoners: government's problem with,
138; enemy occupation (1946) of, 54-55; interrogation of, 130, 135
66; ethnic make-up of, 26; failure to 36; liquidation/intimidation of, 54,
suppress Hukbalahap rebellion, 78, 60; procedures for taking, 53-54;
80, 92; family's importance in, 26; torture of, 60
freedom from difficulties in, 61; Propaganda: CAO's responsibility for,
freedom from Spain desired by, 173; government anti-Huk, 178; of
184; geographic description of, 26; guerrillas, 41, 43, 45; rice propa-
Huk's headway in, 27; intelligence ganda of Huks, 40
INDEX 227
Psychological warfare, 1,18; Attraction Scout-Ranger patrol units, 126, 128,

Program emphasis of, 180-81; CAO 137
anti-guerrilla, 172-73; everyone as Security patrols, 198
target of, 164; food as weapon of, 7th Battalion Combat Team: aggres-
168; guerrillas usage of, 162, 163; in siveness/effectiveness of, 149;
Huklandia, 165; loudspeakers usage casualties of, 149
for, 109-10; Magsaysay's undertak- "Silver Blaze" (Doyle), 142
ing of, 163; money as, 110-11; Slogans/mottos: "Equal Justice for All,"
radio/press/movies, as, 110; soldiers 39, 76, 81, 85; "Fool 'Em, Find 'Em,
employment of, 175-82; U.S. Fight 'Em, Finish 'Em!", 113, 125;
definition of, 163-64 "Honesty and Efficiency in Govern-
Psychological Warfare Branch (of ment," 76; "Know Thine Enemy,"
AFP), 164, 165 37; "Land for the Landless," 39, 40,
Psy-war man, soldier as, 175-82 76.81, 85; of land reform, 28; wide
acceptance of Huk, 80; "Yankee Go
Quaker guns, 20 Home," 40
Quasi guerrillas: defined, 3; determin- Small-unit actions, success of, 154
ing character/weakness of, 5; Social Welfare Administration (SWA),
external support needs of, 8; 182, 188
historical examples of, 3; motiva- Soldiers (orthodox): '"Attraction
tions of, 8 Program" winning of acceptance by,
Quezon, Dona Aurora, 94, 154 168; changing attitudes towards
Quezon, Manuel, 94 civilians by, 80; civilians v., 167;
Quirino, Elpidio, 165 demonstrated helpfulness of, 174;
dilemmas of, 54; friendliness
Radio, as psychological warfare, 110, displays of, 166; guerrillas v., 11-12;
172 Magsaysay's statement to, 166;
Radio monitoring, of enemies, 49 objective achievement's importance
"Relatives Project," 140 to, 75; psychological warfare
Revolution, guerrilla spearheading of, employed by, 175-82; as psy-war
47 man, 175-82; as sources of intelli-
Rice farming, importance of, 30-31 gence, 125; supply difficulties of,
Rizal, Taciano, 55 167; Three-in-One Plan mission of,
Robin Hood and his Merry Men, 4 176-77
Roxax, Manuel, 165 South Africa, prisoner problems of, 55
Spain: Philippines desire for freedom
Sagum, Guillermo, 128, 130 from, 184; surrender of, 184; U.S.
San Mateo barrio: children of, 32; war with, 184
description of, 29-30; lack of Special Operations section (BCT), 210
modern conveniences in, 33; Spying, on guerrillas, 137
medical care lacking in, 32; Squads: as basic unit of Armed Forces,
occupations of, 31; rice farming's 151; configuration of, 151-52
importance to, 30-31; sharecropper "Stealing the thunder" counterguerrilla
farmers of, 31; water shortage approach, 21-22
of, 32 Supplies: Huk difficulty obtaining, 108;
Schoolhouses, Japan's destruction/ Magsaysay's providing of, 167-68;
Magsaysay's rebuilding of, 86 soldier's difficulty obtaining, 167
228 INDEX
Surrender: of France, 21; of Huk Viemes, Alexander, killing of, 98

guerrillas, 22; as initial approach to Vietminh, France's surrender to, 21
guerrilla, 21 Vietnam, 12,46
SWA. See Social Welfare Administration Villages. See Barrio
Village screening operations (zona):
Tactical training, of counterguerrillas, checkpoint conductance of, 134;
151 counterguerrilla warfare combined
Taft, William Howard, 75-76 with, 132-33; Hukbalahap abuses
Tapahan warfare, 49-50 of, 127; Japanese barbarity during,
Taruc, Luis, 39, 115, 116; appeal by 127; Magsaysay's limitation of, 132;
mother of, 172; difficulty in capture of military, 79-80; Philippine
or, 88; distorted views of, 25; known Constabulary/Huk example of, 131;
as Supremo, 51, 101; lack of of populace, 127; Pulong Plasan
capturing of, 88; Magsaysay's defeat example of, 127-31
of, 26 Vo Nguyen Giap, 11, 12, 46
Tax collection, by Huks, 137-38, 140,
167 War-crime trials, 17
Telegraph, bamboo, 120 Warfare: gadgeteers favoring of, 158-
Tenant farms, of Philippines, 40 59; irregular, 1. See also Psychologi-
Terrain, importance of, 25 cal warfare
Terror, employed against civilians, 17, Warning system: bamboo telegraph
41 as, 120; dogs as, 120; of Huks,
Three-in-One Plan, 175, 176-77 119-20
Trackers, value of, 137 Weapons: AFP selection of, 157-59;
Transportation Platoon (BCT), 207-8 homemade, 2; nuclear, 3; patterns of
usage of, 152; Philippine Constabu-
United States: Army News Service of, lary securing of, 93; strategic
173; Communist sympathies destruction of Huk, 109
accusations against, 43; guerrillas "The White Company" (Doyle), 4
(USAFFE) claiming allegiance to, Wingate's Chindits, 3
103; past assistance by, 61; Philip- World war, fear of, 21
pine forces attacked by, 186; World War II, 3; anti-Japanese resis-
Philippine forces attack on, 184; tance movement during, 68; war-
psychological warfare definition of, crime trials after, 17
163-64; Spain's war with, 184
USAFFE. See Guerrillas, legitimate "Yankee Go Home" slogan, 40
Vehicles, searches of, 135 Zona. See Village-screening operations

About the Authors
NAPOLEON D. VALERIANO was among the most highly regarded counter-

insurgency experts in the Philippine army. During his career he was a key aide
to President Ramon Magsaysay and the chief of police in Manila and of the
Philippine Constabulary. Colonel Valeriano also was an advisor on security
matters in Vietnam with his colleague Charles Bohannan. Subsequently, he
was appointed a Philippine representative to the U.N. Security Council. He
retired to the United States where he joined government-sponsored threat
assessment teams in Guatemala and Colombia, and helped to train Cuban
paramilitary forces.
CHARLES T R. BOHANNAN was an American officer who survived the

Bataan Death March and then became adept in irregular warfare while fight-
ing the Japanese behind-the-lines. Trained as an anthropologist and geologist,
he conducted operations after World War II against the communist guerrillas
in the hinterland of the Philippines. Colonel Bohannan also served as an advi-
sor in South Vietnam under Edward Lansdale, and later teamed with Valeriano
to train anti-Castro forces in the Florida swamps.

Napolean D. Valeriano, Charles T.R. Bohannan Counter-Guerrilla Operations The Philippine Experience PSI Classics of The Counterinsurgency Era

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Napolean D. Valeriano, Charles T.R. Bohannan Counter-Guerrilla Operations The Philippine Experience PSI Classics of The Counterinsurgency Era

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Napolean D. Valeriano, Charles T.R. Bohannan Counter-Guerrilla Operations The Philippine Experience PSI Classics of The Counterinsurgency Era

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

What is the book about?

What is the book about?

What approaches to counter-guerrilla warfare are discussed?

What approaches to counter-guerrilla warfare are discussed?

Counter-Guerrilla

The Philippine Experience

PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era

Praeger Security International

1. What and Why Is a Guerrilla? 1

Appendix I. Patrol SOP for Counter-Guerrilla Operations 197

learned political, military, economic, and social lessons needed to convince

Minamahal kong Magbabasa:

a. Only in the Philippines have conquerors of another race succeeded in quell-

WHAT AND WHY IS

You MAY be killed by a guerrilla. You may die fighting as a guerrilla.

concerned with finespun theories imperfectly understood. Student or not, in

Accordingly, it appears appropriate to open a work on counterguerrilla

In some of the bandit plagues that exist today, as in Colombia, small

support and in equipmentat least as compared with the forces opposing

There is almost as much theoretical discussion about the causes of guerrilla

Come andfightfor the Philippines,

What of the motivations of the individual guerrilla? Are they necessarily

1. Remnants of a defeated national army ally themselves with indignant civil-

2. Organizations whose ideologies oppose the existing government, deliber-

Like any human effort, a guerrilla movement requires organization if it is to

everything tangible, but an assumed superiority in ideals and determination.

Fight only at times and places of his own choosing.

REVIEW AND analysis of the history of counterguerrilla operations suggests

Most often, a solution to the guerrilla problem is initially sought by the

well-conceived unconventional operations fail, it is almost always because of

Surrender as the initial approach to guerrilla operations appeals only to

There is another approach to counterguerrilla operations, one that might be

THE SITUATION AND

have, perhaps more do not, a comparable degree of political awareness among

KNOW THINE ENEMY:

alike of an intimate linking of psychological and combat operations can scarcely

yield surprisingly accurate deductions as to strength, capabilities, and inten-

supply capacity. Is there an appreciable percentage of nonfactory weapons? If

interruption of its movement? Answers to these questions indicate the enemy's

Probably of an importance nearly equal to knowledge of enemy capabilities

to the traditional guerrilla role of harassing the enemy, collecting intelligence,

Knowledge of enemy intentions has many benefits. If it is known that the

Knowledge of the enemy's intelligence and communication capabilities is

Continuing relentless command emphasis at all echelons on the production,

fortune of seizing the administrative headquarters of the guerrillas as a justifi-

If a chief executive is not respected, if significantly large segments of the

If a major foreign power is assisting the threatened government in its coun-

Analysis of the composition, strength, equipment, and state of training of

Analysis of the organization and effectiveness of other government depart-

This seemingly unwarranted usurpation of functions was neither a matter

In summation, it must be realized that as guerrilla and counterguerrilla war-

ridiculous as a thoughtful consideration of "Why is a house?" when one's

movement, obstacles to recognition of the basic mission exist in all segments

have not yet been aroused by either protagonist in a national struggle. To be

1. Understand the primary missionthe provision of effective government that

such cases. And the occasional instances of dishonesty or inefficiency in the

Effective action to gain popular support usually necessitates many activities

Under your concept of my duties as Secretary of National Defense, my job is

up the land-settlement program of the government. My purpose was to shift