Supreme Court of the Philippines

156 Phil. 525

EN BANC
G.R. NO. L-26127, June 28, 1974
VICTOR BENIN, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS.
MARIANO SEVERO TUASON Y DE LA PAZ, ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS, J. M. TUASON & CO., INC.,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
[G.R. NO. L-26128. JUNE 28, 1974]
JUAN ALCANTARA, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS.
MARIANO SEVERO TUASON Y DE LA PAZ, ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS, J. M. TUASON & CO., INC.,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
[G.R. NO. L-26129. JUNE 28, 1974]
DIEGO PILI, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS.
MARIANO SEVERO TUASON Y DE LA PAZ, ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS, J. M. TUASON & CO., INC.,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
DECISION
ZALDIVAR, J.:
Appeal from the decision, dated January 18, 1965, of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, the Hon. Judge Eulogio Mencias, presiding, in Civil Cases Nos. 3621,
3622, and 3623.[1]
On May 19, 1955 three sets of plaintiffs filed three separate complaints containing
substantially the same allegations.[2]
In Civil Case No. 3621, the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and
possessors of three parcels of agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of the
complaint, located in the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the
municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an aggregate area of
approximately 278,928 square meters; that they inherited said parcels of land from
their ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his father,
Eugenio Benin; that they and their predecessors in interest had possessed these
three parcels of land openly, adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same and
exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvested therefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiffs'
grandfather, had said parcels of land surveyed on March 4, and 6, 1894; that
during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in barrio San Jose
in 1933 Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs registered their claims of ownership over
said parcels of land; that they declared said lands for taxation purposes in 1940
under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or
sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other
places, after having secured the permission of plaintiffs, constructed their houses
thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs.
In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and
possessors of two parcels of agricultural land, described in Paragraph V of the
complaint, located in the Barrio of La Loma (now Barrio San Jose) in the
municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an aggregate area of
approximately 148,118 square meters; that these parcels of land were inherited by
them from their deceased father Bonoso Alcantara, who in turn inherited the
same from his father, Juan Alcantara; that plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and Jose
Alcantara were the children of Bonoso Alcantara; that these two brothers
inherited the land from their father, and they and their predecessors in interest had
been in open, adverse and continuous possession of the same, planting therein
palay and other agricultural products and exclusively enjoying said products; that
on March 28, 1894 plaintiffs' grandfather, Juan Alcantara, had said lands surveyed;
that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San
Jose in 1933 Bonoso Alcantara and the plaintiffs filed and registered their claims
of ownership over said lands; that plaintiffs had said lands declared for taxation
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2390, of Quezon City; that after the
outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter,
evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured permission from
plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses on said lands and plaintiffs
collected monthly rentals from them.
In Civil Case No. 3623, plaintiffs alleged that they are the owners and possessors
of a parcel of agricultural land located in the Barrio of La Loma (now San Jose),
municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an area of approximately
62,481 square meters; that this parcel of land was inherited by plaintiffs from their
ancestor Candido Pili who in turn inherited the same from his parents; that
Candido Pili and his predecessors in interest owned, possessed, occupied and
cultivated the said parcel of land from time immemorial; that upon the death of
Candido Pili his children Luisa Pili, Pascual Pili, Diego Pili and Manuel Pili
succeeded to the ownership and possession and cultivation of said land; that
plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest, as owners and possessors of said land,
had openly, adversely and continuously cultivated the land, planting thereon palay
and other agricultural products and enjoying exclusively the products harvested
therefrom; that during his lifetime, Candido Pili ordered the survey of said land
sometime on March 11, 1894, and when the cadastral survey of said land was
conducted by the Bureau of Lands in 1933 Candido Pili and plaintiffs filed and
registered their claim of ownership over the said parcel of land; that plaintiffs had
the land declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2597, Quezon
City, Philippines; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in
1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after
securing permission from plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses in said
land and plaintiffs collected monthly rentals from their lessees or tenants.
The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged, in their respective
complaint, that sometime in the year 1951 while they were enjoying the peaceful
possession of their lands, the defendants, particularly the defendant J.M. Tuason
and Co. Inc., through their agents and representatives, with the aid of armed men,
by force and intimidation, using bulldozers and other demolishing equipment,
illegally entered and started defacing, demolishing and destroying the dwellings
and construction of plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the improvements consisting of
rice paddies (pilapiles), bamboos and fruit trees, and permanent improvements
such as old roads, old bridges and other permanent landmarks within and outside
the lands in question, disregarding the objections of plaintiffs, and as a result
plaintiffs were deprived of the rentals received from their lessees; that plaintiffs
made inquiries regarding the probable claim of defendants, and in 1953 they
discovered for the first time that their lands, as described in their respective
complaint, had either been fraudulently or erroneously included, by direct or
constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel No. 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate)
in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the province of
Rizal in the names of the original applicants for registration, now defendants,
Mariano Severno Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan
Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto
Huberto Tuason y de la Paz.
The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged that the registered
owners mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had applied for the
registration of two parcels of land (known as the Santa Mesa Estate and the
Diliman Estate), located in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del
Monte, province of Rizal, of which parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) contained an
area of 8,798,617 square meters; that the registration proceedings were docketed
 q g p g
as LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration; that the application for
registration in LRC No. 7681, containing the boundaries, technical descriptions
and areas of parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) and parcel No. 2 (Diliman Estate)
was published in the Official Gazette; that before the decision was handed down
in LRC No. 7681, the area, boundaries and technical descriptions of parcel No. 1
were altered and amended; that the amendments and alterations, which were made
after the publication of the original application, were never published; that on
March 7, 1914 a decision was rendered in LRC No. 7681 based on the amended
plan; that pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 a decree of registration was
issued on July 6, 1914, known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing the registration in
the names of the applicants of the two parcels of land (Santa Mesa Estate and
Diliman Estate); that the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is null
and void because the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to render the
decision for lack of publication; that Decree No. 17431 issued pursuant to the
decision of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is likewise null and void from the
beginning, because it was issued pursuant to a void decision and because the
boundaries, technical descriptions and areas appearing in the decree are different
and not identical with the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas in the
application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that the area of
parcel No. 1 as mentioned in Decree No. 17431 is bigger than the area of parcel
No. 1 appearing in the application for registration as published in the Official
Gazette; that Original Certificate of Title No. 735, referring to parcel 1 (Santa
Mesa Estate), is also null and void from the beginning because it was issued
pursuant to a void decree of registration; that the area, boundaries and technical
description of Parcel No. 1 appearing in Decree of Registration No. 17431 and in
the Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are different from the area, boundaries
and technical description appearing in the application for registration as published
in the Official Gazette; that the plaintiffs had not been notified of the proceedings
in LRC No. 7681 although the applicants knew, or could have known, by the
exercise of necessary diligence, the names and addresses of the plaintiffs and their
predecessors in interest who were then, and up to the time the complaints were
filed, in possession and were cultivating the lands described in paragraph V of
their respective complaint; and that during, before, and even after the issuance of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 the defendants had tacitly recognized the
ownership of the plaintiffs over their respective lands because said defendants had
never disturbed the possession and cultivation of the lands by the plaintiffs until
the year 1951; and that all transfer certificates of title issued subsequently, based
on Original Certificate of Title No. 735, are also null and void.[3]
The plaintiffs in each of the three cases prayed the court: (1) to declare them
owners and entitled to the possession of the parcel, or parcels, of land described in
their respective complaint, as the case may be; (2) to revoke the decision of the
Court of Land Registration, dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681, and to declare
Decree No. 17431, dated July 6, 1914 null and void from the beginning with
respect to Parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735
which include the lands of the plaintiffs; (3) to declare Original Certificate of Title
No. 735, particularly as it refers to Parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) also null and
void; (4) to declare null and void all transfer certificates of titles issued by the
Register of Deeds of Rizal and of Quezon City subsequent to, and based on,
Original Certificate of Title No. 735; (5) to order the defendants, in the event
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is declared valid, to reconvey and transfer title
over the land described in their respective complaint in favor of the plaintiffs in
each case, as the case may be; (6) to order the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the
market value of the lands in question in case of defendants' inability to reconvey
the same; (7) to order the defendants to pay damages to the plaintiffs; (8) to issue
a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendants, their lawyers, their agents
and representatives from disturbing the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs
during the pendency of these cases.
The plaintiffs, in the three cases, were allowed by the trial court to litigate as
paupers.
Only defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually served with summons. The
other defendants were ordered summoned by publication in accordance with
Sections 16 and 17 of the Rules of Court. Only defendant J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. appeared. The other defendants were all declared in default.
On June 23, 1955 defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss in
each of the three cases. This motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court on
July 20, 1955.
On July 18, 1955 the trial court issued an order granting the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for by the plaintiffs in their complaints. The preliminary
injunction, however, was lifted by order of the trial court on October 3, 1955,
upon the posting by defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. of bonds in the total
amount of P14,000.00 pursuant to the order of the court of September 26, 1955.
On August 11, 1955 defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed in the three cases a
motion for reconsideration of the order of July 20, 1955 denying the motion to
dismiss. This motion for reconsideration was denied by order of the court of
September 26, 1955.
On November 29, 1955 defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed an answer in
each of the three cases. In its answer, this defendant, among others, specifically
denied plaintiffs' claim of ownership of the lands involved in each case. The
answer contains special and affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the plaintiffs'
cause of action is barred by prior judgment and res judicata in view of the judgment
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in its Civil Case No. Q-156 which was
subsequently elevated to the Supreme Court as G. R. No. L-4998, in which latter
case the Supreme Court affirmed in toto the order of the lower court dismissing the
case; (2) that the complaints failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action against the defendants; (3) that the plaintiffs' action, assuming that their
complaints state sufficient cause of action, had prescribed either under Act No.
496 or under statutes governing prescription of action; (4) that defendant J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. is a buyer in good faith and for valuable consideration of the
parcels of land involved in the three cases; (5) that the registration proceedings
had in LRC No. 7681 instituted by the defendant's predecessors in interest was in
 y p
accordance with law, and the requirements for a valid registration of title were
complied with. By way of counterclaim the defendant prayed that the plaintiffs be
ordered to pay damages as therein specified.
The plaintiffs, amended their complaints in the three cases, by including additional
parties as plaintiffs, and the amended complaints were admitted by the trial court.
The defendant, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., filed a manifestation that it was
reproducing and realleging its answers to the original complaints as its answers to
the amended complaints in view of the fact that the amendments to the
complaints consist merely in the inclusion of additional indispensable as well as
necessary parties-plaintiffs.[4]
On June 7, 1962, after the plaintiffs had presented their evidence, defendant J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. presented a motion to dismiss the cases upon the grounds that
(1) the actions were barred by the statute of limitations; (2) that the actions were
barred by a prior judgment; and (3) that plaintiffs had not presented any evidence
to prove their claim of ownership. The defendant later filed a motion to withdraw
the third ground of its motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs filed their opposition to
the motion to dismiss, as well as to the motion of defendant to withdraw its third
ground to dismiss. The trial court, in an order dated December 3, 1962, granted
defendant's motion to withdraw the third ground of its motion to dismiss but
denied the motion to dismiss.[5]
After trial, on January 18, 1965, the lower court rendered a decision for the three
cases, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants
as follows:
"A - Declaring that the decision, the decree and the title issued in LRC
No. 7681, are null and void, ab initio, and of no effect whatsoever;
"B - Declaring that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 found on page
136 Vol. A-7 of the Registration Book of Rizal is null and void from the
very beginning (and) of no effect whatsoever;
"C - Declaring that all Transfer Certificates of Title emanating or
allegedly derived from Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the
Province of Rizal are likewise null and void;
"D - Declaring that the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and
3623 are the owners and entitled to the possession of the parcels of land
claimed and described in paragraph V of their respective complaints;
"E - Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them to
vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possession of the parcels of land
described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3621 and
 indicated as Parcel A, Parcel B and Parcel C, in SWO-40187 (Exh. "UU"
and Exh. "VV");
"F - Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them to
vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possession of the parcels of land
described in paragraph V of the complaint, in Civil Case No. 3622 and
indicated as Parcel D and Parcel F in SWO-40187 (Exh. "UU" and Exh.
"VV");
"G - Ordering the Defendants and all persons claiming under them to
vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possession of the parcels of land
described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 and
indicated as Parcel E, in SWO-491187 (Exh. "UU and Exh. "VV");
"H - Ordering the defendants to pay to plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
3621 the sum of P600.00 a month as actual damages for uncollected
rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to them;
"I - Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
3622 the sum of P600.00 a month, as actual damages for uncollected
rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to them;
"J - Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
3623 the sum of P150.00 a month as actual damages for uncollected
rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to them;
"K - Ordering the defendants to pay the costs;
"L - The defendants' counterclaim is hereby declared dismissed for
lack of merit."[6]
A motion for new trial was filed by defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. on January
30, 1965. However, before the motion for new trial was resolved by the court,
said defendant, on February 11, 1965, filed a notice of appeal to this Court and an
appeal bond, and on February 12, 1965 he filed the record on appeal.[7] The
record on appeal, after it had been corrected and amended, as ordered and/or
authorized by the trial court, was approved on September 29, 1965.[8]
Appellant J. M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in this appeal, contends that the trial court
committed the following errors:
I. The lower court erred in holding that the Land Registration Court
in GLRO No. 7681 lacked or was without jurisdiction to issue decree
No. 17431 for the alleged reason that:
(1) The amendment to the original plan was not published;
(2) The description of Parcel 1 in the decree is not identical with
 the description of Parcel 1 as applied for and as published in the
Official Gazette;
(3) Parcel 1 as decreed is bigger in area than Parcel 1 as applied
for;
(4) A. Bonifacio Road is the only boundary on the West of Parcel
1.
II. The trial court erred in finding that the transcription of the decree
No. 17431 was not in accordance with the law and that, therefore, said
OCT 735 was a complete nullity and the land remains unregistered.
III. The trial court erred in taking cognizance of these cases despite its
lack of jurisdiction to hear and decide the same.
IV. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the grounds
of prescription and laches, and in denying the motions to dismiss filed
on said grounds.
V. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the ground of
res judicata and in denying the motion to dismiss filed on said ground.
VI. The trial court erred in declaring null and void all certificates of
title emanating from OCT 735.
VII. The trial court erred in holding that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is
not a purchaser in good faith and for value.
VIII. The trial court erred in awarding ownership of the lands claimed
by, and in awarding damages to, the appellees.
IX. The trial court erred in denying and in dismissing appellant's
counterclaim and in sentencing appellant to pay the costs of these suits.
As stated by the trial court in its decision, "These cases involve the validity of the
decision and the decree issued in LRC No. 7681 resulting in the issuance of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and the ownership and possession of several
parcels of land, claimed by the plaintiffs in their respective complaints ...."
The lower court, summarizing its findings, among others, concluded that: (1) the
decision and the decree in LRC No. 7681 are null and void ab initio, having been
rendered by a court without jurisdiction; (2) Original Certificate of Title No. 735
issued pursuant to the decree in LRC No. 7681 is null and void, having been
issued pursuant to a void decree; (3) Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null
and void because the Decree No. 17431 in LRC No. 7681, assuming the decree to
be valid, had not been inscribed in accordance with the provisions of Section 41
of Act 496; (4) all Transfer Certificates of Title allegedly emanating and derived
from the void Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are likewise null and void; and
 g
(5) the plaintiffs in these three civil cases are the owners and entitled to the
possession of the parcels of land described in their respective complaints.
We have carefully examined and studied the voluminous records, and the
numerous documentary evidence, of these three cases, and We find that the
conclusions of the trial court are not supported by the evidence and the applicable
decisions of this Court.
The Original Certificate of Title No. 735 that had been declared null and void ab
initio by the trial court covers two big parcels of land, mentioned in said title as
Parcel 1, having an area of 8,778,644.10 square meters more or less, known as the
Santa Mesa Estate; and Parcel 2, having an area of 15,961,246 square meters more
or less, known as the Diliman Estate. The three parcels of land involved in Civil
Case No. 3621, having an aggregate area of 278,853 square meters, more or less;
the two parcels of land involved in Civil Case No. 3622 having an aggregate area
of 154,119.7 square meters, more or less; and the one parcel of land involved in
Civil Case No. 3623, having an area of 62,481 square meters, more or less, are all
included in the area of Parcel 1.[9] The trial court, in its decision, states that the
identity of the parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs is not disputed, and that
both the plaintiffs and the defendant admit that the parcels of land litigated are
found within the boundaries of the present Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision (Parcel
1) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735.[10] It is shown in the survey
plans, presented by both the plaintiffs and the defendant, that the six parcels of
lands involved in these three cases are located at the northwestern portion of
Parcel 1. (Exhs. UU, VV; and Exh. 29).
The records show, and it is established by the evidence, that sometime in 1911
Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose
Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto
Tuason y de la Paz, filed with the Court of Land Registration an application for
the registration of their title over two parcels of land, designated in the survey
plans accompanying the application as Parcel 1 with an area of 8,798,617 square
meters, and Parcel 2 with an area of 16,254,037 square meters. The application
was docketed as LRC No. 7681. There was another application covering three
other parcels of land, docketed as LRC No. 7680. The application in LRC No.
7681 was set for hearing on November 20, 1911 (Exh. X). The application and
the notice of hearing, containing the technical descriptions of the two parcels of
land applied for, were published in the issue of the Official Gazette of October
25, 1911 (Exh. YY). On November 20, 1911 the Court of Land Registration
issued an order of general default against the whole world except the Insular
Government, the Director of Lands and the municipalities of Caloocan and San
Juan del Monte (Exh. 28). On December 23, 1911 the court issued an order
authorizing the amendment of the plan in LRC No. 7681 (Exh. 23). On
November 11, 1913 the applicants and the Government entered into an
agreement whereby the Government agreed to withdraw its opposition to the
application for registration of title over the portion known as Hacienda Diliman
(Parcel 2) on condition that the roads existing on said tract of land be allowed to
remain, and it was further agreed "that the issuance of the title to applicants shall
be made subject to all the exceptions established by Section 39 of Act 496 as
amended by Section 1 of Act 2011" (Exh. 21). On December 29, 1913 the Court
of Land Registration rendered a decision (Exh. 24) in both LRC No. 7680 and
LRC No. 7681 which, among others, stated that during the registration
proceedings the plans accompanying the two applications were amended in order
to exclude certain areas that were the subject of opposition, that the order of
general default was confirmed, that the Chief of the Surveyor's Division of the
Court of Land Registration was ordered to submit a report as to whether or not
the new (amended) plans had included lands which were not covered by the
original plans, and whether or not the new plans had excluded the lands that had
already been covered by the decree in LRC No. 3563. The decision further stated
that in the event that the new plans did not include new parcels of land and that
the lands that were the subject of the proceedings in LRC No. 3563 had been
excluded, an additional decision would be made decreeing the adjudication and
registration of the lands that were the subject of the registration proceedings in
favor of the applicants, as follows: To Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, two
sixths (2/6) undivided portion; to Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth
(1/6) undivided portion; to Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6)
undivided portion; to Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6)
undivided portion; and to Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6)
undivided portion.
In compliance with the order contained in the decision of December 29, 1913, the
Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration, on January 24,
1914, submitted a report (Exh. 22) to the court which, among others, stated that
the new plan of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not include any land that had not been
previously included in the original plan.
On March 7, 1914 the Court of Land Registration rendered a supplemental
decision in LRC No. 7681 (Exh. Z, or Exh. 24-A) definitely declaring that, on the
basis of the decision of December 29, 1913 and of the report of the Surveyor of
the Court of Land Registration, the applicants Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz
and others were the owners of the land applied for, as described in the amended
plan, in the proportion mentioned in the decision, and ordering that the land
applied for be registered in the names of the applicants and that a decree of
registration be issued in accordance with the decision and the amended plan. On
March 27, 1914 the Chief of the Survey Division addressed a communication to
the registration court, in connection with LRC No. 7681, suggesting that the
decision of the court of March 7, 1914 be modified such that the decree of
registration be based upon the original plan as published and not upon the
amended plan (Exh. Z-3). The Court of Land Registration did not follow the
recommendation of the Chief of the Survey Division. On July 6, 1914 Decree of
Registration No. 17431 was issued by the Chief of the General Land Registration
Office pursuant to the decision of the Court of Land Registration of March 7,
1914 in LRC No. 7681. The decree contains the technical description of the two
parcels of land in accordance with the plan as amended. It appears in the decree
that Parcel 1 has an area of 8,798,644.10 square meters, more or less, or an
increase of 27.10 square meters over the area of 8,798,617 square meters that was
stated in the application for registration and in the notice of hearing which were
 pp g g
published in the Official Gazette of October 25, 1911; and that Parcel 2 has an
area of 15,961,246 square meters, more or less, or a decrease of 292,791 square
meters from the area of 16,254,037 square meters that was stated in the
application and in the notice of hearing that were published in the Official Gazette
(Exhs. 25 and YY). All in all, there is a decrease of 292,763.90 square meters in
the aggregate area of the two parcels of land sought to be registered.
Subsequently, on July 8, 1914, the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal
issued Original Certificate of Title No. 735 in the names of the applicants,
Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose
Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto
Tuason y de la Paz (Exh. 30).
1. We shall now deal with the first error assigned by the appellant.
The lower court declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void ab
initio because, according to said court, that title was based on Decree of
Registration No. 17431 in LRC No. 7681 that was null and void, said decree
having been issued pursuant to a decision of the Court of Land Registration in
LRC No. 7681 which had no jurisdiction to render said decision.
As We have adverted to, Original Certificate of Title No. 735 covers two big
parcels of land: Parcel 1, known as the Santa Mesa Estate, and Parcel 2, known as
the Diliman Estate. The records show that these two parcels of land had been
subdivided into numerous lots, and most of those lots had been sold to numerous
parties -- Parcel 1 having been converted into a subdivision known as the Santa
Mesa Heights Subdivision, and the lots had been sold to private individuals and
entities, such that in that subdivision now are located the National Orthopedic
Hospital, the station of Pangasinan Transportation Co. (Pantranco), Sto. Domingo
Church, Lourdes Church and others. Necessarily, as a result of the sales of the
lots into which Parcel 1 was subdivided, transfer certificates of title were issued to
the purchasers of the lots, and these transfer certificates of title were based upon
transfer certificates of title that emanated from Original Certificate of Title No.
735. The trial court declared null and void all transfer certificates of title
emanating, or derived, from Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
The decision of the trial court declaring null and void ab initio Original Certificate
of Title No. 735 would invalidate the title over the entire area included in Parcel 1
-- which admittedly includes the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs -- and
also the title over the entire area included in Parcel 2. Let it be noted that Parcel 1
has an area of 8,798,644.10 square meters, more or less, and Parcel 2 has an area
of 15,961,246 square meters, more or less; while the six parcels of land claimed by
the plaintiffs have an aggregate area of only 495,453.7 square meters, more or
less. In other words, the area of the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs is
only a little over two per cent (2%) of the aggregate area of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2.
But the decision of the trial court nullified Original Certificate of Title No. 735,
without any qualification.
The trial court held that the Court of Land Registration had no jurisdiction to
 g j
render the decision in LRC No. 7681 because during the registration proceedings,
after the original application and notice of hearing had been duly published, the
plan of Parcel 1 was amended and no publication regarding the amended plan was
made. The trial court pointed out that the area and the description of Parcel 1 in
Decree of Registration No. 17431 are not identical with the area and description
of Parcel 1 applied for and published in the Official Gazette. The trial court
stressed on the point that publication is one of the essential bases of the
jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide an application for registration and to
order the issuance of a decree of registration, as provided in Act 496 (Land
Registration Act).
We believe that the lower court erred when it held that the Land Registration
Court was without jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681. Under
Section 23 of Act 496, the registration court may allow, or order, an amendment
of the application for registration when it appears to the court that the
amendment is necessary and proper. Under Section 24 of the same act the court
may at any time order an application to be amended by striking out one or more
parcels or by severance of the application. The amendment may be made in the
application or in the survey plan, or in both, since the application and the survey
plan go together. If the amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for
registration of an area or parcel of land not previously included in the original
application, as published, a new publication of the amended application must be
made. The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all persons
concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new publication the
registration court can not acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is
added to the area covered by the original application, and the decision of the
registration court would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly
included land.[11] The reason is because without a new publication, the law is
infringed with respect to the publicity that is required in registration proceedings,
and third parties who have not had the opportunity to present their claim might
be prejudiced in their rights because of failure of notice.[12] But if the amendment
consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the original
application and the original plan as previously published, a new publication is not
necessary.[13] In the latter case, the jurisdiction of the court over the remaining
area is not affected by the failure of a new publication.[14]
In the case at bar We find that the original plan covering Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 that
accompanied the application for registration in LRC No. 7681 was amended in
order to exclude certain areas that were the subject of opposition, or which were
the subject of another registration case; and the Chief of the Survey Division of
the Court of Land Registration was ordered to determine whether the amended
plan included lands or areas not included in the original plan. In compliance with
the order of the registration court said Chief of the Survey Division informed the
court that no new parcels were included in the new (or amended) plan. Thus, in the de-
cision of the Court of Land Registration in LRC Nos. 7680 and 7681, dated
December 29, 1913 (Exh. 24), We read the following:
 "Despues de las notifications y avisos de las dos solicitudes en ambos
expedientes, se enmendaron los planos unidos a los mismos para excluir
ciertas porciones que habian sido objeto de oposicion."
xxx xxx xxx
"POR TANTO, ratificando como por la presente se ratifica la
declaracion de rebeldia general, se ordena:
1. o Que el Jefe de la Division de Agrimensores de este Tribunal
informe a la mayor brevedad si los nuevos planos incluyen o no terreno que
no haya sido comprendido en los planos originales x x x."[15]
On January 24, 1914 the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land
Registration made a report to the court (Exh. 22), from which report We read the
following:
"Cumpliendo lo mandado por el Tribunal en el No. 1 de la parte
dispositiva de su Decision de fecha 29 de Diciembre proximo pasado, el
que suscribe, despues de un detenido estudio de los planos unidos a los
Expedientes arriba citados, tiene el honor de informar:;
"1. o Que los nuevos planos presentados por los solicitantes
corresponden a las parcelas 1.a 2.a, y 3.a, del Expediente No. 7680 y a la
1.a parcela del No. 7681, que son las mismas a que se refiere el plano
Exhibito A del No. 7680.
xxx xxx xxx
"4. Que los nuevos planos presentados de las parcelas 1.a, 2.a y 3.a del Expediente
7680, y de la 1.a del 7681 no incluyen terreno alguno que no haya sido
comprendido en los planos originales.[16]
And so, in the supplemental decision of the Court of Land Registration in LRC
No. 7681, dated March 7, 1914 (Exh. 24-A), the report of the Chief of the Survey
Division was taken into consideration and the court ordered the registration of the
lands applied for by the applicants as described in the amended plan (como esta
descrito en el plano enmendado"). It is thus shown that the amended plan in LRC No.
7681 did not cover parcels, or areas, that were not previously included in the
original plan which accompanied the application that had been published in the
Official Gazette. There was, therefore, no necessity for a new publication of the
amended plan in order to vest the Court of Land Registration with jurisdiction to
hear and decide the application for registration in LRC No. 7681 and to order the
issuance of Decree of Registration No. 17431 upon which Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 was based.
Way back in 1933, this Court had occasion to rule on the validity of the very same
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which the trial court had declared null and
void in the three cases now before this Court. In the case of the Bank of the
Philippine Islands vs. Acua (59 Phil. 183) the validity of Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 was assailed by the appellants (Pascual Acua and others) precisely
upon the ground that during the registration proceedings, which brought about
the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, the original plan of the
applicants was ordered amended, and no new publication was made of the
amended plan and so it was urged that the registration court did not have
jurisdiction to order the issuance of the decree of registration in favor of the
applicants. The action in this case was instituted by the Bank of the Philippine
Islands as receiver of the Tuason Entail for the purpose, among others, of
recovering from Pascual Acua and others certain lands included in the Santa
Mesa and Diliman hacienda located in the barrios of Bagobantay and Diliman, in
the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte, Province of Rizal. Upon
hearing, the Court of First Instance of Rizal declared that none of the defendants
owned any part of the land in controversy. On appeal, this Court observed that
the character in which the plaintiff sued was not open to question, and the
material facts were as follows: The heirs of the Tuason estate, referred to as the
Tuason Entail, held a Torrens title to a tract of land with an area of about 1,600
hectares located in the province of Rizal. This property was then covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3792 issued in lieu of older certificates dating
from July 8, 1914. This Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3792 emanated from
Original Certificate of Title No. 735.[17] The appellants precisely sought to nullify
the title of the heirs of the Tuason estate, which emanated from Original
Certificate of Title No. 735, upon the ground, as now urged by the appellees in the
three cases at bar, that during the registration proceedings the original plan of the
lands known as the Sta. Mesa and Diliman estates was amended, and no
publication was made of the amended plan. Regarding the question of the non-
publication of the amended plan, this Court said:
"Among the arguments made by the appellants of the Bagobantay
group, it is alleged that the Torrens title relied upon by the plaintiff is
void, and in support of this contention it is stated that, during the
course of the registration proceedings, an order was made by the court
for the amendment of the original plan of the applicants and that this
order was not followed by new publication, wherefore, it is supposed,
the court was without jurisdiction to decree the title to the applicants.
In this connection reliance is placed upon the doctrine stated in the
Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial (49 Phil. 122). But the brief
for the appellants fails to call attention to the fact that the rule stated in
the case cited has reference to an amendment of the plan by which
additional land, different from that included in the original survey, is
intended to be brought within the process of registration. In the case
before us, the order referred to was for the exclusion of certain portions
of the land covered by the original survey, and the doctrine of the case
cited cannot apply. Apart from this it does not appear that the portion
intended to be excluded comprehended any part of the land which had
been usurped."[18]
The appellees, however, asserts that the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands
vs. Acua, supra, is not applicable to the three cases now before this Court because
what was involved in said case was Parcel 2 of Original Certificate of Title No.
735, and not Parcel 1 which is the land involved in these three cases. This as-
sertion of the appellees is not correct. The decision in that case states that the
action was instituted by the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as receiver of the
Tuason Entail, for the purpose, among others, of recovering from Pascual Acua
and others "certain lands contained in the Sta. Mesa and Diliman Hacienda
located in the barrios of Bagobantay and Diliman in the municipalities of
Caloocan and San Juan del Monte."[19] But what matters is the doctrine that was
laid down by this Court in that case, that is: that when the original survey plan is
amended, after the publication of the application, in order to include land not
previously included in the original survey, a new publication of the amended plan
is necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the registration court to order the
registration of the land that is added to what was included in the original survey
plan. The ruling of this Court in the Bank of the Philippine Islands case has a
decisive application in the three cases now before this Court.
The trial court laid stress on the point that publication of the amended plan of
Parcel 1 should have been made because it appears in the Decree of Registration
No. 17431, and as reproduced in Original Certificate of Title No. 735, that the
area of said parcel is "bigger" than the area stated in the application as published in
the Official Gazette; and, also, that the boundaries of Parcel 1 stated in the decree
are not identical with the boundaries stated in the application as published in the
Official Gazette. We paid particular attention on this point of the lower court's
decision, and our impression is that the trial court had exploited certain minor
discrepancies between the description of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration and
its description in the original application, in order to bolster its ruling that "to
render a decision on the amended plan, boundary descriptions, and additional
lands comprised within Parcel 1 in Decree No. 17431, a republication of such
amended plan, boundary description, technical description and additional areas is
necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the Court."[20]
Oddly enough, when the lower court said that the area of Parcel 1 in the decree of
registration is bigger than the area of Parcel 1 in the application as published, it did
not mention the fact that the difference in area is only 27.10 square meters. We believe
that this difference of 27.10 square meters is too minimal to be of decisive
consequence in the determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title
No. 735. It was error on the part of the lower court to lay stress on this
circumstance and made it a basis for ruling that because in the amended plan there
is this increase in area as compared to the area appearing in the application as
published, the Land Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to render the
decision decreeing the registration of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681. The Chief of the
Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration, in his report to the court of
January 24, 1914 (Exh. 22), stated that the new plan of Parcel 1 did not include any
land that was not included in the original plan. That report was made precisely in
compliance with the order of the registration court, in the decision of December
29, 1913 in LRC No. 7681, to inform the court "si los nuevos planos incluyen o no
terreno que no haya sido comprendido en los planos originales". That report was submitted
by the Chief Surveyor "despues de un detenido estudio de los planos unidos a los
expedientes". Under the foregoing circumstances, our inference is that the area of
27.10 square meters was already included in the original plan, and that the
computation of the area in the original survey must have been inaccurate; and the
error was corrected in the recomputation of the area when the amended plan was
prepared. We made a careful study and comparison of the technical description of
Parcel 1 appearing in the application as published, and the technical description
appearing in Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exhs. 19, 19-A and Z-6), and We
accept the explanation of counsel for the appellant that this seeming increase of
27.10 square meters had been brought about "by the fact that when the
amendment of the plan was made, the distances and bearings in a few points along
the southwestern boundary (Please see Exh. 19) were brought to the nearest
millimeter and to the nearest second respectively; whereas, the computation of the
survey in the original plan was to the nearest decimeter and to the nearest minute
only".[21] We believe that this very slight increase of 27.10 square meters would
not justify the conclusion of the lower court that "the amended plan . . . included
additional lands which were not originally included in Parcel 1 as published in the
Official Gazette." It being undisputed that Parcel 1 has an area of more than
8,798,600 square meters (or 879.86 hectares), We believe that this difference of
27.10 square meters, between the computation of the area when the original plan
was made and the computation of the area when the amended plan was prepared,
can not be considered substantial as would affect the identity of Parcel 1.
Moreover, no evidence was presented to identify this area of 27.10 square meters,
nor to show its location, in relation to the entire area of Parcel 1. The appellees
did not even attempt to show that this excess area of 27.10 square meters is
included within the parcels that they are claiming. We cannot, therefore, consider
this area of 27.10 square meters as an area that was separate and distinct from, and
was added to, the land that was covered by the original survey plan, such that the
publication of the amended plan would be necessary in order that the registration
court could acquire jurisdiction over that area. As We have pointed out, this
increase of 27.10 square meters was simply the result of the recomputation of the
area when the original plan was amended. There is no showing that the
recomputation is incorrect. Neither is there a showing that this small area of
27.10 square meters belongs to any person and that person had been deprived of
his property, or had failed to claim that particular area because of the non-
publication of the amended plan. On the other hand, there is the report of the
Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration (Exh. 22) stating
that the amended plan of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not include any land
which was not included in the original plan.[22]
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that only in cases where the original survey
plan is amended during the registration proceedings by the addition of lands not
previously included in the original plan should publication be made in order to
confer jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the area that was added
after the publication of the original plan.[23]
The settled rule, further, is that once the registration court had acquired
jurisdiction over a certain parcel, or parcels, of land in the registration proceedings
in virtue of the publication of the application, that jurisdiction attaches to the land
or lands mentioned and described in the application. If it is later shown that the
decree of registration had included land or lands not included in the original appli-
cation as published, then the registration proceedings and the decree of
registration must be declared null and void insofar -- but only insofar -- as the land
not included in the publication is concerned. This is so, because the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the land not included in the publication -- the publication
being the basis of the jurisdiction of the court. But the proceedings and the
decree of registration, relating to the lands that were included in the publication,
are valid. Thus, if it is shown that a certificate of title had been issued covering
lands where the registration court had no jurisdiction, the certificate of title is null
and void insofar as it concerns the land or lands over which registration court had not acquired
jurisdiction.[24]
And so in the three cases now before this Court, even granting that the
registration court had no jurisdiction over the increased area of 27.10 square
meters (as alleged by appellees), the most that the lower court could have done
was to nullify the decree and the certificate of title insofar as that area of 27.10
square meters is concerned, if that area can be identified. But, certainly, the lower
court could not declare, and should not have declared, null and void the whole
proceedings in LRC No. 7681; and, certainly, the lower court erred in declaring
null and void ab initio Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which covers not only
the supposed excess area of 27.10 square meters but also the remaining area of
8,798,617 square meters of Parcel 1 and the entire area of 15,961,246 square
meters of Parcel 2. The trial court, in its decision, declared Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 "null and void from the very beginning and of no effect
whatsoever", without any qualification. This declaration by the lower court, if
sanctioned by this Court and given effect, would nullify the title that covers two
big parcels of land (Parcels 1 and 2) that have a total area of 24,759,890.10 square
meters, or almost 2,476 hectares. And not only that. The trial court declared null
and void all transfer certificates of title that are derived, or that emanated, from
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, regardless of whether those transfer
certificates of title are the results of transactions done in good faith and for value
by the holder of those transfer certificates of title.
It must be noted that the appellees in the present cases claim six parcels that have
an area of some 495,453.7 square meters (about 49.5 hectares), whereas the
combined area of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 is 24,759,890.10 square meters (about
2,476 hectares). It must also be noted that both Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 have been
subdivided into numerous lots (Exhs. 14 and 14-B) which have already been
acquired by numerous persons and/or entities that are now holding certificates of
title which can be traced back to Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The
decision of the lower court, however, would render useless Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 and all transfer certificates of title emanating, or derived, therefrom.
The decision of the lower court would certainly prejudice the rights of the
persons, both natural and juridical, who had acquired portions of Parcel 1 and
Parcel 2, relying on the doctrine of the indefeasibility of Torrens title. The
decision of the lower court would, indeed, prejudice the rights of persons who are
not parties in the present cases. And this is so, because the trial court, in its
decision, did not adhere to the applicable decisions of this Court in resolving the
pertinent issues in these cases.
Another reason mentioned by the lower court to support its ruling that Decree of
Registration No. 17431 is null and void is that the description of Parcel 1 in the
decree of registration is different from the description of the same parcel in the
notice of hearing of the original application for registration as published in the
Official Gazette. The different description that appears in the decree of
registration, according to the lower court, is an amendment to the Original survey
plan that accompanied the application and the amended survey plan should have
been republished; and because there was no such republication the registration
court was without jurisdiction to issue the decree of registration. The lower court
also committed an error in making this ruling. We find that the lower court
incorrectly laid stress on differences in the names of the owners, and on
differences in the designations, of the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 along its
southwestern boundary. We find, however, that these differences are well
explained in the record.
In the notice of hearing in LRC No. 7681 (Exhibits YY and YY-2) the boundaries
of Parcel 1 are stated as follows:
"Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao and others (Maysilo
Estate); E. by the San Juan River; SW. by Parcel 3, properties of Benito
Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios, by Parcel 2, Santa Clara
Monastery, by Parcel 1; and W. by a road, Cementerio del Norte and the
Roman Catholic Church"
As described in Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exh. 25), the boundaries of
Parcel 1 are as follows:
"PARCEL 1. Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao y
Escobar, et al., (Maysilo Estate): On the E. by San Juan River; on the
SW. by properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., Benito
Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios and C. W. Rosenstock & Co.;
and on the W. by a road, Cementerio del Norte and property of the
Roman Catholic Church x x x"
It will thus be noted that the boundaries of Parcel 1 on the northern, eastern, and
western sides, as they appear in the notice of hearing that was published and in
Decree of Registration No. 17431, are the same. It is in the southwestern
boundary where there appear some differences in the names of the owners, or in
the designations, of the adjoining lands. Thus, in the published notice of hearing,
it appears that the names of the owners, or the designations, of the lands that
bound Parcel 1 (of LRC No. 7681) on the Southwest are parcel 3, properties of
Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios, parcel 2, Monasterio de Santa Clara
and parcel 1; while in the decree of registration it appears that the lands that
 p g pp
bound Parcel 1 (of LRC No. 7681) on the Southwest are the properties of
Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan
de Dios and C. W. Rosenstock & Co. Upon a careful examination of the records,
We find that the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 at its southwestern boundary, as
indicated in the notice of hearing that was published in the Official Gazette, are
the same lands that are indicated in the decree of registration as the lands that
adjoin Parcel 1 at its southwestern boundary. There is simply a change in the
names of the owners, or in the designations, of the lands. We find that parcels 3,
2 and 1, appearing as the boundary lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1 in
LRC No. 7681, as published, are in fact parcels of land that are owned, and had
been applied for registration, by Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al. in LRC
No. 7680. This LRC No. 7680 was heard and decided jointly with LRC No. 7681
by the Land Registration Court (Exh. 24). These parcels 3, 2 and 1 of LRC No.
7680, being lands owned by Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., it may as
well be stated in the decree of registration that those lands on the southwestern
side of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 are the properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y
de la Paz, et al., instead of designating them as parcel 3, parcel 2, and parcel 1 (of
LRC 1680). And so, what appears in Decree of Registration No. 17431 as the
properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., at the southwestern side
of Parcel 1 are no other than those very parcels 3, 2 and 1 that appear in the notice
of hearing as the lands that bound Parcel 1 on the southwest.
In the description of Parcel 1 as published, it appears that one of the boundaries
on the southwestern side is Santa Clara Monastery, while in the decree of
registration the words "Santa Clara Monastery" do not appear but, instead, are
replaced by the words "C. W. Rosenstock & Co." It will be remembered that
during the registration proceedings the plan of Parcel 1 was ordered amended, and
the surveyor who prepared the amended plan must have found that what used to
be the property of the Santa Clara Monastery at the time of the original survey was
already the property of C. W. Rosenstock & Co. when the amended plan was
prepared. This can simply mean that there was a change of ownership from Santa
Clara Monastery to C. W. Rosenstock & Co. It must be considered that the
original survey took place from December, 1910 to June, 1911 (Exhibits 18 and
19), while the registration case was decided on March 7, 1914.
Under Section 40 of Act 496, the decree of registration "shall contain a
description of the land as finally determined by the court." Evidently, the Court of
Land Registration acted in consonance with this provision of the law when, in its
decision in LRC 7681, it took into consideration the actual description of Parcel 1
as shown in the amended survey plan, and when it disregarded the
recommendation of the Chief of the Survey Division, dated March 27, 1914, that
the decision of the court of March 7, 1914 "be based upon the original plans, as
published, and not upon the amended plan." It may well be said that Decree of
Registration No. 17431 simply contains the correct area of Parcel 1 and the
correct names of the owners of the lands that bound Parcel 1 in LRC No. 1681 as
of the time when the decision of the land registration court was rendered.
In this connection, the following pronouncement of this Court in the case of
Domingo vs. Ongsiako, 55 Phil. 361, 373-4, is pertinent:
 g g p
"We may further observe that underlying the contention of the plaintiffs
is the idea that errors in the plans nullify the decrees of registration.
This is erroneous. It is the land and not the plan which is registered.
Prior to the enactment of Act No. 1875, practically all plans for land
registration were defective especially in regard to errors of closures and
areas, but so far no such errors have been permitted to affect the
validity of the decrees. If the boundaries of the land registered can be
determined, the technical description in the certificate of title may be
corrected without cancelling the decree. Such corrections have been
made in this case by approved surveys which embrace all of the land
here in question. To nullify and cancel final decrees merely by reason of
faulty technical descriptions would lead to chaos."
We have taken note of the fact that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the
plaintiffs in the three cases now before this Court are on the northwestern portion
of Parcel 1 (parcels labelled A, B, C, D, E and F, in Exh. UU; and Exhs. 17, 29
and 29-B). They are far from the southwestern boundary. The circumstance,
therefore, regarding the dissimilarity in the names of the owners, or the
designations, of the lands that adjoin the southwestern side of Parcel 1 is of no
moment insofar as the lots claimed by appellees are concerned. What matters is
that the lots claimed by the appellees are all included in Parcel 1 of LRC No. 1681
and are located at the northwestern portion of said Parcel 1. Indeed, it was error
on the part of the lower court to make as one of the bases in declaring Decree of
Registration No. 17431 and Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void and
of no effect whatsoever the aforestated dissimilarities in the names of the owners,
or in the designations, of the lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1, because
those dissimilarities are well explained in the records of these cases.
The lower court committed still another error when it made the finding that the
only boundary of Parcel 1 on the western side is "A. Bonifacio road" and then
declared that the lands situated west of the A. Bonifacio road were never the
subject of the registration proceedings in LRC No. 7681. The lower court
declared the lands west of A. Bonifacio road as unregistered lands and awarded
the ownership of those lands to the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622
(appellees in G. R. Nos. L-26127 and L-26128). This finding of the lower court is
contrary to the evidence presented by the parties in these cases. Both the
appellees and the appellant submitted as their evidence the notice of hearing of
the application as published in the Official Gazette (Exhibit X, YY and YY-2; and
Exhibit 26) and the decree of registration No. 17431 (Exhibit Y, and Exh. 25)
wherein are clearly stated that the boundaries of Parcel 1 on the West are: (1) a
road, (2) Cementerio del Norte and (3) Roman Catholic Church (Exhs. Z-6, UU,
and Exhs. 6, 18, 19 and 20). But the lower court considered the A. Bonifacio road
as the only boundary on the West, and ignored the two other boundaries on the
West that are mentioned both in the notice of hearing as published and in the
decree of registration. The sketches and the survey plans, forming part of the
evidence on record, show that the road, labelled as "A. Bonifacio", goes alongside
the western boundary of Parcel 1 (separating Parcel 1 and the Cementerio del
Norte), until it reaches a point where it traverses the northwestern portion of
Parcel 1, such that from the point where it enters the area of Parcel 1 what is left
 p
as the boundaries on the western side area the Cementerio del Norte and the
Roman Catholic Church (Exhibits UU, VV, 17, 19 and 29). Ignoring the existence
of the Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic Church as the other
boundaries of Parcel 1 on the West, the lower court declared that the lands west
of the A. Bonifacio road, which form part of the lands that are claimed by the
plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622, are outside the boundary of Parcel 1
on the west and that those particular areas had remained as unregistered lands and
are not covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This finding of the lower
court is contrary to the very admission of the appellees in these three cases that all
the lands (six parcels in all) that they claim are included in the area of Parcel 1
mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. In paragraph XIV of the
original, as well as in the amended complaint, in each of these three cases, the
plaintiffs alleged that the lands that they claim "had either been fraudulently or
erroneously included in Parcel 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) of the Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the Province of Rizal."[25] In
their appeal brief, the appellees categorically stated that "Both the appellees and
the appellant admit that these parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs in these
three (3) civil cases are located within Parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 735".[26] In the pre-trial order of the lower court
of December 18, 1957, it was stated that the parcels of land litigated in these cases
are portions of the lands covered by OCT No. 735.[27] The lower court itself, at
the earlier part of its decision, stated that "both the plaintiffs and the defendants
admit that the parcels of land litigated in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are
found within the boundaries of the present Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735".[28] The appellees in these two
cases had never asserted that part of the lands that they claim are outside the
boundaries of Parcel 1, nor did they assert that part of the lands that they claim
have remained unregistered and not covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
735. The lower court had made a finding not only contrary to the evidence of the
appellees but even more than what the appellees asked when it said in its decision
that the western boundary of Parcel 1 is only the A. Bonifacio road and that the
lands claimed by the appellees west of this road had never been registered. This
Court certainly can not give its approval to the findings and rulings of the lower
court that are patently erroneous.
2. The lower court also erred when it declared Original Certificate of Title No.
735 null and void upon the ground that the decree of registration was not trans-
cribed in the Registration Book in accordance with the provisions of Section 41 of
Act 496. In its decision, the lower court said:
"During the trial, the Book of Original Certificate of Title was brought
to the Court. The Court had occasion to see and examine the 'ENTRY'
made in the Registration Book. The Court found that the Face of the
Title which, under ordinary circumstances, should be Page 1 is found as
Page 2. The sheet containing the technical description which should be
page 2 is Page 1. The FACE of the Title, which should have been Page
1, contained the last portion of the description of the land described in
 the decree. The sheet containing the bulk of the description of the
lands decreed should have been Page 2. The so-called Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 found on Page 138, Book A-7 of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal is, therefore, null and void because the
provisions of Section 41 of the Land Registration Law have not been
complied with. Said Section requires that the entry in the Registration
Book must be a transcription of the Decree and the paging should
consist of a leaf or leaves in consecutive order x x x"[29]
The pertinent provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 reads, as follows:
"SEC. 41. Immediately after final decision by the court directing the
registration of any property, the clerk shall send a certified copy of such
decision to the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, who shall
prepare the decree in accordance with section forty of Act numbered
four hundred and ninety-six, and he shall forward a certified copy of
said decree to the register of deeds of the province or city in which the
property is situated. The register of deeds shall transcribe the decree in
a book to be called the Registration Book' in which a leaf, or leaves in
consecutive order, shall be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry
made by the register of deeds in this book in each case shall be the
original certificate of title, and shall be signed by him and sealed with
the seal of his office. x x x x"
The pertinent provisions of Section 40 of Act 496 reads, as follows:
"SEC. 40. Every decree of registration shall bear the day of the year,
hour, and minute of its entry, and shall be signed by the clerk. It shall
state whether the owner is married or unmarried, and if married, the
name of the husband or wife. If the owner is under disability, it shall
state the nature of the disability, and if a minor, shall state his age. It
shall contain a description of the land as finally determined by the court,
. . . The decree shall be stated in a convenient form for transcription
upon the certificates of title hereinafter mentioned."
Section 29 of Act 496 provides that as soon as the decree of title has been
registered in the office of the register of deeds, as provided in Section forty-one,
the property included in said decree shall become registered land under the Act.
Section 42 of Act 496 provides that the certificate shall take effect upon the date
of the transcription of the decree.
This Court has held that as defined in Section 41 of Act 496, the certificate of title
is the transcript of the decree of registration made by the register of deeds in the
registry.[30]
The appellant presented as evidence a photostat of Original Certificate of Title
No. 735, as found in the Registration Book in the office of the register of deeds of
Rizal (Exhibit 50).[31] We have examined this document very carefully, and We
find that it is a copy of the original that satisfies all the requirements of a valid
Torrens title as provided for in Sections 40 and 41 of Act 496.
On the face, or on the first page, of this title, there is the certification of the Chief
of the Land Registration Office that the decree of registration was registered in
Manila on July 6, 1914 at 7:41 a.m.; and the certification of the Register of Deeds
of Rizal that the decree was received for transcription in his office on July 8, 1914
at 3:30 P.M. It is also stated on the face of this title that it was entered pursuant to
Decree No. 17431 of the Court of Land Registration, dated at Manila on the 7th
day of March 1914, in Case No. 7681 of said court. The names of the declared
owners, their civil status, their spouses if married, and their respective interest or
share in the lands covered by the title are stated on the face of this title. We have
noted that the technical descriptions of the lands (Parcels 1 and 2) covered by the
title are copied on the sheets constituting the title. We have compared the
technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 as they appear on this photostat of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exhibit 50) with the technical descriptions of
these lands as they appear in the decree of registration (Exhibit Y for the
plaintiffs, and Exhibit 25 for the defendant), and We find that the technical
descriptions appearing on the title are the complete and faithful reproduction, or
transcription, of the technical descriptions appearing in the decree of registration.
We have noted what the lower court found, that the technical descriptions of
Parcels 1 and 2 do not begin on the face, or on the first page, of this title, as a
technical description is ordinarily copied on the certificate of title. What appears
on the face of this title is the last part of the technical description of Parcel 2. The
technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 begin on the second page and end on the
first page. This circumstance, that is, that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1
and 2 do not begin on the face, or on the first page, of the title, is the basis of the
lower court in ruling that the decree of registration was not transcribed in the
registration book in accordance with Section 41 of Act 496, and so Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void. We have noted, however, that in its
decision the lower court made no mention that in the transcription of the decree
in the registration book any of the data that is required in Section 40 of Act 496 to
be included had been omitted. We have also noted - and this fact is undenied -
that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 as they appear in Decree of
Registration No. 17431 are fully and faithfully transcribed on the photostat of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exhibit 50). There is no showing that the
manner of transcribing the decree, as it appears on that photostat, was done for a
fraudulent purpose, or was done in order to mislead. Considering that the decree
of registration is fully transcribed in the Registration Book, and also as copied in
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, the circumstance that the beginning of the
technical descriptions is not found on the face, or on the first page, of Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 is not a ground to nullify the said certificate of title.
We agree with the lower court that the transcription of the technical descriptions
should begin, or should have been started, on the face, or on the first page, of the
title. We hold, however, that the fact that this was not so done in the case of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 should not be taken as a factor in determining
the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This defect in the manner of
transcribing the technical descriptions should be considered as a formal, and not a
 g p
substantial, defect. What matters is that the original certificate of title contains the
full transcription of the decree of registration, and that the required data provided
for in Section 40 of Act 496 are stated in the original certificate of title. The lower
court made a literal construction of the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 and
strictly applied its construction in the determination of the validity of Original
Certificate of Title No. 735. We believe that the provisions of Section 41 of Act
496 should be interpreted liberally, in keeping with Section 123 of said Act which
provides that "This Act shall be construed liberally so far as may be necessary for
the purpose of effecting its general intent." If We adopt a literal construction of
the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496, as was done by the lower court, such that
the defect in the manner or form of transcribing the decree in the registration
book would render null and void the original certificate of title, then it can happen
that the validity or the invalidity of a certificate of title would depend on the
register of deeds, or on the personnel in the office of the register of deeds. The
register of deeds, or an employee in his office, can wittingly or unwittingly render
useless a decree of registration regularly issued pursuant to a decision of a
registration court and thus nullify by the error that he commits in the transcription
of the decree in the Registration Book an original certificate of title that has been
existing for years. This strict interpretation or construction of Section 41 of Act
496 would certainly not promote the purpose of the Land Registration Law (Act
496), which generally are: to ascertain once and for all the absolute title over a
given landed property[32]; to make, so far as it is possible, a certificate of title
issued by the court to the owner of the land absolute proof of such title[33]; to
quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any question of legality of title[34];
and to decree that land title shall be final, irrevocable and indisputable.[35]
We, therefore, hold that the formal defect in the transcription of Decree of
Registration No. 17431 in the Registration Book did not render null and void
Original Certificate of Title No. 735. Consequently, We declare that the two
parcels of land (Parcel 1 which includes the lands claimed by the appellees, and
Parcel 2) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are properly registered
under the Torrens System of registration.
3. The principal issue that has to be resolved in the present appeal is whether or
not the lower court had correctly declared that "Original Certificate of Title No.
735 is null and void from the very beginning and of no effect whatsoever."[36]
In the preceding discussions, We have held that the lower court erred when it
declared null and void Original Certificate of Title No. 735. We have found that
the registration proceedings that brought about the decree of registration upon
which was based the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 were in
accordance with the provisions of Act 496, as amended. We have held that the
Land Registration Court that ordered the issuance of the decree of registration had
jurisdiction to hear and decide the application for registration filed by Mariano
Severo, Teresa Eriberta, Juan Jose, Demetrio Asuncion, and Augusto Huberto, all
surnamed Tuason y de la Paz. The records show that the notice of hearing of the
application, which embodied the technical descriptions of the two parcels of land
(Parcel 1, known as the Sta. Mesa Estate, and Parcel 2, known as the Diliman
Estate), was duly published as required by law. The records show that the hearing
on the application was regularly held, and that the registration court had seen to it
that no land which was not included in the original survey plan and not covered
by the original application was made the subject of the registration proceedings.
We have found that the decree of registration was properly issued by the Land
Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the Land Registration Court, and
that said decree of registration was fully transcribed in the Registration Book in
the office of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal. We have found also
that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the appellees in the three cases now
before Us are all included in Parcel 1 that is covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 735.
In view of Our findings and conclusion that Original Certificate of Title No. 735
was issued in accordance with the provisions of Act 496, and that the six parcels
of land that are claimed by the appellees in the present cases are covered by said
certificate of title, what is left for this Court to decide is whether or not the appel-
lees still have any legal right over the six parcels of land that they claim.
Let it be noted that, as maintained by counsel for the appellees, the action of the
appellees is principally to recover the ownership and possession of the six parcels
of land mentioned and described in their complaints. The appellees would
accomplish their objective through alternative ways: (1) secure the nullification of
the decision of the Land Registration Court in LRC No. 6781, the nullification of
the Decree of Registration No. 17431 and the nullification of Original Certificate
of Title No. 735; (2) if they fail in their efforts to secure the desired nullifications,
with Original Certificate of Title No. 735 being considered valid and effective,
they seek the reconveyance to them by the defendants named in their complaints,
including herein appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., of the six parcels of land that
they claim; and (3) if they cannot secure a reconveyance, they seek to secure
payment to them by the defendants named in their complaints of the actual value
of the six parcels of land that they claim.
It appears to Us that the appellees are not sure of their stand, or have not adopted
a definite stand, in asserting the rights that they claim.
It is the settled rule that a party seeking the reconveyance to him of his land that
he claims had been wrongly registered in the name of another person must
recognize the validity of the certificate of title of the latter. It is also the rule that a
reconveyance may only take place if the land that is claimed to be wrongly
registered is still registered in the name of the person who procured the wrongful
registration. No action for reconveyance can take place as against a third party
who had acquired title over the registered property in good faith and for value.
And if no reconveyance can be made, the value of the property registered may be
demanded only from the person (or persons) who procured the wrongful
registration in his name.[37]
The lower court accepted, and sustained, the assertion of the appellees that the
proceedings in LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration were null and
void and that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void ab initio and of
no effect. The trial court even went to the extent of declaring that some of the
parcels of land claimed by the appellees in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622 (now
G. R. Nos. L-26127 and L-26128 before this Court) were not covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 735. The lower court forthwith declared the appellees the
owners of the parcels of land claimed by them, as described in their complaints.
Strangely enough, the lower court, upon declaring Original Certificate of Title No.
735 null and void, did not make any statement, or observation, regarding the
status or situation of the remaining lands (Parcels 1 and 2) covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 after adjudicating to the appellees the six parcels of
land claimed by them in their complaints.
In the present appeal counsel for the appellees had maintained, and has
endeavored to show, that the lower court was correct in annulling Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 and in adjudicating in favor of the appellees the
ownership and possession of the six parcels of land claimed by them in their
complaints.
But, as hereinbefore held by Us, the lower court erred in declaring Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 void and of no effect. We have held that Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued as a result of the registration proceedings in
LRC No. 7681 which was regular and that said certificate of title is valid and
effective. The proceedings in LRC 7681 being in rem, the decree of registration
issued pursuant to the decision rendered in said registration case bound the lands
covered by the decree and quieted title thereto, and is conclusive upon and against
all persons, including the government and all the branches thereof, whether
mentioned by name in the application, notice or citation, or included in the
general inscription "To whom it may concern", and such decree will not be
opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person
affected thereby, nor by any proceedings in any court for reversing judgment or
decree. Such decree may only be reopened if any person deprived of land or of
any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud would file
in the competent court of first instance a petition for review within one year after
entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value had acquired an
interest on the land, and upon the expiration of said period of one year, the
decree, or the certificate of title issued pursuant to the decree, is incontrovertible
(Sec. 38, Act 496). In the case now before Us, the Decree of Registration No.
17431 in LRC 7681 was entered on July 8, 1914. It is undisputed that no person
had filed any petition for review of the decree of registration in LRC 7681 within
the period of one year from July 8, 1914. That decree of registration, and Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 issued pursuant thereto, therefore, had been
incontrovertible since July 9, 1915.
Moreover, innocent purchasers for value had acquired interest in the lands
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735.[38]
The Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued on July 8, 1914 in the names
of the original applicants for registration, namely, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la
Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio
Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz. Herein
appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is not one of those who were registered as the
original owners mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. When the
original complaints were filed in these three cases in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal the parties named defendants in each of the three cases were Mariano Severo
Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la
Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, Augusto Huberto Tuason y de le
Paz, the heirs of each one of these defendants (without naming them), and J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. Of all the defendants named in the three complaints only
defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared and filed its answer to the
complaints. All the other defendants did not appear, and so they were all declared
in default.[39] It had to happen that way because as of the time when the three
complaints were filed on May 19, 1955 the ownership of Parcel 1 that was
originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had already passed to
defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. In fact this defendant had caused Parcel 1 to
be subdivided and had sold the subdivision lots.
The records show that Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was part of
the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason (Tuason Entail) which became involved
in a litigation in the Court of First Instance of Manila.[40] During the pendency of
the case the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason were administered by the Bank
of the Philippine Islands as the judicial receiver. In the order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, dated May 5, 1938, in Civil Case No. 24803, the Bank of the
Philippine Islands, as receiver, was authorized, directed and ordered to execute,
upon payment to it of the sum of P763,925.75, a deed of transfer and assignment
in favor of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. of the property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 31997, which was originally Parcel 1 included in Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exh. 13-B). On June 13, 1938 the receiver Bank of
the Philippine Islands executed the deed of transfer and assignment (Exh. 13-A).
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34853 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal was
forthwith issued in the name of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. (Exhs. 12-b and 36).
The deed of transfer and assignment was approved by the court in an order dated
June 17, 1938. This conveyance to the Heirs of D. Tuason Inc. took place at a
time when the Supreme Court had already decided the case of Bank of the
Philippine Islands vs. Acua (59 Phil. 183) wherein this Court upheld the validity
of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and also the validity of the transfer
certificate of title emanating therefrom.[41]
The circumstances attending the acquisition by the Heirs of D. Tuason Inc. of the
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997 -- which was formerly
Parcel 1 covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 - clearly indicate that said
corporation acquired its title in a regular transaction as purchaser in good faith and
for value. On June 15, 1938 the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. in turn sold the same
property to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35073
was issued in the name of the latter (Exhs. 12-c and 37).
The lower court declared that herein appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was a
purchaser in bad faith. We do not find any evidence in the record that would
sustain such a finding of the lower court. One reason given by the lower court in
declaring appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a purchaser in bad faith is the fact
that the incorporators of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. and the incorporators of J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc. were practically the same persons belonging to the same
Tuason family. We do not see anything wrong if some incorporators of the Heirs
of D. Tuason Inc. are also incorporators of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. During
these days when businesses are promoted, operated, and managed, through
corporate entities, it is not surprising to see two or more corporations organized
by the same persons or group of persons, with different purposes, for different
lines of business and with distinct or separate assets and interests. Besides, as has
been shown, the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. acquired the land (Parcel 1 in Original
Certificate of Title No. 735) from the Bank of the Philippine Islands, the receiver
of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason, in a sale that was authorized, and
subsequently approved, by the court. The Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. paid the sum
of P763,950.80 for the property. Certainly if the Heirs of D. Tuason Inc. had
acquired the land originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 in a
transaction that was authorized by the court, for a valuable consideration, thereby
acquiring a good title over the property as a purchaser in good faith and for value,
the title that it transferred to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. when it sold same property
to the latter was also a good title, and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was also a
purchaser in good faith and for value -- even if it appears that the incorporators of
the two corporations belong to the same Tuason family. The records of these
cases are bereft of any evidence which would indicate that the sale of Parcel 1 in
question by the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. to J. M. Tuason, & Co., Inc. was
fraudulent.
Another reason given by the lower court in declaring appellant J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. a buyer in bad faith is that when said appellant bought Parcel 1 originally
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 it was aware of the fact that the
appellees or their predecessors in interest were in possession of, and were
cultivating, the six parcels of land that they now claim in these cases. The
conclusion of the lower court is too strained. It should be remembered that the
registered property bought by J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had an area of some 879
hectares. It could happen that certain relatives or ancestors of appellees had been
squatting on some portions of the land and claimed certain areas as their own, to
the extent of having the areas claimed by them declared for taxation purposes in
their names. Thus the appellees presented in evidence tax declarations that appear
to have taken effect as of 1941. We have noted, however, that at the back of
those tax declarations are written the words "This parcel is a duplicate of the land
under Tax No. 764-J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc." (Exhs. E-Alcantara, F-Alcantara,
FF-1-Benin, GG-Benin, HH-Benin, BBB-Pili, and BBB-1-Pili).[42] These
annotations simply reveal that when the predecessors of the appellees had those
tax declarations made to cover the lands that they claim, those lands were already
included in the tax declaration of appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Appellant J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had been exercising, and asserting, its proprietary rights
over the lands in questions after it bought the same from the Heirs of D. Tuason,
Inc.[43] This is borne by the statement in the order, dated September 26, 1955,
issued by Judge Juan P. Enriquez who at the time was presiding the branch of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal where these three cases were pending, as follows:
"3. It having been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co. had title covering the
land in question which they are subdividing into small lots for sale and
in view of the observation under paragraph 2 hereof the Court finds
that there is no justifiable reason to maintain the writ of preliminary
injunction that has been issued. This is particularly true in Civil Case
No. 2622, defendants having secured affinal judgment against plaintiffs
Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara for ejectment before the Municipal
court of Quezon City; and such injunction would annul the order of the
execution issued by the Quezon City courts. It should be noted that the
herein plaintiffs at the beginning pleaded to the Court that the area on
which their respective houses stand be not touched and their possession
thereof be respected by defendant J. M. Tuason & Co. In other words,
each plaintiff is merely asking for about 250 square meters each which
represents the land on which the house stands and their immediate yard,
and not the whole land covered by these three cases or 68 hectares. On
the other hand, the Court requires J. M. Tuason & Co. to put up a bond
of P2,000 in favor of each of the defendant (sic) to answer for whatever
damages he may suffer by reason of the continuance during the action
of the acts complained of."[44]
Besides, the possession by the appellees, either by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest, if there was such possession at all, would be unavailing
against the holder of a Torrens certificate of title covering the parcels of lands
now in question. From July 8, 1914 when Original Certificate of Title No. 735
was issued, no possession by any person of any portion of the lands covered by
said original certificate of title, or covered by a subsequent transfer certificate of
title derived from said original certificate of title, could defeat the title of the
registered owner of the lands covered by the certificate of title. In this
connection, let it be noted that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. became the
registered owner of Parcel 1, which was originally covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. 735, only on June 15, 1938, or almost 24 years after Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued.
It can well be said that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had relied on the title of the Heirs
of D. Tuason, Inc. when it bought the land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 34853, and the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. likewise had relied on the title
of the Mayorasgo Tuason (Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al.) when it
bought the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997 from the
judicial receiver, duly authorized and approved by the court. We, therefore, can
not agree with the lower court when it declared appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
a purchaser in bad faith.
The evidence shows that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had converted the
land originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, including the six
parcels claimed by appellees into a subdivision, and numerous persons and entities
had purchased the subdivision lots, and the purchasers in turn were issued transfer
certificates of title covering the lots that they bought, based on the transfer
certificate of title in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. The buyers of the lots
necessarily relied upon the certificate of title in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. and because they paid for the lots they certainly are purchasers in good faith
and for value. The purchasers of these lots have built thereon residential houses,
office buildings, shops, hospital, even churches. But the lower court, disregarding
these circumstances, declared null and void all transfer certificates of title that
emanated, or that were derived, from Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This is
a grave error committed by the lower court. And the error is compounded when
the lower court ordered appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and all those claiming
under said appellant, to vacate and restore to the appellees the possession of the
parcels of lands that are claimed by them in the present cases. The possessors of
the lots comprised within the six parcels of land in question, and who hold
certificates of title covering the lots that they bought, are not parties in the present
cases, and yet the decision of the lower court would annul their titles and compel
them to give up the possession of their properties. To give effect to the decision
of the lower court is to deprive persons of their property without due process of
law.[45] The decision of the lower court would set at naught the settled doctrine
that the holder of a certificate of title who acquired the property covered by the
title in good faith and for value can rest assured that his title is perfect and
incontrovertible.[46]
In view of the foregoing discussions, it is obvious that the action of the appellees
in the three cases now before this Court must fail.
It has been shown that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had acquired a valid
title over the land which includes the six parcels that are claimed by the appellees.
The fact, that the predecessors in interest of the appellees -- or any person, for
that matter -- had not filed a petition for the review of the decree of registration in
LRC No. 7681 within a period of one year from July 8, 1914 when the decree of
registration was issued, is a circumstance that had forever foreclosed any
proceeding for the review of said decree. As We have adverted to, that decree of
registration had become incontrovertible. An action, similar to one brought by
the appellees in each of the present cases, which attack collaterally the said decree
of registration cannot be entertained.[47] Neither may the action of the appellees
for reconveyance of the lands in question be entertained because such action had
already prescribed, and barred by laches, considering that Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 had been issued way back in 1914 and the complaint in the present
cases were filed only on May 19, 1955, or after a lapse of some 41 years.
Moreover, as of the time when these complaints were filed the six parcels of land
claimed by the appellees are no longer covered by the certificate of title in the
names of the persons who procured the original registration of those lands. The
title to Parcel 1, which includes the six parcels of land claimed by the appellees,
had passed to the hands of parties who were innocent purchasers for value. This
Parcel 1 which was one of the two parcels originally covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 735, was subsequently covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 31997. As has been shown, this Parcel 1 was part of the properties of
the Mayorasgo Tuason and it was conveyed by order of the court in Civil Case
No. 24803 of the Court of First Instance of Manila to the Heirs of D. Tuason,
Inc., and the latter in turn conveyed the same to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 34853 in the name of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc, was
cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35073 was issued in the name of J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc. It has also been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had
converted Parcel 1 to a subdivision. Numerous persons and entities bought those
subdivision lots, and to those buyers were issued transfer certificates of title
covering the lots that they acquired. It is very clear, therefore, that an action for
reconveyance cannot prosper against appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., much less
against the registered owners of the lots that form parts of the six parcels of land
that are claimed by the appellees.[48]
Neither may the appellees have a cause of action for damages against appellant
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., considering that said appellant is not one of the original
registered owners that procured the registration of the land. There is no evidence
that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had anything to do with the registration proceedings
which brought about the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 -- even
supposing that the registration was procured fraudulently.
4. Numerous cases have been decided by this Court, dealing on questions
regarding the validity and effectiveness of Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
The rulings of this Court in those cases are necessarily relevant to, and of decisive
bearing in, the resolution of the issues involved in the three cases now at bar.
(a) We have earlier cited the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs.
Acua (59 Phil., 183), where the jurisdiction of the Court of Land
Registration that issued the decree which was the basis of Original Certificate
of Title No. 735 was questioned, and this Court upheld the jurisdiction of the
registration court and categorically pronounced the validity of Original
Certificate of Title No. 735.
(b) There is the case of Jose Alcantara, et al., versus Mariano Tuason y de la
Paz, et al. (G. R. No. L-4998, Mar. 13, 1953, 92 Phil. 796), where this Court
declared that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is incontrovertible and is
conclusive against all persons claiming, either by themselves or by their
predecessors in interest, rights over the lands covered by said certificate of
title.
We find that the Alcantara case is intimately related to the three cases at bar, and
the rulings of this Court in that former case are of decisive application to these
three cases.
On August 29, 1950 a complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Quezon City Branch) by Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, Pascual Pili, Alejandro de
Dios, Tomas Bagagonio, Quintina Sandoval, and Tomasa Lazaro against Mariano
Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Mariano Tuason, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and
Gregorio Araneta, Inc. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-156. It will
be noted that three of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156, namely, Jose
Alcantara, Elias Benin, and Pascual Pili, are among the original plaintiffs in the
three cases now before this Court; Elias Benin, in Civil Case No. 3621; Jose
Alcantara, in Civil Case No. 3622; and Pascual Pili, in Civil Case No. 3623. Jose
Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in that Civil Case No. Q-156
claimed that they were the lawful owners of six (of the ten) parcels of land
described in paragraph 2 of their complaint - Jose Alcantara claiming two parcels,
Elias Benin claiming three parcels, and Pascual Pili claiming one parcel.
Substantially, it is alleged in the complaint[49] that each plaintiff, by himself and by
his predecessors in interest, as lawful owner, had been in the actual, open and
continuous possession of his own respective parcel, or parcels, of land from time
immemorial until January 1950 when the defendants by force and by the use of
armed men started to convert their lands into a subdivision; that on July 8, 1914
the defendants had obtained Original Certificate of Title No. 735 over a parcel of
land which included the lands possessed by them (plaintiffs) and which they and
their ancestors had been enjoying as owners, for more than thirty years before the
issuance of the title; that the silence and inaction of the defendants since the date
of their original certificate of title showed that said certificate of title did not
express the status of their claim to the said parcels, that plaintiffs were not given
formal notice by the defendants of the registration of the lands, such that
defendants' certificate of title No. 735 was not in accordance with law, and that
defendants did not have proper title for registration to the parcels of land owned
by the plaintiffs, as described in the complaint; and that because the certificate of
title issued by the register of deeds was still in the names of the defendants,
successors in interest of the Tuasons y de la Paz, and has not passed to innocent
parties for valuable consideration, the conveyance of the same to the plaintiffs was
in order. The plaintiffs prayed that therein defendants be ordered to execute
deeds of conveyance of the parcels of land described in their complaint in favor of
the plaintiffs, that the defendants' certificate of title be cancelled and the
corresponding certificate be ordered issued in the names of the plaintiffs. We
quote from the decision:
"The material allegations of the complaint are: that plaintiffs are owners
of the parcels of land set forth in their complaint, which parcels are sit-
uated along Bonifacio street, barrio of San Jose, Quezon City, and that
they have been in actual, open, and continuous possession and
enjoyment thereof without molestation from defendants from time im-
memorial to the present; that on July 8, 1914, defendants obtained a
certificate of title (No. 735) over a parcel of land, which included the
lands possessed by plaintiffs, and which they and their ancestors had
been enjoying as owners more than 30 years before the issuance of said
title; that on June 23, 1950, defendants caused the removal of two
houses of plaintiffs on the land; and that defendants did not file any
action against plaintiffs before the inclusion of the lands in their title, in
violation of the 'due process of law' clause of the Constitution. There
are other allegations which really are arguments or legal discussion,
thus: that defendants could not acquire title by the registration
 proceedings against the lawful holder, especially without formal notice,
because registration is to confirm title, not to acquire it; that the silence
of the defendants since the issuance of their title shows that this does
not express the lawful status of their claim; etc. The defendants moved
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action
and that, if it does, the same is barred by the statute of limitations. The
court sustained this motion on the second ground. Subsequently,
plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with the same substantial
allegations, but with new ones, i.e., that it was in January, 1950, that they
learned that their lands were included in the registration proceedings
which culminated in the issuance of defendants' title; that defendants
never claimed ownership to the lands, but directly or indirectly allowed
plaintiffs to continue exercising their rights of ownership over the
same. This amended complaint was denied admission, and the motion
for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal was also denied.
Hence the appeal."
In affirming the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint, this Court
held:
"Without considering whether the trial court's refusal to admit the
amended complaint is erroneous or not, we are constrained to hold that
the dismissal of the action, even with the amended complaint as a basis
thereof, is correct. From the allegations of both the original and
amended complaints, it appears that the defendants are holders of a
certificate of title issued on July 8, 1914 as a consequence of registration
proceedings. There is no allegation in both original and amended
complaints that the plaintiffs were not notified, or were not aware, of
the registration proceedings. It is presumed, therefore, that as
occupants proper notices thereof were served on them and that they
were aware of said proceedings. If this is so, then the plaintiffs, who
were, or whose predecessors in interest were, on the land during the
registration proceedings, were bound by said proceedings. The latter
are in rem and bind the whole world, whether served with notice
personally or not. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49). And the
decree of registration, in pursuance of which defendants' title was
issued, binds the land and quiets title thereto, and is conclusive against
the plaintiffs. (Section 38, Land Registration Act). The supposed right
of plaintiffs by reason of their alleged continued possession for thirty
years was, therefore, destroyed fully and completely by the registration
proceedings, and their supposed ignorance of the inclusion of the lands
can not exclude them from the effects of the registration proceedings,
and the supposed conduct of defendants in allowing plaintiffs to
continue on the land after registration can not serve as basis of any title
or right thereto, because acts of a possessory character by tolerance of
an owner does not constitute possession (Article 1942, Spanish Civil
Code), and because no title to registered land in derogation to that of
the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession (Section 46, Land Registration Act)."
 p ( g )
Thus, in the Alcantara case, as in the Bank of the Philippine Island vs. Acua case,
supra, this Court upheld the validity of the registration proceedings which
culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This Court
declared that "the decree of registration, in pursuance of which defendants' title
was issued, binds the land and quiets title thereto and is conclusive against the
plaintiffs." In other words, in virtue of that decision, the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. Q-156, among them Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, and their
successors-in-interest, could no longer question the validity of Original Certificate
of Title No. 735, nor claim any right of ownership over any portion of the land
that is covered by said certificate of title.
But Elias Benin, Jose Alcantara, and Pascual Pili again came to court to claim
ownership over portions of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
735. On May 19, 1955 Elias Benin, joined by his brother Victor Benin and his
sister Marta Benin, filed Civil Case No. 3621; Jose Alcantara joined by his brother
Juan Alcantara, filed Civil Case No. 3622; and Pascual Pili, joined by his sister
Luisa Pili, filed Civil Case No. 3623. These are the three cases which originated in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) which are now before
this Court on appeal.
In the earlier part of this decision, We have pointed out that the complaints in
these three cases had been amended so as to include as parties plaintiffs all the
heirs of the persons who were alleged to be the owners of the parcels of land
claimed by the plaintiffs in each case. Thus, the complaint in Civil Case No. 3621
was amended to include all the heirs of Sixto Benin, the alleged owner of the three
parcels of land described in the complaint and the common predecessor in interest
of all the plaintiffs in the case. The complaint in Civil Case No. 3622 was
amended to include all the heirs of Bonoso Alcantara, the alleged owner of the
two parcels of land described in the complaint and the common predecessor in
interest of all the plaintiffs in the case. The complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 was
amended to include all the heirs of Candido Pili, the alleged owner of the one
parcel of land described in the complaint and the common predecessor in interest
of all the plaintiffs in the case.
In those three cases, in the court below, herein appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
(defendant therein) filed a motion to dismiss upon the principal ground "that the
cause of action (assuming there is one) is barred by prior judgment, or by the
statute of limitation". In its motion to dismiss J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
contended that the decision of the Supreme Court in the Alcantara case is a bar to
the action of the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal. The lower court, however, denied the motion to dis-
miss. In its answer to the complaint in each of these three cases, J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. set up as affirmative defenses the very grounds of its motion to dismiss.
After the plaintiffs had closed their direct evidence, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed
another motion to dismiss upon the ground that the action was barred by the
statute of limitations and by a prior judgment, and that the plaintiffs had not
presented evidence to prove their claim of ownership. This second motion to
dismiss was also denied by the lower court.[50]
In its decision, which is now on appeal before this Court, the lower court held that
the decision in the Alcantara case was not a bar to the action in these three cases,
ruling that there is no identity, of the parties, of the subject matter, and of the
cause of action, between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases
Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623, on the other.
It is now contended by appellant J. M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in the present appeal,
that "the trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the ground of res
judicata and in denying the motion to dismiss filed on said ground."[51]
Does the judgment in the aforementioned Alcantara case operate as a bar to the
action of the appellees in the three cases at bar?
In order that the rule of res judicata may apply, the following requisites must be
present: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by
a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and the second
actions, identity of parties, of subject-matter, and of cause of action (San Diego vs.
Cardona, 70 Phil. 281-283).
We find that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G. R. No. L-4998) is a final
judgment on the merits that was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and over the parties. The only requisite for res judicata which we
have to determine is whether between Civil Case Q-156 (G. R. No. 4998), on the
one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 (G. R. Nos. L-26127, 26128
and 26129), on the other, there is identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause
of action.
In our examination of the records and the evidence, We find that there is identity
of subject matter. In the lower court's pre-trial order, dated December 18, 1957,
which was based on the agreement of the parties, it is stated
"That the parcels of land in litigation in Case No. Q-156 are
substantially identical to the same parcels of land litigated in these cases
Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623."[52]
We also find that there is identity of cause of action. It is apparent, upon reading
the original complaint (Exhibit 1) in Civil Case Q-156 and the decision in the
Alcantara case (G. R. No. L-4998), that the cause of action in Civil Case Q-156
was based on the alleged fact that the defendants had dispossessed and deprived
the plaintiffs therein of the parcels of land described in the complaint, which were
claimed by the plaintiffs as their own and of which they had been in actual, open
and continuous possession from time immemorial, and that said lands were
wrongly included in Certificate of Title No. 735 that was obtained by the
defendants. In the three cases at bar, plaintiffs (now appellees) also complain of
having been dispossessed and deprived by the defendants of the parcels of land of
which they were absolute owners and possessors, by themselves and through their
predecessors in interest, since time immemorial and that their said lands were
wrongly included in Parcel 1 of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 that was
obtained by the defendants. In Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and in the
three cases now at bar, on the other, the plaintiffs therein seek the nullification of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and the reconveyance to them of the parcels
of land that they claim as theirs.[53] It appears clear to Us that in Civil Case No. Q-
156 and in the three cases at bar, the object or purpose of the plaintiffs is to
recover the ownership and possession of the same parcels of land.
As far as the parties are concerned, We find that there is no exact identity of
parties between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos.
3621, 3622 and 3623, on the other. It appears that of the plaintiffs in Civil Cases
Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, only Elias Benin, Jose Alcantara and Pascual Pili were
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156. In Civil Case No. Q-156, the defendants were
Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Mariano Tuason, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
and Gregorio Araneta, Inc.; while in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 the
defendants were Mariano Severo, Teresa Eriberta, Juan Jose, Demetrio Asuncion,
Augusto Huberto, all surnamed Tuason y de la Paz (the persons appearing as
registered owners in Original Certificate of Title No. 735), their heirs, and J. M.
Tuason and Co., Inc. We find that the natural persons surnamed Tuason, and the
heirs, refer to the persons who belong to the Tuason family that secured the
registration of Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The defendant
Gregorio Araneta Inc. in Civil Case No. Q-156 is the administrator of the Tuason
properties. So, the parties defendants in all these cases are practically the same.
We find, however, that in Civil Case No. Q-156 as well as in Civil Cases Nos.
3621, 3622 and 3623, it was the defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. that actually
controverted the claims of the plaintiffs.
After a careful study, We are of the considered view that the judgment in the
Alcantara case is a bar to the action of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Elias
Benin in Civil Case No. 3621 (G. R. No. 26127), of plaintiff Jose Alcantara in Civil
Case No. 3622 (G. R. No. 26128), and of plaintiff Pascual Pili in Civil Case No.
3623 (G. R. No. 26129) under the doctrine of res adjudicata. We are likewise of the
considered view that the decision in the Alcantara case would serve to rule out the
action of the other plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 under the
doctrine of stare decisis.
In Civil Case No. 3621 the original plaintiffs were Victor Benin, Marta Benin, and
Elias Benin - two brothers and a sister. In the amended complaint it was alleged
that these three original plaintiffs had another brother, and another sister, namely
Esteban Benin and Felipa Benin. But because all the five Benin brothers and
sisters died, they were all substituted by their heirs, such that as of the time when
Civil Case No. 3621 was decided the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Victor Benin;
(2) the heirs of Marta Benin; (3) the heirs of Elias Benin; (4) the heirs of Esteban
Benin, and (5) the heirs of Felipa Binin.
In Civil Case No. 3622 the original plaintiffs were Juan Alcantara and Jose
Alcantara, Juan Alcantara died, and he was substituted by his heirs, such that as of
the time Civil Case No. 3622 was decided the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Juan
Alcantara, and (2) Jose Alcantara.
In Civil Case No. 3623 the original plaintiffs were Pascual Pili and Luisa Pili. In
the amended complaint, it was alleged that Luisa Pili and Pascual Pili had two
brothers who were already dead, namely, Diego Pili and Manuel Pili, so they were
substituted by their heirs. Luisa Pili died, and she was substituted by her heirs,
such that as of the time Case No. 3623 was decided, the plaintiffs were: (1) the
heirs of Diego Pili; (2) the heirs of Manuel Pili; (3) the heirs of Luisa Pili, and (4)
Pascual Pili.
It would thus appear that of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 Elias Benin is the
only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156; of the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 3622 Jose E. Alcantara, who is still living, is the only one who was a
plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156; of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 Pascual
Pili, who is still living, is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156.
It being Our finding that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G. R. No. L-4998
- the Alcantara case) is a final judgment on the merits that was rendered by a court
that had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties, and that there is
identity of subject matter and cause of action between Civil Case No. Q-156, on
the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623, on the other; and it
appearing that Elias Benin is a party-plaintiff both in Civil Case Q-156 and Civil
Case No. 3621; that Jose Alcantara is a party-plaintiff in both Civil Case No. Q-
156 and Civil Case No. 3622; that Pascual Pili is a party-plaintiff in both Civil Case
No. Q-156 and Civil Case No. 3623; and that the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-
156 and in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are practically the same persons
and/or entities, We hold that the doctrine of bar by a previous judgment or res
adjudicata squarely applies to Elias Benin, or to his heirs and successors in interest
in Civil Case No. 3621; to Jose Alcantara and his heirs or successors in interest in
Civil Case No. 3622; and to Pascual Pili and his heirs or successors in interest in
Civil Case No. 3623.[54]
We now consider the case of the other plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622
and 3623.
It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffs base their claim of
ownership of the three parcels of land described in the complaint on their being
heirs of successors in interest of Sixto Benin who died in 1936. In Civil Case No.
3622 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership over the two parcels of land
described in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest of
Bonoso Alcantara who died in 1934. In Civil Case No. 3623 the plaintiffs base
their claim of ownership of the one parcel of land described in their complaint on
their being the heirs and successors in interest of Candido Pili who died in 1931.
When Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, alleged in their complaint in
Civil Case No.Q-156 (which was filed in 1950) that they were the owners of the
parcels of land specified in their complaint, having inherited the same from their
ancestors and had been in possession of the same from time immemorial, each
was claiming a right as an heir of Bonoso Alcantara, Sixto Benin, and Candido Pili,
respectively. Similarly, in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, the source of the
rights claimed by the plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili and all
the other plaintiffs were their respective ancestor, or predecessor in interest,
namely Bonoso Alcantara, Sixto Benin and Candido Pili, as the case may be.
Inasmuch as Sixto Benin died in 1936, Bonoso Alcantara died in 1934, and
Candido Pili died in 1931, it is obvious that during all the time when the
registration proceedings in LRC No. 7681 were taking place before the Court of
Land Registration, which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 on July 8, 1914, Sixto Benin, Bonoso Alcantara and Candido Pili were living.
The records show that no one of these three persons, or their representative, had
filed any opposition to the application for registration in said LRC 7681, nor did
any one of them, or their representative, file any petition for review of the decree
of registration No. 17431 that was issued in said LRC No. 7681.
It is Our view, therefore, that the decision of this Court, in G. R. No. L-4998,
which affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing the
complaint of Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili (along with four other
plaintiffs) in Civil Case No. Q-156 should apply not only against the heirs, of Elias
Benin, against Jose Alcantara, and against Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in Civil Cases
Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, respectively, but also against all the other plaintiffs in
those cases. We find that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 do not claim a right
which is different from that claimed by Elias Benin in Civil Case No. Q-156.
Likewise, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622 do not claim a right different from
that claimed by Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No. Q-156. And, also, the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 3623 do not claim a right different from that claimed by Pascual
Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156. They all claim the same right, based on the alleged
ownership of their respective common predecessor in interest -- in Civil Case No.
3621 the common predecessor in interest being Sixto Benin; in Case No. 3622 the
common predecessor in interest being Bonoso Alcantara; and in Civil Case No.
3623 the common predecessor in interest being Candido Pili. In Civil Case No.
Q-156 Elias Benin based his claim of ownership upon the ownership of his
predecessor in interest who necessarily must be Sixto Benin; Jose Alcantara, upon
the ownership of his predecessor in interest who necessarily must be Bonoso
Alcantara; and Pascual Pili, upon the ownership of his predecessor in interest who
necessarily must be Candido Pili. It follows, therefore, that the decision of this
Court in G. R. No. L-4998 (Civil Case No. Q-156), which held untenable the
cause of action of the successors in interest, of Sixto Benin, of Bonoso Alcantara
and of Candido Pili, to recover the ownership and possession of any land covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, would also foreclose a similar cause of
action of all other persons who claim to be successors in interest of Sixto Benin,
of Bonoso Alcantara and of Candido Pili over any land covered by said certificate
of title. As We have Adverted to, Sixto Benin died in 1936, Bonoso Alcantara
died in 1934, and Candido Pili died in 1931. These three predecessors in interest
of the appellees died long after the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No.
735, which took place on July 8, 1914.
And so, even if there are plaintiffs (now appellees) in these three cases who are
not privies to plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, and Pascual Pili in Civil Case
No. Q-156 (G. R. No. L-4998 - the Alcantara case) and were not parties in that
case, still the ruling of this Court in that former case, to the effect that therein
plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest were bound by the proceedings in the
registration court which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title
No. 735, holds and applies to those plaintiffs in these three cases, because the
claim of ownership of these plaintiffs is based on the same predecessors in interest
of plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili in said Civil Case No. Q-
156.[55] It may well be said that the interests of the appellees in G.R. No. L-26127
(Civil Case No. 3621) who claim rights as heirs or successors in interest of Sixto
Benin were represented by Elias Benin in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G. R. No. L-
4998); the appellees in G.R. No. 26128 (Civil Case No. 3622) who claim rights as
heirs or successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara were represented by Jose
Alcantara in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998); the appellees in G. R. No.
26129 (Civil Case No. 3623) who claim rights as heirs or successors in interest of
Candido Pili were represented by Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No.
L-4998).
(c) In the case of Albina Santiago, et al. vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. (G. R. No. L-
14223, November 23, 1960)[56], where Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was
also in question, this Court ruled on issues akin to the issues involved in the three
cases now at bar. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs filed a complaint in the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-2918,
against J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. alleging, substantially, that their ancestor,
Inocencio Santiago, was the owner of a parcel of land, evidenced by a document
(attached to their complaint as Annex A) issued by the Spanish government on
May 12, 1848[57]; that Inocencio Santiago had since then been in possession of the
aforesaid land as owner, publicly, continuously and adversely until his death, when
his two children, Isaias and Albina, succeeded and continued to own and possess
said land pro indiviso in the same character as that of their predecessor; that upon
the death of Isaias Santiago his one-half share of the land was inherited by his
eleven children who, together with their aunt Albina, continued to own and
possess the land in the same character as that of their predecessors; that Albina
and her co-plaintiffs came to know that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had previously
filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City Civil Case No. Q-27 for
"quieting of title and recovery of possession" against five of the children of Isaias
Santiago involving the parcel of land of which they were co-owners; that J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. had claimed that parcel to be part of the land covered by its
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119; that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-27, in
which they (Albina Santiago, et al.) were never impleaded as parties, had already
become final[58]; that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had executed the judgment against
them, excluding and ousting them from the enjoyment and possession of the
land. Albina and her co-plaintiffs also alleged that Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 119 (37679) of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., as well as Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 from which the former was derived, did not include the parcel
claimed by them; that even granting that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119
included the parcel claimed by them the inclusion of that parcel in the certificate
of title of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was done through fraud because they, nor their
predecessors, were not actually notified of the registration proceedings. As
ground for cancellation of the certificate of title of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs further alleged that the technical description
in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had been falsified to include areas never
brought within the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court, since they were
areas not included in the application and publication in the registration
proceedings; that long before the predecessors of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. applied
for, and secured, registration of the land which included their parcel of land they
had already acquired ownership thereof not only by the document, Annex A of
their complaint, but also by acquisitive prescription. Albina Santiago and her co-
plaintiffs prayed, that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. be ordered to desist from
enforcing Civil Case No. Q-27 against them; that a resurvey be ordered to
determine whether or not Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 (37679) included
the land described in their complaint; that a reconveyance to them be ordered of
whatever portion of the land claimed by them may be found included in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 119; that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 and Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 be ordered cancelled and substituted with a new
certificate of title embracing only those lands included in the application,
publication and/or decree in LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration.
Upon motion of defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City dismissed the complaint of Albina Santiago, et al., upon the
grounds that there was no cause of action, that the case was barred by a prior
judgment in Civil Case No. Q-27 which was affirmed by the Supreme Court is G.
R. No. L-5079, and that the action of the plaintiffs, if they had any, had
prescribed.
This Court affirmed the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint of
Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs.[59] Regarding the contention of Albina
Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that the judgment in the previous case (Civil Case
No. Q-27, affirmed in G.R. No. L-5079) would not operate as res judicata against
them because they were not parties in that suit, and that they did not derive their
title from the defendants in the previous suit, this Court held:
"We agree with appellants that the decision in the preceding suit to
quiet title, prosecuted by the appellee Tuason & Co. against other heirs
of Ynocencio Santiago (99 Phil., 615; 50 Off. Gaz. 11, 5727), can not
constitute res judicata against these appellants who were not parties to
that suit and do not derive their title from the defendants in the
previous litigation (Rule 39, sec. 44 (b). There is authority for the
proposition that a judgment may be made binding in a subsequent
litigation upon one who, although not a formal party to a previous suit,
has actually conducted or controlled the action or defense therein (65
ALR 1134), or who was adequately represented in such previous
litigation; but no clear proof of the existence of such exceptional
circumstances is before us in the present case. On the other hand, the
 rule is that co-owners are not privies inter se in relation to the property
owned in common.
xxx xxx xxx

"But granting that the plaintiffs-appellants herein are not privies of the
defendants Santiago in the former litigation over this same property (S.
C. G. R. No. L-5079), still the pronouncement of this Court, made in
the former case, to the effect that the Spanish document (Annex A)
issued in favor of Ynocencio Santiago (ancestor of appellants herein)
was neither a titulo de informacion posesoria nor a title by composicion con el
estado, and, therefore, vested no ownership over the land therein
described in favor of Ynocencio Santiago, holds and applies to herein
appellants, since the quality or the legal effect of the document does not
depend upon the persons who invoke it.
"If the late Ynocencio Santiago did not become the owner of the
disputed property by virtue of the document Annex A, then appellants
herein, as heirs of Ynocencio, have not acquired such ownership either.
It follows that the first and second causes of action of their complaint,
predicated as they are on the assumption that such ownership and its
consequential rights resulted from Annex A, must necessarily fail. Not
being owners, they can complain of no invasion of dominical rights."
It will thus be noted that in the afore-mentioned decision in the Santiago case,
even if Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs were not considered privies to the
defendants in Civil Case No. Q-27, and even if they were not parties in that
previous case, this Court nevertheless applied to them the judgment (G. R. No. L-
5079) in that previous case where it was pronounced that the document, Annex A
of the complaint of Albina Santiago, et al., was neither a titulo de informacion posesoria
nor a title by composicion con el estado, and it did not establish the right of ownership
of their predecessor in interest, Inocencio Santiago, Albina Santiago and her co-
plaintiffs had based their claim of ownership on that document (Annex A).[60]
This Court held in that previous case that the document was unavailing against
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and against
Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
And so, following the logic of this Court in its decision in the Santiago case, in the
three cases at bar We hold that even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621, except
the heirs of Elias Benin, are not privies to Elias Benin and were not parties in Civil
Case No. Q-156; even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622, except Jose
Alcantara, are not privies to Jose Alcantara and were not parties in Civil Case No.
Q-156; and even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623, except Pascual Pili, are
not privies to Pascual Pili and were not parties in Civil Case No. Q-156, still the
pronouncement of this Court in the judgment in that previous case (G.R. No. L-
4998), to the effect that the plaintiffs in that case and their predecessors in interest
were bound by the registration proceedings which culminated, in the issuance of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, holds and applies to all the plaintiffs (now
appellees) in these three cases. In that judgment this Court ruled out, or did not
sustain, the rights claimed by the predecessors in interest of herein appellees over
the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. These appellees,
therefore, have not succeeded to any right that can derrogate the validity and
conclusiveness of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and of the certificates of
title that are derived from said original certificate of title.
Coming back to the Santiago case, as regards the contention of Albina Santiago
and her co-plaintiffs that the registration proceedings which resulted in the
issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 were irregular and fraudulent, this
Court held:
"(T)he mere fact that appellants herein were not personally notified of
the registration proceedings that resulted in a decree of registration of
title in favor of the Tuasons in 1914 does not constitute in itself a case
of fraud that would invalidate the decree. The registration proceedings,
as proceedings in rem, operate as against the whole world and the decree
issued therein is conclusive adjudication of the ownership of the lands
registered, not only against those parties who appeared in such pro-
ceedings but also against parties who were summoned by publication
but did not appear. The registration by the appellee's predecessors-in-
interest freed the lands from claims and liens of whatever character that
existed against the lands prior to the issuance of the certificates of title,
except those noted in the certificate and legal encumbrances saved by
law (Yumol vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17 and cases cited
therein). In addition, there being no allegation that the registered
owners procured the non-appearance of appellants at the registration
proceedings, and very much more than one year having elapsed from
the issuance of the decree of registration in 1914, neither revocation of
such decree nor a decree of reconveyance are obtainable anymore."
Regarding the claim of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that they had
acquired title by prescription over the parcel of land claimed by them, this Court
held:
"It follows also that the allegation of prescriptive title in favor of
plaintiffs does not suffice to establish a cause of action. If such
prescription was completed before the registration of the land in favor of
the Tuasons, the resulting prescriptive title was cut off and extinguished
by the decree of registration. If, on the contrary, the prescription was
either begun or completed after the decree of registration, it conferred
no title because, by express provision of law, prescription can not
operate against the registered owner (Act 496, section 46)."
Thus, in this Santiago case, as in the Alcantara case, this Court declared conclusive
and indefeasible Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which was issued as a result
of the registration proceedings in L. R. C. No. 7681 of the Court of Land
Registration. There are many other cases where this Court has made a similar
pronouncement regarding Original Certificate of Title No. 735.[61]
In view of the findings, and the rulings, that We have hereinbefore made, it
follows that, as contended by the appellant, the lower court also erred when it
declared the appellees the owners of the lands claimed by them and in awarding
damages to them, in these three cases.[62]
We consider it unnecessary to rule on the counterclaim of appellant J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc., for damages and attorneys fees against the appellees[63], considering,
as the records show, that the appellees are persons who are not in a position to
pay damages in any form.[64] We believe that the appellees had filed their
complaints in the honest, but mistaken, belief that they have a good cause of
action against the appellant corporation and not because they meant to embarrass
or humiliate the persons who are identified or connected with the appellant.
WHEREFORE, the joint decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Quezon City Branch) in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, appealed from, is
reversed and set aside. The bond filed by appellant in the three cases in the court
below for the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction is ordered cancelled. No
pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez,
Muoz Palma, and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., did not take part.

[1]The three cases were tried together, and decided in one joint decision, by the
Court of First Instance of Rizal; were jointly appealed directly to the Supreme
Court because of the value of the property involved in each case; and are now
decided jointly by the Supreme Court.
[2]The original plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 were Victor Benin, Marta Benin
and Elias Benin. In the second amended complaint, dated June 18, 1959, it was
there alleged that Sixto Benin, who died in 1936, left five (5) children, namely,
Victor Benin, Elias Benin, Esteban Benin, Felipa Benin and Marta Benin. When
the original complaint was flied on May 19, 1955, Esteban Benin and Felipa Benin
were dead, but their heirs were not included as parties plaintiffs. At the time the
second amended complaint was filed, of the three (3) original plaintiffs, only
Victor Benin end Elias Benin were living -- Marta Benin having died after the
original complaint was filed; and so the complaint was amended, naming as parties
plaintiffs Victor Benin and Elias Benin (two of the three original defendants);
Mercedes Zamora y Benin, Leocadio Zamora y Benin, Roman Zamora y Benin,
Eduardo Zamora y Benin, Pablo Zamora y Benin, Antonio Zamora y Benin and
Rufino Zamora y Benin (in substitution at original plaintiffs Marta Benin); Ines
Benin, Estanislawa Benin, and Irineo Benin, representing their deceased father
Esteban Benin; and Felipe Manuel, Ricardo Manuel, and Virginia Manuel,
representing their deceased mother Felipa Benin. During the pendency of this
case in the court below, original plaintiff Elias Benin died, and he was substituted
by his heirs, namely, Isabel Rivera Vda. de Benin, Hermenegildo R. Benin,
Mamerto R. Benin, Celerina Cruz, Ceferino Cruz, Mario Cruz, and Cora Cruz
(these last four being children of the deceased Margarita Benin who was one of
the children of Elias Benin), Ester R. Benin, Elisa R. Benin and Apolinario R.
Benin. Likewise, during the pendency of this case in the court below, original
plaintiff Victor Benin died, and he was substituted by his heirs, namely, Agripina
Rivera Vda. de Benin, Rosario Benin, Teotimo Benin, Miraldo Benin, Eufrocio
Benin, Gloria Benin, Jose Benin, and Elino Benin. In resume, therefore, at the
time when Civil Case No. 3621 was decided by the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, the plaintiffs in the said case were: (1) VICTOR BENIN, represented by
his heirs, Agripina Rivera Vda. de Benin, Rosario Benin, Teotimo Benin, Miraldo
Benin, Eufrocio Benin, Gloria Benin, Jose Benin, and Elino Benin; (2) MARTA
BENIN, represented by her heirs, Leocadio Zamora y Benin, Mercedes Zamora y
Benin, Roman Zamora y Benin, Eduardo Zamora y Benin, Pablo Zamora y Benin,
Antonio Zamora y Benin, and Rufino Zamora y Benin; (3) ELIAS BENIN, repre-
sented by his heirs, Isabel Rivera Vda. de Benin, Hermenegildo Benin, Mamerto
Benin, Ester Benin, Elisa Benin, Apolinario Benin, Celerina Cruz y Benin,
Ceferino Cruz y Benin, Mario Cruz y Benin, and Cora Cruz y Benin; (4) ESTE-
BAN BENIN, represented by his heirs, Ines Benin, Estanislawa Benin, and Irineo
Benin; and (5) FELIPA BENIN, represented by her heirs, Felipe Manuel y Benin,
Ricardo Manuel y Benin, and Virginia Manuel y Benin. (R. A., Vol. I, pp. 37, 423,
427, 476, 477; R. A., Vol. II, pp. 718-719, 751-752).
The original plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622 were the two brothers, Juan E.
Alcantara and Jose E. Alcantara. During the pendency of this case in the court
below, Juan Alcantara died, and he was substituted by his heirs, namely, Victoria
Alcantara, Marcelina Alcantara, Cresencia Alcantara and Victor Alcantara.
Therefore, at the time when Civil Case No. 3622 was decided by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, the parties-plaintiffs were (1) JOSE E. ALCANTARA, and (2)
JUAN E. ALCANTARA, represented by his heirs, Victoria Alcantara, Marceline
Alcantara, Cresencia Alcantara, and Victor Alcantara. (R. A. Vol. II, pp. 644-646)
In Civil Case No. 3623, the original plaintiffs were Pascual Pili and Luisa Pili, who
were brother and sister. In the second amended complaint, dated June 18, 1959, it
is stated that the two original plaintiffs, Pascual Pili and Luisa Pili, were the
children of Candido Pili who died in 1931. The other children of Candido Pili
were Diego Pili and Manuel Pili, both deceased at the time of the filing of the
original complaint but their heirs were not included as parties plaintiffs. When the
second amended complaint was filed on June 18, 1959, those named plaintiffs
were Pascual Pili, Luisa Pili, Domingo Pili, Florentina Pili and Felicidad Pili (these
last three being the children of Diego Pili), Tarcila Pili and Julia Pili (these last two
being the children of Manuel Pili). During the pendency of Civil Case No. 3623 in
the court below, original plaintiff Luisa Pili died, and she was substituted by her
heirs, namely, Elisa de los Santos y Pili, Salud de los Santos y Pili, Teodorico
Manalili y Pili, Mateo Manalili y Pili, Tomas Manalili y Pili and Leogarda Manalili y
 y y y g y
Pili. At the time when Civil Case No. 3623 was decided by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, therefore, the parties plaintiffs were: (1) PASCUAL PILI; (2)
LUISA PILI, represented by her heirs Elisa de los Santos y Pili, Salud de los
Santos y Pili, Teodorico Manalili y Pili, Mateo Manalili y Pili, Tomas Manalili y Pili,
and Leogarda Manalili y Pili; (3) DIEGO PILI, represented by his heirs Domingo
Pili, Florentina Pili, and Felicidad Pili; and (4) MANUEL PILI, represented by his
heirs, Tarcila Pili and Julia Pili. (R. A. Vol. II, pp. 754-756)
The parties named defendants in each of the three cases (Civil Cases Nos. 3621,
3622 and 3623) were Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason
y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y dela Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz,
Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la
Paz; Heirs of Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz; Heirs of Juan Jose Tuason y de
la Paz; Heirs of Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz; Heirs of Augusto
Huberto Tuason y de la Paz; and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. In the complaint in
each of these three cases the plaintiffs alleged that defendants Mariano Severo
Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la
Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz
appeared in the Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Rizal as having their address in the City of Manila, and that if those
defendants were still living, their whereabouts were unknown, and these
defendants were dead, the plaintiffs had no knowledge of such facts; and so the
plaintiffs prayed that if those defendants were still living they be served with
summons by means of publication. The plaintiffs further alleged that the
defendants, Heirs of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Teresa Eriberta
Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Demetrio
Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, were
being sued in the alternative as additional defendants, and the fact of their being
alive or dead was also unknown to the plaintiffs, and if those defendants were
living they could likewise be served with summons by means of publication. (R.A.
Vol. I, pp. 3-4)
[3] See pp. 3-52, Amended Record on Appeal, Vol. I.
[4] Amended Record on Appeal, Vol. II, pp. 525 and 526.
[5] Amended Record on Appeal, Vol. II, pp. 599-636, 647-697, 698, 715.
[6] Amended Record on Appeal, Vol. II, pp. 953-958.
[7] The motion for new trial was not resolved by the trial court.
[8] Amended Record on Appeal, Vol. II, p. 1038.
[9] Appellee's brief, pp. 16-17.
[10] Lower court's decision, p. 963, Records on Appeal, Vol. II.
[11]Juan and Chuongco vs. Ortiz Luis, 49 Phil. 252-256, 259; Phil. Manufacturing
Co. vs. Imperial, 49 Phil. 122-125; Lichauco, et al., vs. Herederos de Corpus, 60
Phil. 211-214.
[12] Escueta vs. Director of Lands, 16 Phil. 482-487.
[13]Phil. Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial, 49 Phil. 122; Dir. of Lands, et al. vs.
Benitez, et al., L-21368 March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 557, 561.
[14] Bank of P.I. vs. Acua, 59 Phil. 183-186.
[15] Underscoring, supplied.
[16] Underscoring, supplied.
[17] InExhibit VV-5, presented by the appellees in the court below, the Register of
Deeds of Rizal certified that OCT No. 735 was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT
No. 2680 was issued on August 9, 1915; and that TCT 2680 was cancelled and in
lieu thereof TCT 3792 was issued on October 15, 1917.
[18] Underscoring, supplied.
[19] Parcel 1 in OCT No. 735 is the Hacienda Sta. Mesa.
[20] Decision of Lower Court, page 969, Vol. II, Record on Appeal.
[21] Appellant's Brief, pages 33-34.
[22] See footnote 16, ante.
[23]Philippine Manufacturing Co., vs. Imperial, 49 Phil. 122; Juan and Chuongco
vs. Ortiz, 49 Phil. 252; Bank of the P.I. vs. Acua, 59 Phil. 183; Lichauco vs.
Herederos de Corpus, 60 Phil. 211; Director of Lands vs. Benitez, 16 SCRA 557.
[24]
Philippine Manufacturing Co., vs. Imperial 49 Phil. 122; Juan and Chongco vs.
Ortiz, 49 Phil. 252; Lichauco vs. Herederos de Corpus, 60 Phil. 211.
[25] Record on Appeal, Vol. I, pages 10, 35, 59, 445, 480 & 503.
[26] Appellee's Brief, pages 16-17; See Footnote 9. ante.
[27] Record on Appeal, Vol. I, page 421.
[28]Decision of the lower court, page 963, Vol. II, Record on Appeal. See
footnote 10, ante.
[29] Lower court's decision, pp. 970-971, Record on Appeal, Vol. II.
[30] Philippine National Bank vs. Tan Ong Zse, 51 Phil. 317, 321.
[31] Exhibit 50 consists of three pages. The first page is the photostat of the face
of OCT No. 735. The second page is the photostat of four small sheets which
had been joined together and photographed as one whole page. Attached, or
stapled, to this page is the photostat of another small sheet more or less similar in
size to each of the four sheets that were joined together and photographed as one
whole page. This second page together with the small sheet attached to it contain
the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 in LRC No. 7681. The third page is
the photostat of the page containing the memorandum of the encumbrances af-
fecting the property described in the certificate. The records show that this
photostat of OCT No. 735 (Exh. 50) was taken before the present cases were
instituted.
The appellees presented as evidence also a photostat of OCT No. 735 consisting
of three pages (Exhibit WW). The first page is the face of OCT No. 735 which is
similar to the face of the photostat of the same title presented by appellant as Exh.
50, except that this face of Exh. "WW" appears deteriorated and the portion at the
lower right hand corner is mutilated. The second page (which is at the back of the
first page) is the memorandum of the encumbrances affecting the property
described in the title. (This page is similar to the third page of Exhibit 50). The
third page of Exh. WW consists of the photostat of four small sheets that had
been joined together and photographed together as one page. These four small
sheets that had been photographed together contain the greater portion of the
technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2, similar to what appear on page 2 of Exh.
50 of the appellant, except that this page 3 of Exh. "WW" appears deteriorated
and mutilated. Then there is attached, or stapled, to this page 3 a photostat of a
small sheet (marked Exh. WW-2) which contains the technical description of a
parcel of land situated in Muntinglupa, Rizal, along the shore of lake Laguna de
Bay.
It appears that the photostat of the small sheet that is attached to the second page
of Exh. 50 contains part of the descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2, while the photosat
of the small sheet attached to the third page of Exh. "WW" contains the technical
description of a parcel of land in Muntinglupa, Rizal.
We find that what is written on the photostat of the small sheet (Ex. WW-2)
attached to Exh. "WW" has no connection to what are written on the third page
of Exhibit "WW"; while the photostat of the small sheet attached to page two of
Exh. 50 contains part of the technical description of Parcel 2 which is continued
on the face of Exh. 50. The records show that Exhibit "WW" was taken in July,
1961 when these cases were already pending in the lower court (Exhibit WW-3).
The Original complaints in these three cases were filed on May 19, 1955.
Counsel for the appellees made capital of this sheet (Exh. WW-2) which contains
the technical description of a land in Muntinglupa in his claim that the
transcription of Decree of Registration No. 17431 in the Registration Book was
not properly done. Counsel for the appellant explains that at the time of the trial
of these cases the record of OCT No. 735 in the office of the Register of Deeds
of Rizal was not only badly mutilated but was also in a very deteriorated condition,
and the inclusion of a sheet of paper which contains the technical description of a
parcel of land situated in Muntinglupa, Rizal could have been due to mishandling
of the records in the course of the frequent handling of those records, not to
mention the several transfers of the office of the Register of Deeds since 1914 to
its location at the time of the trial. It could have happened that this sheet
containing the technical description of a lot in Muntinglupa (Exh. WW-2) was
mistakenly attached to the record (or pages) of OCT No. 735 in the Registration
Book, while the true and correct sheet which contains part of the technical des-
cription of Parcel 2 was detached from the record or pages of OCT No. 735 in the
Registration Book and misplaced somewhere.
Counsel for the appellant further points out that the best evidence that Decree of
Registration No. 17431 was correctly transcribed in the Registration Book is the
fact that TCT No. 2680 (Exh, 31) which was issued in lieu of OCT 735 on August
9, 1915 contains the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 of LRC No. 7681 as
lifted from OCT 735, and the technical description in TCT No. 2680 does not
make mention of any parcel of land located in Muntinglupa; and TCT No. 3792
(Exh. 32) which was issued on October 15, 1917 in lieu of TCT No. 2680 also
does not contain the description of any parcel of land located in Muntinglupa,
Rizal (Appellant's Reply Brief, pp. 23-25).
We have noted that the lower court did not give importance to this stray sheet
(Exh. WW-2) attached to Exhibit "WW" containing the description of the land in
Muntinglupa, because in its decision it did not say that this sheet is an indication
of an irregularity in the transcription of the technical description in the registration
book (pp. 970- 971, Record on Appeal, Vol. II).
This Court believes that Exh. 50 of the appellant is more authentic, and more
reliable, than Exh. "WW" (and WW-2) of the appellees. (See Galves, et al., vs. J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc., 10 SCRA 344).
[32] Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. 31, 34.
[33] Maloles and Malvar vs. Director of Lands 25 Phil. 548, 552.
[34] Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 593.
[35] Government vs. Abural, 39 Phil. 996, 1000.
[36] As quoted from the lower court's decision, p. 983, Vol. II, Record on Appeal.
[37] Sec. 55, Act 496; Severino vs. Severino, 44, Phil. 348, 357; Dizon vs. Lacap, 59
Phil. 193, 196; Director of Lands vs. Register of Deeds of Rizal, 92 Phil. 826. See
pp. 113-117, "Land Titles and Deeds," by Noblejas, 1965 edition; and Caladiao, et
al., vs. Vda. de Blas, 10 SCRA, 691, 695, 695.
[38]De los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil. 227-228; Sorogon vs. Makalintal, 80 Phil.
259; Tiburcio, et al., vs. PHHC, 106 Phil. 477; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Vibat; 8
SCRA 54, 57; Baldoz vs. Papa, 14 SCRA 691; Ilarde, et al., vs. Lichauco, 42 SCRA
641; Libunan vs. Gil, 45 SCRA 17, 27.
[39]The plaintiffs alleged that the individual defendants Tuason y de la Paz, and
their heirs, were either living or dead, or if they were living their whereabouts were
unknown, so they were summoned by publication.
[40]Civil Case No. 24803, entitled "Antonio Barretto, et al., vs. Augusto H.
Tuason, et al..." The case was later brought up to the Supreme Court (See 50 Phil.
888).
[41] The case of Bank of the P.I. vs. Acua was decided on December 21, 1933.
[42]J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. bought Parcel 1 from the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc.
on June 15, 1938 (Exh. 12-C).
[43] Exhibit
3; See pp. 48-57 t.s.n. of Dec. 15, 1956. See also pp. 227-245, Vol. I of
Record on Appeal.
[44] Record on Appeal, Vol. I, pp. 290, 293-294. "defendant (sic)" should be
"plaintiff".
[45] Bolaos vs. J. M. Tuason & Co. Inc., 37 SCRA 223, 229.
[46]Secs. 45 and 46, Act 496; Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590; De la Cruz vs.
Fabie, 35 Phil. 144.
[47] Domingo vs. Santos Ongsiako, 55 Phil. 361.
[48]Palet vs. Tejedor, 55 Phil. 790, 798. See Tiburcio, et al., vs. PHHC, et al., 106
Phil. 477; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Magdagal, 4 SCRA 84, 88.
[49] Exhibit 1 (Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-156).
[50]J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. moved to withdraw the third ground of the motion
to dismiss and was granted by the trial court, but the court denied the second
motion to dismiss just the same. (Pages 599, 698, 715, Vol. II, Record on Appeal).
[51] Fifth assignment of error, page 3, Appellant's brief.
[52] Record on Appeal, Vol. I, pp. 421-425
[53]
Exh. 1 page 8; Amended record on appeal, Vol. I, pages 49-51; Vol. 2, pages
522-524; 595-596.
[54] Pealosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303; Boncairen vs. Diones, 98 Phil. 122, 126.
[55]
Agregado vs. Muoz, 36 Phil. 465; Varsity Hills, et al., vs. Navarro, et al., 43
SCRA, 503.
[56] 110 Phil. 16; Exhibit 49.
[57]
As erroneously reported in Vol. 110 of the Phil. Reports, p. 18, the date is
"May 12, 1948"; but in the original of the decision, a certified copy of which is
Exhibit 49, the date is "May 12, 1848".
[58] G.R. No. L-5079, July 31, 1956 (J. M. Tuason & Co. vs. Geronimo Santiago, et
al.,); 99 Phil. 617. In this case this Court also upheld the validity of OCT No. 735.
[59] G. R. No. L-14223, November 23, 1960. See footnote 56, ante.
[60]In G. R. No. L-5079 (J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Geronimo Santiago), 99
Phil. 617, Geronimo Santiago and his co-defendants who were co-owners with
Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs, also based their claim of ownership on the
document (Annex A to the complaint of Albina Santiago, et al.).
[61]J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaos 95 Phil. 106; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
Geronimo Santiago, 99 Phil. 615; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. De Guzman, et al.,
99 Phil. 281; Tiburcio, et al., vs. PHHC, et al., 106 Phil. 477; J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. vs. Register of Deeds, 2 SCRA 1018; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Magdagal,
4 SCRA 84; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Aguirre, 7 SCRA 109; Galvez, et al. vs. J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc. 10 SCRA 344; PHHC, et al. vs. Mencias, et al., 20 SCRA
1031; Varsity Hills vs. Navarro, 43 SCRA 503.
[62] Eight Assignment of error of appellant.
[63] Ninth Assignment of error of appellant.
[64] The appellees are prosecuting their cases as paupers.

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