(1) TERESITA TANGHAL OKABE vs. HON.

PEDRO DE LEON GUTIERREZ, in his

capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Pasay City, Branch 119; PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES; and CECILIA MARUYAMA
G.R. No. 150185
May 27, 2004
Callejo, Sr., J.

FACTS:
Cecilia Maruyama (Maruyama) executed a fifteen-page affidavit-complaint and filed the same
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City, on December 29, 1999, charging Lorna
Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal Okabe, a.k.a. Shiela Okabe (Okabe), with estafa.
Maruyama entrusted to Okabe 11,410,000 with the peso equivalent of P3,993,500,for the
latter, who was engaged in the business of door to door delivery, to remit to the Philippines.
Okabe failed to remit such amount.
An information was filed with the RTC of Pasay and a warrant of arrest was issued but Okabe
was able to post bail in the amount of P40, 000.
Petitioner left the Philippines for Japan twice but returned. The prosecution moved for the
issuance of a hold departure order.
The trial court issued an order on the same day, granting the motion of the private prosecutor
for the issuance of a hold departure order and ordering the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) to hold and prevent any attempt on the part of the petitioner to depart from
the Philippines.
Okabe filed a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause and to defer
proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the documents submitted by the investigating
prosecutor were not enough on which the trial court could base a finding of probable cause for
estafa against her. She also filed Very Urgent Motion to Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order and
allow her to regularly travel to Japan.
The private prosecutor opposed the petitioners motions during the hearing which was also the
date set for her arraignment.
Petitioner filed a motion for the postponement of her arraignment alleging that, in case the trial
court ruled adversely thereon, she would refuse to enter a plea and seek relief from the appellate
court.

RTC: Denied the petitioners motions on the ground that when the petitioner posted a personal
bail bond for her provisional liberty, she thereby waived her right to question the courts finding
of the existence of probable cause for her arrest and submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the
court, more so when she filed the motion for the lifting of the hold departure order the court issued,
and the motion to defer the proceedings and her arraignment.

CA: Affirmed the assailed order of the RTC but allowed the petitioner to travel to Japan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the application for or filing of bail bond a waiver of ones right to assail
the warrant issued for his arrest

HELD:
No, there is no waiver in application for or filing of a bail. We agree with the contention of the
petitioner that the appellate court erred in not applying Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure. An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing
the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him,
provided that he raises them before entering his plea.

Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it cannot
be argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to assail the
warrant of arrest issued against her by the respondent judge. There must be clear and convincing
proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right to question the existence of
probable cause.

In this case, the records show that a warrant was issued by the respondent judge in Pasay City for
the arrest of the petitioner. When the petitioner learned of the issuance of the said warrant, she
posted a personal bail bond to avert her arrest and secure her provisional liberty Judge Demetrio
B. Macapagal of the RTC of Quezon City approved the bond and issued an order recalling the
warrant of arrest against the petitioner. Thus, the posting of a personal bail bond was a matter of
imperative necessity to avert her incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of her right to
assail her arrest.

Neither can the petitioners filing of a motion for the lifting of the hold departure order and for
leave to go to Japan be considered a waiver of her right to assail the validity of the arrest warrant
issued by the respondent judge.

(2) THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAMERTO ABNER, ET AL., ROBERTO
SOLER AND DOMINGO ABELLA
G.R. No. L-2508
October 27, 1950
PARAS, J.

FACTS:
Mamerto Abner was charged, with others, with robbery in band with rape committed in the
municipality of Tinambac, Province of Camarines Sur.
Due to the absence of the Judge of the Justice of Peace Court of Tinambac and the refusal of
the Municipal Mayor to receive the complaint, The Court of First Instance(CFI) of Camarines
Sur ordered the Justice of the Peace of Naga to conduct the preliminary investigation.
Abner was thereafter admitted to bail and the appellants Soler and Abella executed a necessary
bond bail for P15,000 on October 1946.
Abner and his bondsmen failed to appear at the preliminary investigation despite notice and
the former, through counsel, subsequently waived his right to a preliminary investigation.
Thereafter, the case was forwarded to the CFI of Camarines Sur.
After Abners several failure to appear on trial despite extensions which were granted, the bail
bond was confiscated. Abner was found out to be missing or is hiding.
The bondsmen contend that the CFI did not acquire jurisdiction over the case as no complaint
was filed before the Justice Peace Court of Tinambac. Also, they contend that since bond was
not signed by Abner as principal, the same is void.

CFI: Granted petition for the confiscation of the bail bond.

ISSUE: Whether or not the bail bond is void for lack of signature of the accused.

HELD:
No. The bondsmen contend that since the bail bond was without the signature of the accused, the
same is void. However, methods by which a bail bond may be taken, has distinction with regards
to the indispensability of the accuseds signature.

Section 1, Rule 110, of the Rules Court, provides that "bail is the security required and given for
the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in
which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance." Under this,
there are two methods of taking bail: (1) by bail bond and (2) by recognizance. A bail bond is an
obligation given by the accused with one or more sureties, with the condition to be void upon the
performance by the accused of such acts as he may legally be required to perform. A recognizance
is an obligation of record, entered into before some court or magistrate duly authorized to take it,
with the condition to do some particular act, the most usual condition in criminal cases being the
appearance of the accused for trial.

In the case at bar, the bail bond executed by the appellants, though so denominated, is essentially
a recognizance, an "obligation" contracted with the State by the appellants, not requiring as an
indispensable condition for its validity, the signature of the accused. In addition, under the
circumstances of this case, the appellants were estopped from assailing the effectiveness of their
bail contract. If, as contended by appellants, it would be difficult, without the accused Abner
having signed as principal, for them to obtain indemnity from or to have power and control over
him, They are solely to blame. Neither is there merit in the argument that the obligation of
appellants under the bond is merely to pay P15,000 in case the accused should fail to pay that
amount, because the latter, who has not signed it, is of course not bound thereby.
(3) MANOLET O. LAVIDES vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HON.
ROSALINA L. LUNA PISON, Judge Presiding over Branch 107, RTC, Quezon City; and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
G.R. No. 129670
February 1, 2000
Mendoza, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child abuse under R.A. No. 7610.
His arrest was made without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police.
The parents of complainant Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then
16 years old, had been contacted by petitioner for an assignation that night at petitioners room
at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City.
This was not the first time the police received reports of petitioners activities. An entrapment
operation was therefore set in motion.
On April 3, 1997 at 8:20pm, police knocked at the door of room 308 of Metropolitan Hotel
where he was set to meet up where Lavides was staying.
The police saw Lavides with Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear.
They arrested him and an information for Violation of Art. III, 5(b) of R.A. 7610 was filed in
RTC of Quezon City.
Lavides filed an Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For
the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless
Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein Accused be
Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged.
Nine more information of child abuse was filed against him by the same complainant and three
other minor children. In all the cases, it was alleged that he had sexual intercourse with the
complainants in exchange of money.
No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed separate applications for bail in the
nine cases.
The trial court issued an order resolving petitioners Omnibus Motion that the accused is
entitled to bail. He is hereby granted the right to post bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each
case or a total of P800,000.00 subject to conditions.
Thereafter, Lavides filed a motion to quash the information against him and asked for the
suspension of his arraignment while pending trial. He also filed a motion in which he prayed
that the amounts of bail bonds be reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be
done prior to his arraignment.

RTC: Denied petitioners motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash the informations, and to suspend
arraignment.

CA: Invalidated the first two conditions imposed in the May 16, 1997 order for the grant of bail
to petitioner but ruled that the issue concerning the validity of the condition making arraignment a
prerequisite for the approval of petitioners bail bonds to be moot and academic.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be arraigned first before he could be granted bail.

HELD:
No. in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the
accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the
case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the second
place, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting
bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule
114, (b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that the accused shall
appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules, while under Rule
116, (b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment is required.

On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to
place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay
his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be
held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and
thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accuseds constitutional
right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him
with a crime and his right to bail.

It is the condition in the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court that approval of the bail bonds shall
be made only after arraignment, which the Court of Appeals should instead have declared void.
The condition imposed in the trial courts order of May 16, 1997 that the accused cannot waive his
appearance at the trial but that he must be present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in
accordance with Rule 114. For another condition of bail under Rule 114,(c) is that The failure of
the accused to appear at the trial without justification despite due notice to him or his bondsman
shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in the notice. In
such case, trial shall proceed in absentia.

Although a condition for the grant of bail to an accused is invalid, it does not follow that his
arraignment and the subsequent proceedings against him are invalid.

(4) ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL
LEANDRO MENDOZA.

G.R. No. 148468

January 28, 2003
Callejo, Sr., J.

FACTS:
The case is a consolidation of 3 petitions filed by Edward Serapio which assailed resolutions
of the 3rd Division of the Sandiganbayan in denying his petition for bail, motion for
reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition for habeas corpus in relation to a plunder
case against him.
Edward Serapio, herein petitioner, was a member of the Board of Trustees and legal counsel
of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. As trustee of the foundation, he received 200 million
donation from Chavit Singson. Thereafter, the donation was turned over to the treasurer of the
foundation and was deposited to the account with the Equitable PCI Bank.
In 2000, Singson publicly accused Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in several illegal
activities triggering the filing with the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against
Estrada. Serapio was among the persons included in the criminal charges.
Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several informations against Estrada and other
persons and no bail was recommended for the provisional release of the accused.
Ombudsman found probable cause for plunder and Serapio filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
It was denied because the information was already filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution finding probable cause to justify the issuance of warrants
of arrests for the accused, including petitioner. Serapio voluntarily surrendered and was
detained at Camp Crame for the said charge.
The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment on June 27, 2001 of Serapio and his co-accused.
Sandiganbayan issued an order declaring that the petition for bail can and should be heard
before petitioner's arraignment.
Serapio filed a petition for bail and was scheduled prior to his arraignment. Bail meeting were
rescheduled several times, however such failed to push through.
Petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash but the prosecution objected to the
holding of bail hearing until petitioner agreed to withdraw his motion to quash.
Serapio insists that the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, does not require that he be
arraigned first prior to the conduct of bail hearings since the latter can stand alone and must,
of necessity, be heard immediately. Also, Serapio, maintains that a motion to quash and a
petition for bail are not inconsistent, and may proceed independently of each other.
The People stress that it is only when an accused pleads not guilty may he file a petition for
bail and if he pleads guilty to the charge, there would be no more need for him to file said
petition. Moreover, since it is during arraignment that he accused is first informed of the precise
charge against him, he must be arraigned prior to the bail hearings to prevent him from later
assailing the validity of the bail hearings on the ground that he was not properly informed of
the charge against him, especially considering that, under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Court, evidence presented during such proceedings are considered automatically
reproduced at the trial.
 Even before the Sandiganbayan can resolve the issues, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court
a petition for habeas corpus and certiorari praying that the issued resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan be declared void because he was denied due process.
Likewise, Serapio prayed that the People be declared to have waived their right to present
evidence in opposition to his petition for bail; and, premised on the failure of the People to
adduce strong evidence of petitioner's guilt of plunder, that he be granted provisional liberty
on bail after due proceedings.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his petition for bail may
be conducted;
2. Whether or not petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended Information during the
pendency of his petition for bail;
3. Whether or not a joint hearing of the petition for bail of petitioner and those of the other accused
in Criminal Case No. 26558 is mandatory;

HELD:

1. No. The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his
petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty
by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. An accused need not wait for his arraignment
before filing a petition for bail. Petitioner had already been arraigned on July 10, 2001 and a
plea of not guilty had been entered by the Sandiganbayan on his behalf, thereby rendering the
issue as to whether an arraignment is necessary before the conduct of bail hearings in
petitioner's case moot.

To condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position
where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail
because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2)
foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be
released on bail. This would undermine his constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon
a valid complaint or Information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail.

2. Yes. The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists between an application of an accused
for bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail is the security given for the release of a person
in the custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman. Its purpose is to obtain the
provisional liberty of a person charged with an offense until his conviction while at the same
time securing his appearance at the trial. As stated earlier, a person may apply for bail from
the moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. On
the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an accused assails the
validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face
in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information. An accused
may file a Motion to quash the Information, as a general rule, before arraignment. The two
reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each other. Certainly, the right
of an accused right to seek provisional liberty when charged with an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when charged with an offense punishable by
such penalties but after due hearing, evidence of his guilt is found not to be strong, does not
preclude his right to assail the validity of the Information charging him with such offense. It
must be conceded, however, that if a motion to quash a criminal complaint or Information on
the ground that the same does not charge any offense is granted and the case is dismissed and
the accused is ordered released, the petition for bail of an accused may become moot and
academic.

3. No. It is not mandatory that the hearings on the petitions for bail of Serapio and his co-accused
in Criminal Case No. 26558 and the trial of the said case as against former President Joseph E.
Estrada be heard jointly.

There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of the
Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or more petitions for bail filed by different accused
or that a petition for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously with the trial of the case against
the other accused. The matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of two or more petitions
for bail filed by two different accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly with the trial
against another accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown, the Court will not interfere with
the exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its discretion.

(5) RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR., vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HONS. SERAFIN E.
CAMILON and RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judges of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Pasig branches, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, the SECURITIES &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, HON. EDMUNDO M. REYES, as Commissioner of
Immigration, and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM)
G.R. No. L-62100.
May 30, 1986
Fernan, J.

FACTS:
Ricardo Manotoc, is one of the principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management, Inc. and
the Manotoc Securities, Inc. He was in the United States for a certain time.
When Manotoc went back to the Philippines following a run on stock brokerages; together
with his co-stockholders, filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the
appointment of a management committee, not only for Manotoc Securities, Inc., but likewise
for Trans-Insular Management, Inc.
Pending disposition of the case, the SEC requested the Commissioner of Immigration,
Edmundo Reyes, not to clear Manotoc for departure.
The Commissioner issued a memorandum to this effect.
When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to
be a fake, six of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints of Estafa against petitioner
and one Raul Leveriza, Jr., as president and vice-president, respectively, of Manotoc
Securities, Inc. to the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
In all cases, petitioner has been admitted to bail in the total amount of P105,000 with FGU
Instance Corporation as surety.
He then filed a motion for permission to leave the country in each trial courts stating as ground
therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and
opportunities."

RTC: Motion was denied.

CA: Dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail
have an unrestricted right to travel.

HELD:
Yes, therefore the petition for review was dismissed. Petitioner contends that having been admitted
to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and
Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from
exercising his constitutional right to travel. Petitioners contention is untenable.

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the
custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required
as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make
himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).

Petitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed travel or shown that his surety has agreed
to it. Petitioner merely alleges that his surety has agreed to his plans as he had posted cash
indemnities. The court cannot allow the accused to leave the country without the assent of the
surety because in accepting a bail bond or recognizance, the government impliedly agrees that it
will not take any proceedings with the principal that will increase the risks of the sureties or affect
their remedies against him. Under this rule, the surety on a bail bond or recognizance may be
discharged by a stipulation inconsistent with the conditions thereof, which is made without his
assent. This result has been reached as to a stipulation or agreement to postpone the trial until after
the final disposition of other cases, or to permit the principal to leave the state or country. Thus,
although the order of March 26, 1982 issued by Judge Pronove has been rendered moot and
academic by the dismissal as to petitioner of the criminal cases pending before said judge, we see
the rationale behind said order.

(6) ISSUANCE OF HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER OF JUDGE LUISITO T. ADAOAG,

MTC, Camiling, Tarlac.
A.M. No. 99-8-126-MTC
September 22, 1999
Mendoza, J.

FACTS:
This refers to the endorsement, dated March 31, 1999, of the Secretary of Justice concerning a
hold-departure order issued on January 29, 1999 by Judge Luisito T. Adaoag, Municipal Trial
Court, Camiling, Tarlac, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-131 and 98-132, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Nestor Umagat y Campos.
The Secretary of Justice calls attention to the fact that the order in question is contrary to
Circular No. 39-97, dated June 19, 1997, of this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC in criminal cases within their exclusive jurisdiction has authority
to issue hold departure orders.

HELD:
No. In order to avoid the indiscriminate issuance of Hold-Departure Orders resulting in
inconvenience to the parties affected, the same being tantamount to an infringement on the right
and liberty of an individual to travel and to ensure that the Hold-Departure Orders which are issued
contain complete and accurate information, the following guidelines are hereby promulgated:
1. Hold-Departure Orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Courts;
2. The Regional Trial Courts issuing the Hold-Departure Order shall furnish the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Bureau of Immigration (BI) of the Department of Justice with
a copy each of the Hold-Departure Order issued within twentyfour (24) hours from the time of
issuance and through the fastest available means of transmittal;
3. The Hold-Departure Order shall contain the following information:
a) The complete, name (including the middle name), the date and place of birth and the place
of last residence of the person against whom a Hold-Departure Order has been issued or
whose departure from the country has been enjoined;
b) The complete title and the docket number of the case in which the Hold-Departure Order
was issued;
c) The specific nature of the case; and
d) The date of the Hold-Departure Order.
If available, a recent photograph of the person against whom a Hold-Departure Order has been
issued or whose departure from the country has been enjoined should also be included.
4. Whenever (a) the accused has been acquitted; (b) the case has been distressed, the judgment of
acquittal or the order of dismissal shall include therein the cancellation of the Hold Departure
Order issued. The courts concerned shall furnish the Department of Foreign Affairs and the
Bureau of Immigration with a copy each of the judgment of acquittal promulgated or the order
of dismissal twenty-four (24) hours from the time of promulgation/issuance and through the
fastest available means of transmittal.

In the case at bar, Judge Adaoag admits his mistake and pleads ignorance of the circular.
How about criminal cases within the exclusive Jurisdiction of first level courts?
Rest assured that from this moment and thereafter, the court will no longer issue such order.

(7) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRESENCIA C. REYES

G.R. Nos. 101127-31
August 7, 1992
Regalado, J.

FACTS:
Respondent Cresencia C. Reyes (Reyes) was charged in the RTC of three cases for violations
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and two cases of estafa.
 On the three cases for violations of BP 22, Reyes was convicted and sentenced to a total penalty
of two years of imprisonment and to pay a fine. On the two indictments for estafa, in Criminal
Case No. 86-51209, she was found guilty and sentenced to 22 years of reclusion perpetua with
its accessory penalties, to indemnify the complaining witness and to pay the costs; and
In Criminal Case No. 86-51210, she was likewise convicted and imposed an indeterminate
sentence of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the accessory penalties, as well as to
indemnify the offended party and to pay the costs.

CA: The cases were forwarded to the Supreme Court in view of the penalty of reclusion perpetua
involved.

In the meantime, Reyes is under provisional liberty on bail in the aforesaid criminal cases under a
corporate surety bond posted by Oriental Assurance Corporation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Reyes who was convicted of estafa and sentenced therefor to serve 22
years of reclusion perpetua, with its accessory penalties and liability for indemnification, may be
allowed to remain on bail during the pendency of her appeal from said conviction.

HELD:
No. With the prohibition in the 1987 Constitution against the imposition of the death penalty, a
correlative provision therein categorically declared the unavailability of bail to persons charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong.
Correspondingly, the aforecited Section 3 of Rule 114 was amended to provide that no bail shall
be granted to those charged with an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission
and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of
guilt is strong. There can be no pretense that such unequivocal and explicit provisions in the
Constitution and the Rules of Court would admit of any exception, qualification or distinction.

Hence, under the rule of contemporanea expositio and since the felony of estafa was not expressly
or impliedly excluded from the aforestated provisions on non availability, we see no reason why
an accused charged with estafa punishable by reclusion perpetua should now be given the
exceptional and favored treatment of being admitted to bail. The same may be said of any accused
charged with any offense so punished, whether the penalty of reclusion perpetua is by direct
statutory prescription or is imposed as a consequence of the interplay of related provisions of the
Code.

The Court hereby resolves to order the bondsman, Oriental Assurance Corporation, to surrender
accused-appellant Cresencia C. Reyes and to require said Regional Trial Court, to order the
transmittal of the accused-appellant to the Bureau of Corrections through the Philipp ine National
Police.

(8) EDUARDO OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. JOSE BERNABE, EMILIO RILLORAZA, and
ANGEL GAMBOA, Judges of People's Court (Fourth Division)
G.R. No. L-439
August 20, 1946
Moran, C.J

FACTS:
Petitioner Eduardo Ocampo was arrested by the Counter Intelligence Corps of the Armed
Forces of the United States and confined in Muntinlupa Prisons since July 30, 1945.
Ocampo filed an Application for Bail under Act No. 682
At the hearing of the application, the special prosecutor stated that petitioner would be charged
on four counts, the most serious of which was No. 4 which charges petitioner with having
pointed out Placido Trinidad as a guerrilla to the Japanese and for that reason Placido Trinidad
was shot to death.
No evidence, however, was presented by the special prosecutor. He only recited the contents
of an affidavit.
Ocampo made an objection and he testified in his own behalf denying all the charges preferred
against him and stated that said charges are mere intrigues of his political enemy.
The Fourth Division of the Peoples Court denied Ocampos application for bail.
ISSUE: Whether or not the denial of Ocampos application for bail was proper.

HELD:
No. The general rule is that all persons whether charged or not yet charged, are entitled to
provisional release on bail, before conviction EXCEPT where the charge is a capital offense and
the evidence of guilt is found to be strong. The determination of whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, which thus requires the evidence of guilt be
submitted to the court. Mere affidavits or recital of their contents are not sufficient since they are
mere hearsay evidence, unless the petitioner fails to object thereto.

The hearing of an application for bail should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the
court. It must be a brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guil.
Where the Court finds that there is strong evidence of the commission of the capital offence,
necessarily means that evidence has been properly adduced by the parties or any of them before it,
in the manner and form prescribed by the laws and rules of judicial procedure.

It appearing in the instant case that on the hearing of the application for bail filed by the petitioner
no proof was offered by the prosecution to show that the evidence of guilt is strong, the Fourth
Division of the People's Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the bail applied
for.

The respondent court is hereby ordered to hold another hearing in the manner herein described and
within seven days from notice for the purpose of determining whether the evidence of guilt is
strong and, therefore, whether petitioner may be released on bail. Without costs.

(9) THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MELQUIADES RABA, ET AL.,

CLEMENTE TALANTOR
No. L-10724
April 21, 1958
Bautista Angelo J.

FACTS:
Clemente Talantor and Melquiades Raba were charged with murder before the Court of First
Instance of Antique and the bail for each was fixed by the court at P30,000 as recommended
by the provincial fiscal.
On April 26, 1956, after the arraignment of the accused at which both pleaded not guilty to the
charge, Talantor filed with the court an urgent motion praying that the amount of the bond
fixed for his provisional liberty be reduced from P30,000 to P14,000 in order to enable him to
go on bail.
While the motion setting the hearing in the morning of the same date contains a notification to
the provincial fiscal, the latter was actually notified at 9:40 o'clock in the morning of the same
day.
The court promptly granted the motion for the reduction of bail one hour later.
On April 28, 1956, the provincial fiscal presented a motion for reconsideration of the order
granting the reduction of the bail to P14,000.
The provincial fiscal argued that it is irregular because no proper notice of the hearing of the
motion for such reduction was given to him as required by the rule.

CFI: The motion was denied, hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court acted properly in reducing the bail without giving the fiscal an
opportunity to be heard.

HELD:
No. In a motion for reduction, notice to fiscal is necessary. The requirement in civil cases that
movant shall serve notice of his motion on all parties concerned at least three days before the
hearing thereof (section 4, Rule 26) is more imperative in a criminal case where a person is accused
of a capital offense, for in such a case admission to bail is a matter of discretion which can only be
exercised after the fiscal has been heard regarding the nature of the evidence he has in his
possession. Thus, it is provided that "when admission to bail is a matter of discretion the court
must require that reasonable notice of the hearing of the application for bail be given to the fiscal"
(section 8, Rule 110), and such notice is necessary because "the burden of showing that evidence
of guilt is strong is on the prosecution" (section 7, Rule 110).

Considering that Talantor did not serve notice of his motion to reduce bail on the provincial fiscal
at least three days before the hearing thereof and the court failed to require that a reasonable notice
thereof be given to said fiscal, it is evident that the court acted improperly in reducing the bail
without giving the fiscal an opportunity to be heard.

The orders of April 26, 1956 reducing the bond of Talantor to P14,000, as well as that approving
the bail bond as thus reduced, are hereby set aside.

(10) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAYOR PABLO SOLA

G.R. No. 56158-64
March 17, 1981
Fernando CJ.

FACTS:
By virtue of a warrant for the search and seizure of the deceased bodies of seven persons
believed in the possession of accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan,
Negros Occidental, the 332nd PC/INP Company made diggings in the area that yielded two
common graves.
Seven separated murder charges were filed against Pablo Sola and his companions at the
municipal court of Kabankalan. An order of their arrest was issued but without giving the
prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the
court granted them the right to post bail for their temporary release.
Hence, a petition to set aside the order granting bail to the accused was filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the bail bond may be cancelled on account of the failure to give the
prosecution the opportunity to prove that evidence of guilt of the accused is strong.

HELD:
Yes. The cancellation of the bail bonds is more than justified. Bail was granted to the accused in
the Order of the Municipal Court without hearing the prosecution. That is to disregard the
authoritative doctrine enunciated in People v. San Diego.

As pointed out by Justice Capistrano, speaking for the Court:

"The question presented before us is, whether the prosecution was deprived of procedural due
process. The answer is in the affirmative. We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion
for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding
or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within
a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve
the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the
prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due
process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground."

(11) DIRECTOR J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO of the National Bureau of Investigation and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUDGE ROMEO G. MAGLALANG and BENJAMIN
S. ESCAO
G.R. No. 78162
April 19, 1991
Fernan J.

FACTS:
A few months after the ambuscade of Mayor Payumo on August 20, 1986, Escao, assisted by
citizens attorney Diosdado S. Savellano, executed before a supervising NBI agent a sworn
statement admitting that he was one of the seven persons who gunned down Mayor Payumo in
Barangay San Jose, Dinalupihan, Bataan; identifying some of his other companions
An information for murder was filed against Escao and ten other unidentified persons by the
provincial fiscal in the Regional Trial Court of Bataan at Balanga.
Four days later, the court issued an order of arrest against Escao recommending no bail for
his provisional liberty.
 Escao was placed under arrest and detained at the NBI detention cell by virtue of said order
of arrest.
Escaos counsel Rolando T. Cainoy filed an application for bail stating that Escao was
arrested by NBI agents on December 7, 1986 without a warrant having been presented to him
and that since then he had been detained in the lock-up cell of the NBI; that said agents, also
without a warrant, searched his house when he was arrested; that he was subjected to inhuman
torture and forced to admit participation in the killing of Mayor Payumo and to implicate other
persons, and that during the custodial investigation, he was not represented by counsel.
In opposing said application, the public prosecutor averred that the accused was charged with
a capital offense for which no bail may be availed of; that the reasons advanced in said
application would be overcome by strong and sufficient evidence; and that during the custodial
investigation, he was represented by counsel.
The court issued an order granting the application for bail fixing the same at P30, 000.
Hence, the NBI released Escao from its custody.
Petitioner Carpio, in his capacity as Director of the NBI, filed the instant case charging
respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion for having granted bail to Benjamin S. Escao

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion for having
granted bail to Benjamin S. Escao

HELD:
Yes. Although the right to bail is principally for the benefit of the accused, in the judicial
determination of the availability of said right, the prosecution should be afforded procedural due
process. Thus, in the summary proceeding on a motion praying for admission to bail, the
prosecution should be given the opportunity to present evidence and, thereafter, the court should
spell out at least a resume of the evidence on which its order granting or denying bail is based.
Otherwise, the order is defective and voidable.
In the often-cited decision in People v. San Diego, this Court said:j

"The courts discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light of a summary
of the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it could be uncontrolled and might be
capricious or whimsical. Hence, the courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary
of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt
is strong. The orders granting bail to the five defendants are defective in form and substance
because they do not contain a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution. They only
contain the courts conclusion that the evidence of guilt is not strong. Being thus defective in form
and substance, the orders complained of cannot, also on this ground, be allowed to stand."

A reading of the April 2, 1987 order convinces us that the court below was remiss in its duty as
enunciated in People v. San Diego. Without summarizing the factual basis of its order granting
bail, the court merely stated the number of prosecution witnesses but not their respective
testimonies, and concluded that the evidence presented by the prosecution was not "sufficiently
strong" to deny bail to Escao.

On this point alone, the order granting bail to Escao should be invalidated. There is, however,
another point which has not escaped the Courts scrutiny. Said order appears to be premised on
the notion that since the death penalty has been constitutionally abolished and reclusion perpetua
has replaced it, bail may be granted to Escao inasmuch as at that particular point, no legislative
enactment had as yet been made restoring the death penalty. This premise is invalid.

Under Rule 114, Section 3 23 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, persons charged with a
capital offense when the evidence of guilt is strong are not entitled to bail. Section 4 of the same
Rule defines a capital offense as "an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished with death."
It should be noted that the crime involved must be punishable by death during two points of time:
the time of its commission and the time of the application for bail.

The facts, however, that Mayor Payumo was killed on August 20, 1986 when the 1973 Constitution
allowing the death penalty was still in force and that the application for bail was made on March
5, 1987 during the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution which abolished the death penalty, should
not have gotten in the way of resolving the application for bail in accordance with the Constitution
and procedural rules.
Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that: "all persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law."

As the phrase "capital offenses" has been replaced by the phrase "offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua", crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua instead of those punishable by the death
penalty, when evidence of guilt is strong, are the exceptions to the rule that the right to bail should
be made available to all accused.

As the court itself acknowledged in its order of April 2, 1987 that "capital punishment in Section
4, Rule 114 has been amended to reclusion perpetua, the court should have proceeded accordingly
and resolved the application for bail pursuant to Section 13, Article III of the Constitution. It did
not have to invoke the abolition of the death penalty and the lack of legislative enactment restoring
it in justifying the grant of bail. All it had to do was to determine whether evidence of guilt is
strong in the light of the provision of Section 13, Article III.

(12) ALEJANDRO C. SIAZON, Senior State Prosecutor, Department of Justice vs. HON.
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT, 16th Judicial District,
Davao City
G.R. Nos. L-34156 to L-34158
October 29, 1971
Makalintal J.

FACTS:
After the arraignment of the accused and before the commencement of the trial for murder, the
applications for bail were heard.
After hearing both parties and with the announcement made by the Fiscal that he has between
40 and 50 witnesses to present, the Court ruled and ordered a joint hearing of the cases on the
merits and of the applications for bail.
On this same occasion the Court also considered the motion filed by the prosecution to
discharge one of the accused, Angelico Najar. Without any objection on the part of the defense,
said motion to discharge was granted and accused Najar was discharged to become state
witness.
As the trial progressed, the prosecution started presenting several witnesses. However, their
testimonies have not established evidence directly linking the accused Escribano and Padilla
to the conspiracy alleged in the information in the case.
The defense filed an urgent motion for the reconsideration of the order given in open Court
ordering a joint hearing of the cases on the merits and of the applications for bail, to which the
prosecution also filed its opposition.
After hearing the arguments of both parties and realizing that it should give paramount
importance to the constitutional provision regarding the right to bail, specially before
conviction, and considering the announcement of the prosecution that it has about 50 witnesses
to present, and considering further that this Court has also to travel to other provinces to try
other cases, the Court reconsidered its previous order and ordered that the applications for bail
be first heard to which the prosecution gave its assent.
The prosecution has already presented some 27 witnesses but their testimonies, in the opinion
of the Court, have not established evidence directly linking the accused to the conspiracy on
the basis of which the Court can determine whether strong evidence of guilt exists or not.
In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby orders the prosecution to present its witness
Angelico Najar during the next scheduled dates of hearing on September 30 and October 1,
1971, and if it fails to do so without justifiable cause the Court will be compelled to declare
the evidence already presented closed and order the defense to present its evidence only in so
far as this bail proceedings is concerned.
The petitioner charged the respondent Court with having gravely abused its discretion in
interfering with what he submits is the right of the prosecution to present as many witnesses
as it considers necessary, and in the order it chooses to do so, in order to show that the evidence
of the guilt of the accused is strong, in support, of its opposition to their petition for bail.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a proceeding in an application for bail is still summary in nature as it was under
the old rule
2. Whether or not the court has the power to limit, in the exercise of wise discretion, the number
of witnesses to be presented if in its judgment it can foresee that said right to bail may be
defeated due to an unnecessary delay in the presentation of witnesses showing strong evidence
of guilt.lib

HELD:
1. Yes. The petitioner submits that the nature of the hearing on a petition for bail has been
changed and that it is now no longer summary in view of the addition to the former Section 7,
Rule 110, which now appears as Section 7, Rule 114, of the following provision:

SECTION 7. Capital offenses Burden of proof. "The evidence presented during such
hearing in the Court of First Instance shall be considered automatically reproduced at the
trial, without need of retaking the same; but, upon motion of either party, the Court may recall
any witness for additional examination unless the witness is dead, outside the Philippines or
otherwise unable to testify."

The court do not see that the addition of the provision aforequoted has materially changed the
nature of the hearing on a petition for bail to the extent of depriving the Court of its discretion to
confine the evidence to the extent necessary for the proper determination of the question of whether
or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The only change that has been introduced is that such
evidence shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial in order to avoid unnecessary
repetition. The proviso that any witness may be recalled at the trial for additional examination
underscores, if anything, the difference between the hearing for purposes of the petition for bail
and the trial on the merits. This is as it should be, because one has for its purpose, from the
standpoint of the prosecution, to show that strong evidence of guilt exists while the other
contemplates proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Neither under the old nor under the new Rules is there any specific provision defining what kind
of hearing it should be, but in the cases of Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons and Ocampo
v. Bernabe it was stated that the hearing should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the
court.

Summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence
of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to
determine the weight of the evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit
to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the
evidence for or against accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further
evidence may be therein offered and admitted.

2. Yes. The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine
itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a
reasonable minimum at the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential
to the purposes of the hearing.

The right of the prosecution to control the quantum of evidence and the order of presentation of
the witnesses, while not to be disregarded, must nevertheless be equated with the purpose of the
hearing, which is to determine whether the accused falls within the exception to the general rule
that he is constitutionally entitled to bail before conviction. To allow the prosecution to conduct
the hearing as if it were a full-dress trial on the merits would defeat the purpose of the proceeding.

(13) ALBINA BORINAGA v JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN

A.M. No. RTJ-93-936
September 10,1993
Regalado J.

FACTS:
An amended criminal complaint for murder dated March 4, 1992 for the killing of
complainant's husband, Regini Borinaga, was filed by the Chief of Police of Dumingag,
 Zamboanga del Sul against Ruaya, Rada and Valenzuela before the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Mahayag for preliminary investigation.
While the case was pending with the said lower court, a petition for bail dated March 25, 1992
was filed by one of the accused, Ruaya, in the RTC before respondent Judge Tamin.
Judge Tamin ordered the public prosecutor to appear at the scheduled hearing to present
evidence that the guilt of Ruaya for the crime charged is strong.
The public prosecutor failed to appear at the hearing, by reason of which Judge Tamin issued
an order granting the bail to the accused Ruaya in the amount of P20,000.00.
Judge Arriesgado, the one who conducted the preliminary investigation issued a resolution
recommending the filing of an information for murder against, among others, Antonio Ruaya,
after said accused failed to file his counter affidavit and other evidence in his defense.
The resolution was affirmed by the Provincial Prosecutor, as a consequence of which an
information for murder was later filed against all the accused with no bail recommended.
Subsequently, the public prosecutor, together with the complainant's counsel, filed a motion to
cancel bailbond and to arrest the accused on the ground that latter is charged with a capital
offense, evidence of guilt is strong and no bail was recommended in the information.
The respondent Judge denied such motion. In his comment he said that: It is now too late and
unfair for the prosecution to invoke the argument that the respondent granted bail when the
case was under preliminary investigation. It is too late because the prosecution is under
estoppel and has already effectively waived to invoke said argument when it chose not to
appear in the hearing of the petition for bail despite due notice given to it.
Since the court has conferred upon the accused the right to bail, such right becomes thereafter
a vested constitutional right which is already beyond the power and authority of the respondent
to recall unless there is a violation of the condition of the bail. The respondent, therefore,
cannot recall the right already vested, even if he wants to, without violating the right of the
accused to due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of Judge Tamin granting bail to the accused is valid.

HELD:
No. Since the accused is charged with a capital offense, bail in this case is a matter of discretion.
Therefore the application for bail should have been filed in the court where the preliminary
investigation was then pending, that is, before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dumingag-
Mahayag, Zamboanga del Sur and not on the Regional trial court. This is pursuant to Section 14
of Rule 114 which states that:

"Sec. 14.Bail, where filed. (b) Whenever the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused
seeks to be released on recognizance, the application therefor may be filed only in the particular
court where the case is pending whether for preliminary investigation, trial, or on appeal."

Further, respondent judge acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and eventually
granting the petition for bail there having been no information filed in his court against the accused-
applicant. Hence, respondent judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the same.

On the other hand, even assuming arguendo that respondent judge had jurisdiction to hear the
petition for bail, under the circumstances attendant to the case he should nonetheless be held liable
for granting the same without benefit of a hearing. The prosecution must be given an opportunity
to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court
may resolve the motion for bail. If the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there
would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be
considered void on that ground.

In the case at bar, the petition for bail was granted by respondent judge on the simple reason that
the prosecution failed to appear and present evidence despite due notice. Forthwith, he concludes
that by reason of the failure of the prosecution to appear at the scheduled hearing, the applicant is
entitled to bail as a matter of right. He aggravated this flagrant error when in his aforequoted
comment, he justified his subsequent denial of the prosecution's motion for the cancellation of the
bail bond and the arrest of the accused on the incredible theory that the prosecution's failure to
appear was a "waiver on its part . . . .and it is allegedly already in estoppel" to challenge the grant
of bail since that right to bail "became irrevocably vested" in the accused who had thereby acquired
"a vested constitutional right beyond the power and authority of the respondent to recall."
In the first place, respondent judge did not have the authority to set the petition for bail for hearing
in view of the fact that he had not even acquired jurisdiction over the criminal case since the
information therefor had not yet been filed in the trial court. In doing so, he acted with grave abuse
of discretion and in wanton disregard of established rules and jurisprudence. Secondly, it has been
held that even where the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to
grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength
of the state's evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail. Here, the non-appearance of
the prosecution at the hearing was obviously justified since, to repeat, respondent had no authority
to schedule and/or conduct the same.

As such, the challenged order of respondent judge cannot be sustained or be given a semblance of
validity. Parenthetically, the "vested constitutional right" theory of respondent judge does not merit
judicial review and is best disregarded.

(14) ENRICA B. AGUIRRE and NENITA A. DELA CRUZ v. JUDGE CANDIDO R.

BELMONTE
A.M. No. RTJ-93-1052
October 27, 1994
Regalado J.

FACTS:
Accused Estelita Hipolito, together with ten others, were indicted for the ambush-slaying
Bernardo Aguirre and his driver, Avelino Cruz.
Judge Nicasio Bartolome of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, conducted the
preliminary investigation and, after finding the existence of probable cause, ordered the arrest
of all the accused with no bail fixed for their provisional liberty.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, on review, ordered the release of the accused in the
belief that there was no probable cause. On appeal to the Department of Justice, the latter found
that, except for one of the accused, there was reasonable ground to hold all of them for trial
and accordingly directed the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file the corresponding
informations with no bail recommended.
Two informations for murder were then filed in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan.
The case was raffled and presided over by respondent judge.
Respondent directed the consolidation of the two cases in his branch even without any motion
therefor being filed by either the accused or the prosecution. After the consolidation was
effected, respondent judge directed the issuance of warrants of arrest against the accused. At
the same time and on his own motion, he also authorized their provisional release on bail.
Pursuant thereto, the accused posted their bail bonds.
On this state of things, complainants have come to the court, impugning the orders of
respondent, berating his actuations, and seeking his dismissal from the service.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge erred in motu propio granting bail, without any
motion or application therfor by any of the accused and without any notice to the prosecution or
any hearing conducted therein.

HELD:
Yes. It has been an established legal principle or rule that in cases where a person is accused of a
capital offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the
prosecution an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to
produce to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue
of bail for the temporary release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing bail in
the instant case amounted to a violation of the process. Irrespective of respondent judge's opinion
that the evidence of guilt against herein accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence
demanded that a hearing be conducted before bail was fixed for the temporary release of accused,
if bail was at all justified. Respondent judge's disregard of an established rule of law by depriving
the prosecution of the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused was
strong, amounted to gross ignorance of the law, which is subject to disciplinary action.

What magnifies the aforementioned procedural misfeasance and nonfeasance of respondent judge
is the fact that when he issued his order granting bail, the accused were admittedly still at large.
It was explicitly clarified in Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al. that since bail is intended to obtain
the provisional liberty of the accused, the same cannot be authorized or posted before custody of
said accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

It is self-evident that a court cannot authorize provisional liberty to one who is then actually in the
enjoyment of his liberty, or as the Court quoted therein, "it would be incongruous to grant bail to
one who is free."

Therefore, respondent's act of granting bail to the accused, under the circumstances earlier
catalogued and ramified, indubitably amounts to such a whimsical and arbitrary exercise of
jurisdiction.

(15) THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FERNANDO ALANO

G.R. No. L-1801
May 14, 1948
Perfecto J.

FACTS:
Detained since March 7, 1946, in connection with treason case, Fernando Alano, the accused,
alleged that the Peoples Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying his petition for
bail and prays that he be released on bail.
Petitioner claims that he is entitled to be bailed because:
a) the law presumes him to be innocent until the contrary is conclusively proved,
b) he has been undergoing a long confinement, while facing a protracted trial of his case,
c) of the 14 counts of the amended information filed against him, 10 have been dropped or
dismissed, upon petition of the prosecution itself, after it had closed its evidence,
d) many other treason indictees, facing more serious charges, and some others who have been
convicted in the first instance have been granted bail by the same Peoples Court, and
e) the prosecutions allegation, opposing petitioners first petition for bail, that the evidence
of guilt is strong, is belied by the fact that later on the prosecution itself had to ask for the
dismissal of 10 of the 14 counts of the information.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alano is entitled to bail.

HELD:
Yes. In all criminal cases, except for capital offenses, where the evidence of guilt is strong, the
accused is entitled, as a fundamental right constitutionally guaranteed, to be bailed. In cases of
capital offense, the accused is bailable in the discretion of the court. The discretion of the court in
such cases is neither absolute nor beyond control, and must be exercised taking into consideration
the purposes of pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions and the rules of the Supreme
Court, all supplemented by the principles of equity and justice that are deemed to be part of the
laws of the land.

After a long deliberation on petitioners case, and considering the fact that, of 14 counts of the
information, 10 had to be dismissed upon petition of the prosecution itself, that the trial is being
protracted, and petitioner is undergoing a long confinement, while there are no assurances that his
case can be speeded in accordance with the constitutional intent, the court is convinced
that petitioner should be bailed.

Mention has been made of the fact that petitioner, while confined in the Old Bilibid Prisons,
escaped on the afternoon of June 16, 1947, but petitioners counsel has satisfactorily explained,
without any contradiction, that petitioner took such course so as to be able to contact his witnesses,
scattered in several places, so as to be able to prove his innocence and that, as soon as he was
through with said mission, he contacted the Office of the President of the Philippines so as to
arrange for his voluntary surrender, which took place sometime in July, 1947, showing his
readiness to face the trial and to allow the administration of justice to take its legal and normal
course. Petitioner argued further that the fact that accused Lucio Santos, in case No. 217, had also
escaped from detention did no impede the Peoples Court to grant him bail.
We are satisfied that in petitioners escape he did not have the purpose of evading the action of
justice, and it is already settled that a detainees escape does not deprive him of the constitutional
right to be bailed.
(16) THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PACIFICO PECZON, ET AL., ACCUSED,
AND PEDRO REBADULLA, ET AL., BONDSMEN
G.R. No. L-15584
October 27, 1961
Bautista Angelo J.

FACTS:
A complaint for robbery in band was filed against five persons before the Justice of the Peace
Court of Japapad, Samar.
Having been allowed to enjoy provisional liberty, 19 persons put up the requisite bail bond in
their behalf in the total amount of P 40,000.
After the formal charge was filed by the fiscal, the case was set for trial. Of the 19 bondsmen
only 8 received notice of the hearing.
Believing, however, that the appearance of the accused was only required for the preliminary
investigation of the case, Atty. Rebadulla, counsel, advised them that their presence was not
necessary it being sufficient that their waiver, as they manifested to him, be made of record.
But upon learning later that the scheduled hearing was for trial on the merits, Atty. Rebadulla
wired the clerk of court asking for the trials postponement.
Counsel also sent by registered mail a written motion for postponement. He justified his request
by stating that he has just been engaged and has not had sufficient time to study the case. The
intervening period was also too short for him to prepare the defense of the accused, more so
considering that the trial would be held at Oras, Samar.
This motion having been denied and the accused having failed to appear at the trial, the court
directed their arrest and the confiscation of their bond, giving the bondsmen 30 days within
which to produce the persons of said accused and to explain why their bond should not be
forfeited.
Counsel Rebadulla filed an urgent motion to lift the order of confiscation alleging that if the
bondsmen were not able to present the accused at the trial it was because of the advice he gave
them not to appear due to his mistaken belief that the same was only for preliminary
investigation which the accused can waive and that if the bondsmen failed to surrender them
within the 30-day period given them it was because the accused had already been arrested and
lodged in jail by virtue of a previous order of the Court.
Finding this explanation unsatisfactory coupled by the fact that the motion was not supported
by any affidavit, the court denied the motion.
Counsel filed a motion, for reconsideration attaching this time the requisite affidavits in
justification of his request for the lifting of the confiscation of the bond, but far from acceding
to it, the court rendered judgment ordering the bondsmen to pay to the Government the amounts
specified in their respective bonds, which judgment was made immediately executory.
Hence the bondsmen interposed the present appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court abused its discretion in ordering the confiscation of the
respective bonds.

HELD:
Yes. Section 15, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court provides: "SEC. 15. Forfeiture of bail. When
the appearance of the defendant is required by the court, his sureties shall be notified to produce
him before the court on a given date. If the defendant fails to appear as required, the bond is
declared forfeited and the bondsmen are given thirty days within which to produce their principal
and to show cause why a judgment should not be rendered against them for the amount of their
bond. Within the said period of thirty days, the bondsmen (a) must produce the body of their
principal or give the reason for its non-production; and (b) must explain satisfactorily why the
defendant did not appear before the court when required to do so. Failing in these two requisites,
a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen."

A bondsman who was not given notice of the date of hearing cannot be held liable for his failure
to produce the person of the accused as required by the court and, hence, his bond cannot be
forfeited on that ground.

Even if the bondsmen who were notified of the trial, failed to produce the persons of the accused
at the trial or within the 30-day period given them to do so, their bonds should not be ordered
forfeited, because upon receipt of the order of the court ordering the confiscation of their bonds
and requiring them to show cause why judgment should not be rendered against them for their
failure to comply with their commitment, they submitted within a reasonable period a written
explanation of the reasons for their failure not only to produce said principals on the date of the
hearing, but also during the period given them to do so as a justification for their exoneration.
Under the circumstances of the case, the steps taken by the bondsmen with regard to their failure
to comply with their commitment constitute a substantial compliance with the requirement of the
rules on the matter.

(17) THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO TAN AND MANILA SURETY
& FIDELITY CO., INC.
G.R. No. L-6239
April 30, 1957
Labrador J.

FACTS:
Due to Antonio Tans failure to appear on the arraignment and trial of his case, the court issued
an order for the confiscation of his bond.
The court gave Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. time to produce the body of the accused and
to explain why judgment should not be rendered against it, but the latter failed in both.
On November 6, 1951, judgment was rendered against the surety to pay the Government
P2,000 including all expenses incident to the collection thereof.
The surety moved to surrender the person of the accused and that it be allowed to withdraw
the bond. The court, however, denied the motion in an order dated May 14, 1952.
The surety filed a motion to reconsider the order of May 14, 1952, alleging that it had spent
big sums in securing the arrest of the accused.
The accused pleaded guilty to the charge on July 9, 1952 and was then and there sentenced.
On September 4, 1952 the court amended its judgment for the payment of P2,000 by the surety,
reducing this amount to P200.
It is against this order that the People has appealed. It is urged by the Solicitor-General that as
the judgment against the surety had become final and executory, the court had already lost
control over its judgment, especially as a writ of execution had already been issued.

ISSUE: Whether or not courts may modify judgments of confiscation of bonds even if there is
already a final and executory judgment.

HELD:
Yes. Upon failure of a bondsman to produce the principal at a date set by the court, it cannot be
stated that there is already a complete and irrevocable breach of the bond; neither does it follow
that the judgment then rendered against the bondsman to pay the amount of the bond is a final
irrevocable judgment.
The judgment of confiscation rendered is merely provisional in character subject to the
contingency that the bondsman may finally secure the arrest of the principal and the production of
his person in court and thereby ultimately comply with his obligation. If after the provisional
judgment, the bondsman succeeds in getting the accused to court, the happening of the contingency
resolves his full liability under the confiscated bond, and the court is given the power to set aside
or modify the previous judgment.

In the case at bar, as the surety succeeded in bringing about the arrest of the accused and in
surrendering his person to court, it had thereby ultimately complied with its obligation under the
bond, for which reason the court had the authority to set aside or modify the judgment rendered
against it by reason of the previous breach.

(18) GIMENO V. VALLANGCA, MARIA TOMANENG, BLAS VILLASIN, DOLORES

AYONAYON, FLAVIANA RENON, PETRA GOROSPE, PEDRO TORRIDA and
HONORATO LANIA, vs. HON. CRISPIN G. ARIOLA, in his capacity as Municipal Judge
of Buguey, Cagayan; HON. NARCISO A. AQUINO, in his capacity as Provincial Fiscal of
Cagayan; and NEMESIO T. ONATE, in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff
G.R. No. L-29226
September 28, 1973
FERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:
 People v. Honorato Lania, a criminal case for illegal possession of firearms, was set for hearing
on July 21, 1964. As far back as July 7 of that year, a subpoena was issued by such court to
notify the bondsmen to produce the person of the accused at the scheduled trial. The bondsmen
did not accept service of such subpoena. Moreover, they did not produce the accused in court
on the scheduled date of July 21. Neither were they present. Then came an order of such court
on July 30, 1964, requiring such bondsmen to explain within 15 days why bail should not be
forfeited.
There was such a memorandum of explanation or a motion for reconsideration of August 19,
1964, which the municipal court of Buguey, Cagayan considered unsatisfactory. Nonetheless,
they were given an additional period of 15 days to produce the person of the accused. Again,
the bondsmen were unable to do so.
On September 23, 1964, the aforesaid Vallangca filed a motion asking a period of 30 days
within which to comply with the obligation to have the accused appear before the court. It was
granted but with the same negative result.
The municipal court therefore decreed the forfeiture. The principal and of all the bondsmen
were ordered to pay for the the bail bond (P2,000.00) and in default of the same, all the real
properties bounded in the bail bond shall be confiscated in favor of government.
When it became final and executory, Provincial Fiscal of Cagayan, respondent Narciso
Aquino, filed a motion dated October 11, 1965 for the issuance of a writ of execution against
the real properties of the bondsmen. The municipal court judge, granted said motion. The third
respondent, Deputy Sheriff Nemesio Onate, after posting the notice of sale and after proper
publication, sold such property at public auction on August 21, 1967 to the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, as the highest bidder.
On August 18, 1967, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and an ex-parte motion for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against Onate to restrain him from selling at
public auction their properties under the bail bond.
The order of said court issued on August 21, 1967 enjoining deputy sheriff Nemesio Onate not
to proceed with the sale at public auction was returned unserved on that date for lack of material
time, because the properties had already been sold at public auction as scheduled to the
government .
The petitioners claim that former judge Ernesto Furugganan of the municipal court had already
dismissed the case against Lania on June27, 1962, when he granted in open court a motion to
quash. However, there is no order of dismissal found in the records of said case. The petition
was subsequently denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred for sustaining the forfeiture of the bond.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative.

Under section 15, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, When the appearance of the defendant is
required by the court, his sureties shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date.
If the defendant fails to appear as required, the bond is declared forfeited and the bondsmen are
given 30 days within which to produce their principal and to show cause why a judgment should
not be rendered against them for the amount of their bond. Within the said period of 30 days, the
bondsmen (a) must produce the body of their principal or give the reason for its non-production;
and (b) must explain satisfactorily why the defendant did not appear before the court when first
required so to do. Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the
bondsmen. This is one of those cases where hardly any room is left for interpretation. All that a
judicial body can do is to apply it as worded.

The law, it will be recalled, provides for a discharge of the forfeiture upon such terms as may be
considered just. In other words, whether a bail bond upon which there is a default should be
declared forfeited to its full amount or in a lesser amount, rests largely in the discretion of the court
and depends on the circumstances of each particular case. (People v. Reyes)

There may be instances where not even the production of the body of the principal would suffice,
there being the added requirement of a satisfactory explanation of the failure to appear when first
required. It will thus be seen that while the Surrender or the appearance of the accused is a
prerequisite to relief from, or remission of, a forfeiture of bail, the sureties cannot exonerate
themselves simply by a surrender of him after a forfeiture, and hence, they are not as a matter of
right, released from their obligations under a forfeited recognizance by the mere surrender of their
principal or his voluntary appearance after forfeiture x x x (Luzon Surety Co. v. Montemayor)
The petition for certiorari, as therein noted, was filed after 2 years, counted from the denial of the
last motion for reconsideration. The failure of the petitioners to file an appeal within the
reglementary period provided for by law is either intentional or a gross negligence on their part
and certiorari cannot be a substitute for that appeal. In the instant case, the judgment of the lower
Court forfeiting the bail bond of the petitioners became final and executor on January 6, 1965.

To grant this petition for certiorari, therefore, would set at naught the final verdict rendered by the
Municipal Court of Buguey which to all appearances is in accordance with law.

(19) COMMUNICATIONS INSURANCE COMPANY, INCORPORATED vs. HON.

ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as Presiding judge of the Circuit Criminal Court,
ANTONIO MARINAS, Deputy Sheriff of Rizal, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-36721-27
August 29, 1980
De Castro, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner failed to produce the body of Nestor Evangelista (one of the accused in seven cases
of Estafa through falsification of commercial documents) during the trial on April 12, 1971.
Because of petitioners failure, on May 11, 1972, the respondent court declared forfeited the
seven bail bonds, petitioner posed for Evangelistas temporary release. It also ordered to
produce Evangelistas body within 30 days and show cause why judgements should not be
rendered against it on its bonds.
Petitioner failed to comply with the order, so on June 8, 1972, the respondent judge, issued a
writ of execution for the total amount of the 7 bail bonds in the sum of P134,000.00
Invoking the three-fold rule under Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, petitioner
filed the motion for the reduction of its liability P30,000.00 being the highest individual
liability therefore P90,000.00 under the bonds it posted, setting the motion for hearing on Apri.
14, 1973.
Petitioner invoked the following:
a) Circular No. 29, May 7, 1972 which reads: When the accused is charged of three or more
offenses arising from the same incident, the crime not being complex the bail bonds shall
not exceed three-fold that which is required under this Circular for the most severe
offense.
b) Ruling in the case of People vs. Puyat, G. R. No. L-8091, February 17, 1956, 98 Phil. 415,
which reduced the liability of the confiscated bond of P10,000.00 to P3,000.00, the Court
taking into account the sentence imposed which was five (5) years, five (5) months and
eleven (11) days, in order to make the suretys liability proportional to the sentence.
Respondent judge denied the motion in an order date April 6, 1973. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge erred in denying petitioners motion to reduce
liability.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

In explaining the doctrine laid in Puyat case the court stated that the liberality which we have
shown in dealing with bondsmen in criminal cases and in mitigating their liability on bonds already
confiscated because of the delay in the presentation of defendants, finds explanation in the fact
that the ultimate desire of the State is not the monetary reparation of the bondsmans default, but
the enforcement or execution of the sentence, such as the imprisonment of the accused or the
payment by him of the fine imposed.

That interest of the State ca not be measured in terms of pesos as in private contracts and
obligations. The surrender of the person of the accused so that he can serve his sentence is its
ultimate goal or object. The provision for the confiscation of the bond, upon failure within a
reasonable time to produce the person of the accused for the execution of the sentence, is not based
upon a desire to gain from such failure; it is to compel the bondsman to enhance its efforts to have
the person of the accused produced for the execution of the sentence. Hence, after the surety has
presented the person of the accused to the court, or the accused already arrested, we have invariably
exercised our discretion in favor of the partial remission of the bondsmans liability.

The three fold-rule, on the other hand, has absolutely no bearing on the confiscation of the bond
and the amount thereof to be forfeited. It has reference only to the maximum duration of the
sentence to be served where three or more offenses have been committed. It has, therefore, no
relevance at all when the accused absconds to become a fugitive from justice and makes a mockery
of the judicial process, designed to protect society in general and particular members thereof
directly offended. Considerations of liberality as have inspired the rulings relied upon by petitioner
cannot be said to equally exist in the case at bar where there is not a mere delay in the presentation
of the accused, but a total failure to produce him to be tried and sentenced accordingly if found
guilty

By its own terms and phraseology, the circular of the Secretary of Justice also invoked by
petitioner, is clearly not applicable. It explicitly excludes complex crimes from its benign effects,
the kind of crime with which Nestor Evangelista is charged in all the seven counts of estafa with
falsification of commercial documents. They likewise do not arise from the same incident, which
is one of the conditions required in the circular for its application in given situation. Furthermore,
the circular sets a rule for the determination of the amount of bail in the situation contemplated,
certainly a different matter from the amount to be forfeited to the State of bail bonds confiscated
for violation of the terms and conditions thereof.

There is a faint intimation in the instant petition that respondent judge abused his discretion gravely
when he denied petitioners motion to reduce its liability on its bond even before the hearing
thereof as set in the motion. Considering, however, that the writ of execution was issued on June
8, 1972, and the motion aforementioned was filed on April 5, 1973, long after the declaration of
confiscation of the bond as early as May 11, 1972, respondent judge saw evidently in the motion
a mere dilatory tactic, which it really is, and a reading thereof not showing any useful necessity of
a hearing, its denial even without hearing is justified. Besides, hearing is more for the benefit of
the adverse party, not to the movant who suffers the penalty of dismissal of his motion if he fails
to set it for hearing with due notice to the adverse party. In any event, since the merit of his motion
has in effect been examined thoroughly by us in this petition, petitioner has no reason to complain
against what appeared to it and now claims to be a hasty denial of said motion in violation of the
due process which it is not.

(20) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. JUDGE HERMENEGILDO A. PRIETO,

SR., CFI Branch IV, Roxas, Isabela, and DARIO GAMAYON
G.R. No. L-46542
July 21, 1978
FERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:
On 7 February 1977, Judge Hermenegildo A. Prieto, Sr. issued an order: "a warrant of arrest
for the apprehension of accused Dario Gamayon for his continuous failure to appear in Court
every time the case is called for trial." The order continued: "His bail bond is declared
forfeited." The order likewise gave the bondsmen 30 days "from notice thereof within which
to produce the body of accused Dario Gamayon and show cause why judgment should not be
rendered against them for the amount of their undertaking."
On 5 April 197, in resolving a motion for reconsideration, however, Judge Prieto reversed his
previous order purportedly on the ground that Article IV, Section 19 of the 1973 Constitution
(now Article III, Section 14 (2) of the Constitution) provides that, In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustified.
Judge Hermenegildo A. Prieto, Sr., of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, would not have
been named respondent by the People of the Philippines in a certiorari proceeding had he taken
greater care in his appraisal of what the last sentence of Section 19 of the Constitution means.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provision allowing the continuation of a trial after arraignment
notwithstanding the absence of the accused affected the traditional concept of bail.

HELD: No.
Under the New Constitution, the trial court must continue the trial of the criminal case even when
the accused jumped bail and is abroad. He failed to take into account that the constitutional right
to bail would be rendered nugatory if, by the mere fact that the trial could proceed in the absence
of the accused, the undertaking in a bail bond and the Rules of Court provision could be ignored.
Bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law,
that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the
bail bond or recognizance. Clearly, the innovation introduced by the present Constitution goes no
further than to enable a judge to continue with the trial even if the accused is not present under the
conditions therein specified. It does not give him the right to jump bail where, as in this case, it is
undisputed that he had gone abroad, the usual procedure provided by the Rules of Court to
determine the liability of his bondsmen should be followed.

Where the accused jumps bail, the trial shall continue and the bondsmen held to their undertaking
as sureties. There is no justification in law, therefore, for such valid and correct order being
reconsidered, just because of the innovation in the Constitution as to the trial being held in the
absence of an accnsed. Respondent Judge unfortunately assumed that thereby a defendant was thus
conferred a fundamental right to ignore the terms of the bond posted by him in accordance with
his constitutional right to bail. The present Constitution certainly has not made a dent on the
traditional and correct concept of a bail as given to allow the release of a person in the custody of
the law on condition that he would appear before any court whenever so required. Upon failure to
do so, the warrant of arrest previously issued can be a sufficient justification for his confinement.
All that is assured on accused who posts bail, therefore, is that prior to his conviction, he need not
be deprived of his liberty. The mere fact that the trial could not continue in his absence certainly
affords no justification for his jumping bail nor for his bondsmen to escape from the legal effects
of their actions.

As correctly pointed out by the Assistant Solicitor, there was no justification for accused
Gamayon's failure to appear during the scheduled hearings. He simply jumped bail and Judge
Prieto knew it. Judge Prieto was informed that Gamayon was about to leave the country and he
was asked to order the proper authorities to prevent the departure of said accused. But Judge Prieto
refused to act on the information and motion. He also denied a motion for reconsideration of his
action. In setting aside his order of February 7, 1977, Judge Prieto gravely abused his discretion.
When Gamayon had left the country, he was already beyond the reach of the lower court and it
was Judge Prietos previous inaction which made possible the departure of accused Gamayon from
the country by refusing to take action against the bondsmen.

Bondsmen need not be named as respondents in the petition below where they have already been
given notice to show cause for failure of accused to appear in court. Again, in the Comment which
private respondent, the accused Gamayon, submitted to this Court, the same counsel argued on
behalf of the bondsmen, relying, as could be expected, in the implausible and farfetched
interpretation of the significance to be attached to the constitutional provision allowing trial to
proceed in the absence of the accused. It cannot be truly said, therefore, that they had not been
accorded a hearing. At any rate, the original order which ought not to have been set aside,
conformably to the Rules of Court, did grant the bondsmen a period of thirty days from notice
within which to produce the body of the accused and also to show cause why judgment should not
be rendered against them for the amount of their undertaking. Thus, they would be accorded full
opportunity to present whatever defenses may be availed of by them. To all intents and purposes,
therefore, there is no juridical objection to considering the petition amended in the sense that the
bondsmen are deemed included to require an amendment to the petition would, under the
circumstances, be sheer superfluity.

(21) BELFAST SURETY AND INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., thru its Vice-President and
General Manager MAURO T. ALLARDE vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
THE HON. PEDRO N. LAGGUI, Presiding Judge, Circuit Criminal Court, Fifth Judicial
District, San Fernando, Pampanga
G.R. No. L-47309
January 30, 1982
Concepcion, Jr. J.:

FACTS:
Sometime on April 7, 1975, an information was filed with the Circuit Criminal Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, charging the accused Allan Pangilinan, Angelito Pangilinan, Reynaldo
 Tiotuico, and Lauriano Tiamzon with the crime of murder, docketed therein as Criminal Case
No. CCC-V-1142
All the accused posted their bail bonds for their provisional liberty. The petitioner Belfast
Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., executed the bail bond for the accused Allan Pangilinan in the
sum of P20,000.00
When arraigned, all the accused entered a plea of not guilty; thereafter, trial proceeded. At the
trial held on April 29, 1976, the accused Allan Pangilinan failed to appear, despite the fact that
he was notified of said trial thru the petitioner.
On the same date, the respondent judge issued an order, ordering the arrest of the accused and
declaring the forfeiture of the bond posted for him by the petitioner.
In the same order, the respondent judge also required the petitioner to produce the body of the
accused and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against it for the amount of
the bond, within 30 days from receipt of the said order.
The order of the respondent Judge of April 29, 1976, was received by the petitioner on May 6,
1976. It had, therefore, thirty (30) days from the said date, or up to June 5, 1976, within which
to comply with the said order.
However, on May 31, 1976, that is, 5 days before the expiration of the 30-day period, the
respondent Judge issued and promulgated an order acquitting all the accused in the presence
of their counsel, and ordered the cancellation of their bonds.
29 days later the judge issues an order which excludes the bail of Allan Pangilinan from the
Cancellation of the bail and orders the Belfast to pay the P20,000.00 bond in favor of the
government.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in rendering the judgement which
forfeited the bail bond of Allan Pangilinan

HELD: Yes.
Where the trial judge acquitted all the accused five (5) days before the expiry of the 30-day period
for the surety to show cause why one of the accused failed to attend the trial, the court can no
longer order a forfeiture of the surety bond.

The order of the respondent Judge of April 29, 1976, was received by the petitioner on May 6,
1976. It had, therefore, thirty (30) days from the said date, or up to June 5, 1976, within which to
comply with the said order. However, on May 31, 1976, that is, five days before the expiration of
the 30-day period, the respondent Judge issued and promulgated an order acquitting all the accused
in the presence of their counsel, and ordered the cancellation of their bonds, except that of the
accused Allan Pangilinan. Considering that the order of acquittal was promulgated five (5) days
before the expiration of the 30-day period. We believe that the petitioner was relieved of its duty
to produce the body of the accused Allan Pangilinan, and to show cause why no judgment should
be rendered against it for the amount of the bond. It would have been different if the order of
acquittal was promulgated after the 30-day period, because by then, the liability of the petitioner
would have become fixed and the order of forfeiture final.

Purpose of Rules in requiring confiscation of bail bond where accused fails to be present at the
trial does not exist anymore where judgment is one of acquittal; hence, bond forfeiture is not called
for anymore in such a case even if surety failed to bring accused to court.

The surrender of the accused so that he can serve his sentence is its ultimate goal or object. The
provision for the confiscation of the bend, upon failure within a reasonable time to produce the
person of the accused for the execution of his sentence, is not based upon a desire to gain from
such failure; it is to compel the bondsman to enchance its efforts to have the person of the accused
for the execution of his sentence. Since the judgment in the case at bar is for acquittal, the reason
for the confiscation of the bend, upon failure of the bondsman to produce within a reasonable time
the person of the accused, for the execution of the sentence, does not exist. Under the facts
obtaining in the case before us, it would seem that respondent Judge acted harshly against the
petitioner. In his Comments on the Rules of Court, the late Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran
observes that it is a general practice followed by all courts in the Philippines to cancel motu
proprio the bond when a judgment of acquittal is rendered. And even if no such cancellation is
ordered, the bond is ipso facto cancelled and all obligations arising therefrom are extinguished.
Besides, a judgment of acquittal is final immediately after promulgation. The respondent Judges
order of acquittal, therefore, became final immediately after its promulgation on May 31, 1976.
After the said date, the respondent Judge had no more jurisdiction over the case and over the person
of the accused Allan Pangilinan. Since the respondent Judges judgment on the bond was rendered
on June 29, 1976, 29 days after the order of acquittal became final, the same is null and void for
lack of jurisdiction.

(22) B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO

PIZARRO, CAPT. MANUEL ISON, COL. LUISITO SANCHEZ, LTC. ROMELINO
GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ, LTC. TIBURCIO
FUSILLERO, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT LTC. FRANKLIN
BRAWNER, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PERA, MAJ. LEUVINO
VALENCIA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO
LIM, CAPT. ELMER AMON, CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA vs.
GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI INVESTIGATING
PANEL COMPOSED OF: COL. MANUEL S. MENDIOLA, COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO
L. DAGZA MAJ. FELIX V. BALDONADO and MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA and
GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14 COMPOSED OF: B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA
COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL.
WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN
G.R. No. 93177
August 2, 1991

B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU,

COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT.
FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN vs. HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch
104, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Q.C., LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA.
GR. No. 95020
August 2, 1991

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO

PIZARRO PN, CAPT. MANUEL ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO PN (M), LTC.
ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ PA, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO
PA, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA, LTC. FRANKLIN
BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M):
MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT. JAIME
JUNIO PA, CAPT. DANILO LIM PA, CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF CAPT. VERGEL
NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA vs. B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO
A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI COL. WILLY FLORENDO,
COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN PRESIDENT AND
MEMBERS OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14
GR No. 96948
August 2, 1991

AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
MAJOR GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL MAJOR GEN.
CESAR NAZARENO and LT. COL. ALBERTO OLARIO, Commanding Officer of the
PNP/INP Detention Center/Jail vs. HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86, CAPTAIN REYNALDO S. RAFAEL, 1 LT
SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), 1 LT. WILFREDO JIMENEZ PAF 1 LT. ATANACIO
T. MACALAN JR PMM 2LT ELISEO T. RASCO PC, 2LT JONAS CALLEJA PC, 2LT
JAIRUS JS GELVEZON III PMM 2LT JOSELITO CABREROS PMM 2LT MEMEL
ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT HERMINIO L. CANTACO PC
GR No. 97454
August 2, 1991
Cruz, J.:

FACTS:
These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and
related issues arising from the same incident
 The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020
and 97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their
alleged participation in the failed coup detat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989
The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder)
In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, they are
questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel constituted to investigate
the charges against them and the creation of the General Court Martial (GCM) convened to try
them
In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14, seek
certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by
Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408
In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City are assailed on certiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and
no authority either to set aside its ruling denying bail to the private respondents
In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in a petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the private respondents.
Jurisdictional objections are likewise raised as in G.R. No. 95020.
Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel had
been constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948.
The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990, individually addressed to
the petitioners
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc. Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was
denied by GCM No. 14.

RTC: rendered judgment declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the
right to bail to all persons with the defined exception is applicable and covers all military men
facing court-martial proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of General Court-Martial No.
14 denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does not apply
to military men facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is no precedent, are
hereby set aside and declared null and void. Respondent General Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby
directed to conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of the petitioner, intervenors and which
may as well include other persons facing charges before General Court-Martial No. 14.

Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General Court-Martial No. 14, this
Court reiterates its orders of release on the provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot as well
as intervenors Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.

ISSUES:
1. Whether there was violation of due process
2. Whether or not the military personnel are entitled to bail, thus, whether or not there was a
violation of the right to bail

HELD:
1. No. The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several opportunities to be heard
when they were asked to submit their counter-affidavits to the PTI. They cannot claim that
they were denied due process. Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the
date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit controverting evidence.
Even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court- martial of
jurisdiction.

Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not
availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.

There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel. Moreover,
it is now settled that even a failure to conduct, a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general
court-martial of jurisdiction. x x x But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not
deprive a general court-martial of jurisdiction. The better accepted concept of pre-trial
investigation is that it is directory, not mandatory, and in no way affects the jurisdiction of a court-
martial.

Neither does it violate equal protection because the military is not similarly situated with others.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection
clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly
situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others.
The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are
not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the
same right that is extended to civilians.

It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of
violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and
otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings.

This is without merit.

The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other
bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.

2. No. We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has
traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the
general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. However, a right to speedy trial is given more
emphasis in the military, where the right to bail does not exist.

Solicitor Generals explanation of the exception: The unique structure of the military should be
enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to
bail.soldiers operate within the framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary
use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid
out of revenues collected from the people. the truly disquieting thought is that they could
freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly
constituted authorities,

Constitution grants the right to bail to all persons with the defined exception is applicable and
covers all military men facing court-martial proceedings.

On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia: (a) Declaring, that Section 13,
Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to all persons with the defined exception is
applicable and covers all military men facing court-martial proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed
orders of General Court-Martial No. 14 denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken
assumption that bail does not apply to military men facing court-martial proceedings on the ground
that there is no precedent, are hereby set aside and declared null and void. Respondent General
Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of the
petitioner, intervenors and which may as well include other persons facing charges before General
Court-Martial No. 14.

(23) EDUARDO N. ASWAT vs. BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALEJANDRO GALIDO, in his

capacity as Commander of the Southern Luzon Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines,
Camp Guillermo Nakar, Lucena City
G.R. No. 88555
November 21, 1991
FELICIANO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Eduardo N. Aswat and victim Felix B. Nebres were both enlisted men of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP") respectively holding the ranks Private First Class and
Corporal. Aswat and Nebres were assigned to the SOLCOM but Aswat was detailed as
caretaker of Brigadier General Galidos Baguio resthouse while Nebres was assigned to act as
a personal driver of Brigadier General Galidos wife. On 29 December 1988, petitioner was
involved in a shooting incident at Dominican Hills, Baguio City, which resulted in the death
of Nebres.
 Records disclose that petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the Baguio City police authorities
and was briefly incarcerated at the Baguio City Jail until he was transferred to a SOLCOM
detention cell on 31 December 1988. Petitioner has been detained at the SOLCOM
Headquarters in Camp Guillermo Nakar, Lucena City since then.
On 20 April 1989, petitioner was charged before a SOLCOM General Court-Martial
(SOLCOM-GCM") with violation of Article 94 of the Articles of War (A.W."), the
specification being homicide.
While the court-martial proceedings were going on, petitioner filed the instant petition,
contending; (1) that the specification of homicide with which he was charged was committed
outside a military installation and hence the offense was cognizable by a regular, civilian court;
(2) that he is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right pursuant to Section 13, Article
III of the Constitution; and (3) that he should be given his due base pay and other pay, aside
from the allowances he has been receiving, computed from the time of commencement of his
detention.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Aswat is entitled to the right to bail as explicitly guaranteed in Section 13,
Article III of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not SOLCOM-GCM lack jurisdiction as the crime was committed outside a
military reservation or installment.
3. Whether or not Aswat is entitled to payment aside from the allowances he has been receiving.

HELD:
1. No. Although the right to bail applies to all, the Court has very recently ruled that the
guarantee is not without any exception. In Comendador vs. De Villa, et al., the Court en banc,
speaking through Mr. Justice Cruz, held: We find that the right to bail invoked by the private
respondents in G.R. No. 96020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the
military, as on exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights.

The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the
constitutional coverage on the right to bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the
framework of the democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government
for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from
the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and against the existing
political system.

The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection
clause is not acceptable. This guarantee requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly
situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others.
The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are
not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the
same right that is extended to civilians.

2. No. The distinction upon which petitioner anchors his argument was obliterated sometime ago.
As the law now stands, as long as the accused is subject to military law, as defined under
Article 2, A.W., he shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. Article 94, A.W. provides:
Article 94. Various Crimes.Any person subject to military law who commits any felony,
crime, breach of law or violation of municipal ordinances which is recognized as an offense of
a penal nature and is punishable under the penal laws of the Philippines or under municipal
ordinances, (A) inside a reservation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or (B) outside any
such reservation when the offended party (and each one of the offended parties if there be more
than one) is a person subject to military law, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct:
In imposing the penalties for offenses falling within this article, the penalties for such offenses
provided in the penal laws of the Philippines or in such municipal ordinances shall be taken
into consideration.

3. No. Petitioner, during detention, ceased to perform his ordinary military duties. His continued
detention necessarily restrains his freedom of work, and he cannot carry out his normal military
functions. There is no showing by petitioner that he was placed on full duty status and
performing regular duties pending trial. On the premise of no work no pay, petitioner
 cannot insist on his right to receive base pay or any other pay while under detention. However,
while petitioner is not entitled to receive any base pay or any other pay during his detention,
the law expressly permits him to receive his regular and other allowances, if otherwise entitled
thereto, while under detention.

(24) ALVAREZ ARO YUSOP vs. The Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division)
G.R. Nos. 138859-60.
February 22, 2001
PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:
Erlinda Fadri filed an Affidavit-Complaint in the Office of the Ombudsman and on September
19, 1995, the office issued an order requiring Benjamin Arao, Fredireck Winters, Pelaez
Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay and the city jail warden of Pagadian City to submit
counter-affidavits and other pieces of controverting evidence.
The Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution dated January 15, 1998 recommending the
prosecution of the aforenamed respondents for violation of Article 269 of the Revised Penal
Code (Unlawful Arrest) and Section 3-a in relation to Section 3-e of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corruption Act) as amended. Yusop was included as one of the persons to be prosecuted but
the prior order does not include his name.
On April 16, 1998, Sandiganbayan issued an order of arrest but petitioner posted bail on May
20, 1998 in the RTC of Dipolos City and he also filed a Motion to Remand Case to the
Ombudsman - Mindanao For Preliminary Investigation. Sandiganbayan denied the petition for
Yusops alleged failure to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court.
Subsequently, he asked for dismissal of the case for lack of preliminary investigation but in an
Order dated September 22, 1998, the Sandiganbayan resolved not to take action on the Motion,
because petitioner had not yet submitted himself to its jurisdiction.
During the arraignment, Yusop claimed that he had not been accorded preliminary
investigation. In its two assailed Orders, the Sandiganbayan rejected his claim and proceeded
with the arraignment.
Sandiganbayan: rejected petitioners plea for preliminary investigation

ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan, despite being informed of the lack of preliminary investigation
with respect to petitioner, committed grave abuse of discretion in proceeding with his arraignment.

HELD: The Petition is meritorious in part. While petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation,
the case against him should not be dismissed.

Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient

ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
- The rationale of a preliminary investigation is to protect the accused from the
inconvenience, expense and burden of defending himself in a formal trial unless the
reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been first ascertained in a fairly summary
proceeding by a competent officer

The Rules of Court requires such investigation before an information for an offense punishable by
at least four years, two months and one day may be filed in court.
- The old Rules, on the other hand, mandates preliminary investigation of an offense
cognizable by the regional trial court.

Petitioner is charged in Criminal Case No. 24524 with violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019. Such
offense is punishable with, among other penalties, imprisonment of six years and one month to
fifteen years. Under the aforecited Rules, whether in the old or the revised version, he is entitled
to a preliminary investigation.

In Go v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the right to preliminary investigation is waived
when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.
Conversely, if the accused does invoke it before arraignment, as the petitioner did in this case, the
right is not waived
Neither did the filing of a bail bond constitute a waiver of petitioners right to preliminary
investigation. Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, [a]n
application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his
arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning
the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them
before entering his plea.

We stress that the right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal or technical.
To deny it to petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process. Hence,
preliminary investigation with regard to him must he conducted.

Petitioner also prays that the cases against him be dismissed for lack of preliminary investigation.
We disagree.
- In the first place, nowhere in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or even the old
Rules, is there any mention that this lack is a ground for a motion to quash.
- Furthermore, it has been held that responsibility for the absence of a preliminary
investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the
proceedings.
- We reiterate the following ruling of the Court in People v. Gomez: If there were no
preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the
attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information,
should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the
inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted.

(25) JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 189122
March 17, 2010
CORONA, J.:

FACTS:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted
by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12
years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition,
and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle
in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of
appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Citing well-
established jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a
prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. It found that petitioner.
failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement
during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. Notably, the physical
condition of petitioner does not prevent him from seeking medical attention while confined in
prison, though he clearly preferred to be attended by his personal physician.
For purposes of determining whether petitioners application for bail could be allowed pending
appeal, the CA also considered the fact of petitioners conviction. It made a preliminary
evaluation of petitioners case and made a prima facie determination that there was no reason
substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioners guilt. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied
Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail,
considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioners theory is that, where the
penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted
to an appellant pending appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not in an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the
trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of
the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court

HELD:
Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to guarantee
his appearance before any court as may be required, is the answer of the criminal justice system to
a vexing question: what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the
dubious interval, often years long, between arrest and final adjudication? Bail acts as a
reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in pretrial liberty and societys
interest in assuring the accuseds presence at trial.

Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced to prison must typically begin
serving time immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to bail. An accused not released
on bail is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that his conviction is legal and proper.
An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he
has never owed. Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the accuseds interest
in bail pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review, opportunity to efficiently prepare
his case and avoidance of potential hardships of prison. On the other hand, society has a compelling
interest in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough to warrant prison time. Other recognized societal
interests in the denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention of the accuseds flight from
court custody, the protection of the community from potential danger and the avoidance of delay
in punishment. Under what circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a
delicate balance between the interests of society and those of the accused. Our rules authorize the
proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal to those convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the
fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity
but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact
convicted by the trial court.

It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without or in excess of its
jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly
declared to be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case
such as this where the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate court.
Thus, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioners urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal. Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners application for bail pending
appeal. Grave abuse of discretion is not simply an error in judgment but it is such a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Ordinary abuse of
discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and
gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
by or to act at all in contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition for certiorari to prosper,
there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.

Petitioner only points out the CA' erroneous application and interpretation of Section 5, Rule 114
of the Rules of Court. However, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure errors
in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact. In this connection, Lee v. People, 393
SCRA 397 (2002) is apropos: Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the
respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not
correct. Its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari.

The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on
the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with
the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism,
habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his
bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or
conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; undue
risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar
circumstances) not present. The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the
said circumstances. The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in
the commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in remedial
law: Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be summarized
in the following rules:
e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6
years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or
any other similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6
years but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar
circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x.

Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body whose
authority is limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts its discretion into merely filling
out the checklist of circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances
where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding
six years. In short, petitioners interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the appellate court by
requiring it to determine a singular factual issuewhether any of the five bail-negating
circumstances is present. However, judicial discretion has been defined as choice. Choice occurs
where, between two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options), there is more
than one possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker. On the
other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion. Thus, by
severely clipping the appellate courts discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding
body in applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial
court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioners theory effectively renders
nugatory the provision that upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.

Laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or senseless
consequences. An absurd situation will result from adopting petitioners interpretation that, where
the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought to be granted
if none of the listed bail-negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases
where the penalty imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will be more lenient than in
cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years. While denial or revocation of bail in
cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years imprisonment must be made only if any
of the five bail-negating conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty
imposed does not exceed six years imprisonment may be denied even without those conditions.

The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more restrictive
approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock principle, that is,
bail pending appeal should be allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only for strong
reasons.

A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly identifying which
court has authority to act on applications for bail pending appeal under certain conditions and in
particular situations. More importantly, it reiterated the tough on bail pending appeal
configuration of Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988
Rules on Criminal Procedure which entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right before final
conviction. Under the present rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Indeed,
pursuant to the tough on bail pending appeal policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions
mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed
to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited.

The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending appeal parallels
the approach adopted in the United States where our original constitutional and procedural
provisions on bail emanated. While this is of course not to be followed blindly, it nonetheless
shows that our treatment of bail pending appeal is no different from that in other democratic
societies. In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail
pending appeal is anchored on the principle that judicial discretionparticularly with respect to
extending bailshould be exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for strong reasons.
In fact, it has even been pointed out that grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial
discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and exemplified in
Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule 114, Section 5.

This Court has been guided by the following: The importance attached to conviction is due to the
underlying principle that bail should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is
guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would,
generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the
presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the
burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be
properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that
the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction.

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the
constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At
the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for
strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of
bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition
finds strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section
5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial courts initial determination
that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his
conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail
pending appeal because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate
review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and
thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally,
permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals which
will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes