LEGAL RESEARCH

A. INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONSTITUTION

Francisco vs. House of Representatives

G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003
Facts:
On June 2, 2003, an impeachment complaint (1st impeachment complaint) was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and 7 Associate Justices for culpable violation
of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high crimes. On October 22, 2003, the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the complaint for being insufficient in substance, although it was
sufficient in form.
On October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the complaint
or 4 months and 3 weeks since the filing thereof, a 2nd impeachment complaint was filed with the
Houses Secretary General by Representatives Teodoro, Jr. and Funtabella against Chief Justice Hilario
Davide, founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
The 2nd impeachment complaint was accompanied by a Resolution of Endorsement/
Impeachment signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Due to the
events that took place, several instant petitions were filed against the House of Representatives, mostly
contending that the filing of the 2nd impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates Article XI
Section 5 of the Constitution that no impeachment proceedings shall be INITIATED against the same
official more than once within a period of one year; and that sections16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 12th Congress are unconstitutional as well.
The House of Representatives argues that sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of the present Constitution, contending that
the term "initiate" does not mean "to file", and concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation
of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and the 7 Associate Justices had not been initiated
as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it. The resolution of this
issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate".

Issue:
Whether or Not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

Held:
Yes. To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must
necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional
construction.
First, verbalegis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Second, where there is ambiguity,
ratio legisest anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of
its framers. And finally, utmagisvaleat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
The framers of the Constitution understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a
proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line
on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing
of a complaint does.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment
proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle
of reddendosingulasingulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding." Having
concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the
members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the
complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the
beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated
when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior
to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its
initiation or beginning. Rather, the impeachment proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified
complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which
triggers the series of steps that follow. He concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment
proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it
means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for
action.
Therefore, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., along with 7 Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, on
June2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Teodoro, Jr. and Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on
October23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
B. SELF-EXECUTING & DOCTRINE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS GR 122156, 3 February 1997

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30%
to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation,
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as
the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince
Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28
September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but
which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the
tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-
executing.

RULING:

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule
by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation
to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a
provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the
protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the
exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for
the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in
the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy
for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-
executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust
legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the
exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against
constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle
and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in
a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has
evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify
the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation.

C. AMENDMENT AND REVISION OF CONSTITUTION

Lambino Vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 174153
Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change
the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M
individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987
constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the
proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral-
parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and
invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative
petitions.
Issue: Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate
or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend
the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino
Groups petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on
dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the
signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the
initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is
intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments
to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a
constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated
Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA
6735

Petition is dismissed.

D. POLITICAL QUESTION

VINUYA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010
(Justiciable & Political Questions)

FACTS:

Petitioners, members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with
the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military
forces in the Philippines during the Second World War, claim that since 1998, they have approached
the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim
against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort
women stations in the Philippines.

But officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position
that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by
Japans compliance with the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations
Agreement of 1956 between the Philippines and Japan.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of discretion in refusing;
a. to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against
them?
b. to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals?

HELD:

Petition lacks merit. This is a foreign relations matter that present political question. Political
questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. Thus, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches (executive
&legistlative).
 In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the
country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of
1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and ergaomnes obligations will not alter this analysis.
Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens
prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of
international crimes is an ergaomnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.

Ergaomnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) is a legal term describing obligations owed by States
towards the community of states as a whole.
Jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command peremptory authority,
superseding conflicting treaties and custom.

E. JUDICIAL REVIEW VIS-A-VI ACTUAL CASE AND CONTROVERSY

JAMES M. IMBONG vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not present any actual case or controversy
because the RH Law has yet to be implemented. They claim that the questions raised by the petitions
are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its
provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by
its operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.

ISSUES: WON there is an actual controversy in the case at bar.

HELD: Yes. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an
advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy
scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and
concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the
pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial
thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or
issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a
decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.101
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a
result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of. In this case, the Court is of the view
that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering
that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to
carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the
dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or
medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations
thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.

F. LEGAL STANDING TO QUESTION THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PORK BARREL SYSTEM VIS-A-VI THE TAX
PAYERS

BELGICA, ET AL. VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL. (G.R. NO. 208566; SOCIAL JUSTICE
SOCIETY VS. HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, ET AL. (G.R. NO. 208493); NEPOMUCENO VS. PRES.
AQUINO (G.R. NO. 209251) NOVEMBER 19, 2013

FACTS:

HISTORY of CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL

The term pork barrel, a political parlance of American-English origin, refers to an appropriation
of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring
money to a representatives district.
The earliest form of the pork barrel system is found in Section 3 of Act 3044, otherwise known as
the Public Works Act of 1922. Under this provision, release of funds and realignment of
unexpended portions of an item or appropriation were subject to the approval of a joint
committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives.
In 1950, members of Congress, by virtue of being representatives of the people, also became
involved in project identification.
The pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued when martial law was declared.
 It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) called Support
for Local Development Projects (SLDP). SLDP started the giving of lump-sum allocations to
individual legislators. The SLDP also began to cover not only public works project or hard
projects but also covered soft projects such as those which would fall under education, health
and livelihood.
After the EDSA People Power Revolution and the restoration of democracy, the pork barrel was
revived through the Mindanao Development Fund and the Visayas Development Fund.
In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). The CDF was
meant to cover small local infrastructure and other priority community projects.
CDF Funds were, with the approval of the President, released directly to implementing agencies
subject to the submission of the required list of projects and activities. Senators and
congressmen could identify any kind of project from hard projects such as roads, buildings and
bridges to soft projects such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.
In 1993, the CDF was further modified such that the release of funds was to be made upon the
submission of the list of projects and activities identified by individual legislators. This was also
the first time when the Vice-President was given an allocation.
The CDF contained the same provisions from 1994-1996 except that the Department of Budget
and Management was required to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the
House Committee on Appropriations regarding the releases made from the funds.
Congressional insertions (CIs) were another form of congressional pork barrel aside from the
CDF. Examples of the CIs include the DepEd School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative
Allocations, and the Public Works Fund, among others.
The allocations for the School Building Fund were made upon prior consultation with the
representative of the legislative district concerned and the legislators had the power to direct
how, where and when these appropriations were to be spent.
In 1999, the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced by three separate forms of CIs: (i)
Food Security Program Fund, (ii) Lingap Para sa Mahihirap Fund, and (iii) Rural/Urban
Development Infrastructure Program Fund. All three contained a provision requiring prior
consultation with members of Congress for the release of funds.
In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. PDAF required
prior consultation with the representative of the district before the release of funds. PDAF also
allowed realignment of funds to any expense category except personal services and other
personnel benefits.
In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu concept which is essentially a list of general
programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently
chosen by the identifying authority. This was retained in the GAAs from 2006-2010.
It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal participation of non-governmental
organizations in the implementation of PDAF projects was introduced.
The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with respect to specific amounts for individual
legislators.
In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express statement on lump-sum amounts
allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President. It also contained a provision on
realignment of funds but with the qualification that it may be allowed only once.
The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies. Legislators were
also allowed identify programs/projects outside of his legislative district. Realignment of funds
and release of funds were required to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be.

MALAMPAYA FUNDS AND PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND

The use of the term pork barrel was expanded to include certain funds of the President such as
the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund (PSF).
The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8 of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 910 issued by President Ferdinand Marcos on March 22, 1976.
The PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV of PD No. 1869, or the Charter of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD No. 1993. The PSF is
managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff and is sourced from the share
of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.

PORK BARREL MISUSE

In 1996, Marikina City Representative Romeo Candozo revealed that huge sums of money
regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks.
In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF but the Supreme Court
dismissed the petition for lack of evidentiary basis regarding illegal misuse of PDAF in the form
of kickbacks.
In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation probed the allegation that a syndicate
defrauded the government of P10 billion using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and
various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.
In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released the results of a three-year audit investigation
detailing the irregularities in the release of the PDAF from 2007 to 2009.
Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million from the Malampaya Funds had gone into
a dummy NGO.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to sue

RULING: Yes. Petitioners have legal standing to Sue

Petitioners have legal standing by virtue of being taxpayers and citizens of the Philippines.
As taxpayers, they are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds.
As citizens, the issues they have raised are matters of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

G. OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE

Araullovs Aquino III (DAP Case)

Facts:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of
the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary
Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP).The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next years
appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being
undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will
then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as
economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by
the Supreme Court).Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the
GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and
other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken
from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds
within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few:
Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National
Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for
Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and
several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity
of the DAP. Among their contentions was:DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional
rule which provides that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to
augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and
authority to use savings, respectively).

Issues: Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

Held: Yes. The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to
thedetermination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that
cannotalways be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but
sustainsits effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law
produces noeffect. But its use must be subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be
invoked tovalidate an unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted to only as a matter of equity
and fair play.
It applies only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the
extraordinarycircumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its application.The
doctrine of operative fact applicable to the adoption and implementation of the DAP. Thedoctrine of
operative fact extends to a void or unconstitutional executive act. The term executive act isbroad enough
to include any and all acts of the Executive, including those that are quasi-legislative andquasi-judicial in
nature. The term executive act is broad enough to encompass decisions ofadministrative bodies and
agencies under the executive department which are subsequently revoked bythe agency in question or
nullified by the Court. (Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian ReformCouncil, G.R. No. 171101,
November 22, 2011)
The doctrine of operative fact can apply only to the PAPs that can no longer be undone, and
whosebeneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP, but cannot apply to the authors,
proponents and implementors of the DAP, unless there are concrete findings of good faith in their favor
by the proper tribunals determining their criminal, civil, administrative and other liabilities.

H. STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al., Petitioners,

vs.
SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al., Respondents.

G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014

PONENTE: Villarama

TOPIC: Writ of kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity from suit

FACTS:

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December
2012, the US Embassyin the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel to enter and
exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of
routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty. On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo,
Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the
northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one
was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the
provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga
del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology.

ISSUES: Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

HELD: NO. The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to
special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be
inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a
violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately.

The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal
jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the
USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.

The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State
immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the
violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of
administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the
criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law.