Breakfast With Dave: David A. Rosenberg
Breakfast With Dave: David A. Rosenberg
Breakfast With Dave: David A. Rosenberg
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August 24, 2010 – BREAKFAST WITH DAVE
But look at the bright spot, we are finally exiting the denial stage and heading
towards acceptance. That, my friends, is progress in its own right. When The Chicago Fed National
Washington realizes that the solutions lie in supply-side policies that will promote
Activity index came out for July
and rang in at a stagnant 0.0
growth in the capital stock and hiring/work incentives — education, infrastructure,
after hitting a recession-like
payroll taxes, a coherent energy strategy (nuclear!) — and begin to abandon failed
-0.70 print the month before
policies such as this ongoing emphasis on Keynesian short-term spending quick
fixes, the adoption of “too big to fail” strategies, initiatives aimed at bailing out
delinquent homeowners, measures that actually try to prevent market forces from
working, initiatives that pay people to stay off work for 99 weeks with no thought
behind skills improvement and training in return, and attempts at influencing the
equilibrium level of asset prices, such as real estate, then indeed, when we have
finally broken free from these failed interventionist and distorting manoeuvres,
then we will likely have much more reason to turn optimistic.
CHICAGO!
The Chicago Fed National Activity index came out for July and rang in at a
stagnant 0.0 after hitting a recession-like -0.70 print the month before. The
chart below just about says it all ... the consumer/housing segment has been
below zero now for each of the past 43 months, which is unprecedented.
0.4
0.2
0.0
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
Now we’ll tell you why this is a depression, and not just some garden-variety
recession. For all the chatter about whether the recession that started in
December 2007 ended sometime last year, here is what you should know about
the historical record. The 1930s depression was not marked by declining
quarterly GDP data every single quarter. In fact, the technical recessionary
aspect to the initial period following the asset and credit shock goes from the
third quarter of 1929 to the third quarter of 1933.
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August 24, 2010 – BREAKFAST WITH DAVE
There was another deep downturn in 1937-38, but the initial recession lasted four
years and if you read the Benjamin Roth diary, you will see the euphoric response For all the chatter about
to any piece of good news — as brief as they may have been. Such is human
whether the recession that
started in December 2007
nature and nobody can be blamed for trying to be optimistic; however, in the
ended sometime last year,
money management business, we have a fiduciary responsibility to be as realistic
keep in mind that the
as possible about the outlook for the economy and the markets at all times.
depression in the 1930s was
not marked by declining
What is important to know is this. In that initial four-year economic downturn, quarterly GDP every single year
from 1929 to 1933, there were no fewer than six — six! — quarterly bounces in
the GDP data. The average gain in these up-quarters was 8% at an annual rate!
But because they proved not to be sustainable, the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) refused to declare that the recession officially
ended, even though the stock market rallied 50% in the opening months of
1930 on the belief that the downturn was about to end. False premise. And
guess what? We may well be reliving history here. If you’re keeping score, we
have recorded four quarterly advances in real GDP, and the average is only 3%.
It wasn’t really until we could put together a string of very solid GDP data in
1934, 1935, and well into 1936 that the recession definitely had come to a
close and at least an intermitted period of solid growth took hold. That is, until
the policy mis-steps of 1937. All that second recession of the decade proved
was just how fragile the post-bubble recovery really was.
The 80% rally of 2009 that whipped up so much excitement at the time and
reignited all the criticism over the “bears” and how they didn’t understand the What is important to know is
power of stimulus and how their call over the 2007-08 meltdown was just dumb this. In that initial four-year
luck, will be remembered in the future about as much as the 50% rally of the economic downturn, from
1930. It’s funny how nobody seems to recall that massive dead-cat bounce off the 1929 to 1933, there were no
lows; people just remember 1930 was a period of soup lines, bread lines, and fewer than six — six! —
unemployment lines. Maybe it’s because we ended up with a classic Bob Farrell- quarterly bounces in GDP
like third wave — the fundamental downtrend to a new low over the next two years,
and the overall economic malaise with double-digit unemployment rate lasted for
another decade even with massive doses of government intervention.
We can understand how emotional the debate can get over whether or not we
have actually just stumbled along some post-recession recovery path or whether or
not this is actually a depression in the sense of a downward trend in economic
activity merely punctuated with noise that is influenced by recurring rounds of
government intervention. The reality is that the Fed cut the funds rate to zero, as
was the case in Japan, to little avail (perhaps only making a bad situation less
bad). Then the Fed tripled the size of its balance sheet — again with little
sustained impetus to a broken financial system (see the op-ed on page A15 of the
WSJ by George Melloan — The Fed Can Create Money, Not Confidence).
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August 24, 2010 – BREAKFAST WITH DAVE
Keep in mind that by now the Fed was suppose to be shrinking its pregnant
balance sheet but has refrained from doing so, though the Bernanke-led move The critical issue for the Bank
to sustain its incursion in the capital markets is not being universally supported
of Canada is whether their
policy setting is consistent
(have a look at the front page of the WSJ — Fed Split on Move to Bolster Sluggish
with a stable price
Economy). Also keep in mind that the Fed sliced its economic forecast twice in
environment
the past two months and we are coming off a Q2 GDP growth pace that was
likely little better than a 1% annual rate (as we will see post-revision this Friday).
When you cut your forecast and the economy is barely growing faster than 1%, a
renewed contraction cannot be ruled out (in fact, the monthly data showed this
erosion to be taking place as we type).
How’s that for a reality check. It’s not too late, by the way, to shift course if you
have stayed long this market.
The proof in the pudding is always in the eating – but the reality is that the
current interest rate structure is proving to be totally consistent with a
disinflation backdrop at a time when measured inflation rates are microscopic.
Look at the latest CPI data. Strip out the effects of the HST, and consumer
prices fell 0.1% in July. Not only that, but the CPI excluding indirect taxes has
been flat or down now for six months in a row, during which it has deflated at a
1.2% annual rate. You read this right — deflation, and with a much lower
unemployment rate than is the case south of the border to boot (7.3% on a
comparable U.S. basis versus the actual 9.5% in the United States).
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August 24, 2010 – BREAKFAST WITH DAVE
In fact, we could see a situation where another 4 to 5 million jobs could be shed We could see a situation where
in the United States — and in the three sectors that were, and remain, the most another 4 to 5 million jobs
affected by the housing crisis and financial collapse. could be shed in the United
States — especially in the three
For example, historically, the construction industry employed three workers for sectors (construction, finance
every housing start. Today, that ratio is closer to 10. This could easily mean and state/local government)
that we see 3 to 4 million construction jobs being lost going forward, barring a that were, and remain, the
major revival in the housing market, which isn’t happening. most affected by the housing
crisis and financial collapse
The ratio of employees in the financial sector to outstanding private sector credit
is at a new and lower level that would warrant around a workforce 500,000
lower than is the case today — just to get to productivity ratios that prevailed in
the pre-bubble era. And the third sector, which is the fiscally-challenged state
and local government segment, for payrolls there to mean revert to the level
commensurate with the ever-declining level of public spending would also mean
roughly 500,000 employment cutbacks. No doubt there are other sectors that
will provide some offset in health and education and even manufacturing, but it
took 25 years for these areas combined to rise five million and something tells
us that the downsizing that is left in the housing, financial and state/local
government sectors will occur in a much shorter period (and the latter too, if
what happened recently in New Jersey is any indication, the social contract with
public sector unions will soon go the way of the dodo bird).
Note that the year-on-year trend in layoff announcements, after a brief period of
declines, is now re-accelerating in the three above-mentioned affected sectors.
For the first time since late 2007, the financial sector posted no hiring
announcements in each of the last two months and this has also been the case
in three of the past four months in the real estate sector. Government sector
hiring announcements, as an aside, have plunged 75% from year-ago levels.
The signs are already there — get ready for another downleg in employment as
the jobless claims are now suggesting — especially as it pertains to this 33
million or 25% chunk of the total workforce.
15.0
12.5
10.0
7.5
5.0
2.5
0.0
60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
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August 24, 2010 – BREAKFAST WITH DAVE
These are the Japanese who came of age after the bubble, never
having known Japan as a flourishing economy. They are
accustomed to being frugal. Today’s youths, living in a society older
than any in the world, are the first since the late 19th century to feel
so uneasy about the future.
Getting small, how novel. Make sure your portfolio dovetails with this theme.
IS LEAMER A DREAMER?
We mentioned yesterday that the Ceridian-UCLA Pulse of Commerce Index ticked
up in July, prompting its architect, Ed Leamer, to tell that Globe and Mail that “I
don’t think that a double-dip is in the cards.” Never mind that this index
appears to have peaked in early 2008, after the recession actually began. But
no sooner did the ink dry on our report that we received this from a faithful
reader, regarding Mr. Leamer:
“My favorite WSJ quote (12/14/2006) to this day is: “This time will be different,”
Ed Leamer, who heads the forecasting center at the University of California at
Los Angeles’ Anderson School of Management, predicts in a report: “This time
the problems in housing will stay in housing.”
Come to think it, this sounds like something Bernanke would have said.
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August 24, 2010 – BREAKFAST WITH DAVE
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