Trump Defamation

FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/31/2017 11:59 PM INDEX NO.
150522/2017
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 153 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/31/2017
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF NEW YORK
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:
SUMMER ZERVOS, : Index No. 150522/2017
:
Plaintiff, : Hon. Jennifer G. Schecter
:
v. : Motion Seq. No. 003
:
DONALD J. TRUMP, :
:
Defendant. :
:
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REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT

DONALD J. TRUMPS MOTION TO DISMISS AND STRIKE THE COMPLAINT
PURSUANT TO CPLR 3211 AND CAL. CODE CIV. P. 425.16(B)(1) OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, FOR A STAY PURSUANT TO CPLR 2201
KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP
Marc E. Kasowitz
Christine A. Montenegro
Paul J. Burgo
1633 Broadway
New York, New York 10019
P: (212) 506-1700
Attorneys for Defendant Donald J. Trump
October 31, 2017
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FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/31/2017 11:59 PM INDEX NO. 150522/2017
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................... 1
ARGUMENT.................................................................................................................................. 4
I. Ms. Zervoss Claim Is Not Actionable As A Matter Of Law............................................. 4
A. Ms. Zervoss Self-Contradictory Allegations Warrant Dismissal. ......................... 4
B. Statements Made In The Context Of A National Political Campaign

Are Routinely Treated As Non-Actionable. ........................................................... 5
C. Jacobus Is Directly On Point. ............................................................................... 10
D. Statements Of General Denials Are Not Actionable. ........................................... 11
E. Ms. Zervoss Reliance On Davis Is Misplaced..................................................... 13
F. President Trump Is Not Liable For The Barry Statement..................................... 14
II. Californias Anti-SLAPP Statute Applies To Ms. Zervoss Claim. ................................. 16
III. The Constitution Prohibits This Court From Exercising Jurisdiction. ............................. 19
A. The Supremacy Clause Bars Suits In State Court Against The President. ........... 19
B. Clinton v. Joness Holding That Federal Courts Can Appropriately

Manage Cases Against The President Explicitly Does Not Extend To State
Courts.................................................................................................................... 23
C. Civil Litigation Places A Substantial Burden On The President. ......................... 24
IV. Alternatively, The President Is Entitled To A Stay. ......................................................... 25
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................. 26
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
600 W. 115th St. Corp. v. Von Gutfeld,

80 N.Y.2d 130 (1992) ................................................................................................................9
Adelson v. Harris,
973 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).............................................................................. passim
Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examr,

721 P.2d 87 (Cal. 1986) .............................................................................................................8
Batzel v. Smith,
333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) .................................................................................................18
Beilenson v. Superior Court,

52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) .................................................................................8
Brach v. Congregation Yetev Lev DSatmar, Inc.,

696 N.Y.S.2d 496 (2d Dept 1999)..........................................................................................12
Brian v. Richardson,
87 N.Y.2d 46 (1995) ..............................................................................................................5, 7
Broadspring, Inc. v. Congoo, LLC,

2014 WL 4100615 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2014).........................................................................16
Brown v. Hartlage,
456 U.S. 45 (1982).....................................................................................................................6
Brown v. Marsolais,
2012 WL 6969283 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Oct. 5, 2012) ........................................................................7
Burson v. Freeman,
504 U.S. 191 (1992)...................................................................................................................6
Cappellino v. Rite-Aid of N.Y., Inc.,

544 N.Y.S.2d 104 (4th Dept 1989).........................................................................................12
Celle v. Filipino Reporter Enters. Inc.,

209 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2000).....................................................................................................12
Clark v. McGee,
49 N.Y.2d 613 (1980) ................................................................................................................9
ii
3 of 36
Clinton v. Jones,
520 U.S. 681 (1997)......................................................................................................... passim
Condit v. Dunne,
317 F. Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)......................................................................................16
Cook v. Relin,
721 N.Y.S.2d 885 (4th Dept 2001)...........................................................................................6
Couloute v. Ryncarz,
2012 WL 541089 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2012)............................................................................12
Cummins v. Suntrust Capital Markets, Inc.,

649 F. Supp. 2d 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)......................................................................................16
Curry v. Roman,
217 A.D.2d 314 (4th Dept 1995)............................................................................................12
Davis v. Boeheim,
24 N.Y.3d. 262 (2014) .........................................................................................................3, 13
Divet v. Reinisch,
564 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1st Dept 1991) .........................................................................................12
Duane v. Prescott,
521 N.Y.S.2d 459 (2d Dept 1987)............................................................................................6
Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC v. Bleeping Computer LLC,

194 F. Supp. 3d 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)......................................................................................15
Ernst v. Carrigan,
814 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2016).....................................................................................................18
Eu v. San Francisco Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm.,

489 U.S. 214 (1989)...................................................................................................................3
Fallay v. San Francisco City & Cty.,

2015 WL 7874312 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015)...........................................................................17
Feldman v. United States,

322 U.S. 487 (1944).................................................................................................................22
Firth v. State,
98 N.Y.2d 365, 372 (2002) ......................................................................................................15
Fisher v. Larsen,
188 Cal. Rptr. 216 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) ..................................................................................12
iii
4 of 36
Forras v. Rauf,
39 F. Supp. 3d 45 (D.D.C. 2014) .............................................................................................18
Frankel v. Citicorp Ins. Servs., Inc.,

913 N.Y.S.2d 254 (2d Dept 2010)..........................................................................................17
Galante ex rel. Galante v. Cty. of Nassau,

720 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Cnty. 2000)....................................................................23
Gillies v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,

213 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) ...........................................................................2, 4
Gisel v. Clear Channel Commcns, Inc.,

942 N.Y.S.2d 751 (4th Dept 2012)...........................................................................................7
Glob. Telemedia Intl, Inc. v. Doe 1,

132 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ...................................................................................12
Godin v. Schencks,
629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010)......................................................................................................18
Good Govt Grp. of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court,

586 P.2d 572 (Cal. 1978) ...........................................................................................................9
Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,

552 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1976) .........................................................................................................12
Gross v. New York Times,

82 N.Y.2d 146 (1993) ..............................................................................................................12
Hancock v. Train
426 U.S. 167 (1976).................................................................................................................22
Handlin v. Burkhart,
632 N.Y.S.2d 608 (2d Dept 1995)..........................................................................................11
Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800 (1982).................................................................................................................26
Helstoski v. Meanor,
442 U.S. 500 (1979).................................................................................................................22
Hillyer v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co. as trustee for Hasco

2011 WL 5041960, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2011)..........................................................15
Huse v. Auburn Assocs., Inc.,

2011 WL 3425607 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2011).....................................................................12
iv
5 of 36
Indepenent Living Aids, Inc. v. Maxi-Aids, Inc.,

981 F. Supp. 124 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) ....................................................................................11, 12
Jacobus v. Trump,
51 N.Y.S.3d 330 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. 2017) ................................................................. passim
Kaminester v. Weintraub,
516 N.Y.S.2d 234 (2d Dept 1987)..........................................................................................12
Kindred v. Colby,
2015 WL 12915686 (Sup. Ct., Monroe Cnty. 2015) .................................................................8
Koch v. Goldway,
817 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1987) .....................................................................................................7
Lafontant v. Aristide,
844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ..........................................................................................26
Lapine v. Seinfeld,
918 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. 2011) .......................................................................11
LeBreton v. Weiss,
680 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1st Dept 1998) .....................................................................................6, 11
Leidholdt v. L.F.P. Inc.,

860 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1988) .....................................................................................................8
Liberty Synergistics Inc. v. Microflo Ltd.,

718 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2013).....................................................................................................18
Liranzo v. Astrue,
2010 WL 626791 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2010)..............................................................................6
Mann v. Abel,
10 N.Y.3d 271 (2008) ................................................................................................................8
Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. v. Cnty. of San Diego,

544 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2008) ...................................................................................................12
Mase v. Reilly,
201 N.Y.S. 470 (1st Dept 1923) .............................................................................................12
Matson v. Dvorak,
46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 880 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) .............................................................................6, 8
McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. 316 (1819).............................................................................................................21, 22
6 of 36
McNamee v. Clemens,
762 F. Supp. 2d 584 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) .....................................................................................12
Merrill Lynch Futures, Inc. v. Miller,

686 F. Supp. 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).........................................................................................16
Morgenthow & Latham v. Bank of New York Co., Inc.,

760 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1st Dept 2003) .......................................................................................2, 4
Municipality of Bremanger v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc.,

2013 WL 1294615 (S.D.N.Y. March 28, 2013) ......................................................................15
Munoz-Feliciano v. Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist.,

2015 WL 1379702 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2015) ...........................................................................9
U.S. ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space, Co.,

190 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1999) ...................................................................................................18
Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 731 (1982).......................................................................................................4, 21, 22
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Govt PAC,

528 U.S. 377 (2000)...................................................................................................................6
OMahony v. Whiston,
2016 WL 5931368 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. Oct. 7, 2016) ............................................................8
Okun v. Superior Court,

629 P.2d 1369 (Cal. 1981) .........................................................................................................9
Pentalpha Macau Commercial Offshore Ltd. v. Reddy,

2004 WL 2738925 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2004)...........................................................................12
Perry v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,

829 F.3d 760 (D.C. Cir. 2016) .................................................................................................24
Petrus v. Smith,
459 N.Y.S.2d 173 (4th Dept 1983).........................................................................................12
Price v. Stossel,
2008 WL 2434137 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2008) ...........................................................................18
Ram v. Moritt,
612 N.Y.S.2d 671 (2d Dept 1994)..........................................................................................12
Readers Digest Assn v. Superior Court,

690 P.2d 610 (Cal. 1984) ...........................................................................................................5
vi
7 of 36
Reed v. Gallagher,
204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) ..................................................................... passim
Rojas v. Debevoise & Plimpton,

634 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. 1995) .......................................................................12
Rosenaur v. Scherer,
105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 674 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) .........................................................................5, 12
Roth v. United Fedn of Teachers,

787 N.Y.S.2d 603 (Sup. Ct., Kings Cnty. 2004)........................................................................8
Rotunno v. Gruhill Const. Corp.,

816 N.Y.S.2d 139 (2d Dept 2006)..........................................................................................18
Rotz v. Van Kampen Asset Mgmt.,

5 N.Y.S.3d 330 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. 2014) ...........................................................................19
Russell v. Davis,
2011 WL 8907836 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. Jul. 1, 2011) .............................................................9
Sabratek Corp. v. Keyser,

2000 WL 423529 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2000)............................................................................12
In re Salomon Analyst Winstar Litig.,

2006 WL 510526 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006)..............................................................................4
Sarver v. Chartier,
813 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................................17
Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc.,

65 N.Y.2d 189 (1985) ..............................................................................................................17
Sharpton v. Guiliani,
1997 WL 34846668 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. Oct. 9, 1997) ..........................................................6
Silsdorf v. Levine,
59 N.Y.2d 8 (1983) ....................................................................................................................9
Sleepys LLC v. Select Comfort Wholesale Corp.,

779 F.3d. 191 (2d Cir. 2015)....................................................................................................11
Steam Press Holdings, Inc. v. Hawaii Teamsters, Allied Workers Union,

Local 996,
302 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2002) .....................................................................................................7
Steinhilber v. Alphonse,
68 N.Y.2d 293 (1986) ..............................................................................................................14
vii
8 of 36
Summit Bank v. Rogers,

142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 40 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) .................................................................................7
In re Tarble,
80 U.S. 397 (1871)...................................................................................................................22
Tobinick v. Novella,
108 F. Supp. 3d 1299, 1304 (S.D. Fla. 2015) ..........................................................................17
Underwager v. Channel 9 Australia,

69 F.3d 361 (9th Cir. 1995) .......................................................................................................7
Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys.,

608 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1979) .................................................................................................26
Weiner v. Doubleday & Co., Inc.,

74 N.Y.2d 586 (1989) ................................................................................................................5
Williams v. Cordillera Commns Inc.,

2014 WL 2611746 (S.D. Tex. June 11, 2014) .........................................................................18
Wynn v. Chanos,
2017 WL 1149508 (9th Cir. Mar. 28, 2017)............................................................................18
Wynn v. Chanos,
75 F. Supp. 3d 1228 (N.D. Cal. 2014) .......................................................................................7
Other Authorities
11 U.S.C. 362..............................................................................................................................26
28 U.S.C. 1441(b) .......................................................................................................................23
28 U.S.C. 1442(a) .......................................................................................................................21
Cal. Code Civ. P. 425.16.......................................................................................................16, 18
CPLR 2201...............................................................................................................................25, 26
CPLR 3211.....................................................................................................................................16
CPLR 3212.....................................................................................................................................16
Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.635-41.670..................................................................................................18
N.Y. Civ. Rights Law 70-a, 76-a .............................................................................................16
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. 3901.....................................................................26
viii
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U.S. Const. art. VI, 2.............................................................................................................19, 21
ix
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Defendant President Donald J. Trump, in his individual capacity, respectfully submits
this memorandum of law (a) in further support of his motion to dismiss and special motion to
strike, or in the alternative, to stay and (b) in reply to plaintiffs memorandum in opposition to
the motion (Pl. Mem.) and to the amicus memorandum (Am. Mem.) submitted by the
Protect Democracy Project (Docket No. 138) (Amicus).1
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Summer Zervos and her counsel, Gloria Allred, continue to press what they have openly
proclaimed to be a purely politically-motivated lawsuit, touted as Ms. Allreds answer to
President Trump winning the election.2 Three weeks before the Presidential election, Ms. Zervos
and Ms. Allred held a carefully choreographed press conference to publicize Ms. Zervoss false
allegations so that the public could evaluate Mr. Trump fully as a candidate for President.
(Compl. 50.) After President Trump exercised his First Amendment right to defend himself
during his campaign through quintessential political forums, Ms. Zervos sued him for defamation
based on snippets of statements -- which are not defamatory as a matter of law and most of
which do not even reference her.
What Ms. Zervos alleges occurred never happened, as confirmed by her own allegations
in the Complaint. Among other things, as she admits, on the same day as Ms. Zervoss press
conference, Ms. Zervoss own cousin, John Barry, voluntarily came forward to refute her false
accusations, stating that he was completely shocked and bewildered by [his] cousin, because
Ms. Zervos had previously only spoke glowing[ly] about President Trump, going so far as to
1
Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meaning given to them in President Trumps
opening memorandum of law (Opening Memorandum or Mem.). Submitted herewith in further support of the
motion is the affirmation of Marc E. Kasowitz, dated October 31, 2017 (Kasowitz Reply Aff.).
2
As a threshold matter, as shown previously (Mem. 2-3, 10-15) and below, the Supremacy Clause bars this lawsuit
from proceeding in state court during the Trump Presidency.
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convert her friends and family to supporting his campaign. (Compl. 56; App. A. No. 2.) Ms.
Zervos also admits that even after the purported incident she complains about, she continued to
seek employment from the President and otherwise contact him. (Compl. 21, 35, 40, 56, App.
A. No. 2.) Ms. Zervos herself alleges that she spoke with her father about the supposed incident
and still decided to go meet Mr. Trump the following day to discuss her employment at his
golf course. (Compl. 35.) She also admits that during the ensuing years she continued to seek
employment from President Trump because her dream of working for Mr. Trump might come
true. (Compl. 24; see also id. at 40.) And, as recently as April 14, 2016 -- in the midst of
the campaign and a mere six months before she held a press conference to make false
accusations against the President -- she emailed the President to invite him to her restaurant.
(Compl. 64; App. A. Nos. 2, 8.) Only after President Trump failed to accept her invitation, did
she turn against him and level her false accusations against him. A complaint containing
allegations that belie the purported claims it asserts must be dismissed. See Morgenthow &
Latham v. Bank of New York Co., Inc., 760 N.Y.S.2d 438, 444 (1st Dept 2003) (dismissing
complaint based on plaintiffs inconsistent allegations); Gillies v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
213 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210, 214 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (same).
Likewise, as shown (Mem. 23-28), Ms. Zervos cannot hold the President liable for
engaging in political speech in the context of a public debate because such speech is clearly
protected by the First Amendment. Political statements in political contexts are non-actionable
political opinion. See Jacobus v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S.3d 330, 343 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. 2017)
(dismissing defamation claim against Mr. Trump on the grounds that it would be impossible to
conclude that [his statements on Twitter during the Republican primary] . . . could subject . . .
[plaintiff] to contempt . . . or reflect adversely upon [her] work, or otherwise damage her
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reputation). Indeed, political and, in particular, campaign speech is quintessential speech
protected by the First Amendment and are universally so viewed. See, e.g., Eu v. San Francisco
Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) ([T]he First Amendment has its fullest
and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political office) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
Ms. Zervos relies on Davis v. Boeheim, 24 N.Y.3d 262 (2014) (Pl. Mem. 22, 25, 31), but
that case has no application here. There, unlike here, the defendant made specific and precise
allegations -- in a context completely unrelated to the political sphere -- calling plaintiff a liar. In
Davis, the defendants statements were held actionable because he had falsely insinuated he
knew undisclosed facts that gave him superior knowledge that the plaintiff had lied. Here, unlike
in Davis, no one called Ms. Zervos a liar or made any such insinuation that there were
undisclosed facts. And, again, all of the Statements were made in the context of a political
campaign.
Ms. Zervos argues that California law, including its anti-SLAPP statute, which requires
her to show a probability of prevailing on the merits, does not apply here. (Pl. Mem. 15-17.)
But well-established case law makes clear that California law governs here because California,
where Ms. Zervos resides, is the place of the alleged injury and because California has a clearly
expressed interest in encouraging participation in matters of public significance and deterring its
citizens from bringing suits that would punish the exercise of Constitutionally protected speech.
Moreover, as shown (Mem. 2-3, 10-20), this state court action against a sitting President
is barred by the Supremacy Clause and should be dismissed (or stayed) without prejudice to its
reinstatement after the Trump Presidency. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 691 n.13 (1997).
Ms. Zervos and Amicus claim that decision should control here, but that decision involved a
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federal court action not subject to the Supremacy Clause and the Supreme Court explicitly noted
that a state court action would pose a quite different question. Id. Moreover, contrary to
Amicuss memorandum and Ms. Zervoss repeated claims in her papers and the press (e.g., Pl.
Mem. 3, 8, 13-15; Am. Mem. 1, 3-4), applying the Supremacy Clause here would in no way
place the President above the law; it would merely postpone the action. The Supreme Court
aptly characterized such a claim as rhetorically chilling but wholly unjustified. Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756-57 & n.41 (1982) (holding that the President cannot be sued for
damages in the outer perimeter of his official duties but that [i]t is simply error to characterize
an official as above the law because a particular remedy is not available against him.).
ARGUMENT
I. Ms. Zervoss Claim Is Not Actionable As A Matter Of Law.
A. Ms. Zervoss Self-Contradictory Allegations Warrant Dismissal.
Because Ms. Zervoss politically-motivated case is based on unfounded and self-
contradicting allegations, it should be dismissed. See Morgenthow & Latham, 760 N.Y.S.2d at
444; Gillies, 213 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 214. Nothing Ms. Zervos says in response to President
Trumps motion to dismiss alters that conclusion. Ms. Zervos and her counsel orchestrated a
highly-publicized press conference on October 14, 2016 -- just weeks before the Presidential
election -- to make false accusations against the President and thereby oppose his candidacy.3
President Trump participated in that debate, denying those false accusations. In addition, Ms.
3
Mem. 7-8, 19-20. Ms. Allred argues that the political motivations ascribed to her in the news articles cited in the
Opening Memorandum do not relate to this specific lawsuit with Mr. Trump as a defendant. (Pl. Mem. 7 n.2.) This
seems to be a distinction without a difference. Regardless, she recently reaffirmed her goals as to this suit in a
recent interview. See Kasowitz Reply Aff. Ex. 1. Ms. Zervos also argues that articles concerning her motives for
bringing suit are inadmissible. (Pl. Mem. 7 n.2.) However, because the articles -- which far from being ad hominem
attacks merely quote her own words -- are submitted to show motive and not for the truth of a matter, they are
admissible. See In re Salomon Analyst Winstar Litig., 2006 WL 510526, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006); see also
Mem. 5-6 & n.3.
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Zervoss own cousin, John Barry, also joined in that political debate and openly refuted her
unfounded accusations on October 14, 2016, the same day as Ms. Zervoss press conference.
Further, as shown (Mem. 28-30; supra pages 1-2), her own statements belie her claims.
B. Statements Made In The Context Of A National Political Campaign

Are Routinely Treated As Non-Actionable.
As shown (Mem. 20-22, 38-40), Ms. Zervoss defamation claim should be dismissed
because: (1) she has failed to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7), and (2) she has not
met her heightened burden of showing that her claim is factually substantiated and that she has a
probability of prevailing on the merits under Californias anti-SLAPP statute. Cal. Code Civ. P.
425.16.4
Here, Ms. Zervos has not shown and cannot show that the Statements taken as a whole,
from the perspective of the average person, are reasonably susceptible to a defamatory meaning.
See Reed v. Gallagher, 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178, 191 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (courts must consider the
statements in context from the perspective of the average person); Brian v. Richardson, 87
N.Y.2d 46, 51 (1995) (same); Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 339-40. Accordingly, her Complaint
must be dismissed. Indeed, an expeditious disposition of this frivolous action would avoid a
protracted litigation that risk[s] chilling the speech that breathes life into political debate,
Rosenaur v. Scherer, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 674, 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).5
This is a politically-driven action, brought against a sitting President for exercising his
First Amendment right to speak on political and public matters concerning, among other things,
his own qualifications for President, the medias role in the election process, and the tactics of
4
As shown below, Californias anti-SLAPP statute is a substantive law that applies here. See, infra Part II.
5
See Readers Digest Assn v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 610, 614 (Cal. 1984); Weiner v. Doubleday & Co., Inc., 74
N.Y.2d 586, 594 (1989).
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his opponent, Hillary Clinton. However, for speech uttered during a campaign for political
office, the First Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application. Burson v. Freeman,
504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992) (citations omitted); Mem. 23-25 (collecting cases).6 In political debate
[e]ven apparent statements of fact may assume the character of statements of opinion, and thus
[must] be privileged . . . . Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 338; Mem. 23-24 (collecting cases).7
While Ms. Zervos argues that she is not politically motivated in bringing this suit (Pl.
Mem. 7, 26, 28, 30), her subjective intent does not matter. She made her false accusations at a
press conference during the height of a Presidential campaign, injecting herself into a political
debate, and that is context in which Mr. Trump and Mr. Barrys responsive statements were
made. Moreover, it is a matter of public record of which the court can take judicial notice (Mem.
5 n.3) that Ms. Zervos and her counsel have openly admitted both in the Complaint and at press
conferences, that they made accusations against Mr. Trump for political reasons: so that the
public could evaluate Mr. Trump fully as a candidate for president. (Compl. 50 (emphasis
added)); see also Mem. 7-8, 19-20; supra, Part I.A.)8 In light of her own admissions, Ms.
6
See also Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53 (1982) (The candidate . . . has a First Amendment right to engage in
the discussion of public issues and vigorously and tirelessly to advocate his own election. . . .); Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Govt PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386 (2000) ([T]he constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent
application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.).
7
See also Matson v. Dvorak, 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 880 (1995); Cook v. Relin, 721 N.Y.S.2d 885, 898 (4th Dept 2001)
(significantly, the communication was made in the midst of a heated and bitter political campaign. . . . [T]he
inescapable conclusion . . . is that the statement would be understood by the ordinary listener for what it is: a
tasteless effort to lampoon plaintiff for his actions in opposing defendants reelection.); Duane v. Prescott, 521
N.Y.S.2d 459, 460 (2d Dept 1987); Sharpton v. Guiliani, 1997 WL 34846668, at *3-4 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. Oct. 9,
1997).
8
Ms. Zervoss self-serving statements in her affidavit that this is not a politically driven lawsuit (Zervos Aff. 3-4)
are inadmissible because they directly contradict the allegations in her Complaint. See LeBreton v. Weiss, 680
N.Y.S.2d 532, 532-33 (1st Dept 1998); Liranzo v. Astrue, 2010 WL 626791, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2010).
16 of 36
Zervoss recent protestations that she is not political because she was not a political candidate
or commentator, ring hollow. (Pl. Mem. 28.)9
Nor can Ms. Zervos refute the fact that all of the Statements occurred on political forums
-- a campaign website, on Mr. Trumps Twitter account, in a presidential debate, and at
campaign rallies -- where the listeners expect to hear public debate, taken as political opinion
rather than a defamatory statement. See, e.g., Brian, 87 N.Y.2d at 52 (a medium that is
typically regarded by the public as a vehicle for the expression of individual opinion [such as a
political forums] rather than the rigorous and comprehensive presentation of factual matter
suggest that a reader would anticipate vigorous expressions of personal opinion); Mem. 27-
28.10
Courts consistently recognize that Internet postings -- particularly on social media like
Twitter -- are on forums that an audience would understand to contain vigorous expressions of
personal opinion, rather than the rigorous and comprehensive presentation of factual matter.
Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 339; Mem. 27-28 (collecting cases).11 This does not mean that, as Ms.
9
For this reason, Ms. Zervoss argument that the First Amendment only protects campaign speech between political
opponents (Pl. Mem. 28-29) is unavailing where she purposefully injected herself into a political debate. Her
argument is also unsupported by caselaw and First Amendment principles. The decisions she cite reason only that
greater latitude is given to statements in the political context to ensure public debate will not suffer for lack of
imaginative expression or rhetorical hyperbole which has traditionally added much to the discourse of our Nation.
Rosenaur, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 687 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Such reasoning is not restricted
to political opponents.
10
See also Steam Press Holdings, Inc. v. Hawaii Teamsters, Allied Workers Union, Local 996, 302 F.3d 998, 1007
(9th Cir. 2002) (at union hearings, an audience may anticipate efforts by the parties to persuade others to their
positions by the use of epithets, fiery rhetoric, or hyperbole.). The same is true when more traditional forums used
by politicians for a heated debate. See Koch v. Goldway, 817 F.2d 507, 509 (9th Cir. 1987) (candidates remarks on
television part of a heated political debate so cannot reasonably be taken as anything but opinion); Underwager
v. Channel 9 Australia, 69 F.3d 361, 366 (9th Cir. 1995); Wynn v. Chanos, 75 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1238 (N.D. Cal.
2014); Gisel v. Clear Channel Commcns, Inc., 942 N.Y.S.2d 751, 752 (4th Dept 2012). (Mem. 27-28 (describing
importance of Twitter for political debate and its lack of susceptibility to interpretation as fact).)
11
See also Summit Bank v. Rogers, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 40, 60 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) ([Message] board culture
encourages discussion participants to play fast and loose with facts . . . . [C]ourts . . . have recognized that [these] are
places where readers expect to see strongly worded opinions rather than objective facts.); Brown v. Marsolais, 2012
WL 6969283, at *1 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Oct. 5, 2012) (The appellate cases reflect that internet bulletin boards are
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Zervos insinuates, Mr. Trump contends that posting something in any manner on the Internet will
immunize it from liability in all cases. (Pl. Mem. 27.) However, each of the Twitter
Statements (Compl. 60-61, 63, 66-70; App. A. Nos. 4-7, 10-14) are subject to the same
considerations that led the Court in Jacobus to conclude that the public would not consider them
to be defamatory. 51 N.Y.S.3d at 339. Similarly, the Statements published on Mr. Trumps
campaign website (Compl. 55-56; App. A. Nos. 1-2), were posted on pages that visibly stated:
Be a Voter and Donald J. Trump for President, and Paid for by Donald J. Trump for
President, Inc. on a banner upon entering the website. Kasowitz Reply Aff. Ex. 2. As such,
these are akin to political flyers and advertisements, routinely considered to be non-actionable
campaign opinion. See, e.g., Matson v. Dvorak, 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 880, 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995);
Reed, 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 191; supra page 7.12
Ms. Zervos insists the speech had to be made spontaneously during a live debate to be
afforded such protection. (Pl. Mem. 26-28.) However, there is no such limitation to the First
Amendment, which routinely protects public debates occurring in newspaper columns and
editorials, advertisements, mailed campaign literature, and more.13 Moreover, that Ms. Zervos
universally known in our society as places for ranting and emotional catharsis, and places where readers expect to
see opinion and hyperbole, not verifiable facts.) (citation omitted); Kindred v. Colby, 2015 WL 12915686, at *5
(Sup. Ct., Monroe Cnty. 2015); OMahony v. Whiston, 2016 WL 5931368, at *3 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. Oct. 7, 2016).
12
Contrary to Ms. Zervoss assertions, the Internet forum need not be anonymous to take on the cloak of non-
actionable opinion, as demonstrated by the Jacobus. Ms. Zervoss counsel, Ms. Wang, has herself vigorously
argued as much. See Kasowitz Reply Aff. Ex. 3 at 11, 14 (arguing that because the statement was made on an
Internet message board. . . . taking the comment in context and considering the mores of this online everyone-has-
an-opinion age, no reasonable reader would give the posting much credence, if any at all.) Nor must the forum be a
live free-for-all. See, supra page 8 n.13 (collecting cases).
13
See Reed, 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 191 (television advertisement); Beilenson v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357,
359-60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (campaign literature); Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examr, 721 P.2d 87, 91 (Cal.
1986) (newspaper); Leidholdt v. L.F.P. Inc., 860 F.2d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 1988) (magazine article); Mann v. Abel, 10
N.Y.3d 271, 276-77 (2008) (op-ed); Adelson, 973 F. Supp. 2d at 489 (internet petition); Roth v. United Fedn of
Teachers, 787 N.Y.S.2d 603, 611-12 (Sup. Ct., Kings Cnty. 2004) (union resolution).
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repeatedly accessed the media to voice her opinions and engage in self-help to refute any
statements she disagreed with demonstrates the Statements were made as part of a back and
forth public debate.14 600 W. 115th St. Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 80 N.Y.2d 130, 138 (1992)
(discussing importance of self-help).
Contrary to Ms. Zervoss argument (Pl. Mem. 26), President Trump is not seeking
blanket immunity or carte blanche for a candidate to say what he likes in the midst of a
political campaign[.] As a matter of First Amendment principles, courts shelter strong, even
outrageous political speech, which the audience would reasonably view as part of a free,
political discourse, rather than defamatory. Mem. 24; see also Adelson, 973 F. Supp. 2d at 489.15
However, there are limits to the wide latitude campaign speech is given in defamation cases.
Russell v. Davis, 2011 WL 8907836, at *10 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. Jul. 1, 2011). For example a
candidates specific, false allegations of criminal conduct might not be protected, as the cases
Ms. Zervos cites demonstrate.16 But this case does not come anywhere close to that. Here, Mr.
Trump was merely defending his character and qualifications for office from the false attacks
Ms. Zervos leveled against him just a few weeks before the Presidential election.17
14
Ms. Zervos and her attorneys continually participated in the debate, holding numerous press conferences and
issuing written statements. See, e.g., Kasowitz Aff. Exs. 23, 25, 26; Wang Aff. Exs. 18, 20. Indeed, Ms. Allred is
known for her savvy in the realm of publicity. Kasowitz Reply Aff. Ex. 1.
15
See also Reed, 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 191 (the audience naturally . . . anticipate[s] the use of rhetorical hyperbole
during the heat of a political campaign); Munoz-Feliciano v. Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist., 2015 WL
1379702, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2015) (noting more is fair in electoral politics than in other contexts and
[n]umerous courts have acknowledged the unique rhetorical atmosphere of the political arena).
16
See Silsdorf v. Levine, 59 N.Y.2d 8, 12 (1983) (specific allegations of mayors criminal corruption); Good
Govt Grp. of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court, 586 P.2d 572, 576 (Cal. 1978) (specific allegations of
councilmans extortion and blackmail). Ms. Zervoss cases also recognize the right of a party to to defend himself
against attacks upon his character Clark v. McGee, 49 N.Y.2d 613, 620 (1980) (discussing immunity, not the First
Amendment) and the leeway for criticism when a party injects themselves into the debate, as Zervos did. Okun v.
Superior Court, 629 P.2d 1369, 1374 (Cal. 1981).
17
Indeed, as shown on a statement-by-statement basis (Mem. 31-32), thirteen of the eighteen allegedly defamatory
Statements are not even of and concerning Ms. Zervos at all, but rather address, among other things, the Hillary
Clinton campaign and the media generally. Several selectively quoted Statements explicitly refer to other false
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C. Jacobus Is Directly On Point.
Ms. Zervos attempts -- on a number of irrelevant grounds -- to distinguish this case from
Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 343, which found that the statements Mr. Trump made on Twitter
during the Republican presidential primary were not defamatory. (Pl. Mem. 29-30.) For
instance, that Ms. Zervos was not a political commentator like Ms. Jacobus is not a relevant
distinction. Rather, it is relevant that Ms. Zervos both directly and through her politically-
motivated counsel, continuously and readily accessed the media to debate Mr. Trumps fitness
for office. Compl. 50; supra note 14. Ms. Zervoss heated back and forth exchanges with
Mr. Trump, similar to Ms. Jacobuss, weigh in favor of the statements not being actionable, as
Jacobus found. 51 N.Y.S.3d at 342.
Further, Ms. Zervos claims that Jacobus involved loose, figurative, and hyperbolic
language, ignoring the allegedly false statements there that were specific: that Ms. Jacobus had
approached the Mr. Trumps campaign and begged for a job (instead of the campaign
approaching her), that Mr. Trump turned her down twice (instead of her turning him down at the
end of the second meeting), and that she therefore had zero credibility! Nevertheless, given
the greater political context and the forum in which the statements were made, the court
concluded that, like here, it is fairly concluded that a reasonable reader would recognize
defendants statements as opinion, even if some of the statements, viewed in isolation, could be
found to convey facts. Id. at 343.
accusers, including a woman whose story was refuted by the butler she claims witnessed the incident (Compl. 64;
App. A No. 8 (one with People magazine, the butler said it was a total lie)), and a woman who made false
accusations of activity on a plane (Compl. 73; App. A. No. 17 (the woman on the plane)). Ms. Zervos claims
that the Statement in paragraph 64 of the Complaint refers to her, relying on a selective quote of Mr. Trump saying
total lies. Compl. 64; App. A No. 8. But taken in context, that Statement is not about Ms. Zervos, but unrelated
allegations in People Magazine refuted by the very butler that the accuser claims witnessed the supposed incident.
10
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D. Statements Of General Denials Are Not Actionable.
Any denials Mr. Trump made against Ms. Zervoss baseless attacks on his reputation and
qualifications for office in the midst of a heated election (see supra note 10) are not actionable.18
If the law were to the contrary, the protection of the First Amendment would be unacceptably
denied to persons who publicly defend themselves against what they believe to be baseless
public charges . . . . Lapine v. Seinfeld, 918 N.Y.S.2d 313, 329 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. 2011);
(Mem. 30.)
As shown (Mem. 5-6), this is particularly true where, as here, the plaintiff solicits the
allegedly defamatory statement. See Sleepys LLC v. Select Comfort Wholesale Corp., 779 F.3d.
191, 201 (2d Cir. 2015) (statements solicited by plaintiff not actionable); LeBreton v. Weiss, 680
N.Y.S.2d 532, 532 (1st Dept 1998) (same). Here Ms. Zervos made accusations in press
statements and conferences, explicitly soliciting, even challenging, Mr. Trump to participate in
that debate. Mem. 5-6. Ms. Zervos claims that Sleepys and LeBreton are inapplicable simply
because they involved secret or pretend shoppers or landlords sent in to record defendants
and prompt them into making damning statements. (Pl. Mem. 35.) However, the doctrine is
not limited to parties making secret recordings, but applies more broadly to a persons
intentional eliciting of a statement she expects will be defamatory. Sleepys, 779 F.3d at 199.
See, e.g., Handlin v. Burkhart, 632 N.Y.S.2d 608, 609 (2d Dept 1995) (plaintiff requested
meeting with union representatives concerning requested resignation with every reason to
18
See also Independent Living Aids, Inc. v. Maxi-Aids, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 124, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (remarks calling
individuals liars could only be understood as a denial of their accusations, that was therefore non-actionable
personal opinion and rhetorical hyperbole.); Kasowitz Reply Aff. Ex. 4 115, at 825 (The defendant may
publish, in an appropriate manner, anything which reasonably appears to be necessary to defend his own reputation
against the defamation of another.).
11
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anticipate the explanation would be defamatory in nature). This is exactly what Ms. Zervos
did here.
Ms. Zervos goes to great lengths to mischaracterize statements of general denial in
response to politically-motivated accusations as an actionable accusation that she is a liar, and
cites a litany of inapposite cases to support this theory.19 (Pl. Mem. 2, 6, 22-25.) To be clear,
President Trump never called Ms. Zervos a liar. (Compl. 55-56, 59-74.) However, calling
someone a liar is not some talismanic utterance triggering an actionable defamation claim
where the context dictates, as here, that the average listener would not understand the statement
to be defamatory in nature. See, e.g., Independent Living Aids, 981 F. Supp. at 128 (calling
[plaintiff] and others liars, can only be understood as a denial of their accusations. . . . . [T]his
cannot be construed as defamatory. Even the most careless reader must have perceived that the
words . . . a vigorous epithet used by [defendant] who considered himself unfairly treated.);
Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 342.20
19
First, many of the cases cited by Ms. Zervos involve allegations of criminal activity, a key fact not present here.
See Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. v. Cnty. of San Diego, 544 F.3d 959, 962 (9th Cir. 2008); Gross v. New
York Times, 82 N.Y.2d 146, 153 (1993); McNamee v. Clemens, 762 F. Supp. 2d 584, 601 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). Second,
other cases involve allegations of professional dishonesty directly affecting the plaintiffs business, and are far more
specific than the ambiguous term liar. See Pentalpha Macau Commercial Offshore Ltd. v. Reddy, 2004 WL
2738925 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2004); Brach v. Congregation Yetev Lev DSatmar, Inc., 696 N.Y.S.2d 496, 497
(2d Dept 1999); Celle v. Filipino Reporter Enters. Inc., 209 F.3d 163, 185-86 (2d Cir. 2000); Divet v. Reinisch, 564
N.Y.S.2d 142, 143 (1st Dept 1991); Mase v. Reilly, 201 N.Y.S. 470, 471-72 (1st Dept 1923); Cappellino v. Rite-
Aid of N.Y., Inc., 544 N.Y.S.2d 104, 105 (4th Dept 1989); Curry v. Roman, 217 A.D.2d 314, 317-19 (4th Dept
1995). Third, other cases Ms. Zervos cites simply do not support her argument, and either dismiss the defamation
claim as non-actionable opinion or are too sparse of an opinion to draw conclusions. See Petrus v. Smith, 459
N.Y.S.2d 173, 174 (4th Dept 1983) (granting summary judgment where malice was not properly alleged and
defendant established qualified privilege); Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 552 P.2d 425, 430 (Cal. 1976)
(finding accusation was non-actionable opinion); Kaminester v. Weintraub, 516 N.Y.S.2d 234, 234 (2d Dept 1987)
(offering no detail as to the nature of the defamatory statement).
20
See also Rosenaur, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 687; Ram v. Moritt, 612 N.Y.S.2d 671, 672 (2d Dept 1994); Huse v.
Auburn Assocs., Inc., 2011 WL 3425607, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2011); Fisher v. Larsen, 188 Cal. Rptr. 216,
22930 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Rojas v. Debevoise & Plimpton, 634 N.Y.S.2d 358, 362 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. 1995);
Sabratek Corp. v. Keyser, 2000 WL 423529, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2000); Couloute v. Ryncarz, 2012 WL
541089, at *67 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2012) (given forum was for people to air grievances about romantic partners, a
reasonable reader would understand comments such as Plaintiff lied and cheated all through his 40 years of life to
be opinion); Glob. Telemedia Intl, Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1269-70 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
12
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E. Ms. Zervoss Reliance On Davis Is Misplaced.
Ms. Zervos relies extensively on Davis v. Boeheim, 24 N.Y.3d 262 (2014) to argue that
calling someone a liar is defamatory. (Pl. Mem. 2, 22.) However, Davis simply does not
apply here. First, the statements in Davis did not concern political speech. Supra, Part I.B.
Second, the statements were not in political and Internet forums in which the audience would
expect opinion statements (supra pages 7-8), but were in contexts in which the audience would
expect factual statements, including on a universitys official website and to reporters covering
the allegations. 24 N.Y.3d at 273. Third, the defendant, on his own volition, made a number of
specific, easily understood statements, like I know [Davis is] lying and trying to get
money. See, e.g., id. at 271. Mr. Trump contributed to a political debate, speaking on various
public issues, to defend his character and fitness for office only after Ms. Zervos initiated the
debate. See, supra, page 11. Fourth, the defendant in Davis falsely insinuated that -- based on
nonpublic information, such as a universitys internal investigation -- he knew the plaintiff was
motivated by money. Id. at 270-71, 273.21 In contrast, Mr. Trump did not insinuate the
Statements were corroborated by secret, undisclosed facts.22
Relying on Davis, Ms. Zervos further ambiguously claims that the Statements are
actionable under a mixed opinion theory because the Statements imply they are based upon
undisclosed facts that justify them, namely taking issue with the disclosure of Ms. Zervoss April
21
See also id. at 271 (Mr. Boeheim stated: I know [Davis is] lying about me seeing him in his hotel room. Thats
a lie. If hes going to tell one lie, Im sure theres a few more of them.); id. (Mr. Boeheim stated: It is a bunch of a
thousand lies that [Davis] has told. . . . He supplied four names to the university that would corroborate his story.
None of them did . . . there is only one side to this story. He is lying.); id. (Mr. Boeheim stated: The Penn State
thing came out and the kid behind this is trying to get money. Hes tried before. And now hes trying again. . . .
Thats what this is about. Money.).
22
In fact, the allegations that Trump met [Zervos] at a hotel [and] greeted her inappropriately -- which purportedly
occurred 10 years in the past -- were introduced to the public by Ms. Zervos on October 14, 2016. (Compl. 53.)
13
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2016 email to Mr. Trump inviting him to her restaurant. (Pl. Mem. 31, n.14.) But unlike Davis,
Mr. Trump did not imply that he had unique access to undisclosed information, which he had
decided to hold back, that corroborated the Statements.23 The purported unreleased email that
Ms. Zervos contends establishes President Trumps so-called unique position of knowledge
was one that she herself disclosed at a public press conference, along with quoted portions of a
purported subsequent email.24 Thus, the audience had access to all relevant information to fully
evaluate the Statements. Moreover, the Statements discussing Ms. Zervos inviting Mr. Trump to
her restaurant, a few months before her unfounded accusations against him, are not defamatory.
(Compl. 56; App. A No. 2.)
F. President Trump Is Not Liable For The Barry Statement.
The Barry Statement is not defamatory for all the reasons discussed above and as shown
(Mem. 33-36). Furthermore, as shown (Mem. 33-34), Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act (CDA) bars Ms. Zervoss claim because President Trump, as an interactive
computer service user, did not provide the content of the information contained in Mr. Barrys
statements posted to the Internet or the retweets. 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1) (No provider or user of
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.). Contrary to Ms. Zervoss argument (Pl.
Mem. 33-35), the CDA still applies because (a) he never circulated the purported defamatory
statements to a new audience as the hyperlinked content published online is continuously
23
None of the cases Ms. Zervos cites (Pl. Mem. 31) are like the case at bar but instead, like Davis, involve
defendants who stated that they had superior knowledge based on unique access to undisclosed facts that corroborate
the defamatory statement. Ms. Zervos herself even cites a case which explicitly recognizes that broader context is
key. Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 293, 294 (1986).
24
See, e.g., Wang Aff. Ex. 18. It should also be noted that the vague, apparently partially quoted, and self-serving
email that she purportedly sent to his secretary on April 21, 2016 came a week after he did not respond to her April
14, 2016 email, which merely invited him to her restaurant. Id.
14
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available to the public and therefore cannot be republished, e.g., Firth v. State, 98 N.Y.2d 365,
372 (2002), and (b) as shown (Mem. 36-37), Mr. Trump did not substantively augment the
posts he retweeted.
Recognizing her claim is barred by the CDA, Ms. Zervos makes speculative and
conclusory allegations that Mr. Trumps campaign purportedly drafted the Barry Statement at
Mr. Trumps alleged direction and with his supposed approval. But those speculative allegations
fail as a matter of law because they are not supported by any factual allegations, including
allegations that the campaign was acting within the scope of its authority when it purportedly
drafted the Barry Statement as shown. (Mem. 35-36.)
Furthermore, Ms. Zervoss argument that the timing of the Barry Statement posting and
its placement next to Mr. Trumps picture and an email to which Mr. Trump had access supports
an inference that the Barry Statement was drafted on Mr. Trumps behalf is also meritless
because it is not supported by any allegations in the Complaint -- just her unsupported briefing.
(Pl. Mem. 33.)25
Lastly, Ms. Zervos argument that Mr. Trump purportedly ratified the Barry Statement
by retweeting it the next morning (Pl. Mem. 33) is also unavailing, as Ms. Zervos has not
specifically alleged that Mr. Trump knew the campaign wrote the Barry Statement and that he
benefited from that action. See Municipality of Bremanger v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc.,
2013 WL 1294615, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. March 28, 2013); Hillyer v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co. as
trustee for Hasco 2007-NC1, 2011 WL 5041960, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2011).
25
Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC v. Bleeping Computer LLC, 194 F. Supp. 3d 263, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), cited by
Ms. Zervos, does not involve anti-SLAPP or allegations made on information and belief. Rather, that court found
that the numerous allegations concerning the alleged agents authority and the way in which he was held out to the
public were sufficient to raise an inference of agency. Ms. Zervos makes no such allegations here.
15
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II. Californias Anti-SLAPP Statute Applies To Ms. Zervoss Claim.
As shown (Mem. 20 n.35), because California has the most significant relationship to
this action, its anti-SLAPP statute applies here. Ms. Zervoss futile attempt to invoke New York
law fails for two reasons. (Pl. Mem. 15-17.) First, contrary to Ms. Zervoss insinuations (Pl.
Mem. 16), New York and Californias defamation laws do conflict, with California having a
broader anti-SLAPP statute than New York. See also Condit v. Dunne, 317 F. Supp. 2d 344, 352
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Broadspring, Inc. v. Congoo, LLC, 2014 WL 4100615, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
20, 2014). Compare Cal. Code Civ. P. 425.16 with N.Y. Civ. Rights Law 70-a, 76-a, N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 3211(g), 3212(h).
Second, under well-settled New York choice of law rules, for defamation actions, the
state of plaintiffs domicile . . . is where he is presumed to have been most injured, which is
therefore usually the state with the most significant relationship to the action. Merrill Lynch
Futures, Inc. v. Miller, 686 F. Supp. 1033, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws 150(2) (1977)); see also Condit, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 355; Cummins v.
Suntrust Capital Markets, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 2d 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Here, California clearly
has the most significant relationship to the suit because California is where, among other things,
(i) Ms. Zervos resides and the alleged acts underlying her claim purportedly occurred, (ii) she
allegedly suffered injuries to her reputation and business, (iii) she held her press conferences to
initiate a public debate about Mr. Trumps candidacy,26 and (iv) Mr. Barry published two of the
statements. (Compl. 14, 27-34, 81-82.) Moreover, California has expressed a strong interest
in enforcing its anti-SLAPP law to encourage continued participation in matters of public
26
See Kasowitz Reply Aff. Ex. 5; see also Kasowitz Aff. Ex. 2 (John Barry, Mission Viejo, CA).
16
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significance, Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 2016), and to prevent its citizens
from filing suits that restrict protected speech, like here.27 Conversely, New York has no
significant relationship to this lawsuit where the Statements occurred outside of the state28 and
Ms. Zervos has no specific allegations to demonstrate otherwise. (Compl. 60, 63, 66-70, 72.
Mem. 20 n.35.) See Adelson v. Harris, 973 F. Supp. 2d 467, 472, 477-79 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Ms. Zervos argues that because her defamation claim is a conduct-regulating rule under
choice of law principles, New York law applies because, as she claims without basis, Mr.
Trumps acts allegedly occurred in New York. (Pl. Mem. 15-17.) But as the Court of Appeals
held when rejecting this very argument, when the defendants [tortious] conduct occurs in one
jurisdiction and the plaintiffs injuries are suffered in another, the place of the wrong is
considered to be the place where the last event necessary to make the actor liable occurred. . . .
Thus, the locus in this case is determined by where the plaintiffs injuries occurred. Schultz v.
Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 195 (1985) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, California law, including its anti-SLAPP statute, which is a substantive law,
applies to her claims.29 (Pl. Mem. 37-40.) Adelson v. Harris is instructive on this. There, the
27
See, e.g., Tobinick v. Novella, 108 F. Supp. 3d 1299, 1304 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (applying Californias anti-SLAPP
statute because Californias interest in limiting frivolous litigation filed by its residents outweighs any interest
Florida has in the dispute, where that dispute is between a California [plaintiff] corporation and a Connecticut
resident [defendant]); Fallay v. San Francisco City & Cty., 2015 WL 7874312, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015)
(Californias anti-SLAPP statute is designed to discourage suits . . . brought to deter common citizens from
exercising their political or legal rights or to punish them for doing so.) (internal quotation marks omitted), appeal
dismissed (Jan, 27, 2016).
28
The Debate was in Las Vegas, Nevada. Id. 73. The campaign rallies were in Charlotte, North Carolina,
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Bangor, Maine, Green Bay, Wisconsin, Grand Junction, Colorado, and Gettysburg,
Pennsylvania. Id. 59, 64-65, 71-72, 74.
29
Tellingly, Ms. Zervos does not -- because she cannot -- challenge that the President satisfies the first prong of
Californias anti-SLAPP statute as the Statements undoubtedly arise from protected activity. Rather, she focuses
on the fact California anti-SLAPP statute is codified in the code of civil procedure (Pl. Mem. 37), which is not
determinative of whether a law is substantive. See, e.g., Frankel v. Citicorp Ins. Servs., Inc., 913 N.Y.S.2d 254, 260
(2d Dept 2010) (CPLR 4544 is a substantive law).
17
27 of 36
court applie[d] New York choice of law rules to find that Nevadas anti-SLAPP law, which is
similar to Californias anti-SLAPP law,30 governed because the plaintiff was a citizen of Nevada,
giving it the greatest interest in the case.31 Adelson, 973 F. Supp. 2d at 476. Relying upon
Liberty Synergistics Inc. v. Microflo Ltd., 718 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2013),32 Ms. Zervos argues that
federal diversity cases have found Californias anti-SLAPP statute to be substantive when
analyzing under the Erie doctrine whether to apply state or federal law. (Pl. Mem. 38; id. at
n.17.) Ms. Zervos is wrong. The federal court sitting in diversity -- like in Adelson -- first
analyzes whether the foreign anti-SLAPP statute is substantive or procedural on state choice of
law grounds before arriving at the second step of whether the law is substantive or procedural for
Erie purposes. Adelson, 973 F. Supp. 2d at 476 (district court applies state choice of law rules,
based on how the New York Court of Appeals would act). See also Liberty, 718 F.3d at 151-52.
Thus, it is irrelevant that Adelson found, in the context of an Erie analysis, that Nevadas
anti-SLAPP statute has substantive aspects because, like Californias anti-SLAPP statute, it
provides for attorneys fees, shifts the burden of proof and requires a plaintiff to make a
heightened showing. Id. at 494 n.21. Furthermore, New York state courts recognize that statutes
with similar provisions as Californias anti-SLAPP are substantive. See Rotunno v. Gruhill
30
Compare Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.635-41.670 with Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16.
31
Applying a variety of states choice of law rules, courts from around the country hold with increasing uniformity
that anti-SLAPP statutes are substantive. See also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2003); U.S. ex
rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space, Co., 190 F.3d 963, 971-73 (9th Cir. 1999); Price v. Stossel, 2008 WL
2434137, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2008). Indeed, the balance of cases find similar anti-SLAPP statutes to be
substantive. See Forras v. Rauf, 39 F. Supp. 3d 45, 53 (D.D.C. 2014); Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 84 (1st Cir.
2010); Williams v. Cordillera Commns Inc., 2014 WL 2611746, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 11, 2014); Wynn v. Chanos,
2017 WL 1149508, at *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 28, 2017).
32
The holding in Liberty Synergistics, 718 F.3d 138, is limited to its facts, because it involved a transfer of venue
from California to New York such that the court examined the issue pretending to be a California state court and
applying California (not New York) choice of law principles. Id. at 153-54; see also Ernst v. Carrigan, 814 F.3d
116, 122 (2d Cir. 2016) (emphasizing the narrowness of Liberty). Indeed, Liberty acknowledged the substantive
policy furthered by Californias anti-SLAPP and determined that the anti-SLAPP rule would apply if Californias
state courts required a substantive choice of law analysis. 718 F.3d at 148, 155.
18
28 of 36
Const. Corp., 816 N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (2d Dept 2006) (statutes providing for attorneys fees are
substantive); Rotz v. Van Kampen Asset Mgmt., 5 N.Y.S.3d 330, at *5-6 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty.
2014) (burden shifting statutes are substantive).
Lastly, Ms. Zervos baselessly contends that President Trumps anti-SLAPP motion is
untimely (Pl. Mem. 39) but the parties agreed by stipulation to extend the deadline to answer or
move with respect to the complaint (Dkt. Nos. 5, 18, 40, 97) -- which includes an anti-SLAPP
motion. Regardless, the Court has broad discretion to allow a late-filed anti-SLAPP motion. See
Adelson, 973 F. Supp. 2d at 495.
III. The Constitution Prohibits This Court From Exercising Jurisdiction.
A. The Supremacy Clause Bars Suits In State Court Against The President.
As established in the Opening Memorandum, this action should be dismissed without
prejudice to its reinstatement after the Trump Presidency. While the U.S. Supreme Court in
Clinton v. Jones, allowed a civil suit to proceed under the circumstances of that case in federal
court the Court warned that actions in state court may present a more compelling case for
immunity. 520 U.S. at 691-92. Thus, Ms. Zervoss strained attempts to apply Clinton v.
Joness reasoning to suits in state court flies in the face of the Courts explicit caution that it does
not so apply. (Pl. Mem. 2, 9-10.)
The Courts concern with a state court exercising jurisdiction over a sitting President
arises from its prior holdings that the Supremacy Clause -- which makes the Constitution and
federal laws and treaties made thereunder, the supreme Law of the Land with Judges in every
State . . . bound thereby -- prevents state courts from interfering with high-ranking federal
officials ability to carry out their official duties. U.S. Const. art. VI, 2. (See Mem. 12-14.)33
33
Ms. Zervos argues that Professor Tribes statement that [a]n order of a state judge directing the President to
19
29 of 36
Ms. Zervos claims that the cases cited in the Opening Memorandum are distinguishable
because they involve a state courts inability to interfere with lower federal officers official
conduct. (Pl. Mem. 11-12.) Ms. Zervoss attempted distinction ignores that the President is
different from those lower federal officers. The President is the ultimate repository of the
Executive branchs powers, Clinton, 520 U.S. at 719, and is required by the constitution . . . to
be always in function,34 such that any state action that burdens the President necessarily
interferes with his official duties. Ms. Zervoss unofficial/official distinction is unavailing here,
because, among other things: (i) the President is inseparable from the office he holds under the
Constitutional scheme and (ii) the Presidents duties are so all-encompassing that they absorb
any unofficial aspect of his life. (Mem. 13-14.)
Indeed, numerous commentators have pointed out the illusory distinction between official
and unofficial conduct when it comes to the President. Any private lawsuit against the
president is bound to become much more than a private case, such that even a private lawsuit
against the president should be treated legally as public (and thus functionally immune)
regardless of the underlying subject matter at issue or the time when the events occurred.
Kasowitz Reply Aff. Ex. 6 at 104, 108, 112. Judge Posner has repeatedly commented that it
should have been apparent to the Justices that public exposure of the details of the Presidents
[private] life could undermine the Presidents authority and effectiveness. Kasowitz Reply Aff.
Ex. 7 at 227; see also Kasowitz Aff. Ex. 35 at 319. Ms. Zervos can point to little else than
release information on pain of contempt would in all probability violate principles of federalism is limited to state
secrets (Pl. Mem. 11 n.4); however, in support, Tribe only cites footnote 13 in Clinton v. Jones, which is entirely
unrelated to state secrets. See Kasowitz Aff. Ex. 38 at 780 n.66. Thus, it is clear Tribe believed that the U.S.
Supreme Court would bar a civil suit in state court.
34
See Mem. 13-14; Kasowitz Aff. Ex. 38 at 631; Kasowitz Aff. Ex. 42 at 7. See also Kasowitz Aff. Ex. 40 at 46
(No single constitutional officer has so much power as the President, none must be on the job so continuously
administration of the laws and the handling of foreign affairs requires that the presidency be open 24 hours a day.).
20
30 of 36
Clinton v. Jones to support her argument that there is a meaningful distinction between
Presidential official and unofficial conduct, which itself explicitly recognized that quite
different questions are raised when the suit is brought in state court. (Pl. Mem. 9-10.)
Ms. Zervos further contends that it is settled that a federal officer can be sued for his
official conduct in state court for damages. (Pl. Mem. 8 (citing Teal v. Felton, 1 N.Y. 537, 543-
547 (1848)); Am. Mem. 5-7.) This is exemplary of the shortcomings in her position. First, it
ignores the singular nature of the President: unlike the federal officers at issue in Teal, the
President cannot be sued anywhere for damages even for conduct that falls within the outer
perimeter of his official responsibility. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 756. Similarly, the existence of the
officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a) -- which allows a federal official who is sued in
state court for official conduct to remove to federal court -- has no bearing on whether the
President is amenable to suit in state court under the Constitution. (Pl. Mem. 8-9.) Second, Ms.
Zervoss position ignores Clinton v. Jones, which explicitly recognized that the Presidents
amenability to suits for damages in state court arising out of unofficial conduct is, at best, an
open issue. 520 U.S. at 690, 691 n.13.
Similarly, Ms. Zervos and Amicuss arguments that the Supremacy Clause is about the
status of federal laws, not federal officials and that Congressional action is necessary to shield
the President from suit (Am. Mem. 12-14; Mem. 9-10) are incorrect. The Supremacy Clause
makes the Constitution, not just Congressional laws, the supreme Law of the Land. U.S.
Const. art. VI, 2. As a result, even when a federal law is not impacted by state action, the
Supremacy Clause prevents states and their courts, from interfering with the Constitution, or the
exercise of Constitutional powers vested in the federal government. See, e.g., McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 317, 330 (1819) (invalidating states attempt to tax a national bank with
21
31 of 36
powers vested in the national government); In re Tarble, 80 U.S. 397, 408, 411 (1871) (state
could not order a military official to discharge a solider, because the power over the military
resides in the federal government under the Constitution).35 Because the Constitution vests the
President with Executive branch powers, Nixon, 457 U.S. at 749-50, the Supremacy Clause, even
absent Congressional action, prevents this state Court from exercising jurisdiction over the
President. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Presidents amenability to suit is a
Constitutional matter, such that it has reserved ruling on whether it would be constitutional for
Congress to create damages liability for the President where he would otherwise be immune. Id.
at 448 n.27. Thus, it is clear, no Congressional action is necessary to remove liability.
Amicus attempts to limit the Clinton v. Jones Courts Supremacy Clause concerns to
where a state court compels the President to take specific action. Am. Mem. 11-12. However,
the Court explicitly raised the question [of] whether a court may compel the attendance of the
President at any specific time or place as a second unresolved concern, entirely separate from
the question of whether a comparable claim might succeed in a state tribunal. 520 U.S. at 691.
Indeed, the test for whether state action violates the Supremacy Clause is not limited to control,
but asks whether the state action will retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the
operations of the federal government. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 317. And a state court retards,
impedes, burdens, and also asserts direct control over the President simply by compelling him
to participate in a lawsuit, respond to a complaint, answer discovery, or satisfy a judgment.36
35
See also Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 178-79 (1976) (Supremacy Clause requires that federal functions be
left free of [state] regulation, particularly where . . . the rights and privileges of the Federal Government at stake
. . . find their origin in the Constitution); Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 491 (1944) ([T]he sphere of
action appropriated to the United States is as far beyond the reach of the judicial process issued by a State judge of a
State court, as if the line of division was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye.), overruled on
other grounds by Murphy v. Waterfront Commn, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
36
Cf. Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 508 (1979) (immunity was designed to protect Congressmen not only
22
32 of 36
B. Clinton v. Joness Holding That Federal Courts Can Appropriately Manage

Cases Against The President Explicitly Does Not Extend To State Courts.
Ms. Zervos and Amicus argue that state courts can manage suits to avoid burdening the
Presidency as well as federal courts, such that the reasoning in Clinton v. Jones should apply
equally to state courts.37 (Pl. Mem. 10; Am. Mem. 7-8.) However, the Court explicitly
distinguished between the two.38 In reserving ruling on this very question, the Clinton Court was
responding directly to concerns raised at length in briefing concerning Case Management By
State Trial Courts:
[E]ven the possibility that an incumbent President could be subject to the

jurisdiction of a state court . . . demonstrates that suits against a sitting President
are inconsistent with our constitutional scheme. The Framers were well aware
that state governments might come into conflict with the federal government, and
particularly with the Executive Branch. It would take little ingenuity to contrive a
state law damages action against a President unrelated to the conduct of his office.
In an atmosphere of local partisan hostility to the President, the ability to bring
such a suit in state court would be a powerful weapon in the hands of state
interestsone that the Framers could not possibly have intended to permit.
Kasowitz Reply Aff. Ex. 8 at *33-34; see also Kasowitz Reply Aff. Ex. 9 at *29. Thus, these
concerns which include concerns of inconsistent rulings from fifty different state courts and the
from the consequences of litigations results but also from the burden of defending themselves.) (quoting
Dombrowksi v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967)); Galante ex rel. Galante v. Cty. of Nassau, 720 N.Y.S.2d 325, 328
(Sup. Ct., Nassau Cnty. 2000), affd as modified sub nom. Galante v. Cty. of Nassau, 740 N.Y.S.2d 225 (2d Dept
2002); see also infra Part III.B,C. Ms. Zervos, in fact asks the Court to order a retraction and/or apology from the
President (Compl. Prayer for Relief), which would be an even clearer exercise of control.
37
Contrary to Ms. Zervoss assertion, Mr. Trump could not have removed this action to federal court on diversity
grounds to avoid these concerns (Pl. Mem. 10-11), because she only claims damages of $2,914 (Compl. 81), far
below the $75,000 amount-in-controversy threshold. 28 U.S.C. 1441(b). Indeed, if a federal court did have
diversity jurisdiction, Ms. Zervos herself could have just as easily brought suit there to avoid this issue.
38
Ms. Zervos argues that because the motion to dismiss does not suggest[] that such [prejudice] issues are present
here, there is no basis for dismissal. (Pl. Mem. 10.) However, the President was pointing to the concern over local
prejudice raised by the U.S. Supreme Court, not himself. Clinton, 520 U.S. at 691. Further, a rule of law that could
allow suits in state court would be a harmful precedent, which the Court recognized to be an important concern in its
own right. Id. at 690-91 (The representations made on behalf of the Executive Branch as to the potential impact of
the precedent established by the Court of Appeals merit our respectful and deliberate consideration.).
23
33 of 36
risk of local partisan hostility from elected judges (Mem. 15-16) -- were at the forefront of the
Courts mind and occupied a substantial part of the Courts attention at oral argument.39
C. Civil Litigation Places A Substantial Burden On The President.
Both Ms. Zervos and Amicus argue that allowing an action would not unduly burden the
President.40 (Pl. Mem. 10; Am. Mem. 7-10.) History has proven this false. (Mem. 18-19.) As
shown at length in the Opening Memorandum, it is now beyond reasonable debate that Clinton v.
Jones -- which included claims for defamation -- occupied an inordinate amount of President
Clintons time and impeded his ability to carry out his duties.41 This lawsuit, and the far-
reaching discovery sought, appear to have the same goals. (Mem. 8-9, 19.) For example, Ms.
Zervoss sweeping and overbroad subpoena already seeks information that has nothing to do
with this lawsuit. Wang Aff. Ex. 8.
39
Mem. 11 n.16, 16; Kasowitz Aff. Ex. 41. Oral argument is relevant here, not to show that statements made by
U.S. Supreme Court Justices in oral argument have some legal effect (Pl. Mem. 10 n.3), but rather to give context
to the Court singling state court adjudication as a separate concern. See Perry v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 829 F.3d 760,
765-66 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (looking to justices questions during oral argument to show their awareness of the
possibility of a distinction not that they had necessarily decided the issue), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 811 (2017),
and revd on other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017), and vacated sub nom. Anthony W. Perry, Petitioner V. Wilbur
Ross, United States Secretary Of Commerce, Respondent, 2017 WL 4231118 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 2017).
40
Amicus cites to an Office of Legal Counsel memorandum to argue that civil litigation may impose less of a
burden than a criminal case (Am. Mem. 8); however, that focused exclusively on federal rather than state
prosecution of a sitting President. Memorandum to the Attorney General, Assistant Attorney General Randolph D.
Moss, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, A Sitting Presidents Amenability to Indictment and
Criminal Prosecution (Oct. 16, 2000), available at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2000/10/31/op-olc-v024-p0222_0.pdf. at n.2. The
Department of Justice has expressed concern that allowing a civil suit in state court would enmesh state courts in
the affairs of the national government and that it would overburden the President. See Kasowitz Reply Aff. Ex. 9 at
*7.
41
Mem. 18 & n.28; Kasowitz Aff. Ex. 35 at 316 (referring to the suit as a national emergency with a disastrous
effect); Kasowitz Aff. Ex. 43 at 26 ([the] whole thing created chaos and took away from the ability of the U.S.
government to function. The ability of the presidency and the White House to function -- it is not even arguable. . . .
It had a huge effect . . . on his ability to get things done.); Kasowitz Aff. Ex. 45 at 3 (President Clinton spoke with
his attorney three times on the day he was consulting about whether to attack Iraq); Kasowitz Reply Aff. Ex. 10 at
652 ([T]he matter necessarily displaced other policy items from the agendas.); Kasowitz Aff. Ex. 38 at 765-66
(The Court -- unwisely, hindsight would suggest -- deemed the threat that civil litigation . . . . impair the effective
performance of [the Presidents] office, to be implausible.); Kasowitz Aff. Ex. 44 at 265 (We have learned that
. . . [w]e do not need to be able to sue our Presidents during their term of office.).
24
34 of 36
Amicus argues that they are unaware of a deluge of litigation against sitting Presidents
that occupied a significant amount of time, and downplays the likelihood of many small-stakes
suits against the President of the United States. (Am. Mem. 2, 9-10.) As Clinton v. Jones alone
established, however, a single suit can cause substantial damage. Amicus also ignores that there
are many incentives to sue a President. As one commentator noted, [the Jones case] took on a
special gleam, like valuable treasure. If played right, this case could return the Republicans to
power in the White House. It lured to the treasure hunt some of the finest conservative legal
talent in America. Kasowitz Reply Aff. Ex. 11 at 177. Further, [t]he normal incentive
structures that we have to keep civil litigation in check dont apply when the litigation is against
the president because of those who would have enormous amounts to gain by destabilizing his
presidency. Id. at 223. Indeed, [o]nce discovery began in the fall of 1997 [in Clinton v.
Jones], its intensity amounted to a virtual blitzkrieg. . . . [T]he parties conducted 62
depositions. Kasowitz Reply Ex. 12 at 75-76.42
IV. Alternatively, The President Is Entitled To A Stay.
Alternatively, as shown, the Court has broad discretion to grant a temporary stay of
proceedings . . ., upon such terms as may be just, CPLR 2201, (Mem. 17-20), and such stays are
not limited to promoting efficiency as Ms. Zervos suggests.43 In fact, such a stay is not nearly as
extraordinary as Ms. Zervos suggests. Lengthy stays are common in, for example: bankruptcy,
even in suits against non-debtors; in civil actions where criminal prosecution are pending against
the same defendant; against military personnel on active duty; and while immunity issues are
42
See also Kasowitz Reply Aff. Ex. 13 at 61.
43
None of the cases cited by Ms. Zervos involves such weighty public concerns. (Pl. Mem. 14.)
25
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resolved.44 The relief sought falls far short of the diplomatic immunity granted to foreign heads
of state for their unofficial conduct.45
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and those demonstrated in the Opening Memorandum, the
Court should dismiss the Complaint, or in the alternative, stay the action pursuant to CPLR 2201,
and award President Trump his costs and attorneys fees pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. P.
425.16(c).
Dated: October 31, 2017

New York, New York
KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP
By: /s/ Marc E. Kasowitz

Marc E. Kasowitz
Christine A. Montenegro
Paul J. Burgo
1633 Broadway
New York, New York 10019
(212) 506-1700
Attorneys for Defendant Donald J. Trump
44
11 U.S.C. 362; 2 Collier on Bankruptcy 105.02; Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 608 F.2d 1084, 1089 (5th
Cir. 1979); Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. 3901 et seq.; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19
(1982).
45
See, e.g., Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
26
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FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/31/2017 11:59 PM INDEX NO.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT

KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP

Attorneys for Defendant Donald J. Trump

October 31, 2017

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................... 1

I. Ms. Zervoss Claim Is Not Actionable As A Matter Of Law............................................. 4

A. Ms. Zervoss Self-Contradictory Allegations Warrant Dismissal. ......................... 4

B. Statements Made In The Context Of A National Political Campaign

C. Jacobus Is Directly On Point. ............................................................................... 10

D. Statements Of General Denials Are Not Actionable. ........................................... 11

E. Ms. Zervoss Reliance On Davis Is Misplaced..................................................... 13

F. President Trump Is Not Liable For The Barry Statement..................................... 14

II. Californias Anti-SLAPP Statute Applies To Ms. Zervoss Claim. ................................. 16

B. Clinton v. Joness Holding That Federal Courts Can Appropriately

C. Civil Litigation Places A Substantial Burden On The President. ......................... 24

IV. Alternatively, The President Is Entitled To A Stay. ......................................................... 25

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