Marine Corps Martial Arts: One Mind, Any Weapon
Marine Corps Martial Arts: One Mind, Any Weapon
Marine Corps Martial Arts: One Mind, Any Weapon
MajorCBLynn,CG15
20February2009
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14. ABSTRACT
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Yet doubt still pervades the force. Is it really necessary, and does it actually work?
Three simple but effective ideas will assist commanders in employing the MCMAP
program. First, leaders must recognize the benefits of MCMAP. Second, leaders must
counter-balance the limitations of the MCMAP instructors with their own war fighting
education and experience. Third, leaders must encourage instructors to train to a specific end.
These three ideas, coupled with clear guidance from the commander, will sky-rocket the close-in
fighting skills of the Marines in any given unit.
Fundamentally, these three ideas arise from an existent paradigm regarding the nature of
war and the focus of a commander. The commander employs his unit in combat to accomplish
the mission. In doing so, he does not limit himself to only one or two tools. Rather, he seeks to
use all tools available to place his enemy in a dilemma. Anything that can be used to assist in
accomplishing his mission is a tool. Hence, the value of a tool in the eyes of a commander is
based on its capacity to assist in accomplishing the commanders mission.
It is understandable that MCMAP can a too, but it is not the only tool How does one
adjudicate between the value of one tool against another, and what places MCMAP at a
higher level than call for fire or close quarters battle? What is the basis of prioritization?
As previously stated, the value of a tool lies in its capacity to assist the commander in
accomplishing the mission. This value is stated in terms of capabilities and limitations, and
priority is assigned according to the tools relative value compared to other tools. The first step,
then, is to determine the nature of the tool (capabilities and limitations).
First, MCMAP provides a primary capability to engage enemies and non-compliant civilians
with both lethal and non-lethal techniques along the entire force continuum in support of the
mission and according to the Rules of Engagement (ROE)/Rules for the Use of Force (RUF).
Second, MCMAP teaches the combined arms dilemma mindset through use of the One
Mind, Any Weapon idea1, developing the following thought process: You may come at me with
a knife, but I will fight you with my rifle, stick, knife, hands, feet, knees, the walls, any obstacles,
my canteen, helmet, or the carabineer that I wear on my flak jacket It is one mind; any
weapon.
Third, MCMAP also develops confidence in non-kinetic ability. Personnel who lack
confidence in their non-kinetic abilities (controlling the force of an engagement, talking down a
belligerent, restraining/detaining an individual) are more apt to escalate to a kinetic solution.
Developing the confidence to deal with situations throughout the spectrum of violence enables
Marines to relax more in situations that require close-in contact with civilians. The strategic
implications are astounding.
Fourth, MCMAP teaches dominance of a situation. Self-defense denies the enemy the ability
to have an effect on oneself (move, block); self-protection focuses on dominating a situation to
achieve the desired outcome (offensive). A Marine who finds himself on the ground wrestling
with an enemy should have one thing in mind Get up, finish this, get my weapon and continue
the mission.
Fifth, MCMAP addresses psychological preparation necessary to take a life by your own
hands with bayonet, knife, canteen or boot heel.
Green belt instructors are taught to instruct rather than teach. The green belt instructor
school focuses on one thing accurate transmission of information. The school teaches the
Marines the precise moves for the first three belts of MCMAP and how to train other individuals
to mimic these movements (EDIP Explain, demonstrate, imitate, practice). 2 Instructors will
need instruction to develop their teaching abilities further.
In addition, instructors teach techniques in isolation rather than integrated with other
techniques into a combined attack to defeat an opponent. Commanders should teach the
combined arms dilemma to instructors and assist them in integrating tan, gray and green
techniques. This integration should create a barrage of attacks similar to the combined arms
attack of machine guns, mortars, artillery and tanks. Once a baseline is established, the
instructors can develop their own combinations.
The third limitation is that instructors are taught drills rather than scenario. The modern
battlefield; however, requires actions throughout the entire force continuum, not merely those
required for bull-in-the ring, pugil sticks and knife grappling. The commander should encourage
scenario development by the instructors in support of field exercises that will test the specific
skill sets expected to be needed per the mission requirements.
Lastly, instructors are focused on belt instruction rather than end state. Instructors are taught
how to train individuals to attain rank rather than how to develop individuals who can fight at
close range. The commander must specify the result required.
Limitations only become risks when one does not recognize the limitation but operates as if it
does not exist. When a limitation is known and properly staffed, it is no longer limiting.
But isnt the purpose of having black belt instructors partially to develop these aspects of
training and to make the training usable to the Marines?
Black belt instruction addresses many of the aspects that green belt instructor training does
not. However, most units will not have a black belt instructor; even if they do, they will not
make MCMAP the instructors primary duty. The burden of most training falls on the shoulders
of the green belt instructors.
Leaders must encourage instructor to train to a specific end
The philosophy of MCMAP is the philosophy of war fighting. Every method a
commander uses to accomplish his mission is martial in application and art in
implementation. Feet, hands, stick, knife and bayonet are merely different tools to be used at
different distances than pistol, rifle, mortars, artillery and air. However, a few points are helpful
to develop skill. The chart below lists recommendations per the aforementioned benefits of
MCMAP.
Physical Ability
The focus is on developing technique proficiency. The training method is to conduct endless
repetitions of a barrage of linked techniques leading to a determined end. Ten or twenty
repetitions are not enough. The following example ought to be done one hundred times in a row:
Left eye gouge Right knife hand to clavicle folding to a Right horizontal elbow to the head
Right reverse knife hand to opponents opposite temple wrap the neck knee to face
takedown vertical stomp to back of the skull. Imagine this rather than a single vertical hammer
fist, twenty times.
Mindset
The focus is acquiring the adrenal state. The training method is to place Marines into uncertain
scenarios after having physically pre-exhausting them with other stresses (hike, run, sleep
deprivation). Examples include ambush runs in which Marines will be attacked at an unknown
time and location during a trail run and must defend themselves as well as limited visibility
scenarios. Frequently change the terms of combat.
Confidence
The focus is developing ability throughout the force continuum. The training method is to
conduct blindfolded scenarios addressing the entire continuum. An example is to brief a
blindfolded Marine the setting and current ROE/RUF. Once the blindfold is removed, the other
assailants begin their assault, and he acts in accordance with the scenario.
Self-protection
The focus is dominating a situation. The training method is to force Marines to fight from a
position of disadvantage, demanding dominance according to the ROE before the scenario ends.
Examples include making them fight unarmed against multiple armed opponents, fight to get up
against an enemy standing above him, or fight back to a weapon system, in which his rifle is
placed twenty feet from Marine and the bad guys are between him and weapon. Digressive fight
training is also useful for teaching how to end a fight. For example, every thirty seconds the
scenario will deteriorate to the enemys favor.
Physical violence
Focus is developing ruthlessness. The training method is to allow Marines to impact inanimate
objects. Examples include striking MCMAP pads, striking an opponent in a Red Man suit (from
the MPs) and stabbing a goat carcass with a knife.
The focus is complying with the order. The training method is to practice techniques to achieve
next belt rank. Any green belt instructor can do this.
By active involvement in the process, the commander can use his war fighting experience
and education to bring about his desired end. Two scenarios illustrate this point. In the first
scenario, the commander tells the instructor to teach the green belt counter to the round punch.
As a result, the Marines will know the technique and will be able to reproduce it but may or may
not be able to use it against a stick attack to the front. In the second scenario, the commander
tells the instructor to ensure the Marines are able to defend (unarmed) against a stick attack to
their front. The result here is different. The commander has just opened the door to exploration.
This task awakens the instructor and will awaken the Marines. The counter then becomes any of
the following: counter to the round punch, move-block-strike, arm bar takedown, move-block-
strike to reverse wrist wrap or block and bulldog. Suddenly, the options are endless. Suddenly,
the Marines are creatively involved in the process. Suddenly, the Marines are actually able to
use this knowledge in real application.
But this is only the first step. The training continues. The commander should also require
the instructor to develop a scenario that tests the ability of an individual to use this technique.
The instructor sets up the scenario so that one unarmed individual will walk down a dark alley in
a MOUT town or between a row on CONEX boxes. At some point during his walk, he will be
engaged by multiple opponents with sticks. The Marine executing the scenario achieves the
adrenal state, feeling many of the physiological and psychological aspects of an actual situation.
Conclusion
By understanding MCMAPs capabilities and limitations, the commander develops the
ability to wield this tool in a combined arms fight. By using an appropriate methodology, he
ensures his instructors are able to develop the Marines so the Marines are able to employ their
close-in fighting skills when necessary. By recognizing the benefits of MCMAP, counter-
balancing the limitations of the MCMAP instructors and encouraging instructors to train to a
specific end, a commander will ensure the effective implementation of MCMAP; his company
truly has one mind, any weapon.
Captain Grayson is an infantry officer. He is a Green Belt Instructor in USMC Martial Arts as
well as an instructor in both Lung Chuan Fa (Dragonfist) Kung Fu and FIERCE Instructor
training (force protection seminar training).
Notes
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