VOL.

70, MARCH 26, 1976

165
Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. vs. Won
No. L-23851. March 26, 1976.*
WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. LEE E. WON alias
RAMON LEE and BIENVENIDO A. TAN, defendants-appellees.
Interpleader; Interpleader under section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure; Purpose of.The
action of interpleader, under section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is a remedy whereby a
person who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or
partially, without claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks that the persons who
claim the said personal property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance
with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is
entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded to protect a person not against double
liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability.
Same; Same; Difference between interpleader under the Code of Civil Procedure and under the
Rules of Court.The procedure under the Rules of Court is the same as that under the Code of
Civil Procedure except that under the former the remedy of interpleader is available regardless
of the nature of the subject-matter of the controversy, whereas under the latter an interpleader
suit is proper only if the subject-matter of the controversy is personal property or relates to the
performance of an obligation.
Same; Stakeholder should file action of interpleader within reasonable time after dispute has
arisen without waiting to be sued by claimants; Reason.A stakeholder should use reasonable
diligence to hale the contending claimants to court. He need not await actual institution of
independent suits against him before filing a bill of interpleader. He should file an action of
interpleader within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by
either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue delay. But
where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the environmental circumstances, the
remedy is not barred.
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* EN BANC.
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Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. vs. Won
Same; Where stakeholder files action of interpleader after judgment has been rendered against
him in favor of one of claimants, action deemed too late; Reason.A stakeholders action of
interpleader is too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against him in favor of one
of the contending claimants, especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the
rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the
suit where judgment was entered. This must be so, because once judgment is obtained against
him by one claimant he becomes liable to the latter.
Same; Party who files action of interpleader should show that he has not been made
independently liable to any of the claimants.Before a person will be deemed to be in a
position to ask for an order of interpleader, he must be prepared to show, among other
prerequisites, that he has not become independently liable to any of the claimants.
Same; Where stakeholder defends a suit by one claimant and allows it to proceed to judgment
against him, action of interpleader deemed too late.If a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one
of the adverse claimants and allows said suit to proceed to final judgment against him, he
cannot later on have that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader suit.
Same; A successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in action of
interpleader and compelled to prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants.A
successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in an interpleader suit
and compelled to prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants, as that would in effect
be a collateral attack upon the judgment.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Guillermo E. Torres, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Leonardo Abola for appellant.
Alfonso V. Agcaoili & Ramon A. Barcelona for appellee Lee E. Won.
Bienvenido A. Tan in his own behalf.
CASTRO, C.J.:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance

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Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. vs. Won
of Rizal, in civil case 7656, dismissing the plaintiff-appellants complaint of interpleader upon the
grounds of failure to state a cause of action and res judicata.
In its amended and supplemental complaint of October 23, 1963, the Wack Wack Golf &
Country Club, Inc., a non-stock, civic and athletic corporation duly organized under the laws of
the Philippines, with principal office in Mandaluyong, Rizal (hereinafter referred to as the
Corporation), alleged, for its first cause of action, that the defendant Lee E. Won claims
ownership of its membership fee certificate 201, by virtue of the decision rendered in civil case
26044 of the CFI of Manila, entitled Lee E. Won alias Ramon Lee vs. Wack Wack Golf &
Country Club, Inc. and also by virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued
on October 17, 1963 by Ponciano B. Jacinto, deputy clerk of court of the said CFI of Manila, for
and in behalf of the president and the secretary of the Corporation and of the Peoples Bank &
Trust Company as transfer agent of the said Corporation, pursuant to the order of September
23, 1963 in the said case; that the defendant Bienvenido A. Tan, on the other hand, claims to be
lawful owner of its aforesaid membership fee certificate 201 by virtue of membership fee
certificate 201-serial no. 1199 issued to him on July 24, 1950 pursuant to an assignment made
in his favor by Swan, Culbertson and Fritz, the original owner and holder of membership fee
certificate 201; that under its articles of incorporation and by-laws the Corporation is authorized
to issue a maximum of 400 membership fee certificates to persons duly elected or admitted to
proprietary membership, all of which have been issued as early as December 1939; that it
claims no interest whatsoever in the said membership fee certificate 201; that it has no means
of determining who of the two defendants is the lawful owner thereof; that it is without power to
issue two separate certificates for the same membership fee certificate 201, or to issue another
membership fee certificate to the defendant Lee, without violating its articles of incorporation
and by-laws; and that the membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199 held by the defendant
Tan and the membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued to the defendant Lee
proceed from the same membership fee certificate 201, originally issued in the name of Swan,
Culbertson and Fritz.
For its second cause of action, it alleged that the membership
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. vs. Won
fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued by the deputy clerk of court of court of the CFI of
Manila in behalf of the Corporation is null and void because issued in violation of its by-laws,
which require the surrender and cancellation of the outstanding membership fee certificate 201
before issuance may be made to the transferee of a new certificate duly signed by its president
and secretary, aside from the fact that the decision of the CFI of Manila in civil case 26044 is not
binding upon the defendant Tan, holder of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199; that
Tan is made a party because of his refusal to join it in this action or bring a separate action to
protect his rights despite the fact that he has a legal and beneficial interest in the subject-matter
of this litigation; and that he is made a party so that complete relief may be accorded herein.
The Corporation prayed that (a) an order be issued requiring Lee and Tan to interplead and
litigate their conflicting claims; and (b) judgment be rendered, after hearing, declaring who of the
two is the lawful owner of membership fee certificate 201, and ordering the surrender and
cancellation of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued in the name of Lee.
In separate motions the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds of res
judicata, failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, and bar by prescription.1 These
motions were duly opposed by the Corporation. Finding the grounds of bar by prior judgment
and failure to state a cause of action well taken, the trial court dismissed the complaint, with
costs against the Corporation.
In this appeal, the Corporation contends that the court a quo erred (1) in finding that the
allegations in its amended and supplemental complaint do not constitute a valid ground for an
action of interpleader, and in holding that the principal motive for the present action is to reopen
the Manila Case and collaterally attack the decision of the said Court; (2) in finding that the
decision in civil case 26044 of the CFI of Manila constitutes res judicata and bars its present
action; and (3) in dismissing its action instead of compelling the appellees to interplead and
litigate between themselves their respective claims.
The Corporations position may be stated elsewise as follows: The trial court erred in dismissing
the complaint, instead of
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1 Only Tan interposed the ground of prescription.
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Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. vs. Won
compelling the appellees to interplead because there actually are conflicting claims between the
latter with respect to the ownership of membership fee certificate 201, and, as there is no
identity of parties, of subject-matter, and of cause of action, between civil case 26044 of the CFI
of Manila and the present action, the complaint should not have been dismissed upon the
ground of res judicata.
On the other hand, the appellees argue that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint,
because, having the effect of reopening civil case 26044, the present action is barred by res
judicata.
Although res judicata or bar by a prior judgment was the principal ground availed of by the
appellees in moving for the dismissal of the complaint and upon which the trial court actually
dismissed the complaint, the determinative issue, as can be gleaned from the pleadings of the
parties, relates to the propriety and timeliness of the remedy of interpleader.
The action of interpleader, under section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure,2 is a remedy
whereby a person who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render
wholly or partially, without claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks that the persons
who claim the said personal property or who consider themselves entitled to demand
compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves in order to determine
finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded to protect a person not
against double liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability.3 The procedure
under the Rules of Court4 is the same as that under the Code of Civil Procedure,5
______________

2 Now Section 1, Rule 63, and formerly Sec. 1, Rule 14, of the Rules of Court.
3 Alvarez, et al. v. Commonwealth of the Philippines, 65 Phil. 202, 311-312.
4 Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Interpleader when proper.
Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject-matter are or may be made against a
person, who claims no interest whatsoever in the subject-matter, or an interest which in whole
or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting
claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.
5 Section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: Interpleading.Whenever conflicting
claims are or may be
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. vs. Won
except that under the former the remedy of interpleader is available regardless of the nature of
the subject-matter of the controversy, whereas under the latter an interpleader suit is proper
only if the subject-matter of the controversy is personal property or relates to the performance of
an obligation.
There is no question that the subject-matter of the present controversy, i.e., the membership fee
certificate 201, is proper for an interpleader suit. What is here disputed is the propriety and
timeliness of the remedy in the light of the facts and circumstances obtaining.
A stakeholder6 should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to court.7 He
need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill of
interpleader.8 He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a dispute
has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants.9 Otherwise, he
maybe barred by laches10 or undue delay.11 But where he acts with reasonable diligence in
view of the environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred.12
__________________

made upon a person for or relating to personal property, or the performance of an obligation or
any portion thereof, so that he may be made subject to several actions by different persons,
unless the court intervenes, such person may bring an action against the conflicting claimants,
disclaiming personal interest in the controversy, to compel them to interplead and litigate their
several claims among themselves, and the court may order the conflicting claimants to
interplead with one another and thereupon proceed to determine the rights of the several parties
to the interpleading to the personal property or the performance of the obligation in controversy
and shall determine the rights of all parties in interest.
6 As here used the term stakeholder means a person entrusted with the custody of property or
money that is subject of litigation or of contention between rival claimants in which the holder
claims no right or property interest.
7 Royal Neighbors of America v. Lowary, 46 F. 2d 565.
8 State of Texas v. State of Florida, 59 S. Ct. 563, 306 U.S. 398, 83 L. ed. 817, 121 A.L.R.
1179.
9 Dennis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc, 88 S.W. 2nd 76.
10 U.S. Land & Investment Co. v. Buessey, 7 N.Y.S. 495.
11 Milton Warehouse Co. v. Basche Sage Hardware Co., 34 P 2d 338.
12 Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Yaw, 53 F. 2d 684.
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Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. vs. Won
Has the Corporation in this case acted with diligence, in view of all the circumstances, such that
it may properly invoke the remedy of interpleader? We do not think so. It was aware of the
conflicting claims of the appellees with respect to the membership fee certificate 201 long before
it filed the present interpleader suit. It had been recognizing Tan as the lawful owner thereof. It
was sued by Lee who also claimed the same membership fee certificate. Yet it did not
interplead Tan. It preferred to proceed with the litigation (civil case 26044) and to defend itself
therein. As a matter of fact, final judgment was rendered against it and said judgment has
already been executed. It is now therefore too late for it to invoke the remedy of interpleader.
It has been held that a stakeholders action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgment
has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants,13 especially where
he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the
opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered. This must
be so, because once judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable to the
latter.14 In one case,15 it was declared:
The record here discloses that long before the rendition of the judgment in favor of relators
against the Hanover Fire Insurance Company the latter had notice of the adverse claim of South
to the proceeds of the policy. No reason is shown why the Insurance Company did not implead
South in the former suit and have the conflicting claims there determined. The Insurance
Company elected not to do so and that suit proceeded to a final judgment in favor of relators.
The Company thereby became independently liable to relators. It was then too late for such
company to invoke the remedy of interpleader.
The Corporation has not shown any justifiable reason why it did not file an application for
interpleader in civil case 26044 to compel the appellees herein to litigate between themselves
their conflicting claims of ownership. It was only after adverse final judgment was rendered
against it that the remedy of interpleader was invoked by it. By then it was too late, because
_________________

13 Troy v. Troy, 16 P. 2d 290.

14 Yarborough v. Thompson, 41 Am. Dec. 626.
15 Nash, et al. v. McCullum, etc., et al., 74 S.W. 2d 1046, 1047.
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Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. vs. Won
to be entitled to this remedy the applicant must be able to show that he has not been made
independently liable to any of the claimants. And since the Corporation is already liable to Lee
under a final judgment, the present interpleader suit is clearly improper and unavailing.
It is the general rule that before a person will be deemed to be in a position to ask for an order
of interpleader, he must be prepared to show, among other prerequisites, that he has not
become independently liable to any of the claimants. 25 Tex. Jur. p. 52, Sec. 3; 30 Am. Jur. p.
218, Section 8.
It is also the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes too late when it is filed after judgment
has been rendered in favor of one of the claimants of the fund, this being especially true when
the holder of the funds had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment
and had an opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit in which the judgment was
rendered. United Producers Pipe Line Co. v. Britton, Tex. Civ. App. 264 S.W. 176; Nash v.
McCullum, Tex. Civ. 74 S. W. 2d 1046; 30 Am. Jur. p. 223, Sec. 11; 25 Tex. Jur. p. 56, Sec. 5;
108 A.L.R., note 5, p. 275.16
Indeed, if a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of the adverse claimants and allows said suit
to proceed to final judgment against him, he cannot later on have that part of the litigation
repeated in an interpleader suit. In the case at hand, the Corporation allowed civil case 26044 to
proceed to final judgment. And it offered no satisfactory explanation for its failure to implead Tan
in the same litigation. In this factual situation, it is clear that this interpleader suit cannot prosper
because it was filed much too late.
If a stakeholder defends a suit by one claimant and allows it to proceed so far as a judgment
against him without filing a bill of interpleader, it then becomes too late for him to do so. Union
Bank v. Kerr, 2 Md. Ch. 460; Home Life Ins. Co. v. Gaulk, 86 Md. 385, 390, 38 A. 901; Gonia v.
OBrien, 223 Mass. 177, 111 N.E. 787. It is one of the main offices of a bill of interpleader to
restrain a separate proceeding at law by claimant so as to avoid the resulting partial judgment;
and if the stakeholder acquiesces in one claimants trying out his claim and establishing it at
law, he cannot then have that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader suit. 4 Pomeroys
Eq. Juris. No. 162; Mitfors Eq. Pleading (Tylers Ed.) 147 and 236; Langdells Summary
________________

16 Farmers State Bank of Meridian v. National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, Connecticut, et al., 169
S.W. 2d. 545, 549.
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Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. vs. Won
of Eq. Pleading, No. 162; De Zouche v. Garrison, 140 Pa. 430, 21 A. 450.17
It is the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes too late when application therefor is
delayed until after judgment has been rendered in favor of one of the claimants of the fund, and
that this is especially true where the holder of the fund had notice of the conflicting claims prior
to the rendition of such judgment and an opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit
in which such judgment was rendered. (See notes and cases cited 36 Am. Dec. 703, Am. St.
Rep. 598; also 5 Pomeroys Eq. Juris. Sec. 41.)
The evidence in the opinion of the majority shows beyond dispute that the appellant permitted
the Parker county suit to proceed to judgment in favor of Britton with full notice of the adverse
claims of the defendants in the present suit other than the assignees of the judgment (the bank
and Mrs. Pabb) and no excuse is shown why he did not implead them in that suit.18
To now permit the Corporation to bring Lee to court after the latters successful establishment of
his rights in civil case 26044 to the membership fee certificate 201, is to increase instead of to
diminish the number of suits, which is one of the purposes of an action of interpleader, with the
possibility that the latter would lose the benefits of the favorable judgment. This cannot be done
because having elected to take its chances of success in said civil case 26044, with full
knowledge of all the fact, the Corporation must submit to the consequences of defeat.
The act providing for the proceeding has nothing to say touching the right of one, after
contesting a claim of one of the claimants to final judgment unsuccessfully, to involve the
successful litigant in litigation anew by bringing an interpleader action. The question seems to
be one of first impression here, but, in other jurisdictions, from which the substance of the act
was apparently taken, the rule prevails that the action cannot be resorted to after an
unsuccessful trial against one of the claimants.
It is well settled, both by reasons and authority, that one who asks the interposition of a court
of equity to compel others, claiming property in his hands, to interplead, must do so before
putting them to the test of trials at law. Yarborough v. Thompson, 3 Smedes & M. 291 (41 Am.
Dec. 626); Gornish v. Tanner, 1 You. & Jer. 333; Haseltine v. Brickery, 16 Grat. (Va.) 116. The
remedy by interpleader is afforded to
_____________

17 Phillips, et al. v. Taylor, et al., 129 A. 18, 20.

18 United Producers Pipe Line Company v. Britton, et al., 264 S.W. 576, 578.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. vs. Won
actions touching the same property or demand; but one who, with knowledge of all the facts,
neglects to avail himself of the relief, or elects to take the chances for success in the actions at
law, ought to submit to the consequences of defeat. To permit an unsuccessful defendant to
compel the successful plaintiffs to interplead, is to increase instead of to diminish the number of
suits; to put upon the shoulders of others the burden which he asks may be taken from his
own.* * *.
It is urged, however, that the American Surety Company of New York was not in position to file
an interpleader until it had tested the claim of relatrix to final judgment, and that, failing to meet
with success, it promptly filed the interpleader. The reason why, it urges, it was not in such
position until then is that had it succeeded before this court in sustaining its construction of the
bond and the law governing the bond, it would not have been called upon to file an interpleader,
since there would have been sufficient funds in its hands to have satisfied all lawful claimants. It
may be observed, however, that the surety company was acquainted with all of the facts, and
hence that it simply took its chances of meeting with success by its own construction of the
bond and the law. Having failed to sustain it, it cannot now force relatrix into litigation anew with
others, involving most likely a repetition of what has been decided, or force her to accept a pro
rata part of a fund, which is far from benefits of the judgment.19
Besides, a successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in an
interpleader suit and compelled to prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants, as
that would in effect be a collateral attack upon the judgment.
The jurisprudence of this state and the common law states is well-settled that a claimant who
has been put to test of a trial by a surety, and has established his claim, may not be impleaded
later by the surety in an interpleader suit, and compelled to prove his claim again with other
adverse claimants. American Surety Company of New York v. Brim, 175 La. 959, 144 So. 727;
American Surety Company of New York v. Brim (In Re Lyong Lumber Company), 176 La. 867,
147 So. 18; Dugas v. N.Y. Casualty Co., 181 La. 322, 159 So. 572; 15 Ruling Case Law, 228;
33 Corpus Juris, 477; 4 Pomeroys Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.) 3172; 2 Lawrence on Equity
Jurisprudence, 1023; Royal Neighbors of America v. Lowary (D.C.) 46 F2d 565; Brackett v.
Graves, 30 App. Div. 162, 51 N.Y.S. 895; De Zouche v. Garrison, 140 Pa. 430, 21 A. 450, 451;
Manufacturers
________________

19 American Surety Co. of New York v. Brim, 144 So. 727, 729-730.
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Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. vs. Won
Finance Co. v. W.I. Jones Co. 141 Ga., 519, 81 S.E. 1033; Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Lawder, 22 R.I. 416, 84 A. 383.
There can be no doubt that relators claim has been finally and (definitely established, because
that matter was passed upon by three courts in definitive judgments. The only remaining item is
the value of the use of the land during the time that relator occupied it. The case was remanded
solely and only for the purpose, of determining the amount of that credit. In all other respects the
judgment is final.20
It is generally held by the cases it is the office of interpleader to protect a party, not against
double liability, but against double vexation on account of one liability. Gonia v. OBrien, 223
Mass. 177, 111 N.E. 787. And so it is said that it is too late for the remedy of interpleader if the
party seeking this relef has contested the claim of one of the parties and suffered judgment to
be taken.
In United P.P.I. Co. v. Britton (Tex. Civ. App.) 264 S.W. 576, 578, it was said: It is the general
rule that a bill of interpleader comes too late when application therefor is delayed until after
judgment has been rendered in favor of one of the claimants of the fund, and this is especially
true where the holder of the fund had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of
such judgment and an opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit in which such
judgment was rendered. See notes and cases cited 35 Am. Dec. 703; 91 An. St. Rep. 598; also
5 Pomeroys Equity Jurisprudence No. 41.
The principle thus stated has been recognized in many cases in other jurisdictions, among
which may be cited American Surety Co. v. OBrien, 223 Mass. 177, 111 N.E. 787; Phillips v.
Taylor, 148 Md. 157, 129 A. 18; Moore v. Hill, 59 Ga. 760, 761; Yearborough v. Thompson, 3
Smedes & M. (11 Miss.) 291, 41 Am. Dec. 626. See, also, 33 C.J. p. 447, No. 30; Nash v.
McCullum, (Tex. Civ. App.) 74 S.W. 2d 1042, 1047.
It would seem that this rule should logically follow since, after the recovery of judgment, the
interpleading of the judgment creditor is in effect a collateral attack upon the judgment.21
In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Corporation had already been
made independently liable in civil case 26044 and, therefore, its present application for
interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said civil case;
the appellee Lee had already established his rights to membership fee certificate 201 in the
aforesaid civil case and, therefore, this interpleader suit would compel him to establish his rights
anew, and thereby increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one of the purposes of
_________________
20 Victor v. Lewis, et al., 161 So. 597, 598.
21 Benjamin v. Ernst, 83 Wash. 59, 79.
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Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. vs. Won
an interpleader suit, with the possibility that the benefits of the final judgment in the said civil
case might eventually be taken away from him; and because the Corporation allowed itself to be
sued to final judgment in the said case, its action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for
which reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay.
ACCORDINGLY, the order of May 28, 1964, dismissing the complaint, is affirmed, at appellants
cost.
Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Muoz Palma, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Barredo and Martin, JJ., took no part.
Fernando, J., is on official leave.
Order affirmed.
Notes.a) Action of interpleader to resolve conflicting claims to property seized by sheriff.In
respect to conflicting claims to property seized by the sheriff in the foreclosure of a chattel
mortgage, the sheriff may bring an action of interpleader under section 120 of the Code of Civil
Procedure in order to determine the respective rights of the claimants. Though in such cases it
may ordinarily be better practice for the sheriff to sell the property and hold the proceeds of the
same subject to the outcome of the action of interpleader, his action in suspending the same
pending the determination of the action of interpleader seems justified by the facts in the
present case and the court will not interfere by mandamus. (Sy-Quia vs. Sheriff of Ilocos Sur, L-
22807, October 10, 1924).
b) When interpleader not necessary.The conflicting claims, if any, existing between the two
sons of the defendant on one hand and the plaintiff on the other, could be as well threshed out
by presenting the oft-mentioned sons as witnesses at the trial as it was done by the defendant
in the municipal court. If after the presentation of the evidence the court finds that the claim of
the defendant is true and the commission authorized by law should be given to his two sons, the
only alternative left to the court would be to dismiss the complaint and authorize the defendant
to pay the commission to his two sons. There is no need of any third party complaint, nor of any
action for interpleading, as defendant has done in the present case. (Malinao vs. Bocar, L-4708,
June 30, 1952).
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Fleming vs. Civil Aeronautics Board
c) When interpleader proper.In case the ownership of a leased real property is under litigation
between two claimants and the lessee thereof has reasonable grounds as to whom he should
make payments of the rents, the filing of a complaint for interpleader by the latter is proper.
(Oriental Sawmill vs. Tambunting, L-2097, October 16, 1950).
o0o Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. vs. Won, 70 SCRA 165, No. L-23851 March
26, 1976