THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 74886. December 8, 1992.]

PRUDENTIAL BANK , petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

COURT, PHILIPPINE RAYON MILLS INC. and ANACLETO R. CHI ,
respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. COMMERCIAL LAW; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS; LETTER OF CREDIT;

CONSTRUED. A letter of credit is defined as an engagement by a bank or other person
made at the request of a customer that the issuer will honor drafts or other demands for
payment upon compliance with the conditions specified in the credit. Through a letter of
credit, the bank merely substitutes its own promise to pay for the promise to pay of one of
its customers who in return promises to pay the bank the amount of funds mentioned in
the letter of credit plus credit or commitment fees mutually agreed upon.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESENTMENT FOR ACCEPTANCE, NOT NECESSARY IN CASE AT BAR.
The transaction in the case at bar stemmed from Philippine Rayon's application for a
commercial letter of credit with the petitioner in the amount of $128,548.78 to cover the
former's contract to purchase and import loom and textile machinery from Nissho
Company, Ltd. of Japan under a five-year deferred payment plan. Petitioner approved the
application. The drawee was necessarily the herein petitioner. It was to the latter that the
drafts were presented for payment. There was no need for acceptance as the issued
drafts are sight drafts. They are, pursuant to Section 7 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
(NIL), payable on demand. Presentment for acceptance is defined as the production of a
bill of exchange to a drawee for acceptance. Contrary to both courts' pronouncements,
Philippine Rayon immediately became liable thereon upon petitioner's payment thereof.
Such is the essence of the letter of credit issued by the petitioner. A different conclusion
would violate the principle upon which commercial letters of credit are founded because in
such a case, both the beneficiary and the issuer, Nissho Company Ltd. and the petitioner,
respectively, would be placed at the mercy of Philippine Rayon even if the latter had already
received the imported machinery and the petitioner had fully paid for it. Presentment for
acceptance is necessary only in the cases expressly provided for in Section 143 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL).
3. ID.; ID.; ACCEPTANCE OF A BILL, EXPLAINED. The acceptance of a bill is the
signification by the drawee of his assent to the order of the drawer; this may be done in
writing by the drawee in the bill itself, or in a separate instrument.
4. ID.; TRUST RECEIPTS LAW (P.D. 115), TRUST RECEIPT TRANSACTION, DEFINED.
Under P.D. No. 115, otherwise known as the Trust Receipts Law, which took effect on 29
January 1973, a trust receipt transaction is defined as "any transaction by and between a
person referred to in this Decree as the entruster, and another person referred to in this
Decree as the entrustee, whereby the entruster, who owns or holds absolute title or
security interests over certain specified goods, documents or instruments, releases the
same to the possession of the entrustee upon the latter's execution and delivery to the
entruster of a signed document called the trust receipt wherein the entrustee binds
himself to hold the designated goods, documents or instruments in trust for the entruster
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 and to sell or otherwise dispose of the goods, documents or instruments with the
obligation to turn over to the entruster the proceeds thereof to the extent of the amount
owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or the goods, instruments
themselves if they are unsold or not otherwise disposed of, in accordance with the terms
and conditions specified in the trust receipt, or for other purposes substantially equivalent
to any one of the following: . . ."
5. ID.; ID.; VIOLATIONS THEREOF; PENDENCY OF CRIMINAL ACTION, NOT A LEGAL
OBSTACLE TO A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION. Although petitioner commenced a criminal
action for the violation of the Trust Receipts Law, no legal obstacle prevented it from
enforcing the civil liability arising out of the trust receipt in a separate civil action. Under
Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law, the failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds
of the sale of goods, documents or instruments covered by a trust receipt to the extent of
the amount owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or to return said
goods, documents or instruments if they were not sold or disposed of in accordance with
the terms of the trust receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa, punishable under the
provisions of Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. Under Article 33 of
the Civil Code, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party in cases of defamation, fraud and physical
injuries. Estafa falls under fraud.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY WHEN VIOLATION COMMITTED BY JURIDICAL ENTITIES. A
close examination of Sec. 13 of P.D. No. 115 reveals that the penalty referred to therein
which shall be imposed upon the directors, officers, employees or other officials or
persons of the corporation, partnership, association or other judicial utility is
imprisonment, the duration of which would depend on the amount of the fraud as provided
for in Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The reason for this is obvious: corporations,
partnerships, associations and other juridical entities cannot be put in jail. However, it is
these entities which are made liable for the civil liability arising from the criminal offense.
This is the import of the clause "without prejudice to the civil liabilities arising from the
criminal offense."
7. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; GUARANTY; VALIDITY THEREOF. The attestation by
witnesses and the acknowledgment before a notary public are not required by law to make
a party liable on the instrument. The rule is that contracts shall be obligatory in whatever
form they may have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity
are present; however, when the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it
may be valid or enforceable, or that it be proved in a certain way, that requirement is
absolute and indispensable. With respect to a guaranty, which is a promise to answer for
the debt or default of another, the law merely requires that it, or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing. Otherwise, it would be unenforceable unless ratified.
While the acknowledgment of a surety before a notary public is required to make the same
a public document, under Article 1358 of the Civil Code, a contract of guaranty does not
have to appear in a public document.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENSE OF EXCUSSION; NOT A CONDITION SINE QUA NON FOR THE
INSTITUTION OF ACTION AGAINST GUARANTOR. Under Article 2058 of the Civil Code,
the defense of exhaustion (excussion) may be raised by a guarantor before he may be held
liable for the obligation. However, excussion is not a condition sine qua non for the
institution of an action against the guarantor. In Southern Motors, Inc. vs. Barbosa (99 Phil.
263, 268 [1956]), this Court stated: "4. Although an ordinary personal guarantor not a
mortgagor or pledgor may demand the aforementioned exhaustion, the creditor may,
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 prior thereto, secure a judgment against said guarantor, who shall be entitled, however, to
a deferment of the execution of said judgment against him until after the properties of the
principal debtor shall have been exhausted to satisfy the obligation involved in the case."
9. ID.; ID.; CONTRACT OF ADHESION; CONSTRUCTION THEREOF. Any doubt as to
the import or true intent of the solidary guaranty clause should be resolved against the
petitioner. The trust receipt, together with the questioned solidary guaranty clause, is on a
form drafted and prepared solely by the petitioner; Chi's participation therein is limited to
the affixing of his signature thereon. It is, therefore, a contract of adhesion; as such, it must
be strictly construed against the party responsible for its preparation.
10. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PERMISSIVE JOINDER OF PARTIES;
RATIONALE. There was then nothing procedurally objectionable in impleading private
respondent Chi as a co-defendant in Civil Case No. Q-19312 before the trial court. Section
6, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on permissive joinder of parties explicitly allows it. This is
the equity rule relating to multifariousness. It is based on trial convenience and is designed
to permit the joinder of plaintiffs or defendants whenever there is a common question of
law or fact. It will save the parties unnecessary work, trouble and expense.
11. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; GUARANTY; GUARANTOR; LIABILITY IN CASE AT BAR.
Chi's liability is limited to the principal obligation in the trust receipt plus all the
accessories thereof including judicial costs; with respect to the latter, he shall only be
liable for those costs incurred after being judicially required to pay. Interest and damages,
being accessories of the principal obligation, should also be paid; these, however, shall run
only from the date of the filing of the complaint. Attorney's fees may even be allowed in
appropriate cases. In the instant case, the attorney's fees to be paid by Chi cannot be the
same as that to be paid by Philippine Rayon since it is only the trust receipt that is covered
by the guaranty and not the full extent of the latter's liability. All things considered, he can
be held liable for the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees in favor of the petitioner.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR. , J : p

Petitioner seeks to review and set aside the decision 1 of public respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals), dated 10 March 1986, in AC-G.R. No. 66733 which
affirmed in toto the 15 June 1978 decision of Branch 9 (Quezon City) of the then Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal in Civil Case No. Q-19312. The latter
involved an action instituted by the petitioner for the recovery of a sum of money
representing the amount paid by it to the Nissho Company Ltd. of Japan for textile
machinery imported by the defendant, now private respondent, Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc.
(hereinafter Philippine Rayon), represented by co-defendant Anacleto R. Chi.

The facts which gave rise to the instant controversy are summarized by the public
respondent as follows:
"On August 8, 1962, defendant-appellant Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc. entered into
a contract with Nissho Co., Ltd. of Japan for the importation of textile
machineries under a five-year deferred payment plan (Exhibit B, Plaintiff's Folder
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 of Exhibits, p. 2). To effect payment for said machineries, the defendant-appellant
applied for a commercial letter of credit with the Prudential Bank and Trust
Company in favor of Nissho. By virtue of said application, the Prudential Bank
opened Letter of Credit No. DPP-63762 for $128,548.78 (Exhibit A, Ibid., p. 1).
Against this letter of credit, drafts, were drawn and issued by Nissho (Exhibits X,
X-1 to X-11, Ibid., pp. 65, 66 to 76), which were all paid by the Prudential Bank
through its correspondent in Japan, the Bank of Tokyo, Ltd. As indicated on their
faces, two of these drafts (Exhibits X and X-1, Ibid., pp. 65-66) were accepted by
the defendant-appellant through its president, Anacleto R. Chi, while the others
were not (Exhibits X-2 to X-11, Ibid., pp. 66 to 76).
Upon the arrival of the machineries, the Prudential Bank indorsed the shipping
documents to the defendant-appellant which accepted delivery of the same. To
enable the defendant-appellant to take delivery of the machineries, it executed, by
prior arrangement with the Prudential Bank, a trust receipt which was signed by
Anacleto R. Chi in his capacity as President (sic) of defendant-appellant company
(Exhibit C, Ibid., p. 13).
At the back of the trust receipt is a printed form to be accomplished by two
sureties who, by the very terms and conditions thereof, were to be jointly and
severally liable to the Prudential Bank should the defendant-appellant fail to pay
the total amount or any portion of the drafts issued by Nissho and paid for by
Prudential Bank. The defendant-appellant was able to take delivery of the textile
machineries and installed the same at its factory site at 69 Obudan Street,
Quezon City.
Sometime in 1967, the defendant-appellant ceased business operation (sic). On
December 29, 1969, defendant-appellant's factory was leased by Yupangco
Cotton Mills for an annual rental of P300,000.00 (Exhibit I, Ibid., p. 22). The lease
was renewed on January 3, 1973 (Exhibit J, Ibid., p. 26). On January 5, 1974, all
the textile machineries in the defendant-appellant's factory were sold to AIC
Development Corporation for P300,000.00 (Exhibit K, Ibid., p. 29)

The obligation of the defendant-appellant arising from the letter of credit and the
trust receipt remained unpaid and unliquidated. Repeated formal demands
(Exhibits U, V, and W, Ibid., pp. 62, 63, 64) for the payment of the said trust receipt
yielded no result. Hence, the present action for the collection of the principal
amount of P956,384.95 was filed on October 3, 1974 against the defendant-
appellant and Anacleto R. Chi. In their respective answers, the defendants
interposed identical special defenses, viz., the complaint states no cause of
action; if there is, the same has prescribed; and the plaintiff is guilty of laches." 2

On 15 June 1978, the trial court rendered its decision the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing the defendant Philippine
Rayon Mills, Inc. to pay plaintiff the sum of P153,645.22, the amounts due under
Exhibits "X" & "X-1", with interest at 6% per annum beginning September 15, 1974
until fully paid. LLphil

Insofar as the amounts involved in drafts Exhs. "X" (sic) to "X-11", inclusive, the
same not having been accepted by defendant Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc.,
plaintiff's cause of action thereon has not accrued, hence, the instant case is
premature.

Insofar as defendant Anacleto R. Chi is concerned, the case is dismissed. Plaintiff

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 is ordered to pay defendant Anacleto R. Chi the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
With costs against defendant Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc.

SO ORDERED." 3

Petitioner appealed the decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. In urging the
said court to reverse or modify the decision, petitioner alleged in its Brief that the trial
court erred in (a) disregarding its right to reimbursement from the private respondents for
the entire unpaid balance of the imported machines, the total amount of which was paid to
the Nissho Company Ltd., thereby violating the principle of the third party payor's right to
reimbursement provided for in the second paragraph of Article 1236 of the Civil Code and
under the rule against unjust enrichment; (b) refusing to hold Anacleto R. Chi, as the
responsible officer of defendant corporation, liable under Section 13 of P.D. No 115 for the
entire unpaid balance of the imported machines covered by the bank's trust receipt
(Exhibit "C"); (c) finding that the solidary guaranty clause signed by Anacleto R. Chi is not a
guaranty at all; (d) controverting the judicial admissions of Anacleto R. Chi that he is at
least a simple guarantor of the said trust receipt obligation; (e) contravening, based on the
assumption that Chi is a simple guarantor, Articles 2059, 2060 and 2062 of the Civil Code
and the related evidence and jurisprudence which provide that such liability had already
attached; (f) contravening the judicial admissions of Philippine Rayon with respect to its
liability to pay the petitioner the amounts involved in the drafts (Exhibits "X", "X-1" to "X-
11"); and (g) interpreting "sight" drafts as requiring acceptance by Philippine Rayon before
the latter could be held liable thereon. 4
In its decision, public respondent sustained the trial court in all respects. As to the first and
last assigned errors, it rules that the provision on unjust enrichment, Article 2142 of the
Civil Code, applies only if there is no express contract between the parties and there is a
clear showing that the payment is justified. In the instant case, the relationship existing
between the petitioner and Philippine Rayon is governed by specific contracts, namely the
application for letters of credit, the promissory note, the drafts and the trust receipt. With
respect to the last ten (10) drafts (Exhibits "X-2" to "X-11") which had not been presented
to and were not accepted by Philippine Rayon, petitioner was not justified in unilaterally
paying the amounts stated therein. The public respondent did not agree with the
petitioner's claim that the drafts were sight drafts which did not require presentment for
acceptance to Philippine Rayon because paragraph 8 of the trust receipt presupposes
prior acceptance of the drafts. Since the ten (10) drafts were not presented and accepted,
no valid demand for payment can be made. LLphil

Public respondent also disagreed with the petitioner's contention that private respondent
Chi is solidarily liable with Philippine Rayon pursuant to Section 13 of P.D. No. 115 and
based on his signature on the solidary guaranty clause at the dorsal side of the trust
receipt. As to the first contention, the public respondent ruled that the civil liability
provided for in said Section 13 attaches only after conviction. As to the second, it
expressed misgivings as to whether Chi's signature on the trust receipt made the latter
automatically liable thereon because the so-called solidary guaranty clause at the dorsal
portion of the trust receipt is to be signed not by one (1) person alone, but by two (2)
persons; the last sentence of the same is incomplete and unsigned by witnesses; and it is
not acknowledged before a notary public. Besides, even granting that it was executed and
acknowledged before a notary public, Chi cannot be held liable therefor because the
records fail to show that petitioner had either exhausted the properties of Philippine Rayon
or had resorted to all legal remedies as required in Article 2058 of the Civil Code. As
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 provided for under Articles 2052 and 2054 of the Civil Code, the obligation of a guarantor
is merely accessory and subsidiary, respectively. Chi's liability would therefore arise only
when the principal debtor fails to comply with his obligation. 5
Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by the public respondent in its
Resolution of 11 June 1986, 6 petitioner filed the instant petition on 31 July 1986
submitting the following legal issues:
"I. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR FULL REIMBURSEMENT AGAINST
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR THE PAYMENT PETITIONER MADE TO
NISSHO CO. LTD. FOR THE BENEFIT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT UNDER ART.
1283 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND UNDER THE GENERAL
PRINCIPLE AGAINST UNJUST ENRICHMENT;
II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CHI IS SOLIDARILY LIABLE UNDER THE
TRUST RECEIPT (EXH. C);
III. WHETHER OR NOT ON THE BASIS OF THE JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS OF
RESPONDENT CHI HE IS LIABLE THEREON AND TO WHAT EXTENT;
IV. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CHI IS MERELY A SIMPLE
GUARANTOR; AND IF SO, HAS HIS LIABILITY AS SUCH ALREADY ATTACHED;
V. WHETHER OR NOT AS THE SIGNATORY AND RESPONSIBLE OFFICER OF
RESPONDENT PHIL. RAYON RESPONDENT CHI IS PERSONALLY LIABLE
PURSUANT TO THE PROVISION OF SECTION 13, P.D. 115;
VI. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT PHIL. RAYON IS LIABLE TO THE
PETITIONER UNDER THE TRUST RECEIPT (EXH. C);
VII. WHETHER OR NOT ON THE BASIS OF THE JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
RESPONDENT PHIL. RAYON IS LIABLE TO THE PETITIONER UNDER THE
DRAFTS (EXHS. X, X-1 TO X-11) AND TO WHAT EXTENT;
VIII. WHETHER OR NOT SIGHT DRAFTS REQUIRE PRIOR ACCEPTANCE FROM
RESPONDENT PHIL. RAYON BEFORE THE LATTER BECOMES LIABLE TO
PETITIONER." 7

In the Resolution of 12 March 1990, 8 this Court gave due course to the petition after the
filing of the Comment thereto by private respondent Anacleto Chi and of the Reply to the
latter by the petitioner; both parties were also required to submit their respective
memoranda which they subsequently complied with.
As We see it, the issues may be reduced as follows:

1. Whether presentment for acceptance of the drafts was indispensable to

make Philippine Rayon liable thereon;

2. Whether Philippine Rayon is liable on the basis of the trust receipt;

3. Whether private respondent Chi is jointly and severally liable with
Philippine Rayon for the obligation sought to be enforced and if not, whether he
may be considered a guarantor; in the latter situation, whether the case should
have been dismissed on the ground of lack of cause of action as there was no
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 prior exhaustion of Philippine Rayon's properties. cdrep

Both the trial court and the public respondent ruled that Philippine Rayon could be held
liable for the two (2) drafts, Exhibits "X" and "X-1", because only these appear to have been
accepted by the latter after due presentment. The liability for the remaining ten (10) drafts
(Exhibits "X-2" to "X-11" inclusive) did not arise because the same were not presented for
acceptance. In short, both courts concluded that acceptance of the drafts by Philippine
Rayon was indispensable to make the latter liable thereon. We are unable to agree with this
proposition. The transaction in the case at bar stemmed from Philippine Rayon's
application for a commercial letter of credit with the petitioner in the amount of
$128,548.78 to cover the former's contract to purchase and import loom and textile
machinery from Nissho Company, Ltd. of Japan under a five-year deferred payment plan.
Petitioner approved the application. As correctly ruled by the trial court in its Order of 6
March 1975: 9
". . . By virtue of said Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit,
plaintiff bank 1 0 was under obligation to pay through its correspondent bank in
Japan the drafts that Nisso (sic) Company, Ltd., periodically drew against said
letter of credit from 1963 to 1968, pursuant to plaintiff's contract with the
defendant Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc. In turn, defendant Philippine Rayon Mills,
Inc., was obligated to pay plaintiff bank the amounts of the drafts drawn by Nisso
(sic) Company, Ltd. against said plaintiff bank together with any accruing
commercial charges, interest, etc. pursuant to the terms and conditions stipulated
in the Application and Agreement of Commercial Letter of Credit Annex "A"."

A letter of credit is defined as an engagement by a bank or other person made at the

request of a customer that the issuer will honor drafts or other demands for payment upon
compliance with the conditions specified in the credit. 1 1 Through a letter of credit, the
bank merely substitutes its own promise to pay for the promise to pay of one of its
customers who in return promises to pay the bank the amount of funds mentioned in the
letter of credit plus credit or commitment fees mutually agreed upon. 1 2 In the instant case
then, the drawee was necessarily the herein petitioner. It was to the latter that the drafts
were presented for payment. In fact, there was no need for acceptance as the issued
drafts are sight drafts. Presentment for acceptance is necessary only in the cases
expressly provided for in Section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL). 1 3 The said
section reads:
"SECTION 143. When presentment for acceptance must be made.
Presentment for acceptance must be made:
(a) Where the bill is payable after sight, or in any other case,
where presentment for acceptance is necessary in order to fix the maturity
of the instrument; or

(b) Where the bill expressly stipulates that it shall be presented

for acceptance; or

(c) Where the bill is drawn payable elsewhere than at the

residence or place of business of the drawee.

In no other case is presentment for acceptance necessary in order to render any

party to the bill liable."

Obviously then, sight drafts do not require presentment for acceptance.

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 The acceptance of a bill is the signification by the drawee of his assent to the order of the
drawer; 1 4 this may be done in writing by the drawee in the bill itself, or in a separate
instrument. 1 5
The parties herein agree, and the trial court explicitly ruled, that the subject drafts are sight
drafts. Said the latter: LLpr

". . . In the instant case the drafts being at sight, they are supposed to be payable
upon acceptance unless plaintiff bank has given the Philippine Rayon Mills Inc.
time within which to pay the same. The first two drafts (Annexes C & D, Exh. X &
X-1) were duly accepted as indicated on their face (sic), and upon such
acceptance should have been paid forthwith. These two drafts were not paid and
although Philippine Rayon Mills ought to have paid the same, the fact remains
that until now they are still unpaid." 1 6

Corollarily, they are, pursuant to Section 7 of the NIL, payable on demand. Section 7
provides:
"SECTION 7. When payable on demand. An instrument is payable on
demand
(a) When so it is expressed to be payable on demand, or at
sight, or on presentation; or
(b) In which no time for payment is expressed.

Where an instrument is issued, accepted, or indorsed when overdue, it is, as

regards the person so issuing, accepting, or indorsing it, payable on demand."
(Emphasis supplied)

Paragraph 8 of the Trust Receipt which reads: "My/our liability for payment at maturity
of any accepted draft, bill of exchange or indebtedness shall not be extinguished or
modified" 1 7 does not, contrary to the holding of the public respondent, contemplate
prior acceptance by Philippine Rayon, but by the petitioner. Acceptance, however, was
not even necessary in the first place because the drafts which were eventually issued
were sight drafts. And even if these were not sight drafts, thereby necessitating
acceptance, it would be the petitioner and not Philippine Rayon which had to
accept the same for the latter was not the drawee. Presentment for acceptance is
defined as the production of a bill of exchange to a drawee for acceptance. 1 8 The trial
court and the public respondent, therefore, erred in ruling that presentment for
acceptance was an indispensable requisite for Philippine Rayon's liability on the drafts
to attach. Contrary to both courts' pronouncements, Philippine Rayon immediately
became liable thereon upon petitioner's payment thereof. Such is the essence of the
letter of credit issued by the petitioner. A different conclusion would violate the
principle upon which commercial letter of credit are founded because in such a case,
both the beneficiary and the issuer. Nissho Company Ltd. and the petitioner,
respectively, would be placed at the mercy of Philippine Rayon even if the latter had
already received the imported machinery and the petitioner had fully paid for it. The
typical setting and purpose of a letter of credit are described in Hibernia Bank and
Trust Co. vs. J. Aron & Co., Inc., 1 9 thus:
"Commercial letters of credit have come into general use in international sales
transactions where much time necessarily elapses between the sale and the
receipt by a purchaser of the merchandise, during which interval great price
changes may occur. Buyers and sellers struggle for the advantage of position.
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 The seller is desirous of being paid as surely and as soon as possible, realizing
that the vendee at a distant point has it in his power to reject on trivial grounds
merchandise on arrival, and cause considerable hardship to the shipper. Letters of
credit meet this condition by affording celerity and certainty of payment. Their
purpose is to insure to a seller payment of a definite amount upon presentation of
documents. The bank deals only with documents. It has nothing to do with the
quality of the merchandise. Disputes as to the merchandise shipped may arise
and be litigated later between vendor and vendee, but they may not impede
acceptance of drafts and payment by the issuing bank when the proper
documents are presented."

The trial court and the public respondent likewise erred in disregarding the trust receipt
and in not holding that Philippine Rayon was liable thereon. In People vs. Yu Chi Ho, 2 0 this
Court explains the nature of a trust receipt by quoting In re Dunlap Carpet Co., 2 1 thus:
"By this arrangement a banker advances money to an intending importer, and
thereby lends the aid of capital, of credit, or of business facilities and agencies
abroad, to the enterprise of foreign commerce. Much of this trade could hardly be
carried on by any other means, and therefore it is of the first importance that the
fundamental factor in the transaction, the banker's advance of money and credit,
should receive the amplest protection. Accordingly, in order to secure that the
banker shall be repaid at the critical point that is, when the imported goods
finally reach the hands of the intended vendee the banker takes the full title to
the goods at the very beginning; he takes it as soon as the goods are bought and
settled for by his payments or acceptances in the foreign country, and he
continues to hold that title as his indispensable security until the goods are sold
in the United States and the vendee is called upon to pay for them. This security is
not an ordinary pledge by the importer to the banker, for the importer has never
owned the goods, and moreover he is not able to deliver the possession; but the
security is the complete title vested originally in the bankers, and this
characteristic of the transaction has again and again been recognized and
protected by the Courts. Of course, the title is at bottom a security title, as it has
sometimes been called, and the banker is always under the obligation to
reconvey; but only after his advances have been fully repaid and after the
importer has fulfilled the other terms of the contract."

As further stated in National Bank vs. Viuda e Hijos de Angel Jose, 2 2 trust receipts:
". . . [I]n a certain manner. . . partake of the nature of a conditional sale as
provided by the Chattel Mortgage Law, that is, the importer becomes absolute
owner of the imported merchandise as soon as he has paid its price. The
ownership of the merchandise continues to be vested in the owner thereof or in
the person who has advanced payment, until he has been paid in full, or if the
merchandise has already been sold, the proceeds of the sale should be turned
over to him by the importer or by his representative or successor in interest."

Under P.D. No. 115, otherwise known as the Trust Receipts Law, which took effect on 29
January 1973, a trust receipt transaction is defined as "any transaction by and between a
person referred to in this Decree as the entruster, and another person referred to in this
Decree as the entrustee, whereby the entruster, who owns or holds absolute title or
security interests over certain specified goods, documents or instruments, releases the
same to the possession of the entrustee upon the latter's execution and delivery to the
entruster of a signed document called the trust receipt wherein the entrustee binds
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 himself to hold the designated goods, documents or instruments in trust for the entruster
and to sell or otherwise dispose of the goods, documents or instruments with the
obligation to turn over to the entruster the proceeds thereof to the extent of the amount
owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or the goods, instruments
themselves if they are unsold or not otherwise disposed of, in accordance with the terms
and conditions specified in the trust receipt, or for other purposes substantially equivalent
to any one of the following: . . . ."
It is alleged in the complaint that private respondents "not only have presumably put said
machinery to good use and have profited by its operation and/or disposition but very
recent information that (sic) reached plaintiff bank that defendants already sold the
machinery covered by the trust receipt to Yupangco Cotton Mills," and that "as trustees of
the property covered by the trust receipt, . . . and therefore acting in fiduciary (sic) capacity,
defendants have willfully violated their duty to account for the whereabouts of the
machinery covered by the trust receipt or for the proceeds of any lease; sale or other
disposition of the same that they may have made, notwithstanding demands therefor;
defendants have fraudulently misapplied or converted to their own use any money realized
from the lease, sale, and other disposition of said machinery." 2 3 While there is no specific
prayer for the delivery to the petitioner by Philippine Rayon of the proceeds of the sale of
the machinery covered by the trust receipt, such relief is covered by the general prayer for
"such further and other relief as may be just and equitable on the premises." 2 4 And
although it is true that the petitioner commenced a criminal action for the violation of the
Trust Receipts Law, no legal obstacle prevented it from enforcing the civil liability arising
out of the trust receipt in a separate civil action. Under Section 13 of the Trust Receipts
Law, the failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods, documents
or instruments covered by a trust receipt to the extent of the amount owing to the
entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or to return said goods, documents or
instruments if they were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust
receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa, punishable under the provisions of Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. 2 5 Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. Estafa falls under
fraud. cdll

We also conclude, for the reason hereinafter discussed, and not for that adduced by the
public respondent, that private respondent Chi's signature in the dorsal portion of the trust
receipt did not bind him solidarily with Philippine Rayon. The statement at the dorsal
portion of the said trust receipt, which petitioner describes as a "solidary guaranty clause",
reads:
"In consideration of the PRUDENTIAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY complying
with the foregoing, we jointly and severally agree and undertake to pay on
demand to the PRUDENTIAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY all sums of money
which the said PRUDENTIAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY may call upon us to
pay arising out of or pertaining to, and/or in any event connected with the default
of and/or non-fulfillment in any respect of the undertaking of the aforesaid:
PHILIPPINE RAYON MILLS, INC.
We further agree that the PRUDENTIAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY does not
have to take any steps or exhaust its remedy against aforesaid:
before making demand on me/us.
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 (Sgd.) Anacleto R. Chi
ANACLETO R. CHI" 2 6

Petitioner insists that by virtue of the clear wording of the statement, specifically the
clause ". . . we jointly and severally agree and undertake . . .," and the concluding sentence
on exhaustion, Chi's liability therein is solidary.
In holding otherwise, the public respondent ratiocinates as follows:
"With respect to the second argument, we have our misgivings as to whether the
mere signature of defendant-appellee Chi of (sic) the guaranty agreement, Exhibit
"C-1", will make it an actionable document. It should be noted that Exhibit "C-1"
was prepared and printed by the plaintiff-appellant. A perusal of Exhibit "C-1"
shows that it was to be signed and executed by two persons. It was signed only
by defendant-appellee Chi. Exhibit "C-1" was to be witnessed by two persons, but
no one signed in that capacity. The last sentence of the guaranty clause is
incomplete. Furthermore, the plaintiff-appellant also failed to have the purported
guarantee clause acknowledged before a notary public. All these show that the
alleged guaranty provision was disregarded and, therefore, not consummated.
But granting arguendo that the guaranty provision in Exhibit "C-1" was fully
executed and acknowledged still defendant-appellee Chi cannot be held liable
thereunder because the records show that the plaintiff-appellant had neither
exhausted the property of the defendant-appellant nor had it resorted to all legal
remedies against the said defendant-appellant as provided in Article 2058 of the
Civil Code. The obligation of a guarantor is merely accessory under Article 2052
of the Civil Code and subsidiary under Article 2054 of the Civil Code. Therefore,
the liability of the defendant-appellee arises only when the principal debtor fails to
comply with his obligation." 2 7

Our own reading of the questioned solidary guaranty clause yields no other conclusion
than that the obligation of Chi is only that of a guarantor. This is further bolstered by the
last sentence which speaks of waiver of exhaustion, which, nevertheless, is ineffective in
this case because the space therein for the party whose property may not be exhausted
was not filled up. Under Article 2058 of the Civil Code, the defense of exhaustion
(excussion) may be raised by a guarantor before he may be held liable for the obligation.
Petitioner likewise admits that the questioned provision is a solidary guaranty clause,
thereby clearly distinguishing it from a contract of surety. It, however, described the
guaranty as solidary between the guarantors; this would have been correct if two (2)
guarantors had signed it. The clause "we jointly and severally agree and undertake" refers
to the undertaking of the two (2) parties who are to sign it or to the liability existing
between themselves. It does not refer to the undertaking between either one or both of
them on the one hand and the petitioner on the other with respect to the liability described
under the trust receipt. Elsewise stated, their liability is not divisible as between them, i.e.,
it can be enforced to its full extent against any one of them.
Furthermore, any doubt as to the import or true intent of the solidary guaranty clause
should be resolved against the petitioner. The trust receipt, together with the questioned
solidary guaranty clause, is on a form drafted and prepared solely by the petitioner; Chi's
participation therein is limited to the affixing of his signature thereon. It is, therefore, a
contract of adhesion; 2 8 as such, it must be strictly construed against the party
responsible for its preparation. 2 9
Neither can We agree with the reasoning of the public respondent that this solidary
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 guaranty clause was effectively disregarded simply because it was not signed and
witnessed by two (2) persons and acknowledged before a notary public. While indeed, the
clause ought to have been signed by two (2) guarantors, the fact that it was only Chi who
signed the same did not make his act an idle ceremony or render the clause totally
meaningless. By his signing, Chi became the sole guarantor. The attestation by witnesses
and the acknowledgment before a notary public are not required by law to make a party
liable on the instrument. The rule is that contracts shall be obligatory in whatever form they
may have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are
present; however, when the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it
may be valid or enforceable, or that it be proved in a certain way, that requirement is
absolute and indispensable. 3 0 With respect to a guaranty, 3 1 which is a promise to answer
for the debt or default of another, the law merely requires that it, or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing. Otherwise, it would be unenforceable unless ratified.
3 2 While the acknowledgment of a surety before a notary public is required to make the
same a public document, under Article 1358 of the Civil Code, a contract of guaranty does
not have to appear in a public document.
And now to the other ground relied upon by the petitioner as basis for the solidary liability
of Chi, namely the criminal proceedings against the latter for the violation of P.C. No. 115.
Petitioner claims that because of the said criminal proceedings, Chi would be answerable
for the civil liability arising therefrom pursuant to Section 13 of P.D. No. 115. Public
respondent rejected this claim because such civil liability presupposes prior conviction as
can be gleaned from the phrase "without prejudice to the civil liability arising from the
criminal offense." Both are wrong. The said section reads:

"SECTION 13. Penalty Clause. The failure of an entrustee to turn over the
proceeds of the sale of the goods, documents or instruments covered by a trust
receipt to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appears in the
trust receipt or to return said goods, documents or instruments if they were not
sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipt shall
constitute the crime of estafa, punishable under the provisions of Article Three
hundred and fifteen, paragraph one (b) of Act Numbered Three thousand eight
hundred and fifteen, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code. If
the violation or offense is committed by a corporation, partnership, association or
other juridical entities, the penalty provided for in this Decree shall be imposed
upon the directors, officers, employees or other officials or persons therein
responsible for the offense, without prejudice to the civil liabilities arising from the
criminal offense."

A close examination of the quoted provision reveals that it is the last sentence which
provides for the correct solution. It is clear that if the violation or offense is committed by
a corporation, partnership, association or other juridical entities, the penalty shall be
imposed upon the directors, officers, employees or other officials or persons therein
responsible for the offense. The penalty referred to is imprisonment, the duration of which
would depend on the amount of the fraud as provided for in Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code. The reason for this is obvious: corporations, partnerships, associations and
other juridical entities cannot be put in jail. However, it is these entities which are made
liable for the civil liability arising from the criminal offense. This is the import of the clause
"without prejudice to the civil liabilities arising from the criminal offense." And, as We
stated earlier, since that violation of a trust receipt constitutes fraud under Article 33 of
the Civil Code, petitioner was acting well within its rights in filing an independent civil
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 action to enforce the civil liability arising therefrom against Philippine Rayon.
The remaining issue to be resolved concerns the propriety of the dismissal of the case
against private respondent Chi. The trial court based the dismissal, and the respondent
Court its affirmance thereof, on the theory that Chi is not liable on the trust receipt in any
capacity either as surety or as guarantor because his signature at the dorsal portion
thereof was useless; and even if he could be bound by such signature as a simple
guarantor, he cannot, pursuant to Article 2058 of the Civil Code, be compelled to pay until
after petitioner has exhausted and resorted to all legal remedies against the principal
debtor, Philippine Rayon. The records fail to show that petitioner had done so. 33 Reliance
is thus placed on Article 2058 of the Civil Code which provides:
"ARTICLE 2058. The guarantor cannot be compelled to pay the creditor
unless the latter has exhausted all the property of the debtor, and has resorted to
all the legal remedies against the debtor."

Simply stated, there is as yet no cause of action against Chi.

We are not persuaded. Excussion is not a condition sine qua non for the institution of an
action against a guarantor. In Southern Motors, Inc. vs. Barbosa, 3 4 this Court stated:
"4. Although an ordinary personal guarantor not a mortgagor or pledgor
may demand the aforementioned exhaustion, the creditor may, prior thereto,
secure a judgment against said guarantor, who shall be entitled, however, to a
deferment of the execution of said judgment against him until after the properties
of the principal debtor shall have been exhausted to satisfy the obligation
involved in the case."

There was then nothing procedurally objectionable in impleading private respondent Chi as
a co-defendant in Civil Case No. Q-19312 before the trial court. As a matter of fact, Section
6, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on permissive joinder of parties explicitly allows it. It reads:
"SECTION 6. Permissive joinder of parties. All persons in whom or against
whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or
series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the
alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or
be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any gotten of law or fact
common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action;
but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or
defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any
proceedings in which he may have no interest."

This is the equity rule relating to multifariousness. It is based on trial convenience and is
designed to permit the joinder of plaintiffs or defendants whenever there is a common
question of law or fact. It will save the parties unnecessary work, trouble and expense. 3 5
However, Chi's liability is limited to the principal obligation in the trust receipt plus all the
accessories thereof including judicial costs; with respect to the latter, he shall only be
liable for those costs incurred after being judicially required to pay. 3 6 Interest and
damages, being accessories of the principal obligation, should also be paid; these,
however, shall run only from the date of the filing of the complaint. Attorney's fees may
even be allowed in appropriate cases. 3 7
In the instant case, the attorney's fees to be paid by Chi cannot be the same as that to be
paid by Philippine Rayon since it is only the trust receipt that is covered by the guaranty
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 and not the full extent of the latter's liability. All things considered, he can be held liable for
the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees in favor of the petitioner.
Thus, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint as
against private respondent Chi and condemning petitioner to pay him P20,000 00 as
attorney's fees.
In the light of the foregoing, it would no longer be necessary to discuss the other issues
raised by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision of 10 March
1986 of the public respondent in AC-G.R. CV No. 66733 and, necessarily, that of Branch 9
(Quezon City) of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. Q-19312 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another is hereby entered:
1. Declaring private respondent Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc. liable on the
twelve drafts in question (Exhibits "X", "X-1" to "X-11", inclusive) and on the trust
receipt (Exhibit "C'), and ordering it to pay petitioner: (a) the amounts due thereon
in the total sum of P956,384.95 as of 15 September 1974, with interest thereon at
six percent (6%) per annum from 16 September 1974 until it is fully paid, less
whatever may have been applied thereto by virtue of foreclosure of mortgages, if
any; (b) a sum equal to ten percent (10%) of the aforesaid amount as attorney's
fees; and (c) the costs.

2. Declaring private respondent Anacleto R. Chi secondarily liable on the trust

receipt and ordering him to pay the face value thereof, with interest at the legal
rate, commencing from the date of the filing of the complaint in Civil Case No Q-
19312 until the same is fully paid as well as the costs and attorney's fees in the
sum of P10,000.00 if the writ of execution for the enforcement of the above
awards against Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc. is returned unsatisfied.

Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes

1. Rollo, 39-47; per Associate Justice Crisolito Pascual, concurred in by Associate Justices
Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Serafin E. Camilon.

2. Rollo, 39-41.

3. Rollo, 81-83.
4. Brief for Appellant, 1-4; Rollo, 85, et seq.

5. Rollo, 45-46.
6. Id., 48.

7. Rollo, 16.

8. Id., 131.
9. Record on Appeal, 123.

10. Herein petitioner.

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 11. Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth ed., 813; DAVIDSON, KNOWLES, FORSYTHE AND
JESPERSEN, Business Law, Principles and Cases, 1984 ed., 390.

12. ROSE, Money and Capital Markets, 1983 ed., 692.

13. Act No. 2031.

14. Section 132, NIL.

15. Sections 133 and 134, Id.

16. Rollo, 66.

17. Id., 17.

18. AGBAYANI, A.F., Commercial Laws of the Philippines, 1987 ed., vol. 1, 409, citing
Windham Bank vs. Norton, 22 Conn, 213, 56 Am. Dec. 397.

19. 134 Misc. 18, 21-22, 233 N.Y.S. 486, 490-491, cited in Johnston vs. State Bank, 195
N.W. 2d 126, 130-131 (Iowa 1972), and excerpted in CORMAN, Commercial Law, Cases
and Materials, 1976 ed., 622.
20. 53 Phil. 874, 876-877 [1928]; see also, Samo vs. People, 115 Phil. 346 [1962].

21. 206 Fed., 726.

22. 63 Phil. 814, 821 [1936].

23. Record on Appeal, 6-7.

24. Id., 9.
25. Even before P.D. No. 115, these acts covered by Section 13 were already considered as
estafa; see People vs. Yu Chai Ho, supra.; Samo vs. People, supra.; Robles vs. Court of
Appeals, 199 SCRA 195 [1991].

26. Record on Appeal, 43.

27. Rollo, 45-46.

28. Sweet Lines, Inc. vs. Teves, 83 SCRA 361 [1978]; Angeles vs. Calasanz, 135 SCRA 323
[1985].
29. Western Guaranty Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 652 [1990]; BPI Credit Corp. vs.
Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 601 [1991].

30. Article 1356, Civil Code.

31. Article 2047 of the Civil Code defines it as follows:

"By guaranty a person, called the guarantor, binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the
obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so."
32. Article 1403 (2)(b), Civil Code.

33. Rollo, 75.

34. 99 Phil. 263, 268 [1956].

35. FRANCISCO, V.J., The Revised Rules of Court, vol. I, 1973 ed., 258.

36. Second paragraph, Article 2055, Civil Code; see National Marketing Corp. vs. Marquez,
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 26 SCRA 722 [1969]; Republic vs. Pal-Fox Lumber Co., Inc., 43 SCRA 365 [1972].
37. Plaridel Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. P.L. Galang Machinery Co., Inc., 100 Phil. 679
[1957]; Philippine National Bank vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc., 68 SCRA 207 [1975].

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