Corporations Refusal To Allow Inspection Is A Criminal Offense
Corporations Refusal To Allow Inspection Is A Criminal Offense
Corporations Refusal To Allow Inspection Is A Criminal Offense
1. Republic Act No. 10951 - August 29, 2017- AN ACT ADJUSTING THE AMOUNT
OR THE VALUE OF PROPERTY AND DAMAGE ON WHICH A PENALTY IS
BASED, AND THE FINES IMPOSED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ACT NO. 3815, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED
2. Republic Act No. 10932 - August 3, 2017 - AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE
ANTI-HOSPITAL DEPOSIT LAW BY INCREASING THE PENALTIES FOR THE
REFUSAL OF HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL CLINICS TO ADMINISTER
APPROPRIATE INITIAL MEDICAL TREATMENT AND SUPPORT IN
EMERGENCY, OR SERIOUS CASES, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS
PAMBANSA BILANG 702, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT PROHIBITING THE
DEMAND OF DEPOSITS OR ADVANCE PAYMENTS FOR THE CONFINEMENT
OR TREATMENT OF PATIENTS IN HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL CLINICS IN
CERTAIN CASES, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8344, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
3. Republic Act No. 10930 - August 2, 2017 - AN ACT RATIONALIZING AND
STRENGTHENING THE POLICY REGARDING DRIVERS LICENSE BY
EXTENDING THE VALIDITY PERIOD OF DRIVERS LICENSES, AND
PENALIZING ACTS IN VIOLATION OF ITS ISSUANCE AND APPLICATION,
AMENDING FOR THOSE PURPOSES SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO 4136,
AS AMENDED BY BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 398 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.
1011, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LAND TRANSPORTATION AND TRAFFIC
CODE
4. Republic Act No. 10927 - July 14, 2017 - AN ACT DESIGNATING CASINOS AS
COVERED PERSONS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9160, OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ACT OF 2001, AS AMENDED
5. RA 10666
6. Corporations; refusal to allow inspection is a criminal offense. We find inaccurate the
pronouncement of the RTC that the act of refusing to allow inspection of the stock and
transfer book is not a punishable offense under the Corporation Code. Such refusal, when
done in violation of Section 74( 4) of the Corporation Code, properly falls within the purview
of Section 144 of the same code and thus may be penalized as an offense. Aderito Z. Yujuico
and Bonifacio C. Sumbilla v. Cezar T. Quiambao and Eric C. Pilapil, G.R. No. 180416, June 2, 2014.
7. Continue reading
8. Chain of custody rule. The Supreme Court has time and again spoken on the chain of custody
rule, a method of authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. This would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every
person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it
was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no
change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same. People of the Philippines v. Freddie Ladip y Rubio, G.R. No. 196146,
March 12, 2014.
9. Chain of custody rule; buy-bust situation. From the testimonies of the police officers in the case
at bench, the prosecution established that they had custody of the drugs seized from the
accused from the moment he was arrested, during the time he was transported to the police
station, and up to the time the drugs were submitted to the crime laboratory for examination.
The same witnesses also identified the seized drugs with certainty when these were
presented in court. With regard to the handling of the seized drugs, there are no conflicting
testimonies or glaring inconsistencies that would cast doubt on the integrity thereof as
evidence presented and scrutinized in court. It is therefore safe to conclude that, to the
unprejudiced mind, the testimonies show without a doubt that the evidence seized from the
accused at the time of the buy-bust operation was the same one tested, introduced, and
testified to in court. In short, there is no question as to the integrity of the evidence against
the accused. People of the Philippines v. Freddie Ladip y Rubio, G.R. No. 196146, March 12, 2014.
10. Chain of custody; buy-bust situation. The following links must be established in the chain of
custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turn over of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turn over
by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turn over and submission of the marked illegal drugs seized
from the forensic chemist to the court. People of the Philippines v. Hermanos Constantino, Jr. y
Binayug, a.k.a. Jojit, G.R. No. 199689, March 12, 2014.
11. Chain of custody; buy-bust situation. After a careful scrutiny of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, the Supreme Court found glaring inconsistencies affecting the
integrity of the shabu purportedly confiscated from Constantino. The inconsistent testimonies
of PO3 Domingo, PO3 Hernandez, and P/SInsp. Tulauan as to who, when, and where the
two plastic sachets of shabu were marked lead the court to question whether the two plastic
sachets of shabu identified in court were the very same ones confiscated from Constantino.
The doubtful markings already broke the chain of custody of the seized shabu at a very early
stage. To recall, the first crucial link in the chain of custody is seizure and marking of the
illegal drug. In this case, PO3 Domingo, as poseur-buyer, received two plastic sachets
of shabu from Constantino in exchange for P1,000. However, PO3 Domingo himself did not
put any markings on the two plastic sachets of shabu. Instead, upon arrival of the buy-bust
team with Constantino at the police station, PO3 Domingo turned over the two plastic
sachets of shabu to the investigator, SPO2 Tamang, who was also a member of the buy-bust
team. PO3 Domingo testified that it was SPO2 Tamang who put the marking NBT on the
said sachets of shabu. However, PO3 Hernandez, another member of the buy-bust team,
categorically pointed to SPO2 Taguiam, also a member of the buy-bust team, as the one
who put the marking NBT on the plastic sachets upon the teams return to the police
station. To complicate things even further, P/SInsp Tulauan, the Forensic Chemist, also
declared before the trial court that the marking NBT on the two plastic sachets
of shabu were made by SPO3 Nelson B. Tamaray, the duty officer who received the
specimens at the crime laboratory. On cross-examination, P/SInsp. Tulauan confirmed her
previous declaration that SPO3 Tamaray had claimed making the marking on the sachets
of shabu. Herein, the prosecution is completely silent as to why PO3 Domingo, the poseur-
buyer, despite having immediate custody of the two plastic sachets of shabu purchased from
Constantino, failed to immediately mark the seized drugs before turning over the custody of
the same to another police officer. This lapse in procedure opened the door for confusion
and doubt as to the identity of the drugs actually seized from Constantino during the buy-bust
and the ones presented before the trial court, especially considering that three different
people, during the interval, supposedly received and marked the same. People of the
Philippines v. Hermanos Constantino, Jr. y Binayug, a.k.a. Jojit, G.R. No. 199689, March 12,
2014.
12. Illegal use of aliases. On the issue of the alleged use of illegal aliases, the Supreme Court
observed that respondents aliases involved the names Eugenio Gonzalez, Eugenio
Gonzales, Eugenio Juan Gonzalez, Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado, Eugenio C.R.
Gonzalez, Eugenio J. Gonzalez, and per Limson Eugenio Juan Robles Gonzalez. But
these names contained his true names, albeit at times joined with an erroneous middle or
second name, or a misspelled family name in one instance. The records disclose that the
erroneous middle or second names, or the misspelling of the family name resulted from error
or inadvertence left unchecked and unrectified over time. What is significant, however, is that
such names were not fictitious names within the purview of the Anti-Alias Law; and that such
names were not different from each other. Considering that he was not also shown to have
used the names for unscrupulous purposes, or to deceive or confuse the public, the
dismissal of the charge against him was justified in fact and in law. Revelina Limson v. Eugenio
Juan Gonzalez, G.R. No. 162205, March 31, 2014.
13. Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty; procedure lapses in handling of shabu
negates presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. The Supreme Court ruled
that the lower courts erred in giving weight to the presumption of regularity in the
performance that a police officer enjoys in the absence of any taint of irregularity and of ill
motive that would induce him to falsify his testimony. The regularity of the performance of the
police officers duties leaves much to be desired in this case given the lapses in their
handling of the allegedly confiscated shabu. The totality of all the procedural lapses
effectively produced serious doubts on the integrity and identity of the corpus
delicti, especially in the face of allegations of frame-up. The Supreme Court had previously
held that these lapses negate the presumption that official duties have been regularly
performed by the police officers. Any taint of irregularity affects the whole performance and
should make the presumption unavailable. Indeed, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. It should be noted that the presumption is
precisely just that a presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, it cannot
be regarded as binding truth. People of the Philippines v. Jerry Caranto y Propeta, G.R. No.
193768, March 5, 2014.
14. R.A. 9165; Section 21(a) of the IRR of R.A. 9165; inventory and marking of seized items in
warrantless seizures. From a cursory reading of Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of RA 9165, it can be gleaned that in cases of warrantless seizures, as in
this case, inventory and marking of the seized item can be conducted at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending authorities, whichever is practicable, and not
necessarily at the place of seizure. As held in People v. Resurreccion, marking upon
immediate confiscation does not exclude the possibility that marking can be done at the
police station or office of the apprehending team. Thus, in the present case, the
apprehending team cannot be faulted if the inventory and marking were done at their office
where appellant was immediately brought for custody and further investigation. Indeed, the
fact that the inventory and marking of the subject item were not made onsite is of no moment
and will not lead to appellants exoneration. People of the Philippines v. Manuel S.
Aplat, G.R. No. 191727, March 31, 2014.