Mercantile v. Ysmael

9/18/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 169
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mercantile Ins. Co., Inc. vs. Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc.
*
G.R. No. 43862, January 13, 1989.
MERCANTILE INSURANCE CO., INC., plaintiffappellee,

vs. FELIPE YSMAEL, JR., & CO., INC., defendants
appellants.
Mercantile Law; Insurance; Surety; The surety can demand

indemnification from the principal upon the latters default, even
before the former has paid to the creditor.The question as to
whether or not under the Indemnity Agreement of the parties, the
Surety can demand indemnification from the principal, upon the
latters default, even before the former has paid to the creditor,
has long been settled by this Court in the affirmative.
Same; Same; Same; Cause of action of the appellants was
derived from the terms of the indemnity agreement.
Correspondingly, it is readily apparent that said cause of action
was derived from the terms of the Indemnity Agreement,
paragraph 3 thereof, as above quoted. By virtue of the provisions
of the Indemnity Agreement, defendantsappellants have
undertaken to hold plaintiffappellee free and harmless from any
suit, damage or liability which may be incurred by reason of non
performance by the defendantsappellants of their obligation with
the Philippine National Bank. The Indemnity Agreement is
principally entered into as security of plaintiffappellee in case of
default of defendantsappellants; and the liability of the parties
under the surety bonds is joint and several, so that the obligee
PNB may proceed against either of them for the satisfaction of the
obligation. (Brief for PlaintiffAppellee, p. 7).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Pursuant to the indemnity
agreement, the appellants have given the surety the prerogative of
filing an action even prior to the latters making any payment to
the PNB.Defendantsappellants have, by virtue of the Indemnity
Agreement, given the plaintiffappellee the prerogative of filing
an action even prior to the latters making any payment to the
Philippine National Bank.
Same; Same; Same; Contracts; Contracts are respected as the
law between the contracting parties.Contracts are respected as
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000015e927d7cc85566ee94003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/12
the law between the contracting parties (Henson v. IAC, 148

SCRA 11 [1987], citing Castro v, CA, 99 SCRA 722 [1980] and
Escano v. CA, 100 SCRA 197 [1980]). It is settled that the parties
may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as
they may want to include, and
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
67
VOL. 169, JANUARY 13, 1989 67
as long as such agreements are not contrary to law, morals, good

customs, public policy or public order, they shall have the force of
law between them (Herrera v. Petrophil Corp., 146 SCRA [1986]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Interpretation; Contracts should be
interpreted according to their literal meaning and should not be
interpreted beyond their obvious intendment.Contracts should
be interpreted according to their literal meaning and should not
be interpreted beyond their obvious intentment (Ibid.). It is a
basic and fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts that
if the terms thereof are clear and leave no doubt as to the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of the
stipulation shall control.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Provisions of the indemnity
agreement do not contravene any law or public policy nor militate
against the public good; Having voluntarily entered into the
contract, appellants cannot complain, and their indemnity
agreement have the force and effect of law.A careful analysis of
the contract in question will show that the provisions therein do
not contravene any law or public policy much less do they militate
against the public good. In fact, as shown above, they are fully
sanctioned by wellestablished jurisprudence. Having voluntarily
entered into such contract, the appellants cannot now be heard to
complain. Their indemnity agreement have the force and effect of
law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Obligations of the parties under
the indemnity agreement.Elucidating further on the obligations
of the parties in agreements of this nature, this Court ruled: x x x
The indemnity agreement was not executed for the benefit of the
creditors; it was rather for the benefit of the surety and if the
latter thought it necessary in its own interest to impose this
stipulation, and the indemnitors voluntarily agreed to the same,
the court should respect the agreement of the parties and require
them to abide by their contract. (Security Bank v. Globe
Assurance, 107 Phil. 733 [1960]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Principle of guaranty is not
involved in case at bar; No need for the surety to exhaust all the
properties of the principal debtor before it may proceed against
defendantsappellants.It must be stressed that in the case at
bar, the principal debtors, defendantsappellants herein, are
simultaneously the same persons who executed the Indemnity
Agreement. Thus, the position occupied by them is that of a
principal debtor and indemnitor at the same
68
time, and their liability being joint and several with the
plaintiffappellees the Philippine National Bank may proceed
against either for fulfillment of the obligation as covered by the
Surety bonds. There is, therefore, no principle of guaranty
involved and, therefore, the provision of Article 2071 of the Civil
Code does not apply. Otherwise stated, there is no more need for
the plaintiffappellee to exhaust all the properties of the principal
debtor before it may proceed against defendantsappellants.
Same; Same; Same; Attorneys fees; An award of 15%
attorneys fees in case at bar is not unreasonable.As to the
attorneys fees, it has been squarely ruled by this Court that the
award of fifteen (15) per cent for cases of this nature is not
unreasonable (Cosmopolitan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes, supra).
APPEAL from the decision of the Court of First Instance of

Manila, Br. 3. Bautista, Jr., J.
The facts are stated in the opinon of the Court.
Beltran, Evangelista & Cuasay for plaintiffappellee.
Abraham F. Sarmiento Law Office for defendants
appellants.
BIDIN, J.:
**
This is an appeal from the decision dated October 30, 1971
of the Court of First Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial
Court) in Civil Case No. 82168 entitled Mercantile
Insurance Co., Inc. (herein referred to as the plaintiff

appellee) vs. Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc., et al
(hereinafter referred to as the defendantappellant)
ordering defendantsappellants Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co.,
Inc. and Felipe Ysmael, Jr., to pay jointly and severally to
the plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00 plus 15% thereof as
attorneys fees, and costs. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, this case which involves only a question of law,
was certified to this Court.
The factual milieu of this case as found by the trial court
is as follows:
_______________
** Penned by Jose G. Bautista, Jr., Presiding Judge, CFI, Manila,

Branch III.
69
VOL. 169, JANUARY 13, 1989 69

Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc., represented by Felipe Ysmael filed
an application for an overdraft line of P1,000,000.00 and credit
line of P1,000,000.00 with the Philippine National Bank. The
latter was willing to grant credit accommodation of P2,000,000.00
applied for provided that the applicant shall have filed a bond in
the sum of P140,000.00 to guarantee the payment of the said
amount. Accordingly, on March 6, 1967, Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co.,
Inc., represented by Felipe Ysmael filed surety bond No. G(16)
007 of Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc. in the sum of P100,000.00
(Exh. A). On December 4, 1967, Felipe Ysmael Jr. & Co., Inc. as
principal and the Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc. executed another
surety bond MERICO Bond No. G (16) 0030 in the sum of
P40,000.00. It is the condition in both bonds that if the principal
Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. shall perform and fulfill its
undertakings with the Philippine National Bank, then these
surety bonds shall be null and void (Exh. B).
As security and in consideration of the execution of the surety
bonds, exhibits A and B, Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. and
Magdalena Estate, Inc. represented by Felipe Ysmael, Jr. as
president and in his personal capacity executed with the plaintiff
Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc. an indemnity agreement (Exh. D)
wherein the defendants Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. and Felipe
Ysmael, Jr. bound themselves jointly and severally to indemnify
the plaintiff, hold save it harmless from and against any and all
payments, damages, costs, losses, penalties, charges and expenses
which said company as surety (relative to MERICO Bond No.
0007) shall incur or become liable to pay plus an additional

amount as attorneys fees equal to 20% of the amount due to the
company, Paragraph 3 of the indemnity agreement expressly
provides:
3) ACCRUAL OF ACTION:Notwithstanding the provisions of the next

preceding paragraph, where the obligation involves a liquidated amount
for the payment of which the company has become legally liable under
the terms of the obligation and its suretyship undertaking or by the
demand of the obligee or otherwise and the latter has merely allowed the
COMPANY a term or extension for payment of the latters demand the
full amount necessary to discharge the COMPANYs aforesaid liability
irrespective of whether or not payment has actually been made by the
COMPANY, the COMPANY for the protection of its interest may
forthwith proceed against the undersigned or either of them by court
action or otherwise to enforce payment even prior to making payment to
the obligee which may hereafter be done by the COMPANY.'
70

On September 6, 1967, Gabriel Daza, Jr., Edgardo L. Tordesillas

and Augusto Torres in their official capacities and the defendants
executed another indemnity agreement (Exh. E) with the plaintiff
in consideration of the surety bond (referring to MERICO Bond
No. G (16) 0030. In the indemnity agreement (Exh. E) the same
provisions of paragraph 3 found in exhibit D is provided for.
By agreement dated September 5, 1967 (Exh. C), the amount
of the Bond was reduced by P40,000.00 so that the total liability
of the plaintiff to the Philippine National Bank in view of the
aforesaid reduction is P100,000.00 (Exh. C), P60,000.00 on Surety
Bond No. 0007 plus P40,000.00 on Surety Bond No. 0030.
In view of the failure of the defendants to pay the overdraft
and credit line with the Philippine National Bank demanded from
the Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc. settlement of its obligation
under surety bonds No. (G16)0007 for P60,000.00 which
expired on March 6, 1970 and No. G (16)0030 for P40,000.00
which expired since September 4, 1968 (Exh. P) otherwise drastic
measures for collection to protect the interest of the bank would
be taken. Attached to the demand letter is a statement of account.
By letter of December 17, 1970, the Legal Department of
plaintiff company wrote a letter of demand to the defendants
(Exhs. G and H) inviting their attention to the letter of demand of
the Philippine National Bank sent to the plaintiff and demanding
from the defendants the settlement of said account. These letters
were received as shown by the registry return receipts (Exhs. G2
and H2). Since the defendants failed to settle their obligation

with the Philippine National Bank, on February 10, 1971,
plaintiff brought the present action.
Instead of filing their answer, the defendants (appellants

herein) filed a motion to DISMISS, which motion was
subsequently denied. Thereafter, the defendants filed their
answer and the case was set for pretrial. On the date
scheduled for pretrial, the defendants and their counsel
failed to appear, thus on motion of the plaintiff, they were
declared in default and plaintiff was allowed to present its
evidence exparte. Upon motion for reconsideration filed by
the defendants, the case was ordered reopened and the
case was scheduled for reception of defendants evidence.
Thereafter, the parties were required to submit their
respective memoranda and the case was submitted for
decision. On October 30, 1971, the trial court rendered its
decision, the dispositive part of which reads:
71
VOL. 169, JANUARY 13, 1989 71

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment

is rendered for the plaintiff and the defendants are ordered to pay
jointly and severally the plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00 plus the
further sum of 15% thereof in the concept of reasonable attorneys
fees and the costs.
Plaintiff upon payment of this judgment, shall deliver the sum
of P100,000.00 to the Philippine National Bank in partial
satisfaction of the obligation of the defendants to said Bank.
SO ORDERED." (Record on Appeal, p. 96)
Said decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals on

questions of facts and law. Acting on the appeal and finding
that the only question raised therein involves
***
a question of
law, the Court of Appeals by resolution dated April 29,
1976, certified the same to this Court, for proper
disposition (Rollo, pp. 6263).
This Court, thru its First Division by Resolution dated
May 31, 1978, resolved to have the case docketed and
declared the same submitted for decision (Rollo, p. 65).
The defendantsappellants raised the following
assignments of errors in the Court of Appeals:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE

FOR LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION, THE COMPLAINT BEING
PREMATURE BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF HAS PAID
NOTHING ON THE SURETY BONDS AND HAS SUFFERED
NO ACTUAL DAMAGE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT

PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS IS VOID.
III
CONSEQUENTLY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN

ORDERING THE DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS TO PAY
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY TO THE PLAINTIFF THE SUM
OF P100,000.00 PLUS THE FURTHER SUM OF 15% THEREOF
IN THE CONCEPT OF REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEES
AND THE COSTS." (Brief for DefendantsAppellants, CA, pp. 1
2).
________________
*** Penned by Justices Pacifico P. de Castro, Luis B. Reyes and Vicente

G. Ericta.
72

The crux of the controversy is whether or not the surety

can be allowed indemnification from the defendants
appellants, upon the latters default even before the former
has paid to the creditor,
There is no dispute that the overdraft line of
P1,000,000.00 and the credit line of P1,000,000.00 applied
for by the defendant was granted by the Philippine
National Bank on the strength of the two surety bonds
denominated as MERICO Bond No. G(16) 0007 for one
hundred thousand pesos (Exh. A) and MERICO Bond No.
G(16) 0030 for forty thousand pesos (Exh. B), later reduced
as above stated on September 5, 1967 (Exh. C) by
P40,000.00 or a total amount of P100,000.00. As security
and in consideration of the execution of the surety bonds,
the defendants executed with the plaintiff identical
indemnity agreements (Exhs. D and E) which provide,
among others that payment of indemnity or compensation
may be claimed irrespective of whether or not plaintiff

company has actually paid the same.
Defendantsappellants maintain that the complaint is
premature and that paragraph 3 of the indemnity
agreements is void for being contrary to law, public policy
and good morals. They argued that to allow plaintiff surety
(appellee herein) to receive indemnity or compensation for
something it has not paid in its capacity as surety would
constitute unjust enrichment at the expense of another.
(Brief for DefendantsAppellants, CA, p. 6).
To bolster their contention, defendantsappellants argue
that it is an indispensable requisite for an action to
prosper, that the party bringing the action must have a
cause of action against the other party; and that for a cause
of action to be ripe for litigation, there must be both
wrongful violation and damages; all of which are not
present in the case at bar because plaintiffappellee has not
suffered any injury whatsoever, notwithstanding the
demand sent to it by the Philippine National Bank, nor has
plaintiffappellee made a single actual payment to said
bank. Hence, to allow plaintiffappellee to recover from
them something which it has not paid in its capacity as
surety would violate the fundamental principle which
states NEMOCUM ALTERIUS DETRIMENTO
LOCOPLETARI POTEST (No person should unjustly
enrich himself at the expense of
73
VOL. 169, JANUARY 13, 1989 73

another). [DefendantsAppellants Brief, pp. 78; 49].

The question as to whether or not under the Indemnity
Agreement of the parties, the Surety can demand
indemnification from the principal, upon the latters
default, even before the former has paid to the creditor, has
long been settled by this Court in the affirmative.
It has been held that:
The stipulation in the indemnity agreement allowing the surety

to recover even before it paid the creditor is enforceable. In
accordance therewith, the surety may demand from the
indemnitors even before paying the creditors. (Cosmopolitan Ins.
Co., Inc. v. Reyes, 15 SCRA 528 [1965] citing; Security Bank v.
Globe Assurance, 58 Off. Gaz. 3709 [April 30, 1962]; Alto Surety
and Ins. Co., v. Aguilar, et al., G.R. No. L5625, March 16, 1954).
Hence, appellants contention that the action of the appellee

(surety company) is premature or that the complaint fails
to state a cause of action because the surety has not paid
anything to the bank, cannot be sustained (Cosmopolitan
Ins. Co., Inc. v. Reyes, supra). In fact, such contention is
belied not only by the allegations in the complaint but also
by the agreement enered into between the appellants and
the appellee in favor of the bank.
The records show that the cause of action is distinctly
set forth in the complaint, the pertinent portion of which
states:
6. That defendants, by virtue of the two Surety Bonds

(Annexes A" and B") were extended by the
Philippine National Bank, a credit accommodation
in the sum of TWO MILLION (P2,000,000.00)
PESOS;
7. That the Philippine National Bank is demanding
and collecting from the plaintiff the sum of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS
which is the defendants account with the said bank
that is secured and covered by the abovementioned
bonds (Annexes A" and B");
8. That under the terms of the Indemnity Agreements
(Annexes D" amd E") more particularly paragraph
3, plaintiff may forthwith proceed against the
defendants to impose payment, even prior to
making payment to the Philippine National Bank;
9. That notwithstanding series of demands made by
plaintiff, the defendants failed and refused to pay
the Philippine National
74

Bank the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND

(P100,000.00) PESOS;"
10. That on account of defendants default, plaintiff
becomes liable to the Philippine National Bank in
the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) PESOS;" (Record on Appeal, p. 2.)
Correspondingly, it is readily apparent that said cause of

action was derived from the terms of the Indemnity
Agreement, paragraph 3 thereof, as above quoted. By
virtue of the provisions of the Indemnity Agreement,

defendantsappellants have undertaken to hold plaintiff
appellee free and harmless from any suit, damage or
liability which may be incurred by reason of non
performance by the defendantsappellants of their
obligation with the Philippine National Bank. The
Indemnity Agreement is principally entered into as
security of plaintiffappellee in case of default of
defendantsappellants; and the liability of the parties
under the surety bonds is joint and several, so that the
obligee PNB may proceed against either of them for the
satisfaction of the obligation. (Brief for PlaintiffAppellee,
p. 7).
II
Defendantsappellants have, by virtue of the Indemnity

Agreement, given the plaintiffappellee the prerogative of
filing an action even prior to the latters making any
payment to the Philippine National Bank.
Contracts are respected as the law between the
contracting parties (Henson v. IAC, 148 SCRA 11 [1987],
citing Castro v. CA, 99 SCRA 722 [1980] and Escano v. CA,
100 SCRA 197 [1980]) It is settled that the parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions
as they may want to include, and as long as such
agreements are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public policy or public order, they shall have the force of
law between them (Herrera v. Petrophil Corp., 146 SCRA
[1986].
Contracts should be interpreted according to their literal
meaning and should not be interpreted beyond their
obvious intentment (Ibid.). It is a basic and fundamental
rule in the interpretation of contracts that if the terms
thereof are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of
the contracting parties, the literal meaning of the
stipulation shall control.
75
VOL. 169, JANUARY 13, 1989 75

In the case at bar, there is 110 dispute as to meaning of the

terms of the Indemnity Agreement. The only bone of
contention is whether of not such terms are null and void
as defendantsappellants would have this Court declare.
A careful analysis of the contract in question will show

that the provisions therein do not contravene any law or
public policy much less do they militate against the public
good In fact, as shown above, they are e fully sanctioned by
wellestablished jurisprudence. Having voluntarily entered
into such contract, the appellants cannot now be heard to
complain. Their indemnity agreement have the force and
effect of law.
Elucidating further on the obligations of the par ties in
agree ee ments of this nature, this Court ruled:
x x x The indemnity agreement was not executed for the benefit

of the creditors; it was rather for the benefit of the surety and if
the latter thought it necessary in its own interest to impose this
stipulation, and the indemnitors s voluntarily agreed to the same,
the court should respect the agreement of the parties and require
them to abide by their contract.'' (Security ity Bank v. Globe
Assur ance, 107 Phil. 733 [1960].
III
Finally, the trial court did not err in ordering defendants

appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff the sum
of P100,000.00 plus 15% as attorneys fees,
It must be stressed that in the case at bar, the principal
debtors, defendantsappellants herein, are simultaneously
th same persons who executed the Indemnity Agreement.
Thus the position occupied by them is that of a principal
debtor and indemnitor at the same time, and their Iiability
being joint and several with the plaintiffappellees, the
Philippine National Bank may proceed against either for
fulfillment of the obliga tion as covered by the Surety
bonds, There is, therefore, n principle of guaranty involved
and, therefore, the provision c Article 2071 of the Civil
Code does not apply. Other wise stated there is no more
need for the plaintiffappellee to exhaust a the properties of
the principal debtor before it may procee against
defendantsappellants.
As to the attorneys fees, it has been squarely ruled by
this Court that the award of fifteen (15) per cent for cases
of this
76

People vs. Basiga
nature is not unreasonable (Cosmopolitan Insurance Co.,

Inc. v. Reyes, supra).
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Corts,

JJ., concur.
Decision affirmed.
Note.Nonpayment of consideration constitutes

inability of agreement. (Philippine Phoenix Surety &
Insurance Co. vs. Woodwork, Inc., 92 SCRA 419.)
o0o
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9/18/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 169

66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

MERCANTILE INSURANCE CO., INC., plaintiffappellee,

Mercantile Law; Insurance; Surety; The surety can demand

the law between the contracting parties (Henson v. IAC, 148

VOL. 169, JANUARY 13, 1989 67

as long as such agreements are not contrary to law, morals, good

68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

APPEAL from the decision of the Court of First Instance of

Insurance Co., Inc. (herein referred to as the plaintiff

** Penned by Jose G. Bautista, Jr., Presiding Judge, CFI, Manila,

VOL. 169, JANUARY 13, 1989 69

0007) shall incur or become liable to pay plus an additional

3) ACCRUAL OF ACTION:Notwithstanding the provisions of the next

70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On September 6, 1967, Gabriel Daza, Jr., Edgardo L. Tordesillas

and H2). Since the defendants failed to settle their obligation

Instead of filing their answer, the defendants (appellants

VOL. 169, JANUARY 13, 1989 71

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment

Said decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals on

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT

CONSEQUENTLY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN

*** Penned by Justices Pacifico P. de Castro, Luis B. Reyes and Vicente

72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The crux of the controversy is whether or not the surety

may be claimed irrespective of whether or not plaintiff

VOL. 169, JANUARY 13, 1989 73

another). [DefendantsAppellants Brief, pp. 78; 49].

The stipulation in the indemnity agreement allowing the surety

Hence, appellants contention that the action of the appellee

6. That defendants, by virtue of the two Surety Bonds

74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bank the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND

Correspondingly, it is readily apparent that said cause of

virtue of the provisions of the Indemnity Agreement,

Defendantsappellants have, by virtue of the Indemnity

VOL. 169, JANUARY 13, 1989 75

In the case at bar, there is 110 dispute as to meaning of the

A careful analysis of the contract in question will show

x x x The indemnity agreement was not executed for the benefit

Finally, the trial court did not err in ordering defendants

76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

nature is not unreasonable (Cosmopolitan Insurance Co.,

Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Corts,

Note.Nonpayment of consideration constitutes

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