Union Carbide Labor Union
Union Carbide Labor Union
Union Carbide Labor Union
This refers to a petition for review of the decision of the then Secretary of Labor Blas Ople handed down on
February 7, 1975 which set aside the decision of the Arbitrator ordering reinstatement with backwages, and
instead adjudged the payment of separation pay; and the resolution dated July 24, 1975 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
. . . Complainants Agapito Duro, Alfredo Torio, and Rustico Javillonar, were dismissed from
their employment after an application for clearance to terminate them was approved by the
Secretary of Labor on December 19, 1972. Respondent's application for clearance was
premised on "willful violation of Company regulations, gross insubordination and refusal to
submit to a Company investigation . . . ."
Prior events leading to the dismissal of complainants are recited in the Arbitrator's decision,
which we quote:
It appears that the Company is operating on three (3) shifts namely: morning,
afternoon and night shifts. The workers in the third shift normally work from
Monday to Saturday, the last working day being Friday or forty (40) hours a
week or from Monday to Friday.
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In manifestation of their dissention to the new work schedule, the three
respondents Duro, Torio, and Javillonar did not report for work on November
26, 1972 which was a Sunday since it was not a working day according to the
provisions of the Collecrtive Bargaining Agreement. (Exh. "A" Complainant).
Their absence caused their suspension for fourteen (14) days. (pp. 29-30,
Rollo).
On May 4, 1973, the Arbitrator rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement with backwages of the
complainants. On June 8, 1973, the National Labor Relations Commission dismissed respondent company's
appeal for having been filed out of time. A motion for reconsideration which was treated as an appeal was
then filed by respondent company before the Secretary of Labor, resulting in the modification of the
Arbitrator's decision by awarding complainants separation pay. A motion for reconsideration subsequently
filed by the petitioner was denied for lack of merit.
The main issue in this case is whether or not the complainants could be validly dismissed from their
employment on the ground of insubordination for refusing to comply with the new work schedule.
Petitioner alleges that the change in the company's working schedule violated the existing Collective
Bargaining Agreement of the parties. Hence, complainants cannot be dismissed since their refusal to comply
with the re-scheduled working hours was based on a provision of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Petitioner further contends that the dismissal of the complainants violated Section 9, Article II of the 1973
Constitution which provides "the right of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure,
and just and humane conditions of work."
Although Article XIX of the CBA provides for the duration of the agreement, which We quote:
This agreement shall become effective on September 1, 1971 and shall remain in full force and
effect without change until August 31, 1974. Unless the parties hereto agree otherwise,
negotiation for renewal, or renewal and modification, or a new agreement may not be
initiated before July 1, 1974.
this does not necessarily mean that the company can no longer change its working schedule, for
Section 2, Article II of the same CBA expressly provides that:
Sec. 2. In the exercise of its functions of management, the COMPANY shall have the sole and
exclusive right and power, among other things, to direct the operations and the working force
of its business in all respects; to be the sole judge in determining the capacity or fitness of an
employee for the position or job to which he has been assigned; to schedule the hours of
work, shifts and work schedules; to require work to be done in excess of eight hours or
Sundays or holidays as the exigencies of the service may require; to plan, schedule, direct,
curtail and control factory operations and schedules of production; to introduce and install
new or improved methods or facilities; to designate the work and the employees to perform it;
to select and hire new employees; to train new employees and improve the skill and ability of
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employees from one job to another or form one shift to another; to classify or reclassify
employees; and to make such changes in the duties of its employees as the COMPANY may see
fit or convenient for the proper conduct of its business.
Verily and wisely, management retained the prerogative, whenever exigencies of the service so require, to
change the working hours of its employees. And as long as such prerogative is exercised in good faith for the
advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of
the employees under special laws or under valid agreements, this Court will uphold such exercise (San Miguel
Brewery Sales Force Union (PTGWO) vs. Ople, 170 SCRA 25 [1989]).
Thus, in the case of Abbott Laboratories (Phil.), Inc. vs. NLRC (154 SCRA 713 [1987]), We ruled:
. . . Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the right of
an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. The free will of
management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied.
(p.717)
Further, the incident complained of took place sometime in 1972, so there is no violation of the 1973
Constitution to speak of because the guarantee of security of tenure embodied under Section 9, Article II may
not be given a retroactive effect. It is the basic norm that provisions of the fundamental law should be given
prospective application only, unless legislative intent for its retroactive application is so provided.
Finally, it should be observed that the provisions of the Constitution should be given only a
prospective application unless the contrary is clearly intended. Were the rule otherwise, rights
already acquired or vested might be unduly disturbed or withdrawn even in the absence of an
unmistakable intention to place them within the scope of the Constitution.
We agree with the findings arrived at by both Arbitrator and the Secretary of Labor that there is no unfair labor
practice in this case. Neither was there gross and habitual neglect of complainants' duties. Nor did the act of
complainants in refusing to follow the new working hours amount to serious misconduct or willful
disobedience to the orders of respondent company.
Although no serious objections may be offered to the Arbitrator's conclusion to order reinstatement with
backwages of the complainants, We now refrain from doing so considering that reinstatement is no longer
feasible due to the fact that the controversy started more than 20 years ago aside from the obviously strained
relations between the parties.
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