Lopez Vs CA Caseeeee

LOPEZ VS CA
Gr no.144573
Facts:
Are decisions of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of six (6) months
and one (1) day suspension without pay immediately executory pending
appeal?
Private respondent Atty. Liggayu, Manager of the Legal Department and

Resident Ombudsman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO),
was administratively charged before the Office of the Ombudsman with: 1)
Violation of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), for issuing a
subpoena without authority.; and 2) complicity in the anomalous contracts
entered into by PCSO and Golden Lion Films.
The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the charge against private

respondent in connection with the said anomalous contracts of the PCSO but
found him guilty of Conduct Prejudicial To The Best Interest Of The Service for
issuing a subpoena in relation to OMB-0-99-0571 in excess of his authority as
Resident Ombudsman of PCSO. Thus, the Office of the Ombudsman imposed
upon him the penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay. Later, the
[4]
penalty was modified to six (6) months and one (1) day suspension without
pay.[5]
Private respondents motion for reconsideration was denied. On March 6,

[6]
2000, a petition for review was filed by the private respondent before the
Court of Appeals via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Meanwhile, petitioners implemented the suspension of private respondent

in compliance with the directive of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the

Office of the Ombudsman from implementing the suspension order against
private respondent.[7]
On March 20, 2000, private respondent filed an amended petition

impleading the herein petitioners. On motion of the Office of the Solicitor
[8]
General, the Court of Appeals dropped the names of the impleaded members
of the Office of the Ombudsman pursuant to Section 6, Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. [9]
On May 18, 2000, a resolution was issued granting private respondents

prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against
the execution of private respondents suspension. In the same resolution,
petitioners were asked to explain why they should not be cited in contempt of
court for failing to comply with the Temporary Restraining Order dated March
16, 2000. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction is hereby granted. Let a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be
issued enjoining respondents from implementing immediately the assailed decision of the
Ombudsman to suspend petitioner for six (6) months and one (1) day without pay pending final
determination of the petition for review by petitioner before this Court.
It appearing that respondents failed to implement the resolution of the Court dated March 16,
2000 ordering the issuance of a temporary restraining order restraining respondents from
enforcing the assailed decision dated January 6, 2000 and order dated February 4, 2000 of the
Office of the Ombudsman, they are hereby ordered to explain within ten (10) days from notice
why they should not be cited for indirect contempt of court.
SO ORDERED.[10]
On May 31, 2000, petitioners, by way of Explanation, manifested to the

[11]
Court of Appeals that they could not have complied with or implemented the
TRO dated March 16, 2000 since they were not yet parties to the case at the
time of its issuance. Even assuming that the order was applicable to them, the
same was rendered moot and academic by petitioners suspension on March
8, 2000.
On June 27, 2000, petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. On [12]
the same date, the Court of Appeals ordered petitioners, under pain of
contempt, to reinstate private respondent to his former position pending
resolution of his appeal. Hence, on July 7, 2000, private respondent was
[13]
reinstated as Manager of the Legal Department and Resident Ombudsman of

PCSO. [14]
In the present recourse, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals

gravely abused its discretion in enjoining the execution of petitioners
suspension pending appeal.
The petition is without merit.

Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 provides:
[15]
Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on
the following grounds:
xxx
Findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one months salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten
(10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
x x x x x x x x x.
Rule III, Section 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
states:
[16]
Sec. 7. Finality of Decision. Where the respondent is absolved of the charge and in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more
than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and
unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10)
days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for
certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770.
Construing the above-quoted provisions, the Court held in Lapid v. Court

of Appeals that only orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
[17]
Ombudsman in administrative cases imposing the penalty of public censure,

reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent
to one month salary shall be final and unappealable hence, immediately
executory. In all other disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed is other
than public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or
a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the law gives the respondent the
right to appeal. In these cases, the order, directive or decision becomes final
and executory only after the lapse of the period to appeal if no appeal is
perfected, or after the denial of the appeal from the said order, directive or
decision. It is only then that execution shall perforce issue as a matter of
right. The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from
its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending
appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being
appealable would be rendered nugatory. As explained by the Court
x x x Section 27 states that all provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are
immediately effective and executory; and thatany order, directive or decision of the said Office
imposing the penalty of censure or reprimand or suspension of not more than one [month, or a
fine not equivalent to one month salary], is final and unappealable. As such the legal maxim
[expressio] unius est exclusio [alterius] finds application. The express mention of the things
included excludes those that are not included. The clear import of these statements taken together
is that all other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not
enumerated in the said section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately executory. An
appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate
implementation of the decision. This finds support in the Rules of Procedure issued by the
Ombudsman itself which states that (I)n all other cases, the decision shall become final after the
expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for
reconsideration or petition for certiorari (should now be petition for review under Rule 43) shall
have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770.[18]
Petitioners claim that the applicable provision is Rule 43, Section 12 of the
1997 Rule of Civil Procedure, which provides that [t]he appeal shall not stay
the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless
the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem
just, lacks merit. While it is true that in Fabian v. Desierto, the Court declared
[19]
unconstitutional Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, and all other provisions
of law implementing the same, the declaration should be interpreted to mean
that the said provisions are void only insofar as they provide that
administrative appeals from the Office of the Ombudsman shall be taken to
the Supreme Court.Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the proper forum
for administrative appeals from the Office of the Ombudsman is the Court of
Appeals. The provisions of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 and the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman with respect to the finality and
execution of decisions are not affected by the ruling in Fabian v. Desierto, and
therefore still stand. It is a fundamental principle in statutory con struction that
a statute may be constitutional in one part and unconstitutional in another and
that if the invalid part is severable from the rest, the portion which is
unconstitutional may stand while that which is constitutional is stricken out and
rejected. Whenever a statute contains unobjectionable provisions separable
from those found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of the court to so declare
and to maintain the act insofar as it is valid. The separability clause found in
Section 40 of Republic Act No. 6770 creates the presumption that the
legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute. [20]
Likewise, the Court finds unavailing the claim of petitioners that the stay of
execution pending appeal from the order, directive or decision of the Office of
the Ombudsman violates the equal protection clause for being unfair to
government employees charged under the Civil Service Law, where the
decisions in disciplinary cases are immediately executory. The legislature has
seen fit to grant a stay of execution pending appeal from disciplinary cases
where the penalty imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman is not public
censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not
equivalent to one month salary. Courts may not, in the guise of interpretation,
enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided or
intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of enactment, whether
careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied notwithstanding that later
wisdom may recommend the inclusion. [21]
All told, the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in

issuing the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction enjoining the execution of
private respondents suspension pending appeal. The penalty imposed on
private respondent for Conduct Prejudicial To The Best Interest of The Service
was six (6) months and one (1) day suspension without pay. Considering that
private respondent appealed from the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman, the stay of execution of the penalty of suspension should
therefore issue as a matter of right.
Finally, the Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion in directing
petitioners to explain within ten (10) days from notice why they should not be
cited for indirect contempt of court for failing to implement the resolution dated
March 16, 2000 restraining the execution pending appeal of the January 6,
2000 decision and February 4, 2000 order of the Office of the Ombudsman. It
is within the inherent powers of the Court of Appeals to ensure compliance
with its lawful orders.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is

DISMISSED, and the May 18, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP NO. 57588 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Lopez Vs CA Caseeeee

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LOPEZ VS CA

Private respondent Atty. Liggayu, Manager of the Legal Department and

The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the charge against private

Private respondents motion for reconsideration was denied. On March 6,

Meanwhile, petitioners implemented the suspension of private respondent

The Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the

On March 20, 2000, private respondent filed an amended petition

On May 18, 2000, a resolution was issued granting private respondents

On May 31, 2000, petitioners, by way of Explanation, manifested to the

reinstated as Manager of the Legal Department and Resident Ombudsman of

In the present recourse, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals

The petition is without merit.

Construing the above-quoted provisions, the Court held in Lapid v. Court

Ombudsman in administrative cases imposing the penalty of public censure,

All told, the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is

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