Key Take - Away or Doctrine To Remember
Key Take - Away or Doctrine To Remember
Key Take - Away or Doctrine To Remember
HELD
1. Proving
the
Divorce
Between
Respondent
and
Editha
Samson
In
Art
26
of
the
FC,
marriages
solemnized
abroad
are
governed
by
the
law
of
the
place
where
they
were
celebrated.
Thus,
it
requires
the
presentation
of
the
foreign
law
to
show
the
conformity
of
the
marriage
in
question
to
the
legal
requirements
of
the
place
where
the
marriage
was
performed.
The
burden
of
proof
lies
with
the
party
who
alleges
the
existence
of
a
fact
or
thing
necessary
in
the
prosecution
or
defense
of
an
action.
Since
the
divorce
was
a
defense
raised
by
respondent,
the
burden
of
proving
the
pertinent
Australian
law
validating
it
falls
squarely
upon
him.
2. Respondents
Legal
Capacity
to
Remarry
On
its
face,
the
herein
Australian
divorce
decree
contains
a
restriction
that
reads:
<Marriages
dissolved
by
foreign
judgment>
<Garcia
v.
Recio>
<Hinanay>
<GR
No.
138322.>
<October
2,
2001>
<Panganiban,
J.>
1.
A
party
to
a
marriage
who
marries
again
before
this
decree
becomes
absolute
(unless
the
other
party
has
died)
commits
the
offence
of
bigamy.[48]
This
quotation
bolsters
our
contention
that
the
divorce
obtained
by
respondent
may
have
been
restricted.
It
did
not
absolutely
establish
his
legal
capacity
to
remarry
according
to
his
national
law.
Hence,
we
find
no
basis
for
the
ruling
of
the
trial
court,
which
erroneously
assumed
that
the
Australian
divorce
ipso
facto
restored
respondents
capacity
to
remarry
despite
the
paucity
of
evidence
on
this
matter.
The
Court
also
reject
the
claim
of
respondent
that
the
divorce
decree
raises
a
disputable
presumption
or
presumptive
evidence
as
to
his
civil
status
based
on
Section
48,
Rule
39
of
the
Rules
of
Court,
for
the
simple
reason
that
no
proof
has
been
presented
on
the
legal
effects
of
the
divorce
decree
obtained
under
Australian
laws.
Based
on
the
above
records,
The
Court
cannot
conclude
that
respondent,
who
was
then
a
naturalized
Australian
citizen,
was
legally
capacitated
to
marry
petitioner
on
January
12,
1994.
The
Court
upheld
the
petitioners
contention
that
the
court
a
quo
erred
in
finding
that
the
divorce
decree
ipso
facto
clothed
respondent
with
the
legal
capacity
to
remarry
without
requiring
him
to
adduce
sufficient
evidence
to
show
the
Australian
personal
law
governing
his
status;
or
at
the
very
least,
to
prove
his
legal
capacity
to
contract
the
second
marriage.
The
Court
cannot
grant
petitioners
prayer
to
declare
her
marriage
to
respondent
null
and
void
on
the
ground
of
bigamy.
After
all,
it
may
turn
out
that
under
Australian
law,
he
was
really
capacitated
to
marry
petitioner
as
a
direct
result
of
the
divorce
decree.
OPINION
(CONCURRING)
OPINION
(DISSENTING)