Vitug v. CA

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G.R. No.

82027 March 29, 1990

ROMARICO G. VITUG vs.CA and ROWENA FAUSTINO-CORONA

This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court involving the probate of the two wills
of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in New York, U. S.A, naming private respondent
Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix. In our said decision, we upheld the appointment of Nenita Alonte
as co-special administrator of Mrs. Vitug's estate with her (Mrs. Vitug's) widower, petitioner Romarico
G. Vitug, pending probate.

On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the probate
court to sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly
his advances to the estate which he claimed were personal funds. As found by the Court of
Appeals, the alleged advances spent for the payment of estate tax, deficiency estate tax, and as
"increment thereto." According
to Mr. Vitug, he withdrew the sums from savings account
No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America, Makati, Metro Manila.

Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same funds withdrawn
were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate, and hence, there was allegedly
no ground for reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for failure to include the sums in
question for inventory and for "concealment of funds belonging to the estate."

Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same
through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife. The agreement provides:

We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK OF AMERICAN NATIONAL
TRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION that all money now or hereafter
deposited by us or any or either of us with the BANK in our joint savings
current account shall be the property of all or both of us and shall be
payable to and collectible or withdrawable by either or any of us during our
lifetime, and after the death of either or any of us shall belong to and be the
sole property of the survivor or survivors, and shall be payable to and
collectible or withdrawable by such survivor or survivors.

The trial courts upheld the validity of this agreement and granted "the motion to sell some of the
estate of Dolores L. Vitug, the proceeds of which shall be used to pay the personal funds of Romarico
Vitug.

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals held that the above-quoted survivorship agreement
constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which "did not comply with the formalities of a
valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil Code," and secondly, assuming that it is a
mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation under the provisions of Article 133 of the Civil
Code.

ISSUE: WON the Survivorship Agreement may be considered as a will (If it is a will, the bank
account is deemed part of Dolores estate)

HELD: NO.

The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should be embodied in
a will. A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a
capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with
duties to take effect after his death." In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to
the testator. In this case, the monies subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the
nature of conjugal funds. In the case relied on, Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co., we rejected
claims that a survivorship agreement purports to deliver one party's separate properties in favor of the
other, but simply, their joint holdings.

There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be
presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the marita. relations.

Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons,
because it was to take effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation
between the spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouse's own properties to
the other.

It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the conjugal
partnership, as held by the Court of Appeals, by "mere stipulation" and that it is no "cloak" to
circumvent the law on conjugal property relations. Certainly, the spouses are not prohibited by law to
invest conjugal property, say, by way of a joint and several bank account, more commonly
denominated in banking parlance as an "and/or" account. In the case at bar, when the spouses Vitug
opened savings account No. 35342-038, they merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a money-
making venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other, which would have arguably been
sanctionable as a prohibited donation. And since the funds were conjugal, it cannot be said that one
spouse could have pressured the other in placing his or her deposits in the money pool.

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