Omnibus Cases - Legal Ethics

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LEGAL ETHICS
J. Leonardo De Castro Cases
LEGAL ETHICS
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
Leticia A. Arienda vs. Evelyn A. Monilla, Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 4,
Legazpi City, A.M. No. P112980, June 10, 2013
Facts: Complainant, Andrienda file a complaint alleging that respondent and Atty. Zaldy Monilla (Atty.
Monilla), respondents husband (together referred to as the spouses Monilla), went to complainants
house and offered their services in settling the estate of complainants deceased mother. According to the
spouses Monilla, they would prepare an extrajudicial settlement for complainant and the latters siblings,
while respondents brother, Engineer Matias A. Arquero (Engr. Arquero), would conduct the survey of the
estate. Everytime the spouses Monilla went to complainants house, they would ask for partial payment.
Respondent denied that it was she and her husband who offered complainant their services in settling the
estate of complainants deceased mother. Respondent averred that it was complainant and her sister,
Ester, who came to respondents house and requested respondent to convince her brother Engr.
Arquero, a geodetic engineer, to partition the four lots left by complainants parents situated in Bigaa,
Legazpi City.
Respondent admitted receiving from complainant payments amounting to P49,800.00, all made at
respondents residence in Rawis, not at complainants house in Bigaa.
In her Manifestation, respondent admitted in her comment that she prepared and finalized the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of complainants deceased mother.
Issue: Whether or not respondenrt engaged in an unathorized practice of law.
Held: The preparation of an extrajudicial settlement of estate constitutes practice of law as defined in
Cayetano v. Monsod, to wit:
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind
of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. x x x.
Not being a lawyer, respondent had no authority to prepare and finalize an extrajudicial settlement of
estate. Worse, respondent also admitted receiving money from complainant for her services. Being a
court employee, respondent ought to have known that it was improper for her to prepare and finalize the
extrajudicial settlement of estate, a service only a lawyer is authorized to perform, and to receive money
therefor.
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ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS
Cecilia A. Agno vs. Atty. Marciano J. Cagatan, A.C. No. 4515, July 14, 2008
Facts: Respondent was the President of International Services Recruitment Corporation (ISRC), a
corporation engaged in the recruitment of Filipino workers for overseas employment. ISRCs recruitment
license was cancelled by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for violation of labor law
provisions and subsequently, ISRC was forever banned from participating in overseas recruitment.
Tthe respondent appealed the DOLEs cancellation of ISRCs license with the Office of the President.
However, during the pendency of the aforementioned appeal with the Office of the President, particularly
on August 9, 1992, the respondent entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with a United Arab
Emirates (U.A.E.) national, Mr. Khalifa H. Juma, the husband of herein complainant, Cecilia A. Agno.
More than three (3) years after the execution of the aforesaid agreement, a Complaint-Affidavit for
disbarment was filed with this Court by the complainant against the respondent claiming that the latter
used fraud, deceit and misrepresentation
The complainant found out that the said Memorandum of Agreement could not be validated without the
approval of the Board of Directors of ISRC. While respondent even had the complainant sign an affidavit
stating that she was then the acting Treasurer of ISRC, her appointment as Treasurer was not submitted
to the SEC. The records of the SEC showed that the Board of Directors, officers and stockholders of
ISRC remained unchanged and her name and that of her husband did not appear as officers and/or
stockholders thereof. From the POEA, on the other hand, the complainant learned that ISRCs
recruitment license was yet to be reinstated.
The complainant claimed that respondent used for his own personal benefit the P500,000.00 that she and
her husband invested in ISRC. When she demanded that respondent return the said sum of money,
respondent issued a bank check dated March 30, 19947 in favor of the complainant in the amount of
P500,000.00 which was dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. Despite repeated
demands by complainant, the respondent failed to settle his obligation or redeem his dishonored check,
prompting the complainant to file a case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against the respondent.
The complainant prayed for the disbarment of the respondent for issuing a bouncing check and for his act
of dishonesty in assuring her and her husband that the Memorandum of Agreement would suffice to
install them as stockholders and officers of ISRC which induced them to invest in said corporation the
amount of P500,000.00.
Respondent denied all the allegations against him and challeged the personality of the complainant to file
the action.
Issue: Whether or not the complainant has right to istitute a disbarment proceeding.
Held: The argument of respondent that complainant has no legal personality to sue him is unavailing.
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides that proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The right to institute a disbarment proceeding
is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged
wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for judgment is the
proof or failure of proof of the charges. The evidence submitted by complainant before the Commission
on Bar Discipline sufficed to sustain its resolution and recommended sanctions.
The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following: Canon 1. A lawyer shall
uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Rule
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1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Canon 7. A lawyer
shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession. The afore-cited canons emphasize the high standard of honesty and fairness
expected of a lawyer not only in the practice of the legal profession but in his personal dealings as well. A
lawyer must conduct himself with great propriety, and his behavior should be beyond reproach anywhere
and at all times. For, as officers of the courts and keepers of the publics faith, they are burdened with the
highest degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner
consistent with truth and honor. Likewise, the oath that lawyers swear to impresses upon them the duty of
exhibiting the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with others. Thus,
lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional or in their private capacity, if
such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the court.
Jerry T. Wong vs. Atty. Salvador N. Moya II, A.C. No. 6972, October 17, 2008
Facts: Complainant avers that he is the owner of J & L Agro-vets, a company engaged in the business of
selling agricultural and veterinary products and medicine. Sometime in 1997, he retained the services of
respondent for the purpose of collecting due and demandable debts in favor of the company. Respondent
also handled personal cases of complainant and his wife.
Respondent asked financial help from complainant for the construction of his house and purchase of a
car. Complainant willingly helped him. Pursuant to their arrangement, complainant purchased a car on
installment basis from Transfarm for respondent. He issued postdated checks to cover its payment to
Transfarm. The respondent in turn issued checks in favor of the complainant to reimburse the latter.
The checks issued by complainant in favor of Transfarm were duly encashed upon presentment.
However, the checks issued by respondent to reimburse complainant were dishonored for the reason
Account Closed. Respondent refused to comply with the repeated demands of the complainant to
replace the dishonored checks.
Respondent did not file any responsive pleading at all.
Thus, on April 27, 2005, the Investigating IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala submitted her
Report and Recommendation.13 She recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for one (1) year.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of dishonesty and immoral conduct.
Held: The Court ruled in the affirmative. Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the
Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.
Moreover, in Cuizon v. Macalino, we also ruled that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored
for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render
him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action. Similarly, Sanchez v.
Somoso held that the persistent refusal to settle due obligations despite demand manifests a lawyers low
regard to his commitment to the oath he has taken when he joined his peers, seriously and irreparably
tarnishing the image of the profession he should, instead, hold in high esteem. This conduct deserves
nothing less than a severe disciplinary action.

Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the same
constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public confidence in the legal
profession. He cannot justify his act of issuing worthless checks by his dire financial condition.
Respondent should not have contracted debts which are beyond his financial capacity to pay. If he
suffered a reversal of fortune, he should have explained with particularity the circumstances which
caused his failure to meet his obligations. His generalized and unsubstantiated allegations as to why he
reneged in the payment of his debts promptly despite repeated demands and sufficient time afforded him
cannot withstand scrutiny.
Walter Wilkie vs. Atty. Sinamar E. Limos, A.C. No. 7505, October 24, 2008
Facts: Complainant alleged that on 2 April 2003, he engaged the services of respondent regarding his
intention of adopting his wifes nephew, Reynal Alsaen Taltalen. Complainant has given his full trust and
confidence on respondent. Notwithstanding their lawyer and client relationship, on March 30, 2003,
respondent borrowed money from complainant in the amount of P250,000.00. The loan agreement was
evidenced by a Contract of Loan with a stipulation of interest in the amount of 24% per annum and that
respondent will issue two (2) post dated checks representing the principal amount of P250,000.00 and the
interest in the amount of P60,000.00.
When the checks became due, complainant deposited the same to his account at Equitable PCI Bank but
to his surprise and dismay, the checks were returned as they were drawn against insufficient funds.
Despite demands made, respondent failed to pay her obligation.
Criminal complaints were filed against respondent before Branch 2, Municipal Trial Court of San
Fernando City, La Union.
Complainant has also withdrawn the adoption case from respondent who did not do anything regarding
the case despite the lapse of almost a year.
At the scheduled March 29, 2006 mandatory conference/hearing, the complainant was present but the
respondent failed to appear. Furthermore, respondent failed to file an answer. Thus, the Commissioner
considered respondent in default and deemed the case submitted for report and recommendation.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended for the suspension of the respondent for 2 years.
Issue: Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Held: The Court ruled in the affirmative. x x x [the] deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of
worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension
from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our
legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system
is ensured. They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to
their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a
manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of which explicitly states:
CANON 1A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondent did not deny that she obtained a loan in the amount of P250,000.00 with interest from the
complainant. Respondents bare claim that the loan was, in fact, only an accommodation for a former
client who according to respondent had already died cannot be given credence and, indeed, too specious
to be believed. Besides, she did not file any answer to the complaint nor even appeared personally before

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the CBD despite being duly notified, to allege such claim. Added to this observation is the fact that in her
Manifestation and Motion dated February 23, 2006, no mention was made with regard to the
complainants August 24, 2005 Affidavit of Desistance. It was only mentioned in her letter to the IBP
dated December 14, 2006 which was received in the IBP-CBD on January 3, 2007. By then, the Report
and Recommendation dated July 28, 2006 of the Commissioner was already submitted to the Board of
Governors which resolved to affirm said Report in its Resolution dated December 15, 2006.
Cesar Talento and Modesta Herrera Talento vs. Atty. Agustin F. Paneda, A.C. No. 7433, December
23 2009
Facts: Petitioners secured the services of Atty. Agustin Paneda to help and defend them in for Quieting
of Title where they were sued as defendants by Leticia Herera.
Atty. Paneda filed petitioners answer to the complaint on November 14, 2000 and the case was set for
pre-trial. The Honorable Court in an order required both parties counsels to submit their respective pre-
trial briefs and appear during the scheduled pre-trial hearing on December 18, 2000.
Despite the order and notice to their counsel, he did not file or submit a pre-trial brief for petitioners
behalf. Much more to their surprise and predicament, although petitioners attended the pre-trial hearing,
he did not appear.
As a result of his non-appearance, the counsel for the other party spoke of things beyond our knowledge
which the Honorable Court granted being expressly stated and provided in the Rules of Court. Petitioners
were declared in default because of the failure of their counsel to file and submit petitioners pre-trial brief.
The Honorable Court allowed the case to be heard ex parte much to their damage and prejudice.
The Honorable Court issued a decision against petitioners simply for failure of their counsel Atty. Paneda
to submit petitionerspre-trial brief and for his failure to attend the pre-trial of the case. It was simply
because of technicality and not based on the merits of the allegations of both parties that petitioners lost
the case.
Atty. Paneda filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 27, 2000, but the same was dismissed
by the Honorable Court.
Atty. Paneda told petitioners that he will appeal the case to the Court of Appeals and they]agreed
because they were confident of petitioners claim over the parcel of land subject of this case. He filed a
notice of appeal on February 8, 2001. [Petitioners] paid the required fees and he even required petitioners
to shell out more money for the preparation of the Appeal brief.
Petitioners waited for so long for the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals and petitionersfound out
later that petitioners appeal was dismissed due to lack of an appeal brief only when petitioners went to
Atty. Paneda.
Hence, this administrative complaint filed by mother and son Modesta Herrera Talento and Cesar Talento
charging Atty. Agustin F. Paneda of violation of his oath as a lawyer and neglect of duty.
Issue: Whether or not respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in handling petitioners case
both on trial in the RTC and on appeal in the CA which led to its dismissal without affording petitioners the
opportunity to present their evidence.
Held: After a careful consideration of the records of the instant case, this Court agrees with the IBP in its
findings and conclusion that respondents documented acts fall extremely short of the standard of
professional duty that all lawyers are required to faithfully adhere to.

The pertinent Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE

SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.
xxxxx
Rule 18.02 A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.
There is no doubt that respondent was woefully remiss in his duty to display utmost diligence and
competence in protecting the interests of his clients. The records of this case clearly detailed dire
instances of professional neglect which undoubtedly showed respondents failure to live up to his duties
and responsibilities as a member of the legal profession. Petitioners lost Civil Case No. A-2043 in the
RTC mainly because they were barred from presenting their evidence in court. This was a result of their
being declared in default in the said case as a consequence of respondents failure to appear at the pre-
trial conference. Respondent defended his non-appearance by stating that he had informed petitioners
beforehand of a conflict of schedule and that he had instructed them on what to do in his absence, but
petitioners vehemently denied this claim.
It is beyond dispute that respondent is duty-bound by his oath as a lawyer to diligently prosecute the case
of his clients to the best of his ability within the bounds of law.Regrettably, the facts of this case illustrate
respondents dismal performance of that responsibility, which in its totality could amount to a
reprehensible abandonment of his clients cause.
A lawyer, when he undertakes his clients cause, makes a covenant that he will exert all efforts for its
prosecution until its final conclusion. He should undertake the task with dedication and care, and he
should do no less, otherwise, he is not true to his lawyers oath.
Spouses Virgilio and Angelina Aranda vs. Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda, A.C. No. 7907, December 15,
2010
Facts: In 2006, Atty. Emmanuel Elayda was hired by Spouses Virgilio and Angelina Aranda to be their
counsel in a civil case. However, to their surprise in July 2006, an adverse judgment was issued against
them, thus they lost possession of their car. Apparently, their counsel never appeared in court for them.
Atty. Elayda failed to inform the spouses of the date of hearing as well as the order of judgment. No
motion for reconsideration or appeal was interposed by the lawyer as well.
In his defense, Atty. Elayda said that it was the spouses who never went to court; that the spouses
neglected to check on their case in court; that one time when their case was scheduled, he even notified
the court stenographer to notify him if the spouses are in court so that he could be there for them as he
was in another court branch for another case.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Elayda is guity of gross negligence
Held: Atty. Elayda is duty bound to uphold and safeguard the interests of his clients. He should be
conscientious, competent and diligent in handling his clients cases. Atty. Elayda should give adequate
attention, care, and time to all the cases he is handling. As the spouses Arandas counsel, Atty. Elayda is

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expected to monitor the progress of said spouses case and is obligated to exert all efforts to present
every remedy or defense authorized by law to protect the cause espoused by the spouses Aranda.
Regrettably, Atty. Elayda failed in all these. Atty. Elayda even admitted that the spouses Aranda never
knew of the scheduled hearings because said spouses never came to him and that he did not know the
spouses whereabouts. While it is true that communication is a shared responsibility between a counsel
and his clients, it is the counsels primary duty to inform his clients of the status of their case and the
orders which have been issued by the court. He cannot simply wait for his clients to make an inquiry
about the developments in their case. Close coordination between counsel and client is necessary for
them to adequately prepare for the case, as well as to effectively monitor the progress of the
case. Besides, it is elementary procedure for a lawyer and his clients to exchange contact details at the
initial stages in order to have constant communication with each other. Again, Atty. Elaydas excuse that
he did not have the spouses Arandas contact number and that he did not know their address is simply
unacceptable.
It is undisputed that Atty. Elayda did not act upon the RTC order submitting the spouses Arandas case for
decision. Thus, a judgment was rendered against the spouses Aranda for a sum of money. Notice of said
judgment was received by Atty. Elayda who again did not file any notice of appeal or motion for
reconsideration and thus, the judgment became final and executory. Atty. Elayda did not also inform the
spouses Aranda of the outcome of the case. The spouses Aranda came to know of the adverse RTC
judgment, which by then had already become final and executory, only when a writ of execution was
issued and subsequently implemented by the sheriff.
Evidently, Atty. Elayda was remiss in his duties and responsibilities as a member of the legal
profession. His conduct shows that he not only failed to exercise due diligence in handling his clients case
but in fact abandoned his clients cause. He proved himself unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his
helpless clients. Moreover, Atty. Elayda owes fealty, not only to his clients, but also to the Court of which
he is an officer.

RE-ADMISSION TO THE BAR
Constancia L. Valencia vs. Atty. Dionisio C. Antiniw, A.C. No. 1302, June 30, 2008
Facts: Respondent was found guilty of malpractice in falsifying a notarized deed of sale and
subsequently introducing the same as evidence for his client in court.
Respondents motion for reconsideration of the consolidated decision disbarring him was denied by the
Resolution. Subsequently, in a Manifestation dated September 17, 1993, respondent proffered his
apologies to the Court for his shortcomings as a legal practitioner asserting that ifthere was an offense or
oversight committed against the legal profession, it was due to his sincere belief that he was doing it
honestly to protect the interest of his client. He pleaded that, pending his submission of proof showing
that he is again worthy of membership in the Bar, he be permitted to continue with his notarial work. In a
Resolution datedOctober 19, 1993, the Court denied respondents plea in the aforesaid Manifestation.
Respondents wife, Manuela A. Antiniw, sent to the Court a Letter of Appeal dated February 7,
2000, asking for clemency in behalf of her husband and affirming therein that her husband had for eight
(8) years continuously pleaded for his reinstatement and that he had submitted proof by way of
testimonials of (a) his character and standing prior to his disbarment, (b) his conduct subsequent to his
disbarment, and (c) his efficient government service. Attached to the letter of respondents wife was a
sworn testimonial of one of the complainants in the consolidated administrative cases, Lydia Bernal,
attesting to the respondents character reformation. The aforesaid letter was noted by the Court in a
Resolution dated 28 February 2000.
The OBC submitted its Report and Recommendation, that respondent has been sufficiently punished for
the last fifteen (15) years of his disbarment and he has sufficiently reformed to be a worthy member of the
Bar. In all candor, he promises the Court that should he be reinstated to practice the legal profession, he
will faithfully abide by the ideals, canons and ethics of the legal profession and by his oath as a lawyer.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Antiniws should re-admitted to the bar
Held: The Court lifted the respondents suspension. The Court agreed with the foregoing
recommendations of the Office of the Bar Confidant and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline as
affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors.
Respondent was disbarred from the practice of law pursuant to the Decision which found him guilty of
malpractice in falsifying a notarized deed of sale and subsequently introducing the same as evidence for
his client in court.
However, the record shows that the long period of respondents disbarment gave him the chance to purge
himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his willingness and
capacity to live up once again to the exacting standards of conduct demanded of every member of the bar
and officer of the court. During respondents disbarment for more than fifteen (15) years to date for his
professional infraction, he has been persistent in reiterating his apologies and pleas for reinstatement to
the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show that he has regained his worthiness to practice
law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and unblemished record as an elected public servant, as
attested to by numerous civic and professional organizations, government institutions, public officials and
members of the judiciary.
Moreover, it is well-settled that the objective of a disciplinary case is not so much to punish the individual
attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the
misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court. Restorative justice, not retribution, is our goal in
disciplinary proceedings

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Guided by this doctrine and considering the evidence submitted by respondent satisfactorily showing his
contrition and his being again worthy of membership in the legal profession, the Court finds that it is now
time to lift herein respondents disbarment and reinstate him to the august halls of the legal profession,
but with the following reminder:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid
standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining
a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The
Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over
attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only a right but a bounden duty
as well x x x. That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members.
Likewise, respondent is enjoined to keep in mind that:
Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the
laws, as he is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and
override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society,
argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the
insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.

NOTARIAL PRACTICE
Geronimo C. Fuentes vs. Judge Romualdo G. Buno, A.M. No. MTJ991204, July 28, 2008
Facts: In his complaint, Geronimo Fuentes alleged that he is one of the nine (9) heirs of Bernardo
Fuentes, their father, who owned an agricultural land located at San Jose, Talibon, Bohol, and that
respondent judge prepared and notarized an Extra-Judicial Partition with Simultaneous Absolute Deed of
Sale of the said agricultural land.
In the aforementioned answer, respondent judge contended that he could not be charged of graft and
corruption, since in a municipality where a notary public is unavailable, a municipal judge is allowed to
notarize documents or deeds as ex-officio notary public. To support his claim, he presented two
certifications: one, from Atty. Azucena C. Macalolot, Clerk of Court VI of the RTC, Branch 52, Talibon,
Bohol, who certified that according to their records and dockets, no petition for commission and/or
renewal of commission as notary public was granted by the said court for calendar year 1996 and no
appointment as notary public was issued for that year; and the other, from Mayor Juanario A. Item of
Talibon, Bohol who also certified that no notary public was staying and residing in the Municipality of
Talibon, Bohol during the year 1996.
Respondent judge contended that he did nothing wrong in preparing and notarizing the said document
and that he acted in good faith and in obedience to the earnest plea of complainants mother and siblings
who were in urgent need of money, and with their assurance that complainants SPA was forthcoming. In
his attempt to explain his lack of malice, respondent judge narrated that after learning that the SPA only
authorized his brother, Alejandro Fuentes to mortgage the property, he summoned the latter, his mother
and the buyer of the land. Alejandro then assured him that they would be responsible to the complainant
and that the buyer was willing to return complainants share in the property. Respondent further
questioned complainants sincerity in filing the complaint because the latter allegedly wanted merely the
respondent to persuade the buyer to return the whole property to him instead of his share only.
In its Memorandum Report, the OCA recommended that the present case be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter and that respondent be fined in the amount ofP10,000.00 for unauthorized
notarization of a private document. The said OCA recommendation was premised on the lack of authority
of respondent judge to prepare and notarize the document in question, which had no direct relation to the
performance of his official functions as a judge.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge violated the notarial law
Held: The Court ruled in the affirmative. While it may be true that no notary public was available or
residing within respondent judges territorial jurisdiction, as shown by the certifications issued by the RTC
Clerk of Court and the Municipal Mayor of Talibon, Bohol, SC Circular No. 1-90 specifically requires that a
certification attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in the said municipality or circuit be made
in the notarized document. Here, no such certification was made in the Extra-Judicial Partition with
Simultaneous Deed of Sale. Respondent judge also failed to indicate in his answer as to whether or not
any notarial fee was charged for that transaction, and if so, whether the same was turned over to the
Municipal Treasurer of Talibon, Bohol. Clearly, then, respondent judge, who was the sitting judge of the
MCTC, Talibon-Getafe, Bohol, failed to comply with the aforesaid conditions prescribed by SC Circular
No. 1-90, even if he could have acted as notary public ex-officio in the absence of any lawyer or notary
public in the municipality or circuit to which he was assigned.
Whether or not respondent judge truly acted in good faith when he prepared and acknowledged the
subject document is beside the point since he failed to strictly observe the requirements of SC Circular
No. 1-90. As noted by the then Court Administrator, the document involved here is Document No. 1158,
which shows that numerous documents were notarized by respondent judge in the year 1996
alone. Respondent judge was silent as to whether he charged fees when he notarized documents and if
so, whether he turned over the notarial fees to the municipal treasurer. Moreover, contrary to Rule IV,

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Sec. 6(a) of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004, respondent notarized the said document without the
SPA of the attorney-in-fact of the vendors which gave rise to the legal problem between the vendors and
the vendee concerning the scope of authority of the aforesaid attorney-in-fact. By failing to comply with
the conditions set for SC Circular No. 1-90 and violating the provision of the Rules on Notarial Practice of
2004, respondent judge failed to conduct himself in a manner that is beyond reproach and suspicion. Any
hint of impropriety must be avoided at all cost. Judges are enjoined by the Code of Judicial Conduct to
regulate their extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties.
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court deals with the administrative sanctions imposable on erring
judges. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars is a Less Serious Charge punishable
by suspension from office or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. However,
respondent judges application for optional retirement had already been approved by the Court en banc on
March 10, 1998 in Administrative Matter No. 9449-Ret. and the release of his retirement benefits was
allowed provided that the amount of P20,000.00 was withheld from the said retirement benefits.
THE LAW FIRM OF RAYMUNDO A. ARMOVIT, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BENGSON COMMERCIAL BUILDING, INC., Respondents.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 154559 October 5, 2011
FACTS: Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (BCBI) obtained loans from the GSIS in the total amount
of P4,250,000.00, secured by real estate and chattel mortgages. When BCBI defaulted in the payment of
the amortizations, GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties and sold them at public
auction where it emerged as the highest bidder.
With the Armovit Law Firm as its counsel, BCBI filed an action to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure with
CFI of La Union. The CFI decided in favour of BCBI. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of CFI.
It appears that when Atty. Armovit sought execution with the court a quo, he was informed by Romualdo
Bengzon, president of the respondent corporation, that the firm had retained the services of Atty. Pacifico
Yadao. He was also informed that the company would pay him the agreed compensation and that Atty.
Yadao's fees were covered by a separate agreement. The private respondent, however, later ignored his
billings and over the phone, directed him allegedly not to take part in the execution proceedings.
They delivered to Atty. Armovit the sum of P300,000.00 only. Atty. Armovit protested and demanded the
amount of P552,000.00 (twenty percent of P2,760,000.00), for which Mrs. Bengson made assurances
that he will be paid the balance.
In connection with his petition to record attorneys charging lien, the court rendered the decision that is
the subject of the controversy of this case, which reads:
xxxx
Contingent fees are valid in this jurisdiction. It is true that attorney's fees must at all times be
reasonable; however, we do not find Atty. Armovit's claim for "twenty percent of all recoveries" to be
unreasonable. In the case of Aro v. Naawa, decided in 1969, this Court awarded the agreed fees amid
the efforts of the client to deny him fees by terminating his services. In parallel vein, we are upholding
Atty. Armovit's claim for P252,000.00 more pursuant to the contingent fee agreement amid the
private respondent's own endeavours to evade its obligations.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The private respondent is ORDERED to pay
the petitioner the sum of P252,000.00. Costs against the private respondent.

BCBI delivered the balance of P252, 000.00, however, Atty. Armovit claimed that he is entitled for
greater amount or 20% of any amount paid to BCBI with regard to this case on the basis of the wordings
in the body of the decision.
ISSUE: Whether the foregoing may be subject of execution.
HELD: NO.
It is basic that when there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or fallo of a Decision and the
opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the judgment, the former prevails over the latter. An
order of execution is based on the disposition, not on the body, of the Decision. This rule rests on the
theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering
nothing.
Indeed, the foregoing rule is not without an exception. We have held that where the inevitable conclusion
from the body of the decision is so clear as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion,
the body of the decision will prevail. x x x.
Applying this ruling to the case at bar, it is clear that the statement in the body of our 1991 Decision
(that "we do not find Atty. Armovits claim for twenty percent of all recoveries to be unreasonable") is
not an order which can be the subject of execution. Neither can we ascertain from the body of the
Decision an inevitable conclusion clearly showing a mistake in the dispositive portion. On the contrary,
the context in which the statement was used shows that it is premised on the interpretation that Atty.
Armovits valid claim is only for an additional P252,000.00 in attorneys fees:
Contingent fees are valid in this jurisdiction. It is true that attorney's fees must at all times be
reasonable; however, we do not find Atty. Armovit's claim for "twenty percent of all recoveries" to be
unreasonable. In the case of Aro v. Naawa, decided in 1969, this Court awarded the agreed fees amid
the efforts of the client to deny him fees by terminating his services. In parallel vein, we are upholding
Atty. Armovit's claim for P252,000.00 more pursuant to the contingent fee agreement amid the
private respondent's own endeavours to evade its obligations.
The confusion created in the case at bar shows yet another reason why mere pronouncements in bodies
of Decisions may not be the subject of execution: random statements can easily be taken out of context
and are susceptible to different interpretations. When not enshrined in a clear and definite order, random
statements in bodies of Decisions can still be the subject of another legal debate, which is inappropriate
and should not be allowed in the execution stage of litigation.
EMILIA MARIAS, Complainant, vs. TERENCIO G. FLORENDO, Sheriff V, Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 21, Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, Respondent.
Facts: This was a case wherein Emilia Marias charged Terencio G. Florendo, Sheriff V, Regional Trial
Court (RTC) with neglect of duty relative to the implementation of the writ of execution issued by the
RTC.
In a civil case decided by the court, Marias won. Upon the issuance by the RTC of a writ of execution,
Florendo was assigned as the sheriff to implement the same. Marias alleged that Florendo demanded
from her P7 thousand for sheriffs expenses which she readily gave to the latter. However, despite
repeatedly follow-ups, Florendo failed to implement the writ for about 3 years at the time of the filing of
her complaint. Hence, complainant was constrained to file a complaint for neglect of duty against
Florendo.

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Issues: Whether a sheriff can validly accept funds from the winning party for his operational expenses to
implement the of execution without securing prior court approval
Held: No
Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court provides that the sheriff and other persons serving processes
are authorized to collect certain amounts from parties while in the performance of their functions.
However, the Rules also require the Sheriff to estimate his expenses in the execution of the decision and
he should secure prior approval of the court. The prevailing party will then deposit the said amount to the
Clerk of Court who will disburse the amount to the Sheriff, subject to liquidation. Any unspent amount
will have to be returned to the prevailing party. Thus, a sheriffs act of receiving an amount for expenses
to be incurred in the implementation of the writ of execution, without him having made an estimate
thereof and securing prior approval of the court issuing the writ is clearly proscribed by the rule. Whether
the amount was just given is beside the point, his mere acceptance of the amount without the prior
approval of the court and without him issuing a receipt thereof is clearly a misconduct in office.

JUDICIAL ETHICS
DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY
Re: Judicial Audit Conducted In The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14, Davao City, Presided
over by Judge William M. Layague, A.M. RTJ072039, April 18, 2008
Facts: On October 4 to 15, 2004, a judicial audit was conducted by the judicial audit team of the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14, Davao City, then presided
over by Judge William M. Layague. The audit unearthed numerous undecided/unresolved cases,
prompting the filing of an Administrative Case, A.M. No. 05-1-37- RTC, against respondent Judge William
M. Layague.
After the audit team had submitted its report, the OCA issued a Memorandum Report addressed to the
then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., informing the Court that since the last audit in 1996 of RTC,
Branch 14 of Davao City, respondent Judge Layague had accumulated a total of 83 cases (inclusive of
one inherited case) submitted for decision already beyond the reglementary period to decide. These did
not include the 230 cases submitted for resolution which were already beyond the reglementary period to
resolve, 93 cases with no further action, 19 cases with no further settings and 9 cases with no action
taken yet since the filing thereof.
The Report revealed that respondent judge incurred several absences from 1996 to 2004 as a result of
his poor health, as shown by the latters medical certificates, which adversely affected his work efficiency.
While respondent judges claims to have fully complied with the Courts en banc Resolutions dated
January 25, 2005 and September 20, 2005 in Administrative Order No. 05-1-37-RTC, the recent judicial
audit conducted in the RTC, Branch 14, Davao City on November 16 to 30, 2006, revealed that he had
left behind 41 cases (19 criminal cases and 22 civil cases), submitted for decision; and 12 cases
(3 criminal cases and 9 civil cases) with incidents submitted for resolution, or a total of 53 cases, all of
which were already beyond the reglementary period to resolve. It was also observed that these cases
were not included in the said Resolutions
Hence, in our Resolution dated March 6, 2007, the Memorandum Report of the OCA was re-docketed as
a regular administrative matter against respondent judge for gross inefficiency; that is, for undue delay in
deciding and resolving an exceptionally huge number of cases.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of gross negligence and undue delay
Held: The Court shares the position taken by the OCA. The Court has always impressed upon all
members of the judiciary the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-honored
precept that justice delayed is justice denied. The Constitution itself, under Section 15, Article VIII,
mandates that lower courts have three (3) months from the date of submission within which to decide the
cases or matters pending before them. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct directs judges
to "dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods." Finally,
Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics exhort judges to be prompt and punctual in the
disposition and resolution of cases and matters pending before their court, to wit:
6. PROMPTNESS
He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that

justice delayed is often justice denied.
7. PUNCTUALITY

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He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing that the time
of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his
habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction with the
administration of justice.
However, these rules are not rigid. An extension of the period may be granted by this Court upon request
by the judge concerned on account of heavy case load, age, poor health or any other reasonable excuse.
Here, however, respondent judge clearly transgressed the applicable rules relating to the proper and
speedy disposition and resolution of cases within the reglementary period provided by law. The records
show that as of audit date (October 4 to 15, 2004), the following facts were established: (1) 83 cases
were not decided within the reglementary period; (2) pending incidents in 230 other cases remained
unresolved even beyond the prescribed period to resolve; and (3) no appropriate action was made on 221
others (193 cases with no further action, 19 cases with no further settings and 9 cases with no action
taken yet since the filing thereof), despite the lapse of considerable time.Worse, after his retirement, it
was found out that he had left behind 53 cases (not included in those cases stated in the courts resolution
dated January 25, 2006 and September 20, 2006), all of which were beyond the reglementary period to
decide/resolve.
We have stated in Cadauan v. Judge Alivia:
Decision-making, among other duties, is the primordial duty of a member of the bench.
The speedy disposition of cases in our courts is a primary aim of the judiciary so the ends
of justice may not be compromised and the judiciary will be true to its commitment of
providing all persons the right to a speedy, impartial and public trial and to a speedy
disposition of cases.
While it may be true that the delays incurred by respondent judge can be attributed in part to his
failing health, nonetheless, his illness should not be an excuse for his failure to render the
corresponding decisions or resolutions within the prescribed period. It was incumbent upon him to
inform this Court of his inability to seasonably decide the cases and he could have sought an
extension of the reglementary period within which to decide his cases if he thought that he could
not comply with his judicial duty. Poor health may excuse a judges failure to decide cases within
the reglementary period but not his failure to request an extension of time within which to decide
cases on time. We note that respondent judge made no such request long before an audit was
conducted in his sala. The fact that he was burdened with failing health, which adversely affected
his work efficiency, serves only to mitigate the penalty, not to exonerate him.
Ronnie C. Dela Cruz vs. Redentor A. Zapico, Quirino Y. Itliong II, and Odon C. Balani, A.M. No.
2007-25-SC, September 18, 2008
Facts: The complainant, Ronnie Dela Cruz had an altercation with the respondents, Redentor Zapico and
company.
On November 14, 2007, Complainant, Dela Cruz a court employee went to Peking Wok Restaurant to
fetch his girlfriend, Rubylyn who works as a cashier. When the complainant arrived at the restaurant,
Respondent Zapico also a court employee and his friends were having a drinking session in front of the
cashier counter. Respondent made a lot of unsolicited utterances towards the complainant but the latter
just ignored the respondents as per his girlfriends request and decided to leave the restaurant and
decide to wait for his girlfriend elsewhere. Respondent followed the complainant outside, then shouted
invectives and attacked the latter. The complainant fell to the ground and then, together with the other
respondents they mauled him.

Complainant sustained Physical injuries which rendered him unable to report to work for a period of 2
days.
On November 29, 2007, complainant filed with the Office of the Administrative Services (OAS) an
administrative complaint against the respondent for grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming a court
employee, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
On December 21, 2007, Respondent filed his comment disputed the complainant version of the incident.
Moreover the respondents argued that the incident, which took place after office hours, was purely
personal in character and in no way related to office work. Thus he prayed for the dismissal of the
administrative complaint.
Issues:
1. Whether or not OAS has jurisdiction over the case.

2. Whether or not the conduct of the Respondent shows they are liable for the offenses charged and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions.
Held:
1. The Court Ruled in the Affirmative. It is beyond cavil that this Court has the right to discipline erring
employees by virtue of its administrative supervision of all courts and court personnel. The fact that
the incident complained of was not related to respondents work or official duties and took place after
office hours and outside the Court does not warrant the dismissal of the case, as respondents
contend. This Court has held that employees of the judiciary should be living examples of uprightness
not only in the performance of their official duties, but also in their personal and private dealings with
other people, so as to preserve at all times the good name and standing of courts in the community.
Employees in the government service are bound by the rules of proper and ethical behavior and are
expected to act with self-restraint and civility at all times, even when confronted with rudeness and
insolence.
2. Respondent Zapico was Ordered suspended. Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper,
unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose. Any transgression or
deviation from the established norm of conduct, work-related or not, amounts to a misconduct. The
image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and
women therein, from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel; hence, it becomes the
imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing
as a true temple of justice. The conduct of court personnel must be, and also perceived to be, free
from any whiff of impropriety, with respect not only to their duties in the judiciary but also in their
behavior outside the court. Their behavior and actuations must be characterized by propriety and
decorum and should at all times embody prudence, restraint, courtesy and dignity. Simply put, they
must always conduct themselves in a manner worthy of the publics respect for the judiciary.
With respect to respondent Zapico, we agree with the finding of the OAS that his outburst of temper
and act of attacking the complainant, despite the lack of evidence of sufficient provocation on the part
of complainant tended to degrade the dignity and the image of the judiciary. Such belligerence on the
part of Zapico and his infliction of multiple, visible injuries on complainant are clear deviations from
the established norm of conduct, even if it is not work-related, and amounts to misconduct. He
undeniably fell short of the high standards of propriety and decorum expected of employees of the
judiciary. Thus, the recommendation of the OAS finding respondent Zapico guilty of simple
misconduct is well-taken.

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Judge Placido C. Marquez and Atty. Lyn L. Llamasares vs. Lucila C. Pacariem, A.M. No. P-06-2249,
October 8, 2008
Facts: Judge Marquez and Atty. Llamasares, former Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court of RTC B40 of
Manila filed a complaint against respondent Lucila Pacariem former Stenographer of same RTC branch.
The plaintiffs alleged that respondent committed gross neglect of duty, gross inefficiency, gross
insubordination and gross misconduct in dealing in the course of her job as a court stenographer.
Petitioners assert that respondent committed numerous grammatical and typgraphical errors in her type
written reports despite repeated reminders from the plaintiffs. Atty. Llamasares pointed out that
respondent failed to submit the TSN or Transcript of Stenograhic Notes of 45 cases within the required 20
day period of the rules.Attached to the complaint are 254 pages of error filled output allegedly done by
respondent. Moreover petitioners aver that she is engaged in loafing or spendng an unseemly amount
of time outside of work.
Subsequenly, the OCA (Office of the Court Administrator) noted her ratings of Unsatisfactory and found
meritorious the allegations of loafing and inaccuracies in her court logbook attendance. The verdict found
her Guilty of Inefficiency, loafing and inaccuracies in her entries in the logbook as to time of arrival.
And suggested that she should be suspended from service for 1 year without pay.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of the charges alleged in the complaint?
Held: Yes.We find the recommendations of the OCA well-taken. Failure to submit TSNs within the period
prescribed under the Administrative Circular 24-90 constitutes gross neglect of duty.
As stenographer she should bear in mind that the performance of her duty is essential to the prompt and
proper administration of justice, and her inaction hampers the administration of justice and erodes public
faith in the judiciary.
It must be stressed that all judicial employees must devote their official time to service. They must
exercise at all times a high degree of professionalism and responsibility, as service to the judiciary is not
only a duty; it is A MISSION.
Atty. Raul H. Sesbreo vs. Judge Ireneo L. Gako, Jr. and Manuel G. Nollora, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2144,
November 3, 2008
Facts: The complainant, Atty. Sesbreo alleged that on June 27, 2003, he filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order dated June 2, 2003 in a Special Proceedings which was considered
submitted for resolution per the Order dated July 4, 2003. According to the complainant, respondent
Judge Gako deliberately failed to resolve the motion within the ninety (90)-day period prescribed by the
Constitution, and in clear violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly Rule 3.05, Canon 3,
mandating a judge to dispose of the courts business promptly and to decide cases within the required
periods, and Rule 1.02, Canon 2, requiring judges to administer justice without delay.
The Office of the Court Administrator gave the respondent judge to comment within 10 days but the
respondent judge failed to comply with the 1st indorsement. Court Administrator Velasco then gave the
respondent judge 5 days to comment and again, the respondent judge failed to comply.
For refusing to submit his comment despite the two (2) directives of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), the Court issued a Resolution directing respondent judge to show cause why he should not be
administratively dealt with and to submit the required comment both within five (5) days from receipt
thereof, with warning that in case of failure to comply, the Court shall take the necessary action against
him and decide the administrative complaint on the basis of the record on hand.

On March 15, 2007, respondent judge finally filed his Compliance with an opening statement that he
compulsorily retired from the service on September 20, 2006 and while working on his retirement papers,
he suffered a mild stroke which necessitated his rehabilitation in his home.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge can be held administratively liable?
Held: The Court found respondent judge guilty for two less serious offenses (1) undue delay in rendering
a decision/resolution and (2) violation of Court directives.
The Constitution mandates all lower courts to decide or resolve cases or matters within three (3) months
from their date of submission. Accordingly, Rules 1.02 of Canon 1 and 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct direct judges to administer justice impartially and without delay and to dispose of the
courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
All told, the unreasonable delay of the respondent judge in resolving the motion submitted for his
resolution clearly constituted a violation of complainants constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his
case. Having failed to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration within the prescribed period of time,
respondent judge is liable for undue delay in resolving a decision or order which is considered a less
serious offense.
With respect to respondent judges failure to comply with two directives issued by the OCA, The Court
find the explanation of respondent judge that he suffered a mild stroke to be insufficient to exonerate him,
although it may mitigate his liability. While he may have been suffering from some ailment, he failed to
show that it totally incapacitated him from complying with the lawful orders of the OCA. The failure of
respondent judge to comply with the OCAs directives to file comment to the letter-complaint against him
manifested his indifference to the lawful directives of the Court.
Sergio & Gracelda N. Andres vs. Judge Jose S. Majaducon, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1762, December 17,
2008
Facts: The complaint stemmed from the Special Order of Demolition issued by Judge Majaducon said
order directed the Sheriff of General Santos, Nasil Palati to demolish the improvements erected by the
heirs of John Sycip and Yard Urban Homeowners Association. The land in dispute belonged to spouses
Melencio Yu and and Talinanap Matalauga. Complainants who claimed to have an interest over the lot
filed a Special Appearance with urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation which seeks to inform the court of the
pending protest lodged in the DENR between them and the heirs of spouses Melencio Yu and Talinanap.
Judge Majaducon as Executive Judge of RTC B23 of General Santos denied the Urgent Motion for
Special Raffle and dismissed the case outright and issued on the same day an order declaring the
complainants in direct contempt. Ordering them to pay a fine of P2,000 and imprisonment for 10 days.
This prompted the complainants to file an administrative complaint averring that respondents actions
constituted bad faith, malicious motive, serious partiality, grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the
law.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Majaducon is guilty of abuse of authority?
Held: Yes. Court finds Judge Jose Majaducon guilty of abuse of authority.
Respondent Judge cannot excuse himself from his duty as Executive Judge by dispensing with the raffle
of the case and dismissing it outright. As Executive Judge, he ought to know that raffling of cases is his
personal duty and responsibility.
He is expected to keep abreast and be conversant with Supreme Court rules and circulars that affect the
conduct of cases before him and strictly comply therewith at all times. Failure to abide by these rules
undermines the wisdom behind them and diminishes respect for the rule of law. Judges should therefore

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administer their office with due regard and integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that they
are not depositories of arbitrary power, but judges under the sanction of law.
Section 6 of Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:
Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified
and corteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official
capacity.
Respondent judges act of uncerimoniously citing complainants in direct contempt is a clear evidence of
his unjustified use of authority vested upon him by law. By declaring direct contempt of court respondent
judge exhibited bias against complainants.
Dominga C. Menor vs. Teodora P. Guillermo, A.M. No. P-08-2587, December 18, 2008
Facts: This case was commenced by a Complaint dated July 9, 1999 filed by Dominga C. Menor with the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). Complainant averred that she is the widow of the late Pedro
Menor who, she claimed, owned a parcel of land situated in Tallungan, Reina Mercedes,
Isabela. Complainant further averred that she and her late husband had been occupying said land since
1946 and that sometime in 1998, she discovered that respondent was able to secure title over the same
through a falsified Deed of Absolute Sale of Residential Lot whereby her husband, with her consent,
purportedly sold their land to herein respondent and her spouse Eduardo Guillermo.
In her Comment dated September 8, 2000, respondent denied all the material allegations in the
Complaint. She cited the fact that complainant previously filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC), Naguilan-Reina Mercedes, Isabela a criminal complaint, against her and her late husband for
Falsification involving the same property and the same document. The case was dismissed due to
prescription as stated in the Order of the said MCTC dated October 22, 1998.Complainant later filed an
Action for Declaration of Nullity and Annulment/Cancellation of Title with the RTC.
The case was later dismissed through an Order. The complainants Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforesaid Order was denied by the trial court ,for failure to give proper notice of the said motion to the
defendants in the case, as required by Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. The Petition for
Relief from Judgment which was later on filed by complainant was also denied by the trial court for lack of
merit on December 11, 2007.
The criminal case and the two (2) civil cases filed by complainant against herein respondent were
dismissed by the trial courts on the ground of technicality. For this reason, the issues relevant to the
instant administrative case remain unanswered. Hence, the merits of this administrative case should be
resolved on the basis of evidence on record in accordance with the quantum of evidence required in
administrative proceedings.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is guity of misconduct
Held: The Cout found respondent stenographer guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. There are perceivable differences between the said three signatures of Pedro Menor and the one
appearing on the disputed deed of sale. Although the handwriting experts opinion is not available in this
case to establish with certainty the alleged falsification of the signature of Pedro Menor, respondent failed
to sufficiently rebut the complainants assertion that her signature in the deed of sale is forged, as
complainant does not know how to read and write and instead of signing documents, she merely affixes
her thumbmark. It is logical to conclude that respondent perpetrated or is responsible for the falsification
of the deed of sale imputed to complainant, since respondent and her husband were benefited by it.

There exists substantial evidence, under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, to hold
respondent liable for Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, which is classified as
a grave offense and is punishable with suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year.
Considering that respondent has already retired from the service and the penalty of suspension can no
longer be imposed, the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) retained by the Court should be
applied as fine for respondents administrative liability.
Letter of Judge Josefina D. Farrales, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Br.72, Olongapo City Re: 30
Cases and 84 Motions Submitted For Decision/ Resolution in the said Court, A.M. No. 06-3-196-
RTC, December 24, 2008
Facts: The Court, through the First Division, issued Resolution dated February 7, 2005 in A.M. No. RTJ-
05-1902 (PAGCOR, etc. v. Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas, etc.), preventively suspending Judge Eliodoro G.
Ubiadas (Judge Ubiadas), Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72, Olongapo City, effective immediately
pending resolution of the said administrative case. Judge Ubiadas received the said Resolution on March
11, 2005.
Subsequently, several judges were designated to preside over Branch 72, namely: Hon. Renato J. Dilag,
RTC, Br. 73, Olongapo City from April 18 to June 10, 2005; Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, RTC, Br.
74, Olongapo City, from June 10, 2005 to January 25, 2006; and Hon. Josefina D. Farrales, RTC, Br. 69,
Iba, Zambales, from January 30, 2006 until the present.
Upon her assumption, Judge Farrales immediately conducted an inventory of the pending cases in
Branch 72. In her letter dated February 15, 2006, Judge Farrales reported that there are still 30
cases and 84 motions submitted for decision and resolution and that she requested for sixty (60) days
extension to resolve the same. Of the cases, 15 cases and33 motions were already beyond the
reglementary period to decide/resolve even before Judge Ubiadas was suspended. The other 15
cases and 51 motions were submitted for decision/resolution when Judge Caguioa took over as
presiding judge of Branch 72, of which 6 cases and 30 motions were already beyond the reglementary
period.
The Court noted Judge Farrales letter, directed her to resolve the cases/motions within six (6) months
and to submit a copy of each of her decisions/resolutions within 10 days from rendition/promulgation
thereof. The Court likewise required Judge Ubiadas and Judge Caguioa to explain within 10 days from
notice, their failure to decide/resolve the subject cases/motions within the reglementary periods and to
make the necessary request for extension of time within which to decide/resolve the same.
In his letter, Judge Ubiadas cited his health conditions as an explanation for the delay in
deciding/resolving the cases/other matters submitted for decision/resolution in Branch 72. Judge Ubiadas
averred that on August 2, 1997, he suffered a heart attack, diagnosed as myocardial infraction, and was
confined in the intensive care unit (ICU) of theUST Hospital. He had a second heart attack on January 2,
1998, this time it was diagnosed as cardiac arrest. Again, he was confined in the ICU of the same
hospital. Then a third heart attack occurred in July 1998, which, although not as serious as the first and
second attacks, nevertheless, required his confinement at the James Gordon Memorial Hospital.
Issue: Whether or not Hudge Ubiadas is guity of gross inefficiency
Held: We hold that Judge Ubiadas is guilty of gross inefficiency in the conduct of court business and of
violations of existing SC circulars.
The Constitution provides that lower courts have three (3) months within which to decide cases or resolve
matters submitted to them for resolution. [9] Moreover, the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to
dispose of their business promptly and decide cases within the required period.[10] In addition, this Court

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laid down guidelines in SC Administrative Circular No. 13 which provides, inter alia, that [j]udges shall
observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15, of the Constitution for the
adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters
must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts
while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so. We have reiterated this
admonition in SC Administrative Circular No. 3-99 which requires all judges to scrupulously observe the
periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases and the failure to comply therewith is considered
a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to speedy disposition of their cases.
Indeed, Judge Ubiadas illness could have adversely affected the performance of his duties. Despite
having just been subjected to a triple by-pass operation, he knew fully well that he still had to act as the
judge of four (4) RTC branches for two (2) months. If his illness had indeed seriously hampered him in the
discharge of his duties, Judge Ubiadas could have requested this Court for additional time to
decide/resolve pending cases and incidents. His illness cannot be an excuse for his failure to render
decisions or resolutions within the constitutionally prescribed period, considering that he could have
requested an extension or other relief from this Court but he did not. It is incumbent upon him to dispose
the cases assigned to him without undue delay.
This Court has incessantly admonished members of the bench to administer justice without undue delay,
for justice delayed is justice denied. The present clogged dockets in all levels of our judicial system
cannot be cleared unless every magistrate earnestly, painstakingly and faithfully complies with the
mandate of the law. Undue delay in the disposition of cases amounts to a denial of justice which, in turn,
brings the courts into disrepute and ultimately erodes the faith and confidence of the public in the
judiciary.
On this point, our ruling in another case is instructive:
The Court finds deserving of due consideration, the explanation of respondent Judge for
leaving ten (10) undecided cases before his retirement from the service. Serious illness
may justify the inability of a judge to perform his official duties and functions. But then, the
Court has to enforce what is required by law and to impose a reasonable punishment for
violation thereof. The members of the judiciary have the sworn duty to administer justice
without undue delay. Failure to decide cases within the period fixed by law constitutes a
neglect of duty, which warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions. When he was
hindered by a grave malignancy, it was incumbent upon the respondent Judge to
request this Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator, for additional
time to decide the cases which he could not seasonably act upon and decide. For
failing to do so, respondent Judge has to suffer the consequences of his
omission. (emphasis supplied)
Aware of the caseload of judges, this Court has viewed with understanding requests for extension made
by judges. Hence, should a judge find himself unable to decide cases within the 90-day period for doing
so, he can ask for an extension of time for deciding the same. Such requests are generally granted.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Norma C. Perello, former Clerk of Court Luis C.
Bucayon II, Court Stenographers Thelma A. Mangilit, Cecilio B. Argame, Maricar N. Eugenio, and
Radigunda R. Laman and Interpreter Paul M. Resurreccion, all of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
276, Muntinlupa City, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1952, December 24, 2008
Facts: The case was filed against respondents who were all court employees. Two of which were a judge
and a clerk of court. This started when a judicial audit was conducted by the OCA in the RTC branches of
Muntinlupa. Among these branches included that presided by the respondent judge which had reports on

perceived irregular disposition of petitions for habeas corpus. The audit team then submitted a
memorandum to OCA reporting the following:
1. There were cases (all petitions for habeas corpus) which were not presented to them by the
clerk of court and a significant number of case folders did not contain copies of the decisions of
conviction.
2. There was a huge disparity noted in the number of petitions for habeas corpus raffled in the
said branch against that of the other branches. This allowed the audit team to doubt if a raffle had
been conducted with strict regularity, considering that the respondent judge was the Executive
Judge.
3. There were several substantive procedural lapses performed by the court employees relative
to the disposition of habeas corpus cases on the RTC branch presided by the respondent judge.
4. In some of the petitions for habeas corpus, respondent judge erred in ordering the release of
the prisoners before they have served the full term of their sentence.
The team recommended to the OCA to consider the judicial audit report as an administrative complaint
against the respondent judge and clerk of court for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion
and grave misconduct and other court employees for gross inefficiency. OCA subsequently
recommended that the above persons, except for the clerk of court, to be subjected to disciplinary
actions.
Issue: Whether or not the conduct of the respondent judge and clerk of court constitutes gross ignorance
of the law and jurisprudence.
Held: The Court ruled that respondent judge liable for ignorance of the law and jurisprudence and for
abuse of discretion. Thus, the said respondent has violated Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
which provided for "the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence." Judges are expected to
keep abreast of developments in law and jurisprudence. He should strive for excellence exceeded only by
his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice and the Rule of Law. Indeed, the
facts obtaining in this case speak of other dubious circumstances affecting respondent judge's integrity
and competence too glaring to ignore.
As to Atty. Bucayon's liability, the charges against him all pertained to his duties as Branch Clerk of Court.
During the pendency of this administrative case against him, the said respondent had transferred to the
PAO of the DOJ and was accordingly issued a clearance by the OCA. Thus, the court has accepted the
OCA's recommendation to dismiss the charges against him for being moot.
The Court also stressed out upon all respondents that the conduct of every person connected with the
administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowest clerk, is circumscribed with a heavy
burden of responsibility. A public office is a public trust. Since public officers are accountable to the
people at all times, they must strictly perform their duties and responsibilities.
As the administration of justice is a sacred task, this Court condemns any omission or act that may
diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary.
Disposition: The Court found Judge Norma C. Perello GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and abuse of
discretion, for which she was meted a fine of P40,000.00 to be deducted from her retirement benefits.
Court Stenographers Thelma Mangilit, Cecilio Argame, Maricar Eugenio and Radigunda Laman, and
Court Interpreter Paul Resurreccion were found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty, for which they were
each meted a fine of P5,000.00, and sternly warned that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more
severely. For being moot, the charges against Atty. Luis Bucayon II were DISMISSED.

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Aureo Bayaca vs. Judge Tranquilino Ramos, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1676, January 29, 2009
Facts: In a complaint-affidavit dated September 6, 2006 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), complainant Aureo G. Bayaca charged respondent Judge Tranquilino V. Ramos of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Dupax del Norte, Nueva Vizcaya with gross misconduct, dishonesty, gross
ignorance of the law, arbitrary detention, incompetence, grave abuse of discretion, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Complainant Bayaca was the accused in a criminal case for arson through reckless imprudence presided
by respondent Judge. After trial, respondent Judge promulgated his Decision dated April 2, 2004, finding
complainant Bayaca guilty as charged and imposing upon him the penalty of imprisonment of four (4)
months of arresto mayor as minimum and four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as
maximum with all the accessory penalties imposed by law and to pay costs and actual damages.
Aggrieved, complainant appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court. which came out with its decision
affirming with modification the decision of the MCTC. Despite the deletion of the penalty of imprisonment
in the RTC decision, respondent Judge issued a Warrant of Arrest and Commitment on Final Sentence
which led to complainants incarceration at the Solano District Jail from August 8 to 28, 2006. Hence, the
instant complaint alleging that respondent Judge acted without legal basis in ordering his detention, thus
displaying bias, manifest partiality, incompetence in office, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct,
dishonesty and grave abuse of authority and discretion. Complainant added that respondents conduct
was unbecoming and inappropriate for a judge which is greatly prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
In its Report the OCA, through Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock, found respondent Judge guilty of
Negligence and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service.
By Resolution dated June 27, 2007 the Court required the parties to manifest whether they are willing to
submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings filed. In a Manifestation dated September 6,
2007 and Supplemental Manifestation dated October 4, 2007, respondent Judge interposed no objection
to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings filed. Complainant, upon the other hand, did not
file any manifestation in compliance with our resolution.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge was inexcusably negligent in issuing an order for the arrest of
the complainant.
Held: Yes. This Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the OCA. We hold that respondent Judge
was inexcusably negligent when he issued a Warrant of Arrest and Commitment to Final Sentence
despite the deletion by the appellate court of that portion of the judgment imposing the penalty of
imprisonment. In the performance of his duties, respondent Judge failed to observe that diligence,
prudence and circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any public service. If only
respondent Judge had exercised the requisite thoroughness and caution, he would have noted not only
the modification of the monetary awards by the appellate court, but also the deletion of the penalty of
imprisonment upon which the Warrant of Arrest and Commitment to Final Sentence that he signed was
based.
Respondent Judge cannot pass on the blame to his Clerk of Court and/or Stenographer. A judge cannot
take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his very own court personnel. Certainly, a judge
is responsible not only for the dispensation of justice but also for managing his court efficiently to ensure
the prompt delivery of court services. In the discharge of the functions of his office, respondent Judge
must strive to act in a manner that puts him and his conduct above reproach and beyond suspicion. He

must act with extreme care for his office indeed is laden with a heavy burden of responsibility. Surely, a
judge is enjoined to pore over all documents whereon he is required to affix his signature and give his
official imprimatur. The negligence of respondent Judge in this case simply cannot be countenanced.
Emilia Marias vs. Terencio G. Florendo, A.M. No. P-07-2304, February 12, 2009
Facts: In a Complaint-Affidavit, Emilia Marias charged Terencio G. Florendo, Sheriff V, Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 21, Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, with neglect of duty relative to the implementation of the
writ of execution issued by the RTC, Branch 21, Vigan City, in Civil Case No. 5238-V entitled Emilia
Marias v. Cesar Zaplan.
Complainant alleged that the decision in Civil Case No. 5238-V was promulgated on November 18, 2002
and the same became final and executory for failure of defendant therein to file his appeal. Thus, on May
19, 2003, the RTC issued a writ of execution and respondent sheriff was assigned to implement the
same. Respondent assured complainant that the writ would be implemented and demanded from her
seven thousand pesos (P7,000.00) for sheriffs expenses which she readily gave to the respondent.
Complainant repeatedly followed-up the execution of the writ of execution. However, respondent failed to
implement the writ for about three (3) years at the time of the filing of her complaint. Hence, complainant
was constrained to file this complaint for neglect of duty against respondent.
In his comment, respondent denied having solicited, much less, received P7,000.00 from complainant.
He, however, admitted that he received P1,000.00 from complainant, but only because complainant
herself offered the said amount as, "pandagdag gastos man lang . . kasi nakakahiya na!" Respondent
claims that he asked the assistance of Sheriff Fernando Austria of the RTC, Lingayen in conducting
surveillance on Cesar Zaplans (defendant in Civil Case No. 5238-V) residence for two (2) days but the
latter found nothing to report. On November 27, 2003, Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff Alex R.
Raqueno of the RTC, Vigan, officially endorsed the subject writ of execution for further proceedings to his
counterpart, Clerk of Court Alicia Favia of the RTC, Dagupan City, Pangasinan. According to respondent
he transmitted, via postal money order, the P1,000.00 given to him by complainant to the Office of the
Clerk of Court, Dagupan City, for sheriffs operational expenses. In fine, respondent contended that the
referral of the said writ transferred the task of enforcing the same to the RTC, Dagupan City.
Respondent also disclosed that on October 4, 2005, the parties were summoned for a conference with
Executive Judge Alipio V. Flores, but the complainant did not show up for the scheduled dialogue. Finally,
respondent claimed that the search for the vehicle of the defendant in the case proved futile and
budgetary constraints prevented a longer stay in Dagupan City.
The Office of the Court Administrator reported that the respondent was negligent in the performance of
his duty as sheriff.
Issue: Whether or not respondent sheriff is liable for grave misconduct and gross dishonesty
Held: Yes. A review of the record at hand shows that respondent did not comply with the mandate of
Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Under the said rule, a sheriff is mandated to execute and make
a return on the writ of execution within the period provided by the Rules. In addition, he must make
periodic reports on partially satisfied or unsatisfied writs in accordance with the above-cited rule, in order
that the court as well as the litigants may be apprised of the proceedings undertaken in connection
therewith. The periodic reporting on the status of the writs must be done by the sheriff every 30 days
regularly and consistently until they are returned fully satisfied. Here, no evidence was presented to prove
that respondent complied with the requirements mandated by the rule. Respondent cannot evade liability
by claiming that the duty of enforcing the subject writ was already transferred to the RTC, Dagupan City
when the said writ was officially endorsed by the RTC, Vigan City Branch Clerk of Court Raqueno to Clerk
of Court Favia of the RTC, Dagupan City. As the sheriff assigned to the case, he should implement the
writ personally. Even if the subject writ is to be executed outside his territorial jurisdiction, respondent can

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seek the assistance of the sheriff of the place where the writ of execution shall take place but the
responsibility for its implementation still remains with respondent.
Respondent disregarded Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Under the said rule, the sheriff and
other persons serving processes are authorized to collect certain amounts from parties while in the
performance of their functions. However, the Rules also require the Sheriff to estimate his expenses in
the execution of the decision. The prevailing party will then deposit the said amount to the Clerk of Court
who will disburse the amount to the Sheriff, subject to liquidation. Any unspent amount will have to be
returned to the prevailing party. Thus, any amount received by the Sheriff in excess of the lawful fees
allowed by the Rules of Court is an unlawful exaction and renders him liable for grave misconduct and
gross dishonesty.
In this case, the fact that the P1,000.00 was offered to him by complainant to defray expenses of
execution is of no moment. It makes no difference if the money, in whole or in part, had indeed been
spent in the implementation of the writ. The sheriff may receive only the court-approved sheriffs fees and
the acceptance of any other amount is improper, even if applied for lawful purposes.
Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice and as agents of the law, high standards are
expected of them. They are duty-bound to know and to comply with the very basic rules relative to the
implementation of writs of execution. It is undisputed that the most difficult phase of any proceeding is the
execution of judgment. The officer charged with this delicate task is the sheriff. The sheriff, as an officer of
the court upon whom the execution of a final judgment depends, must necessarily be circumspect and
proper in his behavior. Execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law. He is to execute
the directives of the court therein strictly in accordance with the letter thereof and without any deviation
therefrom.
Respondent departed from the directive of the court by failing to make periodic reports on the
implementation of the writ and to fully implement the said writ. He failed to observe the degree of
dedication to the duties and responsibilities required of him as a sheriff. He breached his sworn duty to
uphold the majesty of the law and the integrity of the justice system. The Court cannot countenance such
dereliction of duty, as it erodes the faith and trust of the citizenry in the judiciary.
Ma. Theresa G. Winterniitz and Raquel Gonzales vs. Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres, A.M. No.
MTJ-09-1733, February 24, 2009
Facts: This administrative case stemmed from the criminal cases filed against complainants Ma. Theresa
G. Winternitz and Raquel L. Gonzalez, which were raffled to the sala of herein respondent, Judge
Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.
According to complainants Winternitz and Gonzalez, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a resolution
dated May 14, 2002 which directed the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City to cause the withdrawal of
the above-mentioned criminal cases against them. On May 24, 2002, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to
Withdraw Informations pursuant to the directive of the DOJ. However, the respondent judge did not
immediately act on said motion but instead set the same for hearing several times. The motion was finally
submitted for its resolution on January 13, 2004. As of October 21, 2003, the motion remained unresolved
despite the complainants prayer for resolution.
This prompted herein complainants to file the instant administrative complaint against respondent judge
for malfeasance/misfeasance. Complainants contended that the delay or inaction of the respondent on
the motion constituted a violation of Article 7, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution and Canon 3, Rules
3.08 and 3.09 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. ordered respondent to file her comment within ten
(10) days from receipt of the same. In her letter dated January 29, 2004, respondent requested a period
of twenty (20) days to collate all pertinent data and to submit a detailed comment. Respondents request
was granted by the Court Administrator in his letter dated February 12, 2004. Still, respondent judge
failed to file her comment within the extended period granted to her. In a letter dated August 18, 2004,
she again asked for a period of twenty (20) days to submit her comment which was again favorably acted
upon by the Court Administrator. Still unable to file her comment, another twenty (20)-day extension was
prayed for by respondent which was granted by the Court Administrator on January 26, 2005.
In a Resolution dated September 28, 2005, the Court required respondent judge to explain her repeated
failure to comment on the administrative complaints against her and to file the same within a period of ten
(10) days. In her letter dated November 7, 2005, respondent judge asked for an additional ten (10) days
to submit her comment which the Court granted in the Resolution dated January 16, 2006. On February
20, 2006, respondent judge finally filed her comment on the three (3) administrative complaints, including
the instant complaint (A.M. No. MTJ-05-1611) filed against her. The comment was attached to her
Second Motion for Reconsideration dated February 15, 2006 in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1611. Respondent
judge explained that she was unable to immediately act on the City Prosecutors motion to withdraw
informations despite having set the same for hearing on several occasions particularly on June 10 and
24, 2002, July 24, 2002 and January 13, 2003 because there was no proof of service of the notice of
hearing upon private complainant and counsel in the aforesaid criminal cases and she may be accused of
partisanship. She also attributed the delay to the heavy caseload when she assumed office in 2001 and
to the lack of personnel in her sala. She admitted culpability for her failure to submit her comment on time
and asked for consideration from this Court.
The instant administrative case was referred to Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals Romeo Barza
for investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation, Justice Barza found
respondent to have been remiss in her duty to resolve the motion to withdraw the criminal cases filed
against herein complainants with dispatch.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision or order
Held: Yes. We find unmeritorious respondent judges excuse that the reason for her delay in resolving the
motion to withdraw is the lack of notice of hearing upon the parties. Firstly, she should have realized that
almost one (1) year had already elapsed from the time of filing of the motion to withdraw on May 24, 2002
up to its submission for resolution on January 13, 2003. Secondly, she is duty-bound to comply with Rule
3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct providing that a judge shall dispose of the courts business
promptly and decide cases within the prescribed periods. This Canon is in consonance with the
Constitutional mandate that all lower courts decide or resolve cases or matters within three (3) months
from their date of submission.
Accordingly, Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 provide as follows:
Rule 1.02. A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.
Rule 3.05. A judge should dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within
the required periods.
In line with the foregoing, the Court has laid down administrative guidelines to ensure that the mandates
on the prompt disposition of judicial business are complied with. Thus, SC Administrative Circular No. 13-
87 states, in pertinent part:
3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15 of the
Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts.
Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of

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submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three
months to do so. x x x.
Furthermore, SC Administrative Circular No. 1-88 dated January 26, 1988 states:
6.1. All Presiding Judges must endeavor to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters
pending before their courts. x x x
Judge Torres failed to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations within three (3) months from the time it
was submitted for resolution on January 13, 2003. This Court cannot countenance such undue inaction
on the part of respondent judge, especially now when there is an all-out effort to minimize, if not totally
eradicate, the problems of congestion and delay long plaguing our courts. The requirement that cases be
decided within the reglementary period is designed to prevent delay in the administration of justice, for
obviously, justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and
confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.
The Court also takes note of the fact that respondent judge submitted her comment on the instant
complaint only after more than two (2) years from the time the OCA required her to do so. Her prolonged
and repeated refusal to comply with the simple directives of the OCA to file her comment constitutes a
clear and willful disrespect for lawful orders of the OCA. It bears stress that it is through the OCA that the
Supreme Court exercises supervision over all lower courts and personnel thereof. At the core of a judges
esteemed position is obedience to the dictates of the law and justice. A judge must be the first to exhibit
respect for authority. Judge Torres failed in this aspect when she repeatedly ignored the directives of the
OCA to file her comment.
Marietta Duque vs. Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido, A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2027, February 27, 2009
Facts: In a verified letter-complaint Marietta Duque charged respondent, Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Tacloban City, Leyte, with gross violation of Section 15, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution for rendering a decision beyond ninety (90) days in Criminal Case entitled
People v Reynaldo Caones y Royo Sr., et al.
Complainant is the alleged common-law wife of the murdered victim in the aforementioned case. She
claimed that the respondent Judge rendered a decision beyond the 90 day reglementary period without
requesting an extension of time from the Court. She alleged that the prosecution filed its Memorandum
submitting the case for resolution on August 10, 2005, but the respondent issued a Decision on
December 12, 2005 which was promulgated on January 27, 2006. Complainant further alleged that
neither the offended party nor the handling prosecutor was notified of the promulgation.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) required respondent Judge to comment on the complaint. In
his Omnibus Comment, respondent judge denied the accusation that the decision in criminal case
aforementioned was rendered beyond the 90-day period.
Respondent maintained that there was no impropriety or procedural infirmity in the promulgation of the
decision even though the complainant and the handling prosecutor, Robert M. Visbal, were not present at
that time. He reasoned that the complainant is not entitled to be notified of the promulgation as she is
neither the private complainant nor a witness, while the prosecution was duly represented during the
promulgation by Prosecutor Edgar A. Sabarre who was also assigned in the RTC. Respondent pointed
out that the court had already set the schedule of the promulgation. Hence, when Prosecutor Visbal opted
not to attend, it was for a reason only known to him.

The OCA found respondent judge administratively liable for rendering a decision beyond the 90-day
period in violation of Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is liable for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct in rendering
a decision beyond the 90-day period.
Held: Yes. We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA. Time and again, the Court has
emphasized that the office of a judge exacts nothing less than faithful observance of the Constitution and
the law in the discharge of official duties.
The Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 dictates as follows:
Rule 3.05 A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods.
Indeed, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent
needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the 90-day period within which to
decide cases is mandatory. The Court has consistently emphasized strict observance of this rule in order
to minimize the twin problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued our courts. Any delay in
the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition
of his case, for, not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice, it undermines the peoples faith and
confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.
As readily gleaned from the records, the last pleading submitted i.e., the Memorandum for the
Prosecution, was filed on August 10, 2005. Thus, the case was deemed submitted for decision on that
date. Accordingly, the decision should have been rendered not later than November 8, 2005. However,
respondent issued it only on December 12, 2005 which was more than four months after the case had
been submitted for decision.
Respondent Judge Garrido clearly violated both the Constitution and the Code of Judicial Conduct when
he failed to decide Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 within the 90-day period to decide cases prescribed
for the lower courts.
Estelito R. Marabe vs. Tyrone V. Tan, Sheriff IV, OCC, Regional Trial Court, Malaybalay City,
Bukidnon, A.M. No. P-05-1996, April 21, 2009
Facts: This administrative case arose from a Letter-Complaint filed by complainant Estelito R. Marabe,
President and Chairman of the Board of Asian Hills Bank at Malaybalay, Bukidnon, charging respondent,
Tyrone Tan, Sheriff IV of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malaybalay
City, Bukidnon with inefficiency and ineffectiveness for failing to implement and execute writs of execution
issued in favor of Asian Hills Bank despite having received advanced amounts for expenses to be
incurred in the implementation of the said writs.
Initially referred to then Executive Judge Jesus Barroso, Jr. of the RTC of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, for
investigation, report and recommendation , the case was subsequently referred to the new Executive
Judge of the same court, Rolando S. Venadas, Sr.
The Investigating Judge found respondent liable for failure to act within a reasonable time on the writs of
execution endorsed to him for enforcement without any sufficient justification. Consequently the
Investigating Judge recommended the imposition of the appropriate penalty on respondent.
The OCA submitted its Memorandum, wherein it concurred with the findings of the Investigating Judge
finding the respondent sheriff guilty of Inefficiency and Ineffectiveness in the Performance of his Duty and

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be imposed a Fine in the amount of P5,000.00 with a STERN WARNING that the same or similar acts in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
Issue: Whether or not respondent sheriff is negligent in the performance of his duty.
Held: Yes. The Court agrees with the report of the OCA adopting the findings of the Investigating Judge
except as to the recommended penalty.
It is undisputable that the most difficult phase of any proceeding is the execution of judgment. The officer
charged with this delicate task is the sheriff. The sheriff, as an officer of the court upon whom the
execution of a final judgment depends, must necessarily be circumspect and proper in his behavior.
Execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law. He is to execute the directives of the
court therein strictly in accordance with the letter thereof and without any deviation therefrom.
Here, respondent sheriff was clearly remiss in the performance of his mandated duties.
Sec. 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Sec. 14. Return of writ of execution. The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court issuing
it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be
satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court
and state the reason therefore. Such writ shall continue in effect during the period within which
the judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every (30)
days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity
expires. The returns or the periodic report shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and
shall be filed with the court and copies thereof promptly furnished the parties.
The six (6) writs of execution subject of this case were admittedly received by respondent in the year
2001, but as shown by the Sheriffs Partial Reports which he submitted, he implemented the same two (2)
years later.
Likewise, respondent sheriff did not render periodic reports on the writs of execution pursuant to Section
14, Rule 39. Indeed, sheriffs ought to know that they have a sworn responsibility to serve writs of
execution with utmost dispatch. When writs are placed in their hands, it is their ministerial duty to proceed
with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute them in accordance with their mandate. Unless
restrained by a court order, they should see to it that the execution of judgments is not unduly delayed.
Accordingly, they must comply with their mandated ministerial duty as speedily as possible.
The failure to implement a writ of execution maybe classified as simple neglect of duty which has been
defined as the failure of an employee to give ones attention to a task expected of him, and signifies a
disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.
Peter B. Mallonga vs. Marites R. Manio, Court Interpreter III, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4,
Tuguegarao City, A.M. No. P-07-2298, April 24, 2009
Facts: This case involves an administrative charge against Court Interpreter III, Marites R. Manio
(Manio,) of Branch 4, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Tuguegarao City for dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Complainant Mallonga related that respondent Manio was his former classmate and friend in college.
Sometime in September 2003, Mallonga went to the RTC of Tuguegarao City and inquired from
respondent Manio if she knew a lawyer who could help him file a petition for the correction of entry in his
marriage certificate. Respondent Manio allegedly volunteered the name of a certain lawyer and told
Mallonga to secure copies of his marriage and birth certificates so that these could be given to the lawyer.

A week later, Mallonga gave respondent Manio copies of the said certificates. Respondent Manio then
asked Mallonga to sign a prepared petition and to pay the total amount of P13,000.00 for attorneys fees
and other expenses.
Respondent Manio eventually persuaded complainant and the latter paid the agreed amount in
installments. As the weeks passed, Mallonga attempted to see or contact respondent Manio to inquire
about the status of his petition but Manio was always out of the office or absent. They finally met once
more sometime in December 2003 where respondent Manio handed to Mallonga a copy of an alleged
resolution dated November 25, 2003 of Branch 4, RTC, Tuguegarao City and purportedly signed by
Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino. Respondent Manio told Mallonga his petition was already granted and
that she "pulled some strings in the court" so that his appearance was dispensed with at the hearing of
the case.
Mallonga then filed the above-mentioned resolution with the Local Civil Registrar of Solana, Cagayan, but
the said office informed him that a certificate of finality was required before the correction of his marriage
certificate could be effected. Hence, he asked respondent Manio to produce a certificate of finality, but
the latter failed to deliver the same on the date agreed upon by them.
Complainant went again to the office of respondent Manio and asked for the assistance of one of the
court personnel who led him to Jacinto Danao, the clerk in charge of civil cases. When Danao checked
his records, he found that the docket number which appeared in the resolution respondent had given
complainant belonged to another case, and that the said resolution was a spurious document.
Judge Abella-Aquino forwarded the complaint of Mallonga to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
and reported that her signature in the purported resolution was a forgery.
The OCA twice required respondent Manio to comment, but the latter failed to comply. This Court then
directed respondent Manio to comply with the directives of the OCA and to show cause why no
administrative sanction should be meted to her for ignoring the same. Respondent Manio was further
reminded that her non-compliance would be considered as a waiver of her right to be heard or to present
any defense, and that the cases would be decided on the basis of the records. Respondent Manio still
refused to answer the charges against her. Consequently, this Court resolved to consider as waived the
right of respondent Manio to be heard and to present evidence and referred these cases back to the OCA
for report and recommendation.
The OCA evaluated the evidence on record and recommended that respondent Manio be held liable for
dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is liable for dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Held: This Court finds respondent guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and hereby dismisses her
from the service.
As a public servant, respondent is expected to exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and
integrity and faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the principle that public office is a public
trust. By soliciting money from complainant, she committed an act of impropriety which immeasurably
affects the honor and dignity of the judiciary and the people's confidence in it. She committed the ultimate
betrayal of the duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the judiciary by arrogating to herself judicial
power which she does not possess, in order to extort money from a party-litigant. Her act of forging the
presiding judge's signature also constitutes a blatant disregard for the values of integrity, uprightness and
honesty which are expected of all court personnel.
The Court has never wavered in exhorting all those in the judiciary to behave at all times to promote
public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. At every opportunity, the Court has emphasized that the

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conduct and behavior of all officials and employees of the judiciary must at all times be characterized by
strict propriety and decorum in order to earn and maintain the respect of the people.
We sustain the findings of the OCA and hold respondent Manio guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct. The detailed narration of the facts in the unrebutted affidavit of Mallonga and the letter of
Judge Aquino, taken together with the copy of the fake resolution, substantially supported the
administrative charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct against respondent Manio. She took
advantage of her official position and defrauded a potential litigant. Her acts clearly constitute dishonesty
which is the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray. On the other hand, the forgery that she committed in furtherance of the deceit
constitutes grave misconduct or a "flagrantly or shamefully wrong or improper conduct."
Dishonesty or grave misconduct carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture
of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from re-employment in
the government service.
Venancio Inonog vs. Judge Francisco B. Ibay, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2175, July 28, 2009
Facts: The present administrative case stemmed from the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Venancio P. Inonog,
filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), charging Judge Francisco B. Ibay of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 135, Makati City with gross abuse of authority. The complaint involved an
incident in the Makati City Hall basement parking lot for which respondent judge cited complainant in
contempt of court because complainant parked his superiors vehicle at the parking space reserved for
respondent judge.
In his Comment, respondent judge explained that on March 18, 2005, he proceeded to the court at
around 7:00 a.m. to finalize the decision in Criminal Case Nos. 02-1320, 02-3046, 02-3168-69 and 03-
392-393, all entitled People v. Glenn Fernandez, et al., which were to be promulgated on the first hour of
the same day. Upon reaching his parking slot, he found complainants vehicle parked there. As a result,
he had a hard time looking for his own parking space. Hence, the promulgation of the decision was
delayed.
According to respondent judge, complainant knew that the parking slot was reserved for him because it
bore his name. He emphasized that prior to the incident, he already had his name indicated at the said
slot precisely because there had been previous occasions when other vehicles would occupy his parking
space and he had been forced to park at the public parking area. Respondent judge added that he
ordered the complainant to appear before him for the hearing but, complainant refused, thus, he declared
him in contempt of court. Respondent judge also averred that he neither took advantage nor exercised
arbitrarily the power of the court as in fact, complainant was given a chance to be represented by a
counsel of his own choice and was given an opportunity to explain his position which the latter seriously
considered.
Based on the Office of Court Administrations evaluation and recommendation, respondent not only
denied the complainants right to be heard but also convicted him in contempt of court based on a very
loose and flimsy reason.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of grave abuse of authority.
Held: Yes. The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA but deems it proper to impose a penalty
different from the OCAs recommendation.

The phrase "improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice," as provided in the Rules of Court, is so broad and general that it encompasses
wide spectrum of acts that could constitute indirect contempt. However, the act of complainant in parking
his car in a slot allegedly reserved for respondent judge does not fall under the said category. There was
no showing that he acted with malice and/or bad faith or that he was improperly motivated to delay the
proceedings of the court by making use of the parking slot supposedly reserved for respondent judge. We
cannot also say that the said act of complainant constitutes disrespect to the dignity of the court. In sum,
the incident is too flimsy and inconsequential to be the basis of an indirect contempt proceeding.
Considering that this is not the first time that respondent judge committed the same offense, the Court
already saw fit to impose upon him a fine in the amount of P40,000.00.
Lolita S. Regir vs. Joel T. Regir, A.M. No. P-06-2282, August 4, 2009
Facts: This is an administrative complaint filed by Lolita S. Regir against Joel T. Regir, Process Server,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Caibiran, Biliran, charging the latter with immorality.
This case was commenced by a Complaint filed by Lolita S. Regir with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA). Complainant alleges that, while being lawfully married to her, respondent carried on
an illicit relationship with another woman, Vilma Sabinay, with whom he begot a child. Complainant
further alleges that respondent now lives openly with Sabinay in Barangay Larrazabal, Naval, Biliran and
has stopped giving her and their children financial support. In his Comment, respondent dismisses these
allegations as purely the result of unfounded jealousy on the part of his wife.
An investigation was conducted by Judge Pepe P. Domael, RTC, Branch 37, Caibiran, Biliran. Thereafter,
an Investigation Report was submitted by the said Investigating Judge to the OCA.
Respondent, when asked to refute the allegations of complainant-wife and her witnesses denied all. In
fact, he doesnt even know who is this woman named Vilma Sabinay. Respondents son and witness,
Joely Regir, even mentioned the name of Vilma without her surname as the name of the woman she
heard when his father and mother had a quarrel. She is the woman whom he said his father is living with
in Naval.
As further stated by this witness, Joely Regir, while his father usually gives money consisting of his
salaries and other benefits received as a court employee, however, since the year 2001, he stopped
giving money but only gives rice, sugar and milk for the youngest child. His father also gives them (Joely
and Joel, Jr.) money for their studies in high school. They are residing in their grandparents house at
Calubian, Leyte.
Judge Domael also indicated his observation that the issue of immorality has not been refuted by the
respondent since his defense does not go beyond a mere complete and bare denial of the charge hurled
against him. The Investigating Judge also came to the conclusion that the witnesses against respondent
were not shown to have been motivated by improper motives. Thus, he recommended that a two (2)
months suspension without pay be imposed upon the respondent.
Issue: Whether or not respondent has committed acts which are considered disgraceful and immoral.
Held: Yes. We agree with the Investigating Judges finding of guilt. However, the recommended penalty
is lower than what the law requires and, therefore, should be modified.
A careful perusal of the evidence, consisting of the affidavits of witnesses, the Investigation Report, and
the transcripts of hearings, reveals that, for his defense, respondent merely denied the allegations of
immoral conduct against him. Without any other evidence, respondents bare denial necessary fails in
light of the positive testimony of complainant and her witnesses.

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The evidence presented is enough to hold respondent guilty of the charge of immorality or disgraceful
and immoral conduct. The acts imputed against respondent, a married man, consist of his cohabitation
with a woman other than his legal wife and there is a strong likelihood that respondent fathered a child
with the said woman. It is morally reprehensible for a married man or woman to maintain intimate
relations with a person other than his or her spouse. Moreover, immorality is not based alone on illicit
sexual intercourse. It is not confined to sexual matters, but includes conducts inconsistent with rectitude,
or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless
conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.
It is of no moment that respondents immoral acts were committed outside the confines of his work as an
employee of the judiciary. This Court has previously ruled that the conduct of all court personnel must be
free from any whiff of impropriety not only with respect to their duties in the judicial branch but also as to
their behavior outside the court as private individuals.
The exacting standards of ethics and morality upon court employees are required to maintain the peoples
faith in the courts as dispensers of justice, and whose image is mirrored by their actuations.
Heirs of the Late Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras vs. Judge Clifton U. Ganay, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Agoo, La Union, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2055, December 17, 2009
Facts: The instant administrative case stemmed from an unsigned letter-complaint filed by the heirs of
the late Reverend Father Jose O. Aspiras addressed to the Court Administrator, requesting that an
investigation be conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on the alleged abuse of
authority of respondent Judge Clifton U. Ganay, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Agoo,
La Union in connection with Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026, entitled "In the Matter of the
Guardianship of Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras."
In the letter, the heirs of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras stated that the judge in the above mentioned case has
been abusing his authority as observed by the Heirs of the late Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras as he previously
ordered to withdraw the amount of P50,000.00 in his favor from the bank account of the late Rev. Fr. Jose
O. Aspiras on December 17, 2004 for him to purchase law books. As per his order, he alleged that, In the
spirit of this Yuletide season and considering the efforts of the Judge of this Court, the guardians in the
above entitled case deemed it best to give him fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) worth of law books to
aid him in his work as a judge. The truth of the matter is that this has been the idea of Judge Ganay,
himself, and was never consented by the guardians.
There are still other orders issued by Judge Ganay ordering the bank to release certain amounts from the
bank account of the late Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras in his favor without the written consent of the
guardians..
The OCA conducted a surprise investigation and examination of the records of SP Case No. A-1026 from
August 30 to September 2, 2005. The investigating team selected pertinent documents relative to the
anonymous complaint in order to verify the irregularities allegedly committed by respondent Judge
Ganay.
From the documents gathered, the investigating team found that the Order dated December 17, 2004
was indeed issued by respondent Judge Ganay. For the money received from the said order, respondent
Judge Ganay even issued an Acknowledgement Receipt dated December 22, 2004. The team also
discovered that on several occasions, respondent Judge Ganay issued numerous orders directing the
manager of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Agoo, La Union Branch, to draw checks from the account
of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras amounting to several thousands of pesos in the name of the Officer-in-

Charge/Branch Clerk of Court Precilla Olympia P. Eslao (OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao) for the purpose of
purchasing cellular phone prepaid cards. The said cards were received by respondent Judge Ganay and
OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao as evidenced by acknowledgement receipts signed by them on several dates.
The investigating team also discovered two other orders issued by respondent Judge Ganay directing the
manager of PNB, Agoo, La Union Branch to draw from the account of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras checks in
the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) each for the purpose of purchasing three (3) cellular
phones. Thereafter, OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao submitted a Report on Expenses dated March 1, 2005
enumerating in detail how the money was spent for buying three (3) cellular phones.
In its Report , the OCA rejected the explanations of respondent Judge Ganay and found him guilty of
violating Sections 13 and 14 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge Ganays act of issuing Orders creates the impression of
impropriety or the appearance of impropriety.
Held: Yes. After a judicious review of the record of this administrative matter, we find that respondent
Judge Ganay has indeed violated Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, of Canon 4 of the New
Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. The aforesaid provisions on Propriety state:
SEC. 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor accept, any gift,
bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or
her in connection with the performance of judicial duties.
SEC. 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their influence,
direction or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything
done or to be done or omitted to be done in connection with their duties or functions.
SEC. 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges may receive a
token gift, award or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made provided that such
gift, award or benefit might not reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the judge in the
performance of judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of partiality.
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
Lower court judges, such as respondent Judge Ganay, play an important role in the promotion of the
people's faith in the judiciary. They are front-liners who give human face to the judicial branch at the
grassroots level in their interaction with litigants and those who do business with the courts. Thus, the
admonition that judges must avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety is more
sternly applied to them.
In Dulay v. Lelina, Jr., the Court held:
Although every office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. A magistrate of law must
comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most
searching scrutiny of the public. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary prescribes
that judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in
the view of a reasonable observer. Thus, judges are to avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all their activities. Likewise, they are mandated not to allow family, social or other
relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment, nor convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. The Code clearly prohibits judges or
members of their families from asking for or accepting, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to
anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in connection with the performance of
judicial duties.

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Respondent Judge Ganay clearly fell short of the exacting standards set by the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. His acts of receiving lawbooks worth fifty thousand pesos, cellular
phones and monthly cellular phone prepaid cards from the property guardians of the late Rev. Fr.
Aspiras, who was then the ward of the court, constitute impropriety which the Court cannot allow.
Respondent Judge Ganays act of issuing Orders directing the manager of the PNB, La Union Branch to
draw checks amounting to thousands of pesos from the account of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras and subjects
the court to suspicion of irregularities in the conduct of the proceedings.
This Court has always stressed that a judge should avoid impropriety and even the appearance of
impropriety in all activities, and that he should perform his duties honestly and with impartiality and
diligence. Also, a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. Since respondent Judge Ganay occupied an exalted position in the
administration of justice, he should pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him; and his official, as
well as his private conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety.
Mayor Hadji Amer R. Sampiano, Somer Abdullah, Salic Tampugao, Anthony Abi, Saga Pole Inog,
Tororac Domato, King Maronsing, Margarita Solaiman, Hadji Acmad Mamenting and Billie Jai
Laine T. Ogka vs. Judge Cader P. Indar, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 12,
Malabang, Lanao del Sur, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953, December 21, 2009
Facts: This administrative case against respondent Judge Cader P. Indar of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 12, Malabang, Lanao del Sur stemmed from a complaint filed by Hadji Amer R. Sampiano
(Sampiano), incumbent Mayor, and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, charging said judge with gross and wanton ignorance of the law, grave abuse
of authority, manifest partiality and serious acts of impropriety in connection with the issuance of an
Order.
Prior to the filing of the present administrative case, complainant Sampiano filed before the Commission
on Elections a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction/TRO against
his rival mayoralty candidate, his uncle Ogka, and the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Balabagan,
Lanao del Sur It appears that the Comelec issued the following: Order dated August 4, 2004 (authorizing
the vice-mayor to temporarily assume the duties and responsibilities as mayor due to the double
proclamation of Sampiano and Ogka for the position of mayor), Order dated August 12, 2004 (recalling
the Order authorizing the assumption of the vice-mayor as the mayor, and instead maintaining the status
quo prevailing at the time of the issuance of the said Order), and Order dated September 9,
2004 (clarifying the Order of August 12, 2004). Pursuant to the said Orders, Sampiano was ordered to
act, perform and discharge the duties, functions and responsibilities as mayor "to prevent paralysis to
public service" pending determination and final resolution of the controversy involving the mayorship of
the Municipality of Balabagan.
Aggrieved, Ogka filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the September 9, 2004 Order. He also
informed in writing, the Chief Legal Counsel of PNB, Atty. Alvin C. Go, and asked him not to release the
IRA (Internal Revenue Allotment, which is the share of the local government unit in national internal
revenue taxes) for the Municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur until the controversy involving the
mayorship of the said municipality now pending with the Comelec shall have been finally resolved.
However, on the basis of the Comelec Order dated September 9, 2004, Go directed PNB-Marawi to
release the July, August, and September 2004 IRA for the Municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur to
Sampiano and Macabato (the Municipal Treasurer). In turn, PNB-Marawi acting through its manager,
Disomangcop, released on September 14, 2004 the pending IRA for the months of July to September
2004. To temporarily suspend the release by the PNB-Marawi of the October 2004 IRA while his Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration of the September 9, 2004 Order of the Comelec is pending resolution, Ogka
filed on October 11, 2004, a special civil action for Prohibition and Injunction with TRO and Preliminary
Injunction, with the RTC, Branch 12, Malabang, Lanao del Sur presided over by herein respondent Judge.

On the same day, respondent Judge issued an Order setting the hearing of the petition. He likewise
directed, pending resolution of the said petition, the PNB-Marawi (represented by Disomangcop and Go)
to hold or defer the release of the IRA for the Municipality of Balabagan unless ordered otherwise by the
court.
Sampiano also alleged that during the October 14, 2004 hearing, his counsel clarified with respondent
Judge if the October 11, 2004 Order was in the nature of a TRO. Respondent Judge replied that it was
not. His counsel then vigorously prodded respondent Judge to immediately lift the said Order so as not to
deprive the officials and employees of the Municipality of Balabagan from receiving their hard earned
salaries, but respondent Judge did not heed the said request.
Because of the aforementioned order, which Sampiano considered as a "SUPER ORDER" because it
was not only issued ex-parte but also it directed the PNB-Marawi to hold or defer the release of the IRA
"until ordered otherwise by [the] court," the Sampiano filed a complaint against respondent Judge praying
that the latter be dismissed from judicial service for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority,
manifest partiality and serious acts of impropriety.
Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. required respondent Judge to file his comment and to
show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for violation of his professional
responsibility as a lawyer. In his Comment , respondent Judge denied the charges against him and
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
The OCA recommended that respondent Judge be penalized for ignorance of the law and violation of
Section 5 of Rule 58, Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Judges issuance of the subject Order constitutes ignorance of the law
and a violation of his professional responsibilities as a lawyer.
Held: We agree with the findings of the OCA that the October 11, 2004 Order is essentially a preliminary
injunction order, and that the respondent Judge failed to comply with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 58
of the Rules of Court.
A cursory reading of the said Order reveals that it was in effect a TRO or preliminary injunction order. The
Order directed PNBs Go and Disomangcop to hold or defer the release of the IRA to Sampiano and
Macabato while the petition is pending resolution of the trial court and unless ordered otherwise by the
court. This Order was merely consistent with the relief prayed for in respondents petition for prohibition
and injunction.
Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. No preliminary injunction
shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it
shall appear from the facts shown by the affidavits or by the verified application that great or
irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court
to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a temporary restraining
order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person
sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court
must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction
should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction
shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order (as amended by En Banc
Resolution of the Supreme Court, Bar Matter No. 803, dated February 17, 1998).
However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme
urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of

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a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary
restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately
comply with provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and the
documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the
judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether
the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction
can be heard. In no case shall the total period of the effectivity of the temporary restraining order
exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two (72) hours provided therein.
The above-quoted provisions expressly prohibit the grant of preliminary injunction without hearing and
prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. However, courts are authorized to issue ex parte
a TRO effective only for seventy-two (72) hours if it should appear from the facts shown by affidavits or by
the verified petition that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter could be
heard on notice. Within the aforesaid period of time, the Court should conduct a summary hearing to
determine if a TRO shall be issued. The TRO, however, shall be effective only for a period of twenty (20)
days from notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. During the 20-day period, the judge must
conduct a hearing to consider the propriety of issuing a preliminary injunction. At the end of such period,
the TRO automatically terminates without need of any judicial declaration to that effect, leaving the court
no discretion to extend the same.
Here, respondent Judge issued the October 11, 2004 Order on the very same day it was filed, and
without any hearing and prior notice to herein complainants. As discussed above, respondent was
allowed by the Rules to issue ex parte a TRO of limited effectivity and, in that time, conduct a hearing to
determine the propriety of extending the TRO or issuing a writ of preliminary injunction.
Emma B. Ramos vs. Apollo R. Ragot, Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Gingoog City, A.M.
No. P-09-2600, December 23 2009
Facts: Complainant Emma B. Ramos charged respondent Apollo R. Ragot, Sheriff III of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Gingoog City, with grave misconduct, neglect of duty and dishonesty in
connection with the implementation of the writ of execution in Criminal Case No. 2005-363.
Complainant alleged that she and her husband accompanied respondent sheriff to the residence of Mrs.
Kawaling, the receipient of the subject writ, in Butuan City. The Ramoses used their own vehicle and
spent for all the expenses for the trip.
In Butuan City, respondent sheriff was able to serve the writ on Mrs. Kawaling. After serving the writ and
talking with Mrs. Kawaling, respondent informed the couple that Mrs. Kawaling promised to pay her
obligations and the three of them traveled back to Gingoog City together. When they reached Gingoog
City, respondent allegedly asked for the amount of P1,000.00 from the complainant, who initially
questioned the sheriffs demand since she and her husband bore all the expenses of their trip to Butuan
City. When respondent told her that the payment was "the usual SOP," complainant paid the P1,000.00
which respondent acknowledged in a receipt. A week later, Mrs. Kawaling sent a check to the court in the
amount of P10,750.00 in partial payment of her obligation.
In the following months, complainant repeatedly followed up the full implementation of the writ of
execution with respondent since Mrs. Kawaling failed to make any further payments. However,
respondent purportedly kept telling complainant to just wait for Mrs. Kawaling to make voluntary
payments since levying Mrs. Kawalings real properties would take years.
Respondent sheriff allegedly asked complainant for P500.00 to be used for his trip to the Register of
Deeds in Butuan City so that he can levy whatever real property he can find in the name of Mrs.
Kawaling. Again, complainant paid and respondent issued a receipt for the said amount. After a few days,

respondent informed complainant that he had already made a levy with the Register of Deeds but he left
the file behind because the signatory was absent.
On February 1, 2007, respondent handed complainant a copy of what appeared to be a court-approved

Itemized Estimated Amount of Expenses dated October 6, 2006 in the amount of P4,100.00 but he
allegedly told her that there was no need to deposit the said amount in court. Instead, he told complainant
to just give him some amount for his trip back to Butuan City to follow-up the levy that he made with the
Register of Deeds. Complainant did not give the amount requested because respondent refused to issue
a receipt for the same.
By this time, complainant was beginning to feel that the sheriff was stonewalling or neglecting her case. In
a letter dated February 14, 2007, complainant, through counsel, requested the respondent to complete
the implementation of the writ of execution. Respondent replied to the aforementioned letter and
furnished complainant with a copy of Sheriffs Return of Service dated February 22, 2007, indicating
partial satisfaction of the writ of execution. Thereafter, no further action was made by the respondent
sheriff with regard to the writ. As of the time of the filing of the complaint, the amount of P33,000.00
purportedly remained unsatisfied.
Then Court Administrator Christopher Lock, made the necessary evaluation and recommended that
respondent sheriff be disciplined for non-compliance with the requirements in the implementation of the
writ of execution.
Issue: Whether or not respondent sheriff has violated the Rules of Court and is guilty of
grave misconduct, dereliction of duty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
Held: We concur with the OCAs finding. At the outset, we must reiterate that the conduct and behavior of
everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with a heavy
burden of responsibility, necessarily so if the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary are to be
maintained. This Court has repeatedly warned that by the very nature of their functions, sheriffs are under
obligation to perform the duties of their office honestly, faithfully and to the best of their ability, and must
conduct themselves with propriety and decorum, and above all else, be above suspicion.
In the implementation of writs or processes of the court for which expenses are to be incurred, sheriffs are
mandated to comply with Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-
SC, the pertinent portion of which reads:
Sec. 10. Sheriffs, process servers and other persons serving processes.
xxx
With regard to sheriffs expenses in executing writs issued pursuant to court orders or decisions
or safeguarding the property levied upon, attached or seized, including kilometrage for each
kilometer of travel, guards fees, warehousing and similar charges, the interested party shall pay
said expenses in an amount estimated by the sheriff, subject to the approval of the court. Upon
approval of said estimated expenses, the interested party shall deposit such amount with the
clerk of court and ex-officio sheriff, who shall disburse the same to the deputy sheriff assigned to
effect the process, subject to liquidation with the same period for rendering a return on the
process. THE LIQUIDATION SHALL BE APPROVED BY THE COURT. Any unspent amount
shall be refunded to the party making the deposit. A full report shall be submitted by the deputy
sheriff assigned with his return, and the sheriffs expenses shall be taxed as costs against the
judgment debtor.
In this case, respondent sheriff served the writ of execution on October 6, 2006 without presenting
complainant with a court approved estimate of expenses and without the required deposit from the

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complainant to the clerk of court. While the records reveal the existence of an approved Itemized
Estimated Amount of Expenses dated October 6, 2006, a copy of the same was only given to
complainant on February 1, 2007 which was almost four (4) months after the writ of execution was served
on the losing party.
Likewise in contravention of Rule 141, respondent directly received money from the complainant.
Respondents bare denial that he solicited the amount of P1,000.00 from the complainant on October 6,
2006 cannot be given credence for he had even signed a receipt for such amount.
Respondent sheriff should have followed the rules of procedure pertaining to the collection of the fees
and expenses to be incurred in the implementation of the writ of execution. No matter how insistent the
winning party is a sheriff should take no procedural shortcuts so as to avoid any misunderstanding and/or
dispel any suspicion against his integrity.
Another infraction committed by respondent sheriff was having failed to render periodic reports every
thirty (30) days from his receipt of the writ of execution in violation of Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
Sec. 14. Return of writ of execution. The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court issuing
it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be
satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court
and state the reason therefor. Such writ shall continue in effect during the period within which the
judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every thirty (30)
days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity
expires. The returns or the periodic report shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and
shall be filed with the court and copies thereof promptly furnished the parties.
In addition, a sheriff must make periodic reports on partially satisfied or wholly unsatisfied writs, in
order to apprise the court and the parties of the proceedings undertaken in connection with the
writs. The periodic reporting on the status of the writs must be done by the sheriff every thirty (30)
days regularly and consistently until they are returned fully satisfied.
It is undisputed that the most difficult phase of any proceeding is the execution of judgment. The officer
charged with this delicate task is the sheriff. The sheriff, as an officer of the court upon whom the
execution of a final judgment depends, must necessarily be circumspect and proper in his behavior.
Execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law. He is to execute the directives of the
court therein strictly in accordance with the letter thereof and without any deviation therefrom.
Walter J. Aragones vs. Hon. Hector B. Barillo, Municipal Trial Court, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental,
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1752, March 10, 2010
Facts: This is an administrative case, which arose from a Complaint filed by Walter J. Aragones, charging
Judge Barillo, then Acting Presiding Judge at the MTC of Guihulngan, Negros Oriental, with violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, manifest bias and partiality, gross ignorance of the law and abuse of
authority.
Complainant Aragones and Oscar C. Lasola vied for the position of Punong Barangay of Poblacion,
Guihulngan, Negros Oriental in the July 15, 2002 Barangay Elections. After the votes were canvassed
during the day of the elections, Aragones was proclaimed the winning candidate. Lasola duly filed an
election protest before the MTC of Guihulngan.
Judge Barillo issued an Order on July 29, 2002, which stated that there was a need for the revision of
ballots in consonance with Sections 12, 13, 15 and 16 of Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

The protestant was, thus, ordered to deposit in cash the amount of P150.00 for every ballot box for the
compensation of the revisors in an amount to be fixed by the MTC. Judge Barillo also created a Revision
Committee composed of the Provincial Election Officer of Negros Oriental, Atty. Rogelio S. Benjamin, as
Chairman, with the Protestant (Lasola) and/or his counsel, the Protestee (Aragones) and/or his counsel,
and the MTC Clerk of Court as members.
On July 31, 2002, the counsel of Aragones, Atty. Francisco D. Yap, filed an Entry of Appearance with
Motion to Disqualify Counsel for Protestant (Lasola) in Election Case No. 7-2002. Atty. Yap manifested
before the MTC that Lasolas counsel, Atty. Justo J. Paras, was suspended from the practice of law and
the latter has filed a Motion to Lift Suspension, which was yet to be acted upon. Pending a reinstatement,
Atty. Yap asserted that Atty. Paras was not legally permitted to appear as counsel in any court in the
Philippines.
On August 2, 2002, Judge Barillo issued an Order in Election Case No. 7-2002, setting the hearing on the
revision of official ballots. Likewise, the Order stated that:
In order not to delay the speedy administration of justice, Atty. Justo J. Paras (unless this court
has received copy of the Supreme Courts Resolution for his suspension or disbarment from the
practice of law), and/or his associates or any authorized counsel for Protestant Oscar C. Lasola
are directed to appear during the hearing on August 9, 2002 at 8:30 oclock in the morning and
until such time that this case is terminated.
Aragones filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders as well as an Urgent Motion
for Reconsideration of the Order dated August 2, 2002 which Judge Barillo resolved to deny.
Aragones insisted that Judge Barillo committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when: 1) he allowed a suspended lawyer to appear as counsel; and 2) he denied the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by Aragones without any hearing and immediately upon receipt thereof on the
same date.
The RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 64, through Judge Felix G. Gaudiel, Jr. stated that the Entry of
Appearance with Motion to Disqualify Counsel for Protestant (Lasola) filed by Atty. Yap was a motion that
was litigious; hence, it should have been heard and not denied outright. Furthermore, Judge Barillo was
directed to cease and desist from proceeding with the hearing of Election Case No. 7-2002 within a
period of 20 days from receipt of the order, given the perception of the RTC that the continuance of the
acts of Judge Barillo complained of would probably work injustice to Aragones. The RTC further
cautioned Judge Barillo that any proceeding or action taken by the lower court after the filing of the
Petition would be declared null and void.
On September 2, 2002, Judge Barillo filed a Comment/Answer in Special Civil Action No. 02-01-G,
wherein he outlined the proceedings undertaken in the MTC and once more pleaded the lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC over the Petition filed by Aragones.
On October 28, 2002, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 64, promulgated a Decision in Special Civil
Action No. 02-01-G, declaring the proceedings in the MTC null and void and reiterating that the RTC has
jurisdiction over Aragones petition. The RTC reiterated that the Entry of Appearance with Motion to
Disqualify Counsel for Protestant [Lasola] filed by Atty. Yap contained the requisite Notice of Hearing and
specified the date and time of the hearing, which was within ten days after the filing of the said motion.
Accordingly, Judge Barillo should not have denied the motion outright without giving the movant an
opportunity to be heard.
On November 25, 2002, presumably before he received a copy of the aforementioned RTC Decision,
Judge Barillo filed an Urgent Motion for Immediate Resolution of Special Civil Action No. 02-01-G
insisting on the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC.

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On November 27, 2002, the MTC of Guihulngan, through Judge Barillo, rendered a Decision in Election
Case No. 7-2002. On the matter of the jurisdiction of the RTC, Judge Barillo held that he Regional Trial
Court, Branch 64, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental has no jurisdiction to hear and decide said case involving
this barangay election case because the same is vested or conferred by law to the Municipal Trial Court
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 37 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. In the said decision, Judge Barillo
declared and proclaimed as the duly elected Punong Punong Barangay of Brgy. Poblacion the winning
candidate Oscar C. Lasola.
On December 16, 2002, Lasola filed a Motion for Execution of the MTC Decision dated November 27,
2002 in Election Case No. 7-2002, given the failure of Aragones to file an appeal thereof within five days
after the promulgation of the said Decision on December 9, 2002. In a Resolution dated December 16,
2002, the MTC, through Judge Barillo, declared that Aragones had not yet filed an appeal of the MTC
Decision seven days after the promulgation thereof. Judge Barillo, thus, ordered Lasola to assume and
take his oath of office as the duly elected Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental.
On December 17, 2002, the MTC Clerk of Court issued an Entry of Final Judgment certifying that the
MTC Decision dated November 27, 2002 in Election Case No. 7-2002 became final and executory on
December 16, 2002.
On January 8, 2003, Aragones filed a Complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),
charging Judge Barillo with violations of his constitutional rights, violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, manifest bias and partiality, gross ignorance of the law and abuse of authority. The Office of the
Court Administrator submitted its recommendation that this case be referred to Judge Ismael O. Baldado,
the Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC of Bais City, Negros Oriental, Branch 45, for investigation, report
and recommendation.
Judge Baldado found that there appeared to be haste in the manner in which Judge Barillo conducted the
proceedings in Election Case No. 7-2002; but the same could not be characterized as undue haste, as
there was no showing that Judge Barillos actuations were impelled by malice, bad faith, or manifest
partiality.
In its own Memorandum Report, the OCA found merit in the Complaint filed by Aragones. The OCA was
of the opinion that Judge Barillo should be held administratively liable for allowing Atty. Paras to represent
a party litigant before his sala, notwithstanding the absence of a Court order lifting the lawyers
suspension. The OCA also disregarded the excuse of Judge Barillo that he decided Election Case No. 7-
2002 after he received the RTC Decision in Special Election Case No. 02-01-G, , given that the existence
of said decision could not be found in the records of Election Case No. 7-2002. The OCA concluded that
Judge Barillo was guilty of trying to mislead the Court as to the existence of the two conflicting RTC
Decisions.
Issues:
1. Whether respondent Judge Barillo can be administratively faulted for having allowed Atty. Justo
Paras, a lawyer who was suspended to practice law by the Supreme Court, to appear as counsel for
the Lasola
2. Whether respondent Judge Barillo issued orders and rendered a decision in Election Protest No. 7-
2002 and issued execution order of his decision with undue haste and manifest bad faith and without
observing due process of law
3. Whether respondent Judge be administratively faulted for defying the decision of the higher court,
RTC, Branch 64

In its Memorandum Report filed with this Court, the OCA recommended that Judge Barillo be suspended
for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law.
Held: The Code of Judicial Conduct ordains that a judge should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence. Furthermore, a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently
to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of
criticism.
In the case at bar, the Court finds that Judge Barillos deportment fell below the level required of the
members of the bench.
To aggravate this mistake, there was no showing from Judge Barillo that he exerted any effort at all to
ascertain the correct rule or procedure regarding the lifting of suspension of lawyers, or to determine if the
suspension of Atty. Paras had indeed already been lifted before the said counsel was allowed to resume
his practice of law. Significantly, upon verification by the Court of the status of the suspension of Atty.
Paras, it appeared that, based on the records of the Office of the Bar Confidant, the suspension imposed
on Atty. Paras in A.C. No. 3066 was yet to be lifted. In our opinion, Judge Barillo was negligent in failing
to confirm such fact.
In connection with the two apparently conflicting Decisions of the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 64, in
Special Civil Action No. 02-01-G, the Court finds, at the outset, that the behavior of Judge Barillo thereon
was highly dissatisfactory.
The first RTC Decision purportedly dismissing the petition filed by Aragones could not be established to
be an authentic issuance from the RTC. The attitude of Judge Barillo towards the first RTC Decision was
both cavalier and careless. What is baffling in the above scenario is that Judge Barillo did not care to
question the dubious circumstances surrounding the first RTC Decision. With respect to the second RTC
Decision, which was in fact certified by the RTC Clerk of Court to be the authentic Decision in Special
Civil Action No. 02-01-G, Judge Barillo was equally dismissive. He merely brushed aside the same on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC over the petition filed by Aragones. The Court,
therefore, finds that Judge Barillo was at the very least decidedly lackadaisical in the management of the
affairs of his sala.
The above disquisition notwithstanding, the Court is not convinced that Judge Barillo should be held liable
for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law absent any evidence showing outright bad faith.
For administrative liability to attach it must be established that the respondent was moved by bad faith,
dishonesty, hatred or some other like motive. As defined
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of a sworn duty though some
motive or intent or ill-will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior
purposes. Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do
wrong or cause damage.
In the instant case, it may truly be said that the various faux pas committed by Judge Barillo are examples
of poor judgment and negligence. However, equally important to note is the fact that there is no
allegation, much less a genuine showing, that Judge Barillo was impelled by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred
or some other corrupt motive in committing the acts for which he was charged.

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Thus, contrary to the findings of the OCA, the transgressions committed by Judge Barillo in this case are
not flagrant enough or motivated by any ill motive so as to be classified as grave misconduct or to warrant
a finding of gross ignorance of the law.
Nevertheless, the Court rules that Judge Barillo is guilty of simple misconduct in view of the commission
of the above-enumerated acts, which subjected the MTC to distrust and accusations of partiality.
Cecilia Gadrinab Senarlo vs. Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga, RTC, Branch 38, Cagayan De Oro
City, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2025, April 5, 2010
Facts: Civil Case No. 2005-160, an action for reconveyance and quieting of title, was instituted by Lorna
Cabarrubias Bacalzo (Bacalzo) against the Archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church of Cagayan de Oro
City (the Archbishop) before the RTC, presided over by Judge Paderanga. Bacalzo was seeking to
recover a piece of land, measuring about 350 square meters, which her predecessor-in-interest had
previously donated to the Roman Catholic Church, since allegedly the said property was no longer being
devoted for the purpose it was donated. Considering that Bacalzo was already residing in the United
States of America (U.S.A.), she was represented by her granddaughter, Senarlo, in Civil Case No. 2005-
160.
Herein respondent referred the case to Judicial Mediation, as directed by the rules of Civil Procedure.
However, the date of the supposed hearing was declared as a non-working holiday in lieu of the
celebration of the feast of Ramadan. In view of the foregoing development, Bacalzo, who arrived from the
U.S.A., went with her counsel to the PMC on November 7, 2005, instead of November 4, 2005. Bacalzo
and her counsel signed on even date a Request for Resetting of Mediation Conference to November 15,
2005. The Request for Resetting was not signed by the Archbishop and his counsel, and written on the
lines allotted for their signatures was the phrase "failed to appear." The Request for Resetting was
approved by Mediator Atty. Zoilo Antonio G. Velez (Atty. Velez) and noted by Daily Supervisor Ariel V.
Lamco. Bacalzo and her counsel subsequently executed another undated Request for Resetting of
Mediation Conference to November 29, 2005. The second Request for Resetting, again unsigned by the
Archbishop and his counsel, who once more failed to appear for mediation, was likewise approved by
Atty. Velez.
Regardless of the resetting of the PMC mediation proceedings, Judge Paderanga issued on November 9,
2005 an Order, which read in part:
The mediator has reported that both parties failed to appear at the Philippine Mediation Center on
November 4, 2005, at 2:00 p.m. for the mediation conference.
For failure of the parties to obey the Order of the Court and to appear at the mediation conference
on November 4, 2005 at 2:00 p.m., the plaintiff is declared non-suited and this case is hereby
ordered DISMISSED.
Issue: Whether Judge Paderanga is liable for grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law in
issuing the Order dated November 9, 2005 which declared Bacalzo non-suited and dismissed Civil Case
No. 2005-160.
Held: Judge Paderanga is guilty of simple misconduct.
A. GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW
To the eyes of this Court, Judge Paderanga is not guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure. To
be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be shown to have committed an error that
was "gross or patent, deliberate or malicious." Also administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law is
a judge who shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption ignored,

contradicted or failed to apply settled law and jurisprudence. Such is not the case presently before this
Court.
B. MISCONDUCT
Judge Paderanga cannot entirely put the blame on the supposedly misleading Mediators Report. As the
Court notes, the RTC had already received on November 8, 2005 the Mediators Report, which stated
that the parties failed to attend the November 4, 2005 mediation conference. Judge Paderanga issued the
assailed Order dismissing Civil Case No. 2005-160 the following day, on November 9, 2005, a mere five
days after November 4, 2005. Judge Paderanga could not have forgotten so soon that November 4, 2005
was a holiday. Moreover, the same Mediators Report requested for the resetting of the mediation
conference to November 21, 2005. Judge Paderanga could have easily inquired with the PMC or required
them to explain the reason for the resetting. Yet, Judge Paderanga no longer bothered to look into the
reason for the non-appearance of the parties or the basis for the request of the mediator for resetting.
Without providing any reasons therefor, Judge Paderanga chose to ignore the request for resetting and
immediately ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2005-160. His action is contrary to the policy that the
judge referring the case to mediation should extend to the mediator every possible support and
assistance. Courts and litigants should give the mediation process a fair chance to work in order for
mediation to become an effective tool in facilitating amicable settlement of cases.
A heavy workload does not excuse Judge Paderanga from ascertaining all pertinent facts that would have
enabled him to justly resolve or decide a case. A judge must not sacrifice the orderly administration of
justice in favor of a speedy but reckless disposition of a case. A prudent judge should have ascertained
the facts before reaching conclusions and issuing orders. It is routinary in every case that the judge
carefully evaluates facts before issuing an order in court. Otherwise, the judge may be held liable for
culpable negligence.
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, which pertains to the Discipline of
Justices and Judges, does not provide any penalty for simple negligence. The Court, though, deems
simple negligence as falling within the ambit of simple misconduct.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of action; more particularly, it is an

unlawful behavior by the public officer. 19 Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation
of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government official. To constitute an
administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official
functions and duties of a public officer.
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, simple misconduct is
considered a less serious offense, sanctioned with suspension without pay for not less than one month
but not more than three months, or a fine of not less than Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) but not
exceeding Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
Re: Cases Submitted for Decision Before Hon. Teresito A. Andoy, former Judge, Municipal Trial
Court, Cainta, Rizal, A.M. No. 09-9-163-MTC, May 6, 2010
Facts: Judge Andoy compulsorily retired on October 3, 2008. In a Letter dated August 24, 2009, he
requested the approval of his retirement papers and that, if needed, a certain amount be deducted from
his retirement benefits. He asked for the payment of his earned vacation/sick leaves, as well as the
release of his withheld September 2008 Special Allowance for the Judiciary (SAJ) allowance, loyalty
award checks, and all other allowances to which he was entitled prior to his retirement. Per the
computation of the Fiscal Management Office of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Judge
Andoy had earned vacation/sick leaves amounting to P966,162.86, SAJ allowance totaling P24,845.10,
and a loyalty award check for the amount of P3,500.00. Judge Andoy also admitted having unaccounted
property accountabilities in the amount of P16,284.20 and a pending administrative case (MTJ-09-1738),
but expressed his willingness to pay for whatever penalty would be imposed upon him by means of

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deduction from his retirement benefits. In the end, Judge Andoy prayed that a clearance be issued with
respect to the monetary value of his accumulated leave credits so that the release of his retirement
benefits may already be processed.
Issue: Whether Judge Andoy is guilty of gross inefficiency.
Held: Yes. Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide a
case within the reglementary period of 90 days. The Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon
3 likewise enunciates that judges should administer justice without delay and directs every judge to
dispose of the courts business promptly within the period prescribed by law. Rules prescribing the time
within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and
speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the 90-day period is mandatory.
Judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Any delay, no matter how short, in the disposition of
cases undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary. It also deprives the parties of their
right to the speedy disposition of their cases.
The Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously
under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge should decide cases
with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions for delay
in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to decide a case within the reglementary period is not
excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on the
defaulting judge.
The inefficiency of Judge Andoy is evident in his failure to decide 139 cases within the mandatory
reglementary period for no apparent reason. Some of these cases have been submitted for resolution as
early as 1997. Judge Andoy, upon finding himself unable to comply with the 90-day period, could have
asked the Court for a reasonable period of extension to dispose of the cases. The Court, mindful of the
heavy caseload of judges, generally grants such requests for extension. Yet, Judge Andoy also failed to
make such a request.
Olivia Laurel vs. Judge Pablo B. Francisco, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1992, July 6, 2010, J. Leonardo-De
Castro
Facts: As the acting Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 24 of Bian, Laguna, Judge Francisco issued an
Order dated July 14, 1998 holding Javier, Laurel, Ramos, and Pros. Nofuente guilty of Direct Contempt,
for supposedly disrupting the court proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. B-2433 held on July 14, 1998, and
sentencing them to nine days imprisonment at the Bian Municipal Jail.
Pros. Nofuente narrated that around 10:00 a.m. on said date, he was with Zenaida Manansala
(Manansala), a complainant in one of the cases he was handling at the RTC-Branch 25 of Bian, Laguna,
to request Process Server Sevilla to subpoena the next witness in Manansalas case. Pros. Nofuente
maintained that his voice was in the ordinary conversational volume which could not have disrupted the
court proceedings, if there was any at all. He was just one or two meters away from the courtroom and, at
that time, Judge Francisco was not wearing his robe and was seated at the lawyers table. Pros. Nofuente
denied he was conversing with Laurel and Ramos for the latter two were inside the staff room, busily
doing their assigned tasks. They were all within the sight of Judge Francisco, but they were not aware
that Judge Francisco was already throwing dagger looks at them. When Pros. Nofuente left, Judge
Francisco shouted "Mga tarantado kayo." Three days after the incident, Judge Francisco released the
Order declaring, not only Laurel, Ramos, and Pros. Nofuente, but also Javier, guilty of Direct Contempt.
Laurel and Ramos also denied that they disrupted the court proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. B-2433 on July
14, 1998. Both of them could not remember talking to each other or to anybody or making noise at that

time. Judge Francisco did not call their attention for the supposed disruption although his sala was just
one or two meters away from their office.
Javier, for her part, argued that she was cited of direct contempt in absencia. She was not within the court
premises at 10:00 a.m. of July 14, 1998, as she was in Landbank, Calamba, Laguna to encash her check.
She presented her Daily Time Record (DTR) for the month of July, showing that on July 14, 1998, she
reported for work only for half a day, particularly, from 1:00 to 5:00 p.m. Javier also asserted that she had
not even once disrupted court proceedings by boisterous conversation or laughter or by making any noise
within the court premises.
In his Answer, Judge Francisco explained that his Direct Contempt Order was not the result of a single
disrespectful act, but the culmination of a series of discourteous acts of Javier, Laurel, Ramos, and Pros.
Nofuente, which impeded the administration of justice, particularly, causing the disruption of the court
proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. B-2433 on July 14, 1998.
Issue: Whether respondent is guilty of abuse of authority.

Held: Yes. It is well settled that the power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all courts
to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the orderly administration of justice. However,
judges are enjoined to exercise the power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the
end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and not for
retaliation or vindictiveness. It bears stressing that the power to declare for contempt must be exercised
on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment.
This was aptly expressed in the case of Nazareno v. Barnes:
A judge, as a public servant, should not be so thin-skinned or sensitive as to feel hurt or offended if a
citizen expresses an honest opinion about him which may not altogether be flattering to him. After all,
what matters is that a judge performs his duties in accordance with the dictates of his conscience and the
light that God has given him. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice,
passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties. He should always bear in mind that the power of
the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal, because that
power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.
Nevertheless, we find that in issuing the Direct Contempt Order without legal basis, Judge Francisco is
more appropriately guilty of the administrative offense of grave abuse of authority, rather than gross
ignorance of the law and incompetence. In point is the case of Panaligan v. Ibay, where Judge Francisco
Ibay improperly cited John Panaligan for contempt. We ruled:
The integrity of the judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice but also upon
the perception and confidence of the community that the people who run the system have done justice.
The assumption of office by a judge places upon him duties and restrictions peculiar to his exalted
position. He is the visible representation of law and justice. He must be perceived, not as a repository of
arbitrary power, but as one who dispenses justice under the sanction of the rule of law. The behavior and
conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely
be done but must also be seen to be done. In the present case, respondent Judge may not have been
urged by ulterior motives in citing complainant in contempt and in subsequently sending him to jail for
putting off the lights in the 12th floor including his sala; nevertheless, his actuation can easily be
perceived as being a repository of arbitrary power. His actuation must never serve to fuel suspicion over a
misuse of the prestige of his office to enhance his personal interest.
We cannot simply shrug off respondent Judges failure to exercise that degree of care and temperance
required of a judge in the correct and prompt administration of justice; more so in this case where the
exercise of the power of contempt resulted in complainants detention and deprivation of liberty.
Respondent Judges conduct amounts to grave abuse of authority.
We have repeatedly reminded members of the judiciary to be irreproachable in conduct and to be free

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from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official
duties, but also in their daily life. For no position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. The imperative and sacred duty of each and
everyone in the judiciary is to maintain its good name and standing as a temple of justice. The Court
condemns and would never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in
the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability or tend to diminish the
faith of the people in the judiciary, like in the case at bar.
Atty. Jose A. Bernas vs. Judge Julia A. Reyes, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 69, Pasig City,
A.M. No. MTJ-09-1728, July 21, 2010
Facts: Complainant was the counsel for Oakridge Properties, Inc. (Oakridge) in an eviction suit 2 filed by
the latter against Atty. Joseph M. Alejandro, a tenant in one of its condominium units, who had refused to
pay rentals and common expenses since August 15, 2001. For his part, Atty. Alejandro explained that his
failure to pay rentals was justified since the air-conditioning unit, which Oakridge provided in the leased
premises, was allegedly defective.
On June 1, 2004, and during the pendency of the eviction suit, Oakridge padlocked the leased premises,
alleging that it was authorized to do so by the terms and conditions of the Contract of Lease. Atty.
Alejandro then filed a Petition for Writ of Preliminary Injunction with prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) to have the unit reopened. This was heard on June 11, 2004. At the hearing, respondent
Judge granted the TRO and ordered Oakridge to reopen the leased premises and to padlock it only if the
proper bond was not posted on or before June 18, 2004. She also set the pre-trial or preliminary
conference hearing on June 22, 2004.
On June 18, 2004, respondent Judge issued a TRO and again on August 16, 2004. Less than 48 hours
thereafter, and without waiting for the explanations from Oakridge, respondent Judge rendered a Decision
dated August 17, 2004, which effectively disposed of the matter covered by the show cause order, as well
as the merits of the case itself, notwithstanding the fact that there was still a pre-scheduled hearing on
September 21, 2004 and several motions pending action from respondent Judge.
Issue: Whether respondent Judge guilty of manifest bias, partiality, and grave abuse of authority.
Held: Yes. After a close scrutiny of all the foregoing circumstances, the Court cannot conclude that
respondent Judge was guilty of such misapplication of elementary court rules and procedure as to
constitute gross ignorance of the law. However, the same circumstances, taken together and measured
against the high ethical standards set for members of the Judiciary, are clear indicators of manifest bias
and partiality as well as grave abuse of authority on the part of respondent Judge. Indubitably, the
unseemly haste with which respondent Judge issued the August 17, 2004 Decision without waiting for
complainants explanation to her August 16, 2004 show-cause order plainly prejudiced complainant and
favored the other party.
Established is the norm that judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial. Judges
must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free from any
suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.
Thus, in the case of Wingarts v. Mejia, this Court ruled:
A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence and should
administer justice impartially and without delay. He should be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence, dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods.
This reminder applies even more to lower court judges like herein respondent because they are judicial

front-liners who have direct contact with litigants. A review of past decisions shows a wide range of
penalty for cases of similar nature. These include reprimand, fine, suspension, and even dismissal. In
assessing the proper penalty against respondent Judge, her deliberate omission to heed the Courts
directive to answer or to comment on the complaints against her may likewise be factored in.
As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties
renders him liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his official
capacity do not always constitute misconduct although said acts may be erroneous. It is true that a judge
may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error was made with a conscious and
deliberate intent to cause an injustice. This does not mean, however, that a judge need not observe
propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his official functions. Indeed, all members of
the Bench are enjoined to behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
Bernardo, Jr. vs. Judge Peter M. Montojo, Municipal Trial Court, Romblon, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1754,
October 20, 2010
Facts: Bernardo is one of the accused in People of the Philippines v. Narciso Bernardo, et al., for
violation of Sections 86, 89, 90, and 104 of Republic Act No. 8550, otherwise known as "The Philippine
Fisheries Code of 1998." He is also a member of the Kooperatiba sa Ikauunlad ng Mga Maliit na
Mangingisda ng Romblon (Kammaro), a cooperative which filed Civil Case No. 490, entitled KAMMARO
(Kooperatiba sa Ikauunlad ng Mga Maliit na Mangingisda ng Romblon), Eddie Cajilig, et al. v. Perpetuo
Ylagan, et al., for damages. All these cases had been pending before respondent Judge Montojos sala.
Bernardo alleged that he was supposed to be arraigned during the hearing of Criminal Case Nos. 4173-
4176 on August 16, 2007, but he did not have any counsel to represent him. Although complainant
Bernardo wanted to wait for a lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), respondent Judge Montojo
wanted to proceed with his arraignment, intimating that he could be represented by Atty. Karen Silverio
Buffe (Atty. Buffe), the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Branch 81. However, when
complainant Bernardo talked to Atty. Buffe after the hearing, the latter said that she was proscribed from
representing any party in a case, even for purposes of arraignment only. Subsequently, complainant
Bernardo discovered that the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) for the August 16, 2007 hearing only
quoted respondent Judge Montojo as saying that, the court will assign a counsel de oficio for you if you
cannot secure the services of a private lawyer." Mrs. Carmen R. Faigao, the stenographer who prepared
the TSN, explained to complainant Bernardo that Judge Montojos utterance about Atty. Buffe acting as
complainant Bernardos counsel for the arraignment was made off the record. Complainant Bernardo
requested that the TSN of August 16, 2007 be amended to faithfully reflect what Judge Montojo said
during the hearing and that the voice tape record of said hearing be produced as basis for the TSN.
Bernardo called attention to a similar delay in Civil Case No. 490. Judge Montojos last action in said civil
case was in November 2007, when he conducted a hearing on therein defendants Motion to Dismiss.
Issue: Whether respondent Judge guilty of undue delay
Held: Yes. Canons 2, 6 and 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, provide, respectively, that the
"administration [of justice] should be speedy and careful"; that judges "should be prompt in disposing of
all matters submitted to [them], remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied;" and that in the
discharge of his judicial duties, a judge "should be conscientious x x x [and] thorough x x x." Moreover,
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct expressly directs that a judge should dispose of the
courts business "promptly and decide cases within the required periods."
The Court cannot overstress the policy on prompt disposition or resolution of cases. Delay in case
disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judiciary and the lowering
6
of its standards. Needless to say, any delay in the determination or resolution of a case, no matter how
insignificant the case may seem to a judge, is, at bottom, delay in the administration of justice in general.
The suffering endured by just one person whether plaintiff, defendant or accused while awaiting a

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judgment that may affect his life, honor, liberty or property, taints the entire judiciarys performance in its
solemn task of administering justice. Inefficient, indolent or neglectful judges are as equally impermissible
in the judiciary as the incompetent and dishonest ones. Any of them tarnishes the image of the judiciary
or brings it to public contempt, dishonor or disrespect and must then be administratively dealt with or
criminally prosecuted, if warranted, and punished accordingly.
Verily, respondent Judge Montojo is guilty of unjustified delay in resolving Criminal Case Nos. 4173-4176
and Civil Case No. 490. A proportionate penalty must be imposed upon him for conduct violative of the
Code of Judicial Conduct to which he is bound as a judge.
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated 11 September 2001,
undue delay in rendering a decision or order is categorized as a less serious charge with the following
sanctions: (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more
than three months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Atty. Norlinda R. Amante-Descallar vs. Hon. Reinerio (Abraham) B. Ramas, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2015,
December 15, 2010
Facts: This case stemmed from Administrative Case No. 05-222-P instituted by Judge Reinerio
(Abraham) B. Ramas (Judge Ramas) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 (RTC-Branch 18) of
Pagadian City, Zamboanga del Sur, against Atty. Norlinda R. Amante-Descallar (Atty. Descallar), Clerk of
Court of the same court, for Grave Misconduct. Atty. Descallar allegedly showed the unopened ballot
boxes inside Judge Ramas chambers to a certain Allan Singedas (Singedas). The ballot boxes were in
Judge Ramas custody in relation to Election Protest Case No. 0001-2K4 pending before his court.
Issue: Whether respondent Judge is guilty of untruthful statements in his Certificate of Service.
Held: Yes. Judge Ramas is presumed to be aware of his duties and responsibilities under the Code of
Judicial Conduct. Canon 3 generally mandates that a judge should perform official duties honestly, and
with impartiality and diligence. Rule 3.01 requires that a judge be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence, while Rule 3.09 commands a judge to observe high standards of public service
and fidelity at all times. Judge Ramas irrefragably failed to observe these standards by making untruthful
statements in his Certificates of Service to cover up his absences.
The Court has previously held that a judges submission of false certificates of service seriously
undermines and reflects on the honesty and integrity expected of an officer of the court. This is so
because a certificate of service is not merely a means to one's paycheck but is an instrument by which
the Court can fulfill the constitutional mandate of the people ' s right to a speedy disposition of cases.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Ma. Ellen M. Aguilar, Regional Trial Court, Branch 70,
Burgos, Pangasinan, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2087, June 7, 2011
Facts: Sometime on July 2, 1998, while Atty. Aguilar was still the Legal Officer of Olongapo City,
mortgagor Lourdes Sison and mortgagee Angelina Cuevas came to her office together, asking her to
notarize a prepared real estate mortgage contract. The document showed that it was a security for a loan
of P120, 000.00. Atty. Aguilar acceded. Later, Sison and Cuevas returned with a different document. It
was obviously the same real estate mortgage contract between the parties but the amount of the loan
was now raised to P140, 000.00. The parties explained that this is the real agreement between them.
Atty. Aguilar notarized it in replacement of the previous document, deeming the first cancelled. Hence, the
second document carried the same entries like document number, book number and the like as the first
document. Either by oversight or inattentiveness, the secretary of Atty. Aguilar put the two documents
together.

Sometime in 2002, Arnel Sison, the son of mortgagor Lourdes Sison, discovered the existence of the two
documents with different amounts but one notarial document number. Furious, he went to see then Atty.
Aguilar. She explained to him the circumstances under which both documents were notarized.
Unappeased, Arnel Sison filed complaints for Falsification of Public Document, Perjury and Estafa against
Atty. Aguilar and Angelina Cuevas before (1) the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor of Bataan AND
(2) the Office of the Ombudsman.
Issue: Whether respondent Judge is guilty of dishonesty.
Held: Yes. While dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal even at the first
instance, jurisprudence is replete with cases where the Court lowered the penalty of dismissal to
suspension taking into account the presence of mitigating circumstances such as length of service in the
government and being a first time offender.
Since respondent has been in the service for fourteen (14) years and since this is her first offense during
employment in the judiciary, the Court deems it proper to impose the penalty of suspension for six (6)
months without pay.
Drawing on the same compassion displayed by the Court in several cases, the Court should take into
consideration the following mitigating circumstances existent in the case at bar:
a) The criminal complaint for falsification, perjury and estafa against Judge Aguilar was dismissed
by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for lack of probable cause. The administrative case
against Judge Aguilar was already decided by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon,
suspending Judge Aguilar for one month (later modified to a fine equivalent to one month salary
by reason of her voluntary retirement from office) for misconduct but not for dishonesty. Both the
dismissed criminal complaint and decided administrative case against Judge Aguilar concern her
notarization of private documents that bore no relation to the performance of her functions as City
Legal Officer;
b) Judge Aguilar appeared to have believed that she was authorized to notarize said private
documents as part of her duties as City Legal Officer, and she neither charged any fee nor
received any consideration therefor;
c) Setting aside for the moment her previous administrative case, Judge Aguilar had otherwise
strong credentials for her appointment as a judge;
d) Judge Aguilar has rendered more than 20 years of government service;
e) This is Judge Aguilars first and only administrative charge in the Judiciary for which she was
found guilty; and
f) Judge Aguilar readily acknowledged her offense, apologized, and promised to be more
circumspect and accurate in her future submissions.
Judge Aguilars case should be distinguished from our previous rulings in Office of the Court
Administrator v. Judge Estacion, Jr., Gutierrez v. Belan and Re: Non-Disclosure before the Judicial and
Bar Council of the Administrative Case Filed Against Judge Jaime V. Quitain (the last two cited in the
report of Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores). In Estacion, the respondent judge failed to disclose his
pending criminal cases for homicide and attempted homicide when he applied to the Judiciary; while in
Belan, the respondent judge failed to previously disclose a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries. In Quitain, the previous administrative case which the respondent
judge failed to disclose upon his application for judgeship was one for grave misconduct for which he was
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of benefits prior to his application to the Judiciary. The
seriousness of the case or cases which respondent judges failed to disclose in their PDS or applications
for judgeship, and the absence of mitigating circumstances, sufficiently differentiate Estacion, Belan, and
Quitain, from the one at bar.

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Atty. Facundo T. Bautista vs. Judge Blas O. Causapin, Jr., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 32, Guimba, Nueva Ecija, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2044, June 22, 2011
Facts: A case of partition was raffled on to the respondents sala. Defendants of the said case failed to
file an answer in time, and instead filed a motion for extension to which the respondent judge granted. A
motion to declare the defendant in default was then made by the petitioner, thru its counsel, Atty.
Bautista. In the Resolution of Motion to Hold Defendants in Default dated September 18, 2006, Judge
Causapin dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the ground that plaintiffs Reynaldo Mesina and
Nancy Polangco did not sign the verification and certification on non-forum shopping attached to the
complaint, in violation of Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. He cited the ruling in Loquias v. Office of
the Ombudsman, that "where there are two or more plaintiffs or petitioners, a complaint or petition signed
by only one of them is defective, unless he was authorized by his co-parties to represent them and to sign
the certification." Judge Causapin observed further that compulsory parties plaintiffs heirs of Baudelio T.
Bautista and Aurora T. Bautista, represented by Delia R. Bautista and Reynaldo Mesina, respectively
were not properly named in the complaint, in violation of Rule 3, Sections 2, 3, and 7 of the Rules of
Court. Hence, Judge Causapin held in the end that defendants could not be declared in default for not
answering a defective complaint, which in law does not exist.
Atty. Bautista, the plaintiffs counsel, questioned Judge Causapins impartiality considering that (1) Judge
Causapin was seen having a drinking spree with Jose T. Bautista, one of the defendants in Civil Case No.
1387-G, as attested to by Delia Ronquillo in an Affidavit dated October 16, 2006; and (2) Judge Causapin
and Jose Bautista, the other defendant in Civil Case No. 1387-G, are both active members of the
Masonic Organization and drink together regularly.
Lastly, Atty. Bautista charged Judge Causapin with gross misconduct. Atty. Bautista alleged that he was
categorically requested by Judge Causapin to withdraw the motion to declare defendants in default since,
as assured by said Judge, the plaintiffs civil case for partition was already strong and there was no
chance of plaintiffs losing the case. Likewise constituting gross misconduct was the granting by Judge
Causapin of defendants many motions for extension of time to file answer on the very same day said
motions were filed. A written motion without a Notice of Hearing was a mere scrap of paper.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty and gross misconduct.
Held: Yes. Atty. Bautista also charges Judge Causapin with gross misconduct, alleging that said judge
had been having drinking sprees with the defendants in Civil Case No. 1387-G, and categorically
requested Atty. Bautista to withdraw plaintiffs motion to declare defendants in default in Civil Case No.
1387-G.
As the OCA pointed out, Judge Causapin failed to deny Atty. Bautistas allegations; and the Court deems
Judge Causapins silence as admission of the same. Judge Causapin could have easily denied the
allegations and adduced proof to rebut the same, but he chose to sidestep said issue by being silent,
notwithstanding that these constitute one of the principal charges against him.
Judge Causapins drinking sprees with the defendants and request for Atty. Bautista to withdraw plaintiffs
motion to declare defendants in default are evidently improper. These render suspect his impartiality. A
judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary. The conduct of a judge must be free from any whiff of impropriety not only with respect to the
performance of his judicial duties but also to his behavior outside his sala and even as a private
individual.

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Antonio T. Reyes, G.R. No. 170512, October 5, 2011
Facts: On January 11, 2001, Jaime B. Acero executed an affidavit against herein respondent Antonio
Reyes and Angelito Pealoza, who were the Transportation Regulation Officer II/Acting Officer-in-Charge
and Clerk III, respectively, of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) District Office in Mambajao, Camiguin.
Acero alleged that he had supposed to pay P 1,000.00 to which he received a change of P 320.00. He
was however, given a receipt with the amount of P 180.00, which serves as his temporary license of 60
days. Respondent vehemently denied said allegations. In his counter-affidavit, Reyes claimed that
Aceros complaint was a "blatant distortion of the truth and a mere fabrication of the complainant." Reyes
asserted that a perusal of the affidavit-complaint revealed that the only imputation against him was that
Pealoza allegedly told Acero to pay P680.00 in his (Reyes) presence. The affidavit revealed that it was
Pealoza who processed the application of Acero; the money was allegedly given to Pealoza and it was
he who handed the change back to Acero; and he had no participation and was not present when the
money changed hands. Reyes stated that when he conducted an informal investigation on the complaint,
Pealoza admitted to having pocketed the extra P500.00. Reyes allegedly reprimanded Pealoza and
ordered the latter to return the money to Acero. Based on the receipt submitted by Acero, the same
proved that as far as the LTO and Reyes were concerned, what the office received was only P180.00.
Reyes contended that he did not ask or receive money from Acero and it was Pealoza who pocketed the
P500.00.
Issue: Whether Reyes is guilty of serious misconduct.
Held: In Salazar v. Barriga, the Court characterized the administrative offenses of misconduct and grave
misconduct as follows:
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected
with the performance of official functions and duties of a public officer.
In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest. Corruption as an element of
grave misconduct consists in the act of an official who unlawfully or wrongfully uses his station or
character to procure some benefit for himself, contrary to the rights of others.
Here, petitioner adjudged Reyes guilty of grave misconduct after finding that Reyes, being then the Head
of Office of the LTO in Mambajao, Camiguin, illegally exacted money from Acero in exchange for the
issuance of a drivers license to the latter, notwithstanding that Acero did not pass the requisite written
examination therefor.
In assailing the judgment of the Court of Appeals, petitioner avers that the findings of fact of the Office of
the Ombudsman are entitled to great weight and must be accorded full respect and credit as long as they
are supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner argues that it is not the task of the appellate court to
weigh once more the evidence submitted before an administrative body and to substitute its own
judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence.
Indeed, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 mandates that the findings of fact by the Office of the
Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. In administrative and quasi-judicial
proceedings, only substantial evidence is necessary to establish the case for or against a party.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of relevant evidence that
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally
reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.
Dadulo v. Court of Appeals reiterates that in reviewing administrative decisions, it is beyond the province
of this Court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise

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substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence.
However, while it is not the function of the Court to analyze and weigh the parties' evidence all over again,
an exception thereto lies as when there is serious ground to believe that a possible miscarriage of justice
would thereby result.
After carefully perusing the records of this case, we find that the above-cited exception, rather than the
general rule, applies herein. Otherwise stated, the Court deems it proper that a review of the case should
be made in order to arrive at a just resolution.
Falsification of Daily Time Records of Ma. Emcisa A. Benedictos, Administrative Officer I,

Regional Trial Court, Malolos City, Bulacan, A.M. No. P-10-2784, October 19, 2011
Facts: The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) sent a telegram1 dated November 5, 2004 requesting
Executive Judge Guillermo Agloro of the RTC, OCC, Malolos City, Bulacan, to instruct Benedictos to
submit her DTRs/bundy cards for September and October 2004 within five days, otherwise, the OCA
would recommend the withholding of Benedictoss salaries.
Benedictos submitted her bundy cards for August, October, and November 2004, which the OCA referred
to Atty. Emmanuel L. Ortega (Atty. Ortega), Clerk of Court VII, RTC, Malolos City, Bulacan, for verification
of his signatures appearing thereon. In a letter2 dated January 13, 2005 to the OCA, Atty. Ortega reported
that only his signature on Benedictoss bundy card for November 2004 was true and genuine; and he
disowned his purported signatures on Benedictoss bundy cards for August and October 2004.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of dishonesty and falsification.
Held: Yes. Benedictoss silence on a principal charge against her is admission, especially considering
that she was given ample opportunity to deny the same. Benedictoss refusal to face the charges against
her head-on is contrary to the principle in criminal law that the first impulse of an innocent person, when
accused of wrongdoing, is to express his or her innocence at the first opportune time. Moreover, as a
result of its own analytical study of the evidence on record, the Court is convinced that Atty. Ortegas
signatures appearing on Benedictoss bundy cards for August and October 2004 were indeed forged. The
marked differences between Atty. Ortegas purported signatures on Benedictoss bundy cards for August
and October 2004, on one hand, and Atty. Ortegas admitted genuine signatures on Benedictoss bundy
cards for September and November 2004, on the other, are easily discernible even to the naked eye.
In determining the appropriate penalty, the Court deems Benedictoss falsification of her bundy cards
tantamount to dishonesty. This Court has defined dishonesty as the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray." Dishonesty, being in the
nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in
government service.
However, in several administrative cases, the Court refrained from imposing the actual penalties in the
presence of mitigating factors. There were several cases, particularly involving dishonesty, in which the
Court meted a penalty lower than dismissal because of the existence of mitigating circumstances.
The compassion extended by the Court in the aforementioned cases was not without legal basis. Section
53, Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, grants the
disciplining authority the discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the proper
penalty.
In the case at bar, this is Benedictoss first administrative case in her 19 years in government service, for
which six months suspension is already sufficient penalty.

Additionally, the Court bears in mind Benedictoss failure to submit her comment, which constitutes clear
and willful disrespect, not just for the OCA, but also for the Court, which exercises direct administrative
supervision over trial court officers and employees through the former. In fact, it can be said that
Benedictoss non-compliance with the OCA directives is tantamount to insubordination to the Court itself.
Benedictos also directly demonstrated her disrespect to the Court by ignoring its Resolutions dated June
25, 2007 (ordering her to show cause for her failure to comply with the OCA directives and to file her
comment) and March 26, 2008 (ordering her to pay a fine of P1, 000.00 for her continuous failure to file a
comment).
Re: Report on Financial Audit Conducted at MCTC, Santiago-San Esteban, Ilocos Sur, A.M. No. P-
11-2950, January 17, 2012
Facts: The Court Management Office (CMO) of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a
judicial audit and physical inventory of cases in said MCTC, in view of (1) the compulsory retirement of
Angeles J. Ancheta (Ancheta), MCTC Clerk of Court II, on August 2, 2006; (2) the request made on
August 6, 2008 by Febella J. Guillermo, Officer-in-Charge, Accounting Division, Finance Management
Office, OCA, for an immediate audit of Virginia D. Hufana (Hufana), MCTC Officer-in-Charge (OIC) Clerk
of Court II, from August 1, 2006 to June 30, 2008, for her failure to submit monthly reports; and (3) the
Memorandum dated July 9, 2009 of then MCTC Acting Presiding Judge Juvencio S. Gascon and letter
dated July 16, 2009 of then Executive Judge Isidro T. Pobre of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Narvacan,
Ilocos Sur, requesting a comprehensive audit of the financial records of the MCTC considering the
assumption to duty of Estella E. Imperial (Imperial) as MCTC Clerk of Court II on July 1, 2008. Court
Administrator Christopher O. Lock requested authority from the Court to withhold Hufanas salaries given
her continuous failure to submit the required monthly report of collections, deposits, and withdrawals for
the Special Allowance for the Judiciary (SAJ), Judiciary Development Fund (JDF), Fiduciary Fund, and
Sheriffs Trust Fund of the MCTC from August 2006 up to the time the request was made. The request
was approved on September 18, 2007.
Upon examinations of the book of accounts, it was found that several discrepancies were made as to the
withdrawal and deposit of certain amounts on their collections.
Issue: Whether or not the Clerk of Courts are guilty of gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave
misconduct.
Held: Yes. Clerks of Court are the chief administrative officers of their respective courts; with regard to
the collection of legal fees, they perform a delicate function as judicial officers entrusted with the correct
and effective implementation of regulations thereon. Even the undue delay in the remittances of amounts
collected by them at the very least constitutes misfeasance. On the other hand, a vital administrative
function of a judge is the effective management of his court and this includes control of the conduct of the
courts ministerial officers. It should be brought home to both that the safekeeping of funds and collections
is essential to the goal of an orderly administration of justice and no protestation of good faith can
override the mandatory nature of the Circulars designed to promote full accountability for government
funds.
Ancheta and Hufanas refusal to face head-on the charges against them is contrary to the principle that
the first impulse of an innocent person, when accused of wrongdoing, is to express his/her innocence at
the first opportune time. Ancheta and Hufanas silence and non-participation in the present administrative
proceedings, despite due notice and directives of this Court for them to submit documents in their
defense, i.e., a written explanation, an accounting, and missing receipts, strongly indicate their guilt.
Moreover, the "failure of a public officer to remit funds upon demand by an authorized officer [shall be]
prima facie evidence that the public officer has put such missing funds or property to personal use." In the
total absence of rebutting or contrary evidence, then the Court can only conclude that Ancheta and
Hufana have misappropriated the unaccounted/unremitted court funds in their care and custody.
Ancheta and Hufanas failure to remit their collections, amounting to P390, 048.00 and P33, 603.80,

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constitutes gross neglect of duty, dishonesty, and grave misconduct. They have transgressed the trust
reposed in them as cashiers and disbursement officers of the Court.
The Court emphasized in Office of the Court Administrator v. Ganzan that:
The conduct or behavior of all court personnel is circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility.1avvphi1 Time and again, the High Court affirms the practical reality that the image
of the court as a true temple of justice is mirrored by the conduct of everyone who works therein,
from the judge to the lowest clerk. It is therefore imperative that those involved in the
administration of justice must live up to the highest standard of honesty and integrity in the public
service.
On court employees who have fallen short of their accountabilities, particularly, Clerks of Court who are
the custodians of court funds and properties, the Court has not hesitated to impose the ultimate penalty.
This Court has never tolerated or condoned any conduct that would violate the norms of public
accountability and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system.
Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator vs. Leoncio K.
Gutierrez III, Clerk III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City, A.M. No. P-11-2951, February
15, 2012
Facts: The case is an administrative complaint charging Leoncio K. Gutierrez III (Gutierrez), Clerk III of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116 of Pasay City, with dishonesty for falsifying his Daily Time
Records (DTRs)/bundy cards. The case arose from the 1st Indorsement dated April 7, 2010 of Presiding
Judge Racquelen Abary-Vasquez (Abary-Vasquez) of RTC-Branch 116 of Pasay City to Executive Judge
Pedro B. Corales (Corales) of RTC, Pasay City, as regards Gutierrezs DTR, which allegedly contained
entries for February 26, 2010 despite Gutierrezs admission that he did not report for work on said date.
Gutierrez denied knowing who caused the questionable entries for February 26, 2010 in his DTR.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of falsification of official document and dishonesty.
Held: Yes. Dishonesty has been defined as "the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."
It is well to remind Gutierrez that dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary. Public
service requires utmost integrity and discipline. A public servant must exhibit at all times the highest
sense of honesty and integrity, for no less than the Constitution declares that a public office is a public
trust, and all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, and serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. These are not mere rhetorical words to be
taken lightly as idealistic sentiments, but as working standards and attainable goals that should be
matched with actual deeds.
Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the
service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification
for reemployment in government service
The compassion we extended in the aforementioned cases was not without legal basis. Rule IV, Section
53 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, grants the disciplining
authority the discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the proper penalty.
We note that Gutierrez readily admitted that he was not at the office on February 26, 2010 and the entries
in his DTR for said date were falsified. This is also Gutierrezs first administrative case in his five years in
government service. However, as correctly observed by the OCA, Gutierrezs subsequent filing of an
application for leave for February 26, 2010 could not be considered in his favor for it was obviously a

mere afterthought, an attempt to cover up his infraction after already being found out by Judge Abary-
Vasquez. In consideration of the foregoing, we deem the imposition of a fine of P5, 000.00 upon
Gutierrez, as recommended by the OCA, as already sufficient.
Dr. Ramie G. Hipe vs. Judge Rolando T. Literato, Municpal Trial Court, Mainit, Surigao Norte, A.M.
No. MTJ-11-1781, April 25, 2012
Facts: Before the Court is an administrative case for gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence,
and gross dereliction of duty filed by Dr. Ramie G. Hipe against Judge Rolando T. Literato, acting judge of
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Mainit, Surigao del Norte, in relation to Civil Case No. 632.
Summary Proceedings commenced, wherein the respondent judge rendered a decision, on which
respondent ordered for the vacation of the building utilized as doctors quarters and residence of the
Municipal Health Office; payment of Php 2000.00. As a result of the aforementioned events, Dr. Ramie
Hipe filed on June 17, 2009 the present administrative complaint against Judge Literato, based on the
following grounds: (1) from June 10, 2008 until April 28, 2009, a period of 322 days, Judge Literato took
no further action in Civil Case No. 632, in violation of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; (2) since
June 10, 2008 up to the filing of the present administrative complaint, Judge Literato failed to resolve Dr.
Ramie Hipes affirmative defenses; (3) since June 10, 2008 until the filing of the present administrative
complaint, Judge Literato failed to conduct a preliminary conference in Civil Case No. 632; (4) Judge
Literato already rendered on April 28, 2009 a judgment in favor of the Municipality of Mainit even though
the parties had not been ordered to submit their positions papers, thus, violating Dr. Ramie Hipes right to
due process of law; and (5) Judge Literatos Decision dated April 28, 2009 in Civil Case No. 632 was
grammatically flawed and displayed his gross incompetence.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Held: Yes. Under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,
gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Section 11(A) of the same Rule
provides that the penalty to be imposed if a respondent Judge is found guilty of a serious charge is either
a fine of more than P20, 000.00 but not more than P40, 000.00, suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months, or dismissal from the service, forfeiture
of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Section 9 of Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, classifies undue delay in rendering a
decision and violation of Supreme Court circulars as a less serious charge for which the penalty is
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for one month to three months, or a fine of
P10,000.00 to P20,000.00.
Section 17 of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Civil Service Law states that if the respondent Judge
is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty imposed should be that corresponding to the
most serious charge or counts and the rest may be considered aggravating circumstances.
The most serious of the charges against Judge Literato is his gross ignorance of the Rule on Summary
Procedure, and his undue delay in deciding Civil Case No. 632 is considered an aggravating
circumstance. Another aggravating circumstance is the fact that Judge Literato was previously charged
and found guilty of gross inefficiency and gross negligence in A.M. No. 03-10-250-MCTC, for which he
had been fined P20, 000.00.
Fe D. Valdez vs. Judge Lizabeth G. Torres, MeTC, Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, A.M. No. MTJ-11-
1796, June 13, 2012
Facts: Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Fe D. Valdez against
respondent Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 60,
Mandaluyong City, for delay in the disposition of Civil Case No. 20191.

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LEGAL ETHICS
Civil Case No. 20191 was an action for damages and attorneys fees instituted on October 25, 2005 by
complainant against Prudential Guarantee & Assurance, Inc. (PGAI) and Charlie Tan (Tan), which was
raffled to the Mandaluyong MeTC-Branch 60, presided over by respondent. Respondent proceeded to
hear Civil Case No. 20191 in accordance with the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. After the parties
had filed their respective position papers, respondent submitted Civil Case No. 20191 for decision on July
19, 2006. However, a year had passed but Civil Case No. 20191 remained unresolved, prompting
complainant to file a motion for immediate resolution of Civil Case No. 20191 on June 27, 2007.
Complainant followed-up with a second motion for immediate resolution filed on October 19, 2007, third
motion for immediate resolution filed on December 11, 2007, fourth motion for immediate resolution filed
on April 15, 2008, fifth motion for immediate resolution filed on June 11, 2008, sixth motion for immediate
resolution filed on July 7, 2008, seventh motion to resolve filed on April 21, 2009, and eighth motion to
resolve filed on January 17, 2010.
Frustrated by the long wait for the resolution of Civil Case No. 20191, complainant filed the present
administrative complaint on June 4, 2010 against respondent, alleging unreasonable delay by the latter in
the disposition of said case to the damage and prejudice of the former.
Issue:: Whether or not respondent is guilty undue delay.

Held: Yes. Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, mandates that cases or matters filed with the
lower courts must be decided or resolved within three months from the date they are submitted for
decision or resolution. With respect to cases falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure, first level
courts are only allowed 30 days following the receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, or the
expiration of the period for filing the same, within which to render judgment.
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain
proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the
orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as
mandatory.
Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to promptly act upon cases and matters pending before their courts.
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, directs judges to "dispose of the courts business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods." Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
further exhort judges to be prompt and punctual in the disposition and resolution of cases and matters
pending before their courts, to wit:
6. PROMPTNESS
He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice
delayed is often justice denied.
7. PUNCTUALITY
He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing that the time of
litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his habits, he
sets a bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction with the administration of
justice.
Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988 once more reminds all magistrates to observe
scrupulously the periods prescribed in Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution, and to act promptly on
all motions and interlocutory matters pending before their courts.
Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. If
they do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of litigants.

Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of
their obligation to promptly administer justice.
Unfortunately, respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards of duty and responsibility that her
position requires. Civil Case No. 20191 was submitted for resolution on July 19, 2006, yet it was still
pending when complainant filed the present administrative complaint on June 4, 2010, and remained
unresolved per complainants manifestation filed on September 8, 2010. More than four years after being
submitted for resolution, Civil Case No. 20191 was still waiting decision by respondent.
Respondent irrefragably failed to decide Civil Case No. 20191 within the 30-day period prescribed by the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Her inaction in Civil Case No. 20191 is contrary to the rationale
behind the Rule on Summary Procedure, which was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious
and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy
disposition of cases. Indeed, respondent even failed to decide Civil Case No. 20191 within the three-
month period mandated in general by the Constitution for lower courts to decide or resolve cases.
Records do not show that respondent made any previous attempt to report and request for extension of
time to resolve Civil Case No. 20191.
City Prosecutor Armando P. Abanado vs. Judge Abraham A. Bayona, Presiding Judge, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 7, Bacolod City, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1804, July 30, 2012
Facts: The case rooted from the case of Pp. vs. Cresencio Palo, Sr. The Complainant City Prosecutor
Armando Abanado filed an information in the MTC and was later on raffled to the sala of Judge Bayona.
Judge Bayona ordered Abanado to submit additional evidence to determine the existence of probable
cause. Abanado submitted a copy of the Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation and informed
respondent that the documents submitted were already appended. As regards the Memorandum of the
transfer of case assignment from designated
Investigating Prosecutor to the City Prosecutor, Abanado explained that there was no memorandum of
transfer of the case to him.
Judge Bayona was dissatisfied with the explanation of the OCP. He stated that those documents were
necessary in the evaluation and appreciation of the evidence to establish probable cause.
The OCP sent a letter again explaining the impossibility of submitting the Jarder Resolution as it was no
longer part of the records of the case.
Once again, Bayona did not accept the explanation of the OCP. He required the complainant to explain
within five days why he should not be cited for contempt.
Bayona denied the request of the ten-day extension and set the hearing for contempt charges.
As a response, Abanado filed a motion for inhibition against Bayona. He also filed a petition for certiorari
with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to restraint Bayona from proceeding with
contempt proceedings.
Abanado then filed an administrative complaint and the same was received by the OCA. Complainant
alleged that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law or procedure, gross misconduct and
violation of the Supreme Court Circular No. 12.
Bayona in his comment with counter-complaint for disbarment essentaially reiterated the importance of
the Jarder Resolution.
Issue: Whether or not Bayona was administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, gross
misconduct and violated SC Circular no. 12.

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LEGAL ETHICS
Held: No. The conduct of a preliminary investigation is primarily an executive function The Department of
Justice-National ProsecutionService (DOJ-NPS) Manual states that the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor should be attached to the information only as far as practicable. Thus, such attachment is
not mandatory or required under the rules. The Court found that Bayona erred in insititing on the
production of the Jarder Resolution and in going so far as to motu proprio initiate a contempt proceeding
against the complainant.
However, not every judicial error is tantamount to ignorance of the law and if it was committed in good
faith, the judge need not be subjected to administrative sanction. While complainant admitted that he
erred in insisting on the production of the Jarder Resolution despite the provisions of the DOJ-NPS
Manual, such error cannot be categorized as gross ignorance of the law as he did not appear to be
motivated by bad faith. Indeed, the rules of procedure in the prosecution office were not clear as to
whether or not an investigating prosecutors resolution of dismissal that had been reversed by the city
prosecutor should still form part of the records.
Neither did respondents action amount to gross misconduct. Gross misconduct presupposes evidence of
grave irregularity in the performance of duty. In the case at bar, respondents act of requiring complainant
to explain why he should not be cited in contempt for his failure to submit the Jarder Resolution in court
was in accordance with established rules of procedure. Furthermore, complainant did not abuse his
contempt power as he did not pursue the proceedings in view of the May 29, 2009 and June 15, 2009
Gellada orders. Lastly, as previously discussed, respondent issued those orders in good faith as he
honestly believed that they were necessary in the fair and just issuance of the warrant of arrest in
Criminal Case No. 0903-16474.
Anecita Panaligan vs. Ethelda B. Valente, Clerk of Court II, 3rd Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Patnogon, Antique, A.M. No. P-11-2952, July 30, 2012
Facts: Panaligan filed a complaint against Valente, Clerk of Court of MCTC of Patnongon, Anitque for
dereliction of duty, abuse of authority and dishonesty, relative to a small claims action entitled Anecita
Panaligan v. Spouses Reynold and Ailene Tumolin.
Judge Barte issued an Order dismissing such case for lack of interest to prosecute her case.
Panaligan averred that after her receipt of on August 18, 2010 of a copy of the MCTC Order dated August
12, 2010 dismissing Civil Case No. 2-P. She further averred that Valente claimed that the latter personally
furnihseed Panaligan a copy of the notice of hearing for August 12, 2010, while in fact, Panaligan did not
receive a copy of such notice of hearing. She also alleged that Valente retracted her previous claim and
blamed Process Server Magbanua for such failure.
Valente denied the charges. She insisted that she personally gave the notice of hearing to Panaligan on
an unspecified date. She also recounted that during the hearing on August 12, none of the parties
appeared before the MCTC. She further insisted that her 30 years of unsullied reputation and dedicated,
faithful, loyal, and unwavering service in the judiciary as MCTC Clerk of Court, and claimed that the
accusations against her were meant to cast aspersion on her reputation and integrity as a loyal public
servant. Hence, she prayed for the dismissal of the complaint against her.
On April 26, 2011, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that the case against Valente be
Redocketed as a regular administrative matter and found Valente Guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Valente is liable for neglect of duty for failing to furnish a copy of notice of
hearing.

2. Whether or not Valente is liable for dishonesty for relaying to Judge Barte that she personally
gave a copy of notice of hearing.
Held:
1. Yes. As an officer of the court, Valente was duty-bound to use reasonable skill and diligence in the
performance of her officially-designated duties as clerk of court. A clerk of court is a role model for other
court employees to emulate in the performance of duties as well as in the conduct and behavior of a
public servant.
Valente is guilty of simple neglect of duty, which has been defined as the failure of an employee to give
attention to a task expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference. Pursuant to Section 52(B) of the same Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, the
penalty of simple neglect of duty, a less grave offense, is suspension for a period of one (1) month and
one (1) day to six (6) months for the first violation. Section 53 of the same Rules enumerates the
circumstances which mitigate the penalty, such as length of service in the government, physical illness,
good faith, education, or other analogous circumstances. The Court weighs on one hand the serious
consequence of Valentes negligence (Panaligan was deprived of the opportunity to collect the purported
unpaid loan from the spouses Tumolin) and on the other the mitigating circumstance in Valentes favor
(this is Valentes first offense in her 30 years of service to the judiciary), suspension for two months is
appropriate.
2. No. The Court does not hold Valente administratively liable for dishonesty. Dishonesty implies
adisposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity. Valente, in telling Judge
Barte that Panaligan was served with a notice of hearing, may have sincerely but mistakenly remembered
and/or believed herself personally handing over such a notice to Panaligan; as well as casually assumed
that Magbanua had served the notice of hearing upon Panaligan in the regular performance of
Magbanuas duties as Process Server. In the absence of substantial evidence, the Court cannot lightly
attribute to Valente an intent to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud anyone.
Memoranda of Judge Eliza B. Yu issued to Legal Researcher Mariejoy P. Lagman and to Court
Stenographer Soledad J. Bassig, all of Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 47, Pasay City, A.M. No. P-
12-3033, August 15, 2012
Facts:
Complaint against Lagman
Judge Yu charges Mariejoy Lagman for grave misconduct, falsification, usurpation of judicial functions,
and dishonesty. Such complaint stemmed from the discrepancies in several civil case calendared in her
sala.
Among others, Judge Yu alleges that:
1. A case was set for hearing even if it was not calendared on such day.
2. Discrepancies in the dates in the dates.
3. In one of the cases, it was stated in Constancia that she was in Cardona, Rizal, when in fact,
she was attending the Orientation of Newly-Appointed Judges.
4. Similar mistakes were made in the preparation of the Minutes of the Hearing.
Complaint against Bassig
Judge Yu also charges Soledad Bassig with misconduct, falsification, usurpation of judicial functions, and
gross insubordination. Such charges also were rooted from the drafting of the minutes of the hearing in
one case and letting the counsels of the parties sign, when in fact no hearing was conducted.

COMMISSION
LEGAL ETHICS
Court Administrator Marquez directed respondents lagman and Bassig to submit their respective
comment/manifestation on the various memoranda issued by Judge Yu which resulted in the filing of the
instant administrative complaint against them.
The OCA held respondents liable for simple neglect of duty and submitted recommendations. Among
which are, both the cases be redocketed as a regular administrative matter, that both Lagman and Bassig
be found GUILTY of simple neglet of duty, and that both be warned sternly and reprimanded for future
commission of similar acts.
Issue: Whether or not Lagman and Bassig be administratively liable.
Held:
Lagman.
Respondent Lagman should have properly informed Judge Yu of the inadvertent omission of Civil Case
No. M-PSY-09- 09232 in the list of calendared cases for hearing. She should have sought the necessary
permission from Judge Yu before calling the case as she was still under her direct supervision.
With regard to the discrepancies in the dates in Civil Case No. 482-01, the Court understand that the said
mistakes could not be blamed solely on respondent Lagman as she was not the one who prepared the
documents. However, the errors in the Constancia and in the Minutes of the Hearing could have been
avoided and corrected had respondent Lagman paid more attention to the details specified in the
documents, i.e., the date of hearing and the name of the then Presiding Judge Vito Cruz.
Similarly in Civil Case No. SCC-10-55, respondent Lagman did not follow established procedure when
she allowed one of the parties to sign the Minutes of the Hearing without waiting for the arrival of Judge
Yu. It must be remembered that the Minutes of the Hearing is a very important document which gives a
brief summary of the events that took place at the session or hearing of a case. It is, in fact, a capsulized
history of the case at a given session or hearing, for it states the date and time of session; the names of
the judge, clerk of court, stenographer and court interpreter who were present; the names of the counsel
of the parties who appeared; the party presenting evidenced marked; and the date of the next hearing.
The Court agreed with the OCA that there was on usurpation of judicial authority on the part of Lagman.
Bassig.
The Court found Bassig liable for simple neglect of duty for her failure to follow the established procedure
in the conduct of hearings.
In the instant case, respondent Bassig could have rectified the inadvertent mistakes in the drafting of the
subpoena, order, and Minutes of the Hearing had she given more effort and attention in reviewing the
drafts and not putting the blame on other court personnel. She should have gone over the drafts and
made sure that the papers were correct and in order. Thus, it is clear that respondent Bassig was remiss
in her duties as the Officer-in-Charge. She failed to supervise her subordinates well and to efficiently
conduct the proper administration of justice.
The Court held that the mistakes or errors in the contents of the orders, subpoena, and Minutes of the
Hearing committed by respondents Lagman and Bassig could be attributed to their lack of attention or
focus on the task at hand. These could have easily been avoided had they exercised greater care and
diligence in the performance of their duties.
The Court finds the respondents Lagman and Bassig liable for simple neglect of duty.

Astorga and Repol Law Offices, represented Atty. Arnold B. Lugares vs. Leodel N. Roxas, Sheriff
IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati City, A.M. No. P-12-3029, August 15, 2012
Facts: The case arose from at case for damages instituted by FGU before the RTC. The RTC rendered a
decision in favour of the FGU and against NEC Cargo Services. The said Decision became final and
executor on September 24, 2004.
FGU filed a Motion for Execution which was granted on July 10, 2006.
On July 11, 2006, respondent served a copy of the Writ of Execution upon NEC which was received by
Catalon. An auction sale was set on July 19, notices were given to all concerned parties. However,
Catalon filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim, asserting ownership over the levied properties.
Respondent personally furnished complainant on July 18, 2006 a copy of the Notice of Third Party Claim,
together with a copy of Catalons Affidavit of Third Party Claim. FGU failed to post an indemnity bond in
favour of Catalon, hence, Roxas did not proceed with the auction sale.
Complainant filed the instant Complaint-Affidavit dated April 29, 2008 against respondent, alleging, that:
1. Sometime in October of 2007, informed the respondent that [NEC] has leviable assets/credits.
Roxas however refused to execute the Decision and make the corresponding levy/garnishment
without any valid reason.
2. Repeated follow-ups were again made by the complainants but still Roxas did not act on it.
3. Roxas frustrated the purpose of the Decision by refusing to execute it.
The OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative case and that
Roxas be suspended for one month without pay.
Issue: Whether or not Roxas should be administratively liable.
Held: Yes. It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of law. A
judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party.
Sheriffs ought to know that they have a sworn responsibility to serve writs of execution with utmost
dispatch. When writs are placed in their hands, it is their ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable
celerity and promptness to execute them in accordance with their mandate. Unless restrained by a court
order, they should see to it that the execution of judgments is not unduly delayed. Accordingly, they must
comply with their mandated ministerial duty as speedily as possible. As agents of the law, high standards
are expected of sheriffs.
In Aonuevo v. Rubio, 435 SCRA 430 (2004), we stressed the reminder to all court personnel to perform
their assigned tasks promptly and with great care and diligence considering the important role they play in
the administration of justice. With respect to sheriffs, they are to implement writs of execution and similar
processes mindful that litigations do not end merely with the promulgation of judgments. Being the final
stage in the litigation process, execution of judgments ought to be carried out speedily and efficiently
since judgments left unexecuted or indefinitely delayed are rendered inutile and the parties prejudiced
thereby, condemnatory of the entire judicial system. This admonition is now enshrined as Canon IV,
Section 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel that reads, [c]ourt personnel shall at all times
perform official duties properly and with diligence.
Gerlie M. Uy and Ma. Consolacion T. Bascug vs. Judge Erwin B. Javellana, Municipal Trial Court,
La Castellana, Negros Occidental, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666, September 5, 2012
Facts: The Complainants are Public Attorneys. They filed a verified complaint for gross ignorance of the
law and procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge,
grave misconduct and others.

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LEGAL ETHICS
The complainants based allegations on nine instances.
First, Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedures. They cited
several cases exhibiting the Judges errors.
Second, Judge Javellana made it appear in several situations that he was involved and he was in a
position where a certain Manunag can influence him in certain instances.
Third, he violated Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. He issued warrants
of arrest even when the accused had already voluntarily surrendered or when a warrantless arrest had
been effected.
Fourth, he violated the constitutional rights of the accused as stated in Section 12(1), Article III of the
Constitution. He set a preliminary investigation even when the accused had no counsel.
Fifth, he was habitually tardy.
Sixth, he arbitrarily implemented laws and rules depending on the stature of the parties, persons
accompanying the parties, lawyers and his personal relations with the parties/lawyers.
Seventh, he adopted the mantra that the litigants are made for the courts instead of courts for the
litigants.
Eight, he did not observe the proper procedures in airing his complaints against public attorneys. He
rebuked the public attorneys in the orders he issued.
Ninth, the complainants attached a hand-written note of an anonymous member of Judge Javellanas
staff.
The OCA recommended for the redocketing of the complaint as a regular administrative matter and that
Judge Javellana be SUSPENDED for three months without salary and other benefits.
Issue: Whether or not the Judge Javellana is liable for the charges against him?
Held: Yes. Every judge is required to observe the law.
When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; and anything less than
that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short, when the law is so elementary, not to be
aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. The previous Code of Judicial Conduct specifically
warned the judges against seeking publicity for personal vainglory. Vainglory, in its ordinary meaning,
refers to an individuals excessive or ostentatious pride especially in ones own achievements. Even no
longer explicitly stated in the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are still proscribed from engaging in
self-promotion and indulging their vanity and pride by Canons 1 (on Integrity) and 2 (on Propriety) of the
New Code.
For his violations of the New Code of Professional Conduct, Judge Javellana committed gross
misconduct. The Court has defined gross misconduct as atransgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.
Gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct
are classified as serious charges under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court, and penalized
under Rule 140, Section 11(a) of the same Rules by: 1) Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part
of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

Lucia Nazar Vda. De Feliciano vs. Romeo L. Rivera, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Office of the
Clerk of Court, Valenzuela City, A.M. No. P-11-2920 September 19, 2012
Facts: The case stemmed from an ejectment case filed by the complainant against Lota. The case was
adjudicated on the complainants favor. Such was affirmed on appeal in the RTC.
Rivera served the notice to the Barangay Council of Barangay Ugong. However, no other action was
undertaken by the respondent to implement the subject Writ of Execution.
The complainant filed the Complaint-Affidavit against Rivera for not executing the writ. In one of the
allegations, Rivera said that he would not implement such writ because the defendant had filed a motion
to quash the writ. After a persistent effort from the complainants asking Rivera to implement such writ,
such efforts became futile as it appears that Rivera has no intention of executing the same.
Rivera denied the complainants allegations.
The OCA recommended that the case be redocketed as a regular administrative matter and that Rivera
be found GUILTY of Simple Neglect of Duty.
Issue:Whether or not Rivera be held liable for for dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, and misconduct.
Held: Yes. The Court reiterates that it is the mandatory and ministerial duty of the sheriff to execute
judgments without delay unless restrained by a court order. Quilo is an exception to the general rule, but
respondents reliance on the case is misplaced. There are particular circumstances in Quilo which
justified the pronouncement of the Court that it would have been more prudent for Sheriff Jundarino to
defer implementation of the writ of execution until a determination of the motion to quash the same.
Sheriff Jundarino was liable for misconduct for his unreasonable insistence on implementing the writ of
execution on March 27, 2008 despite the fact that Quilos motion to quash said writ was already
scheduled for hearing the very next day, March 28, 2008.
Respondent sheriffs unreasonable delay in implementing the Writ of Execution constitutes simple neglect
of duty, defined as the failure of an employee to give ones attention to a task expected of him, and
signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.
Marcelino Magdadaro vs. Judge Bienvenido Saniel, Jr., A.M. NO. RTJ-12-2331, December 10, 2012
Facts: The complaint stemmed from a case for action for breach of contract with damages instituted by
complainants against Bathalal Marketing Industries, Inc. BMII.
Complainant was the owner of a Nissan car covered by the PNB-General Insurers Company, Inc.
Complainants car figured in an accident. Complainant had submitted two repair estimates of the damage
sustained. The NDI did not include the damaged radiator tank in the estimate. He also obtained a repair
estimate from BMII which also did not include the radiator tank.
While waiting for the approval, he continued using his car. On several occasions, the car overheated. He
repeatedly followed-up his request for repair of such radiator. However, the complainant was told that the
radiator was not included in the repair estimate The repair lasted for one month. He was required to pay
P9,120.50 as his share in the repair cost.
Immediately, he test drive his car. But after a few minutes, the engine started to overheat again.
Complainant decided to bring the car to Global. They came to know that the installed radiator was not a
brand new one. He had to pay another for P9,500.00 to buy a new replacement.
Complainant charged GMII for damages. Respondent Judge dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of
action. Aggrieved, complainant filed a Notice of Appeal. Such was only acted upon only after 10 months.

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LEGAL ETHICS
Frustrated, complainant filed the present administrative complainant for unreasonable delay in the
disposition of the aforementioned case.
In its report, the OCA made the following recommendations. First, that the case be redocketed as a
regular administrative matter and Second, that Judge Saniel, Jr. be held liable for undue delay in
rendering decision and undue delay in the proceeding.
Issue: Whether or not the Judge be held liable for unreasonable delay, gross ignorance of the law, and
bias and partiality, in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Held: The Court found that Judge is GUILTY of undue delay in rendering decision. An administrative
complaint against a judge cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to
parties aggrieved by his erroneous order or judgment.
That judges must decide cases promptly and expeditiously cannot be overemphasized, for justice
delayed is justice denied. Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the peoples faith and confidence
in the judiciary. If they cannot decide cases within the period allowed by the law, they should seek
extensions from this Court to avoid administrative liability.
Judges, clerks of court, and all other court employees share the same duty and obligation to dispense
justice promptly. They should strive to work together and mutually assist each other to achieve this goal.
But judges have the primary responsibility of maintaining the professional competence of their staff.
Judges should organize and supervise their court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of
business, and require at all times.
As regards, gross ignorance of the law, it is dismissed. It is settled that a judges failure to interpret the
law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render him administratively
liable. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to
do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office
untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering
justice can beinfallible in his judgment.
Re: Cases Submitted for Decision Before Hon. Teofilo D. Baluma, Former Judge, Branch 1,
Regional Trial Court, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, A.M. No. RTJ132355, August 28, 2013
Fact: Judge Baluma availed of the optional retirement. As a mandatory requirement, inventories of
pending cases were made. As a result, there were 23 cases were left undecided and were already
beyond the reglementary period for deciding them.
The processing of Judge Balumas application for clearance was put on hold.
In a letter, Judge Balumas son, averred that his father was suffering from depression and requested for
the early release of Judge Balumas retirement pay and other benefits.
On its report, the OCA recommended that the matter be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter.
And that Judge Baluma be fined in total amount of FORTY-SIX THOUSAND PESOS for gross inefficiency
for failure to decide the said pending cases.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Baluma is liable for gross inefficiency.
Held: The Court agrees with the findings of OCA, except the recommended penalty.
Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that lower courts have three months within
which to decide cases or resolve matters submitted to them for resolution. Moreover, Canon 3, Rule 3.05

of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to dispose of their business promptly and decide cases
within the required period. In addition, this Court laid down guidelines in SC Administrative Circular No. 13
which provides, inter alia, that [j]udges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII,
Section 15, of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their
courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of
submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to
do so. The Court has reiterated this admonition in SC Administrative Circular No. 3-99 which requires all
judges to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases and the
failure to comply therewith is considered a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to
speedy disposition of their cases.
The Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously
under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge should decide cases
with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions for delay
in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to decide a case within the reglementary period is not
excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on the
defaulting judge.
Under the new amendments to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or
order is a less serious charge, for which the respondent judge shall be penalized with either (a)
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three
months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00, but not more than P20,000.00.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr., Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 25, Tabuk City, Kalinga, A.M. No. P-13-3105, September 11, 2013
Facts: Macusi was the Sheriff of RTC, Branch 25 in Tabuk. In one case, a complainant Palingan inquired
the status of the writ of execution of her case as she had not received any report whether the writ has
already been served. Judge Dalanao referred the letter to the OCA for appropriate action of the letter of
Palingan. The OCA then referred the letter to Atty. Andomang, Clerk of Court, for comment and
appropriate action.
Macusi explained that no report was made because Palingan never appeared at the Office to coordinate
the implementation of said writ.
Judge Dalanao submitted a letter pointing out the Macusi was inconsistent in several aspects of his job.
Macusi was filed an administrative case for allegedly failing to make reports on cases which are pending
for execution.
The Court referred the case to Executive Judge Wacas, for investigation, report and recommendation.
Judge Wacas found substantial evidence that Macusi violated Rule 39, Section 14 and Rule 141, Section
10 of the Rules of Court. He further ruled that Macusi exercised some degree or discretion having his
own rules and unmindful of the existing rules and established jurisprudence.
The OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative case and that Macusi
be found GUILTY of Simple Neglect of Duty and a penalty of fine of Four Thousand Pesos.
Macusi submitted his Manifestation and Motion to the Court informing that he was deemed resigned from
government service and by operation of law when he filed his Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that the
Court dismiss the administrative case against him.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Macusi should be administratively liable.

2. Whether or not resignation would relieve him from such liability.

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LEGAL ETHICS
Held:
1. Yes. A sheriff has the duty to perform faithfully and accurately what is incumbent upon him; Any
method of execution falling short of the requirement of the law deserves reproach and should not be
countenanced.
Sheriffs and their deputies are the frontline representatives of the justice system, and if, through their
lack of care and diligence in the implementation of judicial writs, they lose the trust reposed on them,
they inevitably diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary; As such, the Court will not tolerate or
condone any conduct of judicial agents or employees which would tend to or actually diminish the
faith of the people in the Judiciary. Difficulties or obstacles in the satisfaction of a final judgment and
execution of a writ do not excuse Macusis total inaction. Neither the Rules nor jurisprudence
recognizes any exception from the periodic filing of reports by sheriffs. If only Macusi submitted such
periodic reports, he could have brought his predicament to the attention of his superiors and the
issuing courts and he could have given his superiors and the issuing courts the opportunity to act
and/or move to address the same. A sheriff is guilty of violating Rule 141, Section 10 of the Rules of
Court if he fails to observe the following: (1) prepare an estimate of expenses to be incurred in
executing the writ; (2) ask for the courts approval of his estimates; (3) render an accounting; and (4)
issue an official receipt for the total amount he received from the judgment debtor.
2 .No. Macusis prayer for dismissal of the present case for being moot is baseless. Macusis
constructive resignation from service through filing of his Certificate of Candidacy for the 2010 Local
Elections does not render the case against him moot. Resignation is not a way out to evade
administrative liability when a court employee is facing administrative sanction. As the Court held in
Baquerfo v. Sanchez, 455 SCRA 13 (2005): Cessation from office of respondent by resignation or
retirement neither warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he
was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic. The
jurisdiction that was this Courts at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by
the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case.
Respondents resignation does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall
still be answerable.
Heirs of Celestino Teves represented by Paul John Teves Abad Elsa C. Aquino and Felimon E.
Fernan vs. Augusto J. Felicidario, Sheriff IV, Office of the Clerk Of Court, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, A.M. No. P-12-3089, November 13, 2013
Facts: The complainants were parties in a case in the DAR for settlement of the boundaries of adjacent
lots in Tanay Rizal. The Order of the DAR, favouring the herein complainants, became final and
executory as no motion for reconsideration and/or appeal was filed. Such order was not acted upon by
the Sheriff, the complainants decided to file an administrative case against him.
Felicidario prayed for dismissal of the administrative complaint since such accordingly were not related
tohis official functions.
Issues: Whether or not Felicidario is liable of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of Service.
Held: The Court partly diverges from the findings of the OCA. Respondent is guilty of simple dishonesty
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but not of grave misconduct.

In Villordon v. Avila, 678 SCRA 247 (2012), the Supreme Court defined dishonesty as intentionally
making a false statement on any material fact; and a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud;
untrustworthiness;lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
Respondents deportment under the circumstances likewise constitute conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. In addition to being dishonest, respondent appears to have illegally forced his way
into the disputed area. As a Sheriff, he is expected to be familiar with court procedure and processes,
especially those concerning the execution of orders and decisions of the courts.
The Civil Service law and rules do not give a concrete description of what specific acts constitute conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but the Court defined such an offense in Ito v. De Vera, 511
SCRA 1 (2006), as acts or omissions that violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or tend to
diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary, thereby prejudicing the best interest of the administration
of justice.
Rule 10, Section 50 additionally provides that if the civil servant is found guilty of two or more charges or
counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge and the rest
shall be considered as aggravating circumstances. Based on the foregoing rules, the Court shall apply
the penalty for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, it being the more serious offense.
The Court then considers for purposes of determining the proper penalty, respondents simple dishonesty
as an aggravating circumstance; while respondents 43 years in government service, 32 of which had
been in the judiciary, as mitigating circumstance. The Court likewise takes into account, for humanitarian
reasons, that respondent is almost of retirement age at 64 years. Consequently, the penalty of
suspension without pay for six (6) months and one (1) day is appropriate under the circumstances.
Raul K. San Buenaventura vs. Timoteo A. Migrino, Clerk of Court III, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 69, Pasig City, A.M. No. P-08-2574, January 22, 2014
Facts: An administrative case for Gross neglect of duty, undue interference on a case, and violation of
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees against Migrio, a clerk of
court of MeTC.
San Buenaventura alleged that when the decision of the SC became final and executory, he filed a
Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution. Accordingly, Migrio set the hearing and refused to grant he
writ. San Buenaventura added that Migrio caused delay and evident bias as regards executing the Writ
of Execution.
Migrio commented on the allegations. He pointed that he has nothing to do with the several resetting of
the hearing schedules. He further alleged that those were not part of his duties.
The OCA recommended that Migrio be found guilty for simple neglect of duty.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Migrio is liable for Simple neglect of duty.

2. Will the death of Migrio cause the instant case to be dismissed?
Held:
1. Yes. Migrio is liable for simple neglect of duty.
Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task
or to disregard a duty due to carelessness or indifference. It is classified as a less grave offense under
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service and is punishable with suspension for one
(1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense.

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LEGAL ETHICS
It is incumbent upon respondent Migrio as the Clerk of Court and the administrative assistant of the
judge, to assist in the management of the calendar of the court, particularly in the scheduling of cases
and in all other matters not involving the exercise of discretion or judgment of the judge. Respondent
Migrio is tasked to keep a calendar of cases for pre-trial, trial, and those with motions to set for hearing
and to givepreference to habeas corpus cases, election cases, special civil actions, and those required by
law. Here, respondent Migrio showed carelessness and indifference in the performance of his duties. He
cannot simply reason that he had nothing to do with the resetting and the setting of the hearings. That is
an unacceptable excuse, especially in light of Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel which requires that court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and
diligently.
It is important to stress that as clerk of court, respondent Migrio should take charge of the administrative
aspects of the courts business and chronicle its will and directions, keep the records and seal, issue
processes, enter judgments and orders, and give upon request, certified copies of the records of the
court.
2. No. The death or retirement of any judicial officer from the service does not preclude the finding of any
administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable. In the instant case, an investigation was
completed and two recommendations were already given by the OCA pointing to the misdemeanor of
respondent Migrio.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Hon. Cader P. Indar, Al Haj, Presiding Judge and
Abdulrahman D. Piang, Process Server, Branch 14, Both of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14,
Cotabato City, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2287, January 22, 2014
Facts: Piang is a Process Sever in RTC Branch 14 of Cotabato City. For the facilitation of his initial
salary, his Daily Time Records DTR for the months of February and March 2010 were required.
Piang submitted the said requirements including the two DTRs for the month of February and March.
However, it appeared that the valid periods covered on February exceeded what was contained in the
submitted DTR. Also, as for March DTR, it already contained complete entry for the entrie month even
when the same has not yet transpired.
OCA required Piang to explain the said discrepancies. Piang claimed that it was an honest mistake
caused by his lack of knowledge of the policies being implemented. He furthered that he had no
fraudulent intention and the error was due to sheer inadvertence on his part.
The Court Administrator wrote a letter to Judge Indar requiring him to comment on why he signed the
questioned DTRs even if such were not yet due.
The OCA found Piang administratively liable. It amounts to falsification which were punishable by
dismissal, and under the Civil Service Rules, it is dishonesty.
As regards Judge Indar, Judge Ibrahim, informed the OCA that Judge Indar had not been in touch with
the court. Thus, Ibrahim believed that Judge Indar would no longer submit his comment on the present
case.
After 6 months, Judge Indar finally submitted his Comment. In summary, he said that Piang only acted on
the situation on honest mistake and asked that Piang be given a second chance.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Piang is liable for dishonesty.

2. Whether or not Judge Indar be liable for gross misconduct and insubordination.
Held:
1. Yes. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from
the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification for reemployment in government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act that has
no place in the judiciary. The Court has defined dishonesty as the (d)disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
2. Yes. It took three directives and three years for Judge Indar to submit his Comment on the present
administrative matter against him and Piang. The Supreme Court can only conclude that Judge Indar is
guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination for his long delay in complying, as well as for his total non-
compliance, with the directives/orders of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) and this Court.
Judge Indars excuse that he inadvertently signed Piangs DTRs for February and March 2010 as it
was submitted for signature together with the DTRs of the other employees of RTC-Branch 14 of
Cotabato City is unacceptable. Judge Indar should be fully aware of the weight of his signature as a
judge, and he should take care in affixing the same on the documents before him. In the discharge of the
functions of his office, a judge must strive to act in a manner that puts him and his conduct above
reproach and beyond suspicion. He must act with extreme care for his office indeed is laden with a heavy
burden of responsibility. Certainly, a judge is enjoined, his heavy caseload notwithstanding, to pore over
all documents whereon he affixes his signature and gives his official imprimatur. The cavalier attitude
displayed by Judge Indar in this case simply cannot be countenanced.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Borromeo Bustamante, A.M. NO. MTJ-12-1806, April 7,
2014
Facts: Judge Bustamante retired on November 6, 2010. A judicial audit was conducted on September 21,
2010. As a result, there were 35 cases for decision 21 of which are beyond the reglementary period, 23
cases pending incidents for resolution 1 19 of which were already beyond the reglementary period).
Judge Bustamante explained that: all the cases except Civil Cases Nos. 1937 (Bustillo vs. Sps. Rabago)
and 2056 (Cale vs. Pader, et al.) because of lack of TSN taken when he was not yet the Presiding Judge.
As to the failure to rendered the decision within the reglementary period, he explained that there were
more pressing matters that required his attention. I.e. urgent motions, motions to dismiss, motions to
quash, and approval of bails.
The OCA submitted its Memeorandum, reporting that: 1. Judge Bustamante decided 33 out of 35 cases.
13 13 were still within the reglementary period while 20 were already beyond the reglementary period. 2.
Judge Bustamante had also resolved 6 out of 23 cases pending incidents in his court, all resolved beyond
their respective reglementary period.
The OCA recommended that Judge Bustamante be fined for gross inefficiency.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Bustamante is liable for gross inefficiency.
Held: Yes. Decision making, among other duties, is the primordial and most important duty of a member
of the bench. The speedy disposition of cases in the courts is a primary aim of the judiciary so the ends of
justice may not be compromised and the judiciary will be true to its commitment to provide litigants their
constitutional right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of their cases.

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LEGAL ETHICS
The Court has always emphasized the need for judges to decide cases within the constitutionally
prescribed 90-day period. Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the
litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice,
it undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it to
disrepute.
A member of the bench cannot pay mere lip service to the 90-day requirement; he/she should instead
persevere in its implementation. Heavycaseload and demanding workload are not valid reasons to fall
behind the mandatory period for disposition of cases. The Court usually allows reasonable extensions of
time to decide cases in view of the\ heavy caseload of the trial courts. If a judge is unable to comply with
the 90-day reglementary period for deciding cases or matters, he/she can, for good reasons, ask for an
extension and such request is generally granted. But Judge Bustamante did not ask for an extension in
any of these cases. Having failed to decide a case within the required period, without any order of
extension granted by the Court, Judge Bustamante is liable for undue delay that merits administrative
sanction.
Presiding Judge Juan Gabriel Hizon Alano, Mary Annabelle A. Katipunan, Suzee Wong Jamotillo,
Analie Del Rio Balitung, Edwino Jayson Oliveros and Roberto Babaodono vs. Padma Latip Sahi,
A.M. No. P-11-302, June 25, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Facts: Sahi was a Court Interpreter in MCTC, Maluso, Basilan. She was charged with Gross Inefficiency,
Gross Insubordiation and for being notoriously undesirable by several complainants in the said court.
The charges are as follows:
1. Sahi has been grossly inefficient in performing her duties and such was even discussed in
one of their Judicial Service Team Meetings.
2. Sahi never prepared any court calendar or minutes. She does not know to speak the Yakan
and Visayan dialects, which are necessary for her position.
3. Judge Alano claims that he was the one who interprets the testimonies of the witnesses into
English.
4. Sahis stay in RTC, Basilan was not extended and was directed by the Court to return to her
official position at the MCTC. And when Sahi returned, she was not in the office for more than
a month, and worse, her Daily Time Records bore no signature of authorized to sign the
same.
5. Sahi received another unsatisfactory rating due to her poor performance and unjustified
failure to perform her duties.
6. On 16 September 2010, Sahi calendared one only one case. She even failed to post a copy
of the said calendar.
7. Sahi was sued for extortion.
As a comment, Sahi denied the charges and claimed that the actions were maliciously filed. She asserted
that Judge Alano only want to get back at her for filing a complaint for grave abuse of authority. She only
denied the charges against her as to other matters.
The OCA re-docketed the case as a regular administrative order and found Sahi GUILTY for Inefficiency
and Incompetence in the Performance of Official Duties.
During the pendency of the case, Sahi suffered stroke and resigned from office. She claims that the case
against her becomes moot and academic.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Sahi is liable for the administrative charges against her.
2. Whether the resignation of Sahi render the case moot.
Held:
1. Yes. Respondent Sahis general denial carries little weight. As the preceding paragraphs will show,
there are specific charges against her, supported by documentary evidence, which she had the
opportunity to directly address and explain, but she merely glossed over.
No other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and
uprightness from an employee than the judiciary. P ublic officers must be accountable to the people at all
times and serve them with the utmost degree of responsibility and efficiency. Any act which falls short of
the exacting standards for public office, especially on the part of those expected to preserve the image of
the judiciary, shall not be countenanced. It is the imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the
court to maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of justice.
Court employees are bound to discharge their duties with care, caution, and attention which prudent men
usually exercise in the management of their affairs; and that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in
the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work in the judiciary, from the judge to the
lowest of its personnel.
Section 46(B)(4) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) classifies
inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties as a grave offense and punishable by
suspension ranging from 6 months and 1 day to 1 year, for the first offense, and dismissal for the second
offense. At the same time, Section 48 of the RRACCS allows the Court to consider aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in the determination of the penalty to be imposed on the erring public
employee.
2. No. During the pendency of the present administrative matter, respondent Sahi suffered a stroke and
resigned from office in January 2011. Her claim for separation benefits and accrued leave credits though
cannot be processed and released for lack of requirements. Nonetheless, respondent Sahis resignation
does not render this case moot. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when a court
employee is facing administrative sanction.

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LEGAL ETHICS
FABEQ
(Frequently Asked Bar Exam Questions)
LEGAL ETHICS BAR 2015 - SYLLABUS

2015 Legal Ethics Coverage 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
LEGAL ETHICS
I. Practice of law (Rule 138)
Concept 1 1 1 2
Privilege
Profession, not business 1 1 1
Qualifications 1 1 1 2
Appearance of non-lawyers 1 1 1
Law student practice (Rule
1 1
138-A)
Non-lawyers in courts 1 2
Non-lawyers in administrative
1
tribunals
Proceedings where lawyers
2
are prohibited from appearing
Sanctions for practice or
appearance without authority
Lawyers without authority 1 2 1 1
Persons not lawyers 1 1

Public officials and practice of
law
Prohibition or disqualification
of former government 1 1
attorneys
Public officials who cannot
2 2
practice law or with restrictions
Lawyers authorized to
represent the government
Lawyers oath 1 3 1
Use of Firm Name 1

II. Duties and
1 1 5 1
responsibilities of a lawyer
To society

Respect for law and legal

1 2
processes
Efficient and convenient legal
1
services
True, honest, fair, dignified
and objective information on
legal services
Participation in the
improvement and reforms in
the legal system
Participation in legal education
1
program
To the legal profession
Integrated Bar of the
1
Philippines (Rule 139-A)
Membership and dues 1 1 7 1 1
Upholding the dignity and
integrity of the profession
Courtesy, fairness and candor
towards professional 2
colleagues
No assistance in unauthorized
practice of law
To the courts
Candor, fairness and good
faith towards the courts
Respect for courts and judicial
officers
Assistance in the speedy and
efficient administration of 1
justice
Reliance on merits of his
cause and avoidance of any
impropriety which tends to
3
influence or gives the
appearance of influence upon
the courts
To the clients
Availability of service without
1
discrimination
Services regardless of a
1
persons status
Services as counsel de officio 1
Valid grounds for refusal 1

Candor, fairness and loyalty to
1
clients
Confidentiality rule 1

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LEGAL ETHICS
Privileged communications 1 1
Conflict of interest 1 2 1 1
Candid and honest advice to
clients
Compliance with laws
Concurrent practice of another
profession
Clients moneys and properties 1 1 1 3
Fiduciary relationship 1
Commingling of funds
Delivery of funds
Borrowing or lending
Fidelity to clients cause 3 1
Competence and diligence 3
Adequate protection
Negligence
Collaborating counsel 2
Duty to apprise client 1

Representation with zeal
within legal bounds
Use of fair and honest means
Clients fraud
Procedure in handling the
case
Attorneys fees 4 5 5
Acceptance fees 1 2
Contingency fee arrangements 1 2
Attorneys liens 1 1
Fees and controversies with
2 1 1
clients
Concepts of attorneys fees
Ordinary concept

Extraordinary concept
Preservation of clients
1 1
confidences
Prohibited disclosures and use 1
Disclosure, when allowed 1
Withdrawal of services 1 1 3
III. Suspension, disbarment
and discipline of lawyers 3 3
(Rule 139-B, Rules of Court)
Nature and characteristics of
disciplinary actions against
lawyers
Sui generis
Prescription 1 1 2
Grounds 1 2 2 2 2 7
Proceedings 2 1 2 1
Discipline of Filipino lawyers
1 1
practicing abroad
IV. Readmission to the Bar
Lawyers who have been
1
suspended
disbarred
1
repatriated
V. Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education
Purpose 1
Requirements 1 1
Compliance 1 4 1
Exemptions 3 2 1
Sanctions 1
Bar Matter 2012, Rule on
Mandatory Legal Aid Service
VI. Notarial Practice (A. M.
2
No. 02-8-13-SC, as amended
Qualifications of notary public 2 1
Term of office of notary public 1

COMMISSION
LEGAL ETHICS
Powers and limitations 1 4 1 1 1
Notarial register 1 2
Jurisdiction of notary public
1
and place of notarization
Revocation of commission
Competent evidence of identity 1 2 1 3
Sanctions 2
VII. Canons of Professional
Ethics
JUDICIAL ETHICS
I. Sources
New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary 1 1
(Bangalore Draft)
Code of Judicial Conduct 1
II. Qualities 1
Independence 3 3
Integrity 1 1
Impartiality 2 1 1
Propriety 2
Equality 3
Competence and diligence

III. Discipline of members of
2 1
the Judiciary
Members of the Supreme
Court
Impeachment 1
Ethical Lessons from Former
Chief Justice Coronas
Impeachment
Lower court judges and
justices of the Court of
Appeals and Sandiganbayan
(Rule 140)
Grounds 4 1 1
Impeachment (ethical aspects)

Sanctions imposed by the

Supreme Court on erring 1
members of the Judiciary
IV. Disqualification of
Justices and Judges (Rule
137)
Compulsory 1
Voluntary 1
V. Powers and Duties of
Courts and Judicial Officers
(Rule 135)
VI. Court Records and
General Duties of Clerks and
Stenographer (Rule 136)
VII. Legal Fees (Rule 141)
Manner of payment 1
Fees in lien
Persons authorized to collect
legal fees
VIII. Persons authorized to
collect legal fees
Recovery of costs (Rule 142)
Prevailing party
Dismissed appeal or action
Frivolous appeal
False allegations
Non-appearance of witness

Omnibus Cases - Legal Ethics

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2015 BAR OPERATIONS COMMISSION

Issue: Whether or not respondenrt engaged in an unathorized practice of law.

CENTER FOR LEGAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH P. 1

SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS

P. 2 2015 BAR OPERATIONS COMMISSION

Respondent did not file any responsive pleading at all.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of dishonesty and immoral conduct.

CENTER FOR LEGAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH P. 3

Issue: Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

P. 4 2015 BAR OPERATIONS COMMISSION

CENTER FOR LEGAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH P. 5

The pertinent Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Elayda is guity of gross negligence

P. 6 2015 BAR OPERATIONS COMMISSION

CENTER FOR LEGAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH P. 7

RE-ADMISSION TO THE BAR

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Antiniws should re-admitted to the bar

P. 8 2015 BAR OPERATIONS COMMISSION

Likewise, respondent is enjoined to keep in mind that:

CENTER FOR LEGAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH P. 9

P. 10 2015 BAR OPERATIONS COMMISSION

THE LAW FIRM OF RAYMUNDO A. ARMOVIT, Petitioner,

CENTER FOR LEGAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH P. 11

ISSUE: Whether the foregoing may be subject of execution.

P. 12 2015 BAR OPERATIONS COMMISSION

CENTER FOR LEGAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH P. 13

DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY

He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that

P. 14 2015 BAR OPERATIONS COMMISSION

We have stated in Cadauan v. Judge Alivia:

CENTER FOR LEGAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH P. 15

1. Whether or not OAS has jurisdiction over the case.

P. 16 2015 BAR OPERATIONS COMMISSION

CENTER FOR LEGAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH P. 17

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge can be held administratively liable?

Issue: Whether or not Judge Majaducon is guilty of abuse of authority?

P. 18 2015 BAR OPERATIONS COMMISSION

Section 6 of Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guity of misconduct

CENTER FOR LEGAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH P. 19

Issue: Whether or not Hudge Ubiadas is guity of gross inefficiency

P. 20 2015 BAR OPERATIONS COMMISSION

On this point, our ruling in another case is instructive:

CENTER FOR LEGAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH P. 21

P. 22 2015 BAR OPERATIONS COMMISSION

CENTER FOR LEGAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH P. 23

P. 24 2015 BAR OPERATIONS COMMISSION

CENTER FOR LEGAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH P. 25

P. 26 2015 BAR OPERATIONS COMMISSION

CENTER FOR LEGAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH P. 27

P. 28 2015 BAR OPERATIONS COMMISSION

Sec. 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that:

CENTER FOR LEGAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH P. 29

P. 30 2015 BAR OPERATIONS COMMISSION

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of grave abuse of authority.

CENTER FOR LEGAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH P. 31

P. 32 2015 BAR OPERATIONS COMMISSION