This case involved determining whether a property acquired through a 1955 lease-contract to sell belonged to the conjugal partnership of the petitioner's first or second marriage. The Supreme Court ruled the property belonged to the second marriage because full ownership was only acquired in 1975 with the execution of the absolute deed of sale, at which time the petitioner was already married to his second wife. Both lower courts ordered reimbursements be made from the different sources that contributed to the payments for the property in accordance with the Family Code.
This case involved determining whether a property acquired through a 1955 lease-contract to sell belonged to the conjugal partnership of the petitioner's first or second marriage. The Supreme Court ruled the property belonged to the second marriage because full ownership was only acquired in 1975 with the execution of the absolute deed of sale, at which time the petitioner was already married to his second wife. Both lower courts ordered reimbursements be made from the different sources that contributed to the payments for the property in accordance with the Family Code.
This case involved determining whether a property acquired through a 1955 lease-contract to sell belonged to the conjugal partnership of the petitioner's first or second marriage. The Supreme Court ruled the property belonged to the second marriage because full ownership was only acquired in 1975 with the execution of the absolute deed of sale, at which time the petitioner was already married to his second wife. Both lower courts ordered reimbursements be made from the different sources that contributed to the payments for the property in accordance with the Family Code.
This case involved determining whether a property acquired through a 1955 lease-contract to sell belonged to the conjugal partnership of the petitioner's first or second marriage. The Supreme Court ruled the property belonged to the second marriage because full ownership was only acquired in 1975 with the execution of the absolute deed of sale, at which time the petitioner was already married to his second wife. Both lower courts ordered reimbursements be made from the different sources that contributed to the payments for the property in accordance with the Family Code.
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 2
JOVELLANOS v. COURT OF APPEALS bungalow.
Thus, Mercy and Gil took over for the payment
G.R No. 100728; June 18 1992 of the property.
DOCTRINE: Annette filed a claim stating that the aforesaid property
It is the conjugal partnership of the marriage that is was acquired by her deceased husband while their subsisting at the time of the issuance of the deed of marriage was subsisting, because the deed of absolute absolute sale over the property, and not the marriage sale of 1975 was executed when they were married subsisting when the deed tantamount to a contract to sell already. Thus, it should form part of the conjugal was issued, where the property in question will belong to. partnership of the 2nd marriage. Pursuant to Article 118 of the Family Code, any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses Petitioners contend that that the beneficial and equitable shall be reimbursed by the owner/s upon liquidation of title to the property was acquired during the subsistence the partnership of the 1st marriage pursuant to the lease and conditional sale agreement contract of 1955. FACTS Daniel Jovellanos and Philippine American Life Insurance Lower court ruled for Annette but declared that the Company (PhilamLife) entered into a contract which was amounts advanced by the partnership of the first denominated as a lease and conditional sale on marriage, by Daniels own capital, and those paid by September 2, 1955 over Lot 8, Block 3 and the Mercy and Gil, should be reimbursed by the conjugal bungalow therein in QC. During this time, Daniel was still partnership of the 2nd marriage. Thus, Annette will own married to Leonor Dizon. The petitioners in this case are of the property and she and her children will have 1/6 their 3 children (Wilhelmina, Mercy and Jose). Leonor pro indiviso shares on the other half of the property. CA later on died. Daniel allowed Mercy and her husband, affirmed lower court, but only modified the ruling to now Gil, to build a house on the back portion of the premises. be based on Art. 118 of the Family Code.
Daniel married respondent Annette Jovellanos on May ISSUE
30, 1967. The other co-respondents in this case are their W/n the property should belong to the conjugal 2 children. partnership of the first or second marriage? Second marriage. On January 8, 1975, the lease amounts for the property were fully paid by Daniel so Philamlife executed a deed HELD of absolute sale. The next day, Daniel donated to The contract entered into by Daniel and Philamlife over petitioners all his rights, title and interests over the lot and the property involved a lease period of 20 years at a monthly rental of P288.87, by virtue of which the former, Daniel, (c) from conjugal funds of the second marriage, as lessee-vendee, had only the right of possession and (d) from Mercy and Gils partnership. Both lower over the property. The contract also provided that if the court and CA were right in ordering reimbursements lessee-vendee fully complied with the obligations therein, be made in line with Article 118 of the Family Code. the lessor-vendor shall immediately sell, transfer and convey to the lessee-vendee the subject property. Thus OTHER FAMILY CODE RELATED ISSUE: showing that what was involved here was in the As to petitioners contention that the Family Code should nature of a contract to sell. Even viewed as a lease not be given retroactive effect because it impairs their contract or a contract to sell, what was only vested by the vested right, pursuant to Art. 256 of the Family Code, the contract was the beneficial title to the property. Daniels court does not agree. monthly payments would be considered as amortization payments to be applied to the predetermined price of the The right of Daniel to the property was merely an said property. Thus, he only acquired ownership only inchoate and expectant right which would ripen into a upon fully payment of the said amount, which was in vested right only upon his acquisition of ownership. Ffor a 1975, when Philamlife executed the deed of absolute property right to be vested, there must be a transition sale in his favor. from the potential or contingent to the actual, and the proprietary interest must have attached to a thing; it must This is bolstered by the fact that the lease contract had have become fixed or established and is no longer open stipulations showing restrictions on how Daniel could to doubt or controversy. Thus, no vested rights were make use of the property (cannot sublease, cannot use it impaired here and the Family Code could be given for business or profession, cannot make any alterations retroactive effect without the consent of Philamlife, etc.).
Since the deed of absolute sale was executed in 1975
by Philamlife, it was only then that full ownership was vested in Daniel. Since, as early as 1967, he was already married to Annette H. Jovellanos, this property necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said second wife.
As found by the lower court, the payments for the
property were acquired from different sources: (a) from the conjugal property of first marriage, (b) from capital of