Policy Sciences 391

Science is Not Value-Free

ABSTRACT
The scientific attitude involves a willingness to be objective. But many falsely assume additionally
that such willingness implies being completely value-free. Actually, scientific research is value-
saturated. At every step one faces the question, "Which is the best way?" Not only is it better to
be than not to be scientific, scientists believe, but one ought to seek what is best relative to all
aspects of science. Exploration is limited to (1) problems, (2) attitude and (3) methods. Even
prejudice, which is evil when bias prevents or produces false results, may also be good when it
helps produce true conclusions. Do policy scientists have special obligations regarding this issue ?

Administrators often confront those who insist that "science is, or ought to be,
completely value-free." Granted that the scientific attitude involves a willingness to
let the facts, rather than our preferences, determine the outcome of research. But the
additional assumption, that willingness to be objective implies being completely
value-free, is one with which I must, as a philosopher of science, disagree. Why ?
Because science actually is saturated with values, as I shall show in what follows.
Although only one example is enough to refute the "completely value-free" doctrine,
I choose the more difficult task of demonstrating a more thorough-going, more
extreme, counter-claim: " N o t a single aspect of science is completely value-free."
In order to do this, I select three major components of science, and show, with
respect to each, why values (and value judgments) and obligations (and ought-
judgments) inhere in working scientifically. Three such components, pertaining to
problems, attitude and method, will be distinguished.
My usual method of demonstrating this claim consists in asking questions. My
scientist friend gives his own answers. I cannot carry on a live discussion with each
reader, obviously, but I can report the kinds of replies typically recurring in such
discussions.
M y first question is a general one: "Is science any good at all ?" The reply is always,
of course, a quick "Yes." Sometimes I receive a defensive enumeration of enormous
benefits resulting from science, including greater understanding, better health, longer
life and higher standards of living. Overlooked, usually, is the fact that such an answer
provides a clue to the basic nature and purpose of science. "'Why be scientific?"
"Because being scientific produces good results."
Pushing this issue farther, I ask: "Are good results enough? Or is science also
better? Is it better to be scientific than not to be scientific?" Exceptions aside, where
Policy Sciences 2 (1971), 391-396
Copyright 1971 by Elsevier Publishing Company, Amsterdam
392 Archie J. Bahm
being scientific can produce good, or better, results, ought one not to seek to be
scientific ? Test this question in another form: "Does it make any difference whether
or not one is scientific ?" If not, Le., if it is a matter of indifference whether or not one
is scientific, then no goods or oughts are involved. But if it does make a difference, Le.,
where it is better to be than not to be scientific, then ought one not try to be scientific ?
The point pressed here is that such being good, or being better, is foundational to
science. Such goodness or betterness is the very reason for its being in the first place.
Hence, science continues to depend upon this value foundation even when it is
forgotten. And the implicit "ought to be scientific" motivates one's behavior as a
scientist, even when he remains unaware that it continues to be his basic ought.

I. Problems
If no values were involved in scientific problems, then it should make no difference
whether or not there are any such problems, whether or not anyone is concerned about
them, and whether or not they are ever solved. Yet, only a moment's reflection is
needed to reveal the contrary. Let me put three questions:
1. "Should a scientist work at a problem that is not worth his while ?" The normal
answer is "No. A scientist ought not waste his time. He ought to work only at those
problems which are worthwhile." Such an answer implies that every scientific problem
is, or ought to be, a value problem. That is, a scientist ought to work at only those
problems which have values in the sense that they are worth his while.
2. "Are all scientific problems equally worthwhile ?" Or if some seem relatively
trivial and others immensely important, ought not a scientist devote himself to the
latter ? Does not the relative seriousness of a problem constitute an obligation for a
scaentist to choose it? On the other hand, if a scientist regards an important problem
unsolvable, then he feels no obligation to try. And, when the costs of trying appear
greater than the benefits anticipated, then ought he not spend his time elsewhere?
When the prospective evils outweigh the goods, then does not a scientist have an
obligation to refrain ?
3. "When working on a worthwhile problem, how ought a scientist seek to solve it ?
Are some ways better than others ?" If he is acquainted with alternatives, ought he
not use the most efficient method ? Is not a scientist constantly involved in value, and
ethical, issues because at every step on his way to solving each problem he faces the
question: "Which is the best way to proceed ?"

II. Attitude
If there is an attitude essential to the nature of science, ought not every scientist have
it ? If he does not, ought he not acquire it ? If he acquires it, ought he not maintain it,
i.e., keep it in mind all of the time he works as a scientist? Ought he not also urge his
fellow scientists to do likewise ?
What is the scientific attitude ? If a scientist does not know, or is unsure, ought he
not try to find out ? My studies as a teacher of philosophy of science have led to the
hypothesis that it involves at least three characteristics: curiosity, willingness to be
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Science is Not Value-Free 393
"objective," and willingness to "speculate" (i.e., attempt to formulate solutions even
in the absence of assurance that they will work). If these are essential, then ought not
every scientist have, or endeavor to have, all of them ? The second deserves more
attention, both because it is difficult to understand and because it is the source of the
view that science ought to be value-free.
What is "objectivity"? Is it something simple, or something complex? Stated
simply, it is the willingness to reach conclusions only on the basis of actual evidence
and not on the basis of wishful thinking, prejudice, personal profit or fear. But
complications appear when we study it thoroughly. My analysis reveals that it involves
a willingness to follow curiosity and, as Socrates said, the argument wherever it may
lead. It involves a willingness to be guided by both experience and reason, and, in
the absence of first-hand evidence, the authority of competent fellow scientists. It
involves a willingness to suspend judgment, or to remain uncertain, tentative and
patient, about one's problems until sufficient evidence warrants a conclusion. It
involves being open-minded, or a willingness to be tolerant and unprejudiced, con-
cerning what the outcome will be. It involves a willingness to be neutral, impersonal
and unselfish in whatever way is needed in order not to bias the results. Perhaps these
distinguishable aspects amount to different ways of expressing the same idea. Yet an
exploration of all of them may clarify, magnify and enrich the significance of the
scientific attitude, and reveal both why it is important in science and why many find it
difficult to understand, acquire and maintain. If all of these aspects are essential to
objectivity, then is not every scientist obligated to embody them within himself while
he behaves scientifically ?
Two more issues are crucial to understanding what is meant by "objectivity."
The first pertains to its relation to "subjectivity." Since subject and object are op-
posites, many quickly conclude that seeking to be objective involves avoiding being
subjective. However, "subject" and "object" involve each other. Strictly speaking,
there can be no object without a subject, and no subject without an object, That is, no
knowledge exists apart from knowers. Knowers are subjects. Why, then, conclude
that seeking to be objective involves eliminating all traces of subjectivity ? In fact, the
scientific attitude is an attitude, and all attitudes are attitudes of subjects or persons.
The willingness to be objective is a subjective willingness. Without this subjective
attitude, objectivity would be impossible. Therefore ought not one who claims to be
scientific keep in mind the necessarily subjective conditions of his efforts to be objec-
tive ? Can one be objective in his understanding of science if he fails to recognize both
subjective and objective factors as necessary ?
The second crucial issue turns about the even-less-commonly-revealed roles of
wishful thinking, bias, and prejudice in science. Has wishful thinking always led to
bad results ? Does bias always yield falsity ? Is prejudice always vicious ?
1. When wishful thinking produces false conclusions and bad results, it ought to be
avoided. But if it helps produce good results, ought it not be permitted, or even
encouraged ? For example, when one doubts whether a problem can be solved, if his wish
to have it solved motivates him to efforts which do solve it, was not such wishing good ?
2. When favoring one hypothesis over another leads to gathering evidence which
Policy Sciences 2 (1971), 391-396
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394 Archie J. Bahm
would not otherwise become available, may not such favoritism be useful ? Research
directors sometimes employ scientists known to have conflicting biases, setting each
against the other so that each will pursue evidence favoring his side more energetically,
more persistently, more thoroughly. No matter which side wins, did not the directors
rightly seek to exploit such biases ?
3. Prejudice, or prejudgment, exists in scientists in many ways. Does not commitment
to such views as "being scientific is better than not being scientific," "the scientific
method is better than other methods," "a scientist ought to be willing to be objective,"
exemplify prejudices essential to science ? Public adulation of science commonly ignores
the fact that a scientist, in his trial and error methods, usually endures multitudes of
errors or failures for each success. If, in the face of so many failures, a scientist cannot
retain faith in the prejudice that it is the best method, he becomes a drop-out.
Various faiths, or assumptions, such as "the principle of the uniformity of nature,"
"the world is completely understandable," "if it can't be measured, it doesn't exist,"
are neither self-evident nor empirically demonstrable; yet some scientists regard them
as fundamental prejudices necessary to science. The claim that "science is, or ought to
be, completely value-free" itself exemplifies a prejudice. This one happens to be false;
but, despite the resulting evils, it does motivate some to demand rigor unlikely
without it. Prejudice against prejudice is still prejudice. Thus, prejudice is not, merely
by itself, an evil. But prejudice which produces bad results is evil. Success in science
depends not upon complete absence of prejudice, but upon the presence of beneficial
prejudices.

III. Methods
If some methods are better than others, is not seeking the best method an obligation for
scientists ? Which is better ? Without being exhaustive, I raise several typical questions
about such methods.
1. If a first important step consists in clarification, definition and location of the
boundaries of a problem, since otherwise efforts may be wasted exploring irrelevancies,
is not a scientist faced with value problems, right from the beginning, in seeking a good
definition and in avoiding wastes ?
2. If, next, he must formulate an hypothesis, ought he not seek the best hypothesis,
rather than a poor, indifferent or even merely good one? If there are criteria for good
hypotheses, such as clarity, definiteness, self-consistency, consistency with established
theories, adequacy, simplicity, communicability and fruitfulness, then is not a scientist
obligated to try to meet these criteria ?
3. If verification requires testing, ought not a scientist conduct each test properly,
carefully, precisely and well ? If any test fails to be a good test, by his standards, ought
he not reject it and repeat it ? When several tests are needed, ought he not try to decide
in advance how many, so that fatigue, anxiety, or haste will not be allowed to become
deciding factors ? If standards for minimum numbers, or percentages, of successes in
trial and error situations have been established (as in testing pharmaceuticals on rats,
dogs and monkeys before trying them on humans), does a scientist not have obligations
to reach these standards before announcing success ?
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Science is Not Value-Free 395
4. If experiment is called for, is a scientist not obligated to design one which is
clearly relevant, as adequate as possible, and reliable ? When methods for increasing
the accuracy of experiments have become available, is not a scientist obligated to use
them ? If some experiments are better in the sense of being more decisive or "crucial,"
ought not a scientist attempt such experiments whenever possible ?
5. Involved in the foregoing are many subordinate duties, such as making obser-
vations, measures and inferences, whether inductive, deductive or statistical. A scien-
tist ought to seek good data, avoid erroneous observations, make readable reports, and
preserve his records. Surely his work is not good if his deductions are invalid, his
measurements inaccurate, his inductions incomplete, or if his statistical results vary
more than permissible "probable error." If problems, hypotheses, and verifications are
not "scientific" unless communicable, does a scientist not have duties relative to
communicability and actual communication ?
6. If tools and equipment, such as meters, telescopes, microscopes, transformers
and computers, are needed, ought not a scientist acquire them, the best of them, and
then protect them from deterioration, theft or misuse ? Ought he not seek to improve
their accuracy, efficiency and endurance when possible ?
7. When complicated problems require teamwork, does not the need for good
research entail obligations to obtain highly qualified directors, well-trained personnel,
and enough men to do the job right ? When faced with selecting and training men,
ought not a manager seek persons with the best qualifications, including honesty,
integrity, reliability, morale, adaptability, keenness of observation, inventiveness,
skillfulness, good memory and good health? Ought he not also upgrade, retrain,
remotivate and reward as needed ? Ought he not seek adequate financing and prepare
reliable and convincing reports for those who pay ?
8. If pure research must be kept free from outside inference, ought not a scientist
try to keep it pure ? If research cannot occur without public or private corporation
support, ought not scientists seek such support ? If "pure research" remains merely
speculative until tested in practice, ought not a pure scientist demonstrate interest in,
and, when possible, cooperate with, the efforts of applied scientists ?
9. Whenever danger exists of unnecessarily duplicating efforts to solve problems,
ought not scientists try to discover whether the experiments have been performed
elsewhere ? Ought not all scientists be concerned about rapid publication and wide
distribution of results, and even of experiments under way, so as to avoid waste ?
When a scientist in one field discovers evidence of methods which he cannot use but
which may be useful in other fields, ought he not inform others about it ? If a new and
better technique has been discovered in one field, ought not scientists in other fields
investigate its workability, or adaptability, in their fields ? When a newly confirmed
discovery in one field implies need for revising assumptions or conclusions in another
field, do not scientists in the one field have a duty to publicize it and scientists in the
other field a duty to hasten to inform themselves about it ?
I could continue asking similar questions. Must not the answer always be " Y e s " ?
Is a scientist ever free from obligations ? No, except, perhaps, when he finds time to
relax from his duties, and even then it may be that he ought to relax, ought to relax
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long enough, and ought not to relax too long. Surely any scientist who stops to reflect,
as we are doing, long enough to understand the nature of science will conclude that
science is not, and ought not be, value-free. Science is not value-free. Science is value-
full. Science is saturated with values. There is no aspect of science which is totally
value-free and from which duties and obligations are completely absent.
Why, then, did the false view, the myth that science ought to be value-free, arise ?
Because the value so often observed in "permitting the facts rather than one's pref-
erences determine conclusions" was so great that it was announced as a doctrine.
Both dutiful instruction and unreflective repetition contributed to its uncritical ex-
tension as a universal dogma--a supposed categorical imperative for all scientists.
But the doctrine, that one ought to have no oughts, is not only false but also obviously
self-contradictory. Once a scientist discovers its falsity, does he not thereby acquire
another duty, namely, that of trying to eradicate it, as quickly and as fully as possible,
from the minds of those who still hold it ? Do not all who are concerned with the policy
sciences have a special responsibility relative to this obligation ?

Policy Sciences 2 (t971), 391-396