THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 178741. January 17, 2011.]

ROSALINO L. MARABLE , petitioner, vs . MYRNA F. MARABLE ,

respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR. , J : p

On appeal is the Decision 1 dated February 12, 2007 and Resolution 2 dated July
4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 which reversed and set
aside the Decision 3 dated January 4, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72,
Antipolo City, in Civil Case No. 01-6302. The RTC had granted petitioner's prayer that his
marriage to respondent be declared null and void on the ground that he is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Petitioner and respondent met in 1967 while studying at Arellano University. They
were classmates but initially, petitioner was not interested in respondent. He only
became attracted to her after they happened to sit beside each other in a passenger
bus. Petitioner courted respondent and they eventually became sweethearts even
though petitioner already had a girl friend. Later, respondent discovered petitioner's
other relationship and demanded more time and attention from petitioner. Petitioner
alleged that he appreciated this gesture like a child longing for love, time and attention.
On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in
civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. A church wedding followed
on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison and their marriage
was blessed with five children.
As the years went by, however, their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical
quarrels became common occurrences. They fought incessantly and petitioner became
unhappy because of it. The frequency of their quarrels increased when their eldest
daughter transferred from one school to another due to juvenile misconduct. It became
worse still when their daughter had an unwanted teenage pregnancy. The exceedingly
serious attention petitioner gave to his children also made things worse for them as it
not only spoiled some of them, but it also became another cause for the incessant
quarrelling between him and respondent.
Longing for peace, love and affection, petitioner developed a relationship with
another woman. Respondent learned about the affair, and petitioner promptly
terminated it. But despite the end of the short-lived affair, their quarrels aggravated.
Also, their business ventures failed. Any amount of respect remaining between them
was further eroded by their frequent arguments and verbal abuses infront of their
friends. Petitioner felt that he was unloved, unwanted and unappreciated and this made
him indifferent towards respondent. When he could not bear his lot any longer,
petitioner left the family home and stayed with his sister in Antipolo City. He gave up all
the properties which he and respondent had accumulated during their marriage in favor
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 of respondent and their children. Later, he converted to Islam after dating several
women. HAcaCS

On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds. On said date,
he led a petition 4 for declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent on the
ground of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential responsibilities of
marital life.
In his petition, petitioner averred that he came from a poor family and was
already exposed to the hardships of farm life at an early age. His father, although
responsible and supportive, was a compulsive gambler and womanizer. His father left
their family to live with another woman with whom he had seven other children. This
caused petitioner's mother and siblings to suffer immensely. Thus, petitioner became
obsessed with attention and worked hard to excel so he would be noticed.
Petitioner further alleged that he supported himself through college and worked
hard for the company he joined. He rose from the ranks at Advertising and Marketing
Associates, Inc., and became Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Finance Of cer
therein. But despite his success at work, he alleged that his misery and loneliness as a
child lingered as he experienced a void in his relationship with his own family.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented the Psychological Report 5 of Dr.
Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist from the National Center for Mental Health. Dr.
Tayag's report stated that petitioner is suffering from "Antisocial Personality Disorder,"
characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-
centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of remorse. The report also revealed that
petitioner's personality disorder is rooted in deep feelings of rejection starting from the
family to peers, and that his experiences have made him so self-absorbed for needed
attention. It was Dr. Tayag's conclusion that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated
to perform his marital obligations.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioner's marriage to
respondent on the ground of petitioner's psychological incapacity.
Upon appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the CA reversed the RTC
decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed
Decision hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the marriage between
the parties is declared valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 6

The CA held that the circumstances related by petitioner are insuf cient to
establish the existence of petitioner's psychological incapacity. The CA noted that Dr.
Tayag did not fully explain the root cause of the disorder nor did she give a concrete
explanation as to how she arrived at a conclusion as to its gravity or permanence. The
appellate court emphasized that the root cause of petitioner's psychological incapacity
must be medically or clinically identi ed, suf ciently proven by experts and clearly
explained in the decision. In addition, the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the
time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
On July 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence,
this appeal.
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 Essentially, petitioner raises the sole issue of whether the CA erred in reversing
the trial court's decision. THacES

Petitioner claims that his psychological incapacity to perform his essential

marital obligations was clearly proven and correctly appreciated by the trial court.
Petitioner relies heavily on the psychological evaluation conducted by Dr. Tayag and
quotes the latter's findings:
Petitioner had always been hungry for love and affection starting from his family
to the present affairs that he [has]. This need had afforded him to nd avenues
straight or not, just to ful ll this need. He used charm, deceit, lies, violence, [and]
authority just so to accom[m]odate and justify his acts. Finally, he is using
religions to support his claim for a much better personal and married life which is
really out of context. Rebellious and impulsive as he is, emotional instability is
apparent that it would be dif cult for him to harmonize with life in general and
changes. Changes must come from within, it is not purely external.

Clinically, petitioner's self-absorbed ideals represent the grave, severe, and

incurable nature of Antisocial Personality Disorder. Such disorder is characterized
by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-
centeredness, deceitfulness, and lack of remorse.

The psychological incapacity of the petitioner is attributed by jurisdictional

antecedence as it existed even before the said marital union. It is also profoundly
rooted, grave and incurable. The root cause of which is deep feelings of rejection
starting from family to peers. This insecure feelings had made him so self-
absorbed for needed attention. Carrying it until his marital life. Said psychological
incapacity had deeply marred his adjustment and severed the relationship. Thus,
said marriage should be declared null and void by reason of the psychological
incapacity. 7

According to petitioner, the uncontradicted psychological report of Dr. Tayag

declared that his psychological incapacity is profoundly rooted and has the
characteristics of juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability. Moreover, petitioner
asserts that his psychological incapacity has been medically identi ed and suf ciently
proven. The State, on the other hand, never presented another psychologist to rebut Dr.
Tayag's ndings. Also, petitioner maintains that the psychological evaluation would
show that the marriage failed not solely because of irreconcilable differences between
the spouses, but due to petitioner's personality disorder which rendered him unable to
comply with his marital obligations. To the mind of petitioner, the assailed decision
compelled the parties to continue to live under a "non-existent marriage."
The Republic, through the OSG, led a Comment 8 maintaining that petitioner
failed to prove his psychological incapacity. The OSG points out that Dr. Tayag failed to
explain speci cally how she arrived at the conclusion that petitioner suffers from an
anti-social personality disorder and that it is grave and incurable. In fact, contrary to his
claim, it even appears that petitioner acted responsibly throughout their marriage.
Despite nancial dif culties, he and respondent had blissful moments together. He was
a good father and provider to his children. Thus, the OSG argues that there was no
reason to describe petitioner as a self-centered, remorseless, rebellious, impulsive and
socially deviant person.
Additionally, the OSG contends that since the burden of proof is on petitioner to
establish his psychological incapacity, the State is not required to present an expert
witness where the testimony of petitioner's psychologist was insuf cient and
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 inconclusive. The OSG adds that petitioner was not able to substantiate his claim that
his in delity was due to some psychological disorder, as the real cause of petitioner's
alleged incapacity appears to be his general dissatisfaction with his marriage. At most
he was able to prove in delity on his part and the existence of "irreconcilable
differences" and "con icting personalities." These, however, do not constitute
psychological incapacity.
Respondent also led her Comment 9 and Memorandum 1 0 stressing that
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage should contemplate
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the essential
marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or dif culty, much less ill will, on the part
of the errant spouse.
The appeal has no merit. CcAESI

The appellate court did not err when it reversed and set aside the ndings of the
RTC for lack of legal and factual bases.
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage

under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness af icting a
party even before the celebration of the marriage. 1 1 These are the disorders that result
in the utter insensitivity or inability of the af icted party to give meaning and
significance to the marriage he or she has contracted. 1 2 Psychological incapacity must
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. 1 3
In Republic v. Court of Appeals , 1 4 the Court laid down the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36. The Court held,
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identi ed, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) suf ciently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68

up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
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 children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or scal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certi cation, which will
be quoted in the decision, brie y stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

In the instant case, petitioner completely relied on the psychological examination

conducted by Dr. Tayag on him to establish his psychological incapacity. The result of
the examination and the ndings of Dr. Tayag however, are insuf cient to establish
petitioner's psychological incapacity. In cases of annulment of marriage based on
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, the psychological illness and its root cause
must be proven to exist from the inception of the marriage. Here, the appellate court
correctly ruled that the report of Dr. Tayag failed to explain the root cause of
petitioner's alleged psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made
a general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder
but there was no factual basis stated for the nding that petitioner is a socially deviant
person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful.
As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo, 1 5 the presentation of expert proof in cases
for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a
thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity. Here, the evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short of the required proof which the
Court can rely on as basis to declare as void petitioner's marriage to respondent. In
fact, we are baf ed by Dr. Tayag's evaluation which became the trial court's basis for
concluding that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated, for the report did not
clearly specify the actions of petitioner which are indicative of his alleged psychological
incapacity. More importantly, there was no established link between petitioner's acts to
his alleged psychological incapacity. It is indispensable that the evidence must show a
link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself. 1 6 ATHCDa

For sure, the spouses' frequent marital squabbles 1 7 and differences in handling
nances and managing their business affairs, as well as their con icts on how to raise
their children, are not manifestations of psychological incapacity which may be a
ground for declaring their marriage void. Petitioner even admitted that despite their
nancial dif culties, they had happy moments together. Also, the records would show
that the petitioner acted responsibly during their marriage and in fact worked hard to
provide for the needs of his family, most especially his children. Their personal
differences do not re ect a personality disorder tantamount to psychological
incapacity.
Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer
for a father, was one of the reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs during his
marriage. However, it appears more likely that he became unfaithful as a result of a
general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in
his personal history. His tendency to womanize, assuming he had such tendency, was
not shown to be due to causes of a psychological nature that is grave, permanent and
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 incurable. In fact, the records show that when respondent learned of his affair, he
immediately terminated it. In short, petitioner's marital in delity does not appear to be
symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of
performing his spousal obligations. It has been held in various cases that sexual
in delity, by itself, is not suf cient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological
incapacity. 1 8 It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a
disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of marriage. 1 9 That not being the case with petitioner, his claim
of psychological incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that psychological incapacity
must be more than just a "dif culty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. In Santos v. Court of Appeals , 2 0 the intention of the law is to con ne the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. 2 1
All told, we nd that the CA did not err in declaring the marriage of petitioner and
respondent as valid and subsisting. The totality of the evidence presented is
insuf cient to establish petitioner's psychological incapacity to ful ll his essential
marital obligations.
WHEREFORE , the appeal is DE NI E D for lack of merit. The February 12, 2007
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 and its Resolution dated July
4, 2007 are hereby AFFIRMED .
No costs.
SO ORDERED .
Carpio Morales, Brion, Bersamin and Sereno, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 21-31. Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, with Associate
Justices Vicente Q. Roxas and Ramon R. Garcia, concurring.
2. Id. at 37-38.
3. Id. at 32-35. Penned by Judge Ruth Cruz-Santos.
4. Records, pp. 1-6.

5. Id. at 9-17.
6. Rollo, p. 31.
7. Records, pp. 16-17.
8. Rollo, pp. 49-57.
9. Id. at 68-71.
10. Id. at 100-107.

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 11. Republic v. Cabantug-Baguio, G.R. No. 171042, June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 711, 725.
12. Toring v. Toring, G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010, p. 8.
13. Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 121, 128.
14. G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198, 209-213.
15. G.R. No. 164493, March 12, 2010, 615 SCRA 154, 174.
16. Id.
17. Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, supra note 13 at 129.
18. Villalon v. Villalon, G.R. No. 167206, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 572, 582.
19. Id.
20. G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20, 33.

21. Aspillaga v. Aspillaga, G.R. No. 170925, October 26, 2009, 604 SCRA 444, 449-450;
Tongol v. Tongol, G.R. No. 157610, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 135, 142.

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