Ethnic Politics in Eighteenth-Century Burma by Victor B. Lieberman

Modem Asian Studies, i a , 3 (1978), pp. 455-482. Printed in Great Britain.
Ethnic Politics in Eighteenth-Century Burma

VICTOR B. LIEBERMAN
Hatfield Polytechnic
W E commonly find in the literature on pre-colonial mainland Southeast

Asia a tendency to treat the principal ethnic groupsBurmese, Mons,
Siamese, Cambodians, Vietnameseas discrete political categories.
This tendency is particularly marked in the historiography of the
Irrawaddy valley, where the recurrent north-south conflicts of the
eleventh to the eighteenth centuries have usually been interpreted as
'national' or 'racial' struggles between the Burmese people of the north
and the Mon, or Talaing, people of the south. In writing of the last
major 'Mon-Burmese' war, that of 1740-57, historians have character-
ized the 1740 uprising at the southern city of Pegu as an expression of
'Mon nationalism'.1 The ensuing conflict reportedly became a struggle
between Mons and Burmese each 'fighting for the existence of their
race'; and Alaung-hpaya, said to be a champion of 'Burmese national-
ism', allegedly made vigorous efforts to destroy the Mon culture and
people once he had triumphed. 2
I wish to thank Professor C. D. Cowan, Professor Hugh Tinker, Professor H. L.
Shorto, Professor Hla Pe, Mr William Koenig, and especially Mr John Okell for
their assistance. Responsibility for the content of the article remains my own.
1
For explanations of the revolt in terms of 'Mon nationalism', the 'Talaing
national movement', the 'Talaing . . . nation', etc., see D. G. E. Hall, Early English
Intercourse with Burma, 1587-1743, second edn (London, 1968), pp. 12, 236; B. R.
Pearn, A History of Rangoon (Rangoon, 1939; repr., Westmead, England, 1971), p. 4 1 ;
John F. Cady, Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development (New York, 1964), pp. 285,
288-9; Sir Arthur Phayre, History of Burma (London, 1883; repr., New York, 1969),
pp. 142-3.
2
See G. E. Harvey, History of Burma (London, 1925; new impression, London,
1967), pp. 216, 220, 234-6; Phayre, History of Burma, pp. 150-1; Cady, Southeast
Asia, pp. 288-9; D. G. E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia, 2nd edn (New York,
1966), pp. 365, 381-6; id., Europe and Burma (London, 1945), p. 60; British Burma
Gazetteer, 2 vols (Rangoon, 1879-1880), Vol. 2, pp. 168, 481; Mabel Haynes Bode,
TTie Pali Literature of Burma (London, 1909; repr. London, 1966), pp. 68-9, 83.
Htin Aung, A History of Burma (New York, 1967), pp. 153-70, 313, is a partial excep-
tion to this school of thought in that Htin Aung recognizes the poly-ethnic character
of the initial uprising at Pegu. By 1747, however, he claims that the Mons had begun
to massacre Burmese in the south. He characterizes the ensuing wars as a 'racial
conflict' (p. 313) and freely uses the terms 'nationalism' and 'patriot' in describing
Alaiing-hpaya's movement. Nigel Brailey, 'A Re-Investigation of the Gwe of
455
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456 VICTOR B. LIEBERMAN
Although they fail to offer a precise definition of the terms 'national'
or 'racial', these historians appear to have made three interrelated
assumptions: a) each 'racial' or 'national' group constituted an exclusive,
stable, empirically-identifiable population; b) 'racial' identity was the
only significant factor in determining political allegiance; c) as a result,
each of the contending forces was essentially of one 'racial' or 'national'
type. This paper examines the validity of these assumptions. In so
doing, it provides a theoretical framework for interpreting ethnically-
oriented conflicts in other areas of pre-colonial Southeast Asia, and it
attempts to offer some new perspectives on ethnic relations in con-
temporary Burma.
Theoretical Considerations
It is not difficult to find evidence of Burmese-Mon awareness and

antagonism. The Burmese and Mon tongues, which are mutually
unintelligible, belong to different linguistic families.3 Despite a con-
siderable amount of geographic interpenetration, Burmese-speakers
were concentrated in the dry zone north of about 180 N. latitude,
while Mon-speakers lived principally in the wet coastal zone of the
Irrawaddy delta and the trans-Sit-taung littoral. Burmese and Mons
shared many cultural traits, but there were also significant differences
in religious practices, domestic customs, literary traditions, even physi-
cal appearance. 4 Burmese were said by a European informant in 1759
to be of a somewhat darker complexion, and only among the Burmese
did males commonly tattoo their thighs. Whereas Mon men cut their
hair round in front and shaved the backpart of their heads, Burmese
men grew their hair long and coiled it into a topknot.5 The Mons,
being the earlier residents of the valley and the first to have adopted
Eighteenth Century Burma', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. I, No. 2 (September
1970), pp. 33-47, has escaped the traditional Mon-Burmese dichotomy by focusing
with considerable insight on 'Karen' involvement at Pegu. Yet he, too, has tended to
think in terms of discrete politico-ethnic categories, e.g. 'Karens' vs. 'the Mon party',
See infra.
3
Peter Kunstadter, 'Population and Linguistic Affiliation of Ethnic Groups of
Burma', in Kunstadter (ed.), Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations, 2 vols
(Princeton, 1967), Vol. I, pp. 78-91.
4
See R. Halliday, The Talaings (Rangoon, igi 7).
5
A. Dalrymple (comp.), Oriental Repertory, 2 vols (London, 1808; repr., Rangoon,
1926) [Dal], Vol. I, p. 99. Cf. Halliday, The Talaings, pp. 19-20; and Twin-thin-
taik-wun Maha-si-thu, 'Alaung-min-taya-gyi ayei-daw-bon' (Biography of King
Alaung-hpaya) [AA-T], in Alaung-hpaya ayei-daw-bon hnasaung-dwe (Two Biographies
of King Alaung-hpaya), J Hla Tin, ed (Rangoon, 1961), pp. 161, 186.
ETHNIC POLITICS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BURMA 457
Buddhist civilization, felt culturally superior to the Burmese, whom

they tended to disparage as 'upcountry rustics'. Burmese in turn scorned
the 'effeteness' of their southern neighbors, as when one of Alaung-
hpaya's commanders boasted, 'One hundred Talaing [warriors]
don't equal a single Burman.'*
Cultural and physical differences of this sort, however, do not
mean that ethnic identity was necessarily static, or that the categories
'Burmese' and 'Mon' were mutually exclusive, as some historians have
assumed. Anthropologists of mainland Southeast Asia have demon-
strated that ethnic categories can usefully be regarded as roles vis-d-vis
other groups, and in that sense are only indirectly descriptive of the
empirical characteristics of particular groups.7 If a person wishes to
change his ecological or political role within the larger society, he often
adopts, either temporarily or permanently, cultural attributes of
another group which have a generally-recognized symbolic significance.
Thus a 'Kachin', if he chooses, can 'become a Shan' by adopting Bud-
dhism and/or Shan dress and speech, without at the same time abandon-
ing all the items of his Kachin cultural heritage. There is reason to
believe that a similar pattern operated in Burma during the pre-
colonial period, and that many people living in bi-lingual districts
of the Irrawaddy basin faced a genuine choice as to whether they
would identify themselves as 'Burmese' or 'Mons'. The choice seems to
have been determined in large measure by political considerations:
those people whose communities were politically subordinate to, or
allied with, the coast, sometimes cut their hair in Mon fashion or used
Mon speech in order to declare publicly their support for the coastal
kingdom. On one level at least, these people were deemed to have
'become Mons', although they may also have retained numerous
Burmese cultural features. In the sixteenth century the Burmese king
Tabin-shwei-hti wore a Mon head-dress and cut his hair in Mon fashion,
thereby 'becoming a Mon' in the eyes of his subjects, because a pro-
phecy had said that only Mon kings could rule over Pegu.8 In the mid-
6
Kbn-baung-zet maha-ya-zawin-daw-gyi (Great Royal Chronicle of the Kon-baung
Dynasty) [KBZ], 3 vols (Rangoon, 1967), Vol. I, p. 114.
' F. K. Lehman, 'Ethnic Categories in Burma and the Theory of Social Systems',
in Kunstadter, Southeast Asian Tribes, pp. 93-124; E. R. Leach, Political Systems of
Highland Burma (London, 1964); Michael Moerman, 'Ethnic Identification in a
Complex Civilization: Who Are the Lue?', American Anthropologist, Vol. 67 (1965),
pp. 1215-30.
j Kala, Maha-ya-zawin-gyi (The Great Chronicle), Vol. 2, Hsaya Pwa (ed.)
(Rangoon, n.d.), pp. 214-16; H. L. Shorto, 'A Mon Genealogy of Kings: Observa-
tions on "the Nidana Arambhakatha"', in D. G. E. Hall (ed.), Historians of South
East Asia (London, 1961), p. 68.
eighteenth century, as we shall see, some Burmese who fell within
Pegu's orbit chose (or were forced) to cut their topknots in order to
demonstrate loyalty to Pegu. Conversely, under the stabilized Burmese
hegemony over the coast of the Kon-baung period (1757-1852), Mon-
speakers tended to tattoo their thighs and to acquire Burmese speech
because this behavior conferred political and economic advantages.
As S. J. Tambiah has indicated in his description of'galactic polities',
Southeast Asian kingdoms traditionally comprised a 'central planet'
surrounded by an attenuated field of satellite communities whose
number fluctuated according to the military strength of the center.9
At a crude level of generalization, the long-term implications of this
political pattern for the ethnic composition of the Irrawaddy valley
were as follows: the more powerful the northern kingdom of Ava, the
greater the percentage of people within the Irrawaddy basin who
characterized themselves as 'Burmese'; and the greater the sway
of Pegu, the greater the potential number of'Mons'. 10 The wars be-
tween Ava and Pegu, therefore, were not 'racial' or 'national' struggles
per se, but regional and dynastic conflicts in which cultural traits could
be made to serve as a public badge, a visible emblem, of political
loyalty.11 To some extent, 'Mon' was a role filled by people loyal to
Pegu, while 'Burman' was the role accepted by people loyal to Ava.
The possibility of role choices clearly tended to promote ethnic
homogeneity within the Peguan and Avan polities, and in this sense, the
customary identification of Pegu as the Mon kingdom, and of Ava as the
Burmese kingdom, remains valid. Yet we should recognize that this was
merely a tendency towards uniformity, not an implacable law. In
practice, homogeneity was never achieved, because a number of
powerful traditions militated against a direct correspondence between
ethnic type and political loyalty. Some members of minority groups
within a given polity assimilated to the culture of the majority; but
others, perhaps in even greater numbers, retained their original
identity while they supported the host population politically and
militarily. Thus although Mons dominated Pegu and Burmese domin-
S. J. Tambiah, World Conqueror_and World Renouncer (Cambridge, 1976), Ch. 7.
'"See Michael Adas, The Burma Delta (Madison, Wise, 1974), pp. 1 7-ig, 57-
Similarly, Moerman, 'Ethnic Identification in a Complex Civilization', p. 1222,
has stated that within lowland northern Thailand, all changes among minority
Thai communities have been 'toward the language, culture, and identification of
the politically dominant people which, for the last 50 to 100 years, has been the
Siamese.' Note, however, that people can adopt another group's language and culture
without adopting that group's ethnic self-identification; indeed, this is often the case
in Lower Burma. See Lehman, 'Ethnic Categories in Burma', p. 116.
11
Cf. Moerman, 'Ethnic Identification in a Complex Civilization', p. 1219.
ated Ava, each kingdom was able to incorporate large and strategically-
important minority groups.
One deeply-ingrained tradition favoring heterogeneity was that of
patron-client relations. Political loyalties focused on powerful indi-
viduals, or patrons, who protected their clients against abuse and/or
provided them with sustenance; in return, their clients rendered per-
sonal service. Because authority derived from the power and charisma
of the patron, and because each of his clients was tied to him by separate
personal bonds, there was no need for a common identity among his
followers. We see this on the local level in villages whose headmen
attracted military followings of diverse backgrounds; but in its most
elaborate form, we see this principle embodied in the structure of the
Avan and Peguan monarchies. According to traditional theory, sover-
eignty resided entirely in the person of the ruler, who owned the land
and water of the realm, and the very lives of his subjects. People swore
allegiance to him as an individual, and in return were patronized with
offices and fiefs. The sacred ideal of royal service was expressed in the
Burmese phrase kyei-zu-thit-sa-daw sating'to remember one's oath
of allegiance and one's debt of gratitude for royal patronage'. One could
betray his oath to the monarch, but there was no articulated concept
of treason to the 'nation' since sovereignty did not reside in the people
at large.
From this political conception flowed several logical consequences.
Throughout the Taung-ngu period (c. 15391752)n the composition of
the royal service-people (ahmd-ddns) and of the royal court was surpris-
ingly diverse. The crown, chronically in need of manpower, invited to
the capital area, or forcibly deported, large bodies of non-Burmese who
were settled in separate service communities and allowed to retain their
ethnic identity. (Indeed in some instances it would seem that the
crown actively encouraged these communities to maintain their original
character as a guarantee of group cohesion, and hence of occupational
efficiency.) At the same time, individual Mons, Shans, Siamese, Lao-
tians, Yuans (Yiins), even Europeans who boasted special expertise or
noble blood were welcomed to high ministerial posts at the capital
without being obliged to adopt Burmese customs. The following quota-
tion from a sixteenth-century source expresses the poly-ethnic ideal
of personal service at the court of Bayin-naung (1551-81), but it
is characteristic of later centuries as well:
12
The period is subdivided into the First Taung-ngu-Dynasty, c. 1539-99, with
the capital at Pegu; and the Restored Taung-ngu Dynasty, c. 1597-1752, when the
capital was usually at Ava.
Was it not because of his piety, steadfastness, and wisdom that we all, from
ministers and captains. . . down to pages of noble birthall his chosen
men, in fact, whether Shans, Mons, or Burmans . . . would . . . have
declared ourselves willing to lay down our lives?13
Not only the royal court, but the empire as a whole was viewed as a
poly-glot institution. The ruler of any non-Burmese territory could be
admitted to tributary status merely by swearing an oath; and the
expansion of the imperial territories was always motivated by geo-
political, rather than ethnic considerations. Finally and most inter-
estingly, because sovereignty resided in the person of the ruler, there
was no necessity that he be of the same ethnic type as the majority
of his subjects. Kings of Shan ancestry ruled at Ava in the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries but were accepted in the Burmese chronicles as
legitimate; while in the south the principal dynasties between 1287 and
1599 were founded by a Shan (Wa Row) and a Burman (Tabin-shwei-
This cosmopolitan orientation was reinforced by a second tradition,

one of incomparable influence, that of Theravada kingship. According
to the Scriptures, kingship had been established at the start of the world
in order to advance the spiritual welfare of all mankind. Like Maha-
sammata, the institutional prototype of Theravada monarchs, rulers at
Ava and Pegu sought to augment their subjects' store of good karma by
exhorting people to virtue and by prohibiting behavior inimical to the
Doctrine. Furthermore, by their donations to religious institutions,
kings themselves accumulated a great quantity of good karma which,
in some mystical fashion, advanced the welfare of their subjects at
large. A king's karmatic attainments in this and previous existences
were in no sense dependent on his ethnic type. A man of great power
(hence ipso facto great merit) deserved veneration from all Buddhists.
And in reciprocal fashion, the spiritual benefits of his rule showered
down upon all creatures under his sway, for all are caught in sarhsdrd
(the cycle of rebirths). The kings of Ava and Pegu explicitly proclaimed
themselves to be both Cakkavattis, i.e. world-rulers, and Embryo
Buddhas.
These principles of Theravada kingship had been transmitted by
'3 Page 82 of a typescript MS which is a translation by H. L. Shorto of the Mon
Mdana Ramadhipati-kathd, Phra Candakanto, ed. (Pak Lat, Siam, 1912), p. 152.
At Ayut'ia during the seventeenth century Japanese, Mons and even a Greek adven-
turer achieved high office; while in Arakan Portuguese, Japanese, Afghans and
Indians served in the royal forces.
14
Tabin-shwei-hti 'became a Mon' only towards the end of his reign, and none
of his successors followed suit.
the Mons to the Burmese, who in turn transmitted them (directly and
indirectly) to Shans, Palaungs, and other peoples. Although the various
ethnic groups retained their own ecclesiastical organizations and
animist traditions, by the seventeenth century they were all nominally
Buddhist, and as such shared the same terminology and conceptual
framework which allowed them to accept the ideological pretensions of
the kings at Ava and Pegu. Taung-ngu kings sought to advertise their
piety in ecumenical fashion by consulting a mixture of Burmese, Mon,
and Shan monks on ceremonial occasions. Even when state ceremonies
lacked an explicitly inter-ethnic character, their heavy Buddhist
coloring gave them such a character implicitly.15
Finally, we should mention a third tradition which, while failing
to support cultural diversity within a given polity, nonetheless served
to fragment both the Burmese-speaking and Mon-speaking com-
munities and to inhibit the development of a pan-Mon or pan-
Burmese consciousness. We refer to persistent regional loyalties. The
galactic polity, by definition, held within its orbit a large number of
satellite centers whose leaders constantly strove to maximize their auton-
omy. In the south, predominantly Mon-speaking towns such as Bassein,
Martaban, and Yei were subordinate to the paramount Mon center of
Pegu between c. 1369 and 1595, and again between 1740 and 1757.
This galactic configuration constituted the so-called Kingdom of
Ra-manya (Ramanfia), which H. L. Shorto has shown formed the
background to Mon historical literature.16 Yet the unity of Ra-manya
was singularly loose, for each town cherished a tradition of independent
sovereignty, and each continued to function as the sacral, administra-
tive, and economic center for a wide hinterland. Local Mon headmen
and their followers thus felt strong ties of interest to these regional
capitals, and tended to distinguish, for example, between Peguan
Mons and Martaban Mons (in fact, each district may have spoken
a somewhat different dialect). If Pegu seemed vulnerable, satellite
populations were only too willing to ally themselves with Burmese or
Siamese against their fellow Mons at Pegu. Essentially the same
pattern obtained in the Burmese-speaking sector of the Irrawaddy basin,
15
See, inter alia, V. B. Lieberman, 'The Burmese Dynastic Pattern, c. 1590-1760'
(Univ. of London Ph.D. Thesis, 1976), Ch. 2; M. Aung Thwin, 'The Nature of
State and Society in Pagan' (Univ. of Michigan Ph.D. Thesis, 1976), Chs 2, 4;
Shorto, 'Genealogy', p. 68. See, too, Craig J. Reynolds, 'Buddhist Cosmography
in Thai History, with Special Reference to Nineteenth-Century Culture Change',
Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2 (February 1976), p. 210, for a discussion of
Buddhist literature as an instrument of poly-ethnic political integration in Siam.
16
Shorto, 'Genealogy', pp. 63-72.
where Pagan, Salin, Prome, and Taung-ngu nurtured independent

traditions which conflicted in varying degrees with their loyalty to Ava.
During the so-called Mon-Burmese wars of the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries, satellites of Ava and Pegu switched allegiance with
disconcerting ease. Between 1593 and 1714 we find many additional
examples of intra-Mon and intra-Burmese provincial splits.1' It was
only to be expected that these regional patterns would influence
political developments in the mid-eighteenth century.
The course of the wars between 1740 and 1757 therefore reflected a
complex interaction between these three traditionspersonal loyalty,
Buddhist universalism, and regionalismon the one hand, and the
tendency towards ethnic uniformity within a given polity, on the other.
Polarization between 'Burmese' and 'Mons' was particularly sharp
at the outset of the Peguan revolt in 1740 and in the early years
of Alaung-hpaya's resistance, perhaps because these were periods of
maximum insecurity when people eagerly sought visible symbols of
conformity amongst their neighbors in order to allay their anxieties.
Yet at no time, even under Alaung-hpaya, did the adoption of a parti-
cular ethnic identity become an indispensable prerequisite for political
support.18
The Revolt of 1740: Burmese Support
The Peguan revolt of 1740 was the most destructive in a series of

tributary and provincial uprisings which fed on the debility of the late
Restored Taung-ngu Dynasty. In the first half of the eighteenth century
" See Lieberman, 'The Burmese Dynastic Pattern', Chs 1, 4.

18
We might note that the patterns we are about to describe were by no means
peculiar to the Irrawaddy valley, but in varying degrees must have charactemed a
great many pre-national societies in which quasi-feudal modes of political organiza-
tion, a universalist Great Tradition, and strong particularist tendencies were note-
worthy features. For example, in medieval Britain 'Welsh' and 'English' constituted
distinct ethnic categories, each with its own language, culture, and political traditions.
English and Welsh authors composed scathing attacks on the moral qualities of their
opposite numbers, while a ruler of Snowdonia in the thirteenth century sought to
unify the Welsh on the basis of anti-English sentiment. Yet if we examine the course
of the so-called Welsh Wars of the thirteenth century, we find that local rivalries,
and family and personal jealousies were always more potent than any 'national sense',
and that the English infantry on occasion consisted principally of Welshmen. So, too,
the 'Mon' army, on occasion, consisted chiefly of Burmese. See John E. Morris, The
Welsh Wars of Edward I (Oxford, 1901); Austin Lane Poole, From Domesday Book to
Magna Carta, 1087-1216, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1955); Sir Maurice Powicke, The
Thirteenth Century, 1216-1307, 2nd edn (Oxford, 196a).
the crown suffered a cumulative loss of manpower which led to an
upsurge of factionalism at Ava and to an erosion of the capital region's
military strength. At the same time, the decline in royal authority
encouraged provincial officials to abuse their powers of taxation with
little fear of correction by the central government. Not only at Pegu
(then subject to Ava), but also at Chiengmai and Ok-hpo, Ava's
representatives outraged local opinion with their unrestrained exac-
tions, and thus helped to precipitate successful rebellions. In the case
of Pegu, the issue of excessive taxation may have strengthened a more
long-standing resentment felt by southern gentry families over their
loss of patronage opportunities. Following the shift of capitals from
Pegu to Ava in the early seventeenth century, the number of southern
families who obtained appointments at the royal court declined steadily
until by the early eighteenth century few, if any, could be found in
leading positions at Ava. Nor did they retain control over important
positions at the southern provincial courts, which were dominated by
Burmese from the dry zone.
Ironically, the first outbreak at Pegu was organized by Ava's own
governor, a Burman named Tha-aung who imagined that he could
turn Ava's troubles to his own advantage and reign as sovereign over
the Delta. Accordingly, in May of 1740 after a Manipuri raid on Upper
Burma had revealed the north's appalling military weakness, he
declared his independence. But he was soon slain by local leaders who
resented his heavy-handed treatment of dissent, and who, no doubt,
remembered his record of tax abuses. Following Tha-aung's murder,
Ava succeeded in restoring a measure of control over Pegu. In mid-
November, however, a second rebellion erupted which Ava proved
helpless to suppress. The people of Pegu assassinated Ava's latest
gubernatorial appointee, and then acclaimed as their king a leader of
the Gweis (see below for an explanation of this term) who, upon
entering Pegu, took for himself the royal title Smin Dhaw (or Smin
Dhaw Buddhakeithi). Within three or four months, Smin Dhaw's
forces had expelled Ava's supporters from every major position in
Lower Burma and had begun penetrating up the Irrawaddy valley
towards Prome."
' For contemporary and nearly-contemporary accounts of these events, see the
Burmese translation of the Mon history of the monk of Athwa, British Library,
London, Oriental MS no. 3464 [BL OR 3464], pp. 139-41; an abridged version of
the same work on unpaginated palmleaves in the Henry Burney Papers of the Royal
Commonwealth Society, London, Talaing ya-zawin (Talaing History) [RCS-TY];
Thi-ri-u-zana, Law-kd-byu-ha kyan (Treatise on Customary Usages) [LBHK], U
Hpo Lat (ed.) (Rangoon, 1968), p. 4; India Office Library, London, Letters to Fort
What political loyalties motivated the southern rebels? To what

extent were they inspired by anti-Burmese, pro-Mon sentiment? The
history of the monk of Athwa, written some twenty years after the event
by a Mon former resident of Pegu, says that the people of Pegu endured
unspeakable abuses at the hands of Burmese officials who had been sent
down from Ava, until all the people longed for the resurrection of the
independent southern kingdom of Ra-manya, headed by Pegu. His
use of the opposition 'Mon'/'Burmese' as a distinction of the 'we'/'they'
sort implies that to be a 'Mon' at Pegu in 1740 was to be loyal to Ra-
manya and hostile to Ava. In describing the assassination of Tha-aung,
the monk of Athwa observed:
The Mon people of the Ra-manya country . . . conspired together and con-
sulted a brahmin, saying, 'This Thaw-aung [sic] . . . is oppressing all the
people. The Ava king has yet to take action against this lawless rebel . . .
Therefore we will seize and slay this Thaw-aung. We don't want to be subjects
of the Burmese. What do the stars say the future holds for Han-tha-wadi
[i.e. Pegu] ?' . . . and he replied, 'The astrological situation of the Burmese
is very poor. But the heavenly signs shine brightly on the country of the
Mons (mon-to taing-pyei).' (italics mine)20
A similar picture emerges from contemporary English East India
Company records. In December of 1740 Smin Dhaw wrote to the
English representative at Syriam explaining that he had been compelled
to 'kill all the governing Burmars' because the Burmese governor of
Syriam had planned to immolate all the Peguans, 'Siamers', Tavoyans,
and foreign traders who resided there.21 Fort St George (Madras)
heard, perhaps with some exaggeration, that '7, or 8,000 Burmars'
perished in the ensuing attack.22 Most of the victims were probably
soldiers, officials, and retainers of officials who had benefited from
the ruinous taxation and who, like Tha-aung, were natives of Upper
Burma.
Nevertheless, the new king of Han-tha-wadi, Smin Dhaw, proudly
claimed descent from an uncle of the Burmese king, Tanin-ganwei
(1714-33), so he could hardly have sponsored an anti-Burmese move-
St. George, Vol. 26 (1741) (Madras, 1916), pp. 8-9, 35-7. For somewhat later accounts,
see Hman-nan-ya-zawin-daw-gyi (Great Glass Palace Royal Chronicle) [HNY], 3
vols (Mandalay, 1909), Vol. 3, pp. 380-4; and the summaries in Yi Yi, Myan-ma-
naing-ngan achei-anei, 1714-1752 (Burma's Condition, 1714-1752) (Rangoon, 1973),
pp. 67ff.
2
20 BL OR 3464, pp. 139-40. > Letters to Fort St. George, Vol. 26 (1741), p . 9.
22
India Office Records, London, Abstract of Letters Received from 'Coast' and 'Bay'
173444, in Correspondence with India (Examiner's Office), EI4I4., p . 332. See, too, Yi Yi,
Myan-ma-naing-ngan achei-anei, pp. 165, 179 for evidence that the Burmese identified
their Peguan foes as 'Talaings'.
ment on ethnic grounds alone. According to the Hman-nan chronicle,

Smin Dhaw claimed to be the offspring of a union between Tanin-
ganwei's uncle, who had rebelled unsuccessfully against Ava in 1714
and had then fled to an obscure rural village, and a woman who had
served as his concubine in that village. Smin Dhaw had been raised by
the local Gwei people (to which tribe his mother apparently belonged)
and had now come to Pegu to assume that royal status to which his
noble blood entitled him.23 This genealogy was almost certainly spuri-
ous, like that of many a low-born pretender. Yet it was a major factor
in winning support among the local Mons, who boasted to an Avan
commander that their ruler was of the same royal family as the king
of Ava.24 This claim was also taken at face value by Burmese who thought
that in fighting for Smin Dhaw, they were serving a scion of the old
Burmese royal house.
Indeed, after the initial uprisings, growing numbers of Burmese
began to attach themselves to Smin Dhaw's cause, particularly in the
south. H. L. Shorto has estimated that only about sixty per cent of the
Delta population was Mon, and of the remaining forty per cent
Burmese were probably the chief element.25 They were found not only
in towns, where they served as officials, soldiers, and traders, but also in
rural districts in the western and northern Delta, where they engaged
in agriculture. Like so-called Chin and Karen villages, Burmese com-
munities had been an integral part of the Delta landscape for genera-
tions.26 Some Burmese gentry leaders, particularly those in rural dis-
tricts, probably enjoyed no closer connection with Ava than did their
Mon neighbors. Given the strong tradition of poly-ethnic political
organization at Pegu and the universal nature of Smin Dhaw's religious
appeals (see below), it is therefore not surprising that these southern
Burmeseand later some of their northern counterparts as well
should have pledged allegiance to Ra-manya. The bitter anti-'Burmese'
" HNY, Vol. 3, pp. 383, 390-1.
24
Ibid., pp. 387-8; Yi Yi, Myan-ma-naing-ngan achei-anei, pp. 164-6; See, too, ibid.,
p. 178.
25
H. L. Shorto, personal communication, 1974. A 1759 report in Dal, Vol. I,
p. 99 said, 'Even in Pegu their Numbers [i.e. Burmese to Mons] are 100 to 1'. For
other evidence of a significant Burmese population south of Prome during the seven-
teenth and early eighteenth centuries, see Dal, Vol. I, pp. 133-42 passim; am-bu-
di-pd ok-hsaiing kyan (Treatise of the Crown ofjambudipa Island), J. S. Furnivall and
Pe Maung Tin (eds) (Rangoon, i960), pp. 46, 58; KBZ, Vol. I, p. 105.
26
We do not know whether their ethnic distinctiveness within southern society was
due to separate ahmu-dan roles, to a specialized economic function, to continual
infusions of northern migrants, or to some other factor(s). On the determination of
Chin communities within Lower Burma to maintain their separate identity, see
Lehman, 'Ethnic Categories in Burma', pp. 112-13.
outbreaks of 1740 reflected the fact that many Burmese, particularly
northern migrants concentrated in the coastal towns, were associated
with abuses by officials appointed by Ava. 'Burman' could be used as a
short-hand expression for 'pro-Ava man'. But clearly this term was
not always so restrictive, because Smin Dhaw, a 'Burmese prince'
who had no political connection with the current Ava court, was
accepted by the Mons; and so were a number of lesser figures who also
proclaimed themselves to be Burmese.27
Among Smin Dhaw's early supporters was tj-taya-thari, identified
in a 1766 Mon-language document as 'a Burman from Pegu', whom
Smin Dhaw made governor of Martaban. 28 A noted Peguan infantry
commander Ein-da-bala-kyaw-thu readily acknowledged to his
enemies that he was one of a group of 'Burmese . . . from Han-tha-
wadi.' 29 Smin Dhaw's commander-of-the-right the Let-ya-bo was also
a Burman, apparently from the south; as one of the two or three most
senior military figures at Pegu, he became so influential that when Smin
Dhaw abdicated, the leading commanders begged him to succeed
(he declined).30 In Middle Burma at both Taung-ngu and Prome
provincial capitals which had strong traditions of independence and
which had never been particularly loyal to Avapro-Peguan factions
overawed pro-Avan factions and helped to deliver the towns to Smin
Dhaw. 31 Since both of these towns had a predominantly Burmese
population, in each instance the pro-Peguan faction probably included
many self-proclaimed Burmese. As Pegu's forces pushed further up the
Irrawaddy valley, the number of Burmese who defected to her cause
continued to grow, so that by 1752, three-quarters of the army sent
against Alaung-hpaya was said by a qualified observer to have been
Burmese.32
27
It is probable that a number of bi-lingual 'Burmese' at this time found it desirable
to pass as 'Mons'. Unfortunately, we have no firm evidence of such conversions prior
to 1752.
1766 Martaban Land Roll MS in the possession of H. L. Shorto.
KBZ, Vol. I, p. 55; AA-T, p. 199. This is apparently the same individual
identified as Nan-da-bala-kyaw-thu in KBZ, Vol. I, pp. 170, 235; and in Let-we-naw-
yahta, 'Alaung-min-taya-gyl ayei-daw-bon' (Biography of King Alaung-hpaya)
[AA-L], Alaung-hpaya ayei-daw-bon hnasaung-dwi, p. 93.
U Tin, Myan-ma-min ok-chok-pon sa-dan (Record of Administration under the
Burmese Kings), 5 vols (Rangoon, 1931-33), Vol. 2, pp. 242-3; HNY, Vol. 3, pp.
3912. This is probably the same man as Let-ya-bo-chok Min-nge-kyaw, BL OR
3464, p. 141.
31
Yi Yi, Myan-ma-naing-ngan achei-anei, pp. 76, 81.
"The Testimony of an Inhabitant of the City of Ava', Phra Phraison Salarak
(trans.), Journal of the Siam Society, Vol. 45, Pt 2 (October 1957), p. 32. See, too,
HNY, Vol. 3, p. 405.
Mons Who Failed To Support Pegu
At the same time a significant number of 'Mons'i.e. people who

bore Mon titles, who spoke Mon, and/or who were identified in con-
temporary sources as being Monsremained faithful to the northern
court because of personal ties or local loyalties. They constituted a sort
of mirror image to the Burmese supporters of Pegu. The first major
expedition which the Ava king Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati (1733-52)
sent against Smin Dhaw was composed largely of Mon troops from the
so-called 'nine townships' of the Delta." They enjoyed some initial
success and performed as well as their Burmese comrades. Even after
the Delta was overrun, Mons continued to figure quite prominently
among Ava's commanders, particularly in the army headed by Maha-
dama-ya-za-di-pati's uncle, Taung-ngu-ya-za.^4 It is unclear whether
these Mon leaders and their men came originally from the Delta, or from
Upper Burma, where since at least the early seventeenth century there
were small communities of Mon deportees with connections to the
Ava court.
Moreover, within Lower Burma various Mon communities showed a
decided aversion to both Ava and Pegu, preferring to support the
independence of their regional capital, much as during the fourteenth-
and fifteenth-century wars. Some sources suggest that in early 1741
Smin Dhaw had to seize by force the Mon city of Martaban." There-
after it is certain that he governed Martaban much as Ava had always
done, i.e. by filling all key positions with followers from the capital
rather than with local residents. In 1743, people at Martaban rebelled
and killed Smin Dhaw's governor; but after quelling this revolt, Smin
Dhaw resumed the appointment of Peguans, even to very subordinate
posts. Most significantly, one of these appointees, the aforementioned
U-taya-thari, was identified in the 1766 Martaban Land Roll as a
'Burman from Pegu'. In other words, a Burman from Pegu was more
trustworthy than a Mon from Martaban.
Martaban and adjacent districts contributed forces to the victorious
invasion of Ava in 1752. Nevertheless Peguan commanders soon
had to withdraw the bulk of their forces from Upper Burma, because
33
Yi Yi, Myan-ma-naing-ngan achei-anei, pp. 74-5.
34
Mon leaders who remained loyal to Ava between 1744 and 1752 included
Banya-u-pa-ya-za, Banya-kyan-daw, Banya-dama-ya-za, Ya-za-di-ya-za, and
probably Banya-su, Banya-byat-ta, and Banya-thi-ha.
Cf. HNY, Vol. 3, p. 384, and the 1766 Martaban Land Roll.
they feared that districts east of Martaban as well as Yei, Tavoy,

and Tenasserim, might be scheming with Siam at Pegu's expense."
The districts east of Martaban, and Yei were inhabited chiefly by
Mon-speakers; Tavoy and Tenasserim, by speakers of a Burmese
dialect. Yet neither population demonstrated any particular allegiance
to Pegu. One is led to conclude that the so-called 'Mon national
movement' of 1740 might more accurately be termed a Peguan
regional revolt.
'Karen' Involvement
Speakers of Karen dialects played a role in the Peguan uprisings. In

fact, it seems likely that Smin Dhaw himself and his mysterious Gwei
followers were actually members of a Karen tribal group, which is also
at variance with the usual 'national' interpretations of the 'Mon
revolt'.
The Gweis have been identified with various peoples (Shans, Lawas,
Was, etc.), but the most convincing hypothesis has been presented by
Nigel Brailey, who has argued that they were a people known as Taung-
thus who speak a dialect of Karen and are now concentrated in an
area of hill-country on the edge of the Shan States. According to Brailey,
who relied on the Siamese version of a Mon chronicle, it was the sudden
arrival of three thousand of these people from the eastern hills which
let Smin Dhaw take power at Pegu." Brailey's identification is strength-
ened by Burmese sources, unavailable to him, which show that Smin
Dhaw gave five of his first seventeen appointments to officials with
recognizably 'Karen' names.38 Furthermore, Burmese sources identify
the Gweis as 'Gwei-Karens' some of whom were based at a 'Karen
village' north of Pegu; and they suggest a well-established pattern
whereby groups of Karen-speakers, possibly including Taung-thus,
migrated from the eastern hills to the southeast lowlands.39
3 AA-L, p. 17.
" Brailey, 'Re-investigation of the Gwe', pp. 33-47.
is HNY, Vol. 3, p. 383; O Pyin-nya, Kayin ya-zawin (History of the Karens)
(Rangoon, 1929), pp. i45ff.
" HNY, Vol. 3, pp. 382-3; Zam-bu-di-pd ok-hsaimg kydn, pp. 83, 98; XJ Kala,
Maha-ya-zawin-gyi, Vol. 3, Hsaya 0 Hkin S6 (ed.). (Rangoon, 1961), pp. 332-40
passim; R. S. Wilkie (comp.), Burma GazetteerThe Tamethin District, Vol. A (Ran-
goon, 1934), pp. 26-33, 45 passim; G. H. Luce, 'Introduction to the Comparative
Study of Karen Languages', Journal of the Burma Research Society, Vol. 42, Pt 1 (June
959). PP- 1-18.
Brailey has pictured the events of 1740 as a virtual 'Karen' coup.

According to him, the hill Karens, in loose alliance with some of their
lowland 'brethren', forced Smin Dhaw's acceptance on the Mons of
Pegu, who became 'highly resentful' of their subjection to the primitive
'Karens'. While there is some evidence of tension of this sort, it is clear
that different groups of Karen-speakers recognized no common
identityindeed, the very category 'Karen' was a derogatory invention
of the Burmese which was only given respectability by Christian
missionaries in the nineteenth centuryand that while some groups of
people whom the Burmese called 'Karens' supported Smin Dhaw,
others were implacably hostile.to It is equally clear that the Mons
themselves never formed a united front against Smin Dhaw, who
succeeded at an early stage in developing a poly-ethnic following
based on personal loyalty. All accounts suggest that Smin Dhaw
only entered Pegu after large numbers of Mons had joined his original
Gwei supporters. Of his first seventeen ministers, five had 'Karen'-
type names, one was Shan, but the other eleven had Mon names. Even
the five 'Karens', if (as is likely) they spoke Mon, may have considered
themselves to be Mons in certain contexts.
Although most Taung-thus were animist, Smin Dhaw himself was
thoroughly familiar with Buddhist court culture. That the 'Gwei
king' could pass for a Burmese prince is only the most obvious indication
of this fact. According to Mon and Siamese histories, he had once
served as a Buddhist monk and had acquired supernatural powers
which were a major factor in winning him support in 1740 among the
Mons of Pegu, and presumably among Burmese and Gweis as well.
These histories claim that he was an expert in magic and astrology, and
was invulnerable to weapons.41 After he had taken the throne, he further
enhanced his charisma by acquiring a revered spotted elephant, and
by renewing the practice, abandoned by the last three Ava kings,
of making regular donations to the shrines of the Delta. The Mon
monk of Athwa, who, it must be emphasized, wrote as a private
individual outside the control of Smin Dhaw's court, thus praised him
as a righteous ruler, imbued with 'great reverence for the affairs of
Religion'.^
40 Yi Yi, Myan-ma-naing-ngan achei-anei, p. 85 reports that in 1744 an attack by
'Karens' forced Smin Dhaw temporarily to abandon Pegu (cf. Brailey, 'Re-investiga-
tion of the Gwe', p. 34). See, too, HNY, Vol. 3, p. 383.
41
Prince Damrong, 'Our Wars with the Burmese', U Aung Thein (trans.), Journal
of the Burma Research Society, Vol. 40, Pt 2 (a) (May 1958), pp. 285-6; BL OR 3464,
p. 141.
*2 BL OR 3464, pp. 140-1.
47O VICTOR B. LIEBERMAN
Events from 1747 to 1752
Despite his popularity and his early success, Smin Dhaw never reigned
long enough to defeat Ava, for he was overthrown by a coup in 1747,
while hunting elephants east of Sit-taung. He was succeeded by his
principal minister, the Lord of DalaBanya-dalawhose daughter
Smin Dhaw had married and whose support had probably been
instrumental in securing the throne for Smin Dhaw in 1740. A Shan
elephanteer who had originally been appointed by Ava, Banya-dala was
director of the Pegu elephant corps in 1740 and was thus well placed
to expand his influence in subsequent years. Siamese accounts suggest
that he and Smin Dhaw had become estranged as early as 1745 in the
aftermath of Smin Dhaw's marriage alliance with Chiengmai, which
apparently threatened Banya-dala's position at court.43 In all probabil-
ity he solicited the military expedition to Sit-taung which forced Smin
Dhaw's abdication.
Htin Aung and Brailey have both portrayed Banya-dala as the cham-
pion of Mon interests against Smin Dhaw, whom Htin Aung sees as
favoring fellow Burmese (Htin Aung accepts at face value Smin Dhaw's
royal genealogy) and whom Brailey sees as representing the 'Karens'. 44
Htin Aung's interpretation seems quite suspect. As we shall show,
Burmese support for Pegu increased, if anything, after 1747. Moreover,
Banya-dala was chosen king at a conference of Peguan leaders only
through the recommendation of the Burmese general, Let-ya-bo, one
of his principal allies.*" There may be more substance to Brailey's
interpretation of the coup, in that some Mons may have seen through
Smin Dhaw's genealogical pretensions and resented his early associa-
tion with animists. Yet we can see that in 1747, as in 1740, factional
alignments cut across simple ethnic divisions, and loyalties revolved
primarily around rival patron-client networks. Thus Smin Dhaw in
his subsequent attempts to recapture the throne of Pegu, enjoyed
the support of individual Mons as well as of his father-in-law, the Tai
Buddhist ruler of Chiengmai. On the other hand, the man who usually
ranked third at Banya-dala's court after Banya-dala's own brothers
4
> Brailey, 'Re-investigation of the Gwe', pp. 35-6. On Banya-dala and the coup of
1747 (some sources date it to 1746), see, too, Yi Yi, Myan-ma-naing-ngan achei ami,
PP- 89-95. 99; HNY, Vol. 3J pp. 383, 389-93; LBHK, p. 5 ; RCS-TY; AA-T, p.
209; Hall, English Intercourse, p. 305.
" For Htin Aung's views, see his History, pp. 154-5; f r Brailey's, see 'Re-investiga-
tion of the Gwe', pp. 35-6, 44-5.
" Same as note 30.
was his son-in-law, the general Saw-bya, one of the five men with
'Karen' names who had originally served Smin Dhaw. If ethnic
considerations were paramount, it is also curious that the so-called
'Mon party' should have found it necessary to place their hopes in a
man who was generally recognized as a Shan.
Once he had ascended the throne, Banya-dala was accepted as
'king of the Talaings' like Wa Row, Smin Dhaw, and other non-Mon
kings before him. As we know from his subsequent correspondence with
Alaung-hpaya, he presented himself in traditional fashion as an aspirant
Buddha and a Patron of the Faith in whom all men could take refuge.
He also claimed that his reign fulfilled a prophecy uttered by Gotama
Buddha that in the Buddhist year corresponding to A.D. I 746 or 1747,
a 'master of the white elephant' and a king of great glory would arise
in Han-tha-wadi.4 According to the monk of Athwa, after his corona-
tion he formally addressed his court, recalling the grandeur of former
Peguan kings. He claimed that various Tai rulers had already recog-
nized his sovereignty, and vowed to reduce Ava to a similar state of
subjection.4?
Banya-dala succeeded in this boast within five years of his accession.
Because of factional in-fighting and the strain of endless campaigns,
Ava's loss of manpower became so acute that the administration virtu-
ally collapsed of its own weight. Revolts broke out within forty miles
of Ava, whereupon the southern forces arrived to deliver the coup de
grace and to seize the ancient capital of Upper Burma in March of
The victorious armywhich was identified in contemporary sources

as 'the Talaing army' but which, according to the same sources,
included Burmese in both command and subordinate positions
proceeded to establish its authority over the surrounding countryside.
Most Burmese gentry leaders swore allegiance to the king of Pegu and
were confirmed in their hereditary positions. In the provincial capitals
of Middle and Upper Burma, adherents with recognizably Burmese
names and titles received a number of high-ranking appointments, far
more in fact than Ava in recent decades had been willing to confer on
Mons in the Delta.49 At the same time, the invaders deported to the
46
Alaung-min-taya amein-daw-mya (Edicts of King Alaung-hpaya) [AAm], Hkin
Hkin Sein (comp. and ed.) (Rangoon, 1964), pp. 56-7, 83-4. Cf. Yi Yi, Myan-ma-
naing-ngan achei-anei, pp. 99-100, 177, 178.
'BL OR 3464, p. 141.
These were the uprisings at Madaya and Ok-hpo which Harvey, Hall, Cady,
and Brailey have erroneously dated to 1740 rather than 1747.
See BL OR 3464, p. 142, and KBZ, Vol. I, p. 105.
south a very substantial number of Burmese courtiers and soldiers,
possibly as many as fifteen thousand altogether, who also took an oath
to the southern king. Their leaders were honored with titles and offices
at the Peguan court, serving along with Mons, 'Karens', and southern
Burmese. At least one former Ava minister, Thi-ri-ii-zana, who was
offered a post as senior minister in the Peguan Hlut-daw, declined to
accept the appointment; but he acted out of a personal commitment to
the deposed Ava king, rather than from a sense of Burmese ethnic
loyalty.50 We find a clear tendency towards ethnic polarization in the
fact that shortly after Ava fell, Pegu's garrison commander at Ava was
criticized for taking into his service Burmese who had failed to cut
their hair in Talaing fashion; it was intended that those who cut their
topknots should receive preferential treatment.51 Curiously enough,
however, this rule was not enforced among pro-Peguan gentry leaders
in the north; nor, until 1754, did it apply to the numerous Avan
deportees at Pegu, who continued to wear topknots and to regard
themselves as Burmese.
Growing Polarization Under Alaung-hpaya
In the five years between Ava's fall in 1752 and Pegu's collapse in
1757, the we/they distinction between Burmese and Mons became
somewhat more pronounced, in part through the efforts of Alaung-
hpaya, the Upper Burma headman who founded the Kon-baung
dynasty.
Alaiing-hpaya obviously did not introduce the dichotomy between
'Burmese' and 'Mons' as political categories, for as we have seen, this
was a basic, if at times subdued, theme since the opening days of the
Pegu revolt. Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati's uncle, Taung-ngu-ya-za,
once observed that 'Burmese kings' ruling at Ava and 'Talaing kings'
ruling at Pegu had frequently been locked in prolonged wars such as
the current conflict.52 Following the collapse of Ava, however, the
population of Upper Burma was no longer attached to a single political
center as in Taung-ngu-ya-za's day; so in seeking to re-unify the region
and to crush those local leaders who cooperated with Pegu, Alaung-
hpaya found it necessary to appeal with unprecedented vigor to that
50
LBHK, p. 6. As we shall see, these same sentiments of personal loyalty prevented
some Ava officials from swearing allegiance to Alaiing-hpaya.
" AA-L, p. 28.
!2
Letter quoted in Yi Yi, Myan-ma-naing-ngan achei-anei, p. 179.
common traditioni.e. their role of being 'Burmese'which dis-

tinguished the bulk of the northern population from their southern
neighbors. His appeals for 'Burmese' unity were strengthened by the
fact that the north was at that time suffering from an appalling state
of famine and social dislocation as a result of the southern invasions.
The Peguan army, as we have seen, was in fact quite mixed, but Mons
were certainly the most visible element; and the misery of these years
nurtured a xenophobic reaction against the 'Mon invader' which
Alaung-hpaya was quick to exploit. In appealing to the headman of
Hkin-u village, Let-ya-pyan-chi, Alaung-hpaya reportedly wrote:
'Although you, Let-ya-pyan-chi, are a Burman {myan-ma lu-myo) and
are a brave man, in planning to remain a subject of the Talaings, you
are acting contrary to both your lineage (arnyo-anwe) and your abilities.'53
At the battle of Myaung-wun, he issued orders to spare Burmese
opponents, but no consideration was given to Mons.54 At the battle
of Ti-daw his basic strategy sought to drive a wedge between Mons
and northern Burmese who were fighting in mixed formations.55
At the battle of Prome his men unfurled their topknots to show soldiers
with whom they could not communicate verbally that they were
comrades.5 We find no precedent before 1752 for systematic appeals
and discrimination of this sort.
Alaung-hpaya's military successwhich, as we shall see, was due
only in part to this psychological strategyheartened those deportees
at Pegu who were still hostile to Banya-dala. They gave undue credence
to reports circulating from the opening phase of Alaung-hpaya's
resistance that he was dedicated to restoring the old Ava house.
Accordingly, they formed a conspiracy to place the captive king Maha-
dama-ya-za-di-pati on the throne of Pegu. This plot does not appear
to have been ethnically-oriented: the plotters included numerous local
Mons, and their goal of establishing a Burmese prince at Pegu was in
the tradition of Smin Dhaw. Yet the frightened Peguan court
reacting perhaps to the explicit ethnic element in Alaung-hpaya's
movementcame to doubt the loyalty of many of its Burmese subjects,
particularly those recent deportees from Upper Burma, where Alaung-
hpaya's movement was centered. On the discovery of the conspiracy,
in October of 1754 the court executed over a thousand leading deportees
implicated in the plot, including Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati himself,
and ordered the remaining Burmese at Pegu to wear in their ears an
amulet stamped with the seal of the Pegu-Heir-Apparent and to cut
AA-L, p. 29. Cf. AA-T, p. 162. AA-L, p. 28; KBZ, Vol. I, p. 44.
55 AA-T, pp. 170-71. 56 AA-T, p. 186; KBZ, Vol. I, p. 122.
their hair in Mon fashion as a token of loyalty. 57 Like their counter-
parts at Ava in 1752, those who cut their hair were probably considered
on some level at least to have 'become Mons'.
This Peguan policy was disastrous in the extreme. On the one hand,
ethnic homogeneity was never achieved, because the order on haircuts
was not enforced systematically and Burmese continued to be identified
among Peguan defenders until 1757. On the other hand, the reprisals
were sufficiently severe to force many people, especially Avan deportees,
who considered themselves to be Burmese but who had hitherto co-
operated with the Peguan court, to throw their support behind Alaung-
hpaya. Indeed, with Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati dead, those opposed
to Banya-dala had no one else to whom they could turn. After the
executions started, a former Ava official who had not taken part in
the original conspiracy organized a successful revolt of Burmese leaders
which opened the way for Alaung-hpaya's entry into the Upper Delta.
Over the next two years, from his descent to Prome until his final
seizure of Pegu in May of 1757, Alaung-hpaya sought to undermine
remaining Burmese support for Pegu, in the knowledge that Mons
and 'Karens' alone could never resist his advance.58
Universal Elements in Alaung-hpaya's Ideology
Nevertheless, deeply-ingrained universalist traditions still exercised

a sufficiently powerful influence to justify a major revision of the
customary image of Alaung-hpaya as a 'racial' or 'national' leader.
Some of his early appeals to Burmese were in fact directed simultan-
eously to Shans and Kadiis. These northern peoples had also suffered
at the hands of the southern invaders and Alaiing-hpaya needed their
support. This was despite the fact that the Peguan king Banya-dala was
a Shan. More importantly, appeals to particular ethnic categories,
whether to Burmese or to Burmese and Shans, appeared in only a
fraction of Alaung-hpaya's letters and edicts, and when they did appear,
they were always subordinate to more traditional and universal themes
of religious veneration and personal patronage. These concepts, not
ethnicity, constituted the essential basis of the ideology by which he
attracted people to his cause and legitimized his authority. The afore-
AA-T, pp. 183-4; KBZ, Vol. I, pp. 104-5.
Thus, for example, he disseminated a chain letter quoting a prophecy which said
that the Talaings were not destined to found a kingdom because the Burmese were
'the principal group' (AAm, p. 28). See, too, AAm, pp. 3-4, 9-10, 28, 129; and KBZ,
Vol. I, p. 184.
mentioned letter to Let-ya-pyan-chi in which Alaung-hpaya urged

him to act in accord with his 'lineage and abilities' represents the single
most explicit appeal to Burmese solidarity. After this introductory
sentence, however, the letter continues as follows:
Because I am of true royal lineage and because the benevolent deities
[thamma dei-wd] aid me in accordance with prophecies and omens, I am
promoting the welfare of the Faith and the comfort of the people. Thus
not only my current foes, but all the umbrella-bearing kings on the face of
the earth will be unable to resist me. You, lord of Hkin-u Let-ya-pyan-chi,
are overlooking these facts . . . Now, however, if you come over to my
allegiance, I shall act as patron to you and your family without bitterness
so I inform you.59
As this and numerous other documents make clear, Alaung-hpaya,
like all sovereigns, viewed himself as something much grander than the
leader of a particular ethnic community. He was simultaneously a
'lord of karma', an Embryo Buddha, and a universal monarch. Both
the Restored Taung-ngu Dynasty and Banya-dala's kingdom were
fated to collapse because the good karma of their rulers was exhausted.
Alaung-hpaya, however, had a tremendous amount of good karma
which was manifest in his incomparable glory and military success.60
In some future incarnation, when his spiritual perfections were yet more
developed, Alaung-hpaya expected to attain Perfect Buddhahood, as
his royal title 'Alaung-min-taya-gyi' announced. His military cam-
paigns had but one purpose: to proclaim the universal Law of the
Buddha. For Alaung-hpaya was no ordinary king, but the very ruler
of whom ancient writings had prophesied: 'There shall arise an
Embryo Buddha who shall rule the people of many landsShans,
Talaings, Manipuris, Chinese, Siamese, Indians, Arakaneselike
the children of his own bosom.'*' In token of his mission, the god
Sakka had given Alaung-hpaya the magical set-kya weapon of a
Cakkavatti. These claims were set forth repeatedly in communications
to Burmese and non-Burmese alike. All were invited to do homage and
to recognize that Alaung-hpaya's victories were the result of unique
religious merit.
Some Mons responded favorably. In late 1753 and early 1754,
Mons as well as Burmese who had served under Taung-ngu-ya-za
entered Alaung-hpaya's camp and were welcomed without dis-
crimination. 62 Mons fought as part of the northern forces during
"AA-L, p. 29. See AAm, pp. 9-10, 12-13, 28-30, 212-13.

' KBZ, Vol. I, p. 237. Cf. AAm, p. 28.
61
Mon adherents included Banya-ii-pa-ya-za and Ya-za-di-ya-za.
Alaung-hpaya's descent downriver, while others defected along with
Burmese troops in the south, albeit less frequently. One southern
Mon defector, Daw-zwe-ya-set, received a major military command
and was later made governor (my6-zadng) of Martaban in preference
to Burmese aspirants for the post. (Thus whereas the so-called Mon
national champion Smin Dhaw appointed a Burman to head Martaban,
the Burmese hero Alaung-hpaya chose a Mon.) 63 Nor were Mon
adherents culled entirely from the ranks of latecomers and opportunists.
At least one of Alaung-hpaya's myin-yei-tet followers was a Mon,
Nga-htaw-aing, who apparently came from Madaya in Upper Burma.
The myin-yei-tet were a highly exclusive fraternity of senior relatives and
trusted warriors organized by Alaung-hpaya in 1752 at the very outset
of his resistance. During the first and most perilous engagement of
Alaung-hpaya's career, Nga-htaw-aing singlehandedly burned a
collection of straw-filled carts with which the enemy had planned to
fire the Mok-hso-bo stockade. Shortly thereafter he and another Mon
saved Alaung-hpaya's life from Peguan attackers who had shot Alaung-
hpaya's horse from under him.*4 It is important to note that these
followers retained their Mon hairstyle and dress, and were recognized
as 'Mons' by friend and foe alike. If anti-Mon sentiment per se had been
the principal basis of Alaung-hpaya's authority, it would have been
impossible to obtain their allegiance.
The assertion that Alaung-hpaya and his sons sought to destroy the
Mon 'nationality' also finds little support. Certainly he razed the city
of Pegu, massacred its defenders, and ruthlessly persecuted those monas-
tic and lay leaders who continued to foment resistance. Many bi-
lingual southerners who had hitherto identified themselves as 'Mons'
may suddenly have found it politic to become 'Burmese'. Yet we find
no evidence in any of Alaung-hpaya's extent edicts nor in any of the
voluminous chronicles of his reign that he encouraged such changes in
ethnic identification, much less passed a binding edict on the subject.
Alaung-hpaya sponsored resettlement projects within the Delta of
people who were explicitly identified as Mons, and revenue records
63
KBZ, Vol. I, pp. 187-9, 19I> 2 57- Daw-zwe-ya-set's successor at Martaban
was also a Mon. Moreover, Michael Symes, An Account of an Embassy to the Kingdom
o/Ava (London, 1800; repr., Westmead, England, 1969), pp. 38-9, says that Alaung-
hpaya gave a 'distinguished station' to the Martaban Mon leader, Talaban. An
edict (AAm, pp. 9-10) which Alaung-hpaya issued at the start of his southern
campaign, although addressed to 'my Burmese subjects . . .', specifically invited
Talaings to do homage on equal terms.
> This follows BL OR 3464, p. 144. AA-L, pp. 25-6 and KBZ, Vol. I, p. 38
also refer to the incident of the carts, but identify the Mon hero as Nga-thaik-sat.
KBZ, Vol. I, p. 29 lists Nga-htaw-aing as myin-yei-tet No. 14.
show that Mon headmen families enjoyed virtually complete continuity
of office throughout his reign and those of his sons." The literary activity
of the Mon monk of Athwa in the 1760s and 1770s, which received
official encouragement from Burmese monks near the capital, seems
to gainsay any sustained effort to suppress Mon culture.6* Similarly,
Alaung-hpaya and his sons respected the customs of captive Tavoyans,
Europeans, Indians, Manipuris, Chins, Shans, Lus, etc. whom they
required to appear in 'national' costume on ceremonial occasions.
Indeed, Alaung-hpaya seems to have gloried in their diversity as a
validation of his universal political pretensions. In practical terms,
non-Burmese were of considerable importance, as they usually con-
stituted at least a quarter of Alaung-hpaya's infantry, and a much
larger proportion of specialized units like artillery.
Burmese Opposition to Alaung-hpaya
At the same time as pluralist traditions facilitated the entry of non-

Burmese into Alaung-hpaya's service, personal loyalties and local
ties prevented many men who identified themselves as 'Burmese' from
supporting the Mok-hso-bo headman.
Very large numbers of Burmese, indeed one is tempted to say most
Burmese, supported Alaung-hpaya out of sheer opportunism in much
the same way as they had aided Pegu when its star was ascendant.
During the first year of his resistance, the armies which Alaung-hpaya
faced in the Mu and Chin-dwin valleys consisted principally of Burmese
recruited by northern headmen and former Ava commanders who
had allied themselves with Pegu. As noted, Alaiing-hpaya sometimes
appealed to their anti-Mon prejudices, but without factors quite
independent of ethnicityAlaung-hpaya's sound tactical sense; his
plethora of devoted relatives; methodical training of his troops; his
insistence on ruthless discipline; above all, the religious themes by
which he explained his successhe would never have triumphed and
his enemies would have been content to continue under the Peguan
regime. Ye-gaung-san-kyaw, whose career Alaung-hpaya sum-
marized before executing him in 1755, was representative of many
such individuals:
Dal, Vol. I, p. 204; 'Some Historical Documents', J. S. Furnivall (ed. and trans.),
Journal of the Burma Research Society, Vol. 6, Pt 3 (1916), pp. 213-23; Vol. 8, Pt 1
(1918), pp. 40-52; Vol. 9, Pt 1 (1919), pp. 33-52 passim.
66
R. Halliday, 'Immigration of the Mons into Siam', Journal 0/the Siam Society,
Vol. 10, Pt 3 (September 1913), pp. 6-7.
When he sees that the foe resists too strongly, he is in the habit of deserting
mindless of his oath. While Ava yet flourished, he did service under Taung-
ngu-ya-za and enjoyed office as a general because of his abilities. When he
saw that the Talaings' strength was waxing, he went over to them. In turn
when he saw my glory and might shine forth, he abandoned the Talaings and
came over to me. He is a man who would act like this again in the future
[and thus doesn't deserve to live].<"
At least four categories of Burmese steadfastly refused to accom-
modate themselves to Alaung-hpaya even in the manner of Ye-gaung-
san-kyaw.
(a) Motivated by local pride or by jealousy, a number of northern
gentry leaders fled to the wilds or joined Pegu rather than acknowledge
Alaung-hpaya. They included the headmen of Kyauk-ka, Y6n-ga,
and Tha-zi; and the aforementioned Let-ya-pyan-chi, whose village of
Hkin-u had long vied with Mok-hso-bo for regional leadership. Let-ya-
pyan-chi, rather than the Mon commander at Ava, proved to be
Alaung-hpaya's most determined and resourceful opponent in the
north. In rejecting Alaung-hpaya's demand for surrender, he con-
cluded: 'I don't want to do homage to a fellow Burman, only to a
Talaing will I bow.'s
(b) Even after Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati's execution, some Burmese
continued to look to remnants of the old Ava court for leadership. One
of Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati's sons (the Shwei-daung prince) doggedly
resisted Alaung-hpaya, and on the latter's death retained sufficient
popularity that one of Alaung-hpaya's generals reportedly asked him to
become king. Moreover, the poet later known as Sein-da-kyaw-thu
declined to serve at Alaung-hpaya's court until 1756 or 1757.69 He was
still loyal to the memory of his original patron, Taung-ngu-ya-za,
Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati's uncle who until his death had fought to
restore the Ava house and had opposed Alaung-hpaya's royal pre-
tensions.
(c) The inhabitants of Tavoy in the peninsula, who spoke a dialect
of Burmese, never showed any particular enthusiasm for Alaung-
hpaya, and used the occasion of a fresh uprising at Pegu in 1758-59
to declare their independence. Whether one chooses to classify Tavoy-
ans as 'Burmese' is a matter of convention. A letter from Alaung-
hpaya's commanders shows, however, that not only 'Tavoyans'
' AA-T, pp. 194-5. There is no evidence to suggest that Ye-gaung-san-kyaw
changed his hairstyle to mark these changes in political allegiance.
AA-L, p. 29. Cf. AA-T, p. 162.
Ba-thaimg, Sa-hso-daw-mya at-htok-pat-ti (Biographies of Royal Authors) (Ran-
goon, 1971), pp. 241-52.
(dd-we kyun-daw-myb), but 'Burmese' proper (myan-ma kyun-daw-myb)
joined local Mons fleeing to Siam following the collapse of the 1758-
59 Tavoyan revolt. Furthermore, according to one report, the revolt
itself was organized by a Burmese commander who allied himself with
Mon refugees from Pegu in an attempt to revive Tavoy's independent
sovereignty. 7i
(d) Most important of all, the tradition of Peguan regionalism con-
tinued to captivate many Burmese despite the trend towards ethnic
polarization after October of 1754. Burmese sources identify individual
Burmese commanders and sizeable contingents of Burmese soldiers
who, alongside Mon contingents, helped defend the southern kingdom
until its final collapse. One such Burmese force was said to have
numbered between five and six thousand men." Avan deportees
may have served Pegu after 1754 under some degree of compulsion,
but local Burmese fought enthusiastically. One suspects that in October
and November of 1754, the Burmese leadership in the south split
between, on the one hand, men with long-standing attachments to
the old northern court, and on the other hand, southern Burmese who
had thrown in their lot with Pegu well before 1752. The key organizers
of the uprisings in the Upper Delta in late 1754 (Kyaw-din-thet-daw-
shei, Thado-kyaw-thu, A-ka-shwei-daung, etc.) were all former
Ava servicemen and ministers; while the most prominent Burmese
partisans of Pegu after 1754 (such commanders as Let-ya-bo and Ein-
da-bala-kyaw-thu) had never enjoyed Ava's patronage, so far as we
know, and had all fought for Pegu while Ava yet stood. Ein-da-bala-
kyaw-thu reportedly declined an invitation from Alaiing-hpaya in
1752 in these words, which show that in his view, personal loyalty was
a more noble ideal than ethnic solidarity:
It is true that we [i.e. my men and I] are Burmese [myan-ma lu-myd] but we
are servicemen who have come from Han-tha-wadi. We have already
sworn allegiance to the Talaing king, and although we are indeed Burmese,
we cannot now do domage to Alaung-min-taya-gyi.73
No doubt he was among those Burmese lords still loyal to Banya-
dala whom Alaung-hpaya seized shortly before Pegu fell.74
70
AAm, p. 149.
" Symes, An Embassy to the Kingdom of Ava, pp. 49-50.
72
They garrisoned Hson-gun fortsee AA-L, p. 112. For additional references to
Burmese defenders, see AA-L, p. 116; AA-T, p. 202; KBZ, Vol. I, pp. 128, 141,
159, 184; Dal, Vol. I, p. 166; and supra, note 32. The total Peguan army by 1757
probably did not exceed twenty-five thousand, so Burmese represented a significant
element indeed.
" KBZ, Vol. I, p. 55. Phayre, History of Burma, p. 165.
Epilogue: Some Contrasts with Modern Ethnic Revolts
In summary, we find in the mid-eighteenth century a strong tendency

for populations subject to the same political center to use cultural
traits as a badge of their common identity, particularly in periods of
transition and uncertainty. Yet the correlation between cultural, i.e.
ethnic, identity and political loyalty was necessarily very imperfect,
because groups enjoying the same language and culture were frag-
mented by regional ties, and because the dominant modes of political
organizationresting on concepts of religious universalism and
personal, quasi-'feudaP allegiancewere essentially indifferent to
cultural distinctions. We lack space to prove the point, but we can say
with confidence that the basic patterns of the period 1740-57 re-occurred
during the ephemeral southern uprisings of 1758-59, 1773-74, : 783,
and 1826-27.
These findings are of some relevance to our understanding of colonial
and post-colonial Burma. If the southern resistance to Ava and to
Alaung-hpaya was, as has generally been assumed, motivated by 'ethnic
separatism', one could logically conclude that the so-called Mon,
Karen, Shan and other ethnic rebellions which developed following
the withdrawal of British power from Burma in the 1940s were the
lineal descendants of that eighteenth-century resistance. In fact, our
findings lead us to suspect that the colonial period introduced a basic
discontinuity into the structure of Burmese ethnic relations. At this
point we will essay some brief contrasts between the revolt of the mid-
eighteenth century and those of the mid-twentieth century, in the hope
that scholars specializing in modern Burma may expand on this theme.
Certainly in both the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, rebellion
fed on the discontents of non-Burmese communities on the outskirts
of the Burmese heartland, while the central government was con-
trolled predominantly by Burmese. In both periods as well, the
insecurity attendant on the decline of an established regime accentuated
ethnic divisions, and helped make cultural traits into powerful symbols
of political identification. However, the universalist traditions which
had mitigated this tendency towards ethnic exclusiveness in the mid-
eighteenth century and which had permitted large numbers of self-
proclaimed 'Burmese' to support the Peguan revolt, had largely dis-
appeared by 1947. Differences between the two periods of rebellion are
apparent in personnel, territorial ambitions, and intellectu al orientation.75
75
I am particularly indebted to F. K. Lehman for the perspectives offered in
As we have seen, the revolt of 1740 rivetted popular loyalties to an

idealized political entitythe kingdom of Ra-manya or Pegu
as much as to a particular ethnic identity. Smin Dhaw was apparently
a Taung-thu posing as a Burmese prince, and Banya-dala was a Shan.
By contrast, the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO), the
Mon National Defense Organization, the Kachin Independence
Army, the Shan State Army, and other such post-1947 rebel movements
in each instance tended to be mono-ethnic. It is true that the KNDO
included a Kachin brigadier in 1949 and Burmese and Indian followers
by 1955, but the highest leadership of the KNDO always identified
themselves as Karens and their official pronouncements sought to
appeal exclusively to the so-called 'Karen nation'. So, too, the Mon
National Defense Organization, while cooperating with the KNDO,
viewed itself as the sole legitimate expression of the 'Mon nation'.
The eighteenth-century revolts sought to extend Pegu's authority
over as many tributary states and provinces as possible, regardless of
the ethnic composition of the inhabitants. Its essential thrust was ex-
pansive and integrative. The same was true of Alaung-hpaya's counter-
movement. By contrast, post-1947 dissident groups postulated the
existence of discrete national territories requiring either independence
or a degree of autonomy considerably greater than that permitted
under the federalist constitution of 1947. Whereas in the pre-colonial
period various ethnic groups had always lived in close proximity to
one another, the post-1947 rebellions sought to carve out of the Union
of Burma an independent 'Karen country', a fully autonomous or
independent Shan state, a Mon national area (or a Karen-Mon state),
and an independent Kachin state with compact well-defined ethnic
majorities.
Finally, both the revolt of 1740 and Alaung-hpaya's movement had
their intellectual roots in Buddhist political theories which placed
sovereignty in the person of the ruler in the expectation that he, as
his article 'Ethnic Categories in Burma'. Other sources on which I have relied for
the post-colonial period include: four publications by the Ministry of Information
of the Union of Burma entitled A Brief Review of Disturbances in Burma (1949?),
KNDO Insurrection (1949), Events Relating to the Karen Rising (1949), and Burma and
the Insurrections (1949); Hugh Tinker, The Union of Burma, 4th edn (London, 1967);
John F. Cady, A History of Modern Burma (Ithaca, 1958; 4th print, with supp., 1969);
Frank N. Trager, Burma: From Kingdom to Republic (London, 1966); Dorothy Guyot,
'Communal Warfare Between Burmans and Karens in 1942' (Paper Presented to the
29th Congress of Orientalists, Paris, July, 1973); Josef Silverstein, 'Part Two
Burma', in George M. Kahin (ed.), Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia, 2nd edn
(Ithaca, 1964); various editions of The Nation newspaper, Rangoon, 1952-58;
The Washington Post, April 11, 1976.
Patron of the Faith and defender of the Sahgha, would help make known
the path to salvation among all creatures under his rule. This soterio-
logical goal was the ultimate rationale of eighteenth-century kingship.
Buddhist political doctrines were often combined with magical elements
which, although not necessarily sanctioned by the Scriptures, also had
a potentially universal appeal. By contrast, contemporary nationalist
movements have their intellectual roots in post-Enlightenment
European political theories which are entirely secular in inspiration.
They place sovereignty in the population at large, and exalt secular and
popular culture as the source of national creativity. In seeking to
identify and preserve 'national' units, contemporary movements have
necessarily stressed the particular at the expense of the universal.
European notions about peoples and nations were accepted by most
Western-educated leaders, Burmese as well as non-Burmese, and
deeply influenced the federalist structure of the 1947 Constitution of the
Union of Burma.76
Historians may wish to determine whether these same pre-colonial/
post-colonial dichotomies which we have outlined in the Irrawaddy
valley were also found in Burmo-Siamese, Siamese-Cambodian, and
perhaps Cambodian-Vietnamese relations. At first glance, it would
seem that the pre-nineteenth century wars between Burma and Siam,
for example, were not national conflicts in the modern sense, but re-
gional and dynastic wars in which ethnic identity was but one of several
factors determining political loyalty. Only in this way can we explain
(particularly during the sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century wars)
the lack of guilt with which individuals swore allegiance to kings of
different ethnic type than themselves; the ease with which regional
centers detached themselves from the capital in the face of external
assault; and the prevalence of universal religious themes in the diplo-
matic intercourse between rival monarchies.
16
Lehman, 'Ethnic Categories in Burma', p. 103.

Ethnic Politics in Eighteenth-Century Burma by Victor B. Lieberman

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Modem Asian Studies, i a , 3 (1978), pp. 455-482. Printed in Great Britain.

Ethnic Politics in Eighteenth-Century Burma

W E commonly find in the literature on pre-colonial mainland Southeast

It is not difficult to find evidence of Burmese-Mon awareness and

Buddhist civilization, felt culturally superior to the Burmese, whom

This cosmopolitan orientation was reinforced by a second tradition,

where Pagan, Salin, Prome, and Taung-ngu nurtured independent

The Revolt of 1740: Burmese Support

The Peguan revolt of 1740 was the most destructive in a series of

" See Lieberman, 'The Burmese Dynastic Pattern', Chs 1, 4.

What political loyalties motivated the southern rebels? To what

ment on ethnic grounds alone. According to the Hman-nan chronicle,

Mons Who Failed To Support Pegu

At the same time a significant number of 'Mons'i.e. people who

they feared that districts east of Martaban as well as Yei, Tavoy,

Speakers of Karen dialects played a role in the Peguan uprisings. In

Brailey has pictured the events of 1740 as a virtual 'Karen' coup.

Events from 1747 to 1752

The victorious armywhich was identified in contemporary sources

Growing Polarization Under Alaung-hpaya

common traditioni.e. their role of being 'Burmese'which dis-

Universal Elements in Alaung-hpaya's Ideology

Nevertheless, deeply-ingrained universalist traditions still exercised

mentioned letter to Let-ya-pyan-chi in which Alaung-hpaya urged

"AA-L, p. 29. See AAm, pp. 9-10, 12-13, 28-30, 212-13.

Burmese Opposition to Alaung-hpaya

At the same time as pluralist traditions facilitated the entry of non-

Epilogue: Some Contrasts with Modern Ethnic Revolts

In summary, we find in the mid-eighteenth century a strong tendency

As we have seen, the revolt of 1740 rivetted popular loyalties to an

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