(1) Hungary Becomes First European Country To Ban Rothschild Banks

Posted on July 18, 2016 by Sean Adl-Tabatabai

Hungary have become the first European country to officially ban all Rothschild banks
from operating in the country.

In 2013, Hungary began the process of kicking out the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
agreed to repay the IMF bailout in full in order to rid the country of the New World Order
banking cartel.

A kindly worded letter from Gyorgy Matolcsy, the head of Hungarys CentralBank , asked
Managing Director, Christine Lagarde of the International Misery Fund, as some have fondly
nicknamed it, to close the office as it was not necessary to maintain it any longer.

The Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, seemed keen to ease off austerity measures and prove that the
country could go it alone. It in fact issued its first bond in 2011, borrowing off the global
markets.

Hungary borrowed 20 billion loan to avoid becoming insolvent during the economic crisis in
2008. But the debtee debtor relationship has not been smooth sailing.

Many criticised the Prime Minister as making an ill-advised decision in order to win an election,
which was due in 2014. He also wanted to refrain from having too many foreign eyes on their
economic policies, as many reforms were criticised as being undemocratic.

Paying the loan back early has meant Hungary have saved 11.7 million worth of interest
expenses, but Gordan Bajnai, leader of the electoral alliance E14-PM, claimed that they had
actually lost 44.86 million by March 2014 because of the early repayment as all they did was
replace the loan from the International Mafia Federation (another nickname, were still talking
about the IMF here) with a more expensive one, labelling the stunt as Propaganda .

And what made further nonsense; another loan at high interest rates was signed to finance a
nuclear upgrade, which will mean not only higher repayments but also high electricity costs. But
they do have economic sovereignty now.

Many have claimed that the IMF AKA Imposing Misery and Famine, are owned by the
Rothschild group, the biggest banking group in the world, having their fingers in almost every
central bank in the world. This means that not only do they make money off usurious interest

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rates at the misfortune of crumbling economies, they also literally own Governments and people
of power I mean they have considerable influence.

Escaping the banking clutches is therefore, iconic. Iceland joined Hungary in 2014 when it paid
back its $400 million loan ahead of schedule after the collapse of the banking sector in 2008 and
Russia, of course bowing down to no Western puppeteer, freed itself in 2005.

The return of these three countries to financial independence has been said to be the first time a
European country has stood up to the international fund, since Germany did so in the 1930s. Greece is
anxiously trying to make payments but missing them as we all stand on the sidelines routing for them to
stick two fingers up to the International M***** F******.

http://yournewswire.com/hungary-becomes-first-european-country-to-ban-rothschild-banks/

(2) Soros Groups Get Hacked, Hundreds Of Documents Leaked

By Alex Pfeiffer

10:36 PM 08/13/2016

Hundreds of internal documents from groups run by prominent billionaire liberal donor George
Soros were leaked online Saturday after hackers infiltrated the groups.

The 2,576 files were released by DCLeaks, a website which claims to be launched by the
American hacktivists who respect and appreciate freedom of speech, human rights and
government of the people.

The documents are from multiple departments of Soros organizations. Soros the Open Society
Foundations seems to be the group with the most documents in the leak. Files come from sections
representing almost all geographical regions in the world, the Presidents Office, and something
named SOUK.

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There are documents dating from at least 2008 to 2016. In June, the Open Society Foundations also had
several documents leaked by DCLeaks. Bloomberg reported that the foundation notified the Federal
Bureau of Investigation to the hacking.

Documents in the leak range from research papers such as SOMALIS IN EUROPEAN CITIES
PORTFOLIO REVIEW to specific financials of grants.

DCLeaks previously released emails from Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove, the supreme
commander of NATO forces in Europe. The emails showed Breedlove upset with Obamas
reluctance to address Russian aggression.

DCLeaks has been alleged to be a Russian-backed source.

Hundreds of internal documents from groups run by prominent billionaire liberal donor George
Soros were leaked online Saturday after hackers infiltrated the groups.

The 2,576 files were released by DCLeaks, a website which claims to be launched by the
American hacktivists who respect and appreciate freedom of speech, human rights and
government of the people.

The documents are from multiple departments of Soros organizations. Soros the Open Society
Foundations seems to be the group with the most documents in the leak. Files come from sections
representing almost all geographical regions in the world, the Presidents Office, and something
named SOUK.

There are documents dating from at least 2008 to 2016. In June, the Open Society Foundations
also had several documents leaked by DCLeaks. Bloomberg reported that the foundation notified
the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the hacking.

Documents in the leak range from research papers such as SOMALIS IN EUROPEAN CITIES
PORTFOLIO REVIEW to specific financials of grants.

DCLeaks previously released emails from Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove, the supreme
commander of NATO forces in Europe. The emails showed Breedlove upset with Obamas
reluctance to address Russian aggression.

DCLeaks has been alleged to be a Russian-backed source.

http://dailycaller.com/2016/08/13/soros-groups-get-hacked-hundreds-of-documents-leaked/

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(3) Rothschild family representatives leaves Japan empty
By Benjamin Fulford
November 21 2011
From ShiftFrequency Website

A senior representative of the Rothschild banking family was in Japan earlier this month
demanding money, according to a high level source in the Ruling Democratic Party of Japan.

When he was told the Rothschilds Japanese piggy bank was now cut off to them, he
threatened to have Japan sued for releasing radioactivity into the ocean.

The fact the Rothschilds have had to sink to such low level threats is a clear sign they are
suffering from a serious power loss.

The Rothschilds also need to realize that if they are to sue anybody for the Fukushima nuclear
disaster, it would be their erstwhile US allies like Henry Kissinger, J. Rockefeller and the
usual Council on Foreign Relations suspects.

In any case, this ruling party source has now confirmed what multiple other sources say and
that is that Senator J. Rockefeller, Henry Kissinger and now Jacob Rothschild have all visited
Japan during the past month and have all left empty-handed.

What happened was that there was a show-down in the Japanese underworld and the criminals
who had been sub-contracting here for the Rockefellers and Rothschilds etc. agreed to stop
working for them.

That is why Emperor Akihito suddenly went to the hospital and ceded responsibility to crown
Prince Naruhito. This was to make sure there was no royal family member available for these
Bilderberg thugs to threaten and bully.

As a result of this underground change, the White Dragon Society has now been given detailed
information about politicians who have been bribed in the past by the Sabbatean Jewish
gangsters.

Some of the main conduits for Rockefeller/Rothschild bribe money included,

former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone
DPJ power broker Ichiro Ozawa
Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara

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These people are now being isolated from the Japanese power structure.

In addition, the specific,

North Korean
Japanese
CIA,
...operatives responsible for the 311 Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear attacks on Japan have
been identified.

A representative of this group contacted the White Dragon Society to say that while they were
not proud of what they had done, they had no choice but to follow orders or be killed.

Their identities have been given to sources in,

MI6
the CIA
Interpol
the Yakuza
the Triads
the Japanese military police
However, so long as they refrain from any further such operations, they will not be prosecuted
but will be asked in the future to testify in front of a truth and reconciliation committee.

Also, some very esoteric financiers have emerged from the background as a result of this
power shift. We will not name them for now other than to mention they are ancient European
royal family foundations that have managed to keep their names out of the headlines even as
the Bilderbergers and Rothschilds have had theirs dragged out and excoriated in public.

Connected to this there is once again talk of trillions of dollars being readied for the good of
the planet.

Talk is cheap, however, and until the money is actually spent on ending poverty, stopping
environmental destruction and doing other good things for the planet, it remains just that: talk.

It is still not clear when, exactly, the new financial system will be up and running. A land-
mark lawsuit that was supposed to break the ice was promised for last week but it has failed to
materialize.

The bad guys, for their part, are circling the wagons in Europe, Wall Street and Washington
D.C.

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Vast fraud continues to be reported at the various big US and European money-center banks as
well as at many of the financial exchanges. Cabal controlled governments have also been
popping into existence in Spain, Italy, Greece and no doubt elsewhere soon too.

However, the hard reality is that Germany alone does not have enough money to save the EU
and the Euro project. The only European power with enough cash to save the day is Russia.
That is why analysts in Asia expect Russia and Germany will eventually forge a Eurasian
Union.

Without Russian or Asian money, the North American and European powers are now in a
Wiley Coyote situation. For those of you who never saw Road Runner cartoons as a child,
Wiley Coyote would often run off a cliff and keep running in mid-air for a while before
looking down, realizing he had no ground under his feet and falling. Creating money out of
thin air by putting numbers on computers is not reality.

Unless they embrace world peace, the Washington and EU political apparatuses will crash-
land.

The Pentagon, at least, has shown it knows what the future holds. The fact of the matter is that
the center of gravity of the world has shifted to Asia and the United States military industrial
complex needs to attach itself to Asia in order to survive. The decision announced last week to
permanently station US troops in Australia is part of a shift from defending Europe from
Russia to defending the Chinese periphery from China.

Countries like,
Vietnam
Korea
Japan
Thailand,
...appreciate the economic good times the China boom has brought them but they are also
willing to hire US troops to ensure their independence.

The Chinese, for their part, understand that time is on their side and the wiser leaders there
accept the need for a gradual transition of the US military industrial complex into a peaceful
organization devoted to planetary defense and exploration of the universe.

All that said, the current US regime is in no position whatsoever to lecture China about human
rights when Obama himself has declared the right to kill American citizens without any trial or
legal process. The so-called Patriot act in the US is identical to the Nazi fascist constitution
and the fact of the matter is US is now ruled by a fascist regime.

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 Democracy is not possible in the US with rigged electronic polling and when over 90% of the
media there is owned by five companies all controlled by the fascist oligarchs.

Also, Australian Anzus agents have given me evidence that your Prime Minister Julia Gillard
was undemocratically placed in power by agents of the privately owned US Federal Reserve
Board.

To conclude, a peaceful transition of the military industrial complex is needed to prevent

world war and getting Asian finance for the pentagon is essential to that transition. My
understanding is that as a part of that transition, the Pentagon and the US agencies will be
restoring constitutional democracy to the United States.

Australia also needs to remove the banker-selected Gillard if it wishes to safeguard its
democratic traditions.

http://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/sociopolitica/sociopol_fulford124.htm

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(4) Putin Bans Rothschilds From Russia

Putin played the New World Order game long enough to climb as high as the position of
President - then he abruptly turned his back on them, prompting Jacob Rothschild to accuse him
of being a "traitor to the New World Order."

Posted on June 1, 2016 by Baxter Dmitry on Yournewswire.com

Brave Vladimir Putin has banned Jacob Rothschild and his New World Order banking
cartel family from entering Russian territory under any circumstances.

Putin recently reminded his cabinet that he paid off the Rothschilds debt and grabbed them by
the scruff of the neck and kicked them out Russias back door.

This meeting featured the President pounding his fist on the table and vowing to destroy the New
World Order, and according to a Kremlin source Putin is making great strides towards this goal.

They do not own the world, and they do not have carte blanch to do whatever they want. If we
do not challenge them there will be other issues. We will not be bullied by them.

It is understood that the Rothschild banking racket was a noose tied around the neck of the
Russian economy. Once the knot was tightened, the economy would struggle and choke.

Early in his presidency he made a priority of uniting Russia socially, spiritually, and
economically. He ordered the arrest of the Rothschild backed oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky
who had made Rothschild, Henry Kissinger and Arthur Hartman directors of the Open Russia
foundation.

He was so upset with the banksters in his temple, he tipped over their tables and drove them out
with a whip.

A keen student of history, well versed in world affairs, the Russian President has studied the
history of the worlds most elusive organisation and understands the central role their financial
collaborators have played in fomenting the major international conflicts of the 20th century.

Now they want to plunge us into World War III.

The New World Orders invasive roots and branches keep spreading around the world, but
President Putin has stopped them expanding into Russia. This is a major blow to their plans for
world domination and now they view him as a real threat. Hes got them running scared, which
is why he is degraded in the Western media at every opportunity.

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The reality is that Putin is leading us towards a multi-polar world, far from the one government,
one religion future plotted by the New World Order. When he took his forces into Syria to
protect a sovereign state he further enhanced his reputation as a powerful leader.

People around the world have started to wake up and notice.

http://yournewswire.com/putin-bans-rothschilds-from-russia/

(5) What Will Donald Trumps Asia Policy Look Like?

By Prashanth Parameswaran

November 10, 2016

WASHINGTON, D.C. Ill tell you what Ive told the diplomats: were serious about what we
said [and] flexible about how we do things too, a source close to President-elect Donald Trump
told The Diplomat early Wednesday morning in response to inquiries about his Asia policy
following his stunning victory over Hillary Clinton just a few hours earlier.

After shrugging off much of what Trump said during the election campaign and writing off his
chances of winning, many are now rushing to figure out to what extent his words will translate
into actions after the biggest U.S. election upset since Harry Truman beat Thomas E. Dewey
back in 1948. His approach to Asia has unsurprisingly attracted a lot of attention, given the fact
that the future of U.S. President Barack Obamas rebalance to the Asia-Pacific hangs in the
balance (See: US Asia Policy After Obama: Opportunities and Challenges).

Asia has certainly been an area of focus for the Trump campaign, though most are probably
familiar only with the headline-grabbing statements about U.S. alliances and nuclear weapons
rather than how the region factors into Trumps overall worldview and what that means for his
likely Asia policy. With Trump set to take office in January 2017, it is worth taking a closer look
at what Americas new president might do in the region.

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Trumps Worldview

An America First Foreign Policy

The conventional wisdom is that Trumps foreign policy worldview, if implemented, would
diverge significantly from post-World War II U.S. foreign policy. But the extent to which this is
true is not as clear as it seems.

To be sure, his outlook, which he has said might be summarized as America First, is based on
a bleak assessment of Americas position in the world today, a narrow interpretation of U.S.
interests, and a transactional approach in dealing with the international community. It is a far cry
from what we are used to hearing from traditional U.S. presidential candidates, who rarely
question American exceptionalism and indispensability in the world or the alliances and free
trade agreements that form the bedrock of U.S. commitment to the liberal world order.

Trump fleshed out this view in an April 27 address at the Center for the National Interest, a
Washington, D.C. think tank that, at the time, received a fair bit of flak for even inviting him to
speak.

In that speech, Trump argued that U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War era had been
wasteful, rudderless, unreliable, and ineffective. By contrast, Trump said he would focus more
narrowly on rebuilding Americas military and economy, curbing the spread of radical Islam,
and fashioning what he called a new rational American foreign policy, which some have also
since somewhat loosely termed a version of realism.

It is this broader worldview that gives rise to those of Trumps foreign policy beliefs grabbing
headlines, including his skepticism for alliances and free trade and comfort with authoritarian
regimes in Russia and China.

Trump the Pragmatist?

Yet Trumps views, his advisers say, are often unfairly caricatured in spite of attempts made to
clarify them. Following scrutiny at home and abroad, Trump has subsequently said that he is not
opposed to alliances per se, but their cost, and that he would be open to trade deals he perceives
as being fair to the United States.

But those nuances, the Trump adviser who spoke to The Diplomat said, were only picked up by
those attentive to what he was actually saying, as opposed to what was being reported.

Besides, once one gets beyond these general principles and down to specific issue areas within
his America First foreign policy, Trumps foreign policy views seem relatively more
mainstream.

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Walid Phares, a foreign policy adviser to the campaign, has said that Trumps two principal
concerns are terrorism, with the rise of the Islamic State, and nuclear non-proliferation, with the
challenges that both Iran and North Korea pose. Those concerns would top any prospective
American presidents list.

And with respect to Trumps willingness to work with authoritarian countries like Russia and
China, Trump has repeatedly said that this is due not to his ideological leanings, but simply
because he views the challenge of radical Islam as being far more important and urgent.

Supporting this line of argument, Phares wrote on Fox News back in April that Trumps softer
line toward Moscow and Beijing was simply a product of the fact that he saw jihadism as the
greater immediate threat, which required the assistance of U.S. rivals as well.

Mr. Trump clearly desires to reduce tensions with Russia and China so as to better focus on
containing our common enemy, jihadism, Phares wrote.

As proof of Trumps pragmatism, Phares also claimed in that piece that Trump would not
hesitate to use economic leverage which could conceivably mean sanctions to pressure
China into reining in North Koreas nuclear ambitions, which he also considered a top priority.

Implications for U.S. Asia Policy

Given what we know and dont know about Trumps worldview, what does that mean for U.S.
Asia policy under his watch?

At first glance, Trumps headline-grabbing rhetoric would seem to signal a radical departure
away from all four pillars of Obamas rebalance to Asia building alliances and partnerships;
strengthening regional institutions; deepening economic engagement; and promoting democracy
and human rights. Yet a closer look reveals that the extent of change may not be as dramatic as
some are making it out to be.

Alliances and Partnerships

First, with respect to Americas Asian alliances and partnerships, Trump has signaled a more
transactional, narrow approach to these relationships based largely on greater burden-sharing.

To be fair, Obama, too, emphasized the need for greater burden-sharing in his rebalance to Asia.
But he got to this from a more expansive, liberal internationalist vision, and his solution was to
not only strengthen alliances, but build out a set of newer, institutionalized strategic and
comprehensive partnerships to encourage greater involvement by established and emerging
powers in a wide range of global and regional challenges.

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If Trump follows through on what he has said, he will want to reevaluate Americas key treaty
alliances and, where possible, ask them to do more. But what exactly would that mean in
practice?

In his April 28 speech at CNI, Trump got a little more specific when he boasted that he would
call for a summit with Americas NATO and Asian allies where they would discuss a
rebalancing of financial commitments as well as ways to adopt new strategies to tackle common
challenges.

Predictably, he was mum on the exact nature of that summit. But there are already signs that he
may actually be quite content with even minor adjustments in terms of burden-sharing among
Americas allies.

For instance, in his August 15 speech on radical Islamic terrorism, which came just a few months
after his criticism of NATO, he said the United States would now work closely with the
institution on that challenge since, following his criticism on its obsolescence, NATO had shown
a willingness to change by having a new division focused on terror threats.

It is also unclear which specific allies would be affected by this approach, if any, and how
exactly he will approach each case. Rhetorically, Trumps focus has been on Japan and South
Korea, which is no surprise since that is where most U.S. troops are based in Asia.

Even here, though, Trumps senior advisers, including Michael Flynn, who has visited Japan,
have repeatedly downplayed his suggestions about potentially withdrawing U.S. troops and
tolerance for Tokyo going nuclear, and insisted that he not only remains committed to the
alliance but would be open to strengthening it to address common threats like North Korea
following initial talks.

On Americas Southeast Asian allies, far less is known. One interesting relationship to watch
will be the U.S.-Philippine alliance, where President Rodrigo Duterte has himself said that the
Philippines does not really get that much from the United States and is looking to cut certain
parts of the defense relationship (See: Will Duterte End the US-Philippine Military Alliance?).
So far, Trump has predictably pounced on Dutertes frosty ties with the United States and
warming relations with China as evidence of Obamas failed foreign policy but has said little
else.

On the other hand, Australia presents a case on the opposite end of the spectrum, since Canberra
has been willing to support a greater U.S. military presence. Indeed, Obamas announcement of
the rotational deployment of U.S. marines in Darwin still not fully realized in remarks to the
Australian parliament back in November 2011 was one of the key features of the military aspect

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of the rebalance. How Trump responds to an ally keen to take on a greater share of the burden
remains to be seen.

A final consideration is how Trump would deal with China, which awkwardly lies outside of
Americas expanding alliance and partnership network or, if you prefer, principled security
network in the Asia-Pacific. In spite of the suggestion that Trump would simply embrace
Beijing, the indications from his advisers are that he is likely to continue the approach of his
predecessors who treated China with a mix of engagement and balancing.

For example, in a piece published in Foreign Policy on November 7, two of Trumps advisers,
Alexander Gray and Peter Navarro, framed Trumps Asia approach which would involve a
more self-interested approach to economics and a stronger military almost entirely around
Chinas rising assertiveness and Beijings overplaying of its hand in the region. The piece,
which alsoblamed the Obama administration for failing to respond to Chinese gains in the South
China Sea as well as with Americas twin Southeast Asian allies, Thailand and the Philippines,
was far more hawkish than what we have seen in U.S.-China policy in recent years.

Regional Institutions

Second, on regional institutions and multilateralism more generally, there are very few
indications of what Trumps views are. The temptation would be to assume that if he has very
little patience even for free-riding allies, then he would devote almost none of Americas
attention to Asian multilateral engagements led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), a sharp contrast to the Obama administration, which had devoted more time,
attention, and resources to ASEAN-led institutions (See: Why the US-ASEAN Sunnylands
Summit Matters).

Like other dimensions of Trumps worldview, there are no shortage of speeches and statements
that would support an anti-multiateralist stance. For example, in a speech delivered a day after
Obamas swan song this September at the United Nations General Assembly where the
outgoing president specifically said he believed that giving up some freedom of action to bind
Washington to international rules was ultimately a good investment that would enhance its
security Trump repeated at a rally that unlike the corrupt political establishment, which
embraced globalism for self-serving reasons, he would focus on what was best for the United
States.

I am not running to be president of the world, Trump said to emphasize his point. I am
running to be president of the United States, and thats what were going to take care of.

This fiery rhetoric aside, though, the key question is the degree to which Trump and his
administration would actually approach multilateral engagements.

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It is difficult to see him missing out on all multilateral engagements, especially if he realizes,
with or without the help of his advisers, that some of them actually help advance his goals, like
countering terrorism.

To his credit, Trump has already shown a willingness to selectively employ multilateralism to
realize narrow U.S. interests. In his speech on radical Islam delivered in August, he said he
would call for an international conference where the United States would work with its Middle
Eastern friends and allies, including Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, to tackle the threat.

Less clear is whether a Trump administrations selective employment of multilateralism would

extend to the economic sphere. The extent to which this is the case will determine if we see some
high-level attention devoted to initiatives like the fledgling U.S.-ASEAN Connect Initiative
unveiled under the Obama administration, or whether it simply dies a slow death.

Whether or not he sees engagements like the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the U.S.-ASEAN
Leaders Meeting as important enough to attend on a regular basis, however, is an open question.
On the one hand, Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN as a bloc are important actors in
addressing challenges that Trump and his advisers believe are important, including terrorism and
maritime security.

On the other hand, he may determine that he can still foster this collaboration by engaging
selective countries bilaterally or through other U.S.-led institutions like the Global Coalition to
Counter ISIL, rather than larger groupings that move slower. There are also intermediate options.
For example, he could also choose to not attend certain ASEAN meetings personally and instead
send a lower-ranking official, downgrading Americas presence but not eliminating it entirely.

Economic Engagement

Trump has certainly said a lot more about the third pillar of U.S. Asia policy: economic
engagement.

The item that he has spent the most time on by far is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Given
Trumps fierce opposition to the pact, it is difficult to see him reversing position on this. His
election win also arguably all but kills the odds of TPP passing during the lame duck session
of Congress after the election, since Republicans have little incentive to bring it to a vote and
pick an early fight with an incoming president who may well move to block it.

That does not necessarily mean that Trump is opposed to all trade deals, however. Trump and his
advisers have said that he would be open to trade agreements that are better deals for the United
States. If they are indeed serious about that, this could be a significant point. Beyond other
bilateral agreements, such as the investment treaty proposed between the United States and

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China, TPP, which is essentially a collection of bilateral deals, could be salvaged in parts with
agreements reached with individual nations.

Flynn, the Trump adviser, made a point of mentioning in an interview with Nikkei Asian Review
during his most recent trip to Japan in October that though Trump did believe in free trade, he
thought bilateral deals were better than multilateral blocs because we have opportunity to cut [a]
better deal.

The United States and Japan both do not currently have a bilateral free trade agreement, unlike
some countries within TPP (like Singapore) that already have an FTA with Washington.

Less clear is how Trump would proceed with proposals like raising tariffs on imports from China
and Mexico or renegotiate other existing trading agreements like the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). Tough trade talk is common in U.S. presidential elections, with candidates
seldom following through. Trumps aides, for their part, have sought to downplay the advent of
doomsday scenarios like an all-out trade war.

The dire effects of some of Trumps proposed policies on the American economy also suggest
that they are unlikely to be actually enacted. For instance, one study by the Peterson institute for
International Economics (PIIE), a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, found that if large tariffs
are imposed on China and Mexico and retaliation ensues, the United States could go into a
recession and lose five million jobs.

Trump has said less about broader questions that demand attention within the economic
dimension of U.S. Asia policy, such as how Washington can better leverage its strengths to
engage regional actors as Chinas growing heft tilts the healthy competition for economic
influence in its favor.

Human Rights and Democracy

The fourth and final aspect of U.S. Asia policy worth considering is human rights and
democracy.

At first glance, Trumps views not only seem unclear but at times contradictory. His rhetoric
suggests that he has both a Manichean view of the world especially when talking about radical
Islam but also a realist understanding of international relations where selective cooperation can
be pursued where common interests exist even if ideological differences remain.

This could be nothing more than window dressing to reconcile his amateurish attempts to draw
Cold War-like battle lines between democracies and authoritarian regimes while also leaving
himself room to pursue better relations with authoritarian states like Russia, which he has a
personal affinity for independent of their contribution to the national interest.
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Whether this is the case or not, Trumps narrow interpretation of U.S. interests suggests that he
would devote even less attention to the promotion of U.S. ideals than the Obama administration,
which, to its credit, pursued a relatively softer line relative to the Bush years but also found
nimbler ways of conducting business, whether it be through town hall meetings featuring the
president or the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative (YSEALI).

Trump himself has suggested that he is less interested in spreading universal values that not
everybody shares or wants, but will instead work with U.S. allies to reinvigorate Western
values and institutions.

How exactly he will do that is a mystery. Indeed, the mere fact that he has been elected in the
United States in spite of his xenophobic, misogynistic, and bigoted rhetoric on the campaign
trail, as well as his all-too-cozy relationship with authoritarian regimes, would presumably
undercut any attempt by his administration to reinvigorate Western values or institutions.

Unknowns

As we consider Trumps potential policies, it is also important to keep in mind that there are a
handful of uncertainties that will also affect the shape of his eventual foreign policy, including in
Asia.

First, as has been pointed out repeatedly already, it is not clear to what extent Trump would
actually be wedded to acting on the views that he has expressed. Though some of his views may
be long-held, he has never been in government, and the personal opinions he had while being a
businessmen and television celebrity may evolve once he assumes the presidency and has to
think about the national interest. He has also demonstrated a tendency to flip-flop on certain
issues, and there is often a divergence between what he says and what his aides claim he means
to say.

Second, we dont know how Trumps actual views may translate into policymaking when it
comes to Asia. Unlike the case of Clinton, whose Asia policy team was comprised of known
quantities, Trumps foreign policy advisers in general are much less well-known, even in the
case of Phares and Flynn. The composition and hierarchy of the advisers could also change
depending on whether we see mainstream Republican foreign policy experts who initially
opposed Trump now return to serve under the president in 2017 and beyond.

Beyond personalities, we also do not know how exactly Trump will choose to receive and act on
the advice he gets. Based on what we know about Trump, he does not read much and often
ignores advice. Asked on MSNBCs Morning Joe back in March about whom he consulted on
foreign policy, Trump said he was his own primary consultant because he had what he called a
good instinct. His almost schizophrenic relationship with his advisers during the general

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election also suggests that even if he does listen to advice, the process by which this plays out
will be far from coherent.

Third, Trump, like any president, and perhaps more than most, faces constraints in putting some
of his policies into practice, both in the form of other domestic actors as well as regional and
global challenges.

Domestically, if Trump, with a Republican Congress, chooses to move forward with too many of
his divisive policies too quickly from dismantling Affordable Care Act (ACA) to appointing a
Supreme Court justice that is far too conservative and would reignite Americas culture wars
he could exacerbate fierce political divides, prompt obstructionism in the legislature, and
eventually lose Congress in 2018 as Obama did early on in his first term, following what was
read as executive overreach.

If too much of his time, energy, and political capital is expended domestically, that might give
him less room to chart a radically different U.S. foreign policy that could have implications for
Asia. He could even outsource most of the implementation to his senior foreign policy advisers,
who could then moderate his more extreme tendencies, leading to far more continuity with U.S.
Asia policy than might otherwise be expected (alternatively, though, a President Trump that is
hamstrung domestically could also seek to exert more control on foreign policy, where the
president has far less checks and balances).

Trump could also run into regional and global challenges that may lead him to shift in the
direction of more continuity in U.S. Asia policy irrespective of his initial positions, or,
alternatively even more drastic change.

On the one hand, if Trump, in his war against radical Islam, does end up embroiled in another
Middle Eastern quagmire, we could see Washingtons attention once again being diverted away
from the region, or, alternatively, the rise of more threat-centric U.S. foreign policy approach
centered around counterterrorism and nuclear non-proliferation, something like what we saw
during the first part of George W. Bushs tenure.

On the other hand, if a nightmare scenario does indeed come to pass and Trump begins to take
dramatic steps that undermine Americas military presence and economic influence in Asia, then
we could see a familiar pattern in U.S. foreign policy where vacuums are filled by Washingtons
rivals and adversaries, prompting calls for a more activist stance among other domestic actors.

As I have pointed out repeatedly, it is worth remembering that the last U.S. president that tried to
implement such a radical departure in U.S. foreign policy was Jimmy Carter, who issued a
Trump-like call in the 1970s to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea and the Philippines
following the Vietnam War. Though it took some time, Carter was eventually forced to reverse

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course due to stiff bureaucratic resistance as well as rising regional and global threats, including
Soviet aggression. We could see some form of this repeating itself in the coming years.

How all this plays out will take time, a point that Trumps advisers have been making in
response to the flood of inquiries. Though policymakers, experts, and other observers will be
feverishly seeking answers about what a Trump administration might do in Asia, we probably
will not find out the broad contours until well into 2017. Trump will only be taking office in
January next year, after which officials and advisers will have to go through their confirmation
hearings and policy will slowly begin to take shape as trips are arranged and meetings are held
with key allies and partners. All the while, events will continue to evolve.

Its still early days, the Trump adviser told The Diplomat. Itll be a while, as it often is, before
we get region-specific [and] down in the weeds.

http://thediplomat.com/2016/11/what-will-donald-trumps-asia-policy-look-like/

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(6) US Asia Policy After Obama: Opportunities and Challenges

By Prashanth Parameswaran

November 08, 2016

WASHINGTON, D.C. Look, overall, Id be pretty happy with what hes handed me, big
picture, one of U.S. President Barack Obamas advisers said somewhat frustratedly in a
conversation about the presidents rebalance to Asia policy back in August in Washington, D.C.,
after I had gone through a laundry list of criticisms.

It is difficult to quibble with the argument that Obama has gotten the big picture right on the
U.S. rebalance to Asia. Entering office with the United States bogged down in quagmires in Iraq
and Afghanistan and in the midst of the greatest financial crisis since the Great Depression,
Obama has redirected U.S. attention to the Asia-Pacific, a smart, if belated, acknowledgement of
the tremendous opportunities in the region as well as significant challenges that are likely to
endure well into the 21st century. Indeed, when then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton wrote her
famous article in Foreign Policy, seen as the roll out of the rebalance, Asia was already
generating more than half of global output and nearly half of global trade.

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The list of achievements within the rebalance from concluding and institutionalizing new diplomatic
partnerships with emerging powers to boosting the U.S. military presence in the region is also
impressive by any standard, even if one subtracts the initiatives that were already underway during
George W. Bushs second term, as some of Obamas critics might be inclined to do. Daniel Russel, the
U.S. top diplomat for Asia, has even been publicly suggesting this year that the increased U.S.
commitment to the region has now become a new normal.

But it is also true that Obama leaves office with much of the domestic work unfinished, some
areas of U.S. Asia policy underdeveloped, and a wide array of regional and global challenges
managed but ultimately unaddressed. Indeed, as the next administration officially takes the reins
to Asia policy in January 2017, the inheritance will elicit mixed feelings.

Unpacking the Rebalance

Before assessing the rebalance, it is important to clarify what exactly it is, since it has been
subject to no shortage of sloppy and misguided analysis.

For most of the 20th century and particularly since the end of World War II, U.S. foreign policy
has basically sought to advance greater security, prosperity, and democracy globally. American
policymakers have also been focused more specifically on preserving U.S. hegemony in the
Eurasian landmass and preventing any other single power from dominating it, primarily the
Soviet Union during the Cold War. That idea dates back to the British geographer Halford
Mackinder in the early 20th century, though it has also informed U.S. foreign policy strategists
from George F. Kennan to Zbigniew Brzezinski.

These broad objectives in U.S. foreign policy continue to be relevant today. But the rebalance at
its broadest level represented a recognition by the Obama administration that Asias growing heft
requires the United States to devote relatively more of its resources, attention, and time to the
region than it had previously even as Washington continues to address concerns in other parts of
the world as any global superpower is expected to do.

The list of strategies to advance this vision or goal has evolved during the administrations
tenure, but five key ones are evident: modernizing U.S. treaty alliances; engaging emerging
powers; investing more in regional institutions; expanding U.S. economic engagement; and
protecting human rights and promoting democracy.

Though all of these strategies were also employed previously to varying degrees, the focus on
these particular ones as well as the relative weight assigned to each of them reflected deeper
underlying assumptions held by the Obama administration about the role of the United States in
Asia and the world. These include the importance of cultivating current and emerging powers to
facilitate greater burden-sharing in a more multipolar world; the centrality of institutions in

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shaping and reinforcing rules and norms; and the need to prevent unnecessary conflict and
facilitate heretofore unrealized cooperation, including with rivals and adversaries.

Assessing the Policy

How, then, has the rebalance fared? Assessments of the policy have unfortunately been either
based on a snapshot of a particular point in time pegged to specific developments such as the
slow movement on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in Congress or the unexpected rise of
Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines or limited to specific issue areas, such as U.S.-China
relations or the South China Sea. In fact, such assessments are rather poor ways to judge what
amounts to a comprehensive strategic reorientation of U.S. policy.

A far better way of assessing the rebalance is to ask how this strategic reorientation of U.S.
foreign policy has played out on the domestic, regional, and global fronts, since all three are
essential to its execution. Or, more specifically, to what extent has the Obama administration
been successful at refocusing the domestic on the Asia-Pacific; how effective has the United
States been in implementing its strategies in the region; and what has the impact of the policy
been in terms of how Washington deals with the rest of the world? On all three accounts,
progress has been mixed and the jury is still out.

Domestically, the administration deserves credit for deepening bureaucratic attention to the Asia-
Pacific. To display its seriousness about regional multilateralism, for instance, it created a new
Office of Multilateral Affairs at the State Departments Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
stationed a U.S. ambassador to ASEAN in Jakarta, and committed the president himself to
attending the East Asia Summit and holding annual U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Meetings in spite of
his busy schedule. That is no small feat, since the most valuable commodity in U.S. foreign
policy is the presidents time.

But there have also been challenges on the domestic front. The example often advanced to
symbolize U.S. domestic difficulties in implementing the rebalance is TPP, but that is actually a
rather poor illustration. Although the agreement has not been inked under Obama, it is not
uncommon for trade deals of its ilk to be held up in Congress and even approved in the following
administration (as was the case when Obama signed three Bush-era free trade deals with South
Korea, Colombia, and Panama).

The real problem has been that progress on this front has been uneven across different agencies,
and resourcing has often been a challenge amid the U.S. economic recovery as well as
sequestration. Even on the defense side which has seen the most progress amongst the various
lines of effort, relatively speaking budget caps have significantly constrained the resources that
can be devoted to implementing the rebalance, despite the best efforts of policymakers to
creatively protect certain line items from cuts.

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Regionally, the Obama administration has successfully sent a message to the Asia-Pacific that
the United States is serious about upping its regional commitment. The flashier examples of this
are achievements like the convening of the first-ever summit with Southeast Asian leaders at
Sunnylands in February, one of the clearest manifestations of the administrations increased
emphasis on Southeast Asia the so-called rebalance within the rebalance (See: Why the
US ASEAN Sunnylands Summit Matters).

But other more mundane signals, like institutionalizing U.S. relationships with emerging and
established partners through strategic and comprehensive partnerships, are equally if not more
important and deserve praise (See: US Strategic Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific). As Daniel
Kritenbrink, the senior director for Asian affairs in the Obama administrations National Security
Council, reminded an audience at the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council in October,
institutionalization is important because it helps ease regional fears about the sustainability of
Americas presence.

Yet certain aspects of that commitment have also come under scrutiny. For example, on China
policy, the administrations desire to ease insecurities and collaborate on issues like climate
change initially dubbed strategic reassurance coincided with an increasingly confident and
at times assertive Beijing, particularly after Xi Jinpings ascension to the presidency. In the
South China Sea in particular, which some view as a key test of U.S. credibility, the
administration repeatedly struggled to find a way to respond to Chinas calibrated assertiveness
(See: US South China Sea Policy After the Ruling: Opportunities and Challenges).

Another major criticism is on the democracy and human rights front. Administration officials are
correct when they tirelessly argue that they have promoted American ideals through newer,
arguably nimbler ways such as town hall meetings featuring the president and the Young
Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative (YSEALI). But the fact remains that in some cases, such as
Malaysia, the line that the United States has taken has been softer than it could have been,
reflecting a bias in favor of realizing new opportunities rather than being hamstrung by old
challenges (See for instance: Why Obamas Lifting of the Vietnam Arms Embargo Matters).

Globally, the Obama administration has been somewhat successful in getting established and
emerging powers to come together to help solve global problems such as climate change. It has
also been able to manage a series of crises from the Iranian nuclear program to the situation in
Iraq and Afghanistan using a mix of diplomacy and limited engagement while drawing down
the heavy U.S. presence in the Middle East that had consumed so much of Americas time,
attention and resources.

Yet at the same time, that restraint has at times proved a double-edged sword for U.S. Asia
policy. For instance, in its determination to not enter another Middle Eastern quagmire, the

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administration infamously went back on its red line pledge in Syria, which was read to be a
blow to U.S. commitment with ripples that went out to the Asia-Pacific.

The Obama administrations hasty withdrawal from the Middle East and refusal to get involved
in Syria is also partly blamed for the rise and spread of the Islamic State, whose tentacles have
now spread to Southeast Asia (though it must be said that this is a rather tricky balance, since the
subregion is also vulnerable when Washington intervenes See: ASEANs Islamic State
Conundrum). By not acting sooner, the administration has also arguably narrowed the options
of its successor, thereby increasing the likelihood of the heavier U.S. presence that
Obama sought to prevent in the first place. Time and time again, the charge has been that after
years of overcommitment during the Bush administration, the Obama administration has swung
the pendulum too far in the direction of restraint, thereby leaving vacuums filled by new threats
and emboldened adversaries and compounding the problems for its successor.

The Next Administration

Given this mixed inheritance, what should Obamas successor do? To continue the rebalance, the
next administration will have to confront lingering challenges, seize new opportunities, and
strengthen the foundation on which U.S. policy is built.

The first and most immediate task of the next administration will be confronting a daunting set of
domestic, regional, and global challenges. Domestically, the next president will have to manage
both the wave of populist discontent that has at times threatened to undermine the bipartisan
consensus on Asia policy centered around the twin pillars of alliances and free trade and
unresolved budgetary issues that could lead to further underresourcing of the rebalance,
especially on the military side (See: Can Trumpism Survive Without Trump?).

Furthermore, given the polarization we saw before the election and the mud-slinging we saw
during it, irrespective of what kind of mandate the polls offer, the next president will likely have
to govern with a divided populace and as well as a contested legislature, thereby sapping political
capital that could otherwise be devoted to a more activist foreign policy (See: Trump or Clinton,
Challenges Ahead for US Asia Policy). For the first time in a quarter century, the United States
could well end up with a one-term president.

The task abroad is no less difficult, with a complex set of threats that will test the
administrations ability to keep its focus on Asia. As the administration contends with regional
challenges such as an increasingly confident and capable China and a nuclear North Korea, it
will also have to grapple with other issues that threaten to consume its attention, including a
prickly Russia, fractured Europe, dangerous Islamic State, and tumultuous Middle East.

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Furthering the rebalance is not just about tackling familiar challenges, but thinking up new
opportunities. On the economic side, one area ripe for fresh ideas is how the United States and
some of its partners, like Japan, can better leverage their strengths to engage regional actors as
Chinas growing heft tilts the healthy competition for economic influence in its favor.

Of course, the way in which the United States does economic statecraft and aid disbursement is
different from countries like China or Japan, and Washingtons advantages may chiefly lie in
shaping norms and building capacity through longer-term initiatives like TPP. There have also
been some good ideas advanced over the past few years, with initial talk of a U.S. regional
infrastructure facility and, more recently, the public roll out of the broader U.S.-ASEAN Connect
initiative (See: Obama Unveils New ASEAN Economic Initiative at Sunnylands Summit) .

But Washington needs to go beyond just marketing or coordinating the various existing U.S.
lines of effort. And longer-term measures must be supplemented by shorter-term, impactful ones
that are in line with U.S. interests and ideals but also aligned with the interests of regional
leaders working on a shorter time horizon and to the benefit of the populations of these countries
to generate goodwill.

On the security side, maritime security will continue to be a priority area. Much of the attention
will likely be placed on the South China Sea, especially if Beijing continues its quest to turn the
sea into a Chinese lake. Though the U.S.-led Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI)
has been a good first step to advancing an important longer-term goal of building a common
operating picture in the region and boosting U.S. defense relationships with regional actors, U.S.
policymakers must think about how to better utilize the full range of American as well as allied
and partner capabilities including coast guard assets to blunt Chinas future bouts of
calibrated assertiveness in the near-term (See: Americas New Maritime Security Initiative for
Southeast Asia).

Beyond the South China Sea, U.S. policymakers should foster collaboration with regional actors
in other key waterways as well. For instance, given the relatively growing attention to
transnational threats as well as the recent subregional cooperation already underway in the form
of trilateral patrols, the Sulu Sea is one additional front where Washington may be able to play a
role (See: Confronting Threats in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas: Opportunities and Challenges). Of
course, this would depend on the demand signal from regional states as well, with the Regional
Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) launched in 2004 during the George W. Bush administration
being a cautionary tale about the importance of proper messaging.

On the democracy and human rights front, the next administration must publicly articulate a
clear U.S. approach to the issue in the region for the 21st century during its first year in office.
Such an approach would both acknowledge recent regional trends from a rising and more
empowered middle class to the mixed picture for democracy in the region; from setbacks in

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Thailand and China to limited successes like the opening in Myanmar but also reiterate
Washingtons longstanding role in promoting democracy and human rights and reinvigorate the
way in which it does so. With elections in Malaysia and Cambodia coming up in 2018, both of
which could see historic transitions or contested outcomes, Washington would do well to get
ahead of events. Besides, promoting rights ought to be viewed not just as a challenge, but an
opportunity to advance a critical part of the so-called rules-based order.

Beyond these functional areas, the next administration should also advance opportunities with
key states in the region. Managing the U.S. relationship with an increasingly capable and
confident China will be a key priority, and, as with the previous few administrations, the next
will have its own learning curve when it comes to dealing with Beijing. The next president too
will end up with some mix of engagement and balancing.

But within this management process, it would behoove the administration to at least seek a few
tangible, practical demonstrative projects on which it can cooperate with China in the Asia-
Pacific. U.S. officials say some such efforts have been met with frustration in the past and that
more often than not, it is far easier to collaborate in regions other than Asia. But it is still worth
pressing the issue. Getting to something, however symbolic, would be a powerful signal to the
rest of the region that both powers are committed to a constructive relationship, especially if it is
in areas of pressing need like infrastructure development. It is not enough for the U.S.-China
relationship to just go global; it should try to go regional as well where it is possible.

Even as it looks for additional avenues for cooperation with China, the next administration
should also continue to find new opportunities to advance collaboration within the growing U.S.
alliance and partnership network in the Asia-Pacific, or, in narrower, defense terms, the
principled security network (See: US Hits Right Note at Shangri-La with Principled Security
Network).

When I asked U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter about the quadrilateral the growing alignment
between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States he said that Washingtons goal was to
just keep going, broadening the ever-widening networks of activity in the Asia-Pacific (See:
Return of Asias Quad Natural: US Defense Chief). For the next administration, this might
mean advancing newer formalized alignments like the U.S.-India-Japan trilateral dialogue, or
starting new ones with other emerging powers such as the U.S.-Japan-Vietnam trilateral, which
has already been taking place at the non-official level (See: The Future of US-Japan-Vietnam
Trilateral Cooperation).

There may also be additional opportunities to boost cooperation with U.S. partners who are also
in the process of rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific as well. To cite just one, with Taiwans new
president Tsai Ing-wens New Southbound Policy focused on Southeast Asia, there may be
opportunities for the United States and Taiwan to collaborate in certain areas like the digital

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economy as part of the Global Cooperation Training Framework Program (GCTF) that was
recently signed between the two sides.

Apart from overcoming challenges and thinking up opportunities, perhaps the most challenging
part of furthering the rebalance is strengthening the domestic base, which serves as the
foundation for realizing opportunities and tackling challenges in the first place. Part of this is
about bringing along the American people and the wider U.S. policy apparatus more effectively
to sustain the United States increased regional commitment. Former senior U.S. policymakers,
including Kurt Campbell, one of the architects of the rebalance, have suggested several proposals
that could help accomplish this, whether it be several presidential speeches delivered
domestically that emphasize Asias importance to an American audience, or the issuance of a
single, publicly available document that articulates the administrations Asia strategy to ensure
better coordination amongst agencies.

Another aspect of this is fostering more effective policymaking. This is not simply about
boosting or shrinking resources or staff in specific bodies such as the stretched State
Departments Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP) or the increasingly bloated
National Security Council, as some have suggested. It is also about understanding how to make
interagency cooperation more effective. For example, though the need for various agencies to be
involved in the U.S.-ASEAN Connect initiative is understandable, those in the region familiar
with the program routinely complain that as a result, the initiative has become rather unwieldy
and its future direction is unclear.

A final aspect is continuing to be clear-eyed about U.S. interests in spite of rising threat
perceptions and occasional ideological impulses. At certain points be it the reaction to Japans
rise in the 1980s, the response to the Asian financial crisis in the 1990s, or the mindset following
the September 11, 2001 attacks there has been a tendency for U.S. policymakers to overreact to
threats or respond impulsively without considering what the regional reaction might be. As we
now see the rise of another Asian power as well as another wave of terrorism, the next
administration should respond decisively but also ensure that it calibrates threats with
opportunities, and interests and ideals, in its worldview. After all, it is worth remembering that it
was the post-9/11 environment that prompted the course correction that was the U.S. rebalance in
the first place.

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