Heirs of Mascunana V CA
Heirs of Mascunana V CA
Heirs of Mascunana V CA
MASCUANA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AQUILINO BARTE, and SPOUSES RODOLFO and CORAZON
LAYUMAS, respondents.
FACTS: Gertrudis Wuthrich and her six other siblings were the co-owners of a parcel of land. Over time,
Gertrudis and two other co-owners sold each of their one-seventh (1/7) shares, or a total area of 741 square
meters, to Jesus Mascuana.
Jesus Mascunana sold a portion of his 140-square-meter undivided share of the property to Diosdado
Sumilhig. Mascuana later sold an additional 160-square-meter portion to Sumilhig. However, the parties
agreed to revoke the said deed of sale and, in lieu thereof, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. In the said deed,
Mascuana, as vendor, sold an undivided 469-square-meter portion of the property for P4,690.00,
with P3,690.00 as down payment.( balance of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) shall be paid by the
VENDEE unto the VENDOR as soon as the above-portions of Lot 124 shall have been surveyed in the name
of the VENDEE and all papers pertinent and necessary to the issuance of a separate Certificate of Title in the
name of the VENDEE shall have been prepared. ) A survey was conducted and the portion of the property
deeded to Sumilhig was identified in the said plan as Lot No. 124-B.[6]
ISSUE: whether or not THE SALE OF LOT NO. 124-B MADE BY JESUS M. MASCUANA IN FAVOR OF
DIOSDADO SUMILHIG A CONTRACT TO SELL OR CONTRACT OF SALE. (petitioners are contending
contract to sell)
While it is true that Jesus Mascuana executed the deed of absolute sale over the property on August 12,
1961 in favor of Diosdado Sumilhig for P4,690.00, and that it was only on July 6, 1962 that TCT No. 967 was
issued in his name as one of the co-owners of Lot No. 124, Diosdado Sumilhig and the respondents
nevertheless acquired ownership over the property. The deed of sale executed by Jesus Mascuana in favor
of Diosdado Sumilhig on August 12, 1961 was a perfected contract of sale over the property. It is settled that a
perfected contract of sale cannot be challenged on the ground of the non-transfer of ownership of the property
sold at that time of the perfection of the contract, since it is consummated upon delivery of the property to the
vendee. It is through tradition or delivery that the buyer acquires ownership of the property sold. As provided
in Article 1458 of the New Civil Code, when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof
is equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, unless the contrary appears or can
be inferred. The record of the sale with the Register of Deeds and the issuance of the certificate of title in the
name of the buyer over the property merely bind third parties to the sale. As between the seller and the buyer,
the transfer of ownership takes effect upon the execution of a public instrument covering the real property.
[31]
Long before the petitioners secured a Torrens title over the property, the respondents had been in actual
possession of the property and had designated Barte as their overseer.
In this case, there was a meeting of the minds between the vendor and the vendee, when the vendor
undertook to deliver and transfer ownership over the property covered by the deed of absolute sale to the
vendee for the price of P4,690.00 of which P3,690.00 was paid by the vendee to the vendor as down
payment. The vendor undertook to have the property sold, surveyed and segregated and a separate title
therefor issued in the name of the vendee, upon which the latter would be obliged to pay the balance
of P1,000.00. There was no stipulation in the deed that the title to the property remained with the vendor, or
that the right to unilaterally resolve the contract upon the buyers failure to pay within a fixed period was given
to such vendor. Patently, the contract executed by the parties is a deed of sale and not a contract to sell.
Applying these principles of DIGNOS vs CA to this case, it cannot be gainsaid that the contract of sale between
the parties is absolute, not conditional. There is no reservation of ownership nor a stipulation providing for a
unilateral rescission by either party. In fact, the sale was consummated upon the delivery of the lot to
respondent. Thus, Art. 1477 provides that the ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee
upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof.[33]
The condition in the deed that the balance of P1,000.00 shall be paid to the vendor by the vendee as soon
as the property sold shall have been surveyed in the name of the vendee and all papers pertinent and
necessary to the issuance of a separate certificate of title in the name of the vendee shall have been prepared
is not a condition which prevented the efficacy of the contract of sale. It merely provides the manner by which
the total purchase price of the property is to be paid.
In a contract to sell, ownership is retained by a seller and is not to be transferred to the vendee until full
payment of the price. Such payment is a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a breach of
contract but simply an event that prevented the obligation from acquiring binding force.[35]
It bears stressing that in a contract of sale, the non-payment of the price is a resolutory condition which
extinguishes the transaction that, for a time, existed and discharges the obligation created under the
transaction.[36] A seller cannot unilaterally and extrajudicially rescind a contract of sale unless there is an
express stipulation authorizing it. In such case, the vendor may file an action for specific performance or
judicial rescission.[37]
Article 1169 of the New Civil Code provides that in reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the
other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him; from the
moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the other begins. In this case, the vendor (Jesus
Mascuana) failed to comply with his obligation of segregating Lot No. 124-B and the issuance of a Torrens
title over the property in favor of the vendee, or the latters successors-in-interest, the respondents herein.
Worse, petitioner Jose Mascuana was able to secure title over the property under the name of his deceased
father.