Crimpro Sec. 3, RULE 111 Title: Madeja v. Caro G.R. No. G.R. No. L-51183

CRIMPRO Sec.
3, RULE 111
TITLE: G.R. No. G.R. No. L-51183

Madeja v. Caro
Date: 21 December 1983
Ponente: ABAD SANTOS, J
Petitioner(s) Respondent(s)
CARMEN L. MADEJA HON. FELIX T. CARO and EVA ARELLANO-
JAPZON
FACTS:
Case timeline:
1. Dr. Eva A Japzon is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after
an appendectomy in the Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar.
2. The complaining witness is the widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja.
3. The information states that: "The offended party Carmen L. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate
civil action for damages.
4. While the criminal case is still pending, Madeja sued Dr. Japzon for damages in Civil Case No. 141 of the
same court. She alleged that her husband died because of gross negligence of the accused.
5. The respondent judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss which motion invoked Section 3(a) of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court.
6. According to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New Rules of Court, the
instant civil action may be instituted only after final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.
7. This is the instant petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge granting the defendant's
motion to dismiss.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the civil action may proceed independently of the criminal action against
Dr. Eva A. Japzon.
RATIO:
YES.
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision.
"Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved
as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of Court.)
"Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed inde-
pendently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (Civil Code.)
The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto.
And Tolentino says:
"The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
reserves his right to institute it separately; and after a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action
arising from the same offense can be prosecuted. The present articles creates an exception to this rule when
the offense is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries. In these cases, a civil action may be filed independently
of the criminal action, even if there has been no reservation made by the injured party; the law itself in this
article makes such reservation; but the claimant is not given the right to determine whether the civil action
should be scheduled or suspended until the criminal action has been terminated. The result of the civil action
is thus independent of the result of the criminal action."
The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the
Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries by consummated, frustrated and attempted homi-
cide. Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the
Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation
and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but
in their generic sense.In other words, the term 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury,
not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms.
RULING:
In the light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may proceed independently
of the criminal action against her.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the order dismissing Civil Case No. 141 is hereby set aside; no
special pronouncement as to costs.
NOTES:
Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads:
"Sec. 3. Other civil action arising from offenses. In all case not included in the preceding section the fol-
lowing rules shall be observed:
(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal
action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action." . . .
Action Ex Delicto means a legal action for a breach of a duty that is not stated in a contract but arises pursuant
to the contract. Ex delicto is a Latin term , meaning from a wrong or from a transgression. Therefore, action
ex delicto is an action arising out of the breach of a duty or obligation created by positive law, independent of
contract.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur. Death due to a negligent act may be a delict or quasi-delict. It may create a civil action based on
article 100 of the Penal Code or an action based onculpa aquiliana under article 2176 of the Civil Code. These
alternatives are assumed in article 2177 of the Civil Code "but the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same
act or omission of the defendant" (Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 and Sudario vs. Acro Taxi and Yuson, 86
Phil, 1. See Formento vs. CA, L-26442, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 437).
The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and may give rise to an independent
civil action (Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).
The rule in Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, that reckless imprudence is not included
in Article 33 of the Civil Code, is not authoritative doctrine because it was concurred in by only five Justices.
Four Justices concurred in the result.

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CRIMPRO Sec.

TITLE: G.R. No. G.R. No. L-51183

Ponente: ABAD SANTOS, J

The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto.

And Tolentino says:

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