Psychological Reality of Grammars:

Devitts Ignorance of Language

Peter Slezak ([email protected])
Program in Cognitive Science,
School of History & Philosophy of Science
University of New South Wales, Sydney 2052 AUSTRALIA

Abstract intuitions do not reflect information supplied by the

language faculty that there is little or nothing to the
Devitt makes a sustained critique of Chomskyan linguistics, language faculty (2006b, vi)
articulating persistent complaints about the psychological
reality of generative grammars. I suggest these complaints are
Devitts critique rests on two pillars: his negative arguments
merely terminological and that Devitt fails to appreciate the
status of Chomskys computational formalisms found
against Chomskys psychological realism regarding
elsewhere in cognitive science. Devitt ascribes an intentional grammars, and his positive case for an alternative conception
conception of representations that Chomsky repudiates and of a linguistic reality that grammars are about. Thus, in
that is independently implausible. I argue that Devitts part, Devitts book depends on attributing a certain doctrine
proposed alternative linguistic reality constituted by physical concerning mental representation to Chomsky despite
symbol tokens neglects the problems of tokens as opposed to Chomskys explicit rejection of it. As an exegetical
types and he misses the force of Chomskys case against principle, beyond a certain point, such severe uncharitability
Behaviourism and nominalism. I suggest that Devitts case is itself a symptom of mistaken attributions and we must ask
against intuitions as data misunderstands their standard role
how such errors of substance and interpretation are possible.
throughout perceptual psychology. I argue that Devitts
position exemplifies pervasive errors concerning mental
Answering this question provides insight into deep and
representation seen throughout cognitive science. pervasive philosophical puzzles. Devitts work may be seen
as a case study in what Rorty (1979, 60) has called the
Keywords: Linguistics; grammar; competence; psychological original sin of epistemology to model knowing on seeing
reality; behaviorism; nominalism; Chomsky; Devitt. (1979, 146). In a telling metaphor, Devitt suggests If we
could look into the brain and simply see if there were
Rather Idle Controversy representations of this and that, as we can look in a book and
In his recent book Ignorance of Language, Michael Devitt see if there are representations , then that would of course
(2006b) has mounted an extended, scathing critique of the settle the matter (2006b, 51).
generative enterprise and compares the situation to quantum A certain Representational Thesis (discussed below) is
physics where there are not only successful explanatory attributed to Chomsky not only in the face of Chomskys
theories but also controversy about foundations. Devitt says repudiation, but also despite the familiar merits of his quite
in linguistics, by contrast, There is not a similar controversy different computational conception found elsewhere
about how to interpret these theories but I think that there throughout cognitive science. In this way, Devitts rejection
should be. However, on the contrary, there has been just of Chomskys psychological, computational conception and
this controversy from the earliest days of generative his own alternative program entails nothing less than
linguistics, and Devitt is simply rehearsing the most undoing the mentalism of the cognitive revolution in a
persistent objection to the psychological reality of return to certain nominalistic aspects of Skinnerian,
grammars as internal representations (see Quine 1972, Stich Bloomfieldian behaviourism the second pillar of Devitts
1972, Searle 1980b, Ringen 1975, Botha 1980). By 1978, book. Devitt is concerned with what he regards as a
one philosopher remarked that More has been written, linguistic reality the real subject matter of grammars
much of it exasperatingly shallow, about the confusions constituted by the outputs/products such as physical
surrounding the concept of competence and knowledge-as- sentence tokens and the spoken, written, etc., symbols that
competence than almost any other topic in recent speakers produce (2006a 483). We may recall Chomskys
philosophy (Nelson 1978, 339). (1965) remarks on this rather idle controversy being
Devitts verdict is a calamitous judgment on Chomskys revived by Devitt. In a lengthy footnote to his famous
conception of his linguistics: methodological chapter of Aspects he wrote:

I urge that linguistics is not part of psychology; that the In fact, the issue of mentalism versus antimentalism in
thesis that linguistic rules are represented in the mind is linguistics has to do only with goals and interests, and
implausible and unsupported; that speakers are largely not with questions of truth or falsity, sense or nonsense.
ignorant of their language; that speakers linguistic (1965, 193)

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 incomprehension of Descartes critics for several centuries.
Remarkably, it remains apt to characterise Devitts work in Of specific relevance here is Cecilia Wolf-Devines (2000)
Chomskys (1967) words forty years ago as a paradigm treatment of Descartes analogy of a blind man holding two
example of a futile tendency in modern speculation about sticks whose separation and angle permits him to know the
language and mind. distance of an object. Wolf-Devine takes this account of
For Fodor (1968) the generative approach provided a knowing to invoke a homunculus, despite Descartes explicit
model for psychological explanation of the sort also disavowal of such question-begging pseudo-explanations
articulated in Pylyshyns (1984) seminal work namely, the and despite the manifest virtues of the proposed
computational view of cognition that presupposes that we computations on their own. The parallels with Chomskys
take seriously such distinctions as those between critics are noteworthy. Wolf-Devine draws attention to
competence and performance. A decade earlier, Pylyshyn Descartes use of the verbs savoir and connatre to suggest
(1972, 1973) gave important analyses of the notions of that Descartes is guilty of a hopeless over-
psychological reality and competence in psychology in intellectualization of perception (2000a, 513). These
which he explained above all, One reason why the notion of complaints are striking to a modern reader familiar with the
competence is particularly important is that it is the first interminable disputes surrounding Chomskys use of the
clear instance of the influence of mathematical words know or cognize to characterise his generative
imagination on the study of cognition, referring to studies grammars. We will see that these worries are a constant
by Turing, Gdel, Church and others in the foundations of refrain in the chorus of criticism that Devitt joins.
mathematics and the theory of computation. Chomsky has
referred to his approach in this regard as Galilean and The Natural Interpretation of Chomsky
Pylyshyn explains the allusion as reflecting the fact that, like In seeking to reconstruct Chomskys views, Devitt chooses
the great advances in physics, Chomskys work is to depart from Chomskys own terminology and to insist
permeated with the belief that the secrets of the universe upon terms and conceptions that Chomsky has explicitly
(both physical and psychological) are, as Galileo said, repudiated, namely the philosophical ideas of intentionality
written in the language of mathematics. The extraordinary and propositional attitudes. Devitt (2006b, 5) persists in his
persistence of the same disputes suggest that their underlying semantic, intentional sense of representation, indeed,
sources are deep ones that deserve to be diagnosed. I suggest remarkably, illustrating it with the very example of a picture
that these misunderstandings are not unique to linguistics but that Chomsky (2003, 276) uses to distinguish it from his
pervasive throughout cognitive science and philosophy of own. Devitt characterises Chomskys view of linguistic
mind since the 17th century (Slezak 2006). knowledge as propositional knowledge of syntactic rules
(2003b, 108), using the philosophical idiom which entails
Savoir and Connatre that speakers have access to the linguists theories. Indeed,
Devitt (2006a, b) dubs a certain view of our intuitions about Devitt (2006b, 69) suggests that Chomsky has made the
language Cartesian because of the introspective elementary confusion of a theory and its object. However,
immediacy and certainty such evidence seems to possess. for Chomsky, the rules are not the intentional object of the
However, the characterisation is perhaps more apt than speakers knowledge, but rather constitute this knowledge.
Devitt intends. Beyond the notion of privileged access to our Chomskys frequent comparisons with insects and bird-song
mental states, Descartes also held views concerning our could hardly make sense on any other interpretation. Aside
inaccessible tacit knowledge views that are remarkable from the intrinsic implausibility of the idea that nave
anticipations of contemporary conceptions in cognitive speakers might have propositional knowledge of syntactic
science and linguistics. Specifically, in his Dioptrics facts, Devitt ascribes to Chomsky the very errors he has
Descartes proposes that in binocular vision the mind been careful to warn against. Devitt defends this
determines the distance of an object by means of an implicit interpretation of Chomsky as the most natural one because
triangulation or parallax calculation based on the separation it takes his talk of knowing that, propositional attitudes,
of the eyes and their orientation. Descartes says this and representation at face value (2003b, 109). However,
happens by an action of thought which, although it is only a what appears as face value to a philosopher steeped in
simple act of imagination, nevertheless implicitly contains a scholastic subtleties may not appear as face value to
reasoning quite similar to that used by surveyors, when, by cognitive scientists. Thus, the doctrine that Devitt ascribes to
means of two different stations, they measure inaccessible Chomsky is characterised as follows: The Representational
places. (Descartes 1637/1965, 106) This is, of course, just Thesis (RT): A speaker of a language stands in an
Chomskys conception of a competence theory that captures unconscious or tacit propositional attitude to the rules or
our tacit knowledge a formal, mathematical, computational principles of the language, which are represented in her
model describing what we know unconsciously and language faculty. (Devitt 2006a, 482, 2006b, 4). Devitt
underlying our intuition or simple act of imagination. asserts Many linguists, including Chomsky, seem to believe
Devitts critique of Chomsky is not only rehearsing RT (2006a, 482) and The natural interpretation attributes
objections that have been made and answered repeatedly for RT to Chomsky (Devitt 2006b, 7). It is telling that Rey
several decades recently, but he is also echoing the (2003b) uses the same curious expression the natural

648
interpretation as if we are dealing with hermeneutics of the competence/performance distinction as though he has
Dead Sea Scrolls and doctrines whose authors intentions are advanced some novel insight.
obscure or unavailable. By any reasonable measure, the Rey accuses Chomsky of inconsistency or insincerity
natural interpretation is clearly the one that Chomsky has because he sees Chomskys (1980a, 102) illustrative
repeatedly articulated and insisted upon in specific response examples as essentially involving intentional, referring
to the very construals offered by Devitt and Rey. The only representations. The difficulty arises in part because,
sense in which Devitts RT is the natural interpretation of undoubtedly the cases cited do have referential properties,
Chomsky is one that ignores what he says and appears so to but these are entirely irrelevant to Chomskys specific
a philosopher enmeshed in irrelevant philosophical notions theoretical interest in them. It is as if one were to insist that
of intentional representation. billiard balls have a colour that is an intrinsic property, even
though a Newtonian explanation of their behaviour will not
Simply embodied refer to these aspects of the phenomena of interest. Rey
For Chomsky, the rules and representations of a grammar are (2003b, 158) reports Chomskys comparisons with
taken to be real in the usual sense applicable in any other immunology, physics and insect navigation in order to
scientific inquiry namely, when they are posits of our best illustrate his notion of representation that is not conceived as
explanatory theory. Devitt says One is left uncertain of intentional in the philosophers sense. However, Rey
Chomskys position (2006b 71) and, not surprisingly, finds dismisses such illustrations with sarcasm, accusations of
a deep paradox in the fact that Chomsky allegedly has no disingenuousness, and the evidence of his colleagues shared
worked out opinion about, or even much interest in, how that incomprehension (Rey 2003b, 160 fn 19). Not surprisingly,
grammar in the head plays a role in language use (2006b, like Devitt, Rey sees an alternative that he considers more
71). However, on the contrary, Chomsky has repeatedly (see plausible than the idea that the ant represents the system of
1980, 197) suggested plausibly that his abstract, idealized vector algebra itself. (2003b. 157). Instead, Rey suggests
approach is the best way to discover underlying That system is, at best, merely implemented somehow in
neurological, processing correlates of grammars. Far from the ants nervous system (2003b 157). However, as we
lacking interest in the question, Chomsky is simply have seen, terminology aside, this is not an alternative to
responding to the obvious fact acknowledged in Devitts Chomskys conception but precisely his view, since to be
own words that we dont even know enough about what to implemented in the nervous system is to be represented in
look for (2006b 52) or, in Fodors words quoted the relevant sense.
approvingly by Devitt, there isnt one, not one, instance
where its known what pattern of neural connectivity realizes Devitts Philosophie Als Ob1
a certain cognitive content (Fodor 1998, 145 quoted in Devitt holds that a system might behave as if it is
Devitt 2006b, 52). Thus, Chomsky expresses exactly following rules but for all that, it might not be governed by
Devitts own sentiment, saying we might go on to suggest represented rules at all. We will see that the entire debate
actual mechanisms [underlying abstract rules], but we know might be settled if the term psychological reality is ceded
that it would be pointless to do so in the present stage of our to the critics and understood to mean processing
ignorance concerning the functioning of the brain mechanism since Chomskys critics on this issue appear to
(Chomsky 1980, 206,7). Nevertheless, Devitt discovers a be almost exclusively motivated by this concern. Devitts
supposed anomaly in Chomskys approach: What is articulation of his position is striking for its precise
puzzling about this is that a strong commitment to RT seems recapitulation of Chomskys own position under the illusion
inappropriate in the absence of a well-supported theory of that an alternative view is being proposed a point also
language use that gives RT a central role (2006b, 71; noted by Laurence (2003, 87). This charge is easy to
emphasis added). That is, Devitt foists a view onto Chomsky substantiate, as we can see from Devitts statements:
that he doesnt hold and is then mystified by his failure to
take it seriously. It is not enough to know that there is something-we-
know-not-what within a speaker that respects the rules of
The Birds and the Bees her language We would like to go beyond these
The decisive evidence of Devitts failure to understand minimal claims to discover the ways in which the
Chomsky is Devitts own articulation of what he takes to be competence of the speaker respect these rules.
a possible alternative to the most natural reading of (2006b, 38)
Chomskys words. On this alternative construal, he is taken
to hold that language rules are merely embodied without Chomsky writes:
being represented (2006b, 7, 63; 2003b, 109). However,
given Devitts stipulation of how representation is to be
used, this is simply an arbitrary terminological matter of no
theoretical interest. Indeed, as we will see, from another 1
Hans Vaihingers (1911) book The Philosophy of As If argued
point of view Devitt is merely re-stating Chomskys own that we can never know the underlying reality of the world that
behaves as if it corresponds with our models.

649
 we are keeping to abstract conditions that unknown Methodological Preliminaries sets out the key ideas of a
mechanisms must meet. We might go on to suggest competence theory including the following warning. Far
actual mechanisms, but we know that it would be from seeming uninterested in the difference between theory
pointless to do so in the present stage of our ignorance and its object, Chomsky made the same clarification in
concerning the functioning of the brain. If we were Language and Mind (1972), where he noted The term
able to investigate humans as we study other, defenceless grammar is often used ambiguously to refer both to the
organisms, we might well proceed to inquire into the internalised system of rules and to the linguists description
operative mechanisms (1980, 197) of it. (1972, 116). The same point had been explained in
Chomskys (1975, 37) Introduction to his Logical Structure
Chomskys phrase abstract conditions that unknown of Linguistic Theory. Thus, it should be needless to say that
mechanisms must meet is precisely Devitts much-vaunted Chomsky does not suggest that the formalisms of a grammar
Respect Constraint and Chomskys acknowledgment that themselves are in the head, just as Descartes did not propose
a grammar might be realized in as yet unknown ways is just that Euclidean theorems are literally inscribed in the brain.
Devitts point about what he calls psychological reality. It
should be evident that there is nothing of substance left over Marrs Computationalism
besides terminological disagreement between Devitt and Chomskys grammars illustrate the functionalist conception
Chomsky. Sufficient evidence of the oddity of Devitts of mind the modern statement of what it means to do
polemic is the fact that, terminology aside, Chomskys point psychology and to attribute internal representations. Devitts
concerning the competence-performance distinction might reservations amount to dissenting not only from Chomskys
well be encapsulated in Devitts own supposed challenge: views, but from the entire enterprise of modern psychology.
A grammar may have nothing more to do with Chomskys functionalist view is unmistakable in his Aspects
psychological reality than comes from meeting the Respect (1965), where he writes:
Constraint (2006b, 37).
The mentalist need make no assumptions about the
Cognize possible physiological basis for the mental reality he
Chomsky (2000, 94) suggests that in its modern guise we studies. it is the mentalistic studies that will ultimately
can trace the argument about psychological reality of be of greatest value for the investigation of
grammars back to Quines distinction between fitting and neurophysiological mechanisms, since they alone are
guiding, the latter term supposedly only appropriate to concerned with determining abstractly the properties that
conscious application of rules. Where rules are not guiding such mechanisms must exhibit and the functions they
and followed consciously in this manner, it is widely held must perform. (Chomsky 1965, 193, fn. 1)
that we may only speak of behaviour fitting or conforming
with rules in the way that a planet obeys Keplers Laws. It is particularly surprising that Devitt wishes to deny that
Devitts main criticism of Chomsky is just an elaboration of linguistics is psychology since accounts of this kind
this Quinean distinction between fitting and guiding articulate what constitutes psychological explanation in the
rules. Clearly, the debate has long ago degenerated into a information processing paradigm.2 Chomsky (1982, 10)
ritual talking past one another. Chomsky and Katz (1974, has repeatedly cited the work of Marr (1982) as
363) replied to Stichs (1972, 817) projectile argument exemplifying this approach, just as Marr (1982, 28), in turn,
saying: At best, it is an open question whether more than an cites Chomskys (1965) competence/performance distinction
uninteresting issue of terminology is involved. as the appropriate methodological analysis of his
We may note the irony of Devitts accusation of a certain computational theory of vision.
looseness of talk of knowledge. Devitt says I think that
linguistics would do better to avoid the talk and I think R - E - S - P - E - C - T: Find out what it
that we should drop talk of knowledge from serious science means to me (Aretha Franklin)
(2006b, 5). However, it was precisely because of the
Since Devitt refuses to take seriously Chomskys
misleading connotations of the term know that Chomsky
idealization that abstracts from any possible realization of
(1986, 265) himself suggested that it might be replaced with
the rules, not surprisingly, Devitt says it is hard to see how
the neologism cognize.
it [a grammar] could be a theory at the computational level
(2006b, 66). Even where Devitt acknowledges the purely
Theory and Object mathematical sense of the notion of generate he fails to
Devitt attributes implausibly nave errors to Chomsky such appreciate the precise force of this conception (2006b, 68).
as a certain use/mention sloppiness and a neglect of the The term generate is used in the clear sense in which one
crucial, elementary distinction between a theory and its says that an axiom system generates its theorems and has
object. There could be no clearer indication of Devitts own nothing whatever to do with actual mechanisms or causal
sloppiness here, for he has failed to appreciate Chomskys processes. Above all, the formal sense of the term generate
explicit warning about the systematic ambiguity of the term
grammar: In his Aspects (1965, 25), the first chapter on 2
See Chomsky 1966, 91; 1980, 201; 1980, 206,7.

650
is not merely metaphorical in any sense, as Devitt seems be construed in the manner of a grammar representing tacit
to think. knowledge of conceptual structures. Indeed, David Gil
Devitt illustrates his analysis with the case of chess (1983) has argued that the intuitionist or conceptualist
moves which are rule-governed in that something counts as account of mathematics takes intuitions in essentially the
a chess move at all only if it has a place in the structure same way that a linguist does, namely, as data to be
defined by the rules of chess (2006b, 18). Devitt labels explained by a formal theory
these rules structure rules in order to distinguish them Despite Devitts animadversions against intuitions, this
from the rules governing the psychological process by form of evidence is commonplace and uncontroversial
which [a player] produces chess moves. Aside from elsewhere throughout psychology. Nevertheless, Devitt
Devitts irrelevant characterization of the latter as explicitly rejects the analogy of linguistic intuitions with
interesting, this analysis simply restates Chomskys perceptual experience (2006b, 112). However, Devitts
competence/performance distinction. That is, the first pillar objection to the analogy is surprising because he draws
of Devitts book his critique of Chomsky collapses into a precisely the wrong conclusion from his own allusion to
verbal quibble. Devitt seems to appreciate the point in a Fodors (1983) account of the visual module. Ironically,
footnote: I do not take it [a grammar] to be real simply in Fodor illustrates his point with Ullmans (1979) algorithmic
virtue of its meeting the Respect Constraint. But this theory, exactly the example used by Chomsky (1986, 264)
difference may be just verbal. (2006b, 67). Arguably, this to illustrate the nature of his own computational theory. The
footnote vitiates the rest of Devitts book. perceptual judgments that are relevant in the visual case are
emphatically not what is seen in the success sense of
Intuitions such terms, but in the psychological sense of what seems to
Devitt (2006a, b) devotes special attention to the vexed be the case. The distinction is, after all, well known to
question of the status of intuitions and suggests that, rather philosophers (Ryle 1949, 152), though Devitt relies
than being the voice of competence, linguistic intuitions irrelevantly on the veridical or achievement conception of
are opinions resulting from ordinary empirical what is seen (2006b, 114). The visual module doesnt
investigation, theory-laden in the way all such opinions are provide the truth about the distal stimulus but only a
(2006b, 98). Moreover, Devitt argues that speakers perceptual judgment that Ullmans algorithm purports to
intuitions are not the main evidence for linguistic theories explain, just like Chomskys grammar.
(2006b, 96) and do not support the claims for grammars as The familiar perceptual phenomena that form a large part
mentally represented. However, Lerdahl and Jackendoff of the data for the psychology of vision include such things
(1983) have developed a grammar of music saying: We as the various constancies, ambiguous figures such as
believe that our generative theory of music can provide a Necker Cube, duck-rabbit and faces-goblet, anomalous
model of how to construct a competence theory (in figures such as the Penrose Triangle, Kanizsa illusory
Chomskys sense) (1983, xi). In particular, Lerdahl and contours, and the ubiquitous Mller-Lyer Illusion, inter alia.
Jackendoff write: We take the goal of a theory of music to The phenomena of interest in all such cases are the percepts
be a formal description of the musical intuitions of a listener of normal viewers the judgments or construals that
who is experienced in a musical idiom. (1983, 1) They constitute the data to be explained by theories of visual
explain that they are adopting a stance analogous to that processing. The two interpretations of the Necker Cube
taken in the study of language by the school of generative- known intuitively to a visual virtuoso (Hoffman 1998) are
transformational grammar (1983, 5). Music cognition closely analogous to the two meanings of an ambiguous
serves to illustrate Chomskys point concerning the nature of sentence known as the percepts of a native speaker.
the enterprise. Since music has no content or reference to the Chomsky writes:
world, these factors need not give rise to the irrelevant
intentionalist attribution of RT. Thus, as I. Giblin (2007) has A grammar is a system of rules that generates an infinite
persuasively shown, despite parallel, spurious objections, we class of potential percepts, In short, we can begin
may say that a music grammar is internally represented in by asking what is perceived and move from there to a
exactly the same sense as a language tacit knowledge study of perception. (Chomsky 1972, 168,9)
captured by the rules of a formal generative theory. In
particular, we see that Devitts Representational Thesis is From such remarks we can see that the place of intuition in
utterly irrelevant in the case of musical cognition. Of course, grammars hardly deserves to be controversial, unless the
one could defend something like Devitts position by whole of perceptual psychology is also open to the
claiming that the formalisms of a generative theory of music difficulties alleged to arise for linguistics. Thus, Chomsky
were not psychologically real and not about a mental explained the interest of his famous pair John is easy/eager
reality underlying musical intuitions, but about something to please saying that introspective data of this sort are
else, perhaps a musical reality or about the heavenly simply what constitute the subject matter for linguistic
spheres. theory. We neglect such data at the cost of destroying the
In his efforts to clarify his view, Chomsky (1982, 16) has subject (Chomsky 1964, 79).
drawn an analogy with mathematics which, like music, can

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