IV.

Additional Cases

28. Noriega vs Sison, G.R. No. L-24548, Oct. 27, 1983

HERMINIO R. NORIEGA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. EMMANUEL R. SISON, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

GUERRERO, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed on June 3, 1981 by Herminio R. Noriega against Atty. Emmanuel
R. Sison (admitted to the Bar on March 31, 1976) on the ground of malpractice through gross misrepresentation
and falsification.

Complainant Noriega alleges that respondent Sison is a regular and permanent employee of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) as a Hearing Officer and as such, "is mandated to observe strictly the civil service rules
and regulations, more particularly x x x the prohibition of government employees to practice their
professions"; that to circumvent the prohibition and to evade the law, respondent assumed a different name, fal-
sified his identity and represented himself to be one "Atty. Manuel Sison", with offices at No. 605
EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City, "at the times that he will handle private cases"; that "Manuel Sison" is not listed
as a member of the Bar in the records of the Supreme Court; that under his said assumed name, respondent is
representing one Juan Sacquing, the defendant in Case No. E-01978 before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Manila, submitting pleadings therein signed by him (respondent) under his assumed name, despite his full
knowledge that "Manuel Sison" is not a member of the Bar and that his acts in doing so are illegal and
unlawful.[1] Xerox copies of pertinent documents, pleadings, orders and notices are annexed to the complaint to
support the material allegations therein.

As required, respondent filed his Answer on August 20, 1981. He attached thereto a copy of the written
authorization given by Julio A. Sulit, Jr., Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission, for
him to appear as counsel of Juan Sacquing, a close family friend, in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
(JDRC) of Manila. Respondent alleges that he never held himself out to the public as a practicing lawyer; that he
provided legal services to Sacquing in view of close family friendship and for free; that he never represented
himself deliberately and intentionally as "Atty. Manuel Sison" in the Manila JDRC where, in the early stages of his
appearance, he always signed the minutes as "Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison", and in one instance, he even made the
necessary correction when the court staff wrote his name as "Atty. Manuel Sison"; that due to the "inept and
careless work of the clerical staff of the JDRC", notices were sent to "Atty. Manuel Sison" at 605
EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City, where respondent's parents conduct a printing office and establishment, which notices
were honored by the personnel of said office as respondent's family has called respondent by the nickname
"Manuel"; that respondent did not feel any necessity to correct this error of the JDRC since he "could use his
nickname 'Manuel' interchangeably with hisoriginal true name as a formal name, and its use was not done for a
fraudulent purpose nor to misrepresent"; and, that this administrative case is only one of the numerous baseless
complaints brought by complainant against respondent, the former being a disgruntled loser in an injunction case
in the SEC heard before respondent as Hearing Officer.

In resolving this disbarment case, We must initially emphasize the degree of integrity and respectability attached
to the law profession. There is no denying that the profession of an attorney is required after a long and laborious
study. By years of patience, zeal and ability, the attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself and his
family. This is not to say, however, that the emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the
social prestige and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to the same by reason of the
fact that every attorney is deemed an officer of the court.

The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been wisely put by Chief Justice Marshall of
the United States Court when he said:

"On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great, importance to an individual and the prosperity of his life may
depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other
hand, it is extremely desirable that the respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that its harmony with
the bench should be preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some discretion ought to be exercised
with great moderation and judgment, but it must be exercised."[2]

The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood but is
rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this function should
be competent, honorable and reliable in order that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in them. [3]
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its
disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing, and satisfactory
proof. Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court
has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative
penalty.[4]

This Court has also held in In re Atty. Felizarda M. de Guzman[5] that to be made the basis of suspension or
disbarment, the record must disclose as free from doubt a case which compels the exercise by this Court of its dis-
ciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done as well as the motivation thereof must be clearly demons-
trated. An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges preferred against him
until the contrary is proved; and as an officer of the court, that he performed his duty in accordance with his oath.

Examining the facts of this case, We hold that the allegations in the complaint do not warrant disbarment of the
respondent. There is no evidence that the respondent has committed an act constituting deceit, immoral conduct,
violation of his oath as a lawyer, wilfuldisobedience of any lawful order of the court, or corruptly
and wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.[6]

There is no violation of the Civil Service rules and regulations for his appearance as counsel for the defendant in
the JDRC Case No. E-01978 was with authority given by the Associate Commissioner of SEC, Julio A. Sulit, Jr.

This Court also holds that under the facts complained of supported by the annexes and the answer of respondent,
likewise sustained by annexes attached thereto and the reply of the complainant, the accusation that respondent
with malice and deliberate intent to evade the laws, assumed a different name, falsified his identity and
represented himself to be one "ATTY. MANUEL SISON" with offices at No. 605 EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City at the
times that he will handle private cases, is not meritorious. Neither is the charge substantiated. The only case
referred to is that pending the JDRC, Case No. E-01978 wherein respondent appeared as counsel for the
defendant. It being an isolated case, the same does not constitute the practice of law, more so since respondent
did not derive any pecuniary gain for his appearance because respondent and defendant therein were close family
friends. Such act of the respondent in going out of his way to aid as counsel to a close family friend should not be
allowed to be used as an instrument of harrassment against respondent.

The ruling in Zeta vs. Malinao (87 SCRA 303) wherein the respondent was dismissed from the service because
being a government employee, he appeared as counsel in a private case, cannot be applied in the case at
bar because the respondent in said Zeta case had appeared as counsel without permission from his superiors.

Although the complaint alleges violation of civil service rules, the complainant however states that the basis of his
complaint for disbarment is not the respondent's act of appearing as counsel but the unauthorized use of
another name.[7]

A perusal of the records however, reveals that whereas there is indeed a pleading entitled "Objection/Opposition
to the Formal Offer of Evidence" (Annex "C" to the Complaint for Disbarment, which is signed as "Manuel Sison",
counsel for defendant, 605 EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City, p. 7 of the Records), there is, however, no showing that
respondent was thus motivated with bad faith or malice, for otherwise, he would not have corrected the spelling
of his name when the court staff mis-spelled it in one of the minutes of the proceeding. Moreover, We find no
reason or motive for respondent to conceal his true name when he has already been given express authority by his
superior to act as counsel for Juan Sacquing in the latter's case pending before the JDRC. And while it may be true
that subsequent errors were made in sending notices to him under the name "Atty. Manuel Sison," the errors were
attributable to the JDRC clerical staff and not to the respondent.

At most, this Court would only counsel the respondent to be more careful and cautious in signing his name so as to
avoid unnecessary confusion as regards his identity.

At this point, We are constrained to examine the motives that prompted the complainant in filing the present case.
An examination of the records reveals that the complainant was a defendant in the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) Case No. 1982 filed by the Integrated Livestock Dealers Inc. and Teofisto Jiao against seven (7)
respondents including the complainant, seeking to oust the complainant and his co-defendants from acting as
officers of the Integrated Livestock Dealers Inc., then pending before respondent as Hearing Officer of the SEC,
who after trial decided the case against the herein complainant. From this antecedent fact, there is cast a grave
and serious doubt as to the true motivation of the complainant in filing the present case, considering further that
other administrative charges were filed by the complainant against respondent herein before the SEC, JDRC, and
the Fiscal's office in Manila.

We hold that complainant's repeated charges or accusations only indicate his resentment and bitterness in losing
the SEC case and not with the honest and sincere desire and objectives "(1) to compel the attorney to deal fairly
and honestly with his client;" (Strong vs.Munday, 52 N.J. Eq. 833, 21 A. 611) and "(2) to remove from the
profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
belonging to the office of an attorney." (Ex parte Brounsal, Cowp. 829; 83 Reprint; 6 C.J., p. 581; see In re
de los Angeles Adm. Case No. 225, Sept. 31, 1959, cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 6, p. 242).
In the light of the foregoing, We find no reason or necessity to refer this complaint to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.

WHEREFORE, this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, and Escolin, JJ., concur.
De Castro, J., on leave.

29. Lim-Santiago vs Saguico, AC No. 6705, Mar. 31, 2006

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as government
prosecutor.

The Facts

Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his
estate. 1Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. 2

Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat
Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992. 4

Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber concessions from
the government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government sequestered it sometime in 1986, 5 and its
operations ceased in 1997. 6

Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus
Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal complaint"). 7 Taggat employees
alleged that complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after the death of her father,
withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. 8

Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. 9 He
resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations 10 for violation of Article 288 11 in
relation to Article 116 12 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. 13

Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former
Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should
have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat
employees. 14 Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even
harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the complaint. 15

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while working as a
government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainers
fee for the months of January and February 1995, 16 another P10,000 for the months of April and May
1995, 17 and P5,000 for the month of April 1996. 18

Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor.

Respondent refutes complainants allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved by the
resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation. 19

Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat for more
than five years. 20 Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to Taggat. 21 Respondent
argues that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary investigation. 22 Respondent contends that
complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when he performed his duty. 23 Respondent points out that
complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal complaint 24 but instead
complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without mental reservation. 25

Respondent states that complainants reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression that respondent
would exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from complainants statement during the hearing
conducted on 12 February 1999:

xxx

Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didnt think he would do it, Madam Witness?

A. Because he is supposed to be my fathers friend and he was working with my Dad and he was supposed to be
trusted by my father. And he came to me and told me he gonna help me. x x x. 26

Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat employees or
complainant. Respondent claims he was merely performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor. 27Respondent argues that complainant failed to establish that respondents act was tainted with
personal interest, malice and bad faith. 28

Respondent denies complainants allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases, threatened and harassed
Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of proof because complainant failed to
mention the names of the employees or present them for cross-examination. 29

Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government prosecutor, of retainer fees from
complainant but claims that it

was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. 30 Respondent contends that the fees were paid for his
consultancy services and not for representation. Respondent submits that consultation is not the same as
representation and that rendering consultancy services is not prohibited. 31 Respondent, in his Reply-
Memorandum, states:

x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat without the respondents
asking, intended as token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer fees. These payments
do not at all show or translate as a specie of conflict of interest. Moreover, these consultations had no relation to,
or connection with, the above-mentioned labor complaints filed by former Taggat employees. 32

Respondent insists that complainants evidence failed to prove that when the criminal complaint was filed with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the retained counsel or legal consultant. 33

While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651 Informations
against complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4
January 1999. 34 Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed. 35

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas ("IBP
Commissioner Abbas") heard the case 36 and allowed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 37 Due to
IBP Commissioner Abbas resignation, the case was reassigned to Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP
Commissioner Funa"). 38
After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 ("IBP Resolution") dated 4 November 2004 adopting with modification 39 IBP
Commissioner Funas Report and Recommendation ("Report") finding respondent guilty of conflict of interests,
failure to safeguard a former clients interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while
being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors recommended the imposition of a penalty of three
years suspension from the practice of law. The Report reads:

Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will require the test of whether the matter in
I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former position of Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.

I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors Office, Annex
"B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having the "management and
control" of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).

Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly handled the
personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related with the employees of
Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The
issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much familiar with Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries
pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and personalities in that case are very much familiar with
Respondent.

A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client, the duty to
"maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any
matter in which he previously represented him" (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)

Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or any interest except
justice. It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a former client with respect
to matters that he previously handled for that former client. In this case, matters relating to personnel, labor
policies, and labor relations that he previously handled as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No.
97-240 was for "Violation of the Labor Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have been different had I.S.
No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal
Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.

xxxx

While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought in I.S. No. 97-240
were of the years 1996 and 1997, the employees and management involved are the very personalities he dealt
with as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt with these persons in his fiduciary
relations with Taggat. Moreover, he was an employee of the corporation and part of its management.

xxxx

As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein Complainant while being an
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy work while being an Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, this matter had long been settled. Government prosecutors are prohibited to engage in the private
practice of law (see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA
109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the
practice of law is to do any of those acts that are characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It
covers any activity, in or out of court, which required the application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures
and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA
111; Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).

Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.

As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and instigating the filing of criminal
complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.

Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a former clients
interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. 40
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B 41 of
the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he
violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or
Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").

Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
duties." 43 A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition "not [to] represent conflicting
interests." 44However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting interests
does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all concerned is given after a full
disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship exists. 45 Moreover, considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary
to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. 46

Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct." Unlawful
conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to "engage in the private
practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions." 47

Complainants evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting interests

In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One test of
inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client any confidential
information acquired through their connection or previous employment. 49 In essence, what a lawyer owes his
former client is to maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously
affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him. 50

In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary investigation of the
criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment
of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with
Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.

In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to prove that
respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential information acquired through his previous
employment. The only established participation respondent had with respect to the criminal complaint is that he
was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that
respondent used any confidential information from his previous employment with complainant or Taggat in
resolving the criminal complaint.

The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case
he resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for
representing conflicting interests. A lawyers immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that
occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the
duty to protect the clients interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for
matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.

Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent is not
guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.

Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as

x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in
any degree of legal knowledge or skill." 51
"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding
ones self to the public as a lawyer. 52

Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained
counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does not
distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that
are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term
"practice of law."

Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working as a
government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for "Retainers
fee." 53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.

However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional Responsibility
unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees unless the acts involved also transgress provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Here, respondents violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that
"[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Respondents admission that he
received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct,
which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.

Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when respondent stated in his
Demurrer to Evidence:

In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and indefinitely suspended or
disbarred from the practice of the law profession and his name removed from the Roll of Attorneys on the
following grounds:

xxxx

d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office and in his dealings with
the public. 54

On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts. 55

Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized private
practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to one year. 56 We find this penalty appropriate for
respondents violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law
for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents personal
record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

30. Catu vs. Relioso, AC No. 5738, Feb. 19, 2008

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 5738 February 19, 2008

WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot1 and the building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres
Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of
Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu2 and Antonio Pastor3 of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for
them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of
Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila4 where the parties reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. 5 When the
parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate
action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case.
Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint,6 claiming that respondent committed an
act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact
that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to
the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth
and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards
any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio
filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He
handled her case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a
patent injustice against her.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the
IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.7

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the conciliation
proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however,
he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course
thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper
and notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713:8

SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited
acts and transactions of any public official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

 (2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx
(emphasis supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND,PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)

For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one
month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.9 This
was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors. 10

We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on the
imposable penalty.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former Government Lawyers

Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded,
that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he
intervened while in said service." In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former
government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they]
had intervened while in said service."

Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he
was not covered by that provision.

Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The Practice of Profession of Elective Local
Government Officials

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the
private practice of their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions." This is the general law which applies to all public
officials and employees.

For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 716012 governs:

SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from
practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local
chief executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any
office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local
government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member
concerned is defending the interest of the Government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions
of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.

This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local officials. As a special
law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and
employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.13

Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the following: the
governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city
vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice
mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of
the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.

Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is
because they are required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to
the performance of their official duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayanmay practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In
other words, they may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their
session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least
once a week.14Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any occupation
or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or
authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and
councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any
occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang
barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.15 Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is
that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to
serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.16

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should
have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service
regulations.

A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is Not Prohibited To Practice Law Must Secure Prior Authority From The
Head Of His Department

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the
government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the
department concerned.17 Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or
be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written
permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case
of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the
disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in
outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it
will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no
permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve
real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in
the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an
officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of
Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed
to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law.
Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and
importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis
supplied)

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession,
respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the
dignity of the legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the bar.18 Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in
the integrity of the legal profession.19

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's
oath20 and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating
his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this
resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of
respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of
the land for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

31. Rolly Pentecostes vs. Atty. Hermenegildo Marasigan, A.M. No. P-07-2337, August 03, 2007

SECOND DIVISION

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Atty. Hermenegildo Marasigan (respondent), Clerk of Court VI of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabacan, North Cotabato, standsadministratively charged with grave misconduct and
conduct unbecoming a public officer for the loss of a motorcycle-subject matter of a criminal case which was
placed under his care and custody.

The administrative case against respondent stemmed from a sworn affidavit-complaint[1] filed on
November 11, 2004 by Rolly Pentecostes (Pentecostes), the owner of a Kawasaki motorcycle, which was recovered
by members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Mlang, North Cotabato from suspected carnappers against
whom a criminal case for carnapping, Criminal Case No. 1010, was lodged at Branch 22, RTC, Kabacan,
North Cotabato.

On the order of the trial court, the chief of police of Mlang, North Cotabato turned over the motorcycle to
respondent who acknowledged receipt thereof on August 1, 1995.

After the conduct of hearings to determine the true owner of the motorcycle, the trial court issued an
Order[2] of November 15, 2000 for its release to Pentecostes.

Pentecostes immediately asked respondent to release the motorcycle to him. Respondent, however, told
him to wait and come back repeatedly from 2001 up to the filing of the complaint.

In his Comment[3] filed on February 9, 2005, respondent gave the following explanation:

After the motorcycle was delivered to him by the Mlang chief of police on August 1, 1995, he requested
Alex Pedroso, a utility worker, to inspect the engine, chassis, and make, after which he issued an
acknowledgement receipt thereof.

He thereafter instructed Pedroso to bring the motorcycle to the Kabacan police station for which he
(respondent) prepared a receipt.

He and Pedroso visited and inspected the motorcycle every time a hearing on the criminal case was
conducted. When the court finally ordered the release of the motorcycle to Pentecostes on November 15, 2000,
the latter refused to receive it, claiming that it was already cannibalized and unserviceable.

From that time on until 2003, Pentecostes harassed him, demanding that he be responsible for
reconditioning the vehicle. During the latter part of 2004, upon the advice of the executive judge, he accompanied
Pentecostes to the Kabacan police station only to discover that the motorcycle was missing.

As no explanation could be offered by then Kabacan police chief Nestor Bastareche for the loss, he
prepared a letter-complaint requesting for assistance in the recovery of the motorcycle and for the conduct of an
investigation. Pentecostes refused to sign the letter, however.

He later discovered that the turnover receipt attached to the record of the criminal case and the page of
the blotter where the turnover was recorded were missing. Hence, he submitted the sworn statements of
Pedroso[4] and SPO4 Alex Ocampo[5] who confirmed the transfer of the vehicle from his custody to that of the
Kabacan chief of police.

Belying respondents averments, Pentecostes, in his Rejoinder,[6] contended as follows:

The vehicle was in good running condition when it was delivered to respondent by police operatives [7] of
Mlang.
Respondents act of passing the blame to the PNP of Kabacan was a clear case of hand washing as the
records showed that respondent was responsible for the safekeeping of the motorcycle. It was for this reason that
he (Pentecostes) refused to sign the letter to the chief of police of Kabacan protesting the loss. Moreover, the
police blotter of PNP Kabacan has no entry or record of the alleged turn over.

By Resolution of October 19, 2005,[8] this Court referred the case to the Executive Judge of RTC,
Kabacan, North Cotabato, for investigation, report and recommendation.

Then Executive Judge Francisco G. Rabang, Jr. of the RTC, Kabacan, North Cotabato submitted on January
16, 2006 his findings and recommendation for the dismissal of the administrative complaint against respondent.[9]

In his report, Judge Rabang noted that Pentecostes denied any knowledge about the turnover of the
motorcycle to the PNP of Kabacan.

On the evidence for the defense, the investigating judge found that the motorcycle was delivered by the
PNP of Mlang, North Cotabato to respondent who in turn transferred it to the PNP of Kabacan.

To Judge Rabang, what remained an issue was the actual physical condition of the motorcycle when it was
turned over to the PNP of Kabacan. The judge noted that there was no proof of Pentecostes claim that the vehicle
was cannibalized from the time it was under respondents custody until its transfer to the PNP of Kabacan.
In light of the peace and order situation in Kabacan in the late 1990s and in the early part of 2000 and the
absence of a suitable courthouse then, Judge Rabang believed that respondent had made a wise decision in
turning over the custody of the vehicle to the PNP of Kabacan.

To Judge Rabangs report and recommendation, Pentecostes filed a Motion for Reconsideration[10] in
which he assailed the conclusion that the motorcycle was no longer roadworthy and was already cannibalized
when it was delivered to the office of the clerk of court from the Mlang police station.

Moreover, Pentecostes maintained that the alleged turnover of the motorcycle to the police station of
Kabacan was irrelevant because the proper custodian of the vehicle was respondent who should be held
responsible for its eventual loss.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the investigating judges recommendation to be
sufficiently supported by the evidence.[11]

The OCA thus concurred with Judge Rabangs recommendation for the dismissal of the complaint against
respondent, subject to certain qualifications with respect to the physical condition of the vehicle upon its delivery
to respondent and the latters lack of authority for the turn over of the vehicle to the PNP of Kabacan.

While the investigating judge found no evidence to show the actual condition of the motorcycle at the
time it was turned over to respondent, the OCA observed that the evidence presented during the investigation
supported a finding that the vehicle had missing parts when it was delivered to respondent.

From the testimony of Pentecostes witness SPO2 Servando Guadalupe, the OCA noted, the motorcycle
was loaded into a service vehicle for delivery to respondent. This fact, according to the OCA, could only mean that
the vehicle could not run by itself.
 Although the OCA agreed with the investigating judge that the evidence sufficiently proved that the
vehicle was turned over to the PNP of Kabacan where it got lost, it noted that respondent failed to ask prior
authority from the trial court to transfer its custody. Only when respondent was having problems with Pentecostes
did he bring the matter to the attention of the executive judge, the OCA added.

Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent be reminded to secure prior authority from the
court before evidence is turned over to any authorized government office or agency and that he be warned to be
more careful to prevent any similar incident from arising in the future.

The finding of the OCA insofar as respondents lack of authority to transfer the motorcycle is well taken, on
account of which respondent is administratively liable for simple misconduct.

It is the duty of the clerk of court to keep safely all records, papers, files, exhibits and public property
committed to his charge.[12] Section D (4), Chapter VII of the 1991 Manual For Clerks of Court (now Section E[2],
paragraph 2.2.3, Chapter VI of the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court) provides:

All exhibits used as evidence and turned over to the court and before the case/s
involving such evidence shall have been terminated shall be under the custody and safekeeping
of the Clerk of Court.

Similarly, Section 7 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, provides:

SEC. 7. Safekeeping of property. The clerk shall safely keep all record, papers, files,
exhibits and public property committed to his charge, including the library of the court, and the
seals and furniture belonging to his office.

From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of court of the RTC, Kabacan, respondent was charged
with the custody and safekeeping of Pentecostes motorcycle, and to keep it until the termination of the case,
barring circumstances that would justify its safekeeping elsewhere, and upon the prior authority of the trial court.

No explanation was offered by respondent, however, for turning over the motorcycle. But whatever the
reason was, respondent was mandated to secure prior consultations with and approval of the trial court.

Moreover disconcerting is the fact that the acknowledgment receipt evidencing the turnover of the
motorcycle from the trial court to the Kabacan police station was lost from the records of Criminal Case No.
1010,[13] with nary a lead as to who was responsible for it. This circumstance is viewed with disfavor as it reflects
badly on the safekeeping of court records, a duty entrusted to respondent as clerk of court.

With regard to the condition of the vehicle upon its delivery to respondent, the evidence indicates that it
was still serviceable when it was delivered by the Mlang police to respondent and at the time it was turned over by
respondent to the Kabacan police station. The Joint Affidavit[14] of SPO2 Guadalupe and Police Inspector Romeo
Banaybanay categorically stated that the motorcycle was in good running condition when they delivered it to
respondent. Later during his testimony, Guadalupe narrated that he was the the driver of the service jeep while
Chief Banaybanay was on board the motorcycle when the vehicle was turned over to respondent on August 1,
1995.[15]

Even respondents following testimony that:

x x x when x x x [he] received the motorcycle for safekeeping, he immediately delivered together
with Alex Pedroso [sic] because it could be noted that respondent do[es] not know how to drive a
motorcycle, I requested x x x Alex Pedroso to accompany me and deliver [it] to [the] chief of police
of Kabacan[16] (Italics supplied)

suggests that the vehicle was in running condition when respondent took and subsequently transferred its custody
to the Kabacan police.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are essential and ranking officers of our judicial system
who perform delicate functions vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice. [17] Their duties include the
efficient recording, filing and management of court records and, as previously pointed out, the safekeeping of
exhibits and public property committed to their charge.

Clearly, they play a key role in the complement of the court and cannot be permitted to slacken on their
jobs under one pretext or another.[18] They cannot err without affecting the integrity of the court or the efficient
administration of justice.[19]

The same responsibility bears upon all court personnel in view of their exalted positions as keepers of
public faith.[20] The exacting standards of ethics and morality imposed upon court employees are reflective of the
premium placed on the image of the court of justice, and that image is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official
or otherwise, of court personnel.[21] It becomes the imperative and sacred duty of everyone charged with the
dispensation of justice, from the judge to the lowliest clerk, to maintain the courts good name and standing as true
temples of justice.[22]

By transferring Pentecostes motorcycle without authority, respondent failed to give premium to his
avowed duty of keeping it under his care and possession. He must, therefore, suffer the consequences of his act or
omission, which is akin to misconduct.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of action; more particularly, it is an

unlawful behavior by the public officer.[23] The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proved by substantial
evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple, as in this case.

The Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Memorandum Circular No. 19,
Series of 1999) classifies simple misconduct as a less grave offense, punishable by suspension of One Month and
One Day to Six Months. Considering that this is respondents first offense and no taint of bad faith has been shown
by his actuations, a 15-day suspension without pay is deemed appropriate.
 WHEREFORE, respondent, Clerk of Court Hermenegildo Marasigan, is found guilty of Simple Misconduct.
He is SUSPENDED for 15 days without pay, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

32. Father Ranhilio C. Aquino et al vs. Atty Edwin Pascua, A.C. No. 5095, November 28, 2007

EN BANC

x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the letter-complaint dated August 3, 1999 of Father Ranhilio C. Aquino, then
Academic Head of the Philippine Judicial Academy, joined by Lina M. Garan and the other above-named
complainants, against Atty. Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public in Cagayan.

In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two documents committed as
follows:

(1) He made it appear that he had notarized the Affidavit-Complaint of one Joseph
B. Acorda entering the same as Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243, Book III, Series of 1998,
dated December 10, 1998.

(2) He also made it appear that he had notarized the Affidavit-Complaint of

one Remigio B. Domingo entering the same as Doc. No. 1214, Page 243, Book III, Series of 1998,
dated December 10, 1998.

Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26, 1999, Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, certified that none of the above entries appear in the Notarial Register of
Atty. Pascua; that the last entry therein was Document No. 1200 executed on December 28, 1998; and that,
therefore, he could not have notarized Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214 on December 10, 1998.

In his comment on the letter-complaint dated September 4, 1999, Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized
the two documents on December 10, 1998, but they were not entered in his Notarial Register due to the oversight
of his legal secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli, whose affidavit was attached to his comment.
 The affidavit-complaints referred to in the notarized documents were filed by Atty. Pascua with the Civil
Service Commission. Impleaded as respondents therein were LinaM. Garan and the other above-named
complainants. They filed with this Court a Motion to Join the Complaint and Reply to Respondents Comment. They
maintain that Atty. Pascuas omission was not due to inadvertence but a clear case of falsification. [1] On November
16, 1999, we granted their motion.[2]

Thereafter, we referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and
recommendation.

On April 21, 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued its Report and Recommendation partly
reproduced as follows:

A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this
reason, notaries public must observe the utmost care to comply with the formalities and the
basic requirement in the performance of their duties (Realino v. Villamor, 87 SCRA 318).

Under the notarial law, the notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological
order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the
person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument, xxx xxx. The notary shall give to
each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to
the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument the page or pages of his register on
which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries (Sec. 246, Article V, Title
IV, Chapter II of the Revised Administrative Code).

Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching
his notarial acts in the manner required by law is a ground for revocation of his commission (Sec.
249, Article VI).

In the instant case, there is no question that the subject documents allegedly notarized
by Atty. Pascua were not recorded in his notarial register.

Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but due to oversight of his
staff. Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot escape liability. His failure to enter into
his notarialregister the documents that he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on his part
as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his staff.

The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence is far from true.

The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last entry which he notarized
on December 28, 1998 is Document No. 1200 on Page 240. On the other hand, the two affidavit-
complaints allegedly notarized on December 10, 1998 are Document Nos. 1213 and 1214,
respectively, under Page No. 243, Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and the other complainants are,
therefore, correct in maintaining that Atty. Pascua falsely assigned fictitious numbers to the
questioned affidavit-complaints, a clear dishonesty on his part not only as a Notary Public, but
also as a member of the Bar.

This is not to mention that the only supporting evidence of the claim of inadvertence by
Atty. Pascua is the affidavit of his own secretary which is hardly credible since the latter cannot
be considered a disinterested witness or party.
 Noteworthy also is the fact that the questioned affidavit of Acorda (Doc. No. 1213) was
submitted only when Domingos affidavit (Doc. No. 1214) was withdrawn in the administrative
case filed by Atty. Pascua against Lina Garan, et al. with the CSC. This circumstance lends
credence to the submission of herein complainants that Atty. Pascua ante-dated another
affidavit-complaint making it appear as notarized on December 10, 1998 and entered as
Document No. 1213. It may not be sheer coincidence then that both documents are
dated December 10, 1998 and numbered as 1213 and 1214.

A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in
any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of
the legal profession (Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 409).

As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, Atty. Pascua is mandated to subscribe

to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and
impressed with public interest.

A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for any misconduct in his
professional or private capacity. The Court has invariably imposed a penalty for notaries public
who were found guilty of dishonesty or misconduct in the performance of their duties.

In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr. (325 SCRA 123), respondent lawyer was suspended from his
Commission as Notary Public for a period of one year for notarizing a document without affiants
appearing before him, and for notarizing the same instrument of which he was one of the
signatories. The Court held that respondent lawyer failed to exercise due diligence in upholding
his duties as a notary public.

In Arrieta v. Llosa (282 SCRA 248), respondent lawyer who certified under oath a Deed
of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors were dead was suspended from the practice
of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that another infraction would be dealt with
more severely. In said case, the Court did not impose the supreme penalty of disbarment, it
being the respondents first offense.

In Maligsa v. Cabanting (272 SCRA 409), respondent lawyer was disbarred from the
practice of law, after being found guilty of notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. The Court
considered the seriousness of the offense and his previous misconduct for which he was
suspended for six months from the practice of law.

It appearing that this is the first offense of Atty. Pascua, a suspension from the practice
of law for a period of six (6) months may be considered enough penalty for him as a
lawyer.Considering that his offense is also a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the
same should also be imposed upon him.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully recommended that

the notarial commission of Atty. EDWIN V. PASCUA, if still existing, be REVOKED and that he be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.[3]

After a close review of the records of this case, we resolve to adopt the findings of facts and conclusion of
law by the Office of the Bar Confidant. We find Atty. Pascuaguilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties
for failing to register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo.

Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated,

obstinate or intentional purpose.[4] The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. [5]
 The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct committed by a lawyer is addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court. In Arrieta v. Llosa,[6] wherein Atty. Joel A. Llosa notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing
that some of the vendors were already dead, this Court held that such wrongful act constitutes misconduct and
thus imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months, this being his first
administrative offense. Also, in Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[7] we revoked the notarial commission of Atty. Mario G.
Ramos and suspended him from the practice of law for six months for violating the Notarial Law in not registering
in his notarial book the Deed of Absolute Sale he notarized. In Mondejar v. Rubia,[8] however, a lesser penalty
of one month suspension from the practice of law was imposed on Atty. Vivian G. Rubiafor making a false
declaration in the document she notarized.

In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascuas first offense, we believe that the imposition of a
three-month suspension from the practice of law upon him is in order. Likewise, since his offense is a ground for
revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for three (3) months with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely. His notarial commission, if still existing, is ordered REVOKED.

SO ORDERED.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

33. Administrative case filed against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, JBC No. 013, August 22, 2007

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
10, Davao City on May 17, 2003.[1] Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received
confidential information that administrative and criminal charges were filed against Judge Quitain in his capacity as
then Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Regional Office 11, Davao City, as a
result of which he was dismissed from the service per Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 183 dated April 10, 1995.

In the Personal Data Sheet (PDS)[2] submitted to the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) on November 26, 2001,
Judge Quitain declared that there were five criminal cases (Criminal Cases Nos. 18438, 18439, 22812, 22813, and
22814) filed against him before the Sandiganbayan, which were all dismissed. No administrative case was
disclosed by Judge Qutain in his PDS.

To confirm the veracity of the information, then Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Christopher O. Lock
(now Court Administrator) requested from the Sandiganbayan certified copies of the Order(s) dismissing the
criminal cases.[3] On even date, letters[4] were sent to the NAPOLCOM requesting for certified true copies of
documents relative to the administrative complaints filed against Judge Quitain, particularly A.O. No. 183
dated April 10, 1995 dismissing him from the service. Likewise, DCA Lock required Judge Quitain to explain the
alleged misrepresentation and deception he committed before the JBC.[5]

In a letter[6] dated November 28, 2003, the NAPOLCOM furnished the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) a copy of A.O. No. 183 showing that respondent Judge was indeed dismissed from the service for Grave
Misconduct for falsifying or altering the amounts reflected in disbursement vouchers in support of his claim for
reimbursement of expenses. A.O. 183 partly reads:

THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 183

DISMISSING FROM THE SERVICE ASSISTANT REGIONAL DIRECTOR JAIME VEGA QUITAIN,
NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 11

This refers to the administrative complaint against Jaime Vega Quitain, Assistant
Regional Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Regional Office No. 11, Davao City,
for Grave Misconduct (Violation of Art. 48, in relation to Arts. 171 and 217 of the Revised Penal
Code and Art. IX of the Civil Service Law) filed by the NAPOLCOM.

xxxx

After circumspect study, I am in complete accord with the above findings and
recommendation of the NAPOLCOM.

It was established that the falsification could not have been consummated without
respondents direct participation, as it was upon his direction and approval that disbursement
vouchers were prepared showing the falsified amount. The subsequent endorsement and
encashment of the check by respondent only shows his complete disregard for the truth
which per se constitutes misconduct and dishonesty of the highest order. By any standard,
respondent had manifestly shown that he is unfit to discharge the functions of his
office. Needless to stress, a public office is a position of trust and public service demands of every
government official or employee, no matter how lowly his position may be, the highest degree of
responsibility and integrity and he must remain accountable to the people. Moreover, his failure
to adduce evidence in support of his defense is a tacit admission of his guilt. Let this be a final
reminder to him that the government is serious enough to [weed out] misfits in the government
 service, and it will not be irresolute to impose the severest sanction regardless of personalities
involved. Accordingly, respondents continuance in office becomes untenable.

WHEREFORE, and as recommended by the NAPOLCOM, Assistant Regional Director

Jaime Vega Quitain is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of pay and benefits,
effective upon receipt of a copy hereof.

Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of April in the year of our Lord, nineteen
hundred and ninety-five.

(Sgd. by President Fidel V. Ramos)

By the President:

(Sgd.)

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.

Executive Secretary[7]

In a letter[8] dated October 22, 2003 addressed to DCA Lock, Judge Quitain denied having committed any
misrepresentation before the JBC. He alleged that during his interview, the members thereof only inquired about
the status of the criminal cases filed by the NAPOLCOM before the Sandiganbayan, and not about the
administrative case simultaneously filed against him. He also alleged that he never received from the Office of the
President an official copy of A.O. No. 183 dismissing him from the service.

Thereafter, DCA Lock directed Judge Quitain to explain within ten (10) days from notice why he did not
include in his PDS, which was sworn to before a notary public on November 22, 2001, the administrative case filed
against him, and the fact of his dismissal from the service.[9]

In his letters[10] dated March 13, 2004 and June 17, 2004, respondent explained that during the
investigation of his administrative case by the NAPOLCOM Ad HocCommittee, one of its members suggested to
him that if he resigns from the government service, he will no longer be prosecuted; that following such
suggestion, he tendered his irrevocable resignation from NAPOLCOM on June 1, 1993 [11] which was immediately
accepted by the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Governments; that he did not disclose the case
in his PDS because he was of the honest belief that he had no more pending administrative case by reason of his
resignation; that his resignation amounted to an automatic dismissal of his administrative case considering that
the issues raised therein became moot and academic; and that had he known that he would be dismissed from the
service, he should not have applied for the position of a judge since he knew he would never be appointed.

Finding reasonable ground to hold him administratively liable, then Court Administrator Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and then DCA Lock submitted a Memorandum [12] dated September 3,
2004 to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which states:
 In order that this Office may thoroughly and properly evaluate the matter, we deemed it
necessary to go over the records of the subject administrative case against Judge Jaime V.
Quitain, particularly the matter that pertains to Administrative Order No. 183 dated 10 April
1995. On 15 May 2004, we examined the records of said administrative case on file with the
NAPOLCOM, Legal Affairs Service, and secured certified [true] copies of pertinent documents.

After careful perusal of the documents and records available, including the letters-
explanations of Judge Jaime V. Quitain, this Office finds that there are reasonable grounds to
hold him administratively liable.

An examination of the Personal Data Sheet submitted by Judge Quitain with the Judicial
and Bar Council, which was subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Bibiano M.
Bustamante of Davao City on 22 November 2001, reveals that he concealed material facts and
even committed perjury in having answered yes to Question No. 24, but without disclosing the
fact that he was dismissed from the government service. Question No. 24 and his answer
thereto are hereunder quoted as follows:

24. Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or otherwise

imposed a sanction for the violation of any law, decree, ordinance or
regulation by any court, tribunal or any other government office, agency or
instrumentality in the Philippines or in any foreign country or found guilty of
an administrative offense or imposed any administrative sanction? [ / ] Yes []
No. If your answer is Yes to any of the questions, give particulars.

But all dismissed (acquitted)

Sandiganbayan Criminal Cases Nos. 18438, 18439

Date of [Dismissal] August 2, 1995

Sandiganbayan Criminal Cases Nos. 22812, 22813, 22814

Date of [Dismissal] July 17, 2000

As borne out by the records, Judge Quitain deliberately did not disclose the fact that he
was dismissed from the government service. At the time he filled up and submitted his Personal
Data Sheet with the Judicial and Bar Council, he had full knowledge of the subject administrative
case, as well as Administrative Order No. 183 dismissing him from the government service.Based
on the certified documents secured from the Office of the NAPOLCOM, the following data were
gathered:

1. In compliance with the Summons dated 19 March 1993, signed by Commissioner

Alexis C. Canonizado, Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee of the NAPOLCOM, Judge Jaime V. Quitain,
through Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, filed his Answer (dated 29 March 1993) to the administrative
complaint lodged against him by the Napolcom;

2. On 30 March 1993, Judge Quitain received a copy of the Notice of Hearing of even
date, signed by Mr. Canonizado, in connection with the formal hearing of the subject
administrative case scheduled on 30 April 1993;

3. Administrative Order No. 183, dismissing Judge Quitain from the service, was
dated 10 April 1995. On 18 April 1995, newspaper items relative to the dismissal of Judge Quitain
were separately published in the Mindanao Daily Mirror and in the Mindanao Times, the
contents of which read as follows:

Mindanao Times:
 Dismissed NAPOLCOM chief airs appeal

Former National Police Commission (Napolcom) acting regional

director Jaime Quitain yesterday appealed for understanding to those allegedly
behind his ouster from his post two years ago. Quitain, who was one of the
guests in yesterdays Kapehan sa Dabaw, wept unabashedly as he read his
prepared statement on his dismissal from government service.

Quitain claimed that after Secretary Luis Santos resigned from the
Department of Interior and Local Governments in 1991, a series of
administrative charges were hurled against him by some regional employees.

I was dismissed from the Napolcom Office without due process,

Quitain said.

He also said he had no idea as to who the people (sic) are behind the
alleged smear campaign leveled against him.

Whoever is behind all this, I have long forgiven you. My only appeal to
you, give me my day in court, give me the chance to clear my name, the only
legacy that I can leave to my children, Quitain said in his statement.

It is my constitutional right to be present in all proceedings of the

administrative case, he also said.

Quitain was appointed Assistant Regional Director of Napolcom in

1991 by then President Corazon Aquino upon the recommendation of
Secretary Santos. He was later designated Napolcom acting regional director
for Region XI.

Mindanao Daily Mirror:

Quitain vows to clear name

Former assistant regional director Jaime Quitain of the National Police

Commission (Napolcom) vowed yesterday to clear his name in court from
charges of tampering with an official receipt.

Quitain[,] who is running for a council seat, expressed confidence that

he would soon be vindicated in court against the group that plotted his ouster
from office: He said his only appeal was for Interior and Local Government
Secretary Rafael Alunan to grant him his day in court to answer the charges.

Whoever was behind all of these things, I have long forgiven them,
Quitain said.

Just give me the chance to clear my name because this is the only
legacy that I can give my children, Quitain said.

While the records of the subject administrative case on file with the NAPOLCOM Office
does not bear proof of receipt of Administrative Order No. 183 by Judge Quitain, the same does
not necessarily mean that he is totally unaware of said Administrative Order. As shown by the
above-quoted newspaper clippings, Judge Quitain even aired his appeal and protest to said
Administrative Order.

xxxx
 Judge Quitain asseverated that he should not have applied with the JBC had he known
that he was administratively charged and was consequently dismissed from the service since he
will not be considered. But this may be the reason why he deliberately concealed said fact. His
claim that he did not declare the administrative case in his Personal Data Sheet because of his
honest belief that there is no administrative or criminal case that would be filed against him by
reason of his resignation and the assurance made by the NAPOLCOM that no administrative case
will be filed, does not hold water. It is rather absurd for him to state that his resignation from the
NAPOLCOM amounts to an automatic dismissal of whatever administrative case filed against him
because when he resigned and relinquished his position, the issues raised therein became moot
and academic. He claims that he did not bother to follow up the formal dismissal of the
administrative case because of said belief. All these are but futile attempts to exonerate himself
from administrative culpability in concealing facts relevant and material to his application in the
Judiciary. As a member of the Bar, he should know that his resignation from the NAPOLCOM
would not obliterate any administrative liability he may have incurred[,] much less, would it
result to the automatic dismissal of the administrative case filed against him. The acceptance of
his resignation is definitely without prejudice to the continuation of the administrative case filed
against him. If such would be the case, anyone charged administratively could easily escape from
administrative sanctions by the simple expedient of resigning from the service. Had it been true
that Judge Quitain honestly believes that his resignation amounts to the automatic dismissal of
his administrative case, the least he could have done was to personally verify the status
thereof. He should not have relied on the alleged assurance made by the NAPOLCOM.

On the strength of his misrepresentation, Judge Quitain misled the Judicial and Bar
Council by making it appear that he had a clean record and was qualified to join the Judiciary. His
prior dismissal from the government service is a blot on his record, which has gone [worse] and
has spread even more because of his concealment of it. Had he not concealed said vital fact, it
could have been taken into consideration when the Council acted on his application. His act of
dishonesty renders him unfit to join the Judiciary, much less remain sitting as a judge. It even
appears that he was dismissed by the NAPOLCOM for misconduct and dishonesty.

Thus, the OCA recommended that: (1) the instant administrative case against respondent be docketed as
an administrative matter; and (2) that he be dismissed from the service with prejudice to his reappointment to any
position in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits except accrued leave credits.

Respondent was required to Comment.[13]

In compliance with the Courts Resolution respondent filed his Comment[14] contending that before he
filed his application for RTC Judge with the JBC, he had no knowledge that he was administratively dismissed from
the NAPOLCOM service as the case was secretly heard and decided. He averred that:

1. Being a religious lay head and eventually the Pastoral Head of the Redemptorist
Eucharistic Lay Ministry in Davao City and the surrounding provinces, he was recruited as one of
the political followers of then Mayor Luis T. Santos of Davao City, who later became the
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and was instrumental in his
appointment as Assistant Regional Director of the National Police Commission, Region XI;
 2. After Secretary Luis T. Santos was replaced as DILG Secretary, the political followers
of his successor, who were the same followers involved in the chain of corruption prevalent in
their department, began quietly pressing for his (Quitain) resignation as Assistant Regional
Director;

3. Finding difficulty in attacking his honesty and personal integrity, his detractors went
to the extent of filing criminal charges against him;

4. Before these criminal charges were scheduled for trial, he was being convinced to
resign in exchange for the dismissal of said criminal charges, but when he refused to do so, he
was unjustifiably detailed or exiled at the DILG central office in Manila;

5. Upon his exile in Manila for several months, he realized that even his immediate
superiors cooperated with his detractors in instigating for his removal. Hence, upon advice of his
relatives, friends and the heads of their pastoral congregation, he resigned from his position in
NAPOLCOM on condition that all pending cases filed against him, consisting of criminal cases
only, shall be dismissed, as in fact they were dismissed;

6. From then on he was never formally aware of any administrative case filed against
him. Hence, when he submitted his Personal Data Sheet before the Judicial and Bar Council in
support of his application as RTC judge, he made the following answer in Question No. 23:

23. Is there any pending civil, criminal, or administrative (including

disbarment) case or complaint filed against you pending before any court,
prosecution office, any other office, agency or instrumentality of the
government, or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines?

He could only give a negative answer since there was no pending administrative case
filed against him that he knows;

7. Had he known that there was an administrative case filed against him he would have
desisted from applying as a judge and would have given his full attention to the said
administrative case, if only to avoid ensuing embarrassment; and

8. The filing of the administrative case against him as well as the proceedings had
thereon and the decision rendered therein, without his knowledge, could have probably
occurred during his exile period when he was detailed indefinitely in Manila. The proceedings
had in the said administrative case are null and void since he was denied due process.

Respondents Comment was submitted to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.[15]

OCA submitted its Memorandum[16] dated August 11, 2005 stating therein that it was adopting its earlier
findings contained in its Memorandum dated September 3, 2004. Based on the documents presented, it can not be
denied that at the time Judge Quitain applied as an RTC judge, he had full knowledge of A.O. No. 183 dismissing
him from government service. Considering that Judge Quitains explanations in his Comment are but mere
reiterations of his allegations in the previous letters to the OCA, the OCA maintained its recommendation that
Judge Quitain be dismissed from the service with prejudice to his reappointment to any position in the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits except accrued leave credits.
 The Court fully agrees with the disquisition and the recommendation of the OCA.

It behooves every prospective appointee to the Judiciary to apprise the appointing authority of every
matter bearing on his fitness for judicial office, including such circumstances as may reflect on his integrity and
probity. These are qualifications specifically required of appointees to the Judiciary by Sec. 7(3), Article VIII of the
Constitution.[17]

In this case, Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he was administratively charged and dismissed from the
service for grave misconduct per A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 by no less than the former President of
the Philippines. He insists that on November 26, 2001 or before he filed with the JBC his verified PDS in support of
his application for RTC Judge, he had no knowledge of A.O. No. 183; and that he was denied due process. He
further argues that since all the criminal cases filed against him were dismissed on August 2, 1995 and July 17,
2000, and considering the fact that he resigned from office, his administrative case had become moot and
academic.

Respondents contentions utterly lack merit.

No amount of explanation or justification can erase the fact that Judge Quitain was dismissed from the
service and that he deliberately withheld this information. His insistence that he had no knowledge of A.O. No. 183
is belied by the newspaper items published relative to his dismissal. It bears emphasis that in the Mindanao
Times dated April 18, 1995,[18] Judge Quitain stated in one of his interviews that I was dismissed from the
(Napolcom) office without due process. It also reads: Quitain, who was one of the guests in yesterdays Kapehan sa
Dabaw, wept unabashedly as he read his prepared statement on his dismissal from the government
service. Neither can we give credence to the contention that he was denied due process. The documents
submitted by the NAPOLCOM to the OCA reveal that Commissioner Alexis C. Canonizado, Chairman Ad
Hoc Committee, sent him summons on March 19, 1993 informing him that an administrative complaint had been
filed against him and required him to file an answer.[19] Then on March 29, 1993, respondent, through his counsel,
Atty. Pedro Castillo, filed an Answer.[20] In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain ones side or opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings
is accorded, there is no denial of due process.[21] Furthermore, as we have earlier mentioned and which Judge
Quitain ought to know, cessation from office by his resignation does not warrant the dismissal of the
administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative
case moot and academic.[22] Judge Quitain was removed from office after investigation and was found guilty of
grave misconduct. His dismissal from the service is a clear proof of his lack of the required qualifications to be a
member of the Bench.

More importantly, it is clear that Judge Quitain deliberately misled the JBC in his bid to gain an exalted
position in the Judiciary. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Estacion, Jr.,[23] this Court stressed:
 x x x The important consideration is that he had a duty to inform the appointing
authority and this Court of the pending criminal charges against him to enable them to
determine on the basis of his record, eligibility for the position he was seeking. He did not
discharge that duty. His record did not contain the important information in question because he
deliberately withheld and thus effectively hid it. His lack of candor is as obvious as his reason for
the suppression of such a vital fact, which he knew would have been taken into account
against him if it had been disclosed.

Thus, we find respondent guilty of dishonesty. Dishonesty means disposition to lie, cheat or defraud;
unworthiness; lack of integrity.[24]

Section 8(2), Rule 140[25] of the Rules of Court classifies dishonesty as a serious charge. Section 11, same
Rules, provides the following sanctions:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as

the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case
include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more
than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of not less than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

In Re: Inquiry on the Appointment of Judge Enrique A. Cube,[26] we held:

By his concealment of his previous dismissal from the public service, which the Judicial
and Bar Council would have taken into consideration in acting on his application, Judge Cube
committed an act of dishonesty that rendered him unfit to be appointed to, and to remain now
in, the Judiciary he has tarnished with his falsehood.

WHEREFORE, Judge Enrique A. Cube of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila is

DISMISSED with prejudice to his reappointment to any position in the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits. This decision is immediately executory.

We cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on the part of all those who are in the
service of the Judiciary.[27] We have often stressed that the conduct required of court personnel, from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk of court, must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the Judiciary. We condemn, and
will never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of
justice, which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith
of the people in the Judiciary.[28]

Considering the foregoing, Judge Quitain is hereby found guilty of grave misconduct. He deserves the
supreme penalty of dismissal.

However, on August 9, 2007, the Court received a letter from Judge Quitain addressed to the Chief Justice
stating that he is tendering his irrevocable resignation effective immediately as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 10, Davao City. Acting on said letter, the Court Resolved to accept the irrevocable resignation of
Judge Jaime V. Quitain effective August 15, 2007, without prejudice to the decision of the administrative case.[29]

Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by the Court without prejudice does not
render moot and academic the instant administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the
filing of the administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge by his resignation and
its consequent acceptance without prejudice by this Court, has ceased to be in office during the pendency of this
case. The Court retains its authority to pronounce the respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges against
him. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous
implications.[30] Indeed, if innocent, the respondent official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he
leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding
censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation. [31]

WHEREFORE, in view of our finding that JUDGE JAIME V. QUITAIN is guilty of grave misconduct which
would have warranted his dismissal from the service had he not resigned during the pendency of this
case, he is hereby meted the penalty of a fine of P40,000.00. It appearing that he has yet to apply for his
retirement benefits and other privileges, if any, the Court likewise ORDERS the FORFEITURE of all benefits, except
earned leave credits which Judge Quitain may be entitled to, and he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from
reinstatement and appointment to any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including
government-owned and/or controlled corporations.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Judge Jaime V. Quitains 201 File.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
34. Rodolfo M. Bernerdo vs. Atty Ismael F. Mejia, Adm Case No. 2984, August 31, 2007

EN BANC

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with plea for reinstatement in the
practice of law filed by Ismael F. Mejia (Mejia) who is already seventy-one years old and barred from the practice
of law for fifteen years.

The antecedent facts that led to Mejias disbarment are as follows.

On January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia, of the following
administrative offenses:

1) misappropriating and converting to his personal use:

a) part of the sum of P27,710.00 entrusted to him for payment of real estate taxes on property
belonging to Bernardo, situated in a subdivision known as Valle Verde I; and

b) part of another sum of P40,000.00 entrusted to him for payment of taxes and expenses in
connection with the registration of title of Bernardo to another property in a subdivision known
as Valle Verde V;

2) falsification of certain documents, to wit:

a) a special power of attorney dated March 16, 1985, purportedly executed in his favor by
Bernardo (Annex P, par. 51, complainants affidavit dates October 4, 1989);

b) a deed of sale dated October 22, 1982 (Annex O, par. 48, id.); and

c) a deed of assignment purportedly executed by the spouses Tomas and Remedios

Pastor, in Bernardos favor (Annex Q, par. 52, id.);

3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without funds in the bank, in payment of a loan obtained from
Bernardo in the amount of P50,000.00, and thereafter, replacing said check with others known also to be
insufficiently funded.[1]

On July 29, 1992, the Supreme Court En Banc rendered a Decision Per Curiam, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES the [sic] respondent, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia, guilty of all the
charges against him and hereby imposes on him the penalty of DISBARMENT. Pending finality of
this judgment, and effective immediately, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law. Let a copy of this Decision be spread in his record in the Bar Confidants Office,
and notice thereof furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the Court
Administrator who is DIRECTED to inform all the Courts concerned of this Decision.
 SO ORDERED.

On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed a Petition praying that he be allowed to reengage in the practice of law. On July 6,
1999, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a Resolution denying the petition for reinstatement.

On January 23, 2007, Mejia filed the present petition for review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with a plea for
reinstatement in the practice of law. No comment or opposition was filed against the petition.[2]

Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of
the Court. The action will depend on whether or not the Court decides that the public interest in the orderly and
impartial administration of justice will continue to be preserved even with the applicants reentry as a counselor at
law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good
moral character, a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court will take into consideration the applicants
character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he was
disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and
the application for reinstatement.[3]

In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the law profession. Fifteen years had already elapsed since
Mejias name was dropped from the Roll of Attorneys. At the age of seventy-one, he is begging for forgiveness and
pleading for reinstatement. According to him, he has long repented and he has suffered enough. Through his
reinstatement, he wants to leave a legacy to his children and redeem the indignity that they have suffered due to
his disbarment.

After his disbarment, he put up the Mejia Law Journal, a publication containing his religious and social writings. He
also organized a religious organization and named it El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of Heart and
Mind.

The Court is inclined to grant the present petition. Fifteen years has passed since Mejia was punished with the
severe penalty of disbarment. Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejias disbarment, it also
cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner and the
length of time during which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a
petition for reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992,
no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his
lesson from this experience, and his punishment has lasted long enough. Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of
its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has
already served its purpose. After all, penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct
offenders.

We reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that the practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.
Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the continuing requirements for enjoying the privilege to
practice law.[4]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by Ismael F. Mejia is
hereby GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

35. GSIS vs Hon. Vicente A. Pacquing, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1831, February 2, 2007

EN BANC

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.

In 1971, Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (Bengson) borrowed P4,250,000 from petitioner Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), secured by real estate and chattel mortgages. When Bengson defaulted in the payment of
the amortizations, petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties and sold them at public auction
where it emerged as the highest bidder.

In 1977, Bengson filed an action in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 26 [1] to annul
the extrajudicial foreclosure. The trial court, through Judge Antonio Fineza, declared the foreclosure void and
directed petitioner to restore to Bengson the foreclosed properties, pay damages and costs of suit.

Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed with modification the trial
courts decision and remanded the case for reception of evidence on the costs of suit and determination of the
replacement value of the properties should petitioner fail to return them. The CA decision became final and
executory on February 10, 1988.
 When petitioner failed to return the foreclosed properties, the new presiding judge of Branch 26, respondent
Judge Vicente A. Pacquing, ordered it to pay Bengson the equivalent value of the foreclosed properties. Thereafter,
Bengson moved that it be permitted to present evidence on the costs of suit. On April 6, 1995, the trial court
directed petitioner to pay Bengson P31 million as costs of suit. This order became final on April 24, 1995.

Petitioner filed an urgent omnibus motion with the court a quo stating that its counsel, Atty. Rogelio

Terrado, went on AWOL and never informed it of respondent judges order. [2] This motion, treated as petition for

relief from judgment by respondent judge, was dismissed on January 16, 1997. [3]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) but respondent judge denied the same on April 23,
1998.

Petitioner then instituted a special civil action for certiorari in the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.

47669[4] assailing the court a quos denial of its petition for relief from judgment. The CA, however, dismissed CA-

G.R. SP No. 47669 for having been filed out of time as three years had elapsed since the order awarding

Bengson P31 million as costs of suit became final and executory.[5]

Petitioner filed an MR of the above decision and, while it was pending resolution at the CA, respondent

judge, on December 16, 1998, issued an alias writ of execution ordering petitioner to pay Bengson the P31

million.[6] Pursuant thereto, respondent Atty. Mario Anacleto M. Baez, acting as sheriff of Branch 26, executed the

writ and levied on petitioners shares of stock in San Miguel Corporation (SMC) worth P6.2 million. The garnished

shares were later sold at public auction with Bengson as the only bidder.

Aggrieved, petitioner moved to quash the writ on the ground that its funds and properties were exempt

from garnishment, levy and execution under Section 39 of RA 8291. [7] Respondent judge denied the motion stating

that only funds and properties that were necessary to maintain petitioners actuarial solvency, like contributions of

GSIS members, were exempt from garnishment, levy and execution under RA 8291. [8]

Petitioner filed its MR of the trial courts denial of its motion to quash the writ but this was rejected as

well.

Via a special civil action for certiorari with an urgent motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary

injunction and/or restraining order (TRO), petitioner came to us questioning the garnishment and sale on

execution of its SMC shares. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 136874.[9]
 We referred G.R. No. 136874 to the CA for consideration and adjudication on the merits. In the CA, it was

re-docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 51131 and was consolidated with CA-G.R. SP. No. 47669.[10]

Later, the CA dismissed both petitions.[11]

Petitioner questioned the CAs dismissal of CA-G.R. SP. No. 47669 via a petition for review in this Court

docketed as G.R. No. 137448,[12] the ultimate issue of which was the existence of grounds for relief from the P31

million costs of suit judgment by respondent judge.

Later, petitioner filed another case, a special civil action for certiorari in this Court, this time contesting

the CAs dismissal of its petition in CA-G.R. No. 51131. Docketed as G.R. No. 141454,[13] the petition ascribed grave

abuse of discretion on the part of the CA for upholding the trial courts issuance of the alias writ of execution and

the subsequent garnishment and sale of its shares in SMC.

Petitioner also filed this administrative complaint[14] against respondents for ignorance of the law, bias

and partiality, and for violation of RA 8291. In its complaint, petitioner alleged:

In fine, [respondent judge] refused to take cognizance of [Section 39, RA 8291]. He

refused to await an authoritative and definitive resolution of the issues [on the exemption of
GSISs funds and properties] from execution or the issue of whether GSIS is entitled to a relief
from judgment of his [P]31 million peso cost[s] of suit. [H]e was in a hurry, as Bengson, to
execute the P31 million costs of suit[O]n the other hand, Sheriff Mario Anacleto M. Baez, seemed
to have the same objective when he refused to take heed of [GSISs request] to hold in abeyance
the execution sale on the basis of Section 39 (RA 8291).

The foregoing only shows [respondent judges] deliberate disregard of the express
provisions of [RA 8291], specifically Section 39and his bias, given his exorbitant award for cost[s]
of suit, bereft, as it is, of any legal basis. It evidently reveals a malicious scheme that seriously
undermines the very integrity and impartiality of his court.

The same can be said of the acts of Sheriff Baez in garnishing and selling [GSISs shares of
stock in SMC] to Bengson, characterized by an unusual swiftness and in clear disregard of the
express provision of Section 39, RA 8291[15]

We referred the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for investigation, report and
recommendation. In its report[16] to the Court, the OCA found nothing in the records to support petitioners
accusations against both respondents. According to the OCA, even assuming that respondent judge erred in
interpreting RA 8291, such error did not constitute gross ignorance of the law. It added that the records also failed
to prove malice, fraud, dishonesty or bad faith on the part of respondent judge in issuing the assailed alias writ of
execution.
 On petitioners allegations against respondent Atty. Baez, the OCA likewise found no reason to hold him

liable for failing to defer the execution of the writ.

The OCA then recommended the dismissal of petitioners complaint against respondents. [17]

On petitioners motion, we referred the case to the CA for further investigation. It was assigned to

Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios, who acted as investigating officer. Before a hearing on the case could be

conducted, respondent judge died.[18] The hearing proceeded but we withheld his benefits pending the completion

of the investigation of his case by Justice Barrios.

Subsequently, Justice Barrios submitted his report[19] to us agreeing with OCAs findings that petitioners

complaint against respondents was unfounded. According to Justice Barrios:

Assuming for the nonce that [respondent judge] erred in issuing the Order of 16
December 1998 without awaiting the resolution of [petitioners motion for reconsideration], and
in holding that [its] properties are not exempt from execution, these would not be errors that are
gross and patent, or done maliciously, deliberately or in evident bad faith. [Petitioner] has not
presented proof to the contrary, which with the factual milieu would call for administrative
sanctions against [respondent judge]. As a matter of public policy, the acts of the judge in his
official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Good
faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses
in which a judge charged with ignorance of [the] law can find refuge.[20]

He added that the filing of the administrative charges against respondents was premature because this

Court at that time had yet to decide G.R. No. 137448 and G.R. No. 141454. He thus recommended the dismissal of

the administrative charges against respondents.

On January 31, 2002,[21] we handed down our decision in the above cases nullifying the CAs resolutions

dismissing G.R. Nos. 51131[22] and 47669.[23] In the same decision, we set aside respondent judges January 16, 1997

order dismissing petitioners petition for relief from judgment and his April 23, 1998 order denying the MR. [24]

Notwithstanding the nullification of respondent judges orders, we are adopting the findings and

recommendations of the OCA and Justice Barrios.

 For a judge to be administratively liable for ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must be gross or

patent.[25] To constitute gross ignorance of the law, such acts must not only be contrary to existing law and

jurisprudence but also motivated by bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty. [26] That certainly does not appear to be

the case here as petitioners complaint was spawned merely by the honest divergence of opinion between

petitioner and respondent judge as to the legal issues and applicable laws involved.[27]Petitioner also proffered no

evidence that respondent judges acts were imbued with malice or bad faith.

In the same vein, we hold that respondent judge was neither biased nor partial against petitioner when

he issued the alias writ of execution. Petitioners assertion that respondent judge precipitately issued the alias writ

is not supported by the records. On the contrary, the records indicate that the writ was issued more than three

years from the finality of the order directing petitioner to pay Bengson P31 million as costs of suit. Its issuance was

not all tainted with undue haste. In the exercise of his judicial discretion, respondent judge believed that the

issuance of the alias writ had become forthwith a matter of right following the finality of said order. The rule is that

once a judgment becomes final, the winning party is entitled to a writ of execution and the issuance thereof

becomes a courts ministerial duty.[28]

Assuming ex gratia argumenti that respondent judge erred in issuing the alias writ, his act would still not

merit administrative sanction absent malice or bad faith.[29] Bad faith does not simply connote poor or flawed

judgment; it imports a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity or conscious doing of a wrong.

Furthermore, for allegations of bias and partiality to stand, petitioner should have demonstrated that

respondent judges decisions and orders came from extrajudicial sources or from some bases other than what he

had learned from his study of the case.[30] Decisions formed in the course of judicial proceedings, although they

appear erroneous, are not necessarily partial as long as they are culled from the arguments and evidence of the

parties.[31] The party who alleges partiality must prove it with clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner failed in

that aspect.

Interestingly, this Court, in our decision in G.R. Nos. 137448 and 141454, nullified the orders of

respondent judge only to give petitioner another chance to seek redress from the gross negligence and mistake of

its then counsel, Atty. Terrado. We did not at all declare respondent judges orders as erroneous or tainted with

malice or bad faith. In our decision, we said:

 It is readily apparent that part of [petitioners] predicament stemmed from the
negligence or mistake, to put it mildly, of its former counsels.

Indeed, it is undisputed that despite ample opportunity, [petitioners] counsel, Atty.

Rogelio Terrado, did not rebut BENGSONs evidence on the costs of suit or, at the very least,
verify the schedule of costs and cross-examine BENGSONs witnesses. Much worse, he allowed
the 6 April 1995 Order awarding BENGSON P31 million costs of suit to attain finality by not filing
a motion for reconsideration with the trial court or a petition with the Court of Appeals. Instead,
he went AWOL without informing petitioner of the said Order. These acts constituted gross
negligence, if not fraud, and resulted in the deprivation of petitioner of an opportunity to move
to reconsider or appeal the adverse order.

[A]s a general rule, the negligence or mistake of a counsel binds the client for otherwise
there would be never be no end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could
allege and show that the former counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or
learned. But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as an aid to
justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit
exceptions thereto and prevent miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court has the power to
except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require
it.

Moreover, the filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for correcting the actions of
a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a sufficient remedy exists. [32] The actions
against judges should not be considered as complementary or suppletory to, or substitute for, the judicial
remedies which can be availed of by a party in a case.[33]

Regarding the accusations against respondent Atty. Baez, the Court finds no basis to hold him liable for
executing the assailed writ at that time. Undeniably, the most difficult phase of any proceeding is the execution of
judgment.[34] Charged with this task, he must act with considerable dispatch to administer justice. Otherwise, a
judgment, if not executed at once, would just be an empty victory on the part of the prevailing party. [35] In
executing the writ, Atty. Baez merely carried out a ministerial duty. He had no discretion to implement the writ or
not.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for ignorance of the law, bias and partiality, and violation of RA 8291 against

the late Judge Vicente A. Pacquing and Atty. Mario Anacleto M. Baez, is hereby DISMISSED.

Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Office of the Court Administrator so that the benefits
due the late respondent judge can be promptly released to his heirs, unless there exists some other lawful cause to
withhold the same.

SO ORDERED.

[2]
Atty. Terrado was later on charged with gross misconduct for his alleged willful and deliberate act of not filing
the appropriate motion or appeal from the trial courts order directing GSIS to pay Bengson P31 million as cots of
suit.

[3]
The trial court denied the petition for relief from judgment on the following grounds: 1) GSIS was bound by the
negligence of its counsel; 2) to grant the petition would be to revive GSISs right to appeal which it
irretrievably lost through gross inaction; 3) equity or fairness could not be invoked as valid grounds for
petition for relief from judgment; 4) res judicata had already set in; 5) no extrinsic or collateral fraud was
adduced by GSIS, and; 6) the order for GSIS to pay Bengson P31 million costs of suit already attained
finality. Annex F, Records.
Sec. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien.-
xxx
The funds and/or properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the
benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes
issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies including Commission on Audit (COA)
disallowances and from all financial obligations of the members, including pecuniary accountability arising
from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official functions or duties, or incurred
relative to or in connection with his position or work except when his monetary liability, contractual or
otherwise, is in favor of the GSIS.

36. Velez vs Atty. De Vera A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006

EN BANC

DECISION

Per Curiam:

Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governor and
Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The first pertains to a disbarment case questioning Atty. de
Veras moral fitness to remain as a member of the Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Veras letter-request
to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President, and the third case concerns the validity of his removal as
Governor and EVP of the IBP by the IBP Board. The resolution of these cases will determine the national presidency
of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.

A.C. No. 6697

The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an investigation, report and recommendation on
subject case,[1] summarized the antecedents thereof as follows:

In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the
suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following
grounds:

1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the

suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar of California;
and
2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation rule
enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October
1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).

Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due
his client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the Hearing
Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department San Francisco, State Bar of California in Administrative
Case No. 86-0-18429. Complainant alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign or
surrender his license to practice law in the said state in order to evade the recommended three
(3) year suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence
necessary to lead the countrys most noble profession.

Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-called rotation
rule provided for in Administrative Matter No. 491 when he transferred to IBP Agusan del Sur
Chapter. He claimed that the respondent failed to meet the requirements outlined in the IBP By-
Laws pertaining to transfer of Chapter Membership. He surmised that the respondents transfer
was intended only for the purpose of becoming the next IBP National President. Complainant
prayed that the respondent be enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President.
 Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated that the issues raised
in above-mentioned Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier administrative case filed
by the same complainant against him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were already
extensively discussed and categorically ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December
2005 in Administrative Case No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De
Vera). Respondent prayed that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the
principle of res judicata.

On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of the Bar Confidant for
presentation of evidence in support of their respective allegations.

Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant maintained that

there is substantial evidence showing respondents moral baseness, vileness and depravity, which
could be used as a basis for his disbarment. Complainant stressed that the respondent never
denied that he used his clients money. Complainant argued that the respondent failed to present
evidence that the Supreme Court of California accepted the latters resignation and even if such
was accepted, complainant posited that this should not absolve the respondent from liability.

Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the
case at bar. He asserted that the first administrative case filed against the respondent was one for
his disqualification. x x x.

Bar Matter No. 1227

A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC

As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de Veras letter-request to this Court to
schedule his oath taking as IBP National President. A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, on the other hand, is a letter-report dated
19 May 2005 of IBP National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (IBP President Cadiz) furnishing this Court with the
IBPs Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, removing Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP, for
committing acts inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP in general.[2]

The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the regular meeting of the IBP Board
of Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said meeting, by 2/3 vote (6 voting in favor and 2 against), the IBP Board
approved the withdrawal of the Petition filed before this Court docketed as Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose
Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, SC-R165108. The Petition was intended
to question the legality and/or constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9227, authorizing the increase in the salaries of
judges and justices, and to increase filing fees.[3]

The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the withdrawal of the above-described Petition
were herein respondent Governor and EVP de Vera and Governor Carlos L. Valdez.[4]
On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court of the decision taken by the IBP Board to withdraw
the afore-mentioned Petition. Attached to his letter was a copy of the IBP Boards 14 January 2005 Resolution.[5]

On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de Veras request for oathtaking as National President,
was filed. The same was subsequently consolidated with A.C. No. 6697, the disbarment case filed against Atty. de
Vera.[6]

On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10th National IBP Convention at the CAP-
Camp John Hay Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at this forum where Atty. de Vera allegedly made some
untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in connection with the IBP Boards Resolution to withdraw the
Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227.[7]

On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining Atty. de Vera from assuming
office as IBP National President.[8]

On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President Cadiz a letter wherein he prayed
for the removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board for having committed acts which were inimical to the
IBP Board and the IBP.[9]

On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront Hotel, Cebu City, the
IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP
Executive Vice President.[10] Quoted hereunder is the dispositive portion of said Resolution:

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that Governor Leonard

S. de Vera is REMOVED as a member of the IBP Board of Governors and Executive Vice President
for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP, to wit:

1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in

public about the Supreme Court and members of the IBP Board of Governors,
during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of Lawyers, held
at CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center on 22 April 2005, making it appear
that the decision of the IBP Board of Governors to withdraw the PETITION
docketed as Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs.
The Senate of the Philippines, et al., Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition With
Prayer for the Issuance of A Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, S.C.-R. 165108, was due to influence and pressure from the
Supreme Court of the Philippines;

2. For making said untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant

lies that brought the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP as a whole in public
contempt and disrepute;

3. For violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

for Lawyers which mandates that A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others, by making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant
 lies during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10thNational Convention of Lawyers in
Baguio City;

4. For instigating and provoking some IBP chapters to embarrass

and humiliate the IBP Board of Governors in order to coerce and compel the
latter to pursue the aforesaid PETITION;

5. For falsely accusing the IBP National President, Jose Anselmo I.

Cadiz, during the Plenary Session of the 10th National Convention in Baguio City
of withholding from him a copy of Supreme Court Resolution, dated 25 January
2005, granting the withdrawal of the PETITION, thereby creating the wrong
impression that the IBP National President deliberately prevented him from
taking the appropriate remedies with respect thereto, thus compromising the
reputation and integrity of the IBP National President and the IBP as a whole. [11]

On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon. Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter captioned as Urgent Plea to Correct a Glaring Injustice of the IBP Board of Governors;
Vehement Protest to the Board Resolution Abruptly Removing Atty. Leonard de Vera from the Board of Governors
in Patent Violation of Due Process; Petition to Deny/Disapprove the Completely Unjustified and Highly Arbitrary
Resolution Precipitately Ousting Atty. de Vera from the Board of Governors in Less Than Twenty Four (24) Hours
from Notice and Judgment Without Formal Investigation.[12]

In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically denied having committed acts inimical to the IBP and its
Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter-complaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board
voted to expel him posthaste, without just cause and in complete disregard of even the minimum standards of due
process. Pertinent portions of his letter read:

It is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a grave and serious injustice
against me especially when, as the incumbent Executive Vice President of the IBP, I am scheduled
to assume my position as National President of the IBP on July 1, 2005. x x x

I was denied the very basic rights of due process recognized by the Supreme Court even
in administrative cases:

1. The denial of the right to answer the charges formally or in

writing. The complaint against me was in writing.

2. The denial of the right to answer the charges within a reasonable

period of time after receipt of the complaint.

3. The denial of the right to a fair hearing.

4. The denial of the right to confront the accuser and the witnesses
against me. I challenged Gov. Rivera to testify under oath so I could
 question him. He refused. I offered to testify under oath so I could be
questioned. My request was denied.

5. The denial of my right to present witnesses on my behalf.

6. The denial of my right to an impartial judge. Governor Rivera was

my accuser, prosecutor, and judge all at the same time.

7. Gov. Riveras prejudgment of my case becomes even more evident

because when his motion to expel me was lost in a 5-3 votes (due to
his inhibition to vote), Gov. Rivera asked for another round of
voting so he can vote to support his own complaint and motion to
expel me.[13] (Emphasis and underscoring in original.)

On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of Atty. de Vera.[14] In their Reply,
the IBP Board explained to this Court that their decision to remove Atty. de Vera was based on valid grounds and
was intended to protect itself from a recalcitrant member. Among the grounds cited and elucidated by the IBP
Board were the following:

(i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media campaign and solicited resolutions
from IBP Chapters to condemn the IBP Board of Governors for its decision to withdraw
the PETITION, all with the end in view of compelling or coercing the IBP Board of
Governors to reconsider the decision to withdraw the PETITION.

(ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned the IBP Board of Governors and
the IBP National President in public or during the Plenary Session at the 10 th National
Convention of Lawyers.

(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated solicited speakers (at the plenary session),
Atty. de Vera fanned the fire, so to speak, and went to the extent of making untruthful
statements, innuendos and blatant lies about the Supreme Court and some members of
the IBP Board of Governors. He deliberately and intentionally did so to provoke the
members of the IBP Board of Governors to engage him in an acrimonious public debate
and expose the IBP Board of Governors to public ridicule.

(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies, e.g., that
some of the members of the IBP Board of Governors voted in favor of the withdrawal of
the petition (without mentioning names) because nakakahiya kasi sa Supreme Court,
nakakaawa kasi ang Supreme Court, kasi may mga kaibigan tayo sa Court. He made it
appear that the IBP Board of Governors approved the resolution, withdrawing the
petition, due to influence or pressure from the Supreme Court. [15]
 The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Veras actuation during the Plenary Session was the last straw that
broke the camels back. He committed acts inimical to the interest of the IBP Board and the IBP; hence, the IBP
Board decided to remove him.

On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions and a position paper coming
from various IBP Chapters all condemning his expulsion from the IBP Board and as IBP EVP.[16]

On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a special meeting of the IBP
Board held at the EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005, the IBP Board took note of the vacancy in the position of
the IBP EVP brought about by Atty. de Veras removal. In his stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was
formally elected and declared as IBP EVP.[17]

On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty. Santiago. [18] On 20 June 2005, Atty.
Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP position through a letter addressed to the IBP Board. [19] Thus, on 25 June
2005, during its last regular meeting, the IBP Board elected a new EVP in the person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente
B. Salazar to replace Atty. Santiago.

On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to Chief Justice Davide,
reported to this Court Atty. Salazars election.[20] IBP National President Cadiz also requested, among other things,
that Atty. Salazars election be approved and that he be allowed to assume as National President in the event that
Atty. de Vera is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law or should his removal from the 2003-2005 Board
of Governors and as EVP is approved by this Court.[21] Also on 28 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested the election of
Atty. Salazar.[22]

In his Extended Comment[23] dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de Vera maintained that there was absolutely no
factual or legal basis to sustain the motion to remove him from the IBP Board because he violated no law. He
argued that if the basis for his removal as EVP was based on the same grounds as his removal from the IBP Board,
then his removal as EVP was likewise executed without due notice and without the least compliance with the
minimum standards of due process of law.

Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious charges filed against him,
the speakers at the Plenary Session of the Baguio Convention, although undeniably impassioned and articulate,
were respectful in their language and exhortations, not once undermining the stature of the IBP in general and the
IBP Board of Governors in particular. He posited that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board
during the Conventions Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP
Board of Governors; and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to
dissent is not recognized by the incumbent IBP Board.
 Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy of this Courts Resolution
granting the withdrawal of the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227, Atty. de Vera avowed
that he made no such remarks. As regards the election of a new IBP EVP, Atty. de Vera contended that the said
election was illegal as it was contrary to the provisions of the IBP By-Laws concerning national officers, to wit:

Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold
office for a term of two years from July 1 following their election until 30 June of their second
year in office and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified.

In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties shall be
performed by the Executive Vice President, and in the event of death, resignation, or removal of
the President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President for the unexpired
portion of the term. In the event of death, resignation, removal or disability of both the President
and the Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold
office for the unexpired portion of the term or during the period of disability.

Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and employees appointed
by the President with the consent of the Board shall hold office at the pleasure of the Board or
for such term as the Board may fix.[24]

To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both the President and the EVP die, resign, are
removed, or are disabled, the IBP By-Laws only provides for the election of an Acting President and that no
mention for an election for EVP was made. Thus, when such election for EVP occurs, such is contrary to the
express provision of the IBP By-Laws.

Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP, his replacement should come
from Eastern Mindanao and not from any other region, due to the Rotation Rule embodied in par. 2, Section 47,
Article VII of the IBP By-Laws.

In response to Atty. de Veras averments, the 2003-2005 IBP Board, through its counsel, submitted a Reply
dated 27 January 2006 and clarified as follows:

(i) The IBP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect
itself from an intractable member by virtue of Article VI, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws;

(ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP not because
of his disagreement with the IBP Boards position but because of the various acts that he
committed which the IBP Board determined to be inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP
as a whole;

(iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability by invoking his constitutional
right to Free Speech because, as a member of the Bar, it is his sworn duty to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar
conduct by others;

(iv) The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de Vera, observed the fundamental
principles of due process. As the records would bear, Atty. de Vera was duly notified of
the Regular Meeting of the IBP Board held on 13 May 2004; was furnished a copy of
Governor Riveras Letter-Complaint the day before the said meeting; was furnished a
 copy of the said Meetings Agenda; and was allowed to personally defend himself and his
accuser, Gov. Rivera;

(v) Atty. de Vera was validly removed because the required number of votes under
Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws to remove Atty. de Vera as a member of the IBP Board and
as IBP EVP was duly complied with;

(vi) Atty. de Veras replacement as IBP EVP need not come from Eastern Mindanao Region
because: (a) the rotation rule under Article VII, Section 47, par. 2 of the IBP By-Laws had
already been complied with when Atty. de Vera, who hails from Eastern Mindanao, was
elected IBP EVP; and (b) the rotation rule need not be enforced if the same will not be
practicable, possible, feasible, doable or viable; and, finally, that

(vii) Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus, should now be allowed to take
his oath as IBP National President.[25]

The Courts Ruling

AC No. 6697

In his Memorandum[26] dated 20 June 2005, complainant tendered the following issues for the
consideration of the Court:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) COMMITED MALPRACTICE

WHICH AMOUNTED TO MORAL T[U]RPITUDE IN THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND IN THE
PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRACTICE OF LAW.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS ATTACHED TO THE PERSON OF ATTORNEY
LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) WHEREVER HE MAY GO AND NOT NECESSARILY BOUND BY THE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE MORAL T[U]RPITUDE, AS

BASIS FOR DISBARMENT OF RESPONDENT IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE TO ADMIN. CASE NO. [6052][27]

The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of the fourth issue. Consequently,
we will start with the last issue.

A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the present administrative
case.

In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined:

To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment against respondent
Leonard De Vera is grounded on the following:

1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order

rendered against him by the State Bar in California; and
 2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation rule enunciated in
Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (In the Matter: 1989 IBP
Elections).

It appears that the complainant already raised the said issues in an earlier administrative
case against the respondent. Verily, these issues were already argued upon by the parties in their
respective pleadings, and discussed and ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11
December 2003 in Administrative Matter No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de
Vera).

As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that:

As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when
he was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his
California license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for
determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for the position he is
aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final judgment finding him guilty
of the administrative charge, as the records relied upon by the petitioners are
mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are recommendatory
findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are subject to the review
of and the final decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the
complainant in the California administrative case has retracted the accusation
that he misappropriated the complainants money, but unfortunately the
retraction was not considered by the investigating officer. xxx

On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while
he was still practicing law in California, he explained that no final judgment was
rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He
surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he suffered at the hands of
the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue the case to the end. We
find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It is a basic
rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. In
this case, the petitioners have not shown how the administrative complaint
affects respondent De Vera's moral fitness to run for governor.

On the other hand, as regards the second issue:

Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post

because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in
Paraaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only
changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of
attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver
that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile
rule.

The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II, a
lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with
the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:

xxx

It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws that it is not

automatic that a lawyer will become a member of the chapter where his place of
residence or work is located. He has the discretion to choose the particular
chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does not register his
preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of the place where he
resides or maintains office. The only proscription in registering one's preference
is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same time.

The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this
Section, transfer of IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies
with the conditions set forth therein, thus:

xxx
 The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be
made not less than three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to
which the lawyer wishes to transfer.

In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP
membership to Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP
National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Amador Z.
Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero,
Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent de Vera's
transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in their respective
records. This letter is a substantial compliance with the certification mentioned
in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that de Vera's transfer was made effective
sometime between 1 August 2001 and 3 September 2001. On 27 February 2003,
the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were simultaneously held all over the
Philippines, as mandated by Section 29.a of the IBP By-Laws which provides that
elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of
February of every other year. Between 3 September 2001 and 27 February 2003,
seventeen months had elapsed. This makes respondent de Vera's transfer valid
as it was done more than three months ahead of the chapter elections held
on 27 February 2003.

In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco (Administrative Case No.
2995, 27 November 1996), this Court declared that:

The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and
not to the exercise of the [Courts] administrative powers.

In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was dismissed from service for grave misconduct
highly prejudicial to the service for surreptitiously substituting the bid price in a Certificate of Sale
from P3,263,182.67 to only P730,000.00. Thereafter a complaint for disbarment was filed against
the respondent on the basis of the same incident. Respondent, interposing res judicata, argued
that he may no longer be charged on the basis of the same incident. This Court held that while the
respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, this does not amount to
double jeopardy as both proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. This Court qualified
that, in the first case, the respondent was proceeded against as an erring court personnel under
the Courts supervisory power over courts while, in the second case, he was disciplined as a lawyer
under the Courts plenary authority over membersof the legal profession.

In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears that res judicata still applies in
administrative cases. Thus, in the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera vs. Judge William Layague
(Administrastive Matter No. RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled that:

While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it would be contrary
to equity and substantial justice to penalize respondent judge a second time for
an act which he had already answered for.

Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs. Judge Amado L.
Becamon, Lolita Delos Reyes and Eddie Delos Reyes (Administrative Matter No. MTJ-02-1404, 14
December 2004), this Court held that:

Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present
administrative case becomes dismissible.

xxx

Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of
competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively
settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for
the same cause. It provides that
[a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an
absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause
of action. Res judicata is based on the ground that the party to be affected, or
 some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated the same matter in the
former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted
to litigate it again.

This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of
unnecessary suits and repetitious trials. At the same time, it prevents the
clogging of court dockets.Equally important, res judicata stabilizes rights and
promotes the rule of law.

In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant had
already been resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative case. The complainants contention
that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar as the first administrative case
was one for disqualification while the instant administrative complaint is one for suspension
and/or disbarment should be given least credence. It is worthy to note that while the instant
administrative complaint is denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed
neither the suspension nor the disbarment of the respondent but instead merely sought to enjoin
the respondent from assuming office as IBP National President. [28]

Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, In Re: Petition to Disqualify
Atty. Leonard de Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being Elected IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the
May 31 IBP Election and promulgated on 11 December 2003 does not constitute a bar to the filing of Adm. Case
No. 6697.Although the parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their
capacities in these cases and the issues presented therein are not the same, thereby barring the application of res
judicata.

In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions must concur,
namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by
a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a
judgment or order on the merits, and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties,
identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action.[29] In the absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de
Vera cannot argue res judicata in his favor.

It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject matters and causes of action. In Adm.
Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de Vera to run as a candidate for the position of
IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present administrative complaint, the subject matter is his privilege to
practice law. In the first administrative case, complainants cause of action was Atty. de Veras alleged violation or
circumvention of the IBP By-laws. In the present administrative case, the primary cause of action is Atty. de Veras
alleged violation of lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to
prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as
clarified by complainant in his Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. de Veras suspension or
disbarment.

The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved on the basis of the
parties rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified
from running as Regional Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions the disqualification
of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm ground to stand
on. Likewise, we held that the complainants therein were not the proper parties to bring the suit as the IBP By-
laws prescribes that only nominees - which the complainants were not - can file with the IBP President a written
protest against the candidate. The Courts statement, therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the
ground that he was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election
disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis of the administrative findings
of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him from the practice of law for three years. We held
in that case that

There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit
before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral
fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates.
Indeed, based on each member's standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any
member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another,
basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from
his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final
judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.[30]

What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper case

declaring otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP Regional Director is presumed morally

fit. Any person who begs to disagree will not be able to find a receptive audience in the IBP through a petition

for disqualification but must first file the necessary disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer

concerned.

And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case. As his petition is sufficient in form and
substance, we have given it due course pursuant to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. And, considering that this case
is not barred by the prior judgment in Adm. Case No. 6052, the only issue left for consideration is whether or not
Atty. de Vera can be suspended or disbarred under the facts of the case and the evidence submitted by
complainant.

The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar

of California, standing alone, is not proof of malpractice.

In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of Guam of Atty. Leon G.
Maquera,[31] we were confronted with the question of whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar, who is
concomitantly an attorney in a foreign jurisdiction and who was suspended from the practice of law in said foreign
jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign
jurisdiction.

We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who was admitted to the
practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.) and against whom charges were filed in
connection with his practice in said jurisdiction. However, unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final judgment for
suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years
as he surrendered his license to practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.

In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign
jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines as the acts giving rise
to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension
against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of
the foreign courts action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise
held that the judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.

The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as
follows:

xxxx

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc.,[32] we explained that [a] foreign judgment is
presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a
presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum.

In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the recommendation
by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior
by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by
the hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical
under Philippine law.

There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. de Vera independent of the recommendation of
suspension by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California
 Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or

other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney
is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall
be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension.[33]

Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of
officers of the court and to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence.[34] The statutory enunciation of the grounds for disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as a
limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its
officers cannot be restricted.[35]

Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27
gives a special and technical meaning to the term Malpractice.[36] That meaning is in consonance with the
elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business. [37]

Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of his profession or
which is unbecoming a member of that profession.[38]

Now, the undisputed facts:

1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California, docketed then
as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius Willis,
III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by the elder Willis (father
of Julius who was given authority by the son to control the case because the latter was then studying
in San Diego California) for the release of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a
check in settlement of the case which he then deposited to his personal account; [39]
2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended
from the practice of law for three years;[40] and

3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of
California.[41]

Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he misappropriated his clients
funds as the latters father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the same and that, unfortunately, the
hearing officer did not consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified under oath
that he expected de Vera might use the money for a few days.

By insisting that he was authorized by his clients father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera
has impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own personal use.

In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainants allegation in the latters memorandum that he (de Vera)
received US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he deposited said amount in his personal account and not in
a separate trust account and that, finally, he spent the amount for personal purposes. [42]

At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may
be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. [43] It means such evidence which affords a
substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. [44]

Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his clients funds is highly unethical. Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this, thus:

CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME TO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.

Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.

In Espiritu v. Ulep[45] we held that

The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it
requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its
fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client.

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all money
and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Accordingly, he shall account for all
 money or property collected or received for or from the client. Even more specific is the Canon of
Professional Ethics:

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or
takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.

Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the
possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not
under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.

Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by
him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his
own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in
the legal profession and deserves punishment.

Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of
professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Those
who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of
law. (Emphases supplied.)

In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his clients money
for personal use, he has unwittingly sealed his own fate since this admission constitutes more
than substantial evidence of malpractice. Consequently, Atty. de Vera now has the burden of
rebutting the evidence which he himself supplied.

In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to use the funds
intended for the latters son. Atty. de Vera also points out that he had restituted the full amount of
US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the administrative case against him in the State Bar of California. [46]

Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in the records of this case proof
that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the funds of his client. In Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera[47] we
declared that

When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must
show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of him.

Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis had indeed
testified that he expected de Vera might use the money for a few days. As Atty. de Vera had vigorously
objected to the admissibility of the document containing this statement, he is now estopped from relying
thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis expected de Vera might use the money for a few days was not so
much an acknowledgment of consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of his clients funds as it was an
acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his clients funds, which by itself did not
speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera or the way such character was perceived.

In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his clients money without the latters acquiescence is
conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear that Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own
account and using the same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical
behavior. He caused dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot
be denied that the respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the
profession betrays their trust and confidence.[48] Respondent violated his oath to conduct himself with all good
fidelity to his client.
Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to
disbar must be exercised with great caution.[49] Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired,
disbarment should not be decreed.

In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,[50] we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two years suspension from his practice of law for
depositing the funds meant for his client to his personal account without the latters knowledge. In Reyes v.
Maglaya;[51] Castillo v. Taguines;[52] Espiritu v. Atty. Cabredo IV,[53] the respondents were meted one year
suspension each for failing to remit to their clients monies in the amounts of P1,500.00; P500.00, and P51,161.00,
respectively, received by them for their clients without the latters permission. In Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya,[54] we
indefinitely suspended respondent for failure to remit to his client the amount of the measly sum of P4,344.00
representing the amount received pursuant to a writ of execution. Considering the amount involved here
US$12,000.00, we believe that the penalty of suspension for two (2) years is appropriate.

Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where the lawyer is not a

resident of is not a ground for his suspension or disbarment

Complainant insists that Atty. de Veras transfer of membership from the Pasay, Paraaque, Las Pias and
Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is a circumvention of the rotation rule as it was made
for the sole purpose of becoming IBP National President. Complainant stresses that Atty. de Vera is not a resident
of Agusan del Sur nor does he hold office therein.

In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Veras act of transferring to another IBP Chapter is not a
ground for his disqualification for the post of IBP Governor as the same is allowed under Section 19 of the IBP By-
Laws with the qualification only that the transfer be made not less than three months immediately preceding any
chapter election.

As it was perfectly within Atty. de Veras right to transfer his membership, it cannot be said that he is guilty
of unethical conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly argue that a legal act may not necessarily be
ethical, in herein case, we do not see anything wrong in transferring to an IBP chapter that -- based on the rotation
rule will produce the next IBP EVP who will automatically succeed to the National Presidency for the next term. Our
Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the Lawyers Oath do not prohibit nor punish lawyers from aspiring to
be IBP National President and from doing perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such goal.

Bar Matter No. 1227

Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC

To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5- 15-SC, the following issues must be
addressed:
I. Whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Atty. de Vera as
Governor and EVP of the IBP on 13 May 2005.

i. Whether the IBP Board of Governors complied with administrative due

process in removing Atty. de Vera.

ii. Whether the IBP removed Atty. De Vera for just and valid cause.

II. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the IBP on 25 June 2005, and can
consequently assume the Presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.

The IBP Board observed due process in its removal of Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor

We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP Board is
vested with the power to remove any of its members pursuant to
Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, which states:

Sec. 44. Removal of members. If the Board of Governors should determine after proper inquiry
that any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason become unable to perform his
duties, the Board, by resolution of the Majority of the remaining members, may declare his
position vacant, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including
three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution
adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the
Supreme Court.

In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates from
the region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among the members of the Chapter to
which the resigned governor is a member to serve as governor for the unexpired portion of the
term. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP Board may be removed for cause by resolution adopted
by two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of this Court.

In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of Governors on procedural and
substantive grounds. He argues that he was denied very basic rights of due process recognized by the Honorable
Court even in administrative cases like the right to answer formally or in writing and within reasonable time, the
right to present witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he was not
able to cross-examine the complainant, IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera voted as well
for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the
fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting on his own motion. However, when his inhibition
resulted in the defeat of his motion as the necessary 2/3 votes could not be mustered, Atty. Rivera asked for
another round of voting so he could vote to support his own motion.

The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the plenary session, and personally
witnessed and heard Atty. de Veras actuations, an evidentiary or formal hearing was no longer necessary. Since
they all witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough that he was given an opportunity to refute and answer
all the charges imputed against him. They emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of the complaint and
that he was present at the Board Meeting on 13 May 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against him was part of
the agenda. Therein, he was given the opportunity to be heard and that, in fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his case.

We are in agreement with the IBP Board.

First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property. [55] It
cannot be said that the position of EVP of the IBP is property within the constitutional sense especially since there is
no right to security of tenure over said position as, in fact, all that is required to remove any member of the board
of governors for cause is a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members of the board.

Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in administrative proceedings, the
essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side. [56] At the outset, it is here emphasized that
the term due process of law as used in the Constitution has no fixed meaning for all purposes due to the very
nature of the doctrine which, asserting a fundamental principle of justice rather than a specific rule of law, is not
susceptible of more than one general statement. [57] The phrase is so elusive of exact apprehension, [58] because it
depends on circumstances and varies with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation. [59]

Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with judicial process for a trial in court is not always
essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in
administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The due process clause guarantees no
particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative
character, the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The constitutional requirement of
due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established administrative agency or tribunal. It is not
essential that hearings be had before the making of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial and
tribunal before which all objections and defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and
considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process requires. What is required for hearing may differ as the
functions of the administrative bodies differ.[60]

The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. [61] Nor is an actual hearing always
essential[62] especially under the factual milieu of this case where the members of the IBP Board -- upon whose
shoulders the determination of the cause for removal of an IBP governor is placed subject to the approval of the
Supreme Court all witnessed Atty. de Veras actuations in the IBP National Convention in question.
It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that he was present when the
matter was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic notes of the 13 May 2005 meeting wherein Atty. de
Vera was removed, it is patent that Atty. de Vera was given fair opportunity to defend himself against the
accusations made by Atty. Rivera.

Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that Atty. Rivera, who authored the complaint against him,
also voted for his expulsion making him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera likewise
laments the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting but when this resulted in the defeat of his
motion for lack of the necessary 2/3 vote, he agreed to another round of voting and that, this time, he voted in
favor of his motion.

For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for Atty. de Veras expulsion
(including Atty. Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including Atty. de Vera).

Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including
three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution
adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the
Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the
remaining members. The phrase remaining members refers to the members exclusive of the complainant member
and the respondent member. The reason therefore is that such members are interested parties and are thus
presumed to be unable to resolve said motion impartially. This being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera and de
Vera should be stricken-off which means that only the votes of the seven remaining members are to be counted. Of
the seven remaining members, five voted for expulsion while two voted against it which still adds up to the 2/3
vote requirement for expulsion.

The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor for just and
valid cause

All the concerned parties to this case agree that what constitutes cause for the removal of an IBP
Governor has not been defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws albeit it includes three consecutive absences from
Board meetings without justifiable excuse. Thus, the IBP Board argues that it is vested with sufficient power and
authority to protect itself from an intractable member whose removal was caused not by his disagreement with
the IBP Board but due to various acts committed by him which the IBP Board considered as inimical to the IBP
Board in particular and the IBP in general.

Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board
during the Conventions Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP
Board of Governors and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to
dissent is not recognized by the IBP Board.

After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the fundamental objective of the IBP to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively, we hereby find that Atty. de Veras removal from the IBP Board
was not capricious or arbitrary.

Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if not animosity, are inherent in
the internal life of an organization, but especially of the IBP since lawyers are said to disagree before they agree.

However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, is diluted if the conflicts are brought outside its
governing body for then there would be the impression that the IBP, which speaks through the Board of
Governors, does not and cannot speak for its members in an authoritative fashion. It would accordingly diminish
the IBPs prestige and repute with the lawyers as well as with the general public.

As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be adjusted within the governing board itself so as
to free it from the stresses that invariably arise when internal cleavages are made public.

The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for adjusting and resolving conflicts and
disagreements within the group after the members have been given an opportunity to be heard. While it does not
efface conflicts, nonetheless, once a decision on a contentious matter is reached by a majority vote, the dissenting
minority is bound thereby so that the board can speak with one voice, for those elected to the governing board are
deemed to implicitly contract that the will of the majority shall govern in matters within the authority of the
board.[63]

The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera as the latters actuations during the
10th National IBP Convention were detrimental to the role of the IBP Board as the governing body of the IBP. When
the IBP Board is not seen by the bar and the public as a cohesive unit, it cannot effectively perform its duty of
helping the Supreme Court enforce the code of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well as improve
the administration of justice.

In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, the expulsion of a member of the board who
insists on bringing to the public his disagreement with a policy/resolution approved by the majority after due
discussion, cannot be faulted. The effectiveness of the board as a governing body will be negated if its
pronouncements are resisted in public by a board member.

Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the voice of the majority, he should resign therefrom
so that he could criticize in public the majority opinion/decision to his hearts content; otherwise, he subjects
himself to disciplinary action by the body.

The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of

Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP as well

The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP as well.
Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides:

SEC. 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and
Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional
governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. x x x

Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board of Governors. Atty. de Veras removal
from the Board of Governors, automatically disqualified him from acting as IBP EVP. To insist otherwise would be
contrary to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

The Court will not interfere with the Resolution of the IBP Board to
remove Atty. de Vera since it was rendered without grave abuse of
discretion

While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of supervision over the IBP, [64] it is
axiomatic that such power should be exercised prudently. The power of supervision of the Supreme Court over the
IBP should not preclude the IBP from exercising its reasonable discretion especially in the administration of its
internal affairs governed by the provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP By-Laws were precisely drafted and promulgated
so as to define the powers and functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its organizational structure, and
govern relations and transactions among its officers and members. With these By-Laws in place, the Supreme
Court could be assured that the IBP shall be able to carry on its day-to-day affairs, without the Courts interference.

It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has been vested in the Board of
Governors. The members of the Board are elective and representative of each of the nine regions of the IBP as
delineated in its By-Laws.[65] The Board acts as a collegiate body and decides in accordance with the will of the
majority.The foregoing rules serve to negate the possibility of the IBP Board acting on the basis of personal interest
or malice of its individual members. Hence, the actions and resolutions of the IBP Board deserve to be accorded
the disputable presumption[66] of validity, which shall continue, until and unless it is overcome by substantial
evidence and actually declared invalid by the Supreme Court. In the absence of any allegation and substantial
proof that the IBP Board has acted without or in excess of its authority or with grave abuse of discretion, we shall
not be persuaded to overturn and set aside the Boards action or resolution.

There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to remove its members as provided in Article VI, Section
44[67] of the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises only as to whether the IBP Board abused its authority and discretion in
resolving to remove Atty. de Vera from his post as an IBP Governor and EVP. As has been previously established
herein, Atty. de Veras removal from the IBP Board was in accordance with due process and the IBP Board acted
well within the authority and discretion granted to it by its By-Laws. There being no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the IBP Board, we find no reason to interfere in the Boards resolution to remove Atty. de Vera.

The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as IBP EVP in

replacement of Atty. De Vera was conducted in accordance with the
authority granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws

In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action taken by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of
Governors in holding a special election to fill-in the vacant post resulting from the removal of Atty. de Vera as EVP
of the IBP since the same is a purely internal matter, done without grave abuse of discretion, and implemented
without violating the Rules and By-Laws of the IBP.

With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the IBP Board Resolution dated 13 May
2005, he was also removed from his post as EVP; thus, there was a resultant vacancy in the position of IBP EVP.

Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority to fill vacancies, however
arising, in the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of Section 8 of the Integration Rule, [68] and Section 11
(Vacancies),[69] Section 44 (Removal of members),[70] Section 47 (National officers),[71] Section 48 (other
officers),[72]and Section 49 (Terms of Office)[73] of the By-Laws. The IBP Board has specific and sufficient guidelines
in its Rules and By-Laws on how to fill-in the vacancies after the removal of Atty. de Vera. We have faith and
confidence in the intellectual, emotional and ethical competencies of the remaining members of the 2005-2007
Board in dealing with the situation within the bounds of the IBP Rules and By-Laws.

The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who will assume the Presidency for
the term 2005-2007, was well within the authority and prerogative granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws,
particularly Article VII, Section 47, which provides that [t]he EVP shall automatically become President for the next
succeeding term. The phrase for the next succeeding term necessarily implies that the EVP that should succeed
Atty. Cadiz as IBP President for the next succeeding term (i.e.,2005-2007) should come from the members of the
2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors. Hence, in A.M. No. 05-7-19-SC, we restrained now IBP EVP Feliciano Bautista
from assuming the position of Acting President because we have yet to resolve the question as to who shall
succeed Atty. Cadiz from the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors.

Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP EVP, and thereafter, Governor
Salazar on 25 June 2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon the relinquishment of Gov. Santiago of the position, were valid.

Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that, assuming his removal as IBP Governor
and EVP was valid, his replacement as IBP EVP should come from Eastern Mindanao Region pursuant to the
rotation rule set forth in Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws.

According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be chosen by the Board of Governors
from among the nine Regional Governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. This is based on our
pronouncements in Bar Matter 491, wherein we ruled:

ORDER

xxxx

3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the
Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [9] IBP regions) from among
themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of
automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of
their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar
Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.

4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically
succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive
Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be
rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions.One who has served as president may not run for
election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the
presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall
begin anew.

xxxx

(Emphasis Supplied)
 In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated among the nine
Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is merely a result of the automatic succession rule
of the IBP EVP to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains in particular to the position of IBP EVP, while the
automatic succession rule pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is but a
consequence of the automatic succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of Atty. De Vera

as IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus, the rotation was completed. It

is only unfortunate that the supervening event of Atty. de Veras removal as IBP Governor and EVP rendered it

impossible for him to assume the IBP Presidency. The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule had been

completed despite the non-assumption by Atty. de Vera to the IBP Presidency.

Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the spirit and purpose of

the automatic succession rule, but should be applied in harmony with the latter. The automatic succession

rule affords the IBP leadership transition seamless and enables the new IBP National President to attend to

pressing and urgent matters without having to expend valuable time for the usual adjustment and leadership

consolidation period. The time that an IBP EVP spends assisting a sitting IBP President on matters national in

scope is in fact a valuable and indispensable preparation for the eventual succession. It should also be pointed

out that this wisdom is further underscored by the fact that an IBP EVP is elected from among the members of

the IBP Board of Governors, who are serving in a national capacity, and not from the members at large. It is

intrinsic in the IBP By-Laws that one who is to assume the highest position in the IBP must have been exposed

to the demands and responsibilities of national leadership.

It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule for

Governor Salazar to assume the post of IBP President. By electing the replacement EVP from among the

members of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors, the IBP benefits from the experience of the IBP EVP of 2003-

2005 in this case, Governor Salazar who would have served in a national capacity prior to his assumption of

the highest position.

It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule if the EVP for

the term 2003-2005 will be elected exclusively by the members of the House of Delegates of the Eastern

Mindanao region. This Court notes that the removal of Atty. De Vera in 13 May 2005 was about a month

before the expiration of the term of office of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors. Hence, the replacement

Governor would not have been able to serve in a national capacity for two years prior to assuming the IBP

Presidency.
 In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase as much as practicable to clearly indicate that

the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in compelling and exceptional

circumstances.

It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the IBP national

presidency should be assumed by a nominee from Eastern Mindanao region from where he comes, can not

hold water. It would go against the intent of the IBP By-Laws for such a nominee would be bereft of the wealth

of experience and the perspective that only one who is honed in service while serving in a national post in the

IBP would have.

We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted in accordance with the IBP By-Laws, in electing
Atty. Salazar as IBP EVP and in ensuring a succession in the leadership of the IBP. Had the Board of Governors not
done so, there would have been no one qualified to assume the Presidency of the IBP on 1 July 2005, pursuant to
Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:

1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO (2)
YEARS, effective from the finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be
attached to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts;

2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M.
No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing him from his posts
as Governor and Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
said Resolution having been rendered without grave abuse of discretion;

3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar as
Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder of
the term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws and
absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion; and

4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and assume
the Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in
accordance with the automatic succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-
Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.

[64]
As recognized in In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being
Elected IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election, Adm. Case No. 6052, 418 SCRA 27,
39-42.
[65]
Article VI, Section 37 of the IBP By-Laws.
[66]
Rule 131, Section 3 defines disputable presumptions as presumptions that are satisfactory if uncontradicted,
but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence.
[67]
Sec. 44. Removal of members. If the Board of Governors should determine after proper inquiry that any of its
members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason become unable to perform his duties, the Board, by
resolution of the Majority of the remaining members, may declare his position vacant, subject to the
approval of the Supreme Court.

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three
consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-
thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.

xxx

[68]
Sec. 8. Delegates. The President shall concurrently be the Delegate of the Chapter to the House of
Delegates. The Vice President shall be his alternate, unless the chapter is entitled to have more than one
Delegate, in which case the Vice President shall also be a Delegate. Additional Delegates and alternates
shall in proper cases be elected by the Board.
[69]
Sec. 11. Vacancies. Except as otherwise provided in these By-Laws, whenever the term of an office or position,
whether elective or appointive, is for a fixed period, the person chosen to fill the vacancy therein shall
serve only for the unexpired portion of the term.
[70]
Sec. 44. Removal of members. If the Board of Governors should determine after proper inquiry that any of its
members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason become unable to perform his duties, the Board, by
resolution of the Majority of the remaining members, may declare his position vacant, subject to the
approval of the Supreme Court.

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three
consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-
thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.

In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates from the
region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among the members of the Chapter to which the
resigned governor is a member to serve as governor for the unexpired portion of the term.
[71]
Sec. 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice
President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as
practicable, on a rotation basis.The governors shall be ex officio Vice President for their respective
regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Board.
The Executive Vice President shall automatically become President for the next succeeding
term. The Presidency shall rotate among the nine Regions.
[72]
Sec. 48. Other officers. Other officers and employees as the Board may require shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Board. Such officers and employees need not be members of the
Integrated Bar.
[73]
Sec. 49. Terms of office. The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of two years
from July 1 following their election until June 30 of their second year in office and until their successors
shall have been duly chosen and qualified.
In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties shall be performed
by the Executive Vice President, and in the event of the death, resignation, or removal of the President,
the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President for the unexpired portion of the term. In the
event of the death, resignation, removal or disability of both the President and the Executive Vice
President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office for the unexpired portion
of the term or during the period of disability.
 Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and employees appointed by the
President with the consent of the Board shall hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such term as
the Board may fix.

37. Cynthia Advincula vs. Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata, AC No. 7204, March 07, 2007

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 7204 March 7, 2007

CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula against respondent Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata,
charging the latter with Gross Immorality.

Complainant alleged the following:

Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant [Cynthia Advincula] seek the legal advice of the respondent
[Atty. Macabata], regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. As promised, he sent Demand
Letter dated December 11, 2004 (copy attached as Annex "I") to the concerned parties.

On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato, Quezon City to discuss the possibility of
filing the complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours because they did not settle their accounts as demanded.
After the dinner, respondent sent complainant home and while she is about to step out of the car, respondent
hold (sic) her arm and kissed her on the cheek and embraced her very tightly.

Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met respondent at Starbucks coffee shop in West
Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the draft of the complaint to be filed in Court. After the meeting, respondent
offered again a ride, which he usually did every time they met. Along the way, complainant was wandering (sic)
why she felt so sleepy where in fact she just got up from bed a few hours ago. At along Roosevelt Avenue
immediately after corner of Felipe St., in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City when she was almost restless
respondent stopped his car and forcefully hold (sic) her face and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding
her breast. Complainant even in a state of shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt and
immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of the car.

In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent informing him that she decided to refer the
case with another lawyer and needs (sic) to get back the case folder from him. The communications transpired was
recorded in her cellular phone and read as follows:

Sent by complainant - forget the case. I decided to refer it with other lawyer
At 5:33:46 pm

replied by respondent - "does this mean I can not c u anymore"

at 6:16:11 pm (Does this mean I cannot see you
anymore)

sent by complainant - I feel bad. I cant expect that u will take advantage of the
 at 6:17:59 pm situation.

Follow-up message - wrong to kiss a girl especially in the lips if you dont have
Sent by complainant relationship with her.
At 6:29:30 pm

Replied by respondent - "Im veri sri. Its not tking advantage of the situation, 2 put it
At 6:32:43 pm rightly it s an expression of feeling. S sri" (Im very sorry. Its
not taking advantage of the situation, to put it rightly it is an
expression of feeling)

Follow up message - Im s sri. Il not do it again. Wil u stil c me s I can show u my

by respondent sincerity" (Im so sorry. Ill not do it again. Will you still see me
at 6:42:25 pm so I can show you my sincerity)

On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another message to complainant at 3:55:32 pm saying "I
dont know wat 2 do s u may 4give me. "Im realy sri. Puede bati na tyo." (I dont know what to do so you may
forgive me. Im really sorry. Puede bati na tayo).

Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then another message was received by her at 4:06:33 pm
saying "Ano k ba. Im really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n me." (Ano ka ba. Im really sorry. Please next time behave na
ko), which is a clear manifestation of admission of guilt.2

In his answer,3 respondent admitted that he agreed to provide legal services to the complainant; that he met with
complainant on 10 February 2005 and 6 March 2005, to discuss the relevant matters relative to the case which
complainant was intending to file against the owners of Queensway Travel and Tours for collection of a sum of
money; that on both occasions, complainant rode with him in his car where he held and kissed complainant on the
lips as the former offered her lips to him; and, that the corner of Cooper Street and Roosevelt Avenue, where he
dropped off the complainant, was a busy street teeming with people, thus, it would have been impossible to
commit the acts imputed to him.

By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1) there was a criminal case for Acts of Lasciviousness filed
by complainant against respondent pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City; 2) the legal
name of complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since she remains married to a certain Jinky Toriana because the
civil case for the nullification of their marriage was archived pursuant to the Order dated 6 December 2000 issued
by the Regional Trial Court of Maburao, Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant was living with a man not her
husband; and 4) the complainant never bothered to discuss respondents fees and it was respondent who always
paid for their bills every time they met and ate at a restaurant.

A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the
IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 26 July 2005.

On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report and
Recommendation,4 recommending the imposition of the penalty of one (1) month suspension on respondent for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117 dated 20 March 2006, approving and adopting, with
modification, the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering the behavior of Respondent went beyond the norms of conduct
required of a lawyer when dealing with or relating with a client, Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months.5

The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or which
constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which we deal with respondents actuations shall have a
rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our
liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers
of public faith, are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal
affairs with greater caution.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON I x x x

Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.

xxxx

Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good moral character is a continuing condition to
preserve their membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued possession of good moral character is a
requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law. 6 In Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr.,7 we emphasized that:

This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar. They are
expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity
of the legal profession. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that
an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the
duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to
withdraw the privilege.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The legal profession
exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from
misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than
the highest degree of morality.8 We explained in Barrientos v. Daarol9 that, "as officers of the court, lawyers must
not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives
in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community."

Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout
their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. They may be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as
long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. 10

In Bar Matter No. 1154,11 good moral character was defined as what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is held by the public in
the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective
reality.

It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to
protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect
errant lawyers from themselves.12

In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the lips.

In his Answer,13 respondent confessed, thus:

27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you goodnight. She offered her left cheek and I kissed it
and with my left hand slightly pulled her right face towards me and kissed her gently on the lips. We said
goodnight and she got off the car.

xxxx

35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic) her left cheek and I lightly kissed it and with my right
hand slightly pulled her right cheek towards me and plant (sic) a light kiss on her lips. There was no force used. No
intimidation made, no lewd designs displayed. No breast holding was done. Everything happened very
spontaneously with no reaction from her except saying "sexual harassment."

During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP Building, Dona Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas City,
respondent candidly recalled the following events:

ATTY. MACABATA:

That time in February, we met I fetched her I should say, somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning
because it was then raining so we are texting each other. So I parked my car somewhere along the corner of Edsa
and Kamuning and I was there about ten to fifteen minutes then she arrived. And so I said she opened my car
and then she went inside so I said, would you like that we have a Japanese dinner? And she said yes, okay. So I
brought her to Zensho which is along Tomas Morato. When we were there, we discussed about her case, we
ordered food and then a little while I told her, would it be okay for you of I (sic) order wine? She said yes so I
ordered two glasses of red wine. After that, after discussing matters about her case, so I said its about 9:00 or
beyond that time already, so I said okay, lets go. So when I said lets go so I stood up and then I went to the car. I
went ahead of my car and she followed me then she rode on (sic) it. So I told her where to? She told me just drop
me at the same place where you have been dropping me for the last meetings that we had and that was at the
corner of Morato and Roosevelt Avenue. So, before she went down, I told her can I kiss you goodnight? She
offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with the slight use of my right hand, I ... should I say tilted her face
towards me and when shes already facing me I lightly kissed her on the lips. And then I said good night. She went
down the car, thats it.

COMM. FUNA:

February 10 iyan.

xxxx

ATTY. MACABATA:

Okay. After that were through so I said lets go because I have an appointment. So we went out, we went inside my
car and I said where to? Same place, she said, so then at the same corner. So before she went down , before she
opened the door of the car, I saw her offered her left cheek. So I kissed her again.

COMM. FUNA:

Pardon?

ATTY. MACABATA:

I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her again and then with the use of my left hand, pushed a little
bit her face and then kissed her again softly on the lips and thats it. x x x. 14 (Emphases supplied.)

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to
specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar.
The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral
conduct that warrants disbarment.15

In Zaguirre v. Castillo,16 we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, as such conduct which is so willful,
flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.
Furthermore, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must not simply be immoral, but grossly
immoral. It must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
The following cases were considered by this Court as constitutive of grossly immoral conduct:

In Toledo v. Toledo,17 a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful wife and
cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.

In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,18 a lawyer was disbarred after complainant proved that he had abandoned her and
maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. This court declared that respondent failed to
maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar.

In Dantes v. Dantes,19 respondents act of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the
subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition of
appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently
established that respondent breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law
profession.

In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,20 it was ruled that it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to
have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in
said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she would flank
in all her subjects in case she refused.

In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,21 respondent lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and three
children, lured an innocent woman into marrying him and misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could
contract marriage in a foreign land.

In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,22 respondent entered into multiple marriages and then resorted to legal remedies to
sever them. There, we ruled that "[s]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of
marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of
values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a
whole." As such, "there can be no other fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred."

In Tucay v. Tucay,23 respondent contracted marriage with another married woman and left complainant with
whom he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute "a grossly immoral conduct and
only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession," warranting respondents
disbarment.

In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 respondent married complainant while his first wife was still alive, their marriage still
valid and subsisting. We held that "the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage is contrary to
honesty, justice, decency and morality." Thus, lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court,
respondent was disqualified from being admitted to the bar.

In Cabrera v. Agustin,25 respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied his
lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and integrity which, at all times, is
expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the practice of law.

Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative
of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good
order and public welfare.26

Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of
friendship and camaraderie,27 forms of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of respondent, though, in turning
the head of complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are distasteful. However, such act, even if
considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral.

Complainants bare allegation that respondent made use and took advantage of his position as a lawyer to lure her
to agree to have sexual relations with him, deserves no credit. The burden of proof rests on the complainant, and
she must establish the case against the respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof, 28 disclosing a case
that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power. 29 Thus, the adage that "he
who asserts not he who denies, must prove." 30 As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party
who makes the allegationsei incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum
negantis probation nulla sit.31 In the case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof
required of her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with
guilt.32
Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not motivated by
malice. We come to this conclusion because right after the complainant expressed her annoyance at being kissed
by the respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent immediately extended an apology to
complainant also via cellular phone text message. The exchange of text messages between complainant and
respondent bears this out.

Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several people in the vicinity considering
that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had malicious designs on
complainant, he could have brought her to a private place or a more remote place where he could freely
accomplish the same.

All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondents acts are not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible
to warrant disbarment or suspension.

The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed against a lawyer found guilty of misconduct
requires consideration of a number of factors. 33 When deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court must
consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to protect the public; to foster public
confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar
misconduct.34 Disciplinary proceedings are means of protecting the administration of justice by requiring those
who carry out this important function to be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients
may repose confidence.35 While it is discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem
proper against an erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or
prejudice, but should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and
independence of the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to his client,
to his brethren in the profession and to the public.

The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. Only
those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which
neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of
such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyers unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The
dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be
clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances
that attended the commission of the offense should also be considered. 36

Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also imposed
for some minor infraction of the lawyers duty to the court or the client. 37 In the Matter of Darell Adams,38 a lawyer
was publicly reprimanded for grabbing a female client, kissing her, and raising her blouse which constituted illegal
conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct which adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law.

Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and considering that this is respondents first offense,
reprimand would suffice.

We laud complainants effort to seek redress for what she honestly believed to be an affront to her honor. Surely,
it was difficult and agonizing on her part to come out in the open and accuse her lawyer of gross immoral conduct.
However, her own assessment of the incidents is highly subjective and partial, and surely needs to be corroborated
or supported by more objective evidence.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged immorality, is
hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to be more prudent and cautious in his dealing
with his clients with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of
the same or similar offense in the future.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

38. In re: Petition to disqualify Atty. Leonardo De Vera, AC No. 6052, December 11, 2003
 EN BANC

[A.C. No. 6052. December 11, 2003]

IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, ON LEGAL AND MORAL GROUNDS, FROM BEING
ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN MINDANAO IN THE MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS
OLIVER OWEN L. GARCIA, EMMANUEL RAVANERA and TONY VELEZ, petitioners, vs. ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA
And IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS, respondents.

DECISION
TlNGA, J.:

This is a Petition[1] filed by Attys. Oliver Owen L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony Velez, mainly seeking
the disqualification of respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera from being elected Governor of Eastern Mindanao in the
16th Intergrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Regional Governors elections. Petitioner Garcia is the Vice-President of
the Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while petitioners Ravanera and Velez are the past President and the incumbent
President, respectively, of the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter.
The facts as culled from the pleadings of the parties follow.
The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) was set on April 26, 2003, a month prior to the
IBP National Convention scheduled on May 22-24, 2003. The election was so set in compliance with Section 39,
Article VI of the IBP By Laws, which reads:

SECTION 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. At least one month before the national convention, the
delegates from each region shall elect the governor of their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible
be rotated among the chapters in the region.

Later on, the outgoing IBP Board, in its Resolution[2] No. XV-2003-99 dated April 16, 2003, reset the elections
to May 31, 2003, or after the IBP National Convention.
Respondent De Vera, a member of the Board of Directors of the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter in Eastern
Mindanao, along with Atty. P. Angelica Y. Santiago, President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, sent a letter [3] dated 28
March 2003, requesting the IBP Board to reconsider its Resolution of April 6, 2003. Their Motion was anchored on
two grounds viz. (1) adhering to the mandate of Section 39 of the IBP By Laws to hold the election of Regional
Governors at least one month prior to the national convention of the IBP will prevent it from being politicized since
post-convention elections may otherwise lure the candidates into engaging in unacceptable political practices,
and; (2) holding the election on May 31, 2003 will render it impossible for the outgoing IBP Board from resolving
protests in the election for governors not later than May 31, 2003, as expressed in Section 40 of the IBP By Laws,
to wit:

SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within two days after the
announcement of the results of the elections, file with the President of the Integrated Bar a written protest setting
forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such petition, the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the
outgoing Board of Governors to consider and hear the protest, with due notice to the contending parties. The
decision of the Board shall be announced not later than the following May 31, and shall be final and conclusive.

On April 26, 2003, the IBP Board denied the request for reconsideration in its Resolution No. XV-2003-162.[4]
On May 26, 2003, after the IBP national convention had been adjourned in the afternoon of May 24, 2003,
the petitioners filed a Petition[5] dated 23 May 2003 before the IBP Board seeking (1) the postponement of the
election for Regional Governors to the second or third week of June 2003; and (2) the disqualification of
respondent De Vera from being elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region.
The IBP Board denied the Petition in a Resolution issued on May 29, 2003. The pertinent portions of
the Resolution read:

WHEREAS, two specific reliefs are being sought, to wit, first, the postponement of the elections for regional
governors and, second, the disqualification of Atty. Leonard de Vera.
WHEREAS, anent the first relief sought, the Board finds no compelling justification for the postponement of the
elections especially considering that preparations and notices had already been completed.

WHEREAS, with respect to the disqualifications of Atty. Leonard de Vera, this Board finds the petition to be
premature considering that no nomination has yet been made for the election of IBP regional governor.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Board hereby resolves, as it hereby resolves, to deny the petition. [6]

Probably thinking that the IBP Board had not yet acted on their Petition, on the same date, May 29, 2003, the
petitioners filed the present Petition before this Court, seeking the same reliefs as those sought in
their Petition before the IBP.
On the following day, May 30, 2003, acting upon the petitioners application, this Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO), directing the IBP Board, its agents, representatives or persons acting in their place and
stead to cease and desist from proceeding with the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao. [7]
Citing the IBP By-Laws, the petitioners expound on the mechanics for the selection of the IBP officers from
the Chapter Officers up to the Regional Governors constituting the IBP Board which is its highest policy-making
body, as well as the underlying dynamics, to wit:
IBP Chapter Officers headed by the President are elected for a term of two years. The IBP Chapter Presidents
in turn, elect their respective Regional Governors following the rotation rule. The IBP has nine (9)
regions, viz: Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Greater Manila, Southern Luzon, Bicolandia, Eastern Visayas, Western
Visayas, Eastern Mindanao and Western Mindanao. The governors serve for a term of two (2) years beginning on
the 1st of July of the first year and ending on the 30th of June of the second year.
From the members of the newly constituted IBP Board, an Executive Vice President (EVP) shall be chosen,
also on rotation basis. The rationale for the rotation rule in the election of both the Regional Governors and the
Vice President is to give everybody a chance to serve the IBP, to avoid politicking and to democratize the selection
process.
Finally, the National President is not elected. Under the By-Laws, whoever is the incumbent EVP will
automatically be the National President for the following term.
Petitioners elucidate that at present, all the IBP regions, except Eastern Mindanao, have had two (2) National
Presidents each. Following the rotation rule, whoever will be elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao
Region in the 16th Regional Governors elections will automatically become the EVP for the term July 1, 2003 to
June 30, 2005. For the next term in turn, i.e., from July 1, 2005 to June 20, 2007, the EVP immediately before then
will automatically assume the post of IBP National President.
Petitioners asseverate that it is in this light that respondent De Vera had transferred his IBP membership from
the Pasay, Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to Agusan del Sur Chapter, stressing that he
indeed covets the IBP presidency.[8] The transfer of IBP membership to Agusan del Sur, the petitioners went on, is a
brazen abuse and misuse of the rotation rule, a mockery of the domicile rule and a great insult to lawyers from
Eastern Mindanao for it implies that there is no lawyer from the region qualified and willing to serve the IBP. [9]
Adverting to the moral fitness required of a candidate for the offices of regional governor, executive vice-
president and national president, the petitioners submit that respondent De Vera lacks the requisite moral
aptitude. According to them, respondent De Vera was sanctioned by the Supreme Court for irresponsibly attacking
the integrity of the SC Justices during the deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law. They add that
he could have been disbarred in the United States for misappropriating his clients funds had he not surrendered
his California license to practice law. Finally, they accuse him of having actively campaigned for the position of
Eastern Mindanao Governor during the IBP National Convention held on May 22-24, 2003, a prohibited act under
the IBP By-Laws.[10]
After seeking leave of court, respondent De Vera filed on June 9, 2003 a Respectful Comment [11] on
the Petition.
In his defense, respondent De Vera raises new issues. He argues that this Court has no jurisdiction over the
present controversy, contending that the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the determination of the
qualification of those who want to serve the organization, is purely an internal matter, governed as it is by the IBP
By-Laws and exclusively regulated and administered by the IBP. Respondent De Vera also assails the petitioners
legal standing, pointing out that the IBP By-Laws does not have a provision for the disqualification of IBP members
aspiring for the position of Regional governors, for instead all that it provides for is only an election protest under
Article IV, Section 40, pursuant to which only a qualified nominee can validly lodge an election protest which is to
be made after, not before, the election. He posits further that following the rotation rule, only members from the
Surigao del Norte and Agusan del Sur IBP chapters are qualified to run for Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region
for the term 2003-2005, and the petitioners who are from Bukidnon and Misamis Oriental are not thus qualified to
be nominees.[12]
Meeting the petitioners contention head on, respondent De Vera avers that an IBP member is entitled to
select, change or transfer his chapter membership.[13] He cites the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II and
Section 29-2, Article IV of the IBP By-Laws, thus:

Article II, Section 19. Registration. - xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a
lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his
office or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than
one Chapter.

Article IV, Section 29-2. Membership- The Chapter comprises all members registered in its membership roll. Each
member shall maintain his membership until the same is terminated on any of the grounds set forth in the By-Laws
of the Integrated Bar, or he transfers his membership to another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter,
provided that the transfer is made not less than three months immediately preceding any Chapter election.

The right to transfer membership, respondent De Vera stresses, is also recognized in Section 4, Rule 139-A of
the Rules of Court which is exactly the same as the first of the above-quoted provisions of the IBP By-Laws, thus:

Rule 139-A, Section 4. xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be
considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office, or, in the
absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.

Clarifying that it was upon the invitation of the officers and members of the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter that
he transferred his IBP membership, respondent De Vera submits that it is unfair and unkind for the petitioners to
state that his membership transfer was done for convenience and as a mere subterfuge to qualify him for the
Eastern Mindanao governorship.[14]
On the moral integrity question, respondent De Vera denies that he exhibited disrespect to the Court or to
any of its members during its deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law. As for the administrative
complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled
him to surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his
moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final
judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge, as the records relied upon by the petitioners are mere
preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are recommendatory in character similar to the recommendatory
findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are subject to the review of and the final decision of the
Supreme Court. He also stresses that the complainant in the California administrative case has retracted the
accusation that he misappropriated the complainants money, but unfortunately the retraction was not considered
by the investigating officer. Finally, on the alleged politicking he committed during the IBP National Convention
held on May 22-24, 2003, he states that it is baseless to assume that he was campaigning simply because he
declared that he had 10 votes to support his candidacy for governorship in the Eastern Mindanao Region and that
the petitioners did not present any evidence to substantiate their claim that he or his handlers had billeted the
delegates from his region at the Century Park Hotel.[15]
On July 7, 2003, the petitioners filed their Reply[16] to the Respectful Comment of respondent De Vera who, on
July 15, 2003, filed an Answer and Rejoinder.[17]
In a Resolution[18] dated 5 August 2003, the Court directed the other respondent in this case, the IBP Board, to
file its comment on the Petition. The IBP Board, through its General Counsel, filed a Manifestation[19] dated 29
August 2003, reiterating the position stated in its Resolution dated 29 May 2003 that it finds the petition to be
premature considering that no nomination has as yet been made for the election of IBP Regional Governors.[20]
Based on the arguments of the parties, the following are the main issues, to wit:
(1) whether this Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy;
(2) whether petitioners have a cause of action against respondent De Vera, the determination of which
in turn requires the resolution of two sub-issues, namely:
(a) whether the petition to disqualify respondent De Vera is the proper remedy under the IBP
By-Laws; and
(b) whether the petitioners are the proper parties to bring this suit;
(3) whether the present Petition is premature;
 (4) assuming that petitioners have a cause of action and that the present petition is not premature,
whether respondent De Vera is qualified to run for Governor of the IBP Eastern Mindanao
Region;
Anent the first issue, in his Respectful Comment respondent De Vera contends that the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction on the present controversy. As noted earlier, respondent De Vera submits that the election of the
Officers of the IBP, including the determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the IBP, is purely an
internal matter and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the IBP.
The contention is untenable. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Supreme Court the
power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP, thus:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

....

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and the
legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)

Implicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities of the IBP, including the election
of its officers.
The authority of the Supreme Court over the IBP has its origins in the 1935 Constitution. Section 13, Art. VIII
thereof granted the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of
law. It reads:

SECTION 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice,
and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The above-quoted sections in both the 1987 and 1935 Constitution and the similarly worded provision in the
intervening 1973 Constitution[21] through all the years have been the sources of this Courts authority to supervise
individual members of the Bar. The term Bar refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll
of Attorneys.[22] Pursuant to this power of supervision, the Court initiated the integration of the Philippine Bar by
creating on October 5, 1970 the Commission on Bar Integration, which was tasked to ascertain the advisability of
unifying the Philippine Bar.[23] Not long after, Republic Act No. 6397[24] was enacted and it confirmed the power of
the Supreme Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. Finally, on January 1, 1973, in the per
curiam Resolution of this Court captioned In the Matter of the Integration of the Bar to the Philippines, we
ordained the Integration of the Philippine Bar in accordance with Rule 139-A, of the Rules of Court, which we
promulgated pursuant to our rule-making power under the 1935 Constitution.
The IBP By-Laws, the document invoked by respondent De Vera in asserting IBP independence from the
Supreme Court, ironically recognizes the full range of the power of supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP.
For one, Section 77[25] of the IBP By-Laws vests on the Court the power to amend, modify or repeal the IBP By-
Laws, either motu propio or upon recommendation of the Board of Governors of the IBP. Also in Section 15, [26] the
Court is authorized to send observers in IBP elections, whether local or national. Section 44 [27] empowers the Court
to have the final decision on the removal of the members of the Board of Governors.
On the basis of its power of supervision over the IBP, the Supreme Court looked into the irregularities which
attended the 1989 elections of the IBP National Officers. In Bar Matter No. 491 entitled In the Matter of the Inquiry
into the 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines the Court formed a committee to make an inquiry
into the 1989 elections. The results of the investigation showed that the elections were marred by irregularities,
with the principal candidates for election committing acts in violation of Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws.28 The Court
invalidated the elections and directed the conduct of special elections, as well as explicitly disqualified from
running there at the IBP members who were found involved in the irregularities in the elections, in order to
impress upon the participants, in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and
the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and
reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering.
 The Court likewise amended several provisions of the IBP By-Laws. First, it removed direct election by the
House of Delegates of the (a) officers of the House of Delegates; (b) IBP President; and (c) Executive Vice-President
(EVP). Second, it restored the former system of the IBP Board choosing the IBP President and the Executive Vice
President (EVP) from among themselves on a rotation basis (Section 47 of the By-Laws, as amended) and the
automatic succession by the EVP to the position of the President upon the expiration of their common two-year
term. Third, it amended Sections 37 and 39 by providing that the Regional Governors shall be elected by the
members of their respective House of Delegates and that the position of Regional Governor shall be rotated
among the different chapters in the region.
The foregoing considerations demonstrate the power of the Supreme Court over the IBP and establish
without doubt its jurisdiction to hear and decide the present controversy.
In support of its stance on the second issue that the petitioners have no cause of action against him,
respondent De Vera argues that the IBP By-Laws does not allow petitions to disqualify candidates for Regional
Governors since what it authorizes are election protests or post-election cases under Section 40 thereof which
reads:

SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within two days after the
announcement of the results of the elections, file with the President of the Integrated Bar a written protest setting
forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such petition, the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the
outgoing Board of Governors to consider and hear the protest, with due notice to the contending parties. The
decision of the Board shall be announced not later than the following May 31, and shall be final and conclusive.

Indeed, there is nothing in the present IBP By-Laws which sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP
governors. The remedy it provides for questioning the elections is the election protest. But this remedy, as will be
shown later, is not available to just anybody.
Before its amendment in 1989, the IBP By-Laws allowed the disqualification of nominees for the position of
regional governor. This was carefully detailed in the former Section 39(4) of the IBP By-Laws, to wit:

SECTION 39 (4) Disqualification proceedings. - Any question relating to the eligibility of a candidate must be raised
prior to the casting of ballots, and shall be immediately decided by the Chairman. An appeal from such decision
may be taken to the Delegates in attendance who shall forthwith resolve the appeal by plurality vote. Voting shall
be by raising of hands. The decision of the Delegates shall be final, and the elections shall thereafter proceed.
Recourse to the Board of Governors may be had in accordance with Section 40.

The above-quoted sub-section was part of the provisions on nomination and election of the Board of
Governors. Before, members of the Board were directly elected by the members of the House of Delegates at its
annual convention held every other year.29 The election was a two-tiered process. First, the Delegates from each
region chose by secret plurality vote, not less than two nor more than five nominees for the position of Governor
for their Region. The names of all the nominees, arranged by region and in alphabetical order, were written on the
board within the full view of the House, unless complete mimeographed copies of the lists were distributed to all
the Delegates.30 Thereafter, each Delegate, or, in his absence, his alternate voted for only one nominee for
Governor for each Region.31 The nominee from every Region receiving the highest number of votes was declared
and certified elected by the Chairman.32
In the aftermath of the controversy which arose during the 1989 IBP elections, this Court deemed it best to
amend the nomination and election processes for Regional Governors. The Court localized the elections, i.e, each
Regional Governor is nominated and elected by the delegates of the concerned region, and adopted the rotation
process through the following provisions, to wit:

SECTION 37: Composition of the Board. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be governed by a Board of
Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration
Rule, on the representation basis of one Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the House of
Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor should be rotated among the different chapters in the
region.

SECTION 39: Nomination and election of the Governors. - At least one (1) month before the national convention
the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of which shall as much as
possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.

The changes adopted by the Court simplified the election process and thus made it less controversial. The
grounds for disqualification were reduced, if not totally eradicated, for the pool from which the Delegates may
choose their nominees is diminished as the rotation process operates.
 The simplification of the process was in line with this Courts vision of an Integrated Bar which is non-
political33 and effective in the discharge of its role in elevating the standards of the legal profession, improving the
administration of justice and contributing to the growth and progress of the Philippine society. 34
The effect of the new election process convinced this Court to remove the provision on disqualification
proceedings. Consequently, under the present IBP By-Laws, the instant petition has no firm ground to stand on.
Respondent De Vera likewise asseverates that under the aforequoted Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws,
petitioners are not the proper persons to bring the suit for they are not qualified to be nominated in the elections
of regional governor for Eastern Mindanao. He argues that following the rotation rule under Section 39 of the IBP
By-Laws as amended, only IBP members from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated.
Truly, with the applicability of Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws to the present petition, petitioners are not the
proper parties to bring the suit. As provided in the aforesaid section, only nominees can file with the President of
the IBP a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. As claimed by respondent De Vera, and not disputed
by petitioners, only IBP members from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated and
elected at the election for the 16th Regional Governor of Eastern Mindanao. This is pursuant to the rotation rule
enunciated in the aforequoted Sections 37 and 38 of the IBP By-Laws. Petitioner Garcia is from Bukidnon IBP
Chapter while the other petitioners, Ravanera and Velez, are from the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter.
Consequently, the petitioners are not even qualified to be nominated at the forthcoming election.
On the third issue relating to the ripeness or prematurity of the present petition.
This Court is one with the IBP Board in its position that it is premature for the petitioners to seek the
disqualification of respondent De Vera from being elected IBP Governor for the Eastern Mindanao Region. Before a
member is elected governor, he has to be nominated first for the post. In this case, respondent De Vera has not
been nominated for the post. In fact, no nomination of candidates has been made yet by the members of the
House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too, assuming that respondent De Vera gets nominated,
he can always opt to decline the nomination.
Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really from Eastern
Mindanao. His place of residence is in Paraaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only
changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which
is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the
domicile rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19 Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:

Section 19. Registration. -

....

Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a
member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office or, in the
absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one
Chapter. (Underscoring supplied)

It is clearly stated in the afore-quoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a lawyer will
become a member of the chapter where his place of residence or work is located. He has the discretion to choose
the particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does not register his preference that he
will become a member of the Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains his office. The only proscription
in registering ones preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section, transfer of IBP
membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions set forth therein, thus:

SECTION 29-2. Membership - The Chapter comprises all members registered in its membership roll. Each member
shall maintain his membership until the same is terminated on any of the grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar, or he transfers his membership to another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter,
provided that the transfer is made not less than three months immediately preceding any Chapter election.

The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not less than three
months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan del Sur on 1
August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter 35 addressed to Atty.
Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del
Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent De Veras transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in
their respective records. This letter is a substantial compliance with the certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as
aforequoted. Note that De Veras transfer was made effective sometime between August 1, 2001 and September 3,
2001. On February 27, 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were simultaneously held all over the
Philippines, as mandated by Section 29-12.a of the IBP By-Laws which provides that elections of Chapter Officers
and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of every other year. 36 Between September 3, 2001 and
February 27, 2003, seventeen months had elapsed. This makes respondent De Veras transfer valid as it was done
more than three months ahead of the chapter elections held on February 27, 2003.
Petitioners likewise claim that respondent De Vera is disqualified because he is not morally fit to occupy the
position of governor of Eastern Mindanao.
We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring member meets the basic requirements provided in the IBP By-
Laws, he cannot be barred. The basic qualifications for one who wishes to be elected governor for a particular
region are: (1) he is a member in good standing of the IBP;37 2) he is included in the voters list of his chapter or he
is not disqualified by the Integration Rule, by the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or by the By-Laws of the Chapter
to which he belongs;38 (3) he does not belong to a chapter from which a regional governor has already been
elected, unless the election is the start of a new season or cycle;39 and (4) he is not in the government service. 40
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can run for
IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a candidates lies in the
individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each members standard of
morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements
under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should
emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment
of an offense which involves moral turpitude.
Petitioners, in assailing the morality of respondent De Vera on the basis of the alleged sanction imposed by
the Supreme Court during the deliberation on the constitutionality of the plunder law, is apparently referring to
this Courts Decision dated 29 July 2002 in In Re: Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the
Plunder Law Case Hurled by Atty. Leonard De Vera.41 In this case, respondent De Vera was found guilty of indirect
contempt of court and was imposed a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for his remarks
contained in two newspaper articles published in the Inquirer. Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of the
report, with De Veras statements written in italics.
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Tuesday, November 6, 2001

Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers

Plunder Law

De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition filed by Estradas lawyers
to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness.

De Vera said he and his group were greatly disturbed by the rumors from Supreme Court insiders.

Reports said that Supreme Court justices were tied 6-6 over the constitutionality of the Plunder Law, with two
other justices still undecided and uttered most likely to inhibit, said Plunder Watch, a coalition formed by civil
society and militant groups to monitor the prosecution of Estrada.

We are afraid that the Estrada camps effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the justices- considering that it has a
P500 million slush fund from the aborted power grab that May-will most likely result in a pro-Estrada decision
declaring the Plunder Law either unconstitutional or vague, the group said.42

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER

Monday, November 19, 2001

SC under pressure from Erap pals, foes

Xxx

People are getting dangerously, passionate.. .emotionally charged. said lawyer Leonard De Vera of the Equal
Justice for All Movement and a leading member of the Estrada Resign movement.
He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal rendering the plunder law unconstitutional would trigger
mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to People Power II.

Xxx

De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the jueteng scandal that led to People Power II if the rumor turned out to
be true.

People wouldnt just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong. Sovereignty must prevail. 43

In his Explanation submitted to the Court, respondent De Vera admitted to have made said statements but
denied to have uttered the same to degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence in it and to bring it into
disrepute.44 He explained that he was merely exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech.
The Court found the explanation unsatisfactory and held that the statements were aimed at influencing and
threatening the Court to decide in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law.45
The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera immoral. The act for which he was found
guilty of indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude.
In Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines46 cited in Villaber v. Commission on Elections,47 the Court defines
moral turpitude as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals.48 The determination of whether an act
involves moral turpitude is a factual issue and frequently depends on the circumstances attending the violation of
the statute.49
In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing ones opinion on a public interest issue can be
considered as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity. Respondent De Vera did not bring suffering nor cause
undue injury or harm to the public when he voiced his views on the Plunder Law. 50 Consequently, there is no basis
for petitioner to invoke the administrative case as evidence of respondent De Veras alleged immorality.
On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in
California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of
the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator
and he found it impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of
contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. 51 In this
case, the petitioners have not shown how the administrative complaint affects respondent De Veras moral fitness
to run for governor.
Finally, on the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had housed the delegates from Eastern
Mindanao in the Century Park Hotel to get their support for his candidacy, again petitioners did not present any
proof to substantiate the same. It must be emphasized that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof under our Rules of Court.52
WHEREFORE, the Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to run for the position of IBP
Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the 16th election of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby DISMISSED.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 30 May 2003 which enjoined the conduct of the election
for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao is hereby LIFTED. Accordingly, the IBP Board of Governors is
hereby ordered to hold said election with proper notice and with deliberate speed.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., no part.
[21]
Sec. 5(5) Art. X, 1973 Constitution: Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed,
altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
[24]
An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar and Appropriating Funds Therefor.
[25]
SEC. 77. Amendments. - These By-Laws may be amended, modified or repealed by the Supreme Court motu
propio or upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors.
[26]
SEC. 15. Supreme Court observer. The Supreme Court may designate an official observer at any election of the
Integrated Bar, whether national or local.
[27]
SEC. 44. Removal of Members. If the Board of Governors should determine after proper inquiry that any of its
members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason become unable to perform his duties, the Board, by
resolution of the majority of the remaining members, may declare his position vacant, subject to the
approval of the Supreme Court.
Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive absences
from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining
members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the remaining members of the Board shall, by
majority vote, elect a successor from among the Delegates coming from the Region concerned to serve as
Governor for the unexpired portion of the term.
28
SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to election. - The following acts and practices relative to elections
are prohibited, whether committed by a candidate for any elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any
other member, directly or indirectly, in any form or manner, by himself or through another person:
(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign material;
(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than a statement of the biodata of a
candidate on not more than one page of a legal size sheet of paper; or causing distribution of such
statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the elections;
(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutory office
in the Government or any political subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof;
(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as well as the advertisement thereof;
(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate,
(1) payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any member; (2) giving of food, drink, entertainment,
transportation or any article of value, or any similar consideration to any person; or (3) making a promise
or causing an expenditure to be made, offered or promised to any person.
29
Section 33(g). The House (of Delegates) shall elect the members of the Board of Governors at the annual
convention every other year.
30
SEC. 39. Nomination and election of Governors. -
(a) Nominations. -
On the morning of the first day of the convention of the House of Delegates held for the election of Governors, the
Delegates from each Region shall choose, by secret plurality vote, not less than two or more than five
nominees for the position of Governor for their Region. In no case shall more than one nominee come
from the same Chapter, nor may any person be nominated unless he is a duly registered member of a
Chapter within the Region.
The list of nominees shall be submitted on the same morning to the Chairman of the House, who shall forthwith
read them aloud. The names of all the nominees, arranged by Region and in alphabetical order of
surnames, shall be written on a blackboard or blackboards within the full view of the House, unless
complete mimeographed copies of the lists are distributed to all the Delegates by the secretariat of the
House.
In no case shall any nomination or campaign speech be permitted.
31
Section 39(5) Voting. - Voting for Governors shall take place on the afternoon of the first day of the convention,
and shall be by secret ballot. Official ballots shall be provided for the purpose. No voting by proxy shall be
allowed. Each Delegate, or, in his absence, his alternate shall vote for only one nominee for Governor of
each Region.
32
Section 39 (7) Persons to be declared elected. - Elections shall be determined by plurality vote. The nominee
from every Region receiving the highest number of votes shall be declared and certified elected by the
Chairman. In case of a tie vote, the winner shall be determined by lots drawn by the nominees concerned.
The Secretary shall keep all the ballots and tally sheets in a locked receptacle where they shall remain,
subject to the further orders of the Board of Governors.
33
Section 4, Article 1, IBP By-Laws. Non-political Bar. - The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political, and every activity
tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer
holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the
 Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or
an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as
of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to
any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.
34
Section 2, Article 1, IBP By-Laws. Objectives and purposes.- The following are the general objectives of the
Integrated Bar: to elevate the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. The purposes of the Integrated Bar
include, without being limited to, those specified in the per curiam Resolution of the Supreme Court
dated January 9, 1973 ordaining the integration of the Philippine Bar.
35
Rollo, p. 125.
36
Section 29-12. Rules governing elections.- The following rules shall govern elections:
(a) Date and place of elections. - Elections of Officers and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of
every other year at such time and place as the Board shall designate, which shall be stated in the notice to
be sent to every member by personal delivery or by mail not less than thirty days prior to the elections.
37
Section 9. Officer defined.- The term officer as used in these By-Laws shall include, but not necessarily be limited
to, the following: President, Executive Vice President, Governors, Secretary, Treasurer and other national
officers of the Integrated Bar, officers and members of the House of Delegates, Chapter officers and
directors, commissioners, and members of all national and local committees.
Only members in good standing may become officers, and, unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, no
person who is not a member of the Integrated Bar may become an officer.
Section 20. Members in good standing. - Every member who has paid all membership dues and all authorized
special assessments, plus surcharges owing thereon, and who is not under suspension from the practice
of law or from membership privileges, is a member in good standing.
38
Section 29-12.f Elibigility. - No member may be elected to any office whose name is not duly included in the
voters list, or who is disqualified by the Integration Rule, by the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or by these
by-laws.
Section 29-12 Voters list. - Not earlier than twenty-five days nor later than fifteen days prior to the elections, the
Secretary shall submit to the Board of Officers a list of the names of all the members entitled to vote. The
voters list shall then remain closed and shall not be altered except upon direction of the Board. However,
it shall be open to inspection by all members, and upon request, copies thereof shall be furnished to any
member upon payment of actual cost.
Any member who is delinquent in the payment of dues or any assessment, including surcharges owing, twenty-five
days prior to the day of the elections, shall be excluded from the voters list.

39. Roberto Soriano vs. Atty Manuel Dizon, AC 6792, January 25, 2006

EN BANC

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano with the
Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the
conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the
conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; [2] and constitutes sufficient
ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. [3]
 Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice dated

May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June 11,

2004.[4]

After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint and its

attachments.[5] Accordingly, the CBDdirected him to file his Position Paper, which he did on July 27,

2004.[6] Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and Recommendation, which was

later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.

In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide, [7] which involved moral

turpitude, should result in his disbarment.

The facts leading to respondents conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of

Baguio City in this wise:

x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after
gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a
taxi driver overtook the car driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had
overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community
who was under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter
stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car,
berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced
open his door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused
had been drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly,
the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up
immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the
chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi
driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the
accused until he could be pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his car and
got his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was
on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He
picked them up intending to return them to the accused. But as he was handing the same to the
accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting
him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off.
The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi
driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano.[8]

It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and brought the latter to

the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his neck, [9] complainant would
have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical assistance, according to the attending

surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left part

of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver.

The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002, respondent filed

an application for probation, which was granted by the court on several conditions. These included satisfaction of

the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano. [10]

According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply with this

particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of Appeals. [11]

In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that respondent be disbarred

from the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but that the latter

also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following facts:

1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;

2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter, driving a
taxi, had overtaken him;

3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went back to his
car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was
unarmed;

4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;

5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that he had
shot Complainant;

6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one mauled by
Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,

7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his
civil liabilities to Complainant.[12]

On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution adopting the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and adopted

by the IBP Board of Governors.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a

ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the

administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character. [13] In the instant case, respondent

has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has
already been established and is no longer open to question, the only issues that remain to be determined are as

follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants

disbarment.

Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act

of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in

general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. [14]

The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been discussed

in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,[15] a labor case concerning an employee who was dismissed

on the basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering the particular circumstances surrounding the commission

of the crime, this Court rejected the employers contention and held that homicide in that case did not involve

moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been violative of the IRRIs Employment Policy Regulations and indeed

a ground for dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the employer made a pronouncement

that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That

discretion belonged to the courts, as explained thus:

x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the
crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and
intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude
may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. x x
x.[16] (Emphasis supplied)

In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court appreciated the

presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating circumstances. For a better understanding of

that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows:

x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating and had his
back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly
rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack
but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from
the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on
Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's
intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of
the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of
any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not
inherently vile, immoral or unjust.[17]
The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral

turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.

Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least

expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and

his arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend

off the lawyers assault.

We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of respondent.

He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the

assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the

latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a

handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his

crime.

The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed

his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to

be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly

on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was

definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued

complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one

trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.

It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm[18] and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil

liabilities.[19]

He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both in his

attorneys oath[20] and in the Code of Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to obey the laws of the land.

All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic sense of justice. He

obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it

has been four years[21] since he was ordered to settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent

remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his

violent reaction to a simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity, good health, and youthful
vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that could never even fully restore

what the latter has lost.

Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the profession of

lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character.[22] Where their misconduct outside of their professional

dealings is so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon

them by their license and the law, the court may be justified in suspending or removing them from that office. [23]

We also adopt the IBPs finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is

an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least

common honesty.[24]

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As found by the

trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Farias, an out-of-court settlement with complainants

family.[25] But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was

complainants family that had sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon. [26]

The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of having

been mauled by complainant and two other persons.[27] The trial court had this to say:

The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined
[Atty. Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people including the complainant helped
each other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is
improbable[,] if not downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on
beating him to death could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the
complainants version of the incident particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on the
chest. x x x.[28]

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than

truthfulness.[29] The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous

behavior.[30] Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings,

they are expected to act in good faith.

 The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal profession. They

constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to

practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually,

academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers

must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with

honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[31]

The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw.

Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and

commensurate.

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that

those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and

clients may repose confidence.[32] Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital

yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession of odious members.

We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that disbarment

should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired. In the instant case, however,

the Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his

duties to society and his profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable

with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.

We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of good moral

character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of

law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal

profession.

In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances not the mere fact of their

conviction would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the appalling

vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of

the bar.

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN

from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let

notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator

for circulation to all courts in the country.

 SO ORDERED.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 1-5.
[2]
CANON 1. - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
[3]
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice x x x.

40. Aguirre vs. Rana, BM 1036, June 10, 2003

EN BANC

[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in
the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The
practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice
law even if he passes the bar examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of
the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for Denial
of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct,
violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on
22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could
not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers
oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges
that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the
Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that
respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented
himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as
counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee,
being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to
act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
 On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as
counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents
services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the
winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but disallowed
him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the
Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him before the
MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows
the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the
canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an
attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his
resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the
Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon
Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the
daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of respondent
that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on
19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for
mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel
before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath
as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant
administrative case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report
and recommendation.

OBCs Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001
elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the
lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral
fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground
to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission
to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated
when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary
and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the
MBEC.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared
as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading
entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-
Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same
pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty
Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty.
Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies.
 On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her counsel. On the
same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by
REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself wrote
the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily
Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in
the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for
mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the
practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law,incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law
is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC
and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice
of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held
himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to
be a member of the Philippine Bar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of
good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified.The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust [4] since a
lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the
bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.[5]
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the
bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for
practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person
who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. [7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the
signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the
bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-
law.[8] Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. [9]
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as
counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of
as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice-
mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon
your acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001. [11] Thus, the
evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of
the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized
respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no
misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
 SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

41. Cruz vs Mina, G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on pure questions of law,
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-
1705;1 and the RTCs Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary
injunction was issued by this Court.

The antecedents:

On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as
private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the
complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the
bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge
Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The
petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a
written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private
prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-
A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down
in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.3

On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the
February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of
superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is
the Supreme Court alone.

In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent and the public respondent
MeTC.

After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002,
resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of
Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and
that therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.

On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that
nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar
Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the
inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.

Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner filed a Second
Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial
Order of the said court, on the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated
June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.

On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioners Second Motion for Reconsideration
and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had already denied the Entry of
Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.

On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns the following errors:

I.

the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for the writ of
injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the necessity of granting the writ;

II.

THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT
RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT,
FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW;

III.

THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD
IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF
THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE
ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;

IV.

THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic]
THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730,
PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTCS).4

This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed,
may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.5

Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of Section 34, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules
of Court, and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.

The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or
friend of a party litigant.

The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court,
prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private
complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.

Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

 RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the
regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education
program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the
legal clinic of the law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct
supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school.
Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising
attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure
are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision
of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation
in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In
any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be
either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of
a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)

The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to "In the court
of a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:8

SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be
either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)

which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on September
25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial
Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the
appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule
provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the
courts.

Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have been confused
by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not
have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the
simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioners appearance.

Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of
whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a
law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before
inferior courts.

Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may flow from the
crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not possible.

It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In denying the issuance of
the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no claim for civil liability by the private
complainant for damages, and that the records of the case do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that
therefore, petitioners appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.

Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except in
instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an
enemy country, and crime against popular representation.9 The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that
when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. 10

The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect in
Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the
criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116,
Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT
the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct control
and supervision of the public prosecutor.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

42. In re: Atty. Marcial Edillion, AM 1928, August 3, 1978

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case
No. MDD-1)

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously
adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent
from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court
for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which
reads:
 .... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly
inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall
deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent
by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to
above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due
from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's
comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit
memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity
of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to
particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 in accordance with which
the Bar of the Philippines was integrated and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-
Laws (hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra),
whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which
reads:

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in
the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:

SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as

the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may
hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:

SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good
standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and
inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the
conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled
"Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman
Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution
ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the
unanimous pronouncement that it was

... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in
Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine
Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar
is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out
the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be
members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the
requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and
public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration
imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The
practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and
to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justice
as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must
submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S.
Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the
equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court
to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of
the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution
promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a
body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental
considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi
est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of
individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an
undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some
freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines
is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973
Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules
of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in
order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and
looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary
power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the
said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require
him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even
to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable
interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an
official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a
ready a member. 8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion
to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar,
such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a
membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power
and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine
Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) which power the respondent acknowledges from requiring
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law
is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do
not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary
powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of
this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from
its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a
disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of
Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon
constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court appropriate, indeed
necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is
arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations
no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the
Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a
determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from
overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or
prostituted. ..."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the
power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a
member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon
should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the
Court.

Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and
Guerrero, JJ., concur.

43. Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo Jr. BM 1370, May 9, 2005

EN BANC

[B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005]

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by
petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,[1] dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the
amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being
admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986,
then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained
that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil
Service law prohibits the practice of ones profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed
for the years when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.[2]
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment[3] stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is not
based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he
continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as
determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9
and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld
as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of
no exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation of the Courts directives for all members of the IBP
to help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of
payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and
reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the
IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his
obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of
discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved by the Board of
Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the annual dues.
In his reply[4] dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the IBP Board of
Governors Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether
or not they are engaged in active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the
payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and
the due process clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would
indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status and is without income derived
from his law practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute
deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-
member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to
the community where the inactive lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during
the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he
was working abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out
the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be
members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the
requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member.[5]
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population. This
requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and
the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.[6]
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion
to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the States
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. [7]
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and
duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine
Bar[8] - which power required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is,
indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and
purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar,[9] thus:

For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is attempting to levy a
tax.

A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the
judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a
membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to
defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the States power to regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation does not impose an
unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight
inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This
means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones membership in the IBP remains
regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as
correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay
abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to
pay dues could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of
discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity.
In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,[10] in this wise:

. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license
to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of
the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondents right
to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if
the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must
bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions,[11] one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of
such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioners request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay
P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible
period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension
from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

44. Santos Jr vs. Llamas, AC 4749, January 20, 2001

2/7/00 4:43 PM

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000]

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member
of the bar, alleged that:

On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter
of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR
and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates
"IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three years already, as shown by the
following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals
available)

Annex "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in

A.......- Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC

Annex "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in

B.......- Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Paraaque, MM

Annex "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required
C.......- Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP
(not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly
admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law".
There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues
for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such
payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys."

Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar standing
of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal
Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member. Jksm

Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not indicate
any PTR for payment of professional tax.

Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be
done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court
(thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).

Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:

1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En
Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA )

2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br.
66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).

Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January
17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondents signature above
his name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060."[1] Also attached was a copy of the order,[2] dated
February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying
respondents motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par.
2 of the Revised Penal Code.

On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification[3] dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondents "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991.
Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice,
after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his comment-
memorandum,[4] dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:[5]
 3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the
same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member in good
standing.

Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who is in
good standing is entitled to practice law.

The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing, were as
above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14,
1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances. Chief

As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and reversed and
respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of
Makati, Br. 150.

Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to the
Court of Appeals and is still pending.

Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge was
never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light felony, been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege to
practice law.

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his dues.

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the present,
that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal
occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at
Calauan, Laguna.

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally
exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes,
income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his detachment
from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of
dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights
as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show
that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such
dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges and
surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly
saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the
complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such
dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary. Esmsc

On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution [6] adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a
reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution, [7] dated April 22, 1999. Hence,
pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP
ordering respondents suspension for three months.

The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-indication of the proper IBP O.R.
and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more
particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years."

The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida
R. Makahinud Javier that respondents last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."
 While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has
invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an
example."

....

The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent
admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992
have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to the present time that he had only a
limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondents Memorandum).

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Esmmis

On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his standing
in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore
liable for his actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.

First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP dues.
He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-
Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting
that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed.
He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is
exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior citizen since 1992.

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a
Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased
members thereof.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in
the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it
does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens
"exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not
exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that
year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts
that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall
he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit
the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues
and plea for a more temperate application of the law,[8] we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the
practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or
until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas personal
record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. ULANDU