Natres Module 2
Natres Module 2
Natres Module 2
Held:
The NRC complied with NEPA, and its decision is not arbitrary or capricious within the meaning of 10(e)
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Pp. 97-108.
(a) The zero-release assumption, which was designed for the limited purpose of individual licensing
decisions and which is but a single figure in Table S-3, is within the bounds of reasoned decisionmaking
required by the APA. The NRC, in its statement announcing the final Table S-3 rule, summarized the
major uncertainties of long-term storage of nuclear wastes, noted that the probability of intrusion was
small, and found the evidence "tentative but favorable" that an appropriate storage site [462 U.S. 87,
88] could be found. Table S-3 refers interested persons to staff studies that discuss the uncertainties in
greater detail. In these circumstances, the NRC complied with NEPA's requirements of consideration and
disclosure of the environmental impacts of its licensing decisions. It is not the task of this Court to
determine what decision it would have reached if it had been the NRC. The Court's only task is to
determine whether the NRC had considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made. Under this standard, the zero-release assumption, within
the context of Table S-3 as a whole, was not arbitrary or capricious. Pp. 97-106.
(b) It is inappropriate to cast doubt on the licensing proceedings simply because of a minor ambiguity in
the language of an earlier rule as to whether licensing boards were required to consider health effects,
socioeconomic effects, or cumulative impacts, where there is no evidence that this ambiguity prevented
any party from making as full a presentation as desired or ever affected the decision to license a plant. Pp.
106-108
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. United States Atomic Energy
Commission
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
No. 79-168
Syllabus
Held: The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that, when the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) considered alternative sites before redesignating a
proposed site for middle-income housing as one for low-income housing it should have
given determinative weight to environmental factors such as crowding low-income
housing into a concentrated area and should not have considered the delay that would
occur in developing an alternative site as an overriding factor. Once an agency has
made a decision subject to the procedural requirements of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered
the environmental consequences; it cannot interject itself within the area of discretion of
the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken. Here, there is no doubt that
HUD considered the environmental consequences of its decision to redesignate the
proposed site for low-income housing, and the Act requires no more.