538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Francisco vs. Court of Appeals

*
No. L45674. May 30, 1983.

EMILIANO A. FRANCISCO and HARRY B.

BERNARDINO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Criminal Procedure Prescription of felony An accused who

had committed a lesser offense includible within the offense
charged cannot be convicted of a lesser offense if it has already
prescribed Reason.Where an accused has been found to have
committed a lesser offense includible within the offense charged,
he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense, if it has already
prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to sanction the
circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient
of accusing the defendant of the graver offense.
Same Same Interpretation Complaint or information
referred to in Art 91 of the Revised Penal Code, interpreted
Doctrine in People vs. Olarte that filing of complaint in the
municipal court, even if merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, interrupts the period of prescription
of felony even if court where complaint or information is filed
cannot try the case on its merits, the true and correct doctrine.
The Olarte case set at rest the conflicting views, and enunciated
the doctrine aforecited by the Solicitor General. The reasons for
the doctrine which We find applicable to the case at bar reads: In
view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide
guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has reexamined the
question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the
conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one
established by the decisions holding that the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for
purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and
does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several
reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription
shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information
without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court
for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action
on the merits. Second, even if the court where

________________

* SECOND DIVISION.

539

VOL. 122, MAY 30, 1983 539

Francisco vs. Court of Appeals

the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to

investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial
step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to
deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control. All that the
victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution
is to file the requisite complaint.
Same Same Same Filing of a denuncia or complaint for
intriguing against honor or grave oral defamation even in the
Fiscals office interrupts period of prescription Reason.As is a
wellknown fact, like the proceedings in the court conducting a
preliminary investigation, a proceeding in the Fiscals Office may
terminate without conviction or acquittal. Clearly, therefore, the
filing of the denuncia or complaint for intriguing against honor by
the offended party, later changed by the Fiscal to grave oral
defamation, even if it were in the Fiscals Office, 39 days after the
alleged defamatory remarks were committed (or discovered) by
the accused interrupts the period of prescription.
Criminal Law Libel Statements of a person that a doctor had
in effect committed a mistake in the diagnosis and management of
his patient, which is merely a criticism in a physicians
management of a case, not libelous.Complainant Angeles had
admitted that he committed a mistake in the management of the
case of Mrs. Cruz. The remarks made by Francisco were but a
harmless expression of his opinion on what should have been done
in treating her, if he were the doctor managing her. His
statements were nothing more than a comment that complainant
committed a mistake in the diagnosis and management of the
patient. An impartial observer would readily note that such
remarks do not degrade the competency of a doctor, for the latter,
because of human limitations, cannot be expected to be accurate
at all times in the diagnosis of patients. As noted in the case of
Blende vs. Hearst Publications, 93 P 2d. 733, a physician is only
required to possess the ordinary knowledge and skill of his
profession, and is not liable for mistakes if he uses the methods
recognized and approved by those reasonably skilled in the
profession. Clearly, a criticism in a physicians wrong
management of the case, such as that of Francisco cannot be
considered libelous.
Same Same Conspiracy Fact that two persons were together
when alleged libelous words were uttered, not proof of existence of
conspiracy to utter those words Proof required to establish
conspiracy must be the same as that required to support a finding
of

540

540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Francisco vs. Court of Appeals

guilt for the crime itself.Neither the lower court nor the Court of
Appeals found that they conspired with each other to commit the
alleged crime. This is so because no evidence was offered to show
that there was prior consultation on what each would say. The
fact alone that they were together when those words were uttered
is not proof that there was conspiracy to utter those words.
Clearly, each accused spoke spontaneously and individually.
Conspiracy being of a very farreaching effect, the degree of proof
required for establishing it must be the same as that required to
support a finding of guilt for the crime itself which must be upon
proof beyond reasonable doubt.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Martiniano P. Vivo for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court

of Appeals dated August 25, 1976 which modified the
decision of the lower court by finding petitioners guilty of
the crime of simple slander instead of grave oral
defamation as the former Court of First Instance has held,
and imposed on him a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and ordered them to
pay complainant the amount of P1,000.00 as moral
damages.
On February 6, 1966 complainant Dr. Patrocinio
Angeles, who was then the Director of the Morong
Emergency Hospital, filed a case for intriguing against
honor allegedly committed on December 26, 1965 against
Dr. Emiliano Francisco and Atty. Harry Bernardino with
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. On May 3, 1966,
the Provincial Fiscal filed an information in the former
Court of First Instance of Rizal accusing Francisco and
Bernardino of the crime of grave oral defamation. On
October 8, 1966 the information upon order of the court,
was amended by adding the particular statements uttered
by each accused allegedly constituting the crime of slander
to wit:

541

VOL. 122, MAY 30, 1983 541

Francisco vs. Court of Appeals

AMENDED INFORMATION

The undersigned Special Counsel accuses Harry Bernardino and

Emiliano Francisco of the crime of Grave Oral Defamation,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of December, 1965, in the
municipality of Tanay, province of Rizal, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the abovenamed accused
conspiring and confederating together, with the deliberate intent
of bringing one Dr. Patrocinio Angeles into public discredit,
disrepute and contempt, after having knowledge that the wife of
one Romulo Cruz who was a former patient of the Morong
Emergency Hospital was operated thereat by Dr. Patrocinio
Angeles, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
and publicly speak and utter the following insulting and
defamatory words and expressions, to wit:
Dr. Francisco (To Romulo Cruz):

Your wife should not have been operated. If I were the doctor, all that I
should have done was to do a curretage (raspa) on her.

Atty. Bernardino:

Those doctors are incompetent. They are not surgeons. They are just
bold.
 Dr. Francisco:

The operation was unusual.

Atty. Bernardino:

The doctors who operated on your wife could be charged for murder thru
reckless imprudence. The doctors there are no good. They are not
surgeons.

thereby imputing upon the offended party, Dr. Patrocinio

Angeles, the attending physician of the wife of Romulo Cruz and
one of the physicians at the Morong Emergency Hospital,
professional incompetence, inefficiency, or negligence thus casting
public contempt and ridicule upon the reputation of the said Dr.
Patrocinio Angeles.
Contrary to law.
Pasig, Rizal, October 8, 1966.
(Sgd.) ZENAIDA S. BALTAZAR
Special Counsel

542

542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Francisco vs. Court of Appeals

On February 1, 1973 the trial court rendered its decision

convicting the accused Harry Bernardino and Emiliano
Francisco of the crime of grave oral defamation, sentenced
each of them to suffer a penalty of four (4) months of
arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and one (1) day
of prision correccional as maximum and each of the accused
was directed to pay complainant the amount of ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00).
On appeal to the Court of Appeals the decision of the
trial court as already stated was modified finding the
accused guilty of simple slander.
As found out by the Court of Appeals, the facts of the
case are as follows:

The evidence of the prosecution is that Mrs. Lourdes Cruz, wife

of Romulo Cruz, had been suffering from a vaginal bleeding since
November 24, 1965 that she consulted a Dr. Custodio about her
ailment and the latter was able to stop the bleeding for two days
that thereafter her bleeding recurred that Mrs. Cruz then
consulted a Dr. Floreza who advised her that if her bleeding
continued she should go to a hospital that her bleeding continued
so on December 9, 1965 Lourdes Cruz entered the Morong
Emergency Hospital that she was attended by Dr. Patrocinio
Angeles, the complainant that her ailment was tentatively
diagnosed by Dr. Angeles as RMole, abortion and pregnancy
that an xray examination conducted on Mrs. Cruz, however,
revealed that she was negative for pregnancy that Mrs. Cruz
continued to lose blood and had to be given a transfusion of fresh
blood on December 11, 1965 that as the bleeding did not stop
Mrs. Cruz was operated on by the complainant Dr. Patrocinio
Angeles that her uterus which contained three (3) dead foetal
triplets was removed that the operation was successful and her
bleeding was arrested that on December 26, 1965 at about 9:20
oclock in the evening the two accused Dr. Emiliano Francisco and
Atty. Harry Bernardino, together with Dr. Crisologo Golla and
Ernesto Ocampo went to the house of Mrs. Lourdes Cruz in
Tanay, Rizal that the two accused interviewed Mrs. Cruz and her
husband Romulo Cruz about her operation that the couple
informed the two that they are satisfied with the operation that
in the course of this interview the accused Dr. Emiliano Francisco
said that the operation was not correctly done and Mrs. Cruz
should not have been operated on and that if he were the one he
would not conduct an operation but only curretage (raspahin)
that on the same occasion the accused Atty. Harry Bernardino
said that the physicians in Morong Emergency Hospital

543

VOL. 122, MAY 30, 1983 543

Francisco vs. Court of Appeals

were no good, are incompetent and they are not surgeons and said
accused told Romulo Cruz that he could file charges for murder
through reckless imprudence that the accused Dr. Francisco was
formerly a member of the Courtesy Medical Staff on the Morong
Emergency Hospital and as such he could bring in his private
patients who needed the facility of the hospital for proper
management that, however, on December 15, 1965 his
membership in the said staff was cancelled by the Credential
Committee of said hospital at a meeting called for that purpose by
the complainant Dr, Angeles who was then the Director of the
Morong Emergency Hospital that the accused Harry Bernardino,
as counsel of a Dr. Lerma, had earlier moved for the ouster of Dr.
Angeles as Director of the Morong Emergency Hospital that the
case was bitterly contested that it even reached the Office of the
President that, furthermore, during the incumbency of the
accused Atty. Bernardino as Mayor of Morong, Rizal he caused
the passage of a resolution wherein he was given authority to
recommend all charity cases for admission to the Morong
Emergency Hospital and that this resolution, however, was
ignored by the complainant Dr. Angeles in accordance with the
policy of the Director of the Bureau of Medical Services.
The evidence of the defense is that as Chairman of the Ethics
Committee of the Eastern District of Rizal Medical Society, the
accused Dr. Francisco sought to find out what could be done with
the reported wrong operation of Mrs. Lourdes Cruz by
complainant Dr. Angeles which resulted in the removal of triplets
that so the accused Dr. Francisco consulted the other accused
Atty. Bernardino on the proper steps to take that upon the advice
of accused Atty. Bernardino, the accused Dr. Francisco
accompanied by Dr. Crisologo Golla who was a Committee
member, and the accused, Atty. Bernardino went on December 26,
1965 to Tanay, Rizal the hometown of Mrs. Lourdes Cruz that
they interviewed the spouses Romulo Cruz and Lourdes Cruz
regarding the operation performed on Mrs. Cruz on December 13,
1965 that in that interview the two accused sought the facts
regarding the case pursuant to the Ethics Committee decision to
conduct the fact finding investigation and that after the
interview with the Cruz spouses Dr. Golla and the accused Dr.
Francisco went to Dr. Floreza, incoming president of the Rizal
Medical Society on December 27, 1965, to take up the matter with
him but they were advised to take it up with the Eastern District
of Rizal Medical Society, which they did.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals

concluded that while it is true that the statements were
made on the
544

544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Francisco vs. Court of Appeals

occasion of the socalled fact finding interview pursuant to

the Ethics Committee decision, the accused went out of
bounds by imputing to the complainant acts which are not
only derogatory but constitute a crime that can be
prosecuted de oficio. It went on to rule however that the
defamation committed by the accused cannot be considered
as grave under the circumstances, and the worst that was
said of the complainant was that he should not have
performed the operation, and that he could be prosecuted
for murder through reckless imprudence.
Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals,
the present case was instituted. While the case was
pending, Atty. Harry Bernardino one of the petitioners
herein died, hence in the resolution of April 10, 1979 the
case was dismissed insofar as he is concerned.
 Petitioners brief, prepared by their counsel with notable
zeal raises several questions. In synthesis, they are:

1. Whether or not the crime of simple slander found

by the Court of Appeals to be the offense committed
by the petitioners has prescribed
2. Whether or not the alleged defamatory remarks of
petitioners may be considered libelous
3. Whether or not there was conspiracy
4. Whether or not the failure to allege in the
information that petitioners acted with malice is
fatal and
5. Whether or not the Court erred in giving credence
to the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution.

As the case against the late Harry Bernardino has already

been dismissed, We shall discuss only those matters as
may be pertinent to petitioner Francisco.
Francisco argues that since the Court of Appeals had
found that the offense committed was the lesser offense of
simple slander, which prescribed in two months under
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the said court should
have dismissed the case, and sustained the acquittal of the
accused on the ground that said crime had already
prescribed. He pointed out the alleged defamatory remarks
were committed on December 26, 1965, and the
information charging the accused of the
545

VOL. 122, MAY 30, 1983 545

Francisco vs. Court of Appeals

greater offense of grave oral defamation was filed with the

court more than four (4) months later on May 3, 1966.
Disputing the foregoing, the Solicitor General contends
that for the purpose of determining the proper prescriptive
period, what should be considered is the nature of the
offense charged in the information which is grave oral
defamation, not the crime committed by the accused, as
said crime was found by the Court to constitute only simple
slander. Hence, the period of prescription here should be
six (6) months.
Moreover, according to the Solicitor General, the
complaint was filed by the offended party before the
Fiscals office on February 3, 1966 or only thirtynine (39)
days after the incident in question which is still within the1
prescriptive period. He cited the case of People 2v. Olarte
which overruled the case of People v. del Rosario and held
that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court,
even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation should, and does, interrupt
the period of prescription of criminal responsibility, even if
the court where the complaint or information is filed
cannot try the case on the merits. It makes no difference
whether the case was filed in the Fiscals Office and not in
the Municipal Court as in the Olarte case, since Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code does not require that the
complaint be one filed in court in order to toll the running
of the period.
Where an accused has been found to have committed a
lesser offense includible within the offense charged, he
cannot be convicted of the lesser offense, if it has already
prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to sanction the
circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple
expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver offense.
The principle has the support of overwhelming authorities
in American jurisprudence:

The general rule, as stated in 22 CJS, Criminal Law, sec. 225b, is

as a general rule, one indicted for an offense not barred by
limitation, but convicted of a lesser included offense which is so
barred, is entitled to discharge, and in 15 Am. Jur., Criminal
Law, Sec. 343 It frequently happens that a change of felony
includes an offense of a

________________

1 19 SCRA 494.
2 110 Phil. 476.

546

546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Francisco vs. Court of Appeals

lower grade with a different period of limitation, so that, while the

felony is net barred, the statute has run as to the lesser offense.
In this situation, the rule is that if the statute has not run against
the felony, while the lesser offense is barred, the bar cannot be
evaded by indicting the defendant
3
for the felony and convicting
him of the lesser offense.

Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the

period of prescription shall commence to run from the day
on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence
to run again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
Interpreting
4
the foregoing provision, this Court in People
vs. Tayco held that the complaint or information referred
to in Article 91 is that which is filed in the proper court and
not the denuncia or accusation lodged by the offended party
in the Fiscals Office. This is so, according to the court,
because under this rule it is so provided that the period
shall commence to run again when the proceedings
initiated by the filing of the complaint or information
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted,
adding that the proceedings in the Office of the Fiscal
cannot end there in the acquittal or conviction of the
accused.
The basis of the doctrine in the Tayco case, however,
was disregarded by this Court in the Olarte case, cited by
the Solicitor General. It should be recalled that before the
Olarte case, there was diversity of precedents on the issue
of prescription. One view declares that the filing of the
complaint with the justice of the peace (or municipal judge)
does interrupt the course of prescriptive term. This view is
found in People v. Olarte, L13027, June 30, 1960 and cases
cited therein People vs. Uba, L13106, October 16, 1959
People v. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588, 590. The other
pronouncement is that to produce interruption, the
complainant or information must have been filed in the
proper court that has jurisdiction to try

________________

3 State vs. King, 84 SE 2d 313 47 ALR 2 d 878.

4 73 Phil. 509.

547

VOL. 122, MAY 30, 1983 547

Francisco vs. Court of Appeals

the case on its merits, found in the cases of People v. del

Rosario, L15140, December 29, 1960 People v. Coquia, L
15456, June 29, 1963.
The Olarte case set at rest the conflict views, and
enunciated the doctrine aforecited by the Solicitor General.
The reasons for the doctrine which We find applicable to
the case at bar reads:

In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide

guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has reexamined the
question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the
conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one
established by the decisions holding that the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for
purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and
does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several
reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription
shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information
without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court
for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action
on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its
actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings
against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured
party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that
are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do
on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite
complaint.
And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the
interrupted prescription shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, thereby indicating that the court in which the
complaint or information is filed must have power to acquit or
convict the accused. Precisely, the trial on the merits usually
terminates in conviction or acquittal, not otherwise. But it is in
the court conducting a preliminary investigation where the
proceedings may terminate without conviction or acquittal, if the
court should discharge the accused because no prima facie case
has been shown.

As is a wellknown fact, like the proceedings in the court

conducting a preliminary investigation, a proceeding in the
Fiscals Office may terminate without conviction or
acquittal.
548

548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Francisco vs. Court of Appeals
As Justice Claudio Teehankee has observed:

To the writers mind, these reasons logically call with equal force,
for the express overruling also of the doctrine in People vs. Tayco,
73 Phil. 509, (1941) that the filing of a complaint or denuncia by
the offended party with the City Fiscals Office which is required
by law to conduct the preliminary investigation does not interrupt
the period of prescription. In chartered cities, criminal
prosecution is generally initiated by the filing of the complaint or
denuncia with the city fiscal for preliminary investigation. In the
case of provincial fiscals, besides being empowered like municipal
judges to conduct preliminary investigations, they may even
reverse actions of municipal judges 5
with respect to charges triable
by Courts of First Instance x x x.

Clearly, therefore, the filing of the denuncia or complaint

for intriguing against honor by the offended party, later
changed by the Fiscal to grave oral defamation, even if it
were in the Fiscals Office, 39 days after the alleged
defamatory remarks were committed (or discovered) by the
accused interrupts the period of prescription.
Nevertheless, petitioner Francisco cannot be held liable,
for his statements

Your wife would not have been operated. If I were the doctor, all
that I should have done was to do a curretage (raspa) on her.

x x x

The operation was unusual.

are clearly not libelous per se. Complainant Angeles had

admitted that he committed a mistake in the management
of the case of Mrs. Cruz. The remarks made by Francisco
were but a harmless expression of his opinion on what
should have been done in treating her, if he were the doctor
managing her. His statements were nothing more than a
comment that complainant committed a mistake in the
diagnosis and management of the patient. An impartial
observer would readily note that such remarks do not
degrade the competency of a doctor, for the latter, because
of human limitations, cannot

________________

5 Footnote in the case of David vs. Santos, 31 SCRA 796.

549

VOL. 122, MAY 30, 1983 549

 Francisco vs. Court of Appeals

be expected to be accurate at all times in the diagnosis of

patients. As noted in the case of Blende vs. Hearst
Publications, 93 P 2d. 733, a physician is only required to
possess the ordinary knowledge and skill of his profession,
and is not liable for mistakes if he uses the methods
recognized and approved by those reasonably skilled in the
profession. Clearly, a criticism in a physicians wrong
management of the case, such as that of Francisco cannot
be considered libelous. In the same American case, it was
held:

It is clear that to charge a physician merely with the

mismanagement of the making of a wrong diagnosis in a
particular case is not of itself actionable. Such a charge implies
nothing more, at most, than ignorance or unskillfulness in that
case, and does not materially affect his reputation as respects his
general competency to practice his profession.
To charge a professional man with negligence or
unskillfulness in the management or treatment of an individual
case is not more than to impute to him the mistakes and errors
incident to fallible human nature. The most eminent and skillfull
physician or surgeon may make mistake on the symptoms of a
particular case without detracting from his general professional
skill or learning. To say of him, therefore, that he was mistaken in
that case would not be calculated to impair the confidence of the
community in his general professional competency.

We cannot see our way clear on how Franciscos questioned

statements could be branded as libelous. To stigmatize
them as libelous would be a dangerous precedent whereby
a mere criticism on the actuation of another will generate
criminal liability for slander. His alleged defamatory
remarks may be likened to a criticism of a lawyers or
Judges erroneous handling of the case.
It may be mentioned here that in the brief of the
Solicitor General, the statements quoted and stigmatized
6
as defamatory are those only of accused Bernardino. That
latters statements are what the Solicitor General
considered as strong words that are evidently serious and
damaging. Nothing has been said by the Solicitor General
regarding the

_________________

6 p. 11, Brief of the Solicitor General.

550
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Francisco vs. Court of Appeals

statements uttered by Francisco. Nonetheless, the Solicitor

General would like to hold Francisco liable by the
utterances of Bernardino on the ground of conspiracy.
Assuming that Bernardinos statement is libelous,
Francisco cannot be held liable for the same. Neither the
lower court nor the Court of Appeals found that they
conspired with each other to commit the alleged crime. This
is so because no evidence was offered to show that there
was prior consultation on what each would say. The fact
alone that they were together when those words were
uttered is not proof that there was conspiracy to utter those
words. Clearly, each accused spoke spontaneously and
individually.
Conspiracy being of a very farreaching effect, the
degree of proof required for establishing it must be the
same as that 7
required to support a finding of guilt for the
crime 8itself which must be upon proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
The finding of the Court of Appeals that the statements
were made on the occasion of the socalled factfinding
interview pursuant to the Ethics Committee decision is
obviously incompatible with the notion that petitioners had
gone to the residence of the Cruz pursuant to a conspiracy
to defame or slander Dr. Angeles. The legitimate purpose of
going to Tanay, Rizal, having been accepted as a fact by the
Court of Appeals, it is incongruous to allege, as
respondents now do, that Atty. Bernardino and Dr.
Francisco had conspired to slander Dr. Angeles.
From what has been said, there is no further need to
discuss the other issues raised in this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused
Emiliano Francisco is hereby acquitted, with cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero,

Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., in the result.

________________

7 People vs. Portugueza, 20 SCRA 901.

8 People vs. Tividad, 20 SCRA 549.

551
 VOL. 122, MAY 30, 1983 551
People vs. Mendez

Accused Emiliano Francisco acquitted.

Notes.The defense of laches applies independently of

prescription. Laches is different from the statute of
limitations. Prescription is concerned with the fact of delay,
whereas, laches is concerned with the effects of delay.
Prescription is a matter of time laches is principally a
question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced,
this inequity being founded on the change of condition of
the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is
statutory laches is not. (Rafols vs. Barba, 119 SCRA 146.)
A prayer for reinstatement and additional damages is an
amended answer filed 6 years after the original answer was
filed, is not barred by prescription and laches. (Panay
Electric Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 456.)
A fulldress preliminary investigation is not required in
light offenses. (Edillon vs. Narvios, 99 SCRA 174.)
The CFI of the province or city where the criminal action
for written defamation may be filed may also conduct the
preliminary investigation of the case pursuant to Sec. 13,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. (Agbayani vs. Sayo, 89
SCRA 689.)

o0o

Copyright2017CentralBookSupply,Inc.Allrightsreserved.