Elec

IEEE Guide for the Protection of
Shunt Reactors
IEEE Power Engineering Society

Sponsored by the
Power System Relaying Committee
IEEE
IEEE Std C37.109-2006
3 Park Avenue
(Revision of
New York, NY 10016-5997, USA
IEEE Std C37.109-1988)
20 April 2007
Authorized licensed use limited to: UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX. Downloaded on October 10,2012 at 23:50:13 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
IEEE Std C37.109-2006(R2012)
(Revision of
IEEE Std C37.109-1988)

Shunt Reactors
Sponsor
Power System Relaying Committee

of the
IEEE Power Engineering Society
Reaffirmed 29 March 2012

Approved 6 December 2006
IEEE-SA Standards Board
Abstract: A comprehensive guide to the methods and configurations for the protection of power
system shunt reactors is provided in this guide. The protection of oil-immersed reactors equipped
with auxiliary power windings, improved turn-to-turn protection, and use of digital (microprocessor-
based) protection for shunt reactors are included.
Keywords: air-core, auxiliary power winding, circuit switcher, dry-type reactors, microprocessor-
based relays, neutral reactor, oil-immersed, pole disagreement, protection, protective relay,
reactance, resonance, series-compensated, shunt reactors, turn-to-turn, voltage-unbalance
relaying
_________________________
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.

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Copyright 2007 by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.

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Introduction
This introduction is not part of IEEE Std C37.109-2006, IEEE Guide for the Protection of Shunt Reactors.
This guide covers protection of shunt reactors used typically to compensate for capacitive shunt reactance
of transmission lines. A survey of shunt reactor protection, conducted in 1979 by the Shunt Reactor
Protection Working Group of the IEEE Power System Relaying Committee [B16],a was used as a reference
to determine common circuit arrangements and protective relaying schemes for this guide. This revision
includes additional equipment arrangements and provides more detail to selected protective schemes.
Other arrangements or special applications of reactors such as harmonic filter banks, static var
compensation (SVC), high-voltage direct current (HVDC), or current-limiting reactors are not specifically
addressed; however, the protective methods described in this guide are usually applicable to this
equipment.
Notice to users
Errata
Errata, if any, for this and all other standards can be accessed at the following URL: http://
standards.ieee.org/reading/ieee/updates/errata/index.html. Users are encouraged to check this URL for
errata periodically.
Interpretations
Current interpretations can be accessed at the following URL: http://standards.ieee.org/reading/ieee/interp/
index.html.
Patents
Attention is called to the possibility that implementation of this guide may require use of subject matter
covered by patent rights. By publication of this guide, no position is taken with respect to the existence or
validity of any patent rights in connection therewith. The IEEE shall not be responsible for identifying
patents or patent applications for which a license may be required to implement an IEEE standard or for
conducting inquiries into the legal validity or scope of those patents that are brought to its attention.
_________________________
a
The numbers in brackets correspond to those of the bibliography in Annex A.
iv
Copyright 2007 IEEE. All rights reserved.
Participants
At the time this guide was completed, the Shunt Reactor Protection Working Group had the following
membership:
Kevin A. Stephan, Chair

Pratap Mysore, Vice Chair
John Appleyard Arvind Chaudhary Dean Miller

Munnu Bajpai Roger Hedding Vittal Rebbapragada
Simon Chano Charles Henville Jim Stephens
The following members of the individual balloting committee voted on this guide. Balloters may have
voted for approval, disapproval, or abstention.
William Ackerman Randall Groves Paul Pillitteri

Ali Al Awazi Robert Grunert Gustay Preininger
Steve Alexanderson Ajit Gwal Madan Rana
Paul Barnhart N. Kent Haggerty Radhakrishna Rebbapragada
George Bartok Roger Hedding Johannes Rickmann
Kenneth Behrendt Charles Henville Charles Rogers
W. J. Bergman Jerry Hohn Dinesh Sankarakurup
Edward Bertolini Edward Horgan, Jr. Devki Sharma
Behdad Biglar John Horwath Michael Sharp
Wallace Binder James D. Huddleston, III Hong-Ming Shuh
Thomas Blackburn David Jackson Tarlochan Sidhu
Thomas Blair Clark Jacobson H. Jin Sim
William Bloethe Lars-Erik Juhlin Mark Simon
Oscar Bolado Gael R. Kennedy James E. Smith
Stuart Bouchey Joseph Koepfinger Joshua Smith
Gustavo Brunello Stephen R. Lambert R. Kirkland Smith
Carl Bush Gerald Lee Kevin A. Stephan
Donald Cash Jason Lin Peter Stevens
Simon R. Chano Gregory Luri Ronald Stoner
Tommy Cooper Jesus Martinez Charles Sufana
Luis Coronado Frank Mayle John C. Sullivan
John Crouse Michael McDonald Rick Taylor
R. Daubert Nigel McQuin Demetrios Tziouvaras
Byron Davenport Mike Meisinger Eric Udren
Paul Drum Gary Michel Charles Wagner
Fred Elliott Dean Miller Tom Wandeloski
Walter Elmore Brian Mugalian Joe Watson
Ahmed Elneweihi Anthony Napikoski James Wilson
Gary Engmann Jeffrey Nelson Philip Winston
Jorge Fernandez-Daher Subhash Patel Larry Yonce
Anthony Giuliante Wes Patterson Xi Zhu
Carlos Peixoto
v
When the IEEE-SA Standards Board approved this guide on 6 December 2006, it had the following
membership:
Steve M. Mills, Chair

Richard H. Hulett, Vice Chair
Don Wright, Past Chair
Judith Gorman, Secretary
Mark D. Bowman Kenneth S. Hanus Greg Ratta

Dennis B. Brophy William B. Hopf Robby Robson
William R. Goldbach Joseph L. Koepfinger* Anne-Marie Sahazizian
Arnold M. Greenspan David J. Law Virginia Sulzberger
Robert M. Grow Daleep C. Mohla Malcolm V. Thaden
Joanna N. Guenin T. W. Olsen Richard L. Townsend
Julian Forster* Glenn Parsons Walter Weigel
Mark S. Halpin Ronald C. Petersen Howard L. Wolfman
Tom A. Prevost
*Member Emeritus
Also included are the following nonvoting IEEE-SA Standards Board liaisons:
Satish K. Aggarwal, NRC Representative

Richard DeBlasio, DOE Representative
Alan H. Cookson, NIST Representative
Michelle D. Turner
IEEE Standards Program Manager, Document Development
Matthew J. Ceglia
IEEE Standards Program Manager, Technical Program Development
vi
Contents
1. Overview .................................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Scope ................................................................................................................................................... 1

1.2 Purpose ................................................................................................................................................ 1
2. Normative references.................................................................................................................................. 1
3. Definitions .................................................................................................................................................. 1
4. Use of reactors............................................................................................................................................ 2
5. Reactor construction and characteristics .................................................................................................... 2
5.1 Dry type ............................................................................................................................................... 2

5.2 Oil-immersed ....................................................................................................................................... 2
6. Typical reactor protection........................................................................................................................... 3
7. Dry-type reactorsapplication and protection........................................................................................... 3
7.1 Reactor connections............................................................................................................................. 3

7.2 Failure modes and types of faults ........................................................................................................ 5
7.3 System considerations ......................................................................................................................... 5
7.4 Relaying practices................................................................................................................................ 6
8. Oil-immersed reactorsapplication and protection................................................................................... 9
8.1 Reactor connections............................................................................................................................. 9

8.2 Failure modes and types of faults ........................................................................................................ 9
8.3 System considerations ....................................................................................................................... 12
8.4 Relaying practices.............................................................................................................................. 14
9. Summary of shunt reactor protection ....................................................................................................... 25
Annex A (informative) Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 28
vii
Shunt Reactors
1. Overview
1.1 Scope
This guide includes description of acceptable protective relay practices applied to power system shunt
reactors. The guide covers protection for dry-type (air-core) and oil-immersed type reactors used on power
system buses and lines. Also included in this guide are the protection of oil-immersed reactors equipped
with auxiliary power windings, improved turn-to-turn fault protection, and use of digital (microprocessor-
based) relays for shunt reactor protection.
1.2 Purpose
The purpose of this guide is to provide users of shunt reactors acceptable methods and configurations for
the protection of power system shunt reactors.
2. Normative references
The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated
references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced
document (including any amendments or corrigenda) applies.
IEEE Std C37.015-1993, IEEE Application Guide for Shunt Reactor Switching.1, 2
IEEE Std C62.22, IEEE Guide for the Application of Metal-Oxide Surge Arresters for Alternating-
Current Systems.
3. Definitions
For definitions of terms used in this guide, see The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms
[B8]3 and IEEE Std C37.100-1992 [B10].
1
IEEE publications are available from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., 445 Hoes Lane, Piscataway, NJ
08854, USA (http://standards.ieee.org/).
2
The IEEE standards or products referred to in this clause are trademarks of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
3
The numbers in brackets correspond to those of the bibliography in Annex A.
1
IEEE Std C37.109-2006
IEEE Guide for the Protection of Shunt Reactors
4. Use of reactors
Shunt reactors can be used to provide inductive reactance to compensate for the effects of high charging
current of long transmission lines and pipe-type cables. For light load conditions, this charging current can
produce more leading reactive power than the system can absorb with the consequent risk of instability or
excessive high voltages at the line terminals (Ferranti effect).
5. Reactor construction and characteristics

The two general types of construction used for shunt reactors are dry-type and oil-immersed. The
construction features of each type, along with variations in design, are discussed in 5.1 and 5.2.
5.1 Dry type
Dry-type shunt reactors generally are limited to voltages through 138 kV and can be directly connected to a
transmission line or applied on the tertiary of a transformer that is connected to the transmission line being
compensated. The reactors are of the air-core (coreless) type, open to the atmosphere, suitable for indoor or
outdoor application. Natural convection of ambient air is generally used for cooling the unit by arranging
the windings so as to permit free circulation of air between layers and turns.
The layers and turns are supported mechanically by bracing members or supports made from materials such
as ceramics, glass polyester, and concrete. The reactors are constructed as single-phase units and are
mounted on base insulators or insulating pedestals that provide the insulation to ground and the support for
the reactor.
Since the dry-type shunt reactor has no housing or shielding, a high-intensity external magnetic field is
produced when the reactor is energized. Care is thus required in specifying the clearances and arrangement
of the reactor units, mounting pad, station structure, and any metal enclosure around the reactor or in the
proximity of the reactor. A closed metallic loop in the vicinity of the reactor can produce losses, heating,
and arcing at poor joints; therefore, it is important to avoid these loops or to maintain sufficient separation
distances. The magnitude of current induced in the loop, which is responsible for extra losses and heating,
is dependent on the orientation of the loop with respect to the reactor, impedance of the loop, size of the
loop, and distance of the loop from the reactor. Another consideration is the effect of the magnetic fields on
the impedance deviation between phases. Methods of minimizing the deviations include adequate
separation or arranging the reactors in an equilateral-triangle physical configuration. Deviation from
impedance values for reactors will result in a deviation from the actual rating in megavars. The deviation
issue as it applies to relaying is discussed in 7.4.3. The reactor manufacturer can provide guidance
regarding appropriate clearances or recommendations to minimize stray heating, losses, and impedance
deviations.
For the same range of applications, the primary advantages of dry-type air-core reactors, compared to oil-
immersed types, include lower initial and operating costs, lower weight, lower losses, and the absence of
insulating oil and its maintenance. The main limitation for the application of dry-type air-core reactors is
that of connection voltage where the reactor size becomes prohibitive for higher transmission system
voltages. Since these reactors do not have an iron core, there is no magnetizing inrush current when the
reactor is energized.
5.2 Oil-immersed
The two design configurations of oil-immersed shunt reactors are coreless type and gapped iron-core type.
Both designs are subject to low-frequency long time-constant currents during de-energizing, determined by
the parallel combination of the inductance of the reactor and the line capacitance. However, the gapped
iron-core design is subject to more severe energizing inrush than the coreless type. Most coreless shunt
2
IEEE Std C37.109-2006
reactor designs have a magnetic circuit (magnetic shield) that surrounds the coil to contain the flux within
the reactor tank. The steel core-leg that normally provides a magnetic flux path through the coil of a power
transformer is replaced (when constructing coreless reactors) by insulating support structures. This type of
construction results in an inductor that is linear with respect to voltage.
The magnetic circuit of a gapped iron-core reactor is constructed in a manner very similar to that used for
power transformers with the exception that small gaps are introduced in the iron core to improve the
linearity of inductance of the reactor and to reduce residual or remanent flux when compared to a reactor
without a gapped core.
Oil-immersed shunt reactors can be constructed as single-phase or three-phase units and are very similar in
external appearance to that of conventional power transformers. They are designed for either self-cooling or
forced-cooling.
6. Typical reactor protection

The following two basic shunt reactor configurations are considered:
a) Dry-type, connected ungrounded wye to the impedance-grounded tertiary of a power

transformer
b) Oil-immersed, wye-connected, with a solidly-grounded or impedance-grounded neutral,
connected to the transmission system
Major fault protection for dry-type reactors can be achieved through overcurrent, differential, or negative-
sequence relaying schemes, or by a combination of these relaying schemes. Protection for low-level turn-
to-turn faults can be provided by a voltage-unbalance relay scheme connected at the neutral with
compensation for inherent unbalance of system voltages and the tolerances of the reactor.
Major fault protection for oil-immersed reactors can be achieved through overcurrent relaying, differential
relaying, or a combination of both. Protection for low-level turn-to-turn faults can be provided by
impedance, negative or zero-sequence overcurrent, thermal, gas-accumulator, sudden-pressure relays, or by
a combination of these relays.
7. Dry-type reactorsapplication and protection
7.1 Reactor connections
Dry-type reactor banks are often connected to the delta-connected tertiary of a transformer bank as shown
in Figure 1. Each wye-connected, ungrounded reactor bank can be switched on the supply side of the
reactor bank, as shown in Figure 1, or on the neutral side, as shown in Figure 2. A grounding transformer
having a grounded wye-connected primary and a broken-delta connected secondary, with a grounding
resistor, as shown in Figure 1, is often used on the tertiary circuit to provide a limited amount of ground
current. It is recommended that the grounding transformer and the grounding resistor be sized for a
continuous zero-sequence current at least equal to the zero-sequence current flowing through the tertiary
circuit capacitance to ground under ground fault conditions (charging current). In addition, the grounding
transformer shall be rated for continuous application of line-to-line voltage in order to withstand a
continuous ground fault on the tertiary.
3
IEEE Std C37.109-2006
Figure 1 Typical dry-type shunt reactor connection with three-pole supply-side

switching and with grounding transformer
NOTEGrounding transformer not shown.
Figure 2 Dry-type shunt reactor connection with two-pole or three-pole

neutral-side switching
The grounding scheme for the tertiary is a high-resistance method utilizing the broken-delta secondary of
the grounding transformer to insert the resistance, as well as provide indication of a ground fault on the
tertiary circuits. This method offers the following advantages:
a) The zero-sequence resistance helps stabilize the neutral.

b) The probability of ferroresonance is reduced.
c) The voltages to ground on the tertiary circuits due to switching are minimized.
d) Currents due to line-to-ground faults are minimized; a few amperes are typical.
4
IEEE Std C37.109-2006
e) Excellent ground fault protection is afforded by the voltage relay (59N), across the resistor.
f) Any number of banks can be switched without sacrificing the foregoing advantages.
The multiple advantages of this method have been demonstrated for some time. However, other tertiary
grounding arrangements such as a zig-zag transformer with a grounding resistor can also be applied.
Surge arrester selection, coordination, and application for protection of shunt reactors are covered in
IEEE Std C62.2-1987 [B12] and IEEE Std C62.22.4
7.2 Failure modes and types of faults
The faults encountered in dry-type reactor installations can be categorized as follows:
a) Phase-to-phase faults on the tertiary bus, resulting in a high-magnitude phase current

b) Phase-to-ground faults on the tertiary bus, resulting in a low-magnitude ground current,
dependent upon the size of the grounding transformer and resistor as well as the total
capacitance in the circuit
c) Turn-to-turn faults within the reactor bank, resulting in a very small change in phase current
Phase-to-phase faults are not likely to occur in dry-type reactors when the configuration is that of single-
phase units arranged with adequate separation between phases. However, instances have been reported
where arcing from a faulted reactor contacted the tertiary bus to initiate a phase-to-phase fault.
Since dry-type reactors are mounted on insulators or supports that provide standard clearances to ground,
direct winding-to-ground faults are not likely to occur without unusual circumstances, such as when an
animal bridges the insulation to ground. The damage that occurs for a winding-to-ground fault depends on
how much ground current is permitted by the grounding transformer.
Winding-insulation failures in dry-type reactors can begin as tracking due to surface contamination,
insulation deterioration, or as turn-to-turn faults. Once an arc is initiated, these failures, if not detected
promptly, can flashover the entire winding due to the strong interaction of the arc with the magnetic field of
the reactor, channeling of the arc byproducts along the cooling ducts of the reactor, and excessive heat due
to high circulating current in the first shorted turn. The result is a phase-to-neutral fault that increases the
current in the unfaulted phases to a maximum of the square root of three times normal phase current. This
increase in phase current, if not detected, can cause thermal damage of the unfaulted phases of the reactor
bank.
7.3 System considerations
Reactors are often connected in ungrounded wye on a transformer delta ungrounded tertiary. This
connection affords a lower voltage and a higher current rated reactor than if the reactors were connected
directly on the high-voltage side. The effective reactance referred to the high-voltage side is proportional to
the square of the turns ratio of the transformer multiplied by the low-voltage reactance value. Faults on
only one phase of the ungrounded wye reactor have little effect on the associated transmission supply
system, unless the fault is allowed to evolve and include two phases. Failure of an entire reactor leg, when
all windings of one phase are shorted to the neutral connection point, has only minor impact on normal
system load currents but results in the reactor current in the unfaulted phases being increased by square root
of three times normal phase reactor current. If there is a strong possibility, due to physical arrangement, for
example, of a phase-to-neutral fault evolving to a phase-to-phase fault, this fault should be detected as
quickly as possible and the reactor isolated by tripping its associated switching device. If the reactor
4
For information on references, see Clause 2.
5
IEEE Std C37.109-2006
switching device does not have fault interrupting capability, the transformer bank should be tripped to clear
the fault. Subclause 8.4.8 contains additional information on utilizing less-than-maximum fault interrupting
devices. Subclause 4.3 of IEEE Std C37.015-1993 can be consulted for guidance.
When a faulted reactor is isolated from the tertiary circuit, the voltage on the transmission line tends to
increase. Studies of the system should be made to be sure that the loss of the reactor does not cause a
significant overvoltage condition on the system.
7.4 Relaying practices
7.4.1 Protection for phase-to-phase faults
Relaying protection for phase-to-phase faults generally consists of overcurrent (50/51), differential (87), or
negative-sequence current (46), relaying schemes, or a combination of these relaying schemes. Common
schemes are illustrated in Figure 3.
Unbalance currents in the reactor can be detected using negative-sequence overcurrent relays. Relays
should be set above the levels of unbalance seen in normal service either due to voltage unbalance or due to
manufacturing tolerance of the reactor. Tripping should also be delayed to coordinate with reclosing times
during single-phase tripping and reclosing and also with other protection devices that operate during faults
external to the reactor. The use of negative-sequence relays can also detect an open circuit on the neutral
side of an ungrounded wye-connected shunt reactor bank.
7.4.2 Protection for phase-to-ground faults
Typical ground fault protection is shown in Figure 1. The broken-delta output of the grounding transformer
is monitored by an overvoltage relay (59N), equipped with a harmonic filter to reject any third harmonic
voltage that can be present. Depending on the voltage at the grounding resistor, the primary of an auxiliary
voltage transformer can be connected across the grounding resistor with the secondary of the auxiliary
voltage transformer supplying the overvoltage relay. An accepted practice is to alarm but not trip for this
condition. This relay cannot differentiate between a reactor ground and a ground on other portions of the
tertiary system.
7.4.3 Protection for turn-to-turn faults
Turn-to-turn faults in dry-type reactors present a formidable challenge to the protection engineer. The
current and voltage changes encountered during a turn-to-turn fault can be of the same order of magnitude
as variations expected in normal service, and therefore, sensitive, reliable protection using the common
relaying schemes described in 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 is not possible.
The voltage-unbalance relaying scheme has been applied for this protection. Such a scheme is illustrated in
Figure 4(a) and described in RD-3221 Operating Description [B18]. The voltage appearing between the
neutral connection of the reactor bank and ground can be the result of the following:
a) Reactor bank unbalance due to a faulted reactor

b) Reactor bank unbalance due to manufacturing and configuration tolerances5
c) Tertiary bus voltage unbalance with respect to ground
5
Per IEEE Std C57.21-1990 [B11], in the case of a three-phase shunt reactor or a bank made up of three single-phase reactors, the
maximum deviation of impedance in any one phase shall be within 2% of the average impedance ohms of the three phases. For dry-
type shunt reactors without magnetic-field shielding, this tolerance applies only when units are arranged in an equilateral-triangle
configuration and isolated from any external magnetic influences.
6
IEEE Std C37.109-2006
The manufacturing tolerance produces a fixed-error voltage that can be negated by an equal and opposite
voltage generated by means of a phase-shifting network. System voltage unbalance can be variable;
however, a given percent change in system unbalance affects both the reactor bank neutral-to-ground
voltage and the grounding transformer broken-delta voltage to the same degree, and therefore, these two
voltages can be used to cancel each other. The summing-amplifier output of Figure 4(a), or the output of a
similar comparator, is thus representative of the degree of unbalance due only to the faulted reactor, and
hence, this scheme can discriminate between a turn-to-turn fault and other sources of unbalance.
Figure 3 Common protective relaying schemes for dry-type reactors
7
IEEE Std C37.109-2006
(a)
(b)
Figure 4 Voltage-unbalance relay protection for (a) dry-type reactors and
(b) dry-type reactors (alternate method)
8
IEEE Std C37.109-2006
When the voltage-unbalance relaying scheme is applied, consideration should be given to the effect of a
tertiary bus fault to ground on the operation of the reactor protection relays. If the tertiary bus ground relay
(59N) is connected to trip the tertiary bus source, the reactors will be de-energized and the response of the
reactor neutral voltage relays is immaterial. However, if the bus ground relay only provides an alarm, it is
generally considered desirable to keep the reactors in service during the ground fault and the following
points about the voltage unbalance scheme should be reviewed:
a) Under ground fault conditions, the neutral voltage and the grounding transformer broken-delta
voltage will have high levels.
These voltages should cancel in the comparator circuit; therefore, the comparator should be
linear up to the maximum voltages obtained during a ground fault. Failure of these two voltages
to cancel results in an erroneous output from the comparator and possibly causes the
overvoltage function (59) to trip falsely. An alternate scheme shown in Figure 4(b) keeps the
comparator from seeing the large neutral and grounding transformer voltages. The connection
used provides a summation of the neutral and the grounding transformer output so that the
comparator circuit is only presented with the differential voltage during a reactor fault.
b) If the voltage used to supply the phase-shifting network is affected by a tertiary bus ground
fault, then the compensation for reactor unbalance can be changed in magnitude or phase angle,
possibly resulting in a false trip. This can be avoided by using a phase-to-phase, rather than
phase-to-ground voltage as the source for the phase-shifting network, as illustrated in
Figure 4(b).
When dry-type reactors are constructed using multiple parallel circuits per coil, the voltage
unbalance scheme might not have sufficient sensitivity to detect a single-turn fault in one of the
parallel windings. Some manufacturers, Shunt Reactor Bulletin [B20] and Recommendations
for Protective Relays [B1], of such reactors propose a split-phase protection system, similar to
that used on hydrogenerators for turn-to-turn fault protection, as shown in Figure 5(a) and
Figure 5(b). Neutral switching is possible with the scheme shown in Figure 5(b), while it is not
with the scheme in Figure 5(a).
8. Oil-immersed reactorsapplication and protection
8.1 Reactor connections
Oil-immersed reactors are often connected to one or both ends of a long transmission line, as shown in
Figure 6(a), and are usually wye-connected with a solidly-grounded neutral. These reactor banks can be
switched or permanently connected to the line.
Another reactor bank arrangement for single-phase tripping and reclosing of circuit breakers is the four-
reactor scheme (Edwards et al. [B5]) shown in Figure 6(b). In this application, a fourth reactor is connected
between the reactor bank neutral and ground to suppress the secondary arc current in a faulted and
disconnected phase conductor during single-phase fault interruption.
Oil-immersed reactors can also be connected to the substation bus, and as with line-connected reactors, are
generally solidly grounded and can be either switched or permanently connected. Relaying protection for
bus-connected reactors and for four-reactor configured banks is basically the same as that used for line-
connected, solidly-grounded, oil-immersed reactors (Kimbark [B13]).
8.2 Failure modes and types of faults
The failures encountered with oil-immersed reactor installations can be categorized as follows:
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IEEE Std C37.109-2006
a) Faults resulting in large changes in the magnitude of phase current, such as bushing failures,
insulation failures, etc.
b) Turn-to-turn faults within the reactor winding, resulting in small changes in the magnitude of
phase current
c) Miscellaneous failures such as auxiliary power winding faults, overvoltage, low oil, loss of
forced-cooling, and pole disagreement
(a)
(b)
Figure 5 Split-phase protection: (a) three-phase sensing and

(b) single-phase sensing
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IEEE Std C37.109-2006
(a)
(b)
Figure 6 One-line diagram of (a) line-connected, switched shunt reactors and

(b) line-connected shunt reactor with neutral reactor
Due to the proximity of the winding with the core and tank, winding-to-ground failures can occur. The
magnitude of current resulting from this type of fault is dependent upon the location of the winding-to-
ground fault with respect to the reactor bushing. The farther the fault is away from the bushing, the lower
the fault current. Bushing failures within or external to the tank, as well as faults on the connection between
the transmission line and the reactor bank, can result in large increases in the magnitude of phase current.
Low-level faults within an oil-immersed reactor will result in a change in the reactor impedance, and can
increase the operating temperature, internal pressure, and accumulation of gas. If not detected, the turn-to-
turn fault is likely to evolve into a major fault.
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IEEE Std C37.109-2006
8.3 System considerations
8.3.1 Clearing of faults
A typical relaying practice for line-connected reactors is to trip the local line breaker and transfer trip the
remote line breaker. A dual channel is recommended for extra security (The Art of Protective Relaying-
EHV Systems [B19]). For a reactor fault in a direct-connected line reactor, both line breakers are usually
locked out so as to block reclosing of the line.
For a fault in a switched line reactor, on a line where rapid reclosing is desired, both line breakers can be
tripped, the reactor bank switching device opened, and then the line breakers can be automatically reclosed
if system conditions permit.
When a circuit switcher is utilized as the reactor bank switching device, a blocking or coordinated tripping
scheme can be applied. In this scheme, the circuit switcher interrupts reactor faults within its rating, and the
terminal breaker operates only on higher level faults beyond the rating of the circuit switcher. Other users,
with concern for reliability of trip blocking, may choose to operate the higher capacity terminal breaker
directly for faults beyond the rating of the circuit switcher without blocking trip of the circuit switcher and
depend on the faster circuit breaker to clear the fault. However, use of a full-rated circuit breaker for reactor
switching eliminates the need for a coordinated tripping scheme.
8.3.2 Resonance phenomenon
The distributed shunt capacitance of the transmission line can form a parallel-resonant circuit with the
shunt reactor(s) having a natural frequency close to 60 Hz. This resonant circuit can be troublesome and
should be taken into account by the system planner and the relay protection engineer.
When a deenergized transmission line with directly-connected reactor(s) is physically close enough to
another energized line for the two lines to be electrically coupled, it is possible for higher-than-rated system
voltage to develop across the deenergized reactor. This problem can be prevented by isolating the reactor
by means of a dedicated reactor switching device at the same time as, or immediately following, the de-
energizing of the line (Pickett [B15]).
Another phenomenon of concern to the relay protection engineer occurs when a series-compensated
transmission line is de-energized. The parallel-resonant circuit can produce a damped sinusoidal voltage at
a frequency generally less than 60 Hz, which can last several seconds, with an initial voltage that can
approach rated voltage. This substantial voltage, at a reduced frequency, can cause misoperation of
impedance relays used to protect shunt reactors, unless the impedance relays are specifically designed for
the application.
Figure 7 represents a one-line diagram of shunt reactor application on a series capacitors compensated
transmission line. If the main shunt reactor winding is protected with a differential relay (87) scheme, then
phase and ground faults on the series-compensated line should not have any undesirable impact on the
shunt reactor protection.
Figure 7 illustrates a fault applied on the series-compensated line. It is noted that before opening the line
circuit breaker, the voltages are severely depressed on the line side and bus side of the shunt reactor
installation. As shown from Figure 8, the current in the shunt reactor is small as a result of the depressed
fault voltage. Upon opening of the line circuit breaker(s), the series capacitors will transiently discharge
(IOSC) through the line and shunt reactor (assuming the capacitors are not bypassed for a line fault). The
use of overcurrent protection (50), as shown in Figure 7, is covered in 8.4.1.
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IEEE Std C37.109-2006
Figure 7 Fault on series-compensated line with shunt reactors
Figure 8 TNA study results of series-compensation and reactor oscillations
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IEEE Std C37.109-2006
8.4 Relaying practices
8.4.1 Protection for large-magnitude faults
Relaying protection for faults producing large increases in the magnitude of phase current is generally a
combination of overcurrent (50/51), differential (87), or distance (21), relaying. Common schemes are
illustrated in Figure 9.
One of the principal difficulties with shunt reactor protection is false relay operation during iron-core
reactor energizing and de-energizing. During these periods, dc offset with long time-constants and low-
frequency components of the reactor energization current cause many of the problems. High-impedance
differential relays are generally recommended over summation-connected ordinary low-impedance
overcurrent relays for this reason (Englehardt [B6]). Percentage-restrained (biased) low-impedance
differential relays that perform as well as high-impedance relays can also be applied. Where ordinary low-
impedance differential relays are used, it is generally recommended that the relay be sufficiently
desensitized to prevent misoperation.
Phase overcurrent protection can be useful for protection for large magnitude internal faults. Phase
instantaneous overcurrent protection should be set higher than the maximum current that can flow in the
reactor during transient conditions. During energization, transient offset in the current can result in peak
currents approaching twice rated levels. Since the reactor impedance is proportional to the frequency of the
voltage applied to it, higher than normal currents will also flow during conditions of lower than normal
frequency (such as during the de-energization of the line/reactor combination as noted in 8.3.2). Therefore,
immunity to the transient offset of current and low-frequency current is an important attribute of a reactor
instantaneous phase overcurrent relay. That is, the relay should be tuned to respond to fundamental
frequency only.
If the relay is immune to off-nominal frequency current, the likely other source of high phase current is
temporary high voltage on unfaulted phases during single line-to-ground faults on the power system. High-
voltage (HV) and extra-high-voltage (EHV) systems are usually effectively grounded, and the rise in
voltage on an unfaulted phase rarely exceeds 1.3 per unit during a single line-to-ground fault (see the
standard definition of ground fault factor in IEEE 100 [B8]). Therefore, a setting of 150% of reactor
current at rated voltage is normally sufficient to override temporary overvoltages. However, the maximum
temporary overvoltage should be determined for each application of an instantaneous phase overcurrent
relay.
Differential schemes have been applied as primary protection for the detection of winding-to-core or
winding-to-tank faults. The ground differential (87G) or restricted ground fault schemes are useful when
the shunt reactors are a single phase per tank design. Figure 10 shows a high-impedance ground differential
(87G) scheme; however, a low-impedance scheme can also be implemented. Where a reactor differential
relaying scheme is used that is sensitive to mismatch in current transformer performance during a fault, it is
recommended that the current transformers on both sides of the reactor have similar excitation
characteristics. Ground fault back-up protection can be provided by a neutral overcurrent relay.
8.4.2 Protection for turn-to-turn faults
Phase overcurrent relay schemes might not be sufficiently sensitive to provide adequate protection for turn-
to-turn faults and differential relay schemes normally cannot detect such faults. Distance relays or ground
overcurrent relays offer some improvement in protection, but the sudden-pressure relay or gas-accumulator
relay or both generally provide a sensitive means of detecting turn-to-turn faults within oil-immersed
reactors.
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IEEE Std C37.109-2006
Figure 9 Common protective relaying schemes for oil-immersed reactors
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IEEE Std C37.109-2006
Figure 10 Ground differential scheme for oil-immersed reactors
Nondirectional ground overcurrent relays provide some protection, but there should be time-delay co-
ordination provided for external faults and current transformer saturation. The coordination is for external
unbalanced faults, because such faults unbalance the voltages supplied to the reactor, and also result in
unbalanced currents flowing in the three phases of the reactor. Directional ground overcurrent relays can
provide faster protection provided special precautions are observed to provide sufficient polarizing
quantities for the directional element and to overcome current transformer saturation during reactor
energization and de-energization.
For grounded neutral reactors, a ground overcurrent relay controlled by a directional relay can be used to
discriminate between unbalanced currents due to external faults and unbalanced currents due to internal
faults, such as shorted turns.
A problem arises in the application of directional relays to detect shorted turns in a reactor if the
unbalanced current flow is not sufficient to unbalance the phase voltages sufficiently for a zero-sequence
voltage or negative-sequence voltage polarized directional relay to sense the fault. This problem can be
overcome by using a directional relay that has the polarizing voltage reinforced by voltage developed from
using some relay operating current through an impedance. As long as this impedance is less than the reactor
impedance, the additional polarizing reinforcement provided by the operating current should not be
sufficient to cause incorrect directional indication for an unbalanced external fault. A short time delay (few
hundred milliseconds) on the directionally-controlled ground overcurrent tripping function is helpful to
increase the security of this protection.
Figure 11(a) is a one-line diagram showing the connection of a ground overcurrent relay (50N) on a reactor
bank grounded neutral. Starting of the ground overcurrent relay should be controlled by a negative-
sequence polarized directional relay (67Q). Figure 11(b) shows an alternative scheme using a zero-
sequence polarized directional relay (67N). An arrow indicates the forward direction for which the
directional relay is connected (i.e., operating direction). It is apparent that with the operating direction
indicated, the directional relay might not operate for winding to ground faults in the reactor. This is not of
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IEEE Std C37.109-2006
concern since other reactor protection (for high fault current protection) should detect such faults. The
directional ground relay is applied for turn-to-turn fault protection only. Note that the ground overcurrent
relay and the directional ground overcurrent relay are both connected to a current transformer on the
ground connection, and not to the residual connection of the three phase current transformers. By using the
connection shown, the risk of undesirable operation of the overcurrent detector or directional element due
to unequal saturation of the three phase current transformers during reactor energization is eliminated.
Unequal saturation of the phase current transformers can easily result during the period after energization
of the reactor due to the long time-constant of decay of any dc component present in the initial phase
current.
In the case of the negative-sequence directional relay, there is also a possibility of apparent high levels of
negative-sequence current due to unequal saturation of the phase current transformers immediately after
energization or de-energization. Unlike the case of the ground directional overcurrent function, there is no
alternative connection to avoid undesirable operation. It is therefore necessary to block the turn-to-turn
protection for some time after energization until after the transient dc component of the phase current has
completely decayed.
(a)
(b)
Figure 11 Turn-to-turn fault protection for grounded reactor using

(a) negative-sequence and directional control and
(b) zero-sequence directional control
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IEEE Std C37.109-2006
There is also the possibility of some ground current and negative-sequence current flowing in a reactor
directly connected to a line terminal during the discharge of line charging current immediately after de-
energization of a transmission line. To avoid the possibility of undesirable tripping by sensitive negative-
sequence or zero-sequence overcurrent turn-to-turn fault protection, this protection should be blocked by an
undervoltage relay and timer combination. The undervoltage relay immediately blocks the overcurrent
tripping, and the time delay on reset retains the blocking function for some seconds after energization to
ensure no misoperation due to false directional or overcurrent operation due to unequal saturation of the
phase current transformers during energization. To avoid the possibility of a severe internal turn-to-turn
fault depressing the terminal voltage low enough to block the turn-to-turn fault protection, instantaneous
phase overcurrent protection should also be applied. The undervoltage detector should be set to drop out
below the phase to neutral voltage expected due to winding faults that result in enough current to operate
the instantaneous phase overcurrent protection.
The drop in voltage on the reactor terminals at the current level at which instantaneous phase overcurrent
protection operates can be simply calculated by multiplying the setting of the instantaneous phase
overcurrent element by the maximum positive-sequence source impedance at the terminal of the reactor.
For example, consider a 135 Mvar, EHV reactor applied at a location where the minimum fault current is
20 per unit on a 100 MVA base. The rated current of the reactor is about 1.35 per unit on a 100 MVA base.
Assume the instantaneous phase overcurrent protection is set at 150% of rated reactor current or 2.0 per
unit. The positive-sequence source impedance is 1/20 = 0.05 per unit on a 100 MVA base. The voltage drop
at a current of 2.0 per unit will be 2 0.05 = 0.1 per unit, or 10%. Therefore, if the undervoltage function
supervising the sensitive turn-to-turn fault protection is set at 80% of rated voltage, and if there is an
internal turn-to-turn fault of sufficient severity to depress the terminal voltage to a level low enough to
block the turn-to-turn protection, the instantaneous phase overcurrent protection should operate.
Distance relays have been applied to detect shorted turns in iron-core shunt reactors. The use of distance
relays for this type of protection is possible due to the significant reduction in the 60 Hz impedance of a
shunt reactor under turn-to-turn fault conditions. The turn-to-turn fault sensitivity that can be achieved is
limited by the apparent impedance seen by the relay during the inrush period when the reactor is energized.
The relay reach should be set below the reduced impedance seen during this inrush period and should be
selected so that the relay does not operate incorrectly on the natural frequency oscillation that occurs when
a compensated transmission line is de-energized.
Split-phase protection is an option for reactors in the EHV range and is shown in Figure 5(a) and
Figure 5(b). For such applications, the disc-type reactor windings are split into two parallel groups with
separate neutral connections brought out for each group. Two alternatives using three-phase and single-
phase sensing are shown in Figure 5(a) and Figure 5(b), respectively. In Figure 5(b), the two neutral end
leads are brought together in opposition through a current transformer, which picks up the current
difference. A turn-to-turn fault in the winding creates an imbalance between the impedances of the two
halves and creates a corresponding current imbalance. The relay used is a three-phase overcurrent relay
(51), typically set at approximately 2.5% of reactor rated current.
The gas-accumulator relay is applicable on reactors that are equipped with conservator tanks and have no
gas space inside the reactor tank. This relay is inserted in the pipe between the reactor and the expansion
chamber (conservator). Low-energy partial discharges, creepage, and overheating caused by turn-to-turn
faults, or by high contact or joint resistance cause the insulation at these points to slowly decompose while
evolving gas. The gas rises through the oil and is accumulated in the relay. The relay should also operate
for severe internal arcing or heavy-current flashovers, which force oil through the relay at a high velocity
before the gases rise through the system to the device. This device is commonly known as a Buchholz
relay.
The sudden-gas-pressure relay, also known as a fault-pressure relay, is applicable to gas-cushioned oil-
immersed reactors. The relay is mounted on the reactor tank in the region of the gas space at the top of the
reactor, and consists of a pressure-sensing bellows, a pressure-actuated switch, and a pressure-equalizing
orifice. The relay operates on the difference between the pressure in the gas space of the reactor and the
pressure inside the relay. During slow pressure variations associated with reactor temperature changes, the
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IEEE Std C37.109-2006
pressure-equalizing orifice should equalize the pressure between the relay and the reactor, and thus prevent
operation. For internal arcing that produces large amounts of gas and a sudden rise in gas pressure, the
bellows should expand, causing the relay to operate.
The sudden-oil-pressure relay, another type of fault-pressure relay, is applicable to all oil-immersed
reactors. The relay is mounted on the reactor tank below the minimum deenergized liquid level. Oil fills the
lower chamber of the relay housing, within which a spring-backed bellows is located. The bellows is
completely filled with silicone oil. There is also silicone oil in the upper chamber, which is connected to the
bellows via an equalizer hole. Should an internal fault develop, the resulting rapid rise in oil pressure, or
pressure pulse, is transmitted to the bellows, and the relay should operate. In the event of gradual increases
in oil pressure, due to temperature variations in the reactors, the equalizing hole stabilizes the pressure in
the bellows and should keep the relay from operating.
8.4.3 Neutral or fourth leg reactor protection
Neutral reactors, used for secondary arc extinction on single-phase line tripping, are connected between the
neutrals of the line phase reactors and the ground mat of the substation. The impedance and voltage rating
of the neutral reactors should be based on the shunt capacitance of the transmission line and can be
determined by electromagnetic transients program or other transient switching program studies.
When the reactor bank is energized, there is normally very little voltage being applied across the neutral
reactor. The transmission line phase-to-ground voltages are normally balanced. This normal lack of voltage
across the neutral reactor causes the significant difference in the fault conditions encountered by the neutral
reactor as compared to phase reactors. This difference affects the protection for the reactor. Voltage is
developed across the neutral reactor during a line ground fault and the open phase period for the single-
phase tripping. This period can range from 500 ms to 2 s depending on the system. It is preferred to detect
problems with the neutral reactor before it is called upon to function for a single-phase trip operation. With
the normal lack of applied voltage, prior detection of failures is difficult to impossible with electrical fault
detection devices.
If the neutral reactors are oil immersed, they have failure modes similar to the oil-immersed phase reactors.
A limited way of accomplishing early detection of failure is to apply physical trouble detectors: low oil
level, sudden-pressure, and pressure-relief device. For the sudden-pressure or the pressure-relief device,
some unbalance in the system is needed to supply the energy to generate the gas. The sudden-pressure relay
is critical for detecting turn-to-turn faults in the reactor. A single-phase differential relay can be applied to
detect winding-to-core or winding-to-tank faults. Since the magnitude of the fault currents are usually low
and the duration of the fault condition is limited to the time of the open-phase condition, the differential
relay is possibly the only electrical device that is fast and sensitive enough to detect this type of fault.
Due to the application, neutral reactors are normally not sized for continuous operation. Typically, they are
selected with a 10 s rating for the condition of one phase open. According to IEEE Std 32-1972 [B9], a
neutral reactor has an inherent continuous current capability of 3% of the 10 s rating. A time-delay
overcurrent relay is applied to protect the reactor from abnormal operation of the system.
The neutral reactor has a unique application that makes it possible to remove the reactor from service by
closing a bypassing device as shown in Figure 12. The bypassing device shorts out the reactor, removing
the voltage from it. This device can be triggered to operation by the protective relays.
8.4.4 Auxiliary power winding protection
In some cases, station service can be provided from a shunt reactor auxiliary winding. Figure 13 illustrates
a one-line diagram showing a protection scheme for a solidly-grounded neutral auxiliary shunt reactor
winding. This arrangement provides protection for all types of phase faults and ground faults on the
auxiliary supply side of the installation.
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IEEE Std C37.109-2006
Figure 12 Neutral reactor with bypass device
Figure 13 Shunt reactor with grounded wye auxiliary power winding
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IEEE Std C37.109-2006
Phase overcurrent relays and a residually-connected ground overcurrent relay are shown in this application.
Instantaneous phase (50) and ground (50N) overcurrent relays should be slightly time-delayed (62), to
assure proper coordination with the downstream protection provided for the auxiliary supply feeders. Even
though slightly delayed, both instantaneous phase and ground overcurrent elements initiate fast tripping of
the low-voltage circuit breaker (LVCB). The time-delay elements of both phase (51) and ground (51N)
overcurrent relays should also be coordinated with the downstream feeder protections and provide an
additional important back-up protection function by tripping the high-voltage circuit breaker (HVCB) of
the main shunt reactor in case the fault is not eliminated by the feeder protection or the instantaneous
protections on the auxiliary reactor side.
Another auxiliary power winding configuration6 includes the use of an intermediate transformer before
distribution to the load. The extension of the auxiliary winding to the intermediate transformer is still part
of the shunt reactor and, for any fault, thereon requires tripping of the entire shunt reactor bank. Therefore,
some users choose to operate this circuit ungrounded. Consequently, for a phase-to-ground fault between
the auxiliary winding and intermediate transformer, there can be negligible fault current, allowing the
continued operation of the auxiliary winding to provide substation power supply. As shown in Figure 14, a
ground fault sensing scheme should provide an alarm. This scheme consists of three voltage transformers, a
resistor, and an overvoltage relay, 59N, connected similar to the grounding transformer discussed in 7.1 and
7.4.2. Protection of the distribution system supplied by the auxiliary winding should be coordinated with
the protection of the shunt reactor itself.
Typical station service arrangements are normally provided with emergency supplies (not shown in
Figure 14). Feeder bus tie and feeder breakers should also be provided with overcurrent protections. It is
therefore recommended to account for the various possible means of auxiliary power distribution and
provide adequate coordinated protection schemes taking into consideration both the thermal capability of
the auxiliary reactor winding and the short-circuit capability of the circuit breakers.
8.4.5 Loss of cooling
Oil-immersed reactors are sometimes built with forced-cooling to reduce size and cost. For such reactors,
the cooling is usually critical and should be operational any time the reactor is energized.
The loss of cooling can be detected by monitoring the oil flow with flow indicators, monitoring the ac
supply voltage to the cooling fans and oil pumps, and by monitoring the temperature with temperature
relays.
The oil-flow and ac supply voltage indicators are usually connected for alarm only. The temperature relays
are generally connected to trip and remove the reactor from service. To adequately protect the reactor, a
combination of all the above indicators is usually recommended.
8.4.6 Overvoltage
Overvoltage relays can be used to disconnect reactors under extreme high-voltage conditions, but in this
case, the associated transmission line should be de-energized at the same time; otherwise disconnection of
the reactors tends to further aggravate the overvoltage condition on the system. Reactor overvoltage relays
should be set to accommodate planned contingencies.
6
Some shunt reactor designs with auxiliary power windings can be adversely affected by open-circuiting the auxiliary winding while
energized. As a precaution, inadvertent opening of a controlled circuit interrupting device can be avoided by using noncontrolled
devices such as fuses.
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IEEE Std C37.109-2006
Figure 14 Shunt reactor with ungrounded wye auxiliary power winding
8.4.7 Pole disagreement protection
In the application of shunt reactors at the terminals of EHV lines and buses, it is generally desirable to
provide a means of switching the reactor bank for protection of the reactors and/or for system operating
requirements. Due to the voltage level involved, the switching equipment often consists of single-pole
devices that are not mechanically linked, with each pole having an independent operator. With such an
arrangement, the possibility exists that one pole might not operate coincidentally with the other poles, thus
creating an undesirable imbalance in system voltages or, in case the switching equipment were called upon
to isolate the reactor bank to clear a fault, might fail to remove the faulted reactor from service.
To ensure that all poles of the switching equipment function in unison, two common methods of detecting
pole disagreement are presented, and can be used either together or separately. The first method utilizes
auxiliary contacts on the various pole operators of the switching equipment, interconnecting a and b
contacts of the devices, so that if all poles are not open or closed at the same time, a trip circuit should be
provided to trip all poles of the switching equipment or, additionally, to trip back-up circuit breakers to
isolate the switching equipment. Such a scheme is shown in Figure 15, which illustrates the application for
a three-pole reactor switching arrangement.
A second method of detecting pole disagreement uses a pole disagreement relay designed to compare the
currents in each reactor connected to the transmission system. One way that this comparison can be made is
illustrated in Figure 16, in which a spare reactor is provided that can be switched to replace any of the
normal phase reactors. The scheme shown in Figure 16 provides for two trip outputs with separately
adjustable time delays. The shorter delay is used to trip the reactor switch(es) in the event of a current
disagreement between phases. The longer delay trips local and remote line circuit breakers if the first trip
fails to clear the pole disagreement condition. As shown, the scheme relies on a multiphase comparison of
logic derived from the line current inputs, including that from the spare reactor, and coordinating timers.
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IEEE Std C37.109-2006
Figure 15 Typical auxiliary contact disagreement circuit in

circuit breaker control wiring
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IEEE Std C37.109-2006
Figure 16 Pole disagreement protection for three-phase reactor installation

with switchable spare reactor
8.4.8 Microprocessor-based relays
Several benefits have been demonstrated for using microprocessor-based relays. The first is self-testing. A
microprocessor relay can continually check itself to see if it is working properly. Should something go
awry, a self-check failure alarm occurs and the relay takes itself out of service. It is no longer necessary to
wait for a fault to find a relay has failed. A microprocessor-based relay can also display metering
information, which can be used to determine the integrity of current transformers and potential
transformers. Another benefit from using a microprocessor-based relay is data storage. With the ability to
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IEEE Std C37.109-2006
store data, microprocessor-based relays can store numerous fault records and oscillographic data to aid in
the post-fault analysis.
Microprocessor relays have the ability to store several setting groups and switch between them using
internal programmable logic with or without auxiliary inputs. Depending on system conditions external to
the relay such as inrush current or dissipating trapped charge during line de-energization, it might be
desirable to change a relay setting for the condition to make it more or less sensitive.
The flexibility of a microprocessor relay to be set to respond to either rms or fundamental gives the user the
ability to desensitize the relay to all harmonics, or respond to all harmonics below the Nyquist limit
dictated by the sampling rate. Digital filtering is used to remove the dc component from the sampled
waveform.
The programmability of microprocessor relays can contribute to the ease of implementing different control
options when special situations occur. One example is when a circuit switcher is used to protect a shunt
reactor as discussed in 8.3.1. Should the fault current be too high as to exceed the rating of the circuit
switcher, logic can be employed through the microprocessor-based relay, which blocks the circuit switcher
from operating and trips a back-up breaker with minimal additional wiring. Custom logic can also be used
to open a load-break switch during pole disagreement while normal fault clearing can be through a circuit
breaker.
Many microprocessor relays contain multiple protective functions within one device. The user should
consider redundancy when using multifunction devices.
9. Summary of shunt reactor protection

This clause includes Table 1 through Table 6 that represent a summary of shunt reactor protection.
Table 1 Properties of shunt reactors
Dry air-core type Oil-immersed (self-cooled or forced-cooled)
Typical connections: Connected to the tertiary winding of Typical connection: Solidly-grounded or impedance-
a transformer or directly connected to system grounded neutral connected directly from the system
Voltage range: 138 kV or below Voltage range: Above 34.5 kV
Magnetizing inrush: No magnetizing inrush upon Coreless type: Less severe energizing inrush
energization (no iron core)
Peak current during energization up to: 2 2 Inominal due Gapped iron-core type: Severe energizing inrush
to transient offset
Table 2 Failure modes in dry air-core reactors
Dry air-core type Cause of failure
Phase-to-phase faults on tertiary bus bar Arcing from a failed reactor not detected fast enough and causes
resulting in high magnitude phase current phase-to-phase fault on the tertiary bus bar due to fault ionization
Direct winding-to-ground faults Usually caused by bridging the insulation to ground (animal)
Turn-to-turn faults Insulation failure can result in arc faults. If not detected fast enough,
the fault can cascade the entire winding. It can thermally damage the
healthy phases if the reactor is ungrounded.
Ihealthy phase = 3 Inominal
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IEEE Std C37.109-2006
Table 3 Failure modes in oil-immersed reactors
Oil-immersed reactors Cause of failure
Phase-to-phase faults and phase-to-ground faults Arcing from a failed reactor not detected fast enough
resulting in high magnitude phase and ground current
Direct winding-to-ground faults Usually caused due to the proximity of the winding with
the core and tank. The magnitude of the fault decreases
as the fault is located closer to the neutral side.
Turn-to-turn faults Insulation failure can result in increased temperature,
internal pressure build-up and gas accumulation. This
type of fault can result in a major fault if not detected
quick enough.
Miscellaneous faults Loss of coolinglow oil level
Table 4 Typical protection requirements for shunt reactors
Faults Time clearing requirements
High magnitude phase faults Fast clearing time determined by the fault withstand time
of the primary equipment supplying the reactor or the
critical clearing time of the transmission line
Low magnitude phase-to-ground faults Minimum clearing time required without inducing false
trips
Low magnitude turn-to-turn faults Minimum clearing time required without inducing false
trips
Miscellaneous faults Alarm: sufficient time required for operators to respond
Trip: Required time below damaging levels
Table 5 Typical protection functions for dry air-core and oil-immersed reactors
Type Protection performance
87 Fast, secure for medium to high magnitude faults. Not efficient

for turn-to-turn faults or for partial internal winding faults.
21 Fast for high magnitude faults. Turn-to-turn faults with long time
delay might require differential set below inrush apparent
impedance but above turn-to-turn shorted impedance.
50/51PH Reactor/equipment fault withstand
50/51N,50/51G,87G,67N,67Q Detects winding faults to ground.
Partial turn-to-turn protection

46 Turn-to-turn and winding-to-ground protection
59 Overexcitation of the reactor iron core/system protection
Gas, oil pressure Turn-to-turn/internal tank faults/tank rupture
26
IEEE Std C37.109-2006
Table 6 Typical primary, secondary, and back-up protection schemes
Type Protection performance
Dry-type reactors
50/51,87,46 Phase-to-phase faults
59 (broken delta) Phase-to-ground faults
Voltage unbalance scheme with compensation Turn-to-turn faults
Oil-immersed reactors
50/51,87(HI),21 Large magnitude faults
50/51N Ground faults
50N,67N,67Q Turn-to-turn faults
Sudden-pressure/gas-accumulator relay/21 Internal tank faults/tank rupture
27
IEEE Std C37.109-2006
Annex A
(informative)
Bibliography
[B1] ASEA Electric Recommendations for Protective Relays, Pamphlet ZF27-004E Reg. 4771. ASEA
Brown Boveri, Protective Relay Division, Allentown, PA, 1985.
[B2] Blackburn, J. L., Protection of Shunt Reactors, Silent Sentinels RPL 77-1, Westinghouse Electric
Corporation Publication, Nov. 1977.
[B3] Carlson, L., et al., Single-pole reclosing on EHV lines, International Conference on Large High-
Voltage Electrical Systems, CIGRE, Paris, France, paper no. 3103, 1974.
[B4] Copper, J. W., and Eilts, L. W., Relay for ungrounded shunt reactors, IEEE Transactions on
Power Apparatus and Systems, vol PAS-92, pp 116121, Jan/Feb. 1973.
[B5] Edwards, L., Chadwick, Jr., J. W., Riesch, H. A., and Smith, L. E., Single-pole switching on TVAs
Paradise-Davidson 500-kV line design concepts and staged fault test results, IEEE Transactions on Power
Apparatus and Systems, vol PAS-90, pp. 24362450, Nov/Dec. 1971.
[B6] Engelhardt, K. H., EHV line-connected shunt reactor protection application and experience,
International Conference on Large High-Voltage Electric Systems, CIGRE, Paris, France, paper no. 34-09,
1984.
[B7] Feldman, J. M., and Wilson, D. D., Shunt reactor compensation on present and future transmission
systems, American Power Conference, Apr. 1969.
[B8] IEEE 100, The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms, Seventh Edition.
[B9] IEEE Std 32-1972, IEEE Standard Requirements, Terminology, and Test Procedures for Neutral
Grounding Devices.7, 8
[B10] IEEE Std C37.100-1992, IEEE Standard Definitions for Power Switchgear.
[B11] IEEE Std C57.21-1990, IEEE Standard Requirements, Terminology, and Test Code for Shunt
Reactors Rated Over 500 kVA.
[B12] IEEE Std C62.2-1987 (withdrawn), IEEE Guide for Application of Gapped Silicon-Carbide Surge
Arresters for Alternating-Current Systems.
[B13] Kimbark, E. W., Suppression of ground-fault arcs on single-pole switched EHV lines by shunt
reactors, IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, vol. 83, no. 3, pp 285290, Mar. 1964.
[B14] LaForest, J. J., et al., Resonant voltages on reactor compensated extra-high-voltage lines, IEEE
Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, vol PAS-91, pp 25282536, Nov/Dec. 1972.
7
IEEE publications are available from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., 445 Hoes Lane, Piscataway, NJ
08854, USA (http://standards.ieee.org/).
8
The IEEE standards or products referred to in this clause are trademarks of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
28
IEEE Std C37.109-2006
[B15] Pickett, M. J., et al., Near resonance coupling on EHV circuits: I-Field investigations, IEEE
Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, vol PAS-87, pp 322325, Feb 1968.
[B16] Power System Relaying Committee Report, Shunt reactor protection practices, IEEE Transactions
on Power Apparatus and Systems, vol PAS-103, pp. 19701976, Aug. 1984.
[B17] Reactors, International Electrotechnical Commission Publication 289, 1968.
[B18] S&C Electric Company, Chicago, IL, RD-3221 Operating Description, Aug. 1985.
[B19] The Art of Protective RelayingPower Systems Protection for EHV Systems, General Electric
Company Publication, GET-7207, Jan. 1965.
[B20] Trench Electric, Toronto Ontario, Canada. Shunt Reactor Bulletin T100-35-02l, May 1984.
29

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IEEE Guide for the Protection of

IEEE Power Engineering Society

IEEE Guide for the Protection of

Power System Relaying Committee

Reaffirmed 29 March 2012

The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.

Copyright 2007 by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.

Print: ISBN 0-7381-5322-2 SH95617

Comments on standards should be submitted to the following address:

Secretary, IEEE-SA Standards Board

Kevin A. Stephan, Chair

John Appleyard Arvind Chaudhary Dean Miller

William Ackerman Randall Groves Paul Pillitteri

Steve M. Mills, Chair

Mark D. Bowman Kenneth S. Hanus Greg Ratta

Satish K. Aggarwal, NRC Representative

1.1 Scope ................................................................................................................................................... 1

5. Reactor construction and characteristics .................................................................................................... 2

5.1 Dry type ............................................................................................................................................... 2

6. Typical reactor protection........................................................................................................................... 3

7. Dry-type reactorsapplication and protection........................................................................................... 3

7.1 Reactor connections............................................................................................................................. 3

8. Oil-immersed reactorsapplication and protection................................................................................... 9

8.1 Reactor connections............................................................................................................................. 9

9. Summary of shunt reactor protection ....................................................................................................... 25

Annex A (informative) Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 28

5. Reactor construction and characteristics

5.1 Dry type

6. Typical reactor protection

a) Dry-type, connected ungrounded wye to the impedance-grounded tertiary of a power

7. Dry-type reactorsapplication and protection

7.1 Reactor connections

Figure 1 Typical dry-type shunt reactor connection with three-pole supply-side

NOTEGrounding transformer not shown.

Figure 2 Dry-type shunt reactor connection with two-pole or three-pole

a) The zero-sequence resistance helps stabilize the neutral.

7.2 Failure modes and types of faults

The faults encountered in dry-type reactor installations can be categorized as follows:

a) Phase-to-phase faults on the tertiary bus, resulting in a high-magnitude phase current

7.3 System considerations

7.4 Relaying practices

7.4.1 Protection for phase-to-phase faults

7.4.2 Protection for phase-to-ground faults

7.4.3 Protection for turn-to-turn faults

a) Reactor bank unbalance due to a faulted reactor

Figure 3 Common protective relaying schemes for dry-type reactors

8. Oil-immersed reactorsapplication and protection

8.1 Reactor connections

8.2 Failure modes and types of faults

Figure 5 Split-phase protection: (a) three-phase sensing and

Figure 6 One-line diagram of (a) line-connected, switched shunt reactors and

8.3 System considerations

8.3.1 Clearing of faults

8.3.2 Resonance phenomenon

Figure 7 Fault on series-compensated line with shunt reactors

Figure 8 TNA study results of series-compensation and reactor oscillations

8.4 Relaying practices

8.4.1 Protection for large-magnitude faults

8.4.2 Protection for turn-to-turn faults