Quasi Legislative

Administrative regulations are either interpretative or legislative

Administrative issuances may be distinguished according to their nature
and substance:
1. Legislative rule is in the matter of subordinate legislation, designed
to implement a primary legislation by providing details thereof.
2. Interpretative rule is designed to provide guidelines to the law
which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.

When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a

statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law.
Legislative regulation is further classified into supplementary and the
contingent.
Supplementary regulation is intended to fill in the details of the law and
make explicit what is only general. Its purpose is to enlarge upon a
statute, subject only to the standards fixed therein, to ensure its effective
enforcement in accordance with the legislative will.
Contingent regulation is so called because it is issued upon the
happening of a certain contingency which the administrative body is given
the discretion to determine or to ascertain, under and pursuant to the law,
some circumstances on which the law, by its own terms, makes its own
action depend, or to find the facts or conditions properly prescribed under
which the law as passed will or will not operate, that is, for putting in
effect, applying or suspending a law.

Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil 234

The supreme court sustained a law prohibiting the importation of cattle,
which had caused a rinderpest epidemic, but authorizing the Governor-
General to lift the prohibition, with the consent of the presiding officers of
the legislature, if he should determine after a fact-finding investigation that
there was no longer any threat of contagion from cattle. The lifting of the
ban would have been effected through a contingent regulation based on
the prescribed contingency, to wit, the finding that foreign cattle would no
longer contaminate the local livestock.

Requisites:
To be valid, administrative regulation must comply with the following
requisites:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature;
 3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
4. It must be reasonable

1st requisite: Authority to promulgate the regulation is usually conferred by

the charter itself of the administrative body or by the law it is supposed to
enforce.

There are limitations on the rule-making power of administrative agencies.

A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when congress authorizes
promulgation of administrative rules and regulations to implement given
legislation, all that is required is that the regulation be not in contravention
with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes.

Araneta vs. Gaitmaitan, 101 Phil 328

Thus, as ruled by the Supreme Court in this case, which involved an
authorization granted by congress in favor of the secretary of agriculture
and natural resources to promulgate rules and regulations concerning
trawl fishing, which power was directly exercised by President Ramon
Magsaysay
If under the law, the Secretary of Agriculture has authority to regulate or
ban fishing by trawl, then the President of the Philippines may exercise the
same power and authority because of the following:
(a) The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus
or offices, pursuant to Sec. 10 (1), Article VII, of the constitution;
(b) Executive Orders may be issued by the President under Section 63 of the
Revised Administrative Code governing performance of duties by public
employees or disposing of issues of general concern;
(c) Under section 74 of the Revised Administrative Code, All executive
functions of the government of the Republic of the Philippines shall be
directly under the Executive Department, subject to the supervision and
control of the President of the Philippines in matters of general policy.

2nd Requisite: Assuming a valid authorization, it is still necessary that the

authority delegated be properly exercised, which means simply that the
regulation promulgated must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the
authority conferred. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of
congress.

The rule making power of a public administrative body is a delegated

legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority
given by congress or the constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the
scope intended.
A statute is superior to an administrative directive and the former cannot
be repealed nor amended by the latter.

People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 250

Thus, in this case, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was
authorized to promulgate regulations to carry into effect the provisions of the
Fishing Law, which prohibited, among other acts, fishing with the use of
obnoxious or poisonous substance. In the exercise of this authority, he issued, on
recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, a regulation prohibiting
electro fishing. The accused in this case successfully challenged the regulation
on the ground that it exceeded the powers conferred upon the Secretary since the
law did not prohibit fishing by electricity. It was argued that electricity was
neither poisonous nor obnoxious nor was it a substance but a form of energy. In
sustaining the accused, the Supreme Court noted that nowhere in the law was
electro fishing prohibited; hence, the Secretary of Agriculture and the
Commissioner of Fisheries were powerless to penalize it.

Bautista vs. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329

In this case, the Supreme Court sustained a letter of instruction prohibiting
private extra heavy and heavy vehicles from using public streets on weekends
and holidays but annulled as ultra vires the administrative regulation calling for
the impounding of the offending vehicles. As the penalty imposed by the law
was only a fine and suspension of registration, the court declared that the
impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory justification.

Administrative issuances must not override but must remain

consistent and in harmony with the law they seek to apply and
implement.

3rd Requisites: As an enactment of laws, the promulgation of administrative

regulations of general application does not require previous notice and
hearing, the only exception being where the legislature itself requires it
mandates that the regulation shall be based on certain facts as determined
at an appropriate investigation. In the absence of such a requirement, the
administrative body can promulgate the regulation in its exclusive
discretion and on the basis of information acquired by it through methods
other than holding of a public hearing.

Maceda vs. ERB, 192 SCRA 363

The Supreme Court, in rejecting the petitioners contention that an order of the
Energy Regulatory Board allowing provisional increase in the prices of
petroleum violated due process for having been issued without notice and
hearing, explained
Senator Maceda and Atty. Lozano, in questioning the lack of a hearing, have
overlooked the provisions of Section 8 of Executive Order No. 172, which we quote
Section 8. Authority to grant Provisional Relief The board may, upon the filing
of an application, petition or complaint, or at any stage thereafter and without prior
hearing, on the basis of supporting papers duly verified or authenticated, grant
provisional relief on motion of a party in the case or on its own initiative, without
prejudice to a final decision after hearing, should the Board find that the pleadings,
together with such affidavits, documents and other evidence which may be submitted
in support of the motion, substantially support the provisional order: Provided, That the
Board shall immediately schedule and conduct a hearing thereon within thirty (30) days
thereafter, upon publication and notice to all affected parties.
As the order itself indicates, the authority for provisional increase falls within
the above provision.

Philippine Consumers Foundation vs. DECS, 153 SCRA 622

The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be
either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function,
the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement
of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the
validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an
administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind
throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the
rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a
finding of fact, then its function is quasi judicial in character.
Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its
legislative function? We believe so. The assailed Department Order prescribes
the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private schools in the
country for school year 1987-88. This being so, notice and hearing are not
essential to the validity of its issuance.

Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their

purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that

is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not
the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the
so called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties.

CIR vs. CA, 261 SCRA 236

 Justice Vitug Explained it should be understandable that when an administrative rule
is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance
for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When
upon, the other hand the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that
can facilitate or render least cumbersome its implementation of the law but substantially adds
to or increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those
directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new
issuance is given the force and effect of law.

4th Requisites:
Like statutes, administrative regulations promulgated thereunder must not
be unreasonable or arbitrary as to violate due process.
It is axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not
act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations.

Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila vs. BOT, 117 SCRA 597

In this case, for example, the petitioners assailed a regulation phasing out taxicabs more
than six years old as an invalid exercise of the police power. The Supreme Court
declared the regulation reasonable, holding that its purpose was to promote the
convenience and comfort and protect the safety of the passengers.

B. Penal Regulations
The power to define and punish crime is exclusively legislative and may not be
delegated to the administrative authorities. While administrative regulations may have
the force and effect of law, their violation cannot give rise to criminal prosecution unless
the legislature makes such violation punishable and imposes the corresponding
sanctions. The administrative authorities themselves cannot prescribe such penalties.

US vs. Panlilio, 28 Phil 608

An administrative regulation punishing the transport of quarantined animals without
the permission of the Secretary of Agriculture was held invalid for lack of statutory
basis. The Supreme Court ruled that the accused could not be convicted under this
regulation because
Section 6 simply authorizes the Director of Agriculture to do certain things,
among them, paragraph (c) to require that animals which are suffering from dangerous
communicable disease or have been exposed thereto be placed in quarantine at such
place and for such time as may be deemed by him necessary to prevent the spread of
the disease. Nowhere in the law, however, is the violation of the orders of the Bureau
of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there any punishment for a violation
of such orders. Section 8 provides that any person violating any of the provisions of
this act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand
pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, for each offenses. A violation of the orders
of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph (c), is not a violation of the
provisions of the Act. The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while possibly be said to
have the force of law, are not statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a
violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes
a v iolation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of
the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation
punished in any way therein.

It follows from the above rulings, and also from the general requirements
of due process as previously discussed, that the special requisites of a valid
administrative regulation with a penal sanction are:
(1) The law itself must make violation of the administrative
regulation punishable;
(2) The law itself must impose and specify the penalty for he violation
of the regulation;
(3) The regulation must be published.

Construction and Interpretation

The same rules on the construction and interpretation of statutes are

applied to administrative regulations, with the specific requirement that
the said regulation should be read in harmony with the statute and not in
violation of the authority conferred on the administrative authorities.

Administrative regulations are prospective in operation unless the

contrary is clearly intended.
The interpretation give to a rule or regulation by those charged with
its execution is entitled to the greatest weight by the court construing such
rule or regulation, and such interpretation will be followed unless it
appears to be clearly unreasonable or arbitrary.
Indeed, an administrative officer may revoke, repeal or abrogate the
acts or previous rulings of his predecessor in office. The construction of a
statute by those administering it is not binding on their successors if,
thereafter, the latter becomes satisfied that a different construction should
be given.

Enforcement

It is established that the power to promulgate administrative

regulations carries with it the implied power to enforce them. This may be
effected through judicial action, as in petition for mandamus and
injunction, or through sanctions that the statute itself may allow the
administrative body to impose.
 The power to impose administrative regulations likewise includes the
power to issue opinions and rulings to enable the administrative agency to
properly execute said regulations.

Amendment or Repeal

Like the statute, the administrative regulation made thereunder is

subject to amendment or repeal by the authorities that promulgated them
in the first place. There is no question, of course, that the administrative
regulation may be changed directly by the legislature. This power may be
exercised as often as it becomes necessary to adjust the regulation to the
changing circumstances surrounding the subject thereof or the problem
sought to be solved or alleviated by the rule.

CHAPTER 5

THE QUASI JUDICIAL POWER

The QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER is the power of the administrative agency

to determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself.
Quasi judicial is the term applied to the action, discretion of officers
who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts and
draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action, and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature.

The Supreme has stressed that the action of an administrative

agency in granting or denying or in suspending or revoking a license,
permit, franchise or certificate of public convenience and necessity is
administrative or quasi-judicial.

The proper exercise of the quasi-judicial power requires compliance

with two conditions, to wit:

(1) Jurisdiction must be properly acquired by the administrative body;

(2) Due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.

A. Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction may be simply defined as the competence of an officer or

body to act on a given matter or decide a certain question. Without
jurisdiction, the determinations made by the administrative bodies
are absolutely null and without any legal effect whatsoever. Such acts
are subject to direct and even collateral attach any may be assailed at
any time since they are regarded as invalid ab initio.

It is the legislature that has the power to confer jurisdiction

upon the administrative body and so limit or expand its authrority.
It can be said that each administrative body has its own
peculiar jurisdiction as conferred upon it by the specific provisions of
its charter.
Fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or
official.
Settled is the rule that a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial functions acts without jurisdiction if no authority has been
conferred by law to hear and decide the case.
The law may also allow some administrative bodies to award
certain kinds of damages while denying the same power, for no
apparent reason, to other administrative bodies.

Syquia vs. Board of Power, 72 SCRA 212

Several tenants of a residential building complained to the respondent
administrative body that the petitioner, owner of the apartments they were
leasing, was billing them for electrical consumption in excess of the authorized
Meralco rates. The petitioner argued that she was charging them not only for the
consumption in their individual apartment but also for the fuel adjustments and
the electricity used in common areas, the servants quarter and the elevator,
which additional costs had been distributed pro rata among all the tenants of the
building. The respondent board held that the additional charges were unlawful
since the tenants should be required to pay for the electricity used only in their
own respective units. In reversing this ruling, the Supreme Court held that the
tenants complaints give rise to a question that is purely civil in character that is
to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code (not Public
Service Act) and not by the respondent regulatory board which has not
jurisdiction, but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction.

Globe Wireless vs. Public Service Commission, 147 SCRA 269

In this case, the Supreme Court rejected the claim of the Public Service
Commission that it properly imposed an administrative fine on the petitioner,
which, as found by the court, did not violate any term or condition of any
certificate or any order, decision or regulation of said commission. Had there
been such a violation, the commission would have been authorized to impose the
fine assailed in this case. It was shown, however, that the petitioner operated
under a legislative franchise, so there were no terms or conditions of any
certificate by the Commission to violate. Neither was there any order, decision
and regulation from the commission applicable to petitioner that the latter had
allegedly violated, disobeyed or disregarded. The court explained

Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the

rule that the jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like the Public
Service Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily
implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order
without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective. The order under
consideration (imposing and administrative fine) belonged to this category.

In this connection, it must be stressed that franchise are

always interpreted strictly against the franchise holder, never
liberally and certainly not in a strained exaggerated manner.

1. Rules of Procedure

Where an administrative body is expressly granted the power of

adjudication, it is deemed also vested with the implied power to
prescribe the rules to be observed in the conduct of its
proceedings.

Doctrine of implication where a general power is conferred or duty

enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the
one or the performance of the other is also conferred.

Where the statute does not require any particular method of

procedure to be followed by an administrative agency, the agency
may adopt any reasonable method to carry out its functions.
But to be valid, the rules must not violate fundamental rights or
encroach upon constitutional prerogatives, like the rule making
power of the Supreme Court

Philippine Association of Lawyers vs. Agrava, 105 Phil 173

In this case, where the Patent Office issued a circular requiring any person
intending to practice before that body to first pass an examination to be given
to it on patent laws and jurisprudence and its own rules of practice. This
requirement was questioned by the petitioner on the ground that any lawyer
in good standing could practice before the Patent Office without the necessity
of passing said examination (on top of the bar examination). The Patent Office
replied that the prosecution of patent cases could be handled not only by
lawyers but also by engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and
technical training and that the Rules of Court did not prohibit it or any other
quasi judicial body from requiring further qualifications from those intending
 to handle cases before such bodies. In upholding the petitioner, the Supreme
Court declared:

The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with
respect to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines and any member
of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before
any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the
Philippines.
xxxx

In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the
Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons
and the prosecution of their applicants for patent, their oppositions thereto, or
the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first place, although the
transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of
technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to
be conducted and all orders and decisions of the Director of Patents have to
be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws,
including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in
accordance with the law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office
involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles,
as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of
evidence and procedure.

Courts may not in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a

statute and include therein situations not provided [for] or intended by law
makers.

Procedure, as distinguished from jurisdiction, is the means by which

the power or authority of a court to hear and decide a class of cases is put
into action. Rules of procedure are remedial in nature and not substantive.
They cover only rules on pleadings and practice.

2. The Subpoena Power

The power to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum is not

inherent in administrative bodies. It is settled that these bodies
may summon witnesses and require the production of evidence
only when duly allowed by law, and always only in connection
with the matter they are authorized to investigate.

3. The Contempt Power

 Like subpoena power, the power to punish for contempt is
essentially judicial and cannot be claimed as an inherent right by
the administrative body. To be validly exercised, it must be
expressly conferred upon the body and, additionally, must be
used only in connection with its quasi-judicial as distinguished
form its purely administrative or routinary functions.

As a rule, where say, a subpoena of the administrative body is

disregarded, the person summoned may not directly disciplined
by that body. The proper remedy is for administrative body to
seek the assistance of the courts of justice for the enforcement of its
order.

Guevarra vs. COMELEC, 104 Phil 268

It was held that even if expressly granted the contempt power, the
respondent administrative body could not exercise it over a journalist who
had insinuated in a news report certain irregularities in connection with the
purchase by the respondent Commission of ballot boxes. The Supreme Court
held that the power was not exercisable because the acquisition of election
paraphernalia did not call for the discharge of quasi-judicial functions by the
administrative body.
Much less is the contempt power available to the administrative body for
the purpose of controlling judicial action.

Pursuant to Section 12 of Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, quasi judicial agencies that have the power to cite
persons for indirect contempt can only do so by initiating them in
the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction
and competence to decide the indirect contempt cases.

B. Notice and Hearing

The right to notice and hearing is essential to due process and its
non-observance will as a rule invalidate the administrative
proceedings.

The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the

opportunity to explain ones side or a chance to seek reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of.

1. Administrative due process

 While administrative determinations of contested cases are by
their nature judicial, there is no requirement for strict adherence to
technical rules as are observed in truly judicial proceedings.

Administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are

unfettered by the rigidity of certain procedural requirements,
subject to the observance of fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before
them.

Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil 635

Cardinal Rights or principles to be observed in administrative proceedings

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing which includes the right of
the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. the liberty and property of citizen shall be
protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and
to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented. The right to adduce
evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to
consider it, is vain.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that
of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely
nothing to support it is a nullity.
(4) Not only must there be evidence to support finding or conclusion, but the
evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as an adequate support of conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act
on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving
at a decision.
(7) The court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial question,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision
rendered.

Basic Principles observed in Administrative investigations

1. The burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence the

allegations in his complaint.
 2. In reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government,
the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they are
supported by substantial evidence.
3. Administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be
set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.

The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is simply an

opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of.

Nature of Quasi-Judicial proceedings in relation to evaluation process

The evaluation process may be characterized as an investigative or

inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the exercise
of an administrative bodys quasi judicial power.

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves:

(a) Taking and evaluation of evidence;
(b) Determining facts based on the evidence presented;
(c) Rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved.

The evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting

an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially
criminal. In essence, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a
criminal investigation.

The basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and
civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. The notice
and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be
dispensed with and shelved aside.

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a

finding of guilt is only substantial evidence. Substantial evidence means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. It means evidence which affords a substantial
basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.

In administrative cases, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain

ones side suffices to meet the requirements of due process. A formal
trial type hearing is not always necessary. For the purpose of
ascertaining the truth, an investigation will be conducted, during which
 technical rules applicable to judicial proceeding need not always be
adhered to.

The elements of due process are well established, viz:

1. There must be a court tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear
and determine the matter before it;
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the
defendant or property which is the subject of the proceedings;
3. The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard;
4. Judgment must be rendered in a lawful hearing.

Administrative Appeals and Review

Unless otherwise provided by law or executive order, an appeal from

final decision of the administrative agency may be take to the Department
Head, whose decision may further be brought to the regular courts of
justice, in accordance with the procedure specified by the law.
The constitution or the law usually specifies the procedure and
periods of appeal.

Enforcement of Decision

In the absence of any statute providing for the enforcement of an

administrative determination, the same cannot be enforced except possibly
by appeal to the force of public opinion.

Significantly, many administrative bodies, such as the NLRC have

even been vested with authority to grant provisional reliefs, such as writs
of preliminary attachment or injunction, intended to ensure the
enforcement of their adjudications.

It is established that administrative agencies that have not been

conferred the power to enforce their quasi-judicial decision may invoke
court action for the purpose.

Res Judicata

The general rule is that an administrative decision is not considered

res judicata so as to preclude its subsequent reconsideration or revocation.
Administrative decision-making is a continuing process.
 Where the administrative decision has been affirmed by a court
decision, the doctrine of res judicata is applicable and the administrative
authorities are thereafter precluded from modifying their own
determination. In such a case, the effect of res judicata attaches to the
judgment of the reviewing court rather than to the administrative
judgment.

The aforestated general rule has however been modified in this

jurisdiction.

It is now settled in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders

of administrative agencies, rendered pursuance to their quasi-judicial
authority, have, upon finality, the force and binding effect of a final
judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.

The principle of res judicata applies as well to the judicial and quasi
judicial acts of public, executive or administrative offices and boards acting
within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general
powers.

The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi judicial

proceedings and not to the exercise of administrative powers.

The Supreme court clarified that the principle of res judicata applies
only to the exercise by administrative agencies of their quasi-judicial power
and may not be invoked in connection with their exercise of purely
administrative functions.

Finally, it has been ruled that the doctrine of res judicata does not
apply to judgments based on prohibited or null and void contracts.

C.
 CHAPTER 6
JUDICIAL REVIEW

General Rule

An administrative decision may be appealed to the courts of justice

only if the constitution or the law permits it or if the issues to be reviewed
involve question of law. Outside of these exceptions, the administrative
decision is no more reviewable by the courts of justice than are judicial
decisions reviewable by administrative bodies.
The right to appeal is not a constitutional right nor is it embraced in
the right to be heard as guaranteed by due process.
As a rule, therefore, the administrative decision may be validly
rendered final and inappealable at the administrative level without
allowing the aggrieved party a final resort to the courts of justice.

It is generally true that purely administrative and discretionary

functions may not be interfered with by the courts; but when the exercise of
such functions by the administrative officer is tainted by a failure to abide
by the command of the law, then it is incumbent on the courts to set
matters right, with the Supreme Court having the last say on the matter.

When it comes to question of law, administrative decision thereon

are appealable to the courts of justice even without legislative permission;
indeed, even against legislative prohibition. The reason, according to
Supreme Court, is that judicial tribunals cannot be deprived of their
inherent authority to decide questions of law, initially or by way of review
of administrative decisions. Being, inherent the power cannot be
withdrawn by the legislature through a law making such a decision final
and appealable.

Methods of Review

The administrative code generally provides that an appeal from an

agency decision shall be perfected by filing with the agency within fifteen
days from receipt of a copy thereof a notice of appeal, and with the
reviewing court a petition for review of the order. Copies of the petition
shall be served upon the agency and all parties of record.
 Review shall be made on the basis of the record taken as a whole. The
findings of fact of the agency when supported by substantial evidence shall
be final except when specifically provided otherwise by law.

The Supreme Court may review the decisions of the Office of the
President on questions of law and jurisdiction when properly raised. This
does not mean judicial supremacy over the office of the president by the
performance by the Supreme Court of a duty specifically enjoined upon by
it the constitution, as part of a system of check and balances.

Primary Jurisdiction or Prior Resort

There are two doctrines that must be considered in connection with the
judicial review of administrative decisions. The first is the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction or prior resort and the second is the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to

arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.

Administrative agencies are given a wide latitude in the evaluation of

evidence and in the exercise of their adjudicative functions, latitude which
includes the authority to take judicial notice of facts within their special
competence.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction simply calls for the

determination of administrative questions, which are ordinarily questions
of fact, by administrative agencies rather than courts of justice.

Abejo vs. Dela Cruz, 149 SCRA 654

In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative
boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear
and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters,
subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh
indispensable. xxx Between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court,
the unmistakable trend has been to refer it to the former.

Industrial Enterprises vs. CA, 184 SCRA 426

The Supreme Court has also sustained a referral to an administrative body of an
issue involved in a suit over which a regular court has, and had actually acquired,
jurisdiction. At issue in this case is the validity of a Memorandum of Agreement (a coal
operating contract) which was sought to be rescinded in a suit before the RTC, which
clearly had jurisdiction over the subject. The trial court ordered the rescission. The
Court of Appeals however, reversed said order, declaring that the Trial Court had no
jurisdiction over the action considering that under Presidential Decree No. 1206, it is the
BED that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation
and development of coal blocks. The Supreme Court modified the said ruling the
Court of Appeals

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the special
competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is judicial in
character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because of
technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be
obtained in administrative proceedings before a remedy will be supplied by the courts
even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts,
and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of
issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special
competence of an administrative body; in such case the judicial process is suspended
pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.

Clearly the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since
the question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity
should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical
determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized
expertise to act on the matter. The trial court does not have the competence to decide
matters concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and
extraction of mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial
determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even when apparently they have
statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an
administrative agency.

The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call
for the dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended until after the matters
within the competence of the BED are threshed out and determined. Thereby, the
principal purpose behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is salutarily served.

Where two administrative agencies share concurrent jurisdiction with

respect to a particular issue, the settled rule is that the body or agency that
first take cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the others.
 There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original
jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes and
controversies falling within the agencys special expertise.

GSIS vs. CSC, 204 SCRA 826

In this case the Supreme Court explained When the law bestows upon a
government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters,
it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive, unless it be proved that
another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case both bodies
have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.

Moreover, there is the doctrine of separation of powers, which would

restrain the courts from resolving questions of a legislative character before
the administrative agencies have had an opportunity to resolve them
initially.

The Supreme Court has emphasized that the doctrine of primary

jurisdiction applies only to the exercise by an administrative agency of its
quasi judicial function.

Once initial action is taken by the administrative agency in

accordance with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the administrative
process must continue up to the highest level before resort to judicial
tribunals may be sought. This is required under the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.

Doctrine of Administrative Remedies

Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative

review, and provides for a system of administrative appeal, or
reconsiderations, the courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience,
will not entertain the case unless the available administrative remedies
have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an
opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative
forum.
 CHAPTER 1

THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC OFFICE

A PUBLIC OFFICE is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by
which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating
power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
state to be exercised by him for the benefit of the body politic.

Elements
The elements of a public office are as follows:
1. It must be created by law or by authority of law;
2. It must possess a delegation of a portion of the sovereign powers of government,
to be exercised for the benefit of the public;
3. The powers conferred and the duties to be discharged must be defined, directly
or impliedly, by the legislature or through legislative authority;
4. The duties must be performed independently and without control of a superior
power other than the law unless they be those of an inferior or subordinate office
created or authorized by the legislature, and by it placed under the general
control of a superior or body.
5. It must have some permanence and continuity and not be only temporary or
occasional.

Creation
A public office may be created by the constitution, by statute or by authority of law.

Characteristics

1. A public office is a public trust.

2. A public office is not a hereditable possession;
3. A public office is not property and is outside the commerce of man.

Classification
A public officer may be constitutional or statutory; national or local; legislative,
executive or judicial; lucrative or honorary; discretionary or ministerial; appointive or
elective; civil or military; and de jure or de facto.

CHAPTER 2

REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE

Selection for Public Office

A PUBLIC OFFICER is chosen either by appointment or election.

Distinctions

Elective
In election, such choice is made by the enfranchised citizenry through the
exercise of their suffrages;
Occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate;
They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom
only upon stringent conditions;
Elective officials, or officers or employees holding political officers, are obviously
expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.

Appointive
In appointment, the choice of the public functionaries is made by the particular
officer designated by the Constitution or the law;
Hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing
authority
Some hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take
part in any election except to vote.

Under the Constitution, the President is authorized to appoint the following officers:

1. Heads of the executive departments;

2. Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
3. Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain;
4. Those other officers whose appointments are vested in him by the constitution;
5. All other officers of the government whose appointment are not provided for by
law.
6. Those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.

Appointment act of designation by the appointing officer, body or board, to whom

that power has been delegated, of the individual who is to exercise the functions of a
given office.

- It may be defined as the selection, by the President of the Philippines, not by any
officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its
nature cannot be delegated.

Designation which simply the mere imposition of new duties on the officer to be
performed by him in a special manner.

According to the Supreme Court in the Binamira case, the power of appointment, being
discretionary in nature, may essentially not be delegated.
The president shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress.

Sarmiento vs. Mison, 156 SCRA 549

Confirmation is required only for the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, to
wit: (1) the heads of the executive departments; (2) ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls; (3) officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and (4) other
officers whose appointment are vested in the President by the Constitution. No confirmation is
required under the second sentence for (1) all other officers whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and (2) those whom the president may be authorized by law to
appoint. Neither is confirmation required for the third sentence for those officers lower in rank
whose appointment is vested by law in the President alone.

Apart from the foregoing, there are other limitations on the Presidents power of
appointment. Thus, the spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth civil degree of the President shall NOT during his tenure be appointed as
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or to the Office of the Ombudsman, or as
Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government owned and controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

The president may likewise not make appointments within two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, the exception being
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Moreover, appointments of an Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked

by the elected President within ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of
office.

Luego vs. CSC, 143 SCRA 327

Appointment, as explained by the Supreme Court in this case, is an essentially discretionary

power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights the
only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he
does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better
qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations
of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. The final choice of the appointing
authority should be respected and left undisturbed. The court should not substitute its own
judgment to that of the appointing authority. Not only is the appointing authority the officer
primarily responsible for the administration of his office; he is also in the best position to
determine who among the prospective appointees can efficiently discharge the functions of the
position.

Where the Civil Service Commission approved as temporary a permanent appointment

otherwise duly made) that the Civil Service Commission is NOT empowered to determine the
kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being
limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil
Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service
laws

Appointment is essentially discretionary and cannot be controlled even by the courts as

long as it is properly and not arbitrarily exercised by the appointing authority.

An appointment issued in accordance with pertinent laws and rules shall take effect
immediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority, and if the appointee has
assumed the duties if the position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once,
without awaiting the approval of his appointment by the Commission.

Lacson vs. Romero, 84 Phil 740

The Supreme Court held that an acceptance by the appointee is needed to make the
appointment complete.
The appointment to a government post like that of provincial fiscal to be complete
involves several steps. First, comes the nomination by the President. Then to make that
nomination valid and permanent, the COA has to confirm said nomination. The last step is the
acceptance thereof by the appointee by his assumption of office. The first two steps, nomination
and confirmation, constitute a mere offer of a post. They are acts of the Executive and
Legislative departments of the Government. But the last necessary step to make the
appointment complete and effective rests solely with the appointee himself. He may or may not
accept the appointment or nomination. As held in the case of Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil.
327, there is no power in this country which can compel a man to accept an office.
Consequently, since Lacson has declined to accept his appointment as provincial fiscal of Tarlac
and no one can compel him to do so, then he continues as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental
and no vacancy in said office was created, unless Lacson had been unlawfully removed as such
fiscal of Negros Oriental.

The only recognized instance when an individual can be compelled to accept an

appointive office is in connection with the defense of the State.

ELECTION is a mode of filling a public office, by which the enfranchised citizenry is

able to participate directly in the conduct of the government, through the selection by
them of the functionaries who will represent them therein.

Vacancies

It goes without saying that an office may be filled by either of the above-
mentioned methods only if it is vacant. According to Mechem, a vacancy exists when
there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of
the office.

Costin vs. Quimbo, 120 SCRA 159

This principle was applied by the Supreme Court in this case, where it ruled
 When respondent Verra was appointed chief of police on January 14, 1960, Lajer had
just been dismissed from office with several other members of the police force. The validity of
Verras appointment, therefore, hinges on the legality of Lajers removal. It is elementary in the
law of public officers that no person no matter how qualified and eligible he is for a certain
position, may be appointed to an office which is NOT VACANT. There can be no appointment
to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be legally removed or his appointment
validly terminated.

A vacany maybe original, constructive, accidental or absolute.

It is original when an office is created and no one has yet been chosen to fill it.

It is constructive when the incumbent has no legal right to the office such as a de facto
office and may be legally replaced by another.

It is accidental when the incumbent is separated by any mode other than expiration of
the term, like resignation, death, removal, or abandonment.

It is absolute when, the term of the incumbent having expired, no successor has legally
qualified to replace him.

Qualifications as an Endowment

Qualification, in the Law of Public Officers, is understood in two sense, i.e. as an

endowment and as an act.

Property qualifications may, however not be imposed for the exercise of the right to run
for public office.

1. Disqualification

Lack of disqualifications is itself a qualification. Accordingly, even if a person may

have the prescribed qualifications for a public office, he will still be ineligible
therefore if he is laboring under a disqualification.

Monsanto vs. Factoran, 110 SCRA 190

The Supreme Court in rejecting the plea of the petitioner for reinstatement to her former public
office, having been pardoned pending her appeal from her conviction for an offense which
carried with it the penalty of disqualification from office, declared

For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualification or
ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment by the Revised Penal Code for
estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that
when he guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was
likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office which was
forfeited by reason of he conviction. And, in considering her qualifications and suitability for
the public post, the facts constituting he offense must be and should be evaluated and taken
into account to determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with public
funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her
former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure
required for a new appointment.

Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317

The Supreme court, on the strength of the foregoing constitutional provision, declared as
unconstitutional EO No. 284 which, in effect, allowed Cabinet Members, their undersecretaries
and assistant secretaries and other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold
other positions in the government albeit subject to limitations imposed therein. The Court
explained

Being head of an executive department is no mean job. It is more than a full time job, requiring
full attention, specialized knowledge, skills and expertise. If maximum benefits are to be
derived from a department heads ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his
duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental offices or
employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among
too many positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency.
Surely the advantages to be derived from this concentration of attention, knowledge and
expertise, particularly at this stage of our national and economic development, far outweigh the
benefits, if any, that may be gained from a department head spreading himself too thin and
taking in more that what he can handle.

Labo vs. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1

The Supreme Court, in this case, disqualified, for lack of citizenship, a city mayor who claimed
to have won the election by a resonant and thunderous majority.

The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988, a
citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself
because of his alienage. He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City
under Section 42 of the LGC. xxx

The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a futile technicality that
should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio City who elected him by a resonant and
thunderous majority. To be accurate, it was not as loud as all that, for his lead over the second
placer was only about 2,100 votes. In any event, the people of that locality could not have even
unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution.
The Electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of
Australia, or at least, a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the RP, to preside over them
as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their
countrymen.

Their right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines
cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who (a) are candidates for or are
occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed
forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
 2. Who may prescribe Qualifications

Qualifications may be prescribed by the constitution or by statute. The qualifications for

such officer as those of the President and the Supreme Court are specified directly by
the Constitution. The qualifications for statutory officers, like heads of bureaus and
local elective officials, are laid down by law, usually the statute creating their offices.

Qualification for public office, whether prescribed by the Constitution or by statute,

may not be changed by private agreement.

Where the Constitution itself creates or provides for the creation of the office but
prescribes no qualifications, the legislature may repair the omission and supply the
qualification itself.

3. Scope of Qualifications

When laid down by the Constitution itself, the qualifications are usually enumerated in
an exclusive manner.
But if only minimum qualifications are required by the Constitution, or if no
qualifications are prescribed therein, the legislature is not prohibited from prescribing
additional qualifications.

The legislature can prescribe qualifications in a general manner only so as to allow the
widest possible field of choice.
Additionally, the qualification prescribed, to be valid must be relevant to the position.

To summarize, the following are the limitations on the power of the legislature to
prescribe qualifications:

1. The legislature may not be reduce or increase the qualifications prescribed in an

exclusive manner by the constitution.
2. The legislature may prescribe only general qualifications.
3. The qualifications must be relevant to the office for which they are prescribed.

4. Duration of Qualifications

The prescribed qualifications should be possessed at the earliest on the date indicated
by the Constitution or the law.
Under this rule, a person who did not possess the age qualification at the time of his
appointment would nonetheless be eligible if he had already reached the prescribed age
before actually assuming the office.

Qualifications are continuing requirements and so must be possessed not only on the
date of election or assumption but for the full duration of the officers incumbency. The
moment any of such qualifications is lost during tenure, the right to the office is also
automatically forfeited.
Yee vs. Director of Public Schools, 7 SCRA 832

In the actual case of Yee vs. Director of Public Schools, a public school teacher lost her
position as such when she married a Chinese and so, under the 1935 Constitution, acquired his
Citizenship. In this case, the Supreme Court held that a voluntary change of citizenship or
change thereof by operation of law disqualifies the public officer from continuing to hold the
civil service position to which he had qualified and had been appointed.

Qualification as an Act

The term qualification is interpreted in another sense, to wit, as an act by which

the public functionary formally commences the discharge of his official duties. This is
effected by the taking of an oath or the filing of a bond, or both in the case of certain
officers.

Failure to Qualify
Mere delay in qualifying does not result in automatic forfeiture of the office. The
prevailing view is that such delay entry into the office at a later time on the ground that
the same has been abandoned.

CHAPTER 3

DE FACTO OFFICERS

Rationale
The members of the Public dealing with the government are not supposed to verify the
credentials of every functionary exercising officials functions. They have the right to
presume that he is the officer he assumes to be.

It is not only the acts of the lawful officer that are regarded as valid and binding. Insofar
as third persons are concerned, legal effect is also accorded to certain acts of a person
whose title is presumptively legitimate, that is, who reasonably appears to be the officer
he assumes to be, although he really does not have valid title to the position he is
holding. Such a person is known as de facto officer.

An officer de facto is one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon
principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the
public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised:

Distinctions

De Jure Officer
Is one who has lawful title to the officer but has not been able to take possession
of it or has been ousted therefrom.
Has title
Is one who is validly appointed to a position.

De Facto Officer
 Is one who actually possesses the office although he has an imperfect or colorable
title thereto.
Has color of title, as distinguished from the usurper or intruder who has neither
title nor color of title.
May ripen into an officer de jure
One who is in possession of the office and discharging its duties under color of
authority, and by color of authority is meant that derived from an election or
appointment, however, irregular or informal.

Requisites of de facto officership

The condition and elements of de facto officership are the following:

1. There must be a de jure office;
2. There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public;
3. There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.

Tayko vs. Capistrano, 53 Phil 866

The Supreme Court declared briefly defined, a de facto judge is one who exercises the
duties of a judicial office under color of an appointment or election thereto. He differs,
on the one hand from a mere usurper, who undertakes to act officially without any
color of title, and on the other hand, from a judge de jure, who is in all respects legally
appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not expired.
Apart from any constitutional or statutory regulation on the subject, there
seems to be a general rule of law that an incumbent of an office will hold over after the
conclusion of his term until the election and qualification of a successor. When a judge
in good faith remains in office after his title has ended, he is a de facto officer.
Applying this principles stated to the facts set forth on the petition before us, we
cannot escape the conclusion that, on the assumption that said facts are true, the
respondent judge must be considered a judge de facto. His term of office may have
expired, but his successor has not been appointed, and as good faith is presumed, he
must be regarded as holding over in good faith. The contention of counsel for
petitioners that the auxiliary judge present in the district must be considered the regular
judge seems obviously erroneous.

Rodriguez vs. Tan, 91 Phil 724

The Supreme Court ruled in this case, a candidate proclaimed in an election irregularly
held will be a de facto officer before the nullification of the election as such election will
give him color or title to the office from which he is ultimately ousted.

There is no question that the defendant acted as a de facto officer during the
time he held the office of senator, he was one of the candidates of the Liberal Party in
the elections in 1947, and was proclaimed as one of those who had been elected by the
Commission on Elections, and thereafter he took the oath of office and immediately
entered into the performance of the duties of the position.
Regala vs. CFI of Bataan, 77 Phil 684

In this case, it was further held that a judge who had denied a motion for
reconsideration before his receipt of the official notification of the disapproval of his
appointment by the Commission on Appointments, as reported in the newspapers, was
a de facto officer. Accordingly, all his official acts as judge de facto are valid for all legal
purposes and for all kinds of cases, like those of a judge de jure.

Solis vs. CA, 38 SCRA 53

In this case, a decision rendered by a judge was, one day after he ceased to be so with
the abolition of his court, promulgated under another judge. The Supreme Court
declared that the judgment void. for it is now firmly established in our jurisprudence
that a decision is void if promulgated after the judge who rendered it had permanently
ceased to be a judge of the court where he sat in judgment. To the argument that he
should be considered a de facto judge, Justice J.B.L Reyes said

The main ground upon which the CA held the contested judgment of the CFI to
be valid is that since the approval of RA 1186, effective 20 June 1954, Judge Leuterio
should be considered a judge de facto of said court and the promulgation of his
appealed decision on said date is valid and legally effective. This is a misapplication of
the doctrine laid down in the very case cited by the CA. In Lina Luna vs. Rodriguez,
supra, a judge de facto was defined as one who has the reputation of being the officer
he assumed to be and yet is not good officer in point of law because there exists some
defect in his appointment or his right to exercise judicial functions at that particular
time; but it is essential to the validity of the acts of a de facto judge that he is actually
acting under some color of right. In the present case, Judge Leuterio did not actually act
or perform or exercise the duties of judge when his decision was promulgated, as he
had ceased to be one, and the decision was promulgated under another presiding judge.
The other cases cited by the CA were similarly misaaplied, as said decision refer to the
acts of a de facto judge, not to a case where he did not act.

Monroy vs. CA, 20 SCRA 620

Also considered by the Supreme Court as de facto officers were a senator who was later
defeated in an election protest and, in this case, a mayor who insisted on remaining as
such notwithstanding his forfeiture of his office when he filed a certificate of candidacy
for another position.
Accordingly, it was held in this case that, as a de facto officer, the mayor who
had forfeited his office by running for another position but nonetheless insisted on
remaining as mayor and so prevented the vice mayor from succeeding him, should pay
all the salaries collected by him to the latter as the de jure successors. As the Supreme
Court put it
It is general rule then, i.e. that the rightful incumbent of a public office may
recover from an officer de facto the salary received by the latter during the time of his
wrongful tenure, even though, he entered into the office in good faith and under color
of title that applies in the present case. The resulting hardship occasioned by the
operation of this rule to the de facto officer who did actual work is recognized; but it is
far more cogently acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has been formulated, not for
the protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for the protection of the
public office and individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons
discharging the duties of an office without being lawful officers. The question of
compensation involves different principles and concepts however. A de facto officer,
not having good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must therefore account to the de
jure officer for whatever amount of salary he received during the period of his wrongful
retention of public office.

Effects of Acts of De facto officers

It has already been suggested that the lawful acts of an officer de facto, so far as
the rights of third persons are concerned, are, if done within the scope and by the
apparent authority of the office, considered as valid and binding as if he were the
officer legally elected and qualified for the office and in full possession thereof.

Menzon vs. Petilla, 197 SCRA 251

In this case the Supreme Court sustaining a de facto officers right to emoluments while
actually discharging the duties of the office of Vice-Governor, declared
In view of the foregoing, the petitioners right to be paid the salary attached to
the office of the vice governor is indubitable. x x x
Even granting that the President, acting through the Secretary of Local
Government, possesses no power to appoint the petitioner, at the very least, the
petitioner is a de facto officer entitled to compensation.
There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office of the Vice-Governor
under color of a known appointment. As revealed by the records, the petitioner was
appointed by no less than the alter ego of the President, the Secretary of Local
Government, after which he took his oath of office before senator Alberto Romulo in the
Office of DILG RD Res Salvatierra.
The petitioner, for a long period of time, exercised the duties attached to the
office of the Vice-Governor. He was acclaimed as such by the people of Leyte. Upon the
principle of public policy on which the de facto doctrine is based and basic
consideration of justice, it would be highly iniquitous to now deny him the salary due
him for services he actually rendered as the acting Vice Governor of the Province of
Leyte

CHAPTER 4

Significantly, the Administrative Code of 1987, which reaffirms most of the provisions
of the Civil Service Decree of 1975, likewise reiterates the policy declaration specified in
said Civil Service Law and adds that the Civil Service Commission shall further

a. Promote responsiveness and courtesy in the civil service;

b. Strengthen the merit and rewards system;
c. Integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks;
and
d. Institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability.
Positions in the Civil Service are classified into the career service and the non career
service.

National Service Corporation vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122

As ruled by the SC in this case, the government owned or controlled corporations

included in the civil service under the 1987 Constitution are only those created by
Special Law, or given legislative charters, and not those established under or on the
basis of the provision of the corporation code. In said case, the Supreme Court further
ruled that the civil service does not include government owned or controlled
corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of government owned or controlled
corporations under the general corporation law.

The career service is characterized by:

(1) Entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by
competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications;
(2) Opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and
(3) Security of tenure.

The career service includes:

1. Open career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an
appropriate examination is required;
2. Closed career positions which are scientific or highly technical in nature; these
include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities and
scientific and technical positions on scientific research institutions which shall
establish and maintain their own merit system;
3. Position in the career executive service;
4. Career officers, other than those in the career executive service, who are
appointed by the president, such as foreign service officers in the Department of
Foreign Affairs;
5. Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall
maintain a separate system;
6. Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing
governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career
service; and
7. Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled.

The NON-CAREER SERVICE is characterized by

(1) Entrance on bases other than those of usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for
the career service; and
(2) Tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is co-terminous
with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is
limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment
was made.

The non-career service includes:

1. Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
2. Department heads and other officials of cabinet ranks;
 3. Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office
and their personal or confidential staff;
4. Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in
accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring
special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be
accomplished within a specified period, which in no case shall exceed one year,
and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own
responsibility with minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring
agency; and
5. Emergency and seasonal personnel.

Appointments
Appointments in the Civil Service may be either permanent or temporary.

Permanent appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements
for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of laws, rules and standards promulgated
in pursuance thereof.

Temporary appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements
for the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service
eligibility; provided, that such temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months,
but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes
available.

Juco vs. NLRC, GR No. 98107, 18 August 1997

Maturan vs. Maglana, 113 SCRA 268

It has further been ruled in this case, that, where a temporary appointee acquires civil
service eligibility during his tenure as such, his temporary appointment does not
thereby automatically become permanent. Thus
The fact that petitioner subsequently obtained a testimonial eligibility on
October 10, 1974 is of no moment. At the time he received his appointment, as
aforestated, petitioner had no eligibility. As such, what is required is a new
appointment.

At this juncture, a distinction should also be made between a regular appointment and
an ad interim appointment.

Regular appointment
1. Is made during the legislative session;
2. Is made only after the nomination is confirmed by the COA;
3. Once confirmed by COA, continues until the end of the term of the appointee;
4.
Ad interim appointment
1. Is made during recess;
2. Is made before such confirmation;
 3. Appointment shall cease to be valid if disapproved by the COA or upon the next
adjournment of the congress;
4. Intended to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official duties;

Exceptions
Excepted from the requirement for competitive examinations are the followings:

1. A policy determining is one charged with the laying down of principal or

fundamental guidelines and rules, such as that of a head of a department.
2. A primary confidential is one which denotes not only confidence in the
aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office by primarily close intimacy
which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from
misgivings or betreyals of personal trust or confidential matter of state; or one
declared to be so by the president upon recommendation of the civil service
commission;
3. A highly technical position requires the appointee thereto to possess technical
skill or training in the supreme or superior degree.

Corpus vs. Cuaderno, 13 SCRA 591

Pineda vs. Claudio, 28 SCRA 34

Monsanto vs. Factoran, 170 SCRA 190

SSS Employees Association vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686
TUCP vs. NHA, 173 SCRA 33
Garcia vs. COA, GR No. L-75025, 14 September 1993

Termination of Official Relations

The grounds for impeachment are listed in the constitution likewise in an exclusive
manner. They are:
1. Culpable violation of the constitution
2. Treason;
3. Bribery
4. Other high crimes;
5. Graft and corruption
6. Betrayal of public trust;

Death
Death terminates the incumbent right to the office as it terminates everything else.
However, whether the office will be immobilized as a result will depend on the nature
of the office and provisions for automatic suspension.

Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 130872, 25 March 1999

Estrada vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 146738, 2 March 2001
Collantes vs. CA, GR No. 169604, 6 March 2007
General Manager, PPA vs. Monserate, GR No. 139616, 17 April 2002
Municipality of San Andres vs. CA, GR No. 118883, 16 January 1998
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317