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FIRST DIVISION

ESTATE OF HONORIO G.R. No. 192391

POBLADOR, JR., represented by
RAFAEL A. POBLADOR, Present:
Petitioner,
SERENO, C.J, Chairperson,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO,
PERLAS-BERNABE, and
ROSARIO L. MANZANO, CAGUIOA, JJ.
Respondent.

Promulgated:

JUN 1~ 2017 A ..----

x---------------------------------------------------------------~:_----------x

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the

Decision2 dated September 30, 2009 and the Resolution3 dated May 26,
2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78891 that denied
the appeal of petitioner Estate of Honorio Poblador, Jr. (petitioner),
represented by Rafael A. Poblador (Rafael), from the Order4 dated January
13, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC).
Petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the dismissed criminal case for Esta/a
which it filed against respondent Rosario L. Manzano (Manzano).

Rollo, pp. 13-42.

Id. at 46-57. Penned by then Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of this Court) with
Associate Justices Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal and Antonio L. Villamor concurring.
Id. at 59. Penned by Associate Justice Antonio L. Villamor with Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr.
and Fiorito S. Macalino concurring.
4
CA rollo, pp. 21-25. Penned by Judge Esperanza Pabon-Victorino.

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 Decision 2 G.R. No. 192391

The Facts

Petitioner was the subject of settlement proceedings in Special

Proceedings No. 9984 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (Probate
Court). Among its properties was one share of stock in Wack-Wack Golf
and Country Club, Inc. (Wack-Wack Share) covered by membership
Certificate No. 3759 issued on September 17, 1974. 5

In an Order dated May 10, 1996, the Probate Court authorized

petitioner's administratrix, Elsa A. Poblador (Elsa), to negotiate the sale of
certain properties of petitioner, including the Wack-Wack Share. Upon
Elsa's instruction, Rafael (one of the heirs of the deceased Honorio
Poblador, Jr.) looked for interested buyers. Subsequently, he engaged the
services of Manzano, a broker of Metroland Holdings Incorporated
(Metroland) 6 who, on September 9, 1996, faxed a computation for the sale of
the Wack-Wack Share to petitioner, 7 showing a final net amount of
Pl5,000,000.00. On September 18, 1996, 8 the final net amount to the seller
was increased to Pl 5,200,000.00.

Manzano later introduced Rafael to Moreland Realty, Inc. (Moreland),

and in September 1996, the parties entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale9
with Elsa covering the Wack-Wack Share for the gross amount of
Pl8,000,000.00. Out of the Pl8,000,000.00 purchase price, Moreland
directly paid Elsa the amount of Pl 5,200,000.00 through a Metrobank
10
check. The balance of P2,800,000.00 was allegedly given to Manzano for
the payment of the capital gains tax, documentary stamp tax, and other
pertinent fees, as well as for her service fee. 11

In October 1996, however, the Probate Court annulled the sale of the
Wack-Wack Share. Thus, Elsa returned to Moreland the amount of
Pl 8,000,000.00 which the latter paid for the Wack-Wack Share, plus
interest, and applied with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) for the
refund of the taxes paid for the annulled sale. Petitioner likewise asked
Manzano to return the broker's service fee. 12

Meanwhile, Rafael, through petitioner's accountant, Nonilo P. Torres

(Torres), allegedly requested Manzano for an accounting of the
P2,800,000.00 she received on behalf of petitioner. In response, Manzano
faxed the following documents addressed to Torres: (a) Cover letter dated

Rollo, p. 17.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 60.
Id. at 61.
9
Id. at 62.
10
See acknowledgment receipt; id. at 63.
11
Id. at 18.
12
Id. at 18-19. See also CA rollo, p. 22.

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 Decision 3 G.R. No. 192391

February 4, 1997; 13 (b) Capital Gains Tax Return dated September 23, 1996
indicating the payment of Pl,480,000.00 as capital gains tax; 14 (c) BIR
Certification dated September 23, 1996 indicating the payment of
Pl ,480,000.00 as capital gains tax; 15 (d) Authority to Accept Payment dated
September 23, 1996 indicating the payment of P 13 5, 000. 00 as documentary
stamp tax; 16 and (e) Deed of Absolute Sale between petitioner, represented
by Elsa, and Moreland. 17 Examining these documents, Rafael and Torres
allegedly noticed a discrepancy in the faxed Capital Gains Tax Return: while
the typewritten portion of the Return indicated Pl,480,000.00 as the capital
gains tax paid, the machine validation imprint reflected only P80,000.00 as
the amount paid. To clarify the discrepancy, petitioner secured a certified
true copy of the Capital Gains Tax Return from the BIR that reflected only
P80,000.00 as the capital gains tax paid for the sale of the Wack-Wack
19
Share. 18 As a result, petitioner demanded Manzano to properly account for
the P2,800,000.00 allegedly given to her for the payment of taxes and
broker's fees, but to no avail. 20 This led to the filing, on December 8, 1999,
of an Information21 for the crime of Esta/a under Article 315, paragraph (1)
(b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Manzano before the RTC,
docketed as Crim. Case No. 113549. 22 In the course of the proceedings,
Manzano filed a Demurrer to Evidence23 praying for the dismissal of the
case for failure of the prosecution to establish the essential elements of
Esta/a with which she was charged. 24

The RTC Ruling

In an Order25 dated January 13, 2003, the RTC granted Manzano's

Demurrer to Evidence and dismissed the complaint for Esta/a for failure of
the prosecution to "prove all the elements of estafa through misappropriation
as defined in and penalized under paragraph 1 (b )[, Article 315] of the
Revised Penal Code, x x x. " 26 The RTC found that the element of deceit was
absent, considering that both Manzano and Rafael were equally guilty of
defrauding the government of taxes actually due on the transaction. It
pointed out that Rafael knew and concurred with the plan, including the
special arrangements that had to be made with the BIR, as long as the estate
would receive a higher net proceed from the sale. In fact, petitioner received
in full the agreed net sale proceeds of P15,200,000.00. Finally, it held that
Manzano was entitled to her broker's fee in the amount of P900,000.00 as
13
Id. at 64.
14
Id. at 65.
15
Id. at 66.
16
Id. at 67.
17
Id. at 19-20 and 62.
18
Id. at 20.
19
Id. at 69-70.
20
Id. at 20-21.
21
CA rollo, pp. 26-27.
22
Rollo, p. 21.
23
Not attached to the rollo.
24
Rollo, p. 47.
25
CA rollo, pp. 21-25.
26
Id. at 25.

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 Decision 4 G.R. No. 192391

she was commissioned and successfully closed the transaction for

. . 27
pet1t10ner.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration28 which the

RTC denied in an Order29 dated March 11, 2003. Hence, petitioner appealed
the civil aspect of the case before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision30 dated September 30, 2009, the CA denied petitioner's

appeal, declaring that the prosecution did not only fail to prove all the
31
elements of Esta/a through misappropriation; it also failed to prove the
alleged civil liability of Manzano in the amount of P2,800,000.00. 32

It found that the prosecution's evidence failed to show that Manzano

personally received the P2,800,000.00 earmarked for the payment of taxes
and broker's fees. 33 At most, such evidence only proved that Manzano tried
to help broker and negotiate the sale of the Wack-Wack Share. 34 In fact,
Rafael himself admitted that he was unsure if Manzano indeed received the
P2,800,000.00. Neither could he state the date when she supposedly received
the same. 35

Moreover, the CA stressed that: (a) petitioner readily admitted receipt

of the full amount of PIS,200,000.00 - the amount agreed upon in the
computation sent by Manzano - for the sale of the Wack-Wack Share which
was paid with a check by the buyer, Moreland Realty, Inc., and
acknowledged by Elsa A. Poblador; 36 (b) Rafael made a categorical
admission that he did not even know who actually paid the taxes to the BIR
and that the name of Manzano did not appear in the documents with respect
to the payment of the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax; 37 and (c)
petitioner knew that Manzano was merely an employee of Metroland, who
talked to and negotiated with it in such capacity, and with whom it would
not have dealt with had she not been Metroland's employee. 38

Finally, the CA observed that this is a case of pari delicto, as

petitioner's predicament would have been avoided if only Rafael sought the
27
Id. at 23-25.
28
Not attached to the rollo.
29
CA rollo, p. 13.
30
Rollo, pp. 46-57.
31
Id. at 52.
32
Id. at 54.
33 Id.
34
Id. at 55.
35
Id. at 54, citing Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) dated September 22, 1999 (pp. 41-42) and
October 26, 2000 (p. 4).
36
Id. at 55.
37
Id. at 56.
38 Id.

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 Decision 5 G.R. No. 192391

permission and approval of the Probate Court prior to the sale of the Wack-
Wack Share. 39

Aggrieved, petitioner sought reconsideration,40 which the CA denied

in a Resolution41 dated May 26, 2010; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in denying
petitioner's appeal on the civil liability ex delicto of Manzano.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

It is a fundamental rule that "[t]he acquittal of the accused does not

automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the
case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction
of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as
only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the
liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused
does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is
acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal
action that the [prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
accused, or the] act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist, or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission
imputed to him." 42

In the fairly recent case of Dy v. People, 43 the Court discussed the

concept of civil liability ex delicto in Esta/a cases under paragraph 1 (b ),
Article 315 of the RPC (with which Manzano was likewise charged), stating
that when the element of misappropriation or conversion is absent, there
can be no Estafa and concomitantly, the civil liability ex delicto does not
exist. Particularly, the Court said:

Our laws penalize criminal fraud which causes damage capable of

pecuniary estimation through estafa under Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code. In general, the elements of estafa are:

39 Id.
40
Dated October 22, 2009; CA rollo, pp. 240-255.
41
Rollo, p. 59. Penned by Associate Justice Antonio L. Villamor with Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes,
Jr. and Florito S. Macalino concurring.
42
Dayap v. Sendiong, 597 Phil. 127, 141 (2009). Citations omitted.
43
G.R. No. 189081, August 10, 2016.

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 Decision 6 G.R. No. 192391

(1) That the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence,

or (b) by means of deceit; and

(2) That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is

caused to the offended party or third person.

The essence of the crime is the unlawful abuse of confidence or

deceit in order to cause damage. As this Court previously held, "the
element of fraud or bad faith is indispensable." Our law abhors the act of
defrauding another person by abusing his trust or deceiving him, such that,
it criminalizes this kind of fraud.

Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code identifies the circumstances

which constitute estafa. Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) states that estafa is
committed by abuse of confidence -

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - ... (b) By misappropriating or

converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any
other personal property received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return
the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such
money, goods, or other property.

In this kind of estafa, the fraud which the law considers as

criminal is the act of misappropriation or conversion. When the
element of misappropriation or conversion is missing, there can be no
estafa. In such case, applying the foregoing discussions on civil
liability ex delicto, there can be no civil liability as there is no act or
omission from which any civil liability may be sourced. However, when
an accused is acquitted because a reasonable doubt exists as to the
existence of misappropriation or conversion, then civil liability may still
be awarded. This means that, while there is evidence to prove fraud, such
evidence does not suffice to convince the court to the point of moral
certainty that the act of fraud amounts to estafa. As the act was
nevertheless proven, albeit without sufficient proof justifying the
imposition of any criminal penalty, civil liability exists. 44

The Court further clarified that "whenever the elements of estafa are
not established, and that the delivery of any personal property was made
pursuant to a contract, any civil liability arising from the estafa cannot be
awarded in the criminal case. This is because the civil liability arising from
the contract is not civil liability ex delicto, which arises from the same act or
omission constituting the crime. Civil liability ex delicto is the liability
sought to be recovered in a civil action deemed instituted with the criminal
case." 45

In this case, the Court agrees with the findings of both the RTC and
the CA that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of estafa through
misappropriation as defined in, and penalized under, paragraph 1 (b ),
44
Id. Citation omitted.
45 Id.

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 Decision 7 G.R. No. 192391

[Article 315] of the [RPC]. 46 As the RTC aptly noted, Rafael, as the
representative of herein petitioner, very well knew of and concurred with the
entire arrangement, including those which had to be made with the BIR. In
fact, petitioner itself admitted that it received the full amount of
P15,200,000.00 - the full amount to which it was entitled to under the terms
of the sale of the Wack-Wack Share. For these reasons, petitioner could not
claim that it was deceived. Thus, absent the element of fraud, there could be
no misappropriation or conversion to speak of that would justify the charge
of Esta/a and, with it, the alleged civil liability ex delicto.

More significantly, the CA correctly observed that petitioner's

evidence utterly failed to show that Manzano personally received the
P2,800,000.00 from petitioner with the duty to hold it in trust for or to make
delivery to the latter. In fact, Rafael categorically admitted that he did not
even know who actually paid the taxes to the BIR, and that Manzano's name
did not appear in the documents pertaining to the payment of the capital
gains tax and documentary stamp tax. 47 This admission clearly contradicts
the disputable presumption under Section 3 (q) of Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court, i.e., that the ordinary course of business has been followed, which
petitioner adamantly relies on to support its claim.

A presumption is an assumption of fact resulting from a rule of law

which requires such fact to be assumed from another fact or group of facts
found or otherwise established in the action. 48 It is an inference of the
existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw from
proof of other facts. 49 However, a presumption is not evidence,50 but
merely affects the burden of offering evidence. 51 Under Section 3, Rule
131, disputable presumptions are satisfactory, if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence, as in this case.
Apart from Rafael's admission, petitioner further admitted that: (!!)
Moreland directly paid Metroland the P2,800,000.00 in check although it did
not actually see and was unaware to whom Moreland gave this check; 52 (!!.) it
did not ask Moreland to issue the check for the payment of the taxes directly
in the name of the BIR; 53 (.) it would not have dealt with Manzano had she
not been Metroland' s employee; 54 and (ff) it has several lawyers and an
accountant at its disposal, and its representative Rafael is, in fact, in the real
estate business and is familiar with brokerage transactions. 55

46
Rollo, p. 50.
47
Rollo, p. 54. See also TSN, August 24, 2000, pp. 22-23; and May 2, 2001, pp. 11-12.
48
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1067 citing Uniform Rule 13; NJ Evidence Rule 13.
49
See Delgado vda. de Da la Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian, 516 Phil. 130, 145
(2006).
50
See Riano, Evidence (The Bar Lecture Series), (2009), p. 427, citing California Evidence Code in
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1167.
51
See Riano, Evidence (The Bar Lecture Series), (2009), p. 427, citing 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence,
Sec. 64.
52
TSN, September 22, 1999, pp. 41-42; and October 26, 2000, p. 4
53
TSN, October 26, 2000, pp. 11-12
54
TSN, October 26, 2000, pp. 10-12.
55
TSN, September 22, 1999, pp. 43-44; and August 24, 2000, pp. 2-4 and 13.

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 Decision 8 G.R. No. 192391

With these admissions and under these circumstances, it is thus safe to

conclude that the parties deliberately deviated from the ordinary course of
business, and that - at the very least - Manzano did not deal with it in bad
faith. By and large, petitioner failed to prove even by preponderance of
evidence 56 the existence of any act or omission of Manzano that would
support its claim of civil liability ex delicto. In consequence, the present
petition must fail.

As a final point, it deserves mentioning that in petitions for review

on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law are
addressed. It is not the Court's function to analyze or weigh the evidence
(which tasks belong to the trial court as the trier of facts and to the appellate
court as the reviewer of facts). The Court is confined to the review of errors
of law that may have been committed in the judgment under review. 57 "The
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of
Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it,
its findings of fact being conclusive." 58

All told, the Court finds no reversible error in the CA ruling denying
petitioner's appeal as its findings and conclusion are well supported by the
facts and are founded in law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated

September 30, 2009 and the Resolution dated May 26, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78891 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
JAR-~
ESTELA l\f. ~ERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

56
Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court defines "burden of proof'' as "the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence
required by law." In civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, who is required to
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Once the plaintiff has established his case,
the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant, who, in tum, has the burden to establish his defense.
(See Sps. De Leon v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 721 Phil. 839, 848 (2013), citing Aznar v.
Citibank, N.A., (Philippines), 548 Phil. 218, 230 (2007) and Jison v. CA, 350 Phil. 138, 173 (1998);
and Far East Bank & Trust Company v. Chante, 719 Phil. 221 [2013]).
57
See Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co, Inc. v. People of the Philippines, 721 Phil. 760, 769 (2013).
58
See id. at 770, citing Chan v. CA, 144 Phil. 678, 684 (1970), in Rema/ante v. Tibe, 241 Phil. 930, 935
(1988).
 Decision 9 G.R. No. 192391

~~~~
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
~.?
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

/ ~

/LF~
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice