Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects
of the current of the water- belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of
rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-
up river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian
owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.

Antecedents

Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent
Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the
registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or
less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City, and was bounded in the
Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.),
in the Southeast by the Paraaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road,
and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.1

On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to
include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latters co-ownership of the
property. He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and had
been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for
more than 30 years.2

The City of Paraaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration,
stating that it needed the property for its flood control program; that the property
was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming
that the property was not covered by the legal easement, title to the property could
not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was an
orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion.3

Ruling of the RTC

On May 10, 2000,4 the RTC granted the application for land registration, disposing:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS,
III and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos and of legal age, as the TRUE and
ABSOLUTE OWNERS of the land being applied for which is situated in the Barangay
of San Dionisio, City of Paraaque with an area of one thousand forty five (1045)
square meters more or less and covered by Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000343, being
a portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case 4, Paraaque Cadastre, LRC Rec. No. and orders
the registration of Lot 4998-B in their names with the following technical
description, to wit:

xxxx

Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the corresponding Order for
the Issuance of the Decree be issued.

SO ORDERED.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed.

Ruling of the CA

In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to the RTC,5 to wit:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE

REGISTERED IS AN ACCRETION TO THE ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNED BY
APPELLEES DESPITE THE ADMISSION OF APPELLEE ARCADIO C. SANTOS JR. THAT
THE SAID PROPERTY WAS NOT FORMED AS A RESULT OF THE GRADUAL FILLING
UP OF SOIL THROUGH THE CURRENT OF THE RIVER.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND

REGISTRATION DESPITE APPELLEES FAILURE TO FORMALLY OFFER IN
EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND IS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.

III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEES HAD SUFFICIENTLY
ESTABLISHED THEIR CONTINUOUS, OPEN, PUBLIC AND ADVERSE OCCUPATION OF
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.

On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.6

The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on
October 20, 2003.7

Issues

Hence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that:8

RESPONDENTS CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN ACCRETION TO

THEIR ADJOINING LAND THAT WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTER IT UNDER
ARTICLE 457 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS CONTRADICTED BY THEIR OWN
EVIDENCE.

II

ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED WAS "PREVIOUSLY A

PART OF THE PARAAQUE RIVER WHICH BECAME AN ORCHARD AFTER IT DRIED
UP," THE REGISTRATION OF SAID PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS
CANNOT BE ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL CODE.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT

THE FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL
CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
IS FATAL TO THEIR APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.

IV

THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE

CONTINUOUSLY, OPENLY, PUBLICLY AND ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY WELL-
NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE.

To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable
herein; and whether or not respondents could claim the property by virtue of
acquisitive prescription pursuant to Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree).
Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

I.

The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to respondents
benefit

Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of
the currents of the waters."

In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows:

On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds that
Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land
subject of this application which was previously a part of the Paraaque River which
became an orchard after it dried up and further considering that Lot 4 which adjoins
the same property is owned by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was obtained
by him through inheritance from his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now deceased.
Conformably with Art. 457 of the New Civil Code, it is provided that:

"Article 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters."9

The CA upheld the RTCs pronouncement, holding:

It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of
the waters" (Article 457 New Civil Code) as in this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and
Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land which was previously part of the
Paraaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and considering that Lot
4 which adjoins the same property is owned by the applicant which was obtained by
the latter from his mother (Decision, p. 3; p. 38 Rollo).10

The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of Article
457 of the Civil Code was erroneous in the face of the fact that respondents
evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the Paraaque
River.

The Republics submission is correct.

Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to
establish the merits of their application by a preponderance of evidence, by which is
meant such evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing than that offered
in opposition to it.11 They would be held entitled to claim the property as their own
and apply for its registration under the Torrens system only if they established that,
indeed, the property was an accretion to their land.

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of
rivers.12 The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and
imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c)
taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.13

Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the elements of

accretion to warrant the grant of their application for land registration.

However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show
that the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the
current of the river had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed that the
property was the dried-up river bed of the Paraaque River, leading both the RTC
and the CA to themselves hold that Lot 4998-B was "the land which was previously
part of the Paraaque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it dried up."

Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet exist when the
original title of Lot 4 was issued in their mothers name in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B
came about only thereafter as the land formed between Lot 4 and the Paraaque
River, the unavoidable conclusion should then be that soil and sediments had
meanwhile been deposited near Lot 4 by the current of the Paraaque River,
resulting in the formation of Lot 4998-B.

The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents thereby
ignore that the effects of the current of the river are not the only cause of the
formation of land along a river bank. There are several other causes, including the
drying up of the river bed. The drying up of the river bed was, in fact, the uniform
conclusion of both lower courts herein. In other words, respondents did not
establish at all that the increment of land had formed from the gradual and
imperceptible deposit of soil by the effects of the current. Also, it seems to be highly
improbable that the large volume of soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with
an area of 1,045 square meters had been deposited in a gradual and imperceptible
manner by the current of the river in the span of about 20 to 30 years the span of
time intervening between 1920, when Lot 4 was registered in the name of their
deceased parent (at which time Lot 4998-B was not yet in existence) and the early
1950s (which respondents witness Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when he
knew them to have occupied Lot 4988-B). The only plausible explanation for the
substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-up bed of the Paraaque
River. Confirming this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.s own testimony to the effect that
the property was previously a part of the Paraaque River that had dried up and
become an orchard.
We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.s own Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 44687 confirmed the uniform conclusion of the RTC and the CA that Lot
4998-B had been formed by the drying up of the Paraaque River. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 44687 recited that Lot 4 of the consolidated subdivision plan
Pcs-13-002563, the lot therein described, was bounded "on the SW along line 5-1 by
Dried River Bed."14

That boundary line of "SW along line 5-1" corresponded with the location of Lot
4998-B, which was described as "bounded by Lot 4079 Cad. 299, (Lot 1, Psu-10676),
in the name of respondent Arcadio Santos, Jr. (Now Lot 4, Psd-13-002563) in the
Northeast."15

The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion
that became respondents property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That
land was definitely not an accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry
land involved the recession of the water level from the river banks, and the dried-up
land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible
deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion,
the water level did not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents
as the riparian owners had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B.
Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article 457 of the Civil Code
has confined the provision only to accretion, we should apply the provision as its
clear and categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the
language of the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation;
there is only room for application.16 The first and fundamental duty of courts is then
to apply the law.17

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of
ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their
natural beds are public dominion of the State.18 It follows that the river beds that dry
up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the

State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides
that the dried-up river beds should belong to some other person.19

II

Acquisitive prescription was

not applicable in favor of respondents

The RTC favored respondents application for land registration covering Lot 4998-B
also because they had taken possession of the property continuously, openly,
publicly and adversely for more than 30 years based on their predecessor-in-
interest being the adjoining owner of the parcel of land along the river bank. It
rendered the following ratiocination, viz:20
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicants became the owners
thereof, they took possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly
and adversely for more than thirty (30) years because their predecessors-in-
interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river bank.
Furthermore, the fact that applicants paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per
subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land
Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OICChief, Surveys
Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not
a portion of the Paraaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000,
thus, the Court opts to grant the application.

Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicants in this case and in
view of the foregoing reports of the Department of Agrarian Reforms, Land
Registration Authority and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
the Court finds and so holds that the applicants have satisfied all the requirements
of law which are essential to a government grant and is, therefore, entitled to the
issuance of a certificate of title in their favor. So also, oppositor failed to prove that
the applicants are not entitled thereto, not having presented any witness.

In fine, the application is GRANTED.

As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.

Both lower courts erred.

The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree), which pertinently states:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
[Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

xxxx

Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove
the following, namely: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a
bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.21
The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that respondents "took
possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for
more than thirty (30) years."22

Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the CA, are accorded the highest degree of respect, and generally will
not be disturbed on appeal, with such findings being binding and conclusive on the
Court,23 the Court has consistently recognized exceptions to this rule, including the
following, to wit: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the
case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main
and reply briefs are not disputed by respondent; and (j) when the findings of fact
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record.24

Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; and that the inference made by the RTC and the CA was manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible. Hence, the Court should now review the findings.

In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open, public and adverse
possession of the land for more than 30 years, the RTC declared:

In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicant became the owners
thereof, they took possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly
and adversely for more than thirty years because their predecessor in interest are
the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river banks.
Furthermore, the fact that the applicant paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per
subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land
Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC Chief, Surveys
Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not
a portion of the Paraaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000,
thus, the Court opts to grant the application.

The RTC apparently reckoned respondents period of supposed possession to be

"more than thirty years" from the fact that "their predecessors in interest are the
adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land." Yet, its decision nowhere indicated
what acts respondents had performed showing their possession of the property
"continuously, openly, publicly and adversely" in that length of time. The decision
mentioned only that they had paid realty taxes and had caused the survey of the
property to be made. That, to us, was not enough to justify the foregoing findings,
because, firstly, the payment of realty taxes did not conclusively prove the payors
ownership of the land the taxes were paid for,25 the tax declarations and payments
being mere indicia of a claim of ownership;26 and, secondly, the causing of surveys of
the property involved was not itself an of continuous, open, public and adverse
possession.

The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of
soil does not need to make an express act of possession, and that no acts of
possession are necessary in that instance because it is the law itself that pronounces
the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit created
by the current of the water becomes manifest27 has no applicability herein. This is
simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership
of the land adjacent to the river bank by respondents predecessor-in-interest did
not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive
prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.

On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open, public and adverse
possession of Lot 4998-B was not even validated or preponderantly established. The
admission of respondents themselves that they declared the property for taxation
purposes only in 1997 and paid realty taxes only from 199928 signified that their
alleged possession would at most be for only nine years as of the filing of their
application for land registration on March 7, 1997.

Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-
B for more than thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby
acquire the land by prescription or by other means without any competent proof
that the land was already declared as alienable and disposable by the Government.
Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of its public
dominion.

Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public
dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code lists the properties
considered as part of public dominion, namely: (a) those intended for public use,
such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; and (b) those which
belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth. As earlier mentioned, Article
502 of the Civil Code declares that rivers and their natural beds are of public
dominion.

Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive prescription or

not was a question that the Court resolved in favor of the State in Celestial v.
Cachopero,29 a case involving the registration of land found to be part of a dried-up
portion of the natural bed of a creek. There the Court held:
As for petitioners claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up
bed of the Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession
and that of her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October
22, 1966, when she purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the
right of accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article
461 of the Civil Code, the same must fail.

Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not
susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse
possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an
imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. It
is only after the Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse
possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.

A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and
502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is property
of the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription. And, absent any declaration by the government, that a
portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.

xxxx

Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil
Code took effect, the subject land would clearly not belong to petitioner or her
predecessor-in-interest since under the aforementioned provision of Article 461,
"river beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the
waters ipso facto belong to the owners of the land occupied by the new course," and
the owners of the adjoining lots have the right to acquire them only after paying
their value.

And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are
applicable only when "river beds are abandoned through the natural change in the
course of the waters." It is uncontroverted, however, that, as found by both the
Bureau of Lands and the DENR Regional Executive Director, the subject land became
dry as a result of the construction an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation
Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:

The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370
applies only if there is a natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on
alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to accretions to lands
that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering our earlier
finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the
active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case at
bar and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian
owners.

The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part
of the land of the public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private
ownership. xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in
the course of a river, not where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is
not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a situation,
commentators are of the opinion that the dry river bed remains property of public
dominion. (Bold emphases supplied)

Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.30 No public land can
be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the
State.31 Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.32

Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares
river beds that are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the
waters as ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land occupied by the new course,
and which gives to the owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire only the
abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land affected by
the natural change of course of the waters only after paying their value), all river
beds remain property of public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive
prescription unless previously declared by the Government to be alienable and
disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already declared to be
alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the
property through prescription.

Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already classified as alienable
and disposable by the Government. They cite as proof of the classification as
alienable and disposable the following notation found on the survey plan, to wit:33

NOTE

ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD BL CYL. CONC. MONS 15 X
60CM

All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm

Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the Regional

Executive Director issued by the CENR-OFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996.
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Devt. on Jan. 3, 1968.

Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299

Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paranaque Cadastre.

Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot 4998-B was "inside" the
map "classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development on 03
Jan. 1968" sufficient proof of the propertys nature as alienable and disposable
public land?

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an

applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the
Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative
action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act
or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the alienability and disposability of
public land, we said in Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources v. Yap34 that:

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands
of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable.There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act
of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number
of years is alienable and disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action,

report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of
evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private
claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot
accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open
to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot
be assumed. They call for proof." (Emphasis supplied)
In Menguito v. Republic,35 which we reiterated in Republic v. Sarmiento,36 we
specifically resolved the issue of whether the notation on the survey plan was
sufficient evidence to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, to
wit:

To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This
survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per
L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968,"
appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
"All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. x x x."

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must
overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the
public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to
a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence,
the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineers notation in

Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such
notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the
classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to
reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyors
assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been
declared alienable. (Emphasis supplied)

In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,37 we dealt with the sufficiency of the

certification by the Provincial Environmental Officer (PENRO) or Community
Environmental Officer (CENRO) to the effect that a piece of public land was alienable
and disposable in the following manner, viz:

x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary
had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration
falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy
by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to
prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because
the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the
land is alienable and disposable.

Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the certifications

submitted by respondent.1wphi1 The government officials who issued the
certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents.
The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of
the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and
admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is
alienable and disposable.

xxxx

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove
that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the
DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance,
prove the facts stated therein. Such government certifications may fall under the
class of documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132.
As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date
of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. (Emphasis supplied)

These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-
B, Cad-00-000343 to the effect that the "survey is inside a map classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Devt" did not prove that Lot 4998-B
was already classified as alienable and disposable. Accordingly, respondents could
not validly assert acquisitive prescription of Lot 4988-B.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on May 27, 2003; DISMISSES the application for registration
of Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B with a
total area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay San Dionisio,
Paraaque City, Metro Manila; and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively belonging
to the State for being part of the dried--up bed of the Parat1aque River.

Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects
of the current of the water- belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of
rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-
up river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian
owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.

Antecedents

Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent
Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the
registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or
less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City, and was bounded in the
Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.),
in the Southeast by the Paraaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road,
and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.1

On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to
include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latters co-ownership of the
property. He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and had
been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for
more than 30 years.2

The City of Paraaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration,
stating that it needed the property for its flood control program; that the property
was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming
that the property was not covered by the legal easement, title to the property could
not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was an
orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion.3
Ruling of the RTC

On May 10, 2000,4 the RTC granted the application for land registration, disposing:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS,
III and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos and of legal age, as the TRUE and
ABSOLUTE OWNERS of the land being applied for which is situated in the Barangay
of San Dionisio, City of Paraaque with an area of one thousand forty five (1045)
square meters more or less and covered by Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000343, being
a portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case 4, Paraaque Cadastre, LRC Rec. No. and orders
the registration of Lot 4998-B in their names with the following technical
description, to wit:

xxxx

Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the corresponding Order for
the Issuance of the Decree be issued.

SO ORDERED.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed.

Ruling of the CA

In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to the RTC,5 to wit:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE

REGISTERED IS AN ACCRETION TO THE ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNED BY
APPELLEES DESPITE THE ADMISSION OF APPELLEE ARCADIO C. SANTOS JR. THAT
THE SAID PROPERTY WAS NOT FORMED AS A RESULT OF THE GRADUAL FILLING
UP OF SOIL THROUGH THE CURRENT OF THE RIVER.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND

REGISTRATION DESPITE APPELLEES FAILURE TO FORMALLY OFFER IN
EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND IS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEES HAD SUFFICIENTLY

ESTABLISHED THEIR CONTINUOUS, OPEN, PUBLIC AND ADVERSE OCCUPATION OF
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.
On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.6

The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on
October 20, 2003.7

Issues

Hence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that:8

RESPONDENTS CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN ACCRETION TO

THEIR ADJOINING LAND THAT WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTER IT UNDER
ARTICLE 457 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS CONTRADICTED BY THEIR OWN
EVIDENCE.

II

ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED WAS "PREVIOUSLY A

PART OF THE PARAAQUE RIVER WHICH BECAME AN ORCHARD AFTER IT DRIED
UP," THE REGISTRATION OF SAID PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS
CANNOT BE ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL CODE.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT

THE FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL
CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
IS FATAL TO THEIR APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.

IV

THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE

CONTINUOUSLY, OPENLY, PUBLICLY AND ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY WELL-
NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE.

To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable
herein; and whether or not respondents could claim the property by virtue of
acquisitive prescription pursuant to Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree).

Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

I.

The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to respondents
benefit

Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of
the currents of the waters."

In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows:

On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds that
Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land
subject of this application which was previously a part of the Paraaque River which
became an orchard after it dried up and further considering that Lot 4 which adjoins
the same property is owned by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was obtained
by him through inheritance from his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now deceased.
Conformably with Art. 457 of the New Civil Code, it is provided that:

"Article 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters."9

The CA upheld the RTCs pronouncement, holding:

It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of
the waters" (Article 457 New Civil Code) as in this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and
Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land which was previously part of the
Paraaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and considering that Lot
4 which adjoins the same property is owned by the applicant which was obtained by
the latter from his mother (Decision, p. 3; p. 38 Rollo).10

The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of Article
457 of the Civil Code was erroneous in the face of the fact that respondents
evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the Paraaque
River.

The Republics submission is correct.

Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to
establish the merits of their application by a preponderance of evidence, by which is
meant such evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing than that offered
in opposition to it.11 They would be held entitled to claim the property as their own
and apply for its registration under the Torrens system only if they established that,
indeed, the property was an accretion to their land.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of
rivers.12 The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and
imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c)
taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.13

Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the elements of

accretion to warrant the grant of their application for land registration.

However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show
that the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the
current of the river had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed that the
property was the dried-up river bed of the Paraaque River, leading both the RTC
and the CA to themselves hold that Lot 4998-B was "the land which was previously
part of the Paraaque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it dried up."

Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet exist when the
original title of Lot 4 was issued in their mothers name in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B
came about only thereafter as the land formed between Lot 4 and the Paraaque
River, the unavoidable conclusion should then be that soil and sediments had
meanwhile been deposited near Lot 4 by the current of the Paraaque River,
resulting in the formation of Lot 4998-B.

The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents thereby
ignore that the effects of the current of the river are not the only cause of the
formation of land along a river bank. There are several other causes, including the
drying up of the river bed. The drying up of the river bed was, in fact, the uniform
conclusion of both lower courts herein. In other words, respondents did not
establish at all that the increment of land had formed from the gradual and
imperceptible deposit of soil by the effects of the current. Also, it seems to be highly
improbable that the large volume of soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with
an area of 1,045 square meters had been deposited in a gradual and imperceptible
manner by the current of the river in the span of about 20 to 30 years the span of
time intervening between 1920, when Lot 4 was registered in the name of their
deceased parent (at which time Lot 4998-B was not yet in existence) and the early
1950s (which respondents witness Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when he
knew them to have occupied Lot 4988-B). The only plausible explanation for the
substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-up bed of the Paraaque
River. Confirming this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.s own testimony to the effect that
the property was previously a part of the Paraaque River that had dried up and
become an orchard.

We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.s own Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 44687 confirmed the uniform conclusion of the RTC and the CA that Lot
4998-B had been formed by the drying up of the Paraaque River. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 44687 recited that Lot 4 of the consolidated subdivision plan
Pcs-13-002563, the lot therein described, was bounded "on the SW along line 5-1 by
Dried River Bed."14

That boundary line of "SW along line 5-1" corresponded with the location of Lot
4998-B, which was described as "bounded by Lot 4079 Cad. 299, (Lot 1, Psu-10676),
in the name of respondent Arcadio Santos, Jr. (Now Lot 4, Psd-13-002563) in the
Northeast."15

The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion
that became respondents property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That
land was definitely not an accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry
land involved the recession of the water level from the river banks, and the dried-up
land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible
deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion,
the water level did not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents
as the riparian owners had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B.
Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article 457 of the Civil Code
has confined the provision only to accretion, we should apply the provision as its
clear and categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the
language of the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation;
there is only room for application.16 The first and fundamental duty of courts is then
to apply the law.17

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of
ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their
natural beds are public dominion of the State.18 It follows that the river beds that dry
up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the

State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides
that the dried-up river beds should belong to some other person.19

II

Acquisitive prescription was

not applicable in favor of respondents

The RTC favored respondents application for land registration covering Lot 4998-B
also because they had taken possession of the property continuously, openly,
publicly and adversely for more than 30 years based on their predecessor-in-
interest being the adjoining owner of the parcel of land along the river bank. It
rendered the following ratiocination, viz:20

In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicants became the owners
thereof, they took possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly
and adversely for more than thirty (30) years because their predecessors-in-
interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river bank.
Furthermore, the fact that applicants paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per
subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land
Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OICChief, Surveys
Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not
a portion of the Paraaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000,
thus, the Court opts to grant the application.

Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicants in this case and in
view of the foregoing reports of the Department of Agrarian Reforms, Land
Registration Authority and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
the Court finds and so holds that the applicants have satisfied all the requirements
of law which are essential to a government grant and is, therefore, entitled to the
issuance of a certificate of title in their favor. So also, oppositor failed to prove that
the applicants are not entitled thereto, not having presented any witness.

In fine, the application is GRANTED.

As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.

Both lower courts erred.

The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree), which pertinently states:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
[Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

xxxx

Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove
the following, namely: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a
bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.21

The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that respondents "took
possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for
more than thirty (30) years."22
Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the CA, are accorded the highest degree of respect, and generally will
not be disturbed on appeal, with such findings being binding and conclusive on the
Court,23 the Court has consistently recognized exceptions to this rule, including the
following, to wit: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the
case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main
and reply briefs are not disputed by respondent; and (j) when the findings of fact
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record.24

Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; and that the inference made by the RTC and the CA was manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible. Hence, the Court should now review the findings.

In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open, public and adverse
possession of the land for more than 30 years, the RTC declared:

In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicant became the owners
thereof, they took possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly
and adversely for more than thirty years because their predecessor in interest are
the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river banks.
Furthermore, the fact that the applicant paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per
subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land
Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC Chief, Surveys
Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not
a portion of the Paraaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000,
thus, the Court opts to grant the application.

The RTC apparently reckoned respondents period of supposed possession to be

"more than thirty years" from the fact that "their predecessors in interest are the
adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land." Yet, its decision nowhere indicated
what acts respondents had performed showing their possession of the property
"continuously, openly, publicly and adversely" in that length of time. The decision
mentioned only that they had paid realty taxes and had caused the survey of the
property to be made. That, to us, was not enough to justify the foregoing findings,
because, firstly, the payment of realty taxes did not conclusively prove the payors
ownership of the land the taxes were paid for,25 the tax declarations and payments
being mere indicia of a claim of ownership;26 and, secondly, the causing of surveys of
the property involved was not itself an of continuous, open, public and adverse
possession.

The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of
soil does not need to make an express act of possession, and that no acts of
possession are necessary in that instance because it is the law itself that pronounces
the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit created
by the current of the water becomes manifest27 has no applicability herein. This is
simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership
of the land adjacent to the river bank by respondents predecessor-in-interest did
not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive
prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.

On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open, public and adverse
possession of Lot 4998-B was not even validated or preponderantly established. The
admission of respondents themselves that they declared the property for taxation
purposes only in 1997 and paid realty taxes only from 199928 signified that their
alleged possession would at most be for only nine years as of the filing of their
application for land registration on March 7, 1997.

Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-
B for more than thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby
acquire the land by prescription or by other means without any competent proof
that the land was already declared as alienable and disposable by the Government.
Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of its public
dominion.

Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public
dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code lists the properties
considered as part of public dominion, namely: (a) those intended for public use,
such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; and (b) those which
belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth. As earlier mentioned, Article
502 of the Civil Code declares that rivers and their natural beds are of public
dominion.

Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive prescription or

not was a question that the Court resolved in favor of the State in Celestial v.
Cachopero,29 a case involving the registration of land found to be part of a dried-up
portion of the natural bed of a creek. There the Court held:

As for petitioners claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up
bed of the Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession
and that of her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October
22, 1966, when she purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the
right of accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article
461 of the Civil Code, the same must fail.

Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not
susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse
possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an
imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. It
is only after the Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse
possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.

A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and
502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is property
of the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription. And, absent any declaration by the government, that a
portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.

xxxx

Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil
Code took effect, the subject land would clearly not belong to petitioner or her
predecessor-in-interest since under the aforementioned provision of Article 461,
"river beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the
waters ipso facto belong to the owners of the land occupied by the new course," and
the owners of the adjoining lots have the right to acquire them only after paying
their value.

And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are
applicable only when "river beds are abandoned through the natural change in the
course of the waters." It is uncontroverted, however, that, as found by both the
Bureau of Lands and the DENR Regional Executive Director, the subject land became
dry as a result of the construction an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation
Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:

The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370
applies only if there is a natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on
alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to accretions to lands
that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering our earlier
finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the
active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case at
bar and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian
owners.
The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part
of the land of the public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private
ownership. xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in
the course of a river, not where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is
not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a situation,
commentators are of the opinion that the dry river bed remains property of public
dominion. (Bold emphases supplied)

Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.30 No public land can
be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the
State.31 Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.32

Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares
river beds that are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the
waters as ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land occupied by the new course,
and which gives to the owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire only the
abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land affected by
the natural change of course of the waters only after paying their value), all river
beds remain property of public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive
prescription unless previously declared by the Government to be alienable and
disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already declared to be
alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the
property through prescription.

Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already classified as alienable
and disposable by the Government. They cite as proof of the classification as
alienable and disposable the following notation found on the survey plan, to wit:33

NOTE

ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD BL CYL. CONC. MONS 15 X
60CM

All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm

Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the Regional

Executive Director issued by the CENR-OFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996.

This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Devt. on Jan. 3, 1968.
Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299

Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paranaque Cadastre.

Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot 4998-B was "inside" the
map "classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development on 03
Jan. 1968" sufficient proof of the propertys nature as alienable and disposable
public land?

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an

applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the
Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative
action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act
or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the alienability and disposability of
public land, we said in Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources v. Yap34 that:

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands
of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable.There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act
of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number
of years is alienable and disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action,

report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of
evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private
claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot
accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open
to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot
be assumed. They call for proof." (Emphasis supplied)

In Menguito v. Republic,35 which we reiterated in Republic v. Sarmiento,36 we

specifically resolved the issue of whether the notation on the survey plan was
sufficient evidence to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, to
wit:
To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This
survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per
L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968,"
appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
"All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. x x x."

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must
overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the
public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to
a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence,
the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineers notation in

Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such
notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the
classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to
reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyors
assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been
declared alienable. (Emphasis supplied)

In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,37 we dealt with the sufficiency of the

certification by the Provincial Environmental Officer (PENRO) or Community
Environmental Officer (CENRO) to the effect that a piece of public land was alienable
and disposable in the following manner, viz:

x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary
had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration
falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy
by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to
prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because
the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the
land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the certifications
submitted by respondent.1wphi1 The government officials who issued the
certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents.
The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of
the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and
admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is
alienable and disposable.

xxxx

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove
that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the
DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance,
prove the facts stated therein. Such government certifications may fall under the
class of documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132.
As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date
of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. (Emphasis supplied)

These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-
B, Cad-00-000343 to the effect that the "survey is inside a map classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Devt" did not prove that Lot 4998-B
was already classified as alienable and disposable. Accordingly, respondents could
not validly assert acquisitive prescription of Lot 4988-B.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on May 27, 2003; DISMISSES the application for registration
of Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B with a
total area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay San Dionisio,
Paraaque City, Metro Manila; and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively belonging
to the State for being part of the dried--up bed of the Parat1aque River.

Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

 CASTRO Associate Justice
Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Records, Vol. I, pp. 13-15.

2 Id. at 138-142.

3 Id. at 255-258.

4 Records, Vol. II, pp. 519-523.

5 CA Rollo, p. 26.

6 Id.
at 99-107, penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-de la Cruz (retired),
concurred by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (retired/deceased) and
Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid.

7 Id. at 155.

8 Rollo, pp. 21-22.

9 Records, Vol. II, pp. 521-522.

10 CA Rollo, p. 105.

11 Riverav. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115625, January 23, 1998, 284 SCRA
673, 681.
12 Heirs
of Emiliano Navarro v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68166,
February 12, 1997, 268 SCRA 74, 85.

13 Republic v. Court of Appeals, No. L-61647, October 12, 1984, 132 SCRA
514, 520.

14 Records, Vol. 2, p. 428 (Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687).

15 Records, Vol. 1, pp. 138-139.

16 CebuPortland Cement Company v. Municipality of Naga, Cebu, Nos. 24116-

17, August 22, 1968, 24 SCRA 708, 712.

17 Quijanov. Development Bank of the Philippines, No. L-26419, October 16,

1970, 35 SCRA 270, 277.

18 The Civil Code states:

Article. 502. The following are of public dominion:

(1) Rivers and their natural beds;

xxx

19 II
Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, 1994, pp. 137-138, opines:

When River Dries Up. The present article contemplates a case where
a river bed is abandoned by a natural change in the course of the river,
which opens up a new bed. It has no reference to a case where the
river simply dries up. In fact, it cannot be applied at all to the drying
up of the river, because there are no persons whose lands are
occupied by the waters of the river.

Who shall own the river bed thus left dry? We believe that in such
case, the river bed will continue to remain property of public
dominion. Under article 502 of the Code, rivers and their natural beds
are property of public dominion. In the absence of any provision
vesting the ownership of the dried up river bed in some other person,
it must continue to belong to the State.

20 Records, Vol. II, p. 522.

21 Republic v. Alconaba, G.R. No. 155012, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 611, 617.

22 Rollo, pp. 32-36.

 23 Bulos, Jr. v. Yasuma, G.R. No. 164159, July 17, 2007, 527 SCRA 727, 737.

24 Citibank,
N.A. (formerly First National City Bank) v. Sabeniano, G.R. No.
156132, October 16, 2006, 504 SCRA 378, 409.

25 Ebreo v. Ebreo, G.R. No. 160065, February 28, 2006, 483 SCRA 583, 594;
Seria v. Caballero, G.R. No. 127382, August 17, 2004, 436 SCRA 593, 604;
Del Rosario v. Republic, G.R. No. 148338, June 6, 2002, 383 SCRA 262, 274;
Bartolome v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 76792, March 12, 1990,
183 SCRA 102, 112.

26 Ebreo v. Ebreo, supra; Heirs of Mariano, Juan, Tarcela and Josefa Brusas v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126875, August 26, 1999, 313 SCRA 176, 184;
Rivera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107903, May 22, 1995, 244 SCRA 218,
222; Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73246,
March 2, 1993, 219 SCRA 339, 348; San Miguel Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 57667, May 28, 1990, 185 SCRA 722, 725.

27 I
Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, 1994, p. 28.

28 Rollo, p. 88.

29 G.R. No. 142595, October 15, 2003, 413 SCRA 469, 485-489.

30 Republic v. Sayo, G.R. No. 60413, October 31, 1990, 191 SCRA 71, 74.

31 Gordula v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127296, January 22, 1998, 284 SCRA
617, 630.

32 Pagkatipunan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129682, March 21, 2002, 379
SCRA 621, 627.

33 Rollo, pp. 80-81.

34 G.R. No. 167707 and G.R. No. 173775, October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 164, 192-
193.

35 G.R. No. 134308, December 14, 2000, 348 SCRA 128, 139-140.

36 G.R. No. 169397, March 13, 2007, 518 SCRA 250, 259-260.

37 G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 477, 489-491

Collector of Internal Revenue vs Antonio Campos Rueda

42 SCRA 23 Political Law Definition of State
In January 1955, Maria Cerdeira died in Tangier, Morocco (an international zone
[foreign country] in North Africa). At the time of her death, she was a Spanish citizen
and was a resident of Tangier. She however left some personal properties (shares of
stocks and other intangibles) in the Philippines. The designated administrator of her
estate here is Antonio Campos Rueda.
In the same year, the Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR) assessed the estate for
deficiency tax amounting to about P161k. Campos Rueda refused to pay the
assessed tax as he claimed that the estate is exempt from the payment of said taxes
pursuant to section 122 of the Tax Code which provides:
That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible
personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident
of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer
tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible person property of
the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the
foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death
allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every
character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the
Philippines not residing in that foreign country.

Campos Rueda was able to prove that there is reciprocity between Tangier and the
Philippines.
However, the CIR still denied any tax exemption in favor of the estate as it averred
that Tangier is not a state as contemplated by Section 22 of the Tax Code and that
the Philippines does not recognize Tangier as a foreign country.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tangier is a state.
HELD: Yes. For purposes of the Tax Code, Tangier is a foreign country.
A foreign country to be identified as a state must be a politically organized sovereign
community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood,
legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under
a regime of law. The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite
territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign
will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international
personality.
Further, the Supreme Court noted that there is already an existing jurisprudence
(Collector vs De Lara) which provides that even a tiny principality, that of
Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the sense, did fall under the
exempt category provided for in Section 22 of the Tax Code. Thus, recognition is not
necessary. Hence, since it was proven that Tangier provides such exemption to
personal properties of Filipinos found therein so must the Philippines honor the
exemption as provided for by our tax law with respect to the doctrine of reciprocity.
Constitutional Law: Shipside Inc v Court of Appeals.
GR 143377, February 20, 2001
SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED, petitioner,
vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS [Special Former Twelfth Division], HON.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 26 (San Fernando City, La Union) & The
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts: The petitioner filed a certiorari with the CA containing the requisite
certification on non-forum shopping but failed to attach proof that the person
signing the certification was authorized to do so. The CA dismissed the petition. The
petitioner submits a motion for reconsideration which attached a secretarys
certificate attesting to the signatorys authority to sign certificates against forum
shopping on behalf of the petitioner. When the court of CA denied the motion, the
petitioner sought relief with the SC.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition of Shipside Inc.

Ruling: Yes, the CA erred in the dismissal of the petition. The SC revised the decision
of CA recognizing the belated filing of the certifications against forum shopping as
permitted in exceptional circumstances. It further held that with more reason
should a petition be given due course when this incorporates a certification on non-
forum shopping without evidence that the person signing the certifications was an
authorized signatory and the petitioner subsequently submits a secretarys
certificate attesting to the signatorys authority in its motion for consideration.
The court allows belated submission of certifications showing proof of the
signatorys authority in signing the certification of forum shopping.

Melchora Cabanas vs Francisco Pilapil

58 SCRA 94 Political Law Parens Patriae Strengthening the Family
Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan that his
child will be his beneficiary. He also indicated that if upon his death the child is still
a minor; the proceeds of his benefits shall be administered by his brother, Francisco
Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age when Florentino died and so Francisco
then took charge of Florentinos insurance proceeds for the benefit of the child.
On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a complaint
seeking the delivery of the insurance proceeds in favor and for her to be declared as
the childs trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and that as a
private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and
intended beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of parens patriae to the
terms of the insurance policy.
HELD: Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the
basic social unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar
would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has
been filed should resolve that case according to the best interest of that person. The
uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the
immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shall show
more care towards the child than the uncle will. The application of parens
patriae here is in consonance with this countrys tradition of favoring conflicts in
favor of the family hence preference to the parent (mother) is observed.

LAUREL v. MISA
77 PHIL 856

FACTS:
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that he cannot be
prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code on the grounds that the sovereignty of the legitimate
government and the allegiance of Filipino citizens was then suspended, and that
there was a change of sovereignty over the Philippines upon the proclamation of the
Philippine Republic.

ISSUE:
1. Is the absolute allegiance of the citizens suspended during Japanese occupation?
2. Is the petitioner subject to Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code?

HELD:
The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by
the enemy of their legitimate government on sovereign is not abrogated or severed
by the enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign
de jure is not transferred to the occupier. There is no such thing as suspended
allegiance.
The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of
government does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of
treason because it is an offense to the same government and same sovereign people.
PERALTA v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
75 PHIL 285

FACTS:
William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life
imprisonment as defined and penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of
the Republic of the Philippines. The petition for habeas corpus is based on the
contention that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by
Ordinance No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the military forces of Japan and
which is repugnant to the aims of the Commonwealth of the Philippines for it does
not afford fair trial and impairs the constitutional rights of the accused.
ISSUE:
1. Is the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 valid?
2. Is the sentence of life imprisonment valid?
3. By principle of postliminy, did the punitive sentence cease to be valid from the
time of the restoration of the Commonwealth?

HELD:
There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal
jurisdiction established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law martial as
defined in the usages of nations. It is merely a governmental agency. The sentence
rendered, likewise, is good and valid since it was within the power and competence
of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65. All judgments of political
complexion of the courts during Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon
reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a
crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid.

Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center v. NLRC

FACTS: SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international organization, the

Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, organized through an agreement in
1967 by the governments of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and
the Philippines with Japan as the sponsoring country.

Juvenal Lazaga was employed as a Research Associate on a probationary basis by

SEAFDEC-AQD. Lacanilao in his capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice of
termination to Lazaga informing him that due to the financial constraints being
experienced by the department, his services shall be terminated. SEAFDEC-AQD's
failure to pay Lazaga his separation pay forced him to file a case with the NLRC. The
Labor Arbiter and NLRC ruled in favor of Lazaga. Thus SEAFDEC-AQD appealed,
claiming that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case since it is immune from suit
owing to its international character and the complaint is in effect a suit against the
State which cannot be maintained without its consent.

ISSUES:

1. Does the NLRC have jurisdiction over SEAFDEC-AQD?

2. Is SEAFDEC-AQD estopped for its failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction at the
first instance?

HELD:

1. SEAFDEC-AQD is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public

respondent NLRC. Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its
Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of
the state in whose territory its office is located.

Permanent international commissions and administrative bodies have been created

by the agreement of a considerable number of States for a variety of international
purposes, economic or social and mainly non-political. In so far as they are
autonomous and beyond the control of any one State, they have a distinct juridical
personality independent of the municipal law of the State where they are situated.
As such, according to one leading authority "they must be deemed to possess a
species of international personality of their own."

One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local

jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the
tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the
subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a
convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in there
operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization;
besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body
to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states.

2. Respondent Lazaga's invocation of estoppel with respect to the issue of

jurisdiction is unavailing because estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a
tribunal that has none over a cause of action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Where
there is none, no agreement of the parties can provide one. Settled is the rule that
the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and
void. (SEAFDEC-AQD vs NLRC, G.R. No. 86773, February 14, 1992)

KHOSROW MINUCHER vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO (G.R.
No. 142396 February 11, 2003)

Facts
Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, was filed against Minucher
following a buy-bust operation conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents
accompanied by Scalzo in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin
was said to have been seized. Minucher was later acquitted by the court.
Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of drug trafficking
made by Arthur Scalzo.
Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge of his official duties as
being merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States
Department of Justice.
Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that,
being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was
entitled to diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note of the
United States Embassy addressed to DOJ of the Philippines and a Certification of
Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is a true and faithful copy of
its original. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE
Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.
RULLING
YES.
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from
suit as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the
sending state.
The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the
undisputed facts in the case.
The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the
two countries
Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and
the United States Embassy
Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the buy-bust
operation conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo
These may be inadequate to support the diplomatic status of the latter but they
give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if
not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United
States Drug Enforcement Agency.
The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected
drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers
who would then be expected to make the arrest.
In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer
during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the
criminal case against Minucher,
Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or
duties.