Problems with the Appeal to Intuition in Epistemology

Adam Feltz*

(Please obtain quotable copy from Philosophical Explorations)

George Bealer argues that intuitions are not only reliable indicators of truth, they are necessary to

the philosophical endeavor. Specifically, he thinks that intuitions are essential sources of evidence

for epistemic justification. I argue that Bealer's defense of intuitions either (a) is insufficient to

show that actual human beings are in a position to use intuitions for epistemic justification, or (b)

begs the question. The growing empirical data about our intuitions support the view that humans

are not creatures appropriately positioned to use intuitions for epistemic justification in the way

Bealer suggests. Without the appropriate empirical evidence that humans are beings so positioned,

his view begs the question against those who think that intuitions are not reliable guides to truth.

Keywords: intuitions; epistemology; experimental philosophy

In recent years, intuitions in philosophy have been called into question by both philosophers and

psychologists alike. Psychologists have found that humans are not very good intuitive reasoners

and that intuitions systematically vary between groups of people. These results indicate that

intuitions may not be reliable indicators of truth. George Bealer, however, argues that intuitions

are not only reliable indicators of truth, they are necessary to the philosophical endeavor.

Specifically, he thinks that intuitions are essential sources of evidence for epistemic justification.

I argue that Bealer's defense of intuitions either (a) is insufficient to show that actual human

beings are in a position to use intuitions for epistemic justification, or (b) begs the question. The

growing empirical data about our intuitions support the view that humans are not creatures

*
Email: [email protected].
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appropriately positioned to use intuitions for epistemic justification in the way Bealer suggests.

Without the appropriate empirical evidence that humans are beings so positioned, his view begs

the question against those who think that intuitions are not reliable guides to truth.

1. Bealer's approach

According to Bealer, philosophical intuitions are special entities. On his view, philosophical

intuitions meet the following conditions: (a) they are the result of conscious effort, (b) the

process by which one comes to have philosophical intuitions is at least minimally under ones

control via effort and attention, (c) a multi-stepped process may be involved in reaching the final

philosophical intuition, and (d) intuitions are a priori, self-evident, basic knowledge (Bealer

1996, 123-4). Philosophical intuitions are a distant cousin of the more common 'folk' intuitions.

Philosophical intuitions differ from folk intuitions because they result from critical reflection

while folk intuitions are merely 'uncritical beliefs' (Bealer 1998, 202).

Given this characterization of philosophical intuitions, Bealer argues that intuitions are

valid sources of evidence. Of course, as we are all painfully aware, not all intuitions track the

truth. For example, Bill may have the intuition that Smith knows in a Gettier style case and Jane

may have the intuition that Smith does not know. Obviously, they can't both be right. If people

have conflicting intuitions, then the 'good' intuitions must be sorted from the 'bad' intuitions.

Bealer calls the process which sorts and uses intuitions as evidence the 'Standard Justificatory

Procedure' (SJP). The SJP consists of the following process:

(1) Canvassing intuitions; (2) subjecting those intuitions to dialectical

critique; (3) constructing theories that systematize the surviving intuitions; (4)
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 testing those theories against further intuitions; (5) repeating the process until

equilibrium is approached. (Bealer 1996, 122)

Intuitions that survive the SJP gain the status of philosophical intuitions. They are no longer

uncritical intuitions of the masses but rather are intuitions that have survived philosophers'

critical reflection and attention. Thus, they acquire an epistemic status that folk intuitions lack.

On Bealer's view, the special epistemic status of philosophical intuitions allows them to

be used as evidence for epistemological claims. This is so because philosophical intuitions have a

special modal tie to the truth. Bealer calls the view that accounts for this tie modal reliabilism

a view he characterizes in the following way:

For suitably good cognitive conditions, it is necessary that, if while in such

conditions a subject goes through the whole procedure of a priori justification

[SJP], then most of the propositions derivable from the resulting comprehensive

theoretical systematization of the subjects intuitions would have to be true.1

(Bealer 1996, 130)

'Suitably good cognitive conditions' are conditions that are ideal for theory formation. When

these conditions are met, one is suitably positioned to systematize one's intuitions. For example,

conditions that generate cognitive illusions or performance errors would be absent in good

cognitive conditions. Because these intuitions have a strong tie to the truth, one should be able to

solve most of the questions that have plagued epistemology. After all, given the appropriate

cognitive conditions and the SJP, most of ones theoretically informed philosophical intuitions,

unlike pretheoretical folk intuitions, could not lead to false judgments.

2. The conceptual and empirical case against intuitions and the SJP
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In an interesting research program, Richard Nisbett (Nisbett et al. 2001) has discovered that

people of different cultures reason differently about the world. Stephen Stich argues that this

kind of cognitive diversity is a problem for the proponent of intuitions and the SJP. Cognitive

diversity describes the plurality of ways people form and update their beliefs (Stich 1998, 96).

One way cognitive diversity may occur is by systematic variations of people's intuitions about

epistemic justification. It might turn out that some people intuitively accept beliefs as justified

that are the results of known fallacies. For example, some people wrongly think that the

probability of a conjunction is greater than one of the conjuncts (Tversky and Kahneman 1982).

If this is right, then people can accept principles that are wrong; yet, they are seemingly in

reflective equilibrium for them. But just because principles are in reflective equilibrium does not

mean that one is justified in believing them (Stich 1998, 100). That would entail that one can be

justified in believing a fallacy, which many would hesitate to accept.

Cognitive diversity might also occur when there is more than one concept of justification.

If there is conceptual diversity, then epistemological relativism might come about because what

fits one group's concept of justification may not fit a different group's concept of justification

(Stich 1990, 88). Insofar as the systematization of intuitions fits well with the concept, that

systematization is thought to be true by those who have the concept. If that is true, then the SJP

does not help us determine which theoretical systematization is the right one because there may

be a plurality of 'right' ones. Concepts of justification may be idiosyncratic consequences of

particular environments and upbringings; hence, it seems as if the defender of intuitions and the

SJP is in hot water if she cannot rule out these possibilities (Stich 1990, 95).
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 Stich's arguments are fairly easy to take in stride because they rest on the possibility of

cognitive diversity and different concepts of justification. Building off Stichs earlier work,

Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols, and Stich (WNS) (2001) argue that the use of reflective

equilibrium, with intuitions serving a critical role in the process, might generate epistemological

relativism in the actual world. To establish the systematic variation in intuitions, WNS provide

scenarios to different groups of 'folk' that describe a person in various epistemic situations. 2 One

scenario they use is a typical Gettier case. Responding to the Gettier style case, about 25% of

Westerners, 55% of East Asians, and about 60% of Indians thought the person really knows

(Weinberg et al. 2001, 443-4). These studies indicate that there is systematic diversity of

epistemic intuitions about Gettier style cases. Hence, there is a real risk that theories that depend

on intuitions as input really will give different normative results (Weinberg et al. 2001, 445). At a

minimum, WNS think that the burden is shifted to those who defend intuitions and the SJP to

explain why these empirical results are not threatening. Specifically, if the intuitions used as

inputs into the SJP can lead to different theories, then one must either (a) allow that

epistemological theories founded on intuitions and the SJP could be hopelessly relativistic, (b)

prove that intuition based theories do not lead to relativism, or (c) concede that intuitions cannot

serve an evidentiary basis for justifying beliefs (Weinberg et al. 2001, 447-8).

3. Empirical pressure on Bealer's view

Bealer could respond to these worries in at least two ways. First, the possibility of people

arriving at different theories given different intuitions as input is not threatening to his view. We

have good evidence that many of our intuitions overlap on many cases; thus, the mere possibility

of variation should not be enough to scare us. Second, as a reply to WNS, Bealer could simply
5
say that the type of intuitions with which he is interestedphilosophical intuitionsis simply of

a different kind than the intuitions with which WNS are concerned. WNS are concerned with

folk intuitions, and Bealer is concerned with philosophical intuitions. Hence, neither set of

intuitions have much to say about the other.

Bealer seemingly has replies to both challenges. Why, then, isn't that the end of the story?

The reason is that empirical evidence indicates humans are not the kinds of creatures who have

the requisite philosophical intuitions to engage in epistemology as Bealer conceives it. If we do

not have the right kinds of intuitions, then we are not the kinds of beings who can solve

epistemological questions in the way Bealer thinks we can.

3.1 The problem of relativism

The results presented by WNS are significant because they suggest at least two thingsnamely,

that there can be more than one seemingly coherent set of beliefs and that these different sets of

beliefs can be in reflective equilibrium. The question is which system is to be preferred if the

beliefs are in reflective equilibrium with the intuitions used to generate them? Prima facie, I

think that Bealer is in a dilemma. On the one hand, it seems that Bealer cannot say any set of

intuitions that passes the SJP has a strong modal tie to the truth because it is possible that two

competing systems that pass the SJP can be in reflective equilibrium. If the two systems are

competing, then it cannot be the case that most of the pronouncements of both systems are

necessarily true. On the other hand, there might be something in addition to the SJP that gives the

strong tie to the truth. If that is the case, then Bealer must explain what the additional element is.
6
 One element in addition to the SJP may be that the input data are philosophers' intuitions

and not merely error prone folk intuitions. But even if one looks at philosophers, one finds

diverging intuitions. There are several prima facie examples of competing intuitions among

philosophers. Consider, for instance, the conflict between deontologists and consequentialists.3

They often have different intuitions about the moral status of a particular action. For example, a

consequentialist may think it is permissible to falsely accuse an innocent man to prevent a riot,

but a deontologist might think that action is impermissible. After reflection, the consequentialist

and deontologist make different judgments about the moral status of some actions.

If both deontologists and consequentialists use the SJP to generate their theories, then in

some cases deontologists and consequentialists have different philosophical intuitions concerning

what the morally correct action is. Otherwise, it would be hard to explain the divergent

prescriptions. People who espouse either consequentialism or deontology have spent a great deal

of time thinking about the issues, and their intuitions should count as philosophical if any do. If

these two views are based on philosophical intuitions which have passed through the SJP, then it

seems fairly unlikely that convergence between these two views is going to be achieved. And,

because the two views give conflicting prescriptions, it cannot be that they both have a strong tie

to the truth. At least one of the views must be wrong on Bealers view. However, it is hard to see

how to decide between them if both views are in reflective equilibrium with the philosophical

intuitions that generate them. Once again one is faced with the problem of relativism much like

the one suggested by WNS.

One might think that the relativism entailed by Bealers view is not pernicious. Maybe

some groups of people have intuitions that are in reflective equilibrium and yield the incorrect
7
results, and there are other groups of people whose intuitions are in reflective equilibrium and

yield the correct results. Peoples intuitions may be in reflective equilibrium and yield the

incorrect results because they may not have a wide enough range of intuitions, or the theories

with which they attempt to achieve equilibrium are false. Thus, we should only pay attention to

people whose intuitions are linked to the correct results.

The relativism entailed by Bealer's view is non-pernicious only if one of the following

two possibilities is true. First, the relativism only obtains in situations where we can

independently determine the correct answer. If we know the correct answer, then we can check

and see if intuitions match those standards. However, in most philosophical domains we are not

sure what the correct answer is. One is a deontologist or consequentialist because one finds those

views to be intuitively correct after prolonged reflection and not because we independently know

what the right answer is. If these theories are the result of the systematization of philosophical

intuitions, there is no basis to prefer one set of intuitions over another. We just are not sure which

view is correct, so we cannot tell which set of intuitions is correct.

Second, one might think that the relativity of intuitions is not problematic because we

should appeal to the intuitions of experts rather than the intuitions of laypeople. However, as

Stich argues, if one does not assume that experts' intuitions are in fact correct (an assumption

which is obviously question begging), then it seems possible that experts' intuitions are every bit

as off as the hoi polloi (1993, 86). Thus, appealing to expert authority does not help matters

muchespecially when the experts themselves often have diverging intuitions!

Perhaps when there are divergent intuitions, the concepts are not adequately grasped.

According to Bealer, two people who satisfy the appropriate cognitive conditions will understand
8
a concept in the same determinate manner. In turn, both will have the same intuitions that are

related to that concept. Bealer thinks that if one understands a concept determinately, then almost

all intuitions that have to do with that concept are true (1998, 203). A concept is possessed

determinately when the following two conditions are met:

1. The subjects possess some propositional attitude toward the proposition that

has the concept as its conceptual content.

2. The subjects do not misunderstand the concept or have incomplete knowledge

of the concept (Bealer 1998, 221-2).

When one possesses a concept determinately one really knows the concept fully and completely.

Hence, if two people possess the same concept determinately in ideal conditions, then differences

of intuitions simply are not possible.

Determinate concept possession could play a role in answering the relativity problem in

at least three ways, all of which are problematic. The first way is if people already have

determinately held concepts prior to engaging in the SJP. One way people could already

determinately possess a concept is that the concept makes up part of some of our basic

competencies. For example, our basic competencies with '2', '+', '4', and '=' ensure that we all

have the intuition that 2+2=4. Likewise, we may determinately possess some philosophically

interesting concepts that guarantee most of our intuitions involving those concepts are true.

The problem with the first way of answering the relativity problem arises in two stages.

First, this way makes the SJP impotent. It's not that intuitions are somehow imbued with a strong

tie to the truth because they pass the SJP, but they pass the SJP because they are already tied to

the truth. To see the problem, assume that all intuitions before going through the SJP are folk
9
intuitions, and all surviving intuitions are philosophical intuitions. Let's say that Helga has a folk

intuition that p. Call this intuition (F). Let's also say that Helga possesses concept (C)

determinately, and F applies to C. That means that F already has a strong tie to the truth given

that Helga holds C determinately. Now imagine that Helga uses the SJP on F. What possible

difference could the SJP make on the connection of F with the truth? It seems none. Certainly,

using the SJP can help Helga access determinately possessed concepts by eliminating

interference, simple mistakes, and inattention. But the SJP does not have any bearing on the truth

of F. In this situation, the only property that F gains is that it went through the SJP where that

property has no effect on the truth of F.

Second, if the only property that F gains is that it passes through the SJP and that

property has no bearing on the truth F, then intuitions are true simply because of their relation to

a determinately possessed concept and nothing else. Given suitably good cognitive conditions

and a determinately held concept, one's intuitions already have a strong modal tie to the truth.

The SJP does nothing to strengthen or ensure that tie. If this is right, then determinant concept

possession simply solves the problem of conflicting intuitions by begging the question. The

question is whether humans possess enough philosophically relevant concepts determinately.

Therefore, to claim that possessing a concept determinately entails from the very outset that most

intuitions involving that concept are true begs the question against those who think that humans

do not possess enough philosophically relevant concepts determinately.

The second way is that intuitions are weeded out by the SJP that uses determinately

possessed concepts. Some intuitions are bad and others are good, and the SJP using

determinately held concepts is what sorts the good intuitions from the bad ones. Given that the
10
SJP is a process by which one balances ones intuitions with, among other things, determinately

possessed concepts, determinately possessing a concept will rule out all intuitions that do not

have a strong tie to the truth.

If Bealer makes this move, then he simply begs the question once again. What is required

in addition to possessing a concept determinately is that there is only one relevant concept in that

domain. If there is more than one concept in that domain, then people might possess different

concepts determinately and thereby have different intuitions surviving the SJP. For example,

there may be more than one concept of epistemic justification or moral rightness. If there is more

than one concept of justification or moral rightness, then people may possess those different

concepts determinately and yet have different intuitions about what constitutes right action or

epistemic justification. Recall the example of a deontologist and consequentialist. Presumably, a

consequentialist and a deontologist possess most of the relevant ethical concepts determinately;

yet, they still have differing philosophical intuitions about what constitutes some right actions.

This might indicate that consequentialists and deontologists employ different concepts of

rightness that influence their judgments about right actions. It is unclear why simply possessing a

concept determinately would solve the problem of conflicting intuitions if there is more than one

concept in the domain.

The third way is that the SJP helps along the way to determinately possessing a concept.

That is, the intuitions that pass the SJP are the ones that point to determinately held concepts. If

that is the case, then it seems that we have the same problem that Stich and WNS suggest. If we

start with different intuitions and then attempt to systematize those until we think we have

discovered the correct concept, the variation of input intuitions may affect the output concept.
11
Not only is this a live possibility as Stich argues, but the empirical evidence from WNS adds

additional pressure because there are systematic variations in actual people's intuitions.

Thus, Bealer's approach is subject to the worries presented by Stich and WNS. We cannot

simply assume from the outset that we possess enough concepts determinately because that begs

the question against those who think that we do not. Even with conjunction of the SJP and

determinate concept possession there are problems. We cannot assume that there is only one

relevant concept in a domain. If there is more than one concept, then there can be different,

competing sets of intuitions that are thought to be true. Finally, we cannot assume that the SJP

helps along the way to determinate concept possession because different input intuitions can

result in seeing different concepts as being possessed determinately. Therefore, it is not the case

that, a priori, the SJP and determinate concept possession shows that humans are the kind of

beings who can have the types of intuitions to support Bealer's view.

3.2 The problem of infinite intelligence

One might think that when different philosophical intuitions lead to different theories we are not

dealing with an ideally rational cognizer. What one should base epistemology on is the ideally

rational cognizer under ideal conditions, where the intuitions that the idealized cognizer produces

from the SJP are true. Bealer admits that the conditions under which one achieves an ideal

situation would be very high. A natural question for Bealer is how high must one set the bar? He

has no definite answer to this question, but he does give us some idea. Bealer writes:

Most of the central questions of philosophy do not seem to be the sort of

questions requiring infinitary intelligence (e.g., for doing infinitary proofs,

infinitary computations, etc.); some finitary level (perhaps well beyond ours)
12
 ought to sufficeIf this is right, the issue comes down to the question of what

level of finitary intelligence would be required (for having a sufficiently wide

range of intuitions) to yield Autonomy4Intuitively, however, for any finite level

of intelligence, it is possible for some being to be that intelligent. So, if there

were a barrier to Autonomy, it would have to be something other than

intelligence. (Bealer 1996, 132)

There are two problems with Bealers argument for philosophys autonomy in epistemological

questions. First, how would we ever know when we have a sufficient level of finitary

intelligence? Bealer must provide criteria for determining when one has achieved a sufficient

level. If there is no way to tell when one is in sufficiently good cognitive conditions, then

intelligence is a very real problem for the intuition approach. It may not be the case that

epistemology requires infinite intelligence, but what if it requires a vastly greater intelligence

than humans have? In both cases it seems that humans are simply ill-equipped to handle the

questions that epistemology poses. To guarantee an intuition's tie to the truth, Bealer would have

to concede that we might, to borrow an apt phrase from Stephen Stich, have to have a brain 'the

size of a bathtub', and that certainly would be too demanding (Stich 1990, 153).

Bealer might reply that there is hope that philosophy can answer these problems. He

claims that philosophy as a 'civilization-wide project' might arrive at the same type of

convergence that we find in science. In fact, science is not an individualistic project. Science

needs many individuals over time in order to generate its theories, and some think there is

gradual progress toward the truth. Even if there is not complete convergence on scientific

theories, nobody is calling for an ending of the current way science is practiced. Similarly, it
13
might be premature to call an end to the intuitional approach to epistemology. What we need to

do, Bealer argues, is simply give epistemology more time to work on its problems. There are

many examples where intuitions in philosophy have converged, and that provides a basis for

thinking that convergence in epistemology is also possible (Bealer 1996, 139). For example,

there is wide-scale consensus that the conditions of the traditional Justified True Belief account

of knowledge are insufficient for knowledge. This convergence gives us reason to think that,

incrementally, we can slowly solve problems in epistemology.

I agree with Bealer that we 'can' do philosophy carefully enough in order to answer 'a

substantial number of central philosophical questions.' But, that is a weak claim. It is possible for

us to answer these questions, but what is needed in addition is evidence that it is likely that we

will answer these questions. When we look at the history of the intuitional approach to

epistemology, however, the prospects of convergence seem bleak. In order for Bealers claim to

hold, almost all philosophical intuitions must converge on a single set of intuitions after a

process of reflective equilibrium in order for philosophy to be autonomous. That seems to be a

matter that can be answered empirically, and there is reason to think that Bealer's a priori method

will not be born out. First, WNS's studies suggest there are large cross cultural and socio-

economic differences in epistemic intuitions. Second, studies suggest epistemic intuitions are

biased by non-evidential features. For example, in some cases epistemic intuitions are subject to

order effects (Swain, Alexander, and Weinberg in press). Third, there is a great deal of evidence

from other philosophically relevant domains suggesting a variety of biases, intuitions, and

concepts that might entail intuition relativism. 5 Therefore, if any of these are true, then Bealer's a

priori method is not one humans are well-suited to use to solve epistemological problems.
14
 Second, Bealer claims that for any finite level of intelligence it is possible for finite

beings to obtain it. But again, thinking that it is possible for humans one day to achieve such

conditions is a very weak claim and not one that should ground our epistemic, or any other,

endeavor. This possibility would seem to underwrite using philosophical intuitions to tackle any

theoretical problem.6 For example, there are various examples in the history of philosophy where

philosophers have used philosophical intuitions to solve problems of physics, and those solutions

have been drastically wrong.7 For example, it might be argued that Descartes used philosophical

intuitions to conclude that a vacuum does not exist. He thought long and hard about the vacuum

and related concepts. Descartes had the intuition that extension is identical to space, body cannot

exist unextended, and a vacuum is by definition space with nothing in it. Because of these

intuitions, there simply cannot be a vacuum (CSM I 230). The claim that space must necessarily

be occupied by something is a modal claim that requires a philosophical intuition. But, as it turns

out, Descartes was wrong and there can be space with nothing in it. Thus, mistaken intuitions

result in a mistaken view about the vacuum.

If we are to follow the advice given by Bealer, then it seems that the possibility that one

day we could find the correct answer about the vacuum warrants using philosophical intuitions to

that end. But something over and above philosophical intuitions has helped us discover the

nature of the vacuum. Likewise, it is reasonable that something over and above philosophical

intuitions will be required for us to discover the nature of knowledge. The possibility that we

could achieve the right level of intelligence to use philosophical intuitions to solve

epistemological questions seems to be just as unlikely as us achieving the right cognitive

conditions to use philosophical intuitions to answer the central questions of physics. Hence, the
15
mere possibility that we can find the correct account of knowledge using philosophical intuitions

is not strong enough to warrant us relying on philosophical intuitions totally on a priori grounds.8

What we should want is some evidence that our intuitions have the kind of connection to the

truth Bealer suggests they do.

Perhaps these concerns underwrite Bealer's concern that it might not be nomologically

possible for humans to obtain such conditions. If it is not nomologically possible for humans to

obtain the conditions necessary for our intuitions to be strongly tied to the truth, then there seems

to be little reason for us to guide our epistemic endeavors according to Bealer's method. In order

for the possibility to which Bealer appeals to guide our epistemological endeavors, it seems that

we should require that there is some evidence that we can answer those questions. Given the

history of philosophy, and the growing evidence of systematic diversity of intuitions, we have

reason to think that although convergence is possible, it may not be likely for us.

Finally, one may wish to remain optimistic that the intuitional approach that Bealer

characterizes is still the way to go. After all, Bealers claims are modal claims. That is, it is

possible that in some world there are creatures that achieve the appropriate cognitive conditions

and have a wide variety of intuitions. It is possible that the resulting theories that these creatures

produce do have a strong tie to the truth. Thus, one might think the problem of infinite

intelligence and the problem of relativism are beside the point because the actual world does not

provide a counterexample to the possibility that there can be creatures in such conditions. Even if

our intuitions do not obtain strong ties to the truth, it is still possible that some creatures'

intuitions do. As Bealer claims, one only needs the possibility that intuitions obtain strong ties to

the truth in order to underwrite his view that intuitions can serve an evidentiary basis for
16
justifying beliefs (1998, 203). Hence, we can continue working in the intuition tradition because

there is a possible world in which all these favorable conditions obtain, and we should simply

attempt to approximate that possible world as much as possible.

Certainly, nobody should deny it is possible that there are beings who are smart enough

and are in the appropriate position to use intuitions as evidence. I dont find that claim

particularly problematic. However, if we are to think the mere possibility of there being such

entities is sufficient to underwrite using intuitions in epistemology, then we should also agree to

the following point: It is possible that magic eight balls always give correct answers to

epistemological questions.9 Indeed, depending on ones conception of modality, there is a

possible world where the oracle of the eight ball gives its epistemological proclamations and all

those proclamations have a strong tie to the truth. But to claim that we should use the

pronouncements of the magic eights balls to justify our epistemological theories is absurd.

Likewise, the mere possibility that intuitions could give the correct answers to epistemological

problems is insufficient for them to be used to justify our epistemological theories.

4. Conclusion

If we use intuitions as evidence to justify our epistemological theories as Bealer thinks we

should, we run up against the problem of intuition relativism. I have argued that three different

ways of trying to avoid intuition relativism all fail. First, the properties intuitions gain by going

through the SJP are insufficient to guarantee most of those intuitions are the same. Second,

possessing concepts determinately solves the problem of relativism by begging the question

against those who think that we can possess concepts determinately and yet still have differing

intuitions. Third, the relativism problem might be avoided by using the notions of an ideally
17
rational cognizer whose outputs have a strong tie to the truth. But, the mere possibility of an

ideally rational cognizer under ideal conditions is insufficient to guide our epistemic endeavors.

Therefore, it seems we have many reasons to explore other avenues of epistemic inquiry, and

very few to hold to the a priori position that only intuitions are necessary for epistemic

justification.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Alfred Mele, Michael Bishop, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Bill Roche, and Kim Sterelny, and two

anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions.

Notes

1. Bealer does consider a weaker version of modal reliabilism. The weaker version states, '...if someone in those

cognitive conditions were to process theoretically the deliverances of the candidate source, the resulting theory

would provide a correct assessment as to the truth or falsity of most of those deliverances' (Bealer 1998, 219). I don't

expect that this weakening will affect the main thrust of my argument.

2. The 'folk' are considered to be any person who has not had extensive philosophical training.

3. I thank Kim Sterelny for bringing this particular example to my attention.

4. Bealer defines autonomy as: 'Among the central questions of philosophy that can be answered by one standard

theoretical means or another, most can in principle be answered by philosophical investigation and argument without

relying substantially on the sciences' (Bealer 1996, 121).

5. For a few examples, see Cushman and Mele in press, Knobe 2003, Knobe and Burra 2006, Mele and Cushman

2007, Nadelhoffer forthcoming, Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, Turner 2006, Nichols and Ulatowski 2007.

6. In fact, Bealer suggests something like this in what he calls his Authority of Philosophy thesis, which states,

'Insofar as science and Philosophy purport to answer the same central philosophical questions, in most cases the

support that science could in principle provide for those answers is not as strong as that which philosophy could in
18
principle provide for its answers. So, should there be conflicts, the authority of philosophy in most cases can be

greater in principle' (Bealer 1996, 121).

7. One might worry that Descartes simply confuses a conceptual matter with an empirical matter. Intuitions, in

Bealer's sense, are only about conceptual matters. So, the physics example is beside the point. However, Descartes

engaged in physics in a purely conceptual wayhis concepts of vacuum, space, and body are all discoverable in the

same a priori way Bealer thinks epistemic concepts are discoverable. Second, it is hard to show a clear case where

philosophical intuitions involving 'purely' conceptual matters are wrong.

8. In fact, additional pressure is put on Bealer style approaches by alternative approaches to epistemology that are

emerging. For example, Michael Bishop and J.D. Trout's (2005) view does not necessarily rely on philosophical

intuitions in a pivotal role.

9. I adopted this example from Michael Bishop.

Notes on contributer

Adam Feltz, Department of Philosophy, Florida State University, Tallahassee, USA.

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