Statutory Construction

STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
Armando Santiago Jr
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEFINITION ........................................................................................................................................................................................................3
IMPORTANCE ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION .............................................................................................................................................................................3
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION, DISTINGUISHED ........................................................................................................................3
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION .............................................................................................................................................................................4
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC. VS. ENRICO PALOMAR .......................................................................................................................4
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION VS. NTC AND PLDT .........................................................................................................9
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL) V. EISMA ......................................................................................................................11
PAAT V. CA .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 13
PEOPLE V. MAPA................................................................................................................................................................................. 15
DAOANG V. MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF SAN NICOLAS ..........................................................................................................................17
PARAS V. COMELEC ..........................................................................................................................................................................19
SANTIAGO JR. Page !2 of !23

DEFINITION
Statutory Construction the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the
authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful,
among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
IMPORTANCE
For the law student It helps to prepare the law freshman for the task of studying, interpreting
and constructing laws in the various law subject.
Case provides an appriciation of the complexity and variety of law study
Statcon is based on common sense with logic and grasp of law

For the law practitioner It enables the practitioner to ably prepare his pleadings and court argument
and to anticipate with reasonable accuract
For the court clerk or researcher power to interpret and construe law is a judicial in nature
Law makers and his staff understanding the status of the past statutes is essential for the
promulgation of the future statutes
Good lawmaker or staffer make sure that statutory construction will not or
very little use in the future.
Because, using this construction may render ambiguity within the statutes
passed by the congress through law makers.
For the house counsel Application of the law must be aligned with the intention of the law
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
Rules of construction are not rules of law but merely truth of experience or general principles. Statute is the will
of legislature.
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION, DISTINGUISHED

CONSTRUCTION INTERPRETATION
the drawing of conclusions with respect to subjects is the process of discovering the true meaning of the
that are beyond the direct expression of the text language used.

the drawing of conclusions, respecting subjects that limited to exploring the written text.
lie beyond the direct expressions of the text.
it use the assistance of intrinsic aid (which the answer
It requires assistance of extrinsic aid. (they go beyond for the ambiguity can be found with the provision of
the provision of the law) the law)
Ex. after using the intrinsic aid which found no answe,

they resort to extrinsic aid which goes beyond the
intention of the law; they visit the customs when the
time law was passed and many more.
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
Rules of construction are not rules of law but merely axioms of experience or general principles.
JURISPRUDENCE
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC. VS. ENRICO

PALOMAR
GR. NO.: G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966
PONENTE: CASTRO, J.
TOPIC/S: Statutory Construction Construction; defined Noscitur A Sociis
VERDICT: ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
END POINT:
CITED DOCTRINE/S: N/A
Construction - is the art or process of discovering and expounding the

meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application
CASE DOCTRINE: to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others,
by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the
law.
There was a contest and to advertise they sought an assistance of the
Philippines postal office. But the postmaster denied their assistance for it is
CIRCUMTANCES:
considered lottery. Caltex filed an action which leads them to scrutinise the
contest if it considered lottery.

1. connection of lottery to the gift enterprise

2. intention of the gift enterprise
IMPORTANT POINT/S:
3. methods used to determine gift enterprise
4. necessity of statutory construction
COURT DECISIONS:
FACTS
The case before us now is a petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, parying
that judgment be rendered declaring its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest not to be violative of the Postal Law,
and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the
public.
In 1960, Caltex launched a promotional scheme called Caltex Hooded Pump Contest? which calls for
participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense
during a specified period.? The contest is open to all motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivres?.
There is neither a fee or consideration required nor a purchase required to be made. The forms are available
upon request at each Caltex station and there is also a sealed can where accomplished entry stubs may be de-
posited.
Caltex wishes to use mails amongst the media for publicizing about the contest, thus, Caltex sent representa-
tives to the postal authorities for advance clearing for the use of mails for the contest. However, the postal au-
thorities denied their request in view of sections 1954 (a), 1982, and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code
(Anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law), which prohibits the use of mail in conveying any information concern-
ing non-mailable schemes, such as lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme.
Caltex sought for a reconsideration and stressed that there was no consideration involved in the part of the con-
testant(s) but the Postmaster General maintained their view and even threatened Caltex that if the contest was
conducted, a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives?. This leads
to Caltexs filing of this petition for declaratory relief.
The court ruled that the petitioner does not violate the Postal Law and the respondent has no right to bar the
public distribution or said rules by the mails?. The respondent then appealed.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not Caltexs petition for declaratory relief is proper.
2. Whether or not the Caltex contest is a lottery/gift enterprise.

HELD
By express mandate of Section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court which deals with the applicability to in-
voke declaratory relief which states: Declaratory relief is available to person whose rights are affected by a
statute, to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the statute and for a declaration of
rights thereunder.
In amplification, conformably established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain conditions:
1 There must be a justiciable controversy.
2 The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse.
3 The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy.
4 The issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
With the appellees bent to hold the contest and the appellants threat to issue a fraud order if carried out, the
contenders are confronted by an ominous shadow of imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences
are settled and stabilized by a declaration. And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past
when it can rightly be said that merely the appellees desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of
others which admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justi-
ciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually
contested.
Construction - is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of
the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others,
by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just reached is not without prece-
dent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in promo-
tional advertising was advised by the county prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan had the charac-
teristics of a lottery, and that if such sales promotion were conducted, the corporation would be subject to crimi-
nal prosecution, it was held that the corporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief action against the
county prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales promotion plan.
2. Is the Contest Scheme a Lottery?

Lottery-Extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance
e.g. policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles and fairs as well as various forms of gambling.
Three Essential Elements:
1. Consideration
2. Prize
3. Chance

No, according to the Supreme Court, the contest scheme is not a lottery but it appears to be more of a gratuitous
distribution since nowhere in the rules is any requirements that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought,
any services be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. Since, a prospective
contestant has to do is go to a Caltex Station, request for the entry form which is available on demand and ac-
complish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner. Because of this, the contest fails to exhibit any dis-
cernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery.
Moreover, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is de-
rived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but it does condemn as criminal scheme in which
a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.
Is the scheme, as sales promotion which would benefit the sponsor in the way of increased patronage
be considered as a consideration and thus violates the Postal Law?
No, the required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the sponsors of the contest.
The true test lies on whether or not the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance of winning and
not whether or not those conducting the enterprise receiver something of value for the distribution of the prize.
Is the Contest Scheme a Gift Enterprise?
Even if the term Gift Enterprise is not yet defined explicitly, there appears to be a consensus among lexicogra-
phers and standard authorities that the term is common applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods are
sold for their market value but by way of inducement to purchase the product, the purchaser is given a chance to
win a prize.
And thus, the term of gift enterprise cannot be established in the case at bar since there is not sale of anything to
which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified con-
testant irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellees products.
The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is that every case must be resolved
upon the particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision. It is only logical that the term under a
construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word as-
sociated therewith.
In the end, the Supreme Court ruled out that under the prohibitive provision of the Postal Law, gift enterprise and
similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consid-
eration. Finding non in the contest, it was ruled out that the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for
the purpose thereof.
SYLLABI

Statutes; Construction defined.Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the mean-
ing 'and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is
rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the
law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). In the present case, the question of whether or not the scheme pro-
posed by the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires
an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein. This is as much a question of construction or
interpretation as any other.
Gambling; Essential elements of lottery.The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for' the distribution of
prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of
gambling. The three essential elements of a Iottery are: first, consideration; second, prize: and third, chance ("El
Debate,"1 ).
Same; Gratuitous distribution of property by chance; When element of consideration is not present.In
respect to the element of consideration, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by
chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but does con-
demn as criminal schemes in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the
chance to draw a prize ("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra). Under the rules of the proposed contest there is no
requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoev-
er be given for the privilege to participate. A prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for
the entry form which is available on demand, and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner.
Viewed from all angles, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery,
The scheme is but a gratuitous distribution of property by chance
Same; Test to determine presence of consideration.The element of consideration does not consist of the
benefit derived by the proponent of the contest. The true test is whether the participant pays a valuable consid-
eration for the chance, and not whether those conducting- the enterprise receive something of value in return for
the distribution of the price (People vs, Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal. App. [Supp.] 788). The standpoint of the
contestant, not of the sponsor, is all that matters.
Same; Meaning of "gift enterprise"; When proposed scheme is not embraced by me term.The term "gift
enterprise" is commonly applied to a sporting artifice2 under which goods are sold for their market value,
but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize3 . As thus conceived, the term
clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar, where there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is
attached as an inducement to the purchaser, and where the contest is open to all qualified contestants irre-
spective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products,;
1Inc. vs. Topacio, 44 Phil. 278, 283-284, citing Horner vs. U.S., 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497; U.S. vs. Filart
and Singson, 30 Phil. 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker, 36 Phil. 395; U.S. vs. Baguio, 39 Phil. 962
2
trickery
3
(54 C.J.S. 850; 84 Am. Jur., 654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 817; Ballantine, Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Re-
tail Section of Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth vs. Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga. App.,
705; Bell vs. State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5, Sneed 507, 509)
Postal Law; Statutes; Term "gift enterprise" is used in association with word "lottery"In the Postal Law
the term "gift enterprise" is used in association with the word "lottery." Consonant to the well-known principle of
legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis, it is only logical that the term be accorded no other meaning then that which
is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a
consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not the slightest indi-
cium in the law of any intent to eliminate the element of consideration from the "gift enterprise therein included.
Same; Purpose of mail fraud orders.Mail fraud orders are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a
medium for disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable. As ap-
plied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar schemes, justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress
their tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa.
Super. 208). Since in gambling it is inherent that something of value be hazarded for a .chance to gain a larger
amount, it follows ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the contestant to participate, the. reason
behind the law can hardly be said to obtain.
Same; When gift enterprises are condemnable.Under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law, gift en-
terprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve: the ele-
ment of consideration. Because there is none in the contest herein ,in question, the appellee may not be denied
the use of the mails for purposes thereof.
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION VS.

NTC AND PLDT
GR. NO.: G.R. No. L-63318; August 18, 1984
PONENTE: Makasiar
TOPIC/S: Statutory interpretation
TRIGGER OF THE FACTS:
TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE/S:
TRIGGER OF THE RULING:
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF NOVEMBER 25, 1983 IS HEREBY

VERDICT: RECONSIDERED AND SET ASIDE AND THE PETTION IS HEREBY
DISMISSED.
END POINT: It ascertain the use of shall and may
CITED DOCTRINE/S:
The word used in the law must be given its ordinary meaning, unless a
CASE DOCTRINE:
contrary intent is manifest in the law itself.

CIRCUMTANCES:
IMPORTANT POINT/S:
COURT DECISIONS:
FACTS
Respondent NTC promulgated a decision (NTC decision) dated November 22, 1982 which approved a revised
schedule of rates (translation: phone bills went up) which was within the limits of P.D. No. 217, the law which
regulated the telephone industry. Petitioner, Philippine Consumer Foundation (PCF) filed this petition seeking to
annul this decision.
On November 25, 1983, the Supreme Court promulgated a decision annulling the NTC decision. This decision
interpreted the following phraseology of Section 2 of P.D. No. 217 as mandatory:
The Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, through its Board of Communications and/or
appropriate agency shall see to it that the herein declared policies for the telephone industry are immediately imple-
mented and for this purpose, pertinent rules and regulations may be promulgated (italics supplied).
ISSUE
Whether or not Section 2 of P.D. No. 217 is mandatory.
HELD
The basic canon of Statutory Construction is that the word used in the law must be given its ordinary meaning,
unless the contrary intent is manifested. The phrase may be promulgated cannot be construed to mean
shall or must. Section 2 must therefore be interpreted in its ordinary sense as permissive or discretionary
and not mandatory on the part of the delegate, NTC.
What is mandatory however, is the immediate implementation of the policies declared in P.D. No. 217.
Note that both words shall and may be are used in the same section which demonstrates that the ordinary,
usual or normal distinction between these words is preserved.
It must be emphasized that P.D. No. 217 [which is a special law] only repeals pertinent portions of Act 3436 and
the Public Service Act [which is a general law regulating all manner of public franchises] and that the Board of
Communications, the immediate predecessor of the NTC was adequately served by their own rules of proce-
dure. This meant that the acts complained of by NCF, i.e. the fixing of provisional rates without public hearing
(Section 16 of the public service act), was a valid act.
SANTIAGO JR. Page 10

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SYLLABI
Same; Statutes; Phrase may be promulgated should not be interpreted to mean shall or must. P.D.
217 does not command the NTC to promulgate rules. It can function under existing rules.The basic
canon of statutory interpretation is that the word used in the law must be given its ordinary meaning, unless a
contrary intent is manifest from the law itself. Hence, the phrase may be promulgated should not be construed
to mean shall or must. It shall be interpreted in its ordinary sense as permissive or discretionary on the part of
the delegatedepartment or the Board of Communications then, now the National Telecommunications Com-
missionwhether or not to promulgate pertinent rules and regulations. There is nothing in P.D. No. 217 which
commands that the phrase may be promulgated should be construed as shall be promulgated. The National
Telecommunications Commission can function and has functioned without additional rules, aside from the exist-
ing Public Service Law, as amended, and the existing rules already issued by the Public Service Commission, as
well as the 1978 rules issued by the Board of Communications, the immediate predecessor of respondent NTC.
It should be recalled that the PLDT petition for approval of its revised SIP schedule was filed on March 20, 1980.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; P.D. 217 does not make regulations to be promulgated by NTC first before it
can exercise jurisdiction over applications for SIP schedules.P.D. No. 217 does not make the rules and
regulations to be promulgated by the respondent NTC as essential to the exercise of its jurisdiction over ap-
plications for SIP schedules. In Ang Tibay vs. CIR (69 Phil. 635), this Court, through Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel,
did not include the promulgation of rules and regulations as among the seven (7) requirements of due process in
quasi-judicial proceedings before a quasi-judicial body such as the respondent NTC.
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL) V.

EISMA
GR. NO.: GR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)
PONENTE: Second Division, Torres Jr. (p): 4 concurring
TOPIC/S:
VERDICT:
END POINT:
CITED DOCTRINE/S:
CASE DOCTRINE:
CIRCUMTANCES:

IMPORTANT POINT/S:
COURT DECISIONS:
FACTS
On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (Labor Rela-
tions Division, Zamboanga City), a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining rep-
resentative of the monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao manufacturing plant of the Zamboanga Wood Prod-
ucts, Inc. (Zambowood). On 17 April 1982, such employees charged the firm before the same office for under-
payment of monthly living allowances. On 3 May 1982, the union issued a notice of strike against the firm, alleg-
ing illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice; nonpayment of
living allowances; and employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit. The strike
began on 23 May 1982.
On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the officers and members of the union,
for damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order.
The union filed a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order, and opposition to the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, contending that the incidents of picketing are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa 227 (Labor Code, Article 217) and not to the Court
of First Instance. The motion was denied. Hence, the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.
HELD
The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has
been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which orga-
nizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words
that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the
statutes of the forum, the issue should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute in force. Therefore, since
(1) the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction; since
(2) Presidential Decree 1691 reverted the jurisdiction with respect to money claims of workers or claims for
damages arising from employer-employee relations to the labor arbiters after Presidential Decree 1367
transferred such jurisdiction to the ordinary courts, and since
(3) Batas Pambansa 130 made no change with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters
with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations;

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Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein
provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial
court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he enter-
tained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike.
The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of certiorari, and nullified and set aside the 20 July 1982 order issued
by the court a quo. It granted the writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of said court, or whoever acts in his
behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned, from taking any further action on the civil case (Civil Case 716
[2751]), except for the purpose of dismissing it. It also made permanent the restraining order issued on 5 August
1982.
SYLLABI
Jurisdiction, The Labor Arbiter rather than a regular court has jurisdiction to entertain, a complaint for
damages by an employer against his employees arising from picketing that accompanied a strike.Arti-
cle 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein pro-
vided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judge
now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for
damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike. That was squarely within the express terms of the
law. Any deviation cannot therefore be tolerated. So it has been the constant ruling of this Court even prior to
Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, a 1913 decision. The ringing words of the ponencia of Justice Moreland still call
for obedience. Thus, The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction
and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without
them. It is so even after the lapse of sixty years.
Same; Same.The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130,
made clear that the exclusive and original jurisdiction for damages would once again be vested in labor arbiters.
It can be affirmed that even if they were not that explicit, history has vindicated the view that in the appraisal of
what was referred to by Philippine American Management & Financing Co., Inc. v. Management & Supervisors
Association of the Philippine-American Management & Financing Co., Inc. as the rather thorny question as to
where in labor matters the dividing line is to be drawn between the power lodged in an administrative body and
a court, the unmistakable trend has been to refer it to the former. Thus: Increasingly, this Court has been com-
mitted to the view that unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, the choice should fall on [an administra-
tive agency]. Certainly, the present Labor Code is even more committed to the view that on policy grounds, and
equally so in the interest of greater promptness in the disposition of labor matters, a court is spared the often
onerous task of determining what essentially is a factual matter, namely, the damages that may be incurred by
either labor or management as a result of disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations.
PAAT V. CA
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GR. NO.: GR 111107, 10 January 1997 (266 SCRA 167)
PONENTE: Second Division, Torres Jr. (p): 4 concurring
When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly any room for extended
TOPIC/S:
rationacination or rationalization of the law
VERDICT:
When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly any room for extended
END POINT:
rationacination or rationalization of the law
CITED DOCTRINE/S:
CASE DOCTRINE:
CIRCUMTANCES:
IMPORTANT POINT/S:
COURT DECISIONS:
FACTS
On 19 May 1989, Victoria de Guzmans truck was seized by Department of Environment and Natural Resources
personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya while on its ways to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan because the
driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. On 23 May
1989, Aritao CENROs Jovito Layugan issued an order of confiscation of the truck. Its owner, De Guzman, failed
to submit the required explanation within the reglementary period set by Layugan. On 22 June 1989, DENR Re-
gional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained the Alitao CENROs action of confiscation and ordered
the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order 277.
De Guzman filed for reconsideration but was denied.
The case was appealed to the Secretary of DENR. Pending resolution, however, a suit for replevin (Civil Case
4031), was filed by De Guzman and company against Layugan and Baggayan with the RTC Cagayan (Branch
2), contending that the only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in the transporting
illegal forest products, pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 68. De Guzman further contended that the
seizure is illegal, as she did not use the truck in the commission of the crime (of qualified theft under Article 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, punishable under Section 68), as allegedly admitted by the Regional Exec-
utive Director, releasing her from criminal liability. The trial court thereafter issued a writ ordering the return of the
truck to De Guzman. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
sustained the trial courts order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal one. Hence, the petition.

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ISSUE
1. Whether construction admits that the authority to confiscate or to forfeit conveyances belongs to the courts
2. Whether the truck was used in the commission of an offense under Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705,
as amended by Executive Order 277
HELD
The construction that conveyances are subject of confiscation by the courts exclusively (pursuant to Section 28,
paragraph 2) unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of Section
68-A, aside to the fact that conveyances are not mentioned nor included in the former provision. In the construc-
tion of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute. Statutes
should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they
should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits
intended. In the case at bar, the phrase to dispose of the same is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting
conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made in accordance with perti-
nent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
Further, when the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or ratio-
nalization of the law. The language of the amendatory executive order, when
it eliminated the phrase shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code and inserted the words shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, meant that the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or pos-
sessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under
Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the 16 October decision and 14 July 1992 reso-
lution of the CA, made permanent the restraining order promulgated on 27 September 1993, and directed the
DENR secretary to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.
SYLLABI
PEOPLE V. MAPA
GR. NO.: GR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164)

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PONENTE: En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur
TOPIC/S: DURA LEX SED LEX
Mapa was convicted of the crime of illegal possession of firearms. Masa is a

secret agent of governor leviste of batangas.
VERDICT:
END POINT:
CITED DOCTRINE/S:
CASE DOCTRINE:
CIRCUMTANCES:
IMPORTANT POINT/S:
COURT DECISIONS:
FACTS
Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in an information dated 14 August
1962 in violation of Section 878 of the Revise Administrative Code in connection with Section 2692 of the Re-
vised Administrative Code, as amended by CA 56 and as further amended by RA 4. Accused admits to posses-
sion of firearm on ground of being a secret agent of Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. On 27 November
1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime and sentenced him to imprison-
ment for one year and one day to two years. As the appeal involves a question of law, it was elevated to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the governor is exempt from the require-
ment of having a license of firearm
HELD
The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammu-
nition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts
of firearms, or ammunition except when such firearms are in possession of such public officials and public ser-
vants for use in the performance of their official duties; as those firearms and ammunitions which are regularly
and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors or marines, the Philippines Constabulary, guards in the employ-
ment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers,
municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails. It is the first and fundamen-

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tal duty of courts to apply the law; Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them. The law cannot be any clearer, there being no provision
made for a secret agent.
Reliance in the decision in People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no longer speaks with authority to
the extent that the present decision conflicts with. It may be note that in People v. Macarandang, a secret agent
was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment of the accused as a secret agent to assist in
the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put him within the category
of a peace officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879, Thus,
in the present case, therefore, the conviction must stand.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment.
SYLLABI
Illegal possession of firearms; Being a secret agent of the governor is not a defense.The fact that a per-
son, found in possession of an unlicensed firearm, is a secret agent of a provincial governor does not exempt
him from criminal liability. The law does not contain any exception for a secret agent.
Courts; Statutes; Fundamental duty of courts.The first and fundamental duty of the courts is to apply the
law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them." It is not within the power of a court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a
statutory provision.
DAOANG V. MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF SAN

NICOLAS
GR. NO.: GR L-34568, 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA 369)
PONENTE: Second Division, Padilla (p): 4 concurring
TOPIC/S:
VERDICT:
END POINT:
CITED DOCTRINE/S:
CASE DOCTRINE:
CIRCUMTANCES:

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IMPORTANT POINT/S:
COURT DECISIONS:
FACTS
On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte seeking the adoption of minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. However, minors Roderick and
Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein filed an opposition to the
said adoption. They contended that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named
Estrella Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore said spouses were disqualified to
adopt under Article 335 of the Civil Code, which provides that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowl-
edged natural children or children by legal fiction cannot adopt.
ISSUE
Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of Article
335 of the Civil Code.
HELD
The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt,
are clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word descendant, found in
the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned, to children. The children thus mentioned
have a clearly defined meaning in law and do not include grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory con-
struction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted. The rule is that
only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subjects of statutory construction. In the
present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy,
cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys.
The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte (Special Proceedings 37), wthout pronouncement as to costs.
SYLLABI
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Rule that a statute clear and unambiguous on its
face need not be interpreted.Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear
and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an am-
biguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In enacting the Civil Code, the legislator obviously intended that only
those persons who have certain classes of children are disqualified to adopt.Besides, it appears that the
legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the Philippines, obviously intended that only those persons who have cer-
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tain classes of children, are disqualified to adopt. The Civil Code of Spain, which was once in force in the Philip-
pines, and which served as the pattern for the Civil Code of the Philippines, in its Article 174. disqualified per-
sons who have legitimate or legitimated descendants from adopting. Under this article, the spouses Antero and
Amanda Agonoy would have been disqualified to adopt as they have legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners
herein. But, when the Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word descendants was changed to chil-
dren, in paragraph (1) of Article 335.
Same; Same; Same; Adoption is now geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and
enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life.Adoption used to be for the benefit of the
adopter. It was intended to afford to persons who have no child of their own the consolation of having one, by
creating through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none exists by blood relationship. The
present tendency, however, is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhance-
ment of his opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every intendment is sustained to promote that objec-
tive. Under the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by
legal fiction is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt.
PARAS V. COMELEC
GR. NO.: GR 123169, 4 November 1996 (264 SCRA 49)
PONENTE: En Banc, Francisco (p): 14 concurring
TOPIC/S:
VERDICT:
END POINT:
CITED DOCTRINE/S:
CASE DOCTRINE:
CIRCUMTANCES:
IMPORTANT POINT/S:
COURT DECISIONS:
FACTS

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Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the 1994
barangay election. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the
barangay, which was approved by the Comelec. Petition signing was scheduled on 14 October 1995, where at
least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The
Comelec also set the recall election on 13 November 1995, but which was deferred to 16 December 1995 due to
the petitioners opposition. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC Cabanat-
uan City a petition for injunction (Special Proceeding Civil Action 2254-AF), with the trial court issuing a restrain-
ing order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition
and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting
that the barangay recall election was without Comelec approval.
In a resolution dated 5 January 1996, the Comelec, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election on 13 Jan-
uary 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. The petitioner contends that
no recall can take place within one year preceding a regular local election, the Sangguniang Kabataan elections
slated on the first Monday of May 1996. He cited Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo to support the
argument, the Court in which case considered the SK election as a regular local election.
ISSUE
Whether the Sangguniang Kabataan election is to be construed as a regular local election in a recall proceeding
HELD
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the con-
text, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment. Further, the spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its con-
struction; hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent. The too literal interpretation of the law
leads to absurdity which the Court cannot countenance. A too-literal reading of the law constrict rather than fulfill
its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth but
in the spirit that vivifieth. In the present case, Paragraph (b) of Section 74 construed together with paragraph (a)
merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election. The Sangguni-
ang Kabataan elections cannot be considered a regular election, as this would render inutile the recall provision
of the Local Government Code. It would be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to
construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official
sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
The Supreme Court, however, has to dismiss the petition for having become moot and academic, as the next
regular elections involving the barangay office concerned were seven months away. Thus, the Temporary Re-
straining Order issued on 12 January 1996, enjoining the recall election, was made permanent.
SYLLABI

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Election Law; Recall; Statutory Construction; It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be con-
sidered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the con-
text, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment. The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official
to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely des-
ignates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second
year of his term of office.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; If the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections which is set by
R.A. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the
phrase regular local elections, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall
provision of the Local Government Code.Thus, subscribing to petitioners interpretation of the phrase regu-
lar local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government
Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if
the SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed
within the purview of the phrase regular local election, as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall elec-
tion can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.
Same; Same; Same; In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the
legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain
thing in the enactment of a statute.In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assump-
tion that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a
vain thing in the enactment of a statute. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or
provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed,
explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
Same; Same; Same; It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be inter-
preted in harmony with the Constitution.It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute
should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Gov-
ernment Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of
Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to enact a local government code which shall provide for a more re-
sponsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effec-
tive mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x x.
Same; Same; Same; The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction.Moreover,
petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case,
the Court made the following admonition: We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to
constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in

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the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth x x x. The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its
construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; It would be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provi-
sion of the Local Government Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election
where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by
the electorate.Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government
unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year im-
mediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election
for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the officials replacement in the
said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It
would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local
election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will
be contested and be filled by the electorate.
Separate opinion
DAVIDE, JR., J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Election Law; Recall; Words and Phrases; The term regular local election must be confined to the reg-
ular election of elective local officials, as distinguished from the regular election of national officials.
However, I wish to add another reason as to why the SK election cannot be considered a regular local election
for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The term regular local election
must be confined to the regular election of elective local officials, as distinguished from the regular election of
national officials. The elective national officials are the President, Vice-President, Senators and Congressmen.
The elective local officials are Provincial Governors, Vice-Governors of provinces, Mayors and Vice-Mayors of
cities and municipalities, Members of the Sanggunians of provinces, cities and municipalities, punong barangays
and members of the sangguniang barangays, and the elective regional officials of the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao. These are the only local elective officials deemed recognized by Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of
the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election partici-
pated in by those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are
registered voters.A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated in by
those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are registered voters.
One of the requirements for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is that the per-
son must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he can vote is that he be a registered voter pur-
suant to the rules on registration prescribed in the Omnibus Election Code (Sections 113-118). Under the law,
the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424, Local Government Code of 1991). Accord-

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ingly, they include many who are not qualified to vote in a regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than
18. In no manner then may SK elections be considered a regular election (whether national or local).

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Statutory Construction

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Statutory Construction

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What is statutory construction and what is its importance?

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What are some of the rules of statutory construction?

What are some of the rules of statutory construction?

STATUTORY

RULES OF CONSTRUCTION .............................................................................................................................................................................3

CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION, DISTINGUISHED ........................................................................................................................3

RULES OF CONSTRUCTION .............................................................................................................................................................................4

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC. VS. ENRICO PALOMAR .......................................................................................................................4

PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION VS. NTC AND PLDT .........................................................................................................9

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL) V. EISMA ......................................................................................................................11

DAOANG V. MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF SAN NICOLAS ..........................................................................................................................17

PARAS V. COMELEC ..........................................................................................................................................................................19

SANTIAGO JR. Page !2 of !23

Case provides an appriciation of the complexity and variety of law study

Statcon is based on common sense with logic and grasp of law

CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION, DISTINGUISHED

SANTIAGO JR. Page !3 of !23

Ex. after using the intrinsic aid which found no answe,

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC. VS. ENRICO

TOPIC/S: Statutory Construction Construction; defined Noscitur A Sociis

VERDICT: ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

CITED DOCTRINE/S: N/A

Construction - is the art or process of discovering and expounding the

SANTIAGO JR. Page !4 of !23

1. connection of lottery to the gift enterprise

SANTIAGO JR. Page !5 of !23

2. Is the Contest Scheme a Lottery?

SANTIAGO JR. Page !6 of !23

SANTIAGO JR. Page !7 of !23

PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION VS.

TOPIC/S: Statutory interpretation

TRIGGER OF THE FACTS:

TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE/S:

TRIGGER OF THE RULING:

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF NOVEMBER 25, 1983 IS HEREBY

END POINT: It ascertain the use of shall and may

SANTIAGO JR. Page !9 of !23

SANTIAGO JR. Page 10

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL) V.

PONENTE: Second Division, Torres Jr. (p): 4 concurring

TRIGGER OF THE FACTS:

TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE/S:

TRIGGER OF THE RULING:

SANTIAGO JR. Page !11 of !23

SANTIAGO JR. Page 12

GR. NO.: GR 111107, 10 January 1997 (266 SCRA 167)

PONENTE: Second Division, Torres Jr. (p): 4 concurring

TRIGGER OF THE FACTS:

TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE/S:

TRIGGER OF THE RULING:

SANTIAGO JR. Page 14

SANTIAGO JR. Page 15

PONENTE: En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur

TOPIC/S: DURA LEX SED LEX

Mapa was convicted of the crime of illegal possession of firearms. Masa is a

TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE/S:

TRIGGER OF THE RULING:

SANTIAGO JR. Page 16