059 - Precedent in The Indian Legal System (1990) (465-469)
059 - Precedent in The Indian Legal System (1990) (465-469)
059 - Precedent in The Indian Legal System (1990) (465-469)
Hence the distinction between what is the ratio decidendi of the case
and what are merely obiter dicta has to be constantly borne in mind in apply-
ing multilateral precedents to the decision of a case. When this is borne
in mind, it will also follow that a judgment as a precedent cannot create
law except by deciding the concrete question in the particular case. For
instance, in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India10 a 3-judge bench ofthe Supreme
Court was dealing with a writ petition under article 32 of the Constitution.
The petitioner complained against the pollution of environment by the
chemicals factory of the Shriram Foods and Fertilizers Industries in Delhi.
The locus standi of the petitioner was justified on the ground of the issue
being one of public interest which can be raised in a public interest litiga-
tion. The court laid down conditions for being complied with by the factory
to minimise the pollution caused by its working. There the decision of
the court should have ended. Going beyond the decision ofthe particular
case the court recommended in para 21 to the Government of India to adopt
a well-considered policy for prevention of pollution of environment.
This is a welcome suggestion.
But in the next case, M.C. Mehta v. Union of India11 the court was
concerned with payment of compensation and whether it can be ordered
in a writ petition particularly against an enterprise which is not an
agency or instrumentality of the state. The court declined to de-
termine and grant the compensation and asked the petitioner to file actions
claiming compensation with the help of the Delhi Legal Aid & Advice
Board. The author has missed the following points about this judgment
which need to be critically examined.
For example, para 31 of the judgment deals with the measure of liability
for damage caused by such hazardous and inherently dangerous industry.
Though no compensation was being determined or granted in the case, the
court nevertheless went beyond the issues before it and stated that the liabi-
lity for such a tort in India is not limited by the decision of the House of
Lords in Rylands v. Fletcher1*. After all English decisions are only
persuasive and not authoritative in India.
But then we come to para 32 of the judgment which was not only be-
yond the confines ofthe case but also tried to anticipate the decision in a
future litigation. The court said:
[T]he measure of compensation in the kind of cases referred to in
the preceding paragraph must be correlated to the magnitude and
capacity of the enterprise because such compensation must have a
deterrent effect. The larger and more prosperous the enterprise,
greater must be the amount of compensation payable by it for the
harm caused on account of an accident in the carrying on of the
hazardous or inherently dangerous activity by the enterprise.13
Firstly, the payment of compensation for a tort is to place the person
harmed by the tort in the same position he would have been but for the
tort. No compensation beyond that measure can be granted. But the
observations in para 32 suggest that the amount ofthe compensation would
increase not because of the increase in the harm caused but because the
tort feasor happens to be a large and a prosperous enterprise. It has never
been the law that the amount of compensation can increase by the accident
of the defendant being rich. Nor has the court the power to create such
a law by obiter dicta when the court is not deciding the question of the
quantum of compensation, much less the question whether the quantum
should increase due to the accident ofthe defendant being rich. This obser-
vation rang alarm bells in U.S.A. Not only the Union Carbide Corpora-
tion of the U.S.A. was in the dock feeing claims of compensation for
the extensive harm done by the leakage ofthe poisonous gas from its factory
in Bhopal but other prospective investors were concerned to know whether
the mere accident of their being rich would make them liable to pay com
pensation larger than is admissible under the law of torts.
Secondly, the observation was criticised as foreclosing a future decision
on the amount of compensation which would be payable by the Union Car
bide Corporation. Such a use of obiter dicta cannot pass muster. It is
bound to give rise to criticism and affect the credibility of a judicial prece
dent.
The full court decision in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala^ is
unique not only in India but in the world. Before this decision, the dis
tinction was between the constituent power of the Constituent Assembly
making the Constitution for the first time and the legislative power exer
cised by the Parliament under the Constitution after the Constitution has
been made. The provision for the amendment of the Constitution in arti
cle 368 was regarded as being in the nature ofthe exercise of a constituent
power in as much as the amendment made there under would become a part
of the Constitution. However, this amendment is made not by the Cons
tituent Assembly but by Parliament under a power which also is given by
the Constitution in the same way as the power to make ordinary legislation.
Since it is the function of the Supreme Court and the high courts in India
to construe the Constitution, logically it followed that the exercise of the
amending power was also to be construed by the courts. The word
"amend" was construed in this decision and it was held that the power
to amend could not be so exercised as to change the identity ofthe Consti
tution or the basic structure ofthe Constitution. The effect of this decision
was virtually to leave no power to be exercised by the Parliament which
would be beyond the judicial review by the courts.
To restore the constituent nature of the amending power the Forty-
second amendment of the Constitution was made in 1976 adding clauses
(4) and (5) to article 368 declaring that an amendment ofthe Constitution
shall not be called in question in any court and that there shall be no limi
tation on the constituent power of the Parliament to amend the Constitu
tion. But clauses (4) and (5) in their turn were invalidated by the Consti
tution Bench of the Supreme Court in Minerva Mills v. Union of India^
on the ground that these provisions sought to exclude judicial review which
was one of the basic features of the Constitution as held in Kesavananda.
Thus the conflict between judicial review by the Supreme Court and the
exercise of the so-called constituent power of amendment under article 368
by a special majority in Parliament continues. This unique feature of the
role of precedent in the Indian legal system needs to be discussed further
than what has been done by the author.
The author has discussed the power ofthe Supreme Court and the high
court* to-overrule their own precedents by acting through larger benches.
14. A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461.
15. A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789.