The KLA and The Kosovo War: Armend R. Bekaj

Armend R.
Bekaj
The KLA and the Kosovo War

From Intra-State Conflict to Independent Country
8
Berghof Transitions Series
Resistance/Liberation Movements and
Transition to Politics
Armend R. Bekaj:
The KLA and the Kosovo War: From Intra-State Conflict to Independent Country.
Berghof Conflict Research/Berghof Forschungszentrum fr konstruktive Konfliktbearbeitung 2010
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Berghof Transitions Series
Resistance/Liberation Movements and
Transition to Politics
Editors
Vronique Dudouet and Hans J. Giessmann
Berghof Conflict Research is grateful to acknowledge

the project funding generously provided by the
International Development Research Center, Ottawa,
Canada and the support and co-operation provided
by Berghof Peace Support (BPS).
No. 8
About this Publication Series
This case-study is one of a series produced by participants in an ongoing Berghof research

programme on transitions from violence to peace (Resistance and Liberation Movements in Transition).
The programmes overall aim is to learn from the experience of those in resistance or liberation
movements who have used violence in their struggle but have also engaged politically during the conflict
and in any peace process. Recent experience around the world has demonstrated that reaching political
settlement in protracted social conflict always eventually needs the involvement of such movements.
Our aim here is to discover how, from a non-state perspective, such political development is handled,
what is the relationship between political and military strategies and tactics, and to learn more about
how such movements (often sweepingly and simplistically bundled under the label of non-state
armed groups) contribute to the transformation of conflict and to peacemaking. We can then use that
experiential knowledge (1) to offer support to other movements who might be considering such a shift
of strategy, and (2) to help other actors (states and international) to understand more clearly how to
engage meaningfully with such movements to bring about political progress and peaceful settlement.
Political violence is a tool of both state and non-state actors, and replacing it by political
methods of conflict management is essential to making sustainable peace. With this programme we
want to understand better how one side of that equation has been, or could be, achieved. Depending
on the particular case, each study makes a strong argument for the necessary inclusion of the
movement in any future settlement, or documents clearly how such a role was effectively executed.
We consciously asked participants to reflect on these movements experience from their
own unique point of view. What we publish in this series is not presented as neutral or exclusively
accurate commentary. All histories are biased histories, and there is no single truth in conflict
or in peace. Rather, we believe these case-studies are significant because they reflect important
voices which are usually excluded or devalued in the analysis of conflict. Increasing numbers of
academics, for example, study armed groups from outside, but few actually engage directly with
them to hear their own points of view, rationales, and understandings of their context. We are
convinced that these opinions and perspectives urgently need to be heard in order to broaden our
understanding of peacemaking. For exactly this reason, each case study has been produced with the
very close co-operation of, and in some cases authored by, members of the movement concerned. As
the results amply illustrate, these perspectives are sophisticated, intelligent, political and strategic.
The reader may or may not agree with the perspectives expressed. But, much more importantly,
we hope that the reader will accept that these perspectives are valid in themselves and must be included
in any attempt at comprehensive understanding of violent conflict and its transformation. We urgently
need to understand in more depth the dynamics of organisations who make the transition between
political violence and democratic politics, in order to improve our understanding of their role, and our
practice, in making peace.
The views expressed are those of the authors and contributors, and do not necessarily reflect
the opinions or views of the Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies or any of its constituent agencies.
For further information on the project, please contact:

Vronique Dudouet (Project Coordinator) Prof. Hans J. Giessmann (Director, BCR)

[email protected] [email protected]
Table of Contents
Introduction 7
1. Background and the years of nonviolent resistance 9
1.1 The historical perspective of the armed movement 9

1.2 1945 to 1989: Kosovo and the socialist ideology 10
1.3 Kosovo in the parallel system 12
2. Armed mobilisation and international intervention 17
2.1 Emergence of the armed struggle: the appearance of armed resistance cells 17
2.2 The dominance of the KLA 18
2.3 The intensification of hostilities: March 1998 March 1999 21
2.4 The involvement of international actors and NATOs bombing campaign 23
3. The post-war transformation of the KLA 27
3.1 KPC: transformation, not dissolution 27

3.2 Integration into the police force 31
3.3 The leap from combatant to politician 31
4. The post-independence security presence 33
4.1 Security sector review 33

4.2 The dignified dissolution of the KPC 34
Conclusion 37
Bibliography 38
Internet Sources 39
Interviews 40
Annex I: Acronyms 42
Annex II: Chronology 43
Annex III: Map of Kosovo 46
About the Author 47
The KLA and the Kosovo War: From Intra-State Conflict to Independent Country
Introduction
The recent conflict in Kosovo1 is often referred to as a unique case study for several
reasons: the factors that contributed to the sudden rise of the Albanians armed insurgency
movement in the mid- to late-1990s; the heavy involvement of the international community,
climaxing in the armed intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) against a
sovereign state Serbia/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY);2 and the subsequent establishment
of the international protectorate in Kosovo, led by the United Nations (UN) in concert with the
NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the widest array of international organisations to date. These
unique circumstances, so the argument goes, have followed Kosovos political path, leading up
to its declaration of independence. Along this path, international norms of self-determination
and human rights versus those of national sovereignty and non-interference in internal matters
have been invoked, tested and have even clashed repeatedly. The recent deliberations at the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague as to whether or not Kosovos declaration of
independence is legal bear testimony to this clash.3
Sui generis theory aside, Kosovos conflict has been a protracted one, and in this respect
shares resemblances with other cases of occupation and/or self-determination and liberation. If
one is to set a date, it originated in 1912/13, when the territory was forcefully and illegally annexed
by Serbia, later becoming part of Yugoslavia. With this context in mind, this study aims at offering
an account on the rise of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (Ushtria lirimtare e Kosovs, UK),
whilst analysing some of the root causes that led to its formation. It will look at how the KLA has
interacted with its international partners, such as NATO; how it has transformed itself into a civilian
force; and how its leaders have reinvented themselves as political figures.
The research framework of Berghof Conflict Researchs publication series Resistance/
Liberation Movements and Transition to Politics4 views armed struggle as an expansion of
political strategies, or as a way for resistance/liberation movements to attain their goals. The aims
of this research scheme are to identify the origins and objectives of the movements concerned,
their transition from non-violent to armed struggle and the reasons for this shift. It also explores
the internal and external factors [that have] persuaded the movement to pursue or consider a non-
violent political strategy, and addresses the causes that have assisted the movement in pursuing
a political strategy. Furthermore, it looks at the nature of any resulting/potential transformation
from armed conflict to peace-time politics, whose actors as many resistance movements across
the world testify have in the course of the conflict made the transition from opposing a state
regime to participating in the construction of a new, more democratic system (Dudouet 2009: 14).
In this context, the research on the KLAs armed struggle and the subsequent transition to
politics has several commonalities with other research papers in this series. However, this research
paper will also highlight those singular historical moments in Kosovos recent war which make this
1 The term Kosovo shall be used throughout this text, as it is the version that has become standard in the English
language. Kosova, the Albanian name of the country, shall be referred to as such only when quoted from direct
sources. All other place names within Kosovo shall be noted as in the Albanian vernacular, unless otherwise quoted
in sources.
2 The names Serbia/FRY (or Yugoslavia) and Serb/Yugoslav forces are used interchangeably throughout the
text. Although Serbia was indeed the hegemonic power of rump Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the federation was also
comprised of a second republic: Montenegro. However, in the Kosovo context, historically the Serbian regime and
its policies were always the primary political and military rival.
3 On 22 July 2010 the ICJ rendered its advisory opinion as to whether the declaration of independence by the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo is in accordance with international law, a question put
forward by Serbia. The ICJ found that the declaration of independence of Kosovo adopted on 17 February 2008
did not violate international law. For more, see Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/16010.pdf.
4 See www.berghof-conflictresearch.org/en/publications/transitions-series.
Armend R. Bekaj
particular case unique for several reasons. Notwithstanding the heavy involvement of international
diplomacy and armed intervention, Kosovos transition to post-war politics did not culminate in
the incorporation of former combatants into a more democratic system of the existing state, as
has been the case with most other resistance/liberation struggles. Rather, post-conflict political
developments eventually led Kosovo to complete secession and independence from Serbia. These
singular historical moments, which make Kosovos case unique and arguably unprecedented, will
be noted in this paper.
The methodology employed throughout this research paper takes as its basis the primary
data gathered in interviews with some of the main actors of the armed movement.5 Their insight
and first-hand experience offer a much-needed originality to the research, thus endeavouring to
put forward the KLAs perspective on Kosovos recent war and its aftermath. A few interviews were
also conducted with persons who did not necessarily represent the KLA, but whose opinions derive
from their own experience with other armed or non-armed organisations of that time. The points of
view and experience of the armed and other actors are reflected in this paper. However, in order to
achieve the necessary degree of academic and balanced rigour I have also made use of secondary
data available on the topic. With the literature consulted, I have attempted to refer to mainstream
academic writings from abroad, but also to focus on texts and books published within Kosovo and
by local authors. These local authors have often been best positioned to offer an inside story that is
uniquely valuable, notwithstanding the potential bias. However, in this regard, it was the authors
responsibility to have placed a degree of objectivity and cool-headedness to the research.
Initially, this study looks at the historical events that led or contributed to the armed
insurrection of the late 1990s. There will be a short overview of the nature of the Serbian and/
or Yugoslav system exercised in Kosovo, culminating in the introduction of a de facto apartheid
system in the 1990s. In relation to these events, there will be a synopsis of the rise of Kosovos
parallel system of governance and the peaceful resistance movement. The second chapter will
analyse the KLAs arrival onto the scene and the gradual inclusion of the international community
(read: NATO members and Russia) into the conflict. Following the NATO bombardment in the
first half of 1999, the third chapter will examine the issues of disarmament of the KLA and its
transformation into the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). Finally, the last chapter will take a quick
look at the current state of play of the newly-established Kosovo Security Force (KSF), following the
KPCs demise in 2009.
5 These will be referenced throughout the text as (Xhemajli interview) etc. For details of the posts held by the various
interview partners, see the bibliography.
8
1. Background and the years of nonviolent resistance
The conflict in Kosovo in the late 1990s was the culmination of a long history of Serbian
oppression on one hand and Albanian resistance on the other. It stretches right back to the
beginning of the 20th century, with the crumbling of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent hunt
for territories in the newly-liberated Balkan nations.
Following the defeat of the beleaguered Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, Kosovo was
forcefully and illegally annexed by Serbia during 1912-13. This went against the wishes of its
Albanian majority population, who saw unification with the newly-created Albania as the natural
course of events. In actual fact, they were cut off from it. Nevertheless, at the Ambassadors
Conference in London in December 1912, Serbias occupation of Kosovo was supported by the
great powers Britain, France and Russia, and opposed by Austria-Hungary. Since then, Kosovo
remained part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, proclaimed as such in 1918, and
then of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), as it was named after World War II.
Throughout these political transformations, Serbia kept its monopoly on its claim over Kosovo
(Malcolm 1998; Glenny 1999; Judah 2002, 2008).
1.1. The historical perspective of the armed movement
In order to have a more realistic grasp on the events that led to the creation and
consolidation of the KLA, one needs to have an informed overview of the earlier resistance
movements in Kosovo. Being one episode of a larger historical process, the emergence of the KLA
should not be viewed as an isolated or single point in Kosovos most recent history. Rather, its
creation is part of the same trajectory of resistance movements that has been witnessed in Kosovo
throughout the 20th century. Scattered throughout the century, these movements were different in
their intensity and longevity, but the political rival was always personified in the Belgrade regime.
They followed a consistent, coherent and logical path of continued development that culminated
with the KLA. This trajectory of resistance movements was instigated because of Belgrades
consistent state policy of occupation, colonisation, assimilation and/or forceful emigration of
Albanians out of Kosovo. It was stirred into action by the need for self-determination, freedom and
justice of the Albanian people, suffering under the rule of the Serbian regime. The final objective
was normally defined as the life-long aspiration of unification of Kosovo with Albania.
The annexation of Kosovo by Serbia in 1912/13 sparked off a series of armed resistance
movements between the two world wars. The period right up to World War II witnessed several
armed undertakings by Albanians in Kosovo. Such was the case, for example, with the armed
struggles of Azem Bejta (Galica) and Shote Bejta (Galica) from the Drenica region. One of the
political leaders of that time, Hasan Prishtina, formed the Committee for the National Defence
of Kosovo, more simply known as the Kosovo Committee, which lobbied with the US and other
western governments for the inclusion of Kosovo in the new Albanian state. Others, such as Isa
Boletini, Bajram Curri or Idriz Seferi, also led various armed movements that were eventually
silenced by the Belgrade regime or interrupted by the upcoming World War II.
These armed leaders led a clandestine existence, since they were persecuted by
Belgrade. People referred to them as kaaks, which means outlaws and rebels, who resisted
the hyqymet, or the state, which in this context was identified as an oppressive and colonialist
system. Following this logic, any act against this state was an act of patriotism, an attempt to
Armend R. Bekaj
gain freedom. It is clear that, overall, the kaak movement was a political phenomenon, directed
against Serbian rule as such, and it is also clear that the anti-Albanian policies of the government
and local authorities (including the whole colonisation programme) were a powerful stimulus to
the rebellion (Malcolm 1998: 273).
In addition to the colonisation programme through which Serbia planned to settle
thousands of Serb families in Kosovo the plan for the mass exodus of Albanians from Kosovo
took precedence during the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s. After many discussions between
Yugoslavia and Turkey, the two countries signed an agreement in 1938 under which the latter would
take 40,000 Muslim Albanian families into its territories. It should be noted that, according to the
agreement, a family was defined as blood relations living under one roof, which for Albanian
families in Kosovo often meant three-generation households of more than ten persons (see
Malcolm 1998; or Kraja 2003a). The entire process was meant to take six years, starting from 1939.
However, the plan stalled due to the outbreak of World War II. If the plan had been accomplished
in full, Kosovo would have been emptied of more than 75% of its Albanian population. However,
despite the non-implementation of this agreement, it is estimated that between 1918 and 1941 up
to 150,000 Albanians and other Muslims emigrated out of Kosovo.
Shortly before the end of World War II, the will of the people of Kosovo was reflected in
what came to be known as the Bujan Conference. Namely, between the period of 31 December
1943 and 2 January 1944, the First Conference of the National Liberation Council for Kosovo
and Dukagjin Plateau was held in Bujan, northern Albania. The ensuing Declaration of Bujan
was endorsed by the representatives of all parts of Kosova and the Dukagjin Plateau, Albanian,
Serbian and Montenegrin: nationalists, communists, anti-fascist youth, communist youth, anti-
fascist women, representatives of the National Liberation Army and others inspired by the lofty
ideal of the unification of various political trends, for the development and union of the peoples
of Kosova and the Dukagjin Plateau [...]. The Declaration, signed by the representatives National
Liberation Council, envisaged Kosovos unification with Albania after the end of World War II, in
accordance with the will of the people (Weller 1999: 50-51). However, this will did not find fulfilment
when the war came to an end.
1.2. 1945 to 1989: Kosovo and the socialist ideology
After World War II, Kosovo entered a period of cohabitation with the other republics and
provinces of Titos SFRY. This was a phase of flirtation with the socialist ideology, promoted by slogans
of Brotherhood and Unity (Kraja 2003a). The first generation of the home-grown communist elite
seemed a zealous advocate for successful integration into the Yugoslav model-state. Their own
engagement in public and political life was supposed to be proof of a prosperous cohabitation.
However, away from the official political doctrine propagated by the Yugoslav authorities,
the suppression of Albanians in Kosovo continued. In line with the expressed political will of the
Bujan Conference, in mid-1945 around 5,000 Albanians, under the leadership of their commander
Shaban Polluzha, took up arms against the Yugoslav partisans. The resistance was subsequently
crushed. In the few years after the war, it is estimated that tens of thousands of Albanians were
killed, persecuted and forced to leave their lands (Hyseni interview; Independent International
Commission on Kosovo 2000). The 1950s were marred by the infamous arms collections
campaign. The crackdown on persons suspected of possessing arms brought indiscriminate
misery upon many Albanian families, particularly in rural areas. The rigged trials of 1956 in Prizren
served to clamp down on Kosovar Albanian communists accused of collaborating with the Socialist
Peoples Republic of Albania. The accused were given harsh prison sentences (Banac 2006).
10
Consequently, the period after World War II was marked by the rather random but
repeated emergence of political resistance movements. The common reason for establishing
these movements was the disadvantageous socio-political position of Albanians in Kosovo and
wider Yugoslavia. Being part of the same but divided nation, their aspiration continued to be
unification with the mother country Albania. Of course, voicing such aspirations publicly was
punishable by law, and many were persecuted. Often the popular discontent was shown through
impromptu and fragmented organisations of groups, largely youth and students. These movements
were clandestine by nature and began gathering a serious critical mass towards the end of 1960s.
Since then the whole movement, or rather a series of them, began to be led by people working
largely underground. These movements came to be known by the common name of Illegality (in
Albanian Ilegalja).
The demonstrations of 1968 were the first clear and collective call for human rights and
freedoms for Albanians living in socialist Yugoslavia. The slogan Kosovo Republic was first
heard on the streets of Kosovos capital Prishtina on 27 November of that year, chanted by several
hundred demonstrators. Other slogans included Down with colonial policy in Kosovo, We want
a university and Long live Albania (Malcolm 1998). One of the leading and inspiring figures
at that time was Adem Demai, a young writer and political activist who was already serving his
second prison sentence for denouncing the harsh conditions of Albanians living in Yugoslavia.
Having co-founded one of the first illegal organisations in 1963, called the Revolutionary Movement
for Albanian Unification (Lvizja Revolucionare pr Bashkimin e Shqiptarve, LRBSh), he was
calling for the right of self-determination and unification of Albanians. Adem Demai served a total
of 28 years as a political prisoner, and was finally released in 1990 (Gashi 2010).
The new Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 gave Kosovo greater autonomy within Yugoslavia,
with an almost equal status to the rest of the entities of the federation, be they republics or
provinces. The constitution gave the provinces the right of direct representation in the main federal
bodies. The Presidency of Yugoslavia was to change on a rotating basis, with representatives from
the provinces as well as the republics (Kraja 2003a; Malcolm 1998).
However, despite the positive changes brought forward with the new constitution, the
dissatisfaction of the Kosovar Albanian population with their status in Yugoslavia was still present.
The core cause of their grievance stemmed from the fact that, after all, they remained a subordinate
entity within Yugoslavia. They were not elevated to the constitutional status of a nation, but were
acknowledged as a nationality, which meant that as such they remained relegated to being a
province of Serbia. The latter, herself a republic, enjoyed the status of being a nation.
The 1980s mark the period of intensification of clandestine activities by the Ilegalja
movement. There were a few different initiatives, organised groups comprised mostly of students,
who began conducting illegal activities, such as drafting pamphlets highlighting the Albanians
position in Yugoslavia, holding secret meetings to recruit followers, setting up local radio stations
in the west and publishing bulletins, most prominently that of Zri i Kosovs (The Voice
of Kosovo). Throughout this decade, hundreds of Albanians were killed and thousands were
imprisoned or tortured for alleged subversion.6
The most active and dynamic of these groupings was the organisation that eventually
came to be known as the Peoples Movement of Kosovo (Lvizja Popullore e Kosovs, LPK). This
organisation was established on 17 February 1982, at a meeting held in Turkey by persons who had
been exploring ways to organise themselves politically. The LPK went on to operate clandestinely
throughout the 80s and 90s, living side by side with the official Yugoslav/Serbian regime. A
year before, massive protests erupted in Prishtina, with students demanding equal rights for
6 See Conflict history: Kosovo, on http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-issues/research-resources/conflict-histories/
kosovo.aspx.
11
Armend R. Bekaj
Albanians. The slogans Kosovo Republic and Unification with Albania were chanted with
increasing frequency. It was during these protests that some of the LPKs future members found
the momentum for political organisation, having identified potential partners for clandestine
operations (Xhemajli interview).
The LPKs political programme at the beginning of 1980s was to demand the status of
republic for Kosovo within Yugoslavia. Its wider ambition, accentuated increasingly towards the
late 1980s and 1990s, was to demand rights of self-determination for Kosovo, which meant either
complete secession from Serbia and/or unification with Albania.
The LPKs strategy also included the organisation of armed struggle. War was seen as an
acceptable and possible means of reaching their political goals. Being a liberation organisation,
its programme stated:
To achieve the national objectives, the liberation of the country, LPK will employ
every form of liberation wars: democratic, peaceful, as well as those of armed
uprisings (quoted in Kelmendi 1999).
1989 witnessed the short-lived emergence of the first armed group, called eta e Llapit
(The Group of Llap). However, at that time the organisation of such armed groups was intermittent
and there was a lack of planning. But it is important to highlight the political programme of this
organisation, because of its close association with the KLA a few years later. As will be seen below,
many of the founding members of the KLA had earlier been members of the LPK and its leadership.
In fact, the KLA was closer to the LPK than it was to any other group or association. Unlike some
other Albanian political formations, the LPKs support for the KLA was always open and consistent
(Xhemajli interview).
Because of its clandestine activities, the LPK and other political activists were constantly
persecuted by the authorities of that time. Hence many of them, including most of the leadership,
escaped to western European countries, set up their offices in Germany, Switzerland etc., and
operated as part of the Albanian diaspora. However, the Albanian political activists were not
immune from persecution in the West either, even before the LPK was formed. Most prominently,
on 17 January 1982, in Untergruppenbach in Germany, Jusuf Grvalla, Kadri Zeka and Bardhosh
Grvalla Kosovos Albanian political activists operating in exile were assassinated by Serbian
agents. Jusuf and his friend and brother had emigrated to the West with the aim of assembling
and coordinating the various Albanian political factions operating amongst diaspora communities.
They were an inspiration for the Ilegalja movement, and the leadership of the LPK, formed a
month after their assassination.
1.3. Kosovo in the parallel system
In 1987, as inter-ethnic relations between Albanians and Serbs worsened, Kosovo proved
to be the most expedient nationalist card to play during the rapid ascendancy of Slobodan Miloevi
as President of the Serbian League of Communists (later President of Serbia and Yugoslavia).
The unconstitutional annulment of Kosovos autonomy in 1989 marked the stepping-up of
institutionalised discrimination of Albanians in public life. Over 100,000 Albanians were removed
from their jobs, while the University of Prishtina and most secondary school premises were closed
off to Albanian students and pupils (Clark 2000). The 1990s found Kosovo in a political climate of
apartheid:
...The quite open and undisguised nature of the programme of ethnic politics and
repression, enshrined in Serb law, was a reflection of the belief that the armour of
state sovereignty would protect Belgrade from significant international interest in
12
relation to these practices. After all, all the relevant decisions had been adopted
by what Serbia claimed were the appropriate constitutional procedures, and only
Serbia would be in a position to judge the validity of her own actions. While the
abolition of Kosovos independent powers had, in fact, occurred under rather
controversial circumstances, the protestations of the ethnic Albanian leadership
were now being portrayed as manifestations of separatism which, in turn, could
justify even fiercer oppression (Weller 1999: 26).
The response of the Albanian population was to organise themselves around the newly-
founded political party called the Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovs,
LDK). In conditions of secrecy and under pressure from the police and other security mechanisms,
on July 2, 1990 the Assembly of Kosovo approved a Constitutional Declaration, which paved the way
for asserting Kosovos equal status with the other Yugoslav republics. On September 7 of the same
year, the Assembly met in the town of Kaanik, approved the constitution and declared Kosovo a
republic. In September 1991, a referendum for independence was organised, with a turnout of 87%
of Albanians, of whom 99% voted in favour. In April 1992 the first multi-party elections were held,
confirming peoples trust in the LDKs political programme of civil resistance, led by Dr. Ibrahim
Rugova (Buxhovi 2009; Malcolm 1998; Kraja 2003b).
The political acts detailed above were not acknowledged or validated by Serbia or by the
international community. However, they provided a legal platform (albeit unilaterally recognised)
and legitimacy for representing the majority population of Kosovo. The LDK government led the way
in ushering Kosovo into a shadowy parallel existence, setting up their own health care, welfare and
education systems. Financial contributions from the Albanian diaspora played a significant role in
maintaining this parallel system.
Belgrades regime intensified its repressive methods, installing Serb officials in all
public offices in higher education, police, judiciary, media etc., despite the fact that only around
ten percent of Kosovos population of approximately 2 million inhabitants was of Serb ethnicity.
On the other hand, the political strategy of the Albanian civil resistance rested on boycotting
Belgrade, consolidating the parallel reality in Kosovo and, crucially, lobbying for assistance from
the West. However, in the first half of the 1990s Kosovo never really made it to the forefront of
international negotiations. With the intensification of the wars in Croatia and then Bosnia, Kosovo
was completely sidelined and remained in the margins of the international corridors of power. The
parallel experience of daily oppression by Serbian forces, and the call for patience on the Albanian
side, is amply illustrated in the passage below:
...the ethnic conflict in Kosova has turned into a kind of intense war of nerves,
in which one side stops at nothing, committing the most brutal violations of
human rights and civil liberties, completely ignoring the protests of international
organisations which for a while kept monitoring teams in Kosova, while the other
side bottles up its humiliation, despair, fury, rage and hatred but for how long
before it explodes? (Maliqi 1998: 24).
The 1995 Dayton (Ohio) Peace Accords on Bosnia and Herzegovina provided a rude
awakening for the Albanian nonviolent resistance movement. Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia signed
a peace agreement, thus exposing the fragility of the situation in Kosovo, left entirely as an
internal matter of rump Yugoslavia. The American architect of the Bosnia peace accords, Richard
Holbrooke, recalls Miloevis blunt refusal to even entertain a discussion on the human rights
violations in Kosovo (Holbrooke 1999; also see Glenny 1999). On the other hand, the Kosovar
Albanian leaderships political arsenal rested on the Wests diplomatic intervention in the Kosovo
crisis. However, looking at this event retrospectively, to have expected that the Kosovo issue was
going to be discussed at any meaningful length in Dayton seems like a clear sign of delusion. It can
13
Armend R. Bekaj
perhaps be explained by the desperate, albeit completely unfounded, and hopeless expectation
that somehow Kosovo would finally come to the forefront of the international agenda. That
obviously did not happen, and from then on the peaceful resistance movement lost its momentum
and became increasingly stagnant (Hyseni interview). The parallel world was supported by the
diasporas contributions, but the leadership was often reduced to a simple mechanism of listing
the many cases of human rights violations, and appealing to the outside world for help. In this
dispiriting atmosphere, and in addition to the widespread poverty, unemployment and state
terror, the Albanians dignity and the sanctity of their homes were repeatedly being offended. All
this meant that by mid-1990s, the peaceful resistance seemed too weak to push back the Serbian
oppression, to the growing frustration of Kosovar Albanians (Ibishi interview).
Notwithstanding the rise of the armed insurgency which will be described at length
in the next chapter the first serious manifestations of popular discontent were the students
peaceful protests of 1997. On 1 October that year, the Independent Students Union of the
University of Prishtina (Unioni i Pavarur i Studentve i Universitetit t Prishtins, UPSUP) organised
their first protest, demanding the return of university premises that had been usurped by the
Serbian regime. More than 20,000 students took to the streets in what proved to be a successfully
orchestrated, nonviolent demonstration. The ensuing brutal intervention by the Serbian police
resulted in the arrest of the UPSUP leadership, beatings of demonstrators, teargas and the forceful
dispersion of the crowd. Other protests were organised later that year and in early 1998. As stated
above, the official demand of the students movement was the return of university premises and
the improvement of teaching conditions (Clark 2000). However, the students discontent also
addressed Rugovas civil resistance. Students were becoming increasingly vocal in criticising the
LDKs lack of inventiveness and lack of concrete results on the ground. In fact, by then it was clear
to the UPSUP that the LDK-led parallel government was stifled by inertia, and passive peaceful
resistance had become another name for lack of available diplomatic options, kept alive by fear
and submission.
The students movement has played a pivotal role in Kosovos recent history, not
only because of its successful organisation of nonviolent protests, modelled on other peaceful
resistance movements and figures, such as Martin Luther King Jr., Ghandi, or Northern Irelands
civil rights marches. The immediate effect of this movement was to appeal to the internal audience:
to the LDK-led government for a drastic and proactive change in its political approach. The outward
effect of the movement was to trigger a sudden rise of the international medias interest in the
developments in Kosovo. Finally, the longer-term consequence of the movement was galvanising
the society and the political scene into action, and helping to change the status quo. Actually, this
was the meeting point in the agenda of both the students peaceful movement and the armed
resistance, which was to break the intolerable status quo, and explore other more proactive means
of achieving rights for Albanians in Kosovo.
To summarise, the resistance movement in Kosovo has been an ongoing and consistent
presence amongst the Albanian population throughout the twentieth century. It abated or flared
up at intervals, depending on the socio-political context. During different phases, it became
more intense, or brewed silently beneath the peaceful, socialist veneer. Its manifestation was
symptomatic of the popular discontent reigning amongst Albanians, which in itself was triggered
by the colonialist, and later overtly oppressive and discriminatory policies of Belgrade towards the
majority population of Kosovo.
Moreover, a holistic study of this resistance would not be complete if it did not examine
its complex nuances. Namely, one should recognise that there have been two streams of Albanian
resistance throughout the twentieth century: the nonviolent, political or diplomatic attempts at
resistance and boycott, and the armed struggles. Far from negating each other, these two streams
14
have generally either complemented or replaced one another. The kaak movement between
the two world wars was followed by sparks of rebellions during and after World War II, only to find
expression in the student demonstrations of 1968. Later, the 1980s began with another series of
student demonstrations, seeking equal political rights for Kosovo within Yugoslavia. This decade
also ended with massive protests, following the annulment of Kosovos autonomy in 1989. The
Albanians response to the introduction of the apartheid system of the 1990s was to set up a
parallel system led by the LDK, inspired by principles of civil and nonviolent resistance. However,
its increased passivity and lack of creativity in civil disobedience towards the mid-1990s failed to
alleviate the desperate living conditions of Albanians in Kosovo. The formation of the KLA in the
mid-1990s signalled the return of the armed struggle that eventually culminated in open warfare
and brought the worlds most powerful alliance into the conflict.
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2. Armed mobilisation and international intervention

The resolution of Kosovos political crisis through diplomatic means looked increasingly
delusory, particularly in the aftermath of the Bosnian war and the Dayton Accords. By the mid-
1990s, the Albanian peaceful resistance was being undermined even from within, as different
radical and militant groups began to emerge. The students peaceful movement of 1997-8 was
openly vocal about its revolt against Belgrades discriminatory policies in Kosovos education
system. Simultaneously, this movement was attacking the LDKs passive resistance. Other groups,
such as the LPK, continued their clandestine operations during the 1990s, strengthening their
links with the diaspora communities and reorganising themselves, with the aim of creating a
sustainable armed wing.
Meanwhile, with the annulment of Kosovos autonomy in 1989 and the subsequent
centralisation of powers in Belgrade, the regime intensified its policy of oppression. After Daytons
success, the international community was quick to baptise the Serb leader Miloevi as the
peacemaker of the Balkans, due to his role in brokering a peace deal with Croats and Bosniacs
(Holbrooke 1999). International actors themselves seemed to have reached a state of fatigue. In
reality, after half a decade of bloody wars in the former Yugoslavia, they were very reluctant to
entertain the idea of further involvement in Balkan conflicts. In this context, feeling vindicated
after the Dayton Accords, Miloevis regime enjoyed ample space to contain any unrest in Kosovo,
treating it as a strictly internal state matter. In Kosovo, the voices of those who did not see peaceful
resistance as a feasible option continued to grow. Alternatives to passive nonviolence, involving
armed resistance, were actively being explored:
For a long time, they [the people of Kosovo] would not be searching for other
political alternatives, but would instead end up comprising a subordinate mass
of people, led by an almost unconscious inertia. Therefore, however harsh and
not humane this might sound, Kosovo was in need of a war also for internal
reasons. Kosovo had to get rid not only of Serbia, but also dispose of the idea of
subordination [...] Kosovo needed a war to help her understand that there were
other political alternatives, apart from that capital deception that dictated one could
live in occupation, whilst dreaming of their freedom (Kraja 2003b: 36).
2.1 Emergence of the armed struggle: the appearance of armed resistance cells
As the nonviolent resistance was losing ground, various groups began to search for
alternatives that embraced armed conflict as the way to achieve liberation. At first, such initiatives
were undertaken by a few individuals or groups of people, mostly students and young intellectuals,
who were willing to fight for a common cause. Initially, due to lack of experience and the risks
associated with illegal activities, the organisation of these small cells was not centralised or
coordinated by some joint body. But the emergence of illegal groupings in Kosovo in the late
1980s and early 1990s was illustrative of the stifling political environment. Consequently, peoples
initiatives for finding a way out of the political quagmire meant undertaking armed resistance
(Mustafa interview).
As noted above, the clandestine political organisation LPK had been active in this
regard since 1982. By the early 1990s, the idea of armed resistance was becoming predominant in
their thinking. In fact, most of the people who contributed to the emergence of the KLA had been
in the LPK movement for shorter or longer periods of time, operating within Kosovo or abroad.
16
This is important to note because the LPK, or at least some of its leadership members, played a
crucial role in setting up the foundations and providing financial and logistical support to the KLA
(Xhemajli interview). The LPK provided political guidance to the nucleus of this armed insurgency,
and consciously encouraged them to portray themselves as an army of liberation that adhered to
the Geneva International Convention of 1949 and other international treaties, such as the Right to
Self-Determination of the UN Charter, and that of Helsinki and Paris. Internally, the armed struggle
drew its legitimacy from the 1990 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (although this was not
recognised internationally), specifically Article 77, which stipulated:
The defence of the country is an inviolable and inalienable right, obligation and
great duty for every citizen (quoted in Elshani, 1998).
From this cooperation with the LPK, the KLA came out with a directive which was
meant to regulate its internal functioning and war strategy. It stated that the KLA should commit
liberation acts with a just character, and not attack socio-cultural monuments, civilian population
and subjects of importance for the life of the people. It further stipulated that only the following
should be subject to KLA attacks:
1. The military and police apparatus, including their telecommunication equipment;
2. The special police units, volunteers, paramilitary personnel, as well as combatants
brought from Croatia and Bosnia into Kosovo;
3. Albanian persons who, after conclusive evidence, had been identified as traitors and
working with the enemy forces;
4. Finally, military actions were not allowed to be exercised in public spaces, i.e. in places
where civilian lives would be at risk (Kelmendi 1999).
Since the LPK was closely associated with the establishment of the KLA, the formers
initial idea was to act as a political wing to the army. Political and strategic decisions regarding the
war would rest with the former, whilst the latter would be the depoliticised guerrilla formation on
the ground (Xhemajli interview). However, in reality there were difficulties attached to this vision.
A large part of the LPKs leadership was based in the West mainly in Switzerland and Germany.
In addition, with the KLAs growth, it made sense that the people who had founded it and were
inside Kosovo should take complete ownership of the movement. As the KLA became increasingly
stronger, this is what happened. However, by offering its political and financial support, the LPK
assisted in creating the right conditions for the establishment of the KLA (Selimi interview).
In the first half of the 1990s, other groups were established that saw war as the inevitable
means to achieve liberation. Such was the case with the National Movement for the Liberation of
Kosovo (Lvizja Kombtare pr lirimin e Kosovs, LKK). Formed in March 1993, it placed special
importance on preparing the population for upcoming armed resistance by means of mobilisation
and disseminating political information. In this respect, although the goal was clearly identical,
there was an ideological difference between the LKK and the KLA. The LKK believed that prior
to entering a conflict people should be prepared for the path to national liberation, through a
comprehensive propaganda and mobilisation effort. True to their word, from 1993 to 1999 they
clandestinely published and distributed a magazine called lirimi (Albanian for Liberation)
(Murati interview). The KLA tactic, on the other hand, seemed to consist of entering a conflict sooner
rather than later, while the mobilisation of the masses would naturally be borne out of that conflict.
Although there was a divergence in concepts and approach towards open warfare,
combatants on the ground both from the KLA and the LKK ranks sought a common front for
cooperation. Facing the same enemy, this cooperation most often developed naturally amongst
individuals and groups at different operational levels. By 1997-8 the KLA was swiftly becoming
the dominant military and even political factor. Seeing this, the LKKs members joined forces
17
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with the KLA, thereby contributing to the latters strengthening of organisational capacities. Since
many of the LKKs members were based in Prishtina, this merging of forces actually assisted in
urbanising the conflict (Murati interview). Rural regions of Kosovo were directly affected by the
armed conflict, whereas urban areas had somehow been insulated from it thus far. However, with
an increasing number of combatants operating from the cities, the existing urban-rural divide on
the ownership and perception of the conflict was lessening. Increasingly, this was no longer a war
waged in the hills of Drenica, or the Dukagjin plateau, while Prishtina and other cities bizarrely
went about their normal daily business. This was a conflict that was affecting everyone, it was
enveloping all parts of the country, and as such everybody had a stake in it.
With these various armed cells in formation, it seemed prudent that there should be one
unified chain of command structure. In fact on 11 May 1998, following a period of negotiations,
the LKK signed an agreement with the KLA which consisted of two points. The first point stated
that the entire military capacity of the LKK would formally merge under the command of the KLAs
General HQ, while the former would continue to preserve their political entity. This part of the
agreement was implemented. The second point set some guidelines for the creation of a joint
political war front, a sort of government, in which the LKK would partake, and which would lead
the politics of war. This second point of the agreement did not come to fruition (Murati 2010).
The question as to whether there was a centralised or joint political war front amongst
Albanians, as the conflict with Belgrade accelerated, is legitimate, seeing that every armed/
resistance cell had an identical political goal: the liberation of Kosovo from Serbian occupation.
This goal was bigger than any ideology, according to everyones understanding. Only the means
and methods for reaching this goal might have varied. In this regard, this objective was also shared
by the nonviolent movement. Thus, on the wider political goal, a synergy and understanding
existed across the board. Therefore to analyse the formation of the joint political war front, or
the lack of it, the contribution of all the actors belonging to the armed as well as the nonviolent
resistance movements ought to be taken into consideration.
Some have been quite direct in their claim that the KLA leaders fell short of contributing
to the creation of a joint front for the liberation of Kosovo (Kelmendi 1999). There were a few
other armed cells that sprung up during the 1990s, as was the case with the LKK or the LPK. With
the KLAs rise, the expectation was that the joint front would be representative of all the various
factions of the time. Moreover, the KLA grew in juxtaposition with the LDKs nonviolent resistance.
Far from talking about coordinated political efforts, certain tensions developed in this relationship.
However, we make mention of this debate to highlight the political climate which
accompanied the emergence of the KLA. What the recent historical facts show, though, is that
this formation, which was eventually named the Kosovo Liberation Army, came to attract popular
support in increasing waves. There was also a natural fusion between it and other existing
resistance cells. Its political goal being straightforward, i.e. the liberation of Kosovo from Serbia,
the KLA went on to become the dominant armed force for Kosovar Albanians.
2.2 The dominance of the KLA
As the crisis was accelerating, the first cells of the KLA began to appear. Its political goal,
as stipulated clearly in its name, was straightforward: creating a Kosovo army that would start a
liberation struggle against the oppressor. As clarified above, this goal had not changed essentially
from that of prior resistance movements throughout the 20th century. Its overall political platform
remained the same as those of the clandestine groupings of the Ilegalja movement in the 1980s
and beyond.
18
The intention in the sub-chapter above was to focus on the relationship between the
KLA and other military formations. In this sub-chapter, the aim will be to look at the rise of the new
army, for which there will be a short look back to its early days.
The first documented record of the KLAs existence was its Communiqu No. 1, dated 17
November 1994. The letter confirms the creation of the guerrilla group and claims responsibility for
an attack a few days earlier in the town of Drenas, where a police inspector was wounded. It also
takes responsibility for several combat operations against the Yugoslav forces which had occurred
around that time (Elshani 1998). At this point, the nucleus of the insurgency group did not number
more than twenty people. In the next three years, the KLA managed to recruit a very small number
of interested men, so that by November 1997 it attracted a following of just under 200 combatants,
in addition to logistical and operational support (Selimi interview).
The base of this organisation was in Drenica, a more underdeveloped region of Kosovo,
historically known for rebellious endeavours and subsequent crushes by Serbian forces. More
concretely, the coordinating epicentre of the KLAs clandestine activities was the village of Prekaz,
which had virtually been outside Belgrades reach since 1991. Adem Jashari, of Prekaz, was
identified early on as the moral force to lead and inspire the efforts of the fledgling army. Other
cells of the KLA came from the region of Llap, in the east, and Dukagjin in the west of Kosovo.
Around this time, members of the army began to be dispatched clandestinely to Albania
to undergo intensive military training on intelligence/counter-intelligence, clandestine military
actions, and other kinds of guerrilla warfare. They were trained by retired Albanian military officers,
who were willing to volunteer and share their personal expertise with KLA members (Xhemajli
interview).
Being prudent about its limited power in the event of a frontal clash with the Serbian
forces, the KLA strove to become a guerrilla army by using the tactics of spontaneous and isolated
attacks on military, paramilitary and police targets. Until early 1998, not only was its membership
very limited, but the fighters were also quite inexperienced. The level of coordination and
communication between different cells operating around Kosovo was far from sophisticated. This
was partly because of the lack of experience, but also due to the utmost secret conditions under
which the armed movement was developing.
Its preparations and activities were financed by the diaspora in the West (Abazi
interview). The fund Homeland Calling was opened in Switzerland in 1993 and its assets were to
be dedicated to the war for the liberation of Albanian territories under yoke (Xhemajli interview).
Although it was of major importance in financing the war, this fund was not the only source of
income for the KLA. There were other sources, individual-based and organisational, that supported
the war efforts. The famous voluntary 3% contributions from the salaries of diaspora members,
collected by Kosovos government in exile, were also at times directed to this goal (Mustafa
interview).
In an unrelated event in 1997, Albania experienced a breakdown of its state structures,
following the fall of a financial pyramid scheme. The police and military forces were no longer
in control of the monopoly of violence. Suddenly, thousands of weapons became available on
the black market at very affordable prices. This was a big opportunity for the KLA men to arm
themselves, which was swiftly seized. Also, a lot of weapons were filtered through different routes
from the West to Kosovo (Xhemajli and Abazi interviews).
Being a very small formation, its visibility was still limited. Until late 1997, most people in
Kosovo viewed the KLA as a phantom organisation. The attacks on Serbian forces were accompanied
by written communiqus, normally sent from abroad to the local press, claiming responsibility for
those attacks. In response, Serbia stepped up its practice of raids and maltreatment of suspected
19
Armend R. Bekaj
individuals. In this atmosphere, the anonymity surrounding the KLA triggered suspicions about its
existence or its true intent. Uncertainty became more prevalent when the LDKs leadership refused
to recognise the KLA for what it purported to be. This time, the LDK went even further and accused
KLA members of working surreptitiously for the Serbian regime, which apparently gave the Serbs
a reason to retaliate against the Albanian population. However, as the KLA became stronger, its
leadership and the LDK established direct lines of communication, and held several meetings in
Albania and other places. But they never managed to overcome their differences, and instead stuck
to their respective methods passive nonviolence versus armed resistance until the end of the
conflict.
The discordance between the LDK or the peaceful resistance and the KLA or the armed
struggle represented two different tiers of the Albanian resistance, both claiming to fight for the
same goal. The question is then, why did it come to this clash? In hindsight, the KLA had tried
to reach out to the LDK officials, in Kosovo and abroad. However, neither then, nor later with the
rise of the armed insurgency, did the peaceful resistance agree to put its weight behind the KLA
(Xhemajli interview). It might be that at the beginning, some leadership officials really did not
possess reliable information on the KLAs true identity. However, others in the LDKs top leadership
had indeed been informed about the rise of the armed struggle from the start (Hyseni interview).
But in reality, the LDK was not ready to embark on an armed conflict; and hypothetically
speaking, if it ever had been, then it would have wanted political control over that army. In fact,
under its Ministry of Defence the LDK-led government had created a military formation called The
Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (Forcat e Armatosura t Republiks s Kosovs, FARK).
However, their operations remained limited. One of their more tangible contributions was the
opening of a frontline along the Kosovo-Albania border during NATOs bombing campaign (Kraja
2003b). But by then the KLA had become such a dominating and popular armed force in the local
context that FARKs impact proved to be short-lived.
Finally, the LDK parallel government of Kosovo still believed that since they had won the
elections, they still enjoyed the legitimacy of representing the Albanian people of Kosovo. As such,
if anyone was going to yield, the expectation was that the KLA would do that, and not the other
way around.
However, by late 1997 the KLA was of a different opinion and had other plans. They
considered that the time of futile diplomacy with Serbia was over, and the armed insurgency
was the only way to reawaken the people from their submissive lull, and bring back the dignity
which had been lost in the apartheid system. Freedom would be won by armed struggle, since
all peaceful and diplomatic means had failed, having been met with silence by the international
community (Perritt Jr. 2008).
However, it was clear that peoples doubts about its existence had to be dispersed,
and the army had to step out of the shadows. The first public appearance of the KLA occurred at
the funeral of a local schoolteacher who had been shot by Serbian forces during skirmishes two
days before. The funeral was held in the village of Llaush in Drenica on 28 November 1997
the Albanian Flag Day. One of the KLA founding members, Rexhep Selimi, accompanied by Muj
Krasniqi and Daut Haradinaj, read a short statement, articulating the guerrilla armys intention to
protect civilians and fight against the oppressive forces of the Serbian regime (Selimi interview). In
the statement, Selimi claimed that the army remained ...the only serious force for the realisation
of ideals and aspirations of our people for national unification (Elshani 1998: 211). This first public
display of the KLA sent electric waves through the masses present in the fields of that funeral in
Drenica. It reverberated throughout Kosovo, impacting on peoples psyches and signalling that the
existence of this force was no longer in doubt.
20
2.3 The intensification of hostilities: March 1998 March 1999
The crackdown of the Serbian military, paramilitary and police forces intensified in the
first quarter of 1998. At this stage, the KLA was still strengthening its ranks, and practising tactics
of isolated attacks upon key military installations. The first serious blow that it received was back
in the end of January 1997, when three of its members were killed as the result of an ambush north
of Prishtina. This attack left a gap in the organisational structure of the insurgency since one of
the fallen, Zahir Pajaziti, had been the coordinator for the Llap region in the east. However, the
crackdown also served the KLA as an argument to mobilise more people, convincing them that
armed resistance from the newly-emerging army was the only right response (Selimi interview).
At the end of February 1998, the Serb/Yugoslav Special Forces used excessive retaliation
on the KLA and civilian population in the villages of Qirez and Likoshan, in the west-central part
of Kosovo. Twenty-four civilians were massacred, which caused an outrage in the international
media and human rights organisations, such as Human Rights Watch (Independent International
Commission on Kosovo 2000; Elshani 1998).
It is in response to such crimes that the international communitys attention began to
focus on Kosovo. It is correct to say that one of the aims of the KLA was precisely to draw the
attention of the international community read: the US and the European Union (EU) states to
the escalating crisis triggered by Belgrade. This was in fact also the aim of the LDK-led government,
which had been lobbying internationally for involvement from the above-stated countries. This
government, although not recognised internationally, was seen as the manager of the crisis in
Kosovo, or as the mechanism through which the Kosovar Albanians discontent was channelled.
With the emergence of the armed resistance, that growing discontent began to find a different
alleyway, through the KLA (eku interview).
However, the KLAs entry onto the international scene was first met with scepticism, to
say the least. Famously, upon his visit to Prishtina in February 1998, President Clintons Special
Envoy to the Balkans, Robert Gelbart, was explicit in condemning any terrorist actions in Kosovo.
He then went on to specify that the UCK [KLA] is, without any question, a terrorist group (quoted
in ONiell 2002: 24).
What followed a month later is a defining moment in the history of the armed struggle.
Several commentators made the argument that Gelbarts remarks had given Miloevi the
green light to go after and eradicate the armed cells. On 5 March 1998, the village of Prekaz was
surrounded by Serbian tanks and other artillery, aimed at annihilating the Jashari family. What
followed was a three-day siege, with Serbian forces incessantly attacking the familys compound.
In the end, 56 members of the extended Jashari family were killed, including children, women and
elderly, together with Adem Jashari, his brother Hamz Jashari and their father Shaban Jashari, all
three of them being leading proponents of the armed resistance.
While still alive, Adem Jashari had already acquired the status of moral leader of the
KLA movement. He is known today as the legendary commander (komandanti legjendar) who
had stood ready to pay the ultimate sacrifice with his large family. For almost a decade his village
of Prekaz had literally been out of bounds for the Serbian regime, thereby provoking its wrath.
Adem Jasharis open defiance to the occupation evoked an earlier Albanian tradition of the kaak
rebellion, when an individual or a small group of armed men would take it upon themselves to
protect the Albanian code of honour and the Albanian home. The police had made armed attempts
to reign upon him as early as December 1991 and again in January 1998. Both attempts were met
with fierce resistance. During the second attempt, one of his daughters and one of his nieces were
wounded.
21
Armend R. Bekaj
Adem Jashari became the first symbol of a different Albanian type to the oppressed
but pacifist one that was dominant in the 1990s; he marked an important change
in popular attitudes, as Albanians followed his example and joined as vullnetar
(volunteers) of the armed insurrection in their thousands. The Adem Jashari
legend thus provides a powerful counter-narrative to the one of victimisation and
accommodation with the enemy (Di Lellio and Schwandner-Sievers 2006a: 518)7.
The massacre of the Jashari family triggered an unprecedented surge of popular support
and solidarity. Thousands of young men and women volunteered to join the ranks of the KLA.
However tragic this event had been, Prekaz was not viewed as a defeat; on the contrary, it became
the moment of popular awakening and pride. It stirred, gave rise to, and became the symbol of
national identity and freedom. In the months that followed, the Albanians solidarity and support
for the KLA was so overwhelming that the peoples identification with the army, and vice versa,
was virtually complete. The evolution of this synergetic process led to an almost all-encompassing
support for the armed struggle among Albanians.
The number of volunteers who joined the KLA rose drastically after the March events.
While until the beginning of 1998 the army had numbered only a few hundred in its ranks, soon
after March the numbers jumped to over 10,000 volunteers (Selimi interview). Albanians from
the diaspora also came to join the resistance, as if their financial contributions were not enough.
Most notably, a group of around 400 Albanian Americans volunteered in the so-called Atlantic
Battalion. Most of them returned to the US after the war (Heinemann-Grder and Paes 2001).
To adjust to the much larger membership, the KLA began a phase of organisational
re-structuring. Seven operative zones were drawn up, each one of them commanding two to eight
brigades. All of the above reported directly to the General HQ (Selimi interview). Professional
Albanian military personnel from the old Yugoslav army were recruited, bringing with them
experience and strategic know-how. In the process of growing, the KLA leadership attempted to
adopt NATOs standard operating procedures and organisational structure (eku interview).
Becoming a factor on the ground meant having a formally-structured political organism
that would act as the mouthpiece, or the political wing of the armed struggle. Until this time the KLA
was consolidated as an armed organisation, but did not have its own separate political affiliate. In
contrast to other armed movements, where the political wing gave birth to the armed resistance,
with the KLA this happened in reverse. As described above, the political organisation LPK enjoyed
a close association with the KLA, particularly in the beginning, but as the army grew the formers
intention to act as the political wing did not translate into practice. With the increase of interest
from the international diplomatic community and media, the KLA needed to set up a political wing
that would be the interlocutor and voice of its political goals. Thus, towards the end of 1998 the
KLA created its Political Directorate, with Hashim Thai the current Prime Minister of the Republic
of Kosovo - as its representative (Selimi and Mustafa interviews). To be precise, the Political
Directorate was hierarchically on the same level as the other directorates of the army (such as the
directorate for intelligence/counterintelligence, the directorate of operations etc). In other words,
it was not designed to be the government to lead the army. Nevertheless, taking a pragmatic step,
the Directorate did come to play a leadership role for the KLA, representing the army in talks with
international negotiators and media.
Meanwhile, the fighting between the KLA and the Serbian/Yugoslav forces was
expanding across Kosovo, subjecting Albanian civilians to indiscriminate treatment by the latter.
According to UNHCR documents, by October 1998 more than 1,500 Kosovar Albanians had been
killed, while the number of internally displaced people reached 300,000, raising the alarm of a
7 For an insightful analysis on the socio-psychological meaning of the cult of Adem Jashari as the symbol of Albanian
resistance, freedom and independence, see Di Lellio and Schwandner-Sievers (2006a & 2006b).
22
pending humanitarian catastrophe that would surpass the borders of Kosovo (Roberts 2000). This
situation produced an internationally-brokered ceasefire between the two sides, to be monitored
by an OSCE mission, which proved short-lived when hostilities commenced with renewed vigour.
However, the engagement of the OSCE mission in Kosovo did herald the beginning of a period of
heavy-handed involvement by the international factor.
2.4 The involvement of international actors and NATOs bombing campaign
Throughout the past decade, the actors in this episode have been engaged in a far
larger conflict a struggle for the redefinition of the international system, specifically:
the struggle for ultimate authority within the state: sovereignty vs. human rights;
the struggle about the definition of the state: territorial integrity vs. self-determination;
the struggle about manifestations of international interest: non-intervention vs.
international action;
the struggle among international actors: collective action vs. unilateralism (Weller 1999:
25).
The so-called international factor was becoming a major stakeholder in the political scene of the
late 1990s. At the beginning of the decade, the international community had adopted the role of the
passive observer, viewing the Kosovo crisis as a background to the much more attention-grabbing
wars in Croatia and Bosnia, and as an essentially internal matter for Serbia/rump Yugoslavia to
settle. By the end of the decade, however, international involvement was comprehensive and
formidable. From being an often marginal topic of discussions at international fora, by 1999 the
Kosovo issue reached the pinnacle of its internationalisation.
As international involvement in Yugoslavia intensified in the early 1990s, the lobbying
by Kosovos LDK-led parallel institutions with the western corridors of power increased. However,
their access to high-level politicians and diplomatic events was often limited or had marginal
effects. For example, upon Dr. Rugovas query at the London Peace Conference on Yugoslavia in
August 1992, chaired by Lord Carrington, the Kosovo delegation was politely denied access to the
conference chamber itself, but was invited to attend a Salle decoute, or listening room next door,
where the formal proceedings of the conference would be relayed live (Weller 1999: 86).
The Dayton Accords had served as a clarion-call for Kosovar Albanians that their plight was
nowhere near receiving the international attention they desired. When mentioned, the situation in
Kosovo was often discussed in passing, with certain actors from western countries raising concerns
about human rights violations. Even then, the discussions revolved around the topic of Kosovo as
an internal issue for what was left of Yugoslavia, or more precisely Serbia to settle. Accusations
of human rights violations in Kosovo were flagrantly refuted by Miloevis regime, which grew
accustomed to making good use of the principle of internal matters of sovereignty on the issue.
However, various international organisations increasingly tried to draw attention to
the intolerable human rights abuses in Kosovo. In the early 1990s the European Community,
later the European Union, took some enthusiastic steps towards mediating in the resolution of
the Balkan conflicts, but proved to be ineffective (the words of the European Commissions (EC)
former president, Jacques Delors, The hour of Europe has dawned, sound cynical in retrospect).8
Full American involvement became increasingly necessary in order to enforce peace deals and
compromises in the Yugoslav crises.
Unlike the EU, the United States was more effective in leading the efforts to stop the
8 As President of the EC, Jacques Delors stated in 1991: We do not interfere in American affairs; we trust America will
not interfere in European affairs (quoted in Holbrooke 1999: 21).
23
Armend R. Bekaj
accelerating humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo and bringing the parties to the negotiating table.
As early as December 1992 the then-president George Bush had written to Miloevi, drawing
a red line on Kosovo: In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United
States will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia proper
(quoted in Weller 1999: 272). This so-called Christmas warning was later evoked by the Clinton
administration, after Kosovo had been allowed to recede into the background of international
attention during the Croatia and Bosnia conflicts in the early to mid-1990s.
As part of its monitoring role in 1992-3, the Conference for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE) expressed its concern regarding police reprisals against Albanian civilians in
Kosovo. From 1992 to 1999, numerous resolutions were passed by the UN General Assembly in
relation to the escalating crisis in Kosovo, in the context of Yugoslavia, raising deep concerns about
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Grave concerns were noted about Serbian
police brutality and harassment, arbitrary searches, seizures and arrests, forced evictions, torture,
ill-treatment of detainees and discrimination in the administration of justice, and killings. During
1998 and 1999, the UN Security Council passed a number of resolutions, referring to Chapter VII of
UN Charter, whereby the impending humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo was viewed as a threat
to international peace and security (Weller 1999; Tahiri 2001).
The acceleration of the conflict was followed by an intensification of international action,
beyond just holding discussions in Western capitals. In October 1998, the US special envoy Richard
Holbrooke was dispatched to deliver an ultimatum to Belgrade to cease military operations. After
many deliberations, whereby Miloevi was threatened with NATOs use of force, a ceasefire was
agreed (Tahiri 2001; Weller 1999). Following this agreement, the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) established its Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). This mission was
primarily comprised of former or active-duty military officers serving as civilians, and by March 1999
it numbered up to 1,400 staff. The mission of KVM was to monitor and report on the compliance
with UN Security Council Resolution 1199 (1998), which appealed for an immediate ceasefire, and
withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression. Their reports portrayed a bleak picture
of the situation in Kosovo. A review of their reports shows a clear, organised, and brutal campaign
by Serb forces to intimidate the Albanian population (ONiell 2002: 24-25).
The Holbrooke agreement proved to be short-lived, with the KLA and Serbian/Yugoslav
forces re-engaging in combat. Caught in the middle, the Albanian civilian population experienced
frequent retaliation by Yugoslav forces. One event that particularly outraged international public
opinion was the killing of civilians in the village of Reak, west of Kosovo. This happened on 15
January 1999 when, while going after the KLA, the Yugoslav forces retaliated and killed 45 civilians.
Upon arriving at the scene, the OSCE KVMs ambassador William Walker condemned the massacre
of civilians, and called upon the International Criminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia to
investigate the atrocity (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000).
Meanwhile, there was an accelerated pace of negotiations and shuttle diplomacy between
Belgrade and Prishtina (KLA representatives and others), conducted by various western diplomats,
but mainly led by Holbrooke and the then-US ambassador to Macedonia, Christopher Hill. These
negotiations resulted in a document called Contact Group Non-negotiable Principles/Basic
Elements, dated 30 January 1999. Amongst the ten non-negotiable points outlined in this document,
there was emphasis on the need to end violence and to find a peaceful solution through dialogue,
and a call for an interim agreement which would allow a mechanism for a final settlement after a
period of three years. The document also guaranteed the territorial integrity of FRY (Weller 2009).
The international communitys engagement peaked during the concerted efforts of the
Contact Group an ad hoc six-nation formation, comprised of the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy
and Russia to organise an international peace conference on Kosovo. Taking into account the
24
above-mentioned principles, the Contact Group summoned Prishtina and Belgrade to talks in
Rambouillet, France, to negotiate and sign an Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government
in Kosovo. The Kosovo delegation was comprised of all dominant political factors, and led by
the KLA representative, Hashim Thai. In fact, one third of the delegation came from the armed
resistance, one third represented Dr. Rugovas LDK party, and one third were members of a new
party called The United Democratic Movement (Lvizja pr Bashkim Demokratik, LBD), led by
the academic Rexhep Qosja, who was more closely aligned to the war wing. Two independent
members, publicists, were also part of the team. The FRY/Serbia team consisted of middle-tier
politicians who would report to Miloevi in Belgrade.
The Rambouillet Conference lasted from 6 to 23 February 1999. Before accepting the final
document, the Kosovo delegation asked for a period of grace to consult with people back home.
At this point, meetings were held with the KLAs regional command centres before a common
consensus was reached on accepting the deal. However, vehement opposition was noted amongst
some in not accepting an agreement that would ensure the territorial integrity of FRY/Serbia. The
most prominent voice in this opposition was Adem Demai, Kosovos symbol of resistance, who
had been appointed to the position of the KLAs General Political Representative in August 1998.9
His opposition led him to resign from this post.
The Peace Accord talks recommenced in Paris between 15 and 18 March 1999, at which
point the Kosovo delegation signed the document. The so-called Rambouillet document provided
an interim agreement for peace and self-government in Kosovo. Although it guaranteed the
territorial integrity of FRY/Serbia, it also provided for an international conference after three years
to determine Kosovos political status, taking into account the will of the people. The Kosovar
delegation understood this to be an interim agreement that would pave the way for a referendum
and independence. Belgrade refused to sign the document.10
Meanwhile, the UNHCR estimated that between January and mid-March, 150,000 to
200,000 refugees had been forced out of their homes due to the accelerating crackdown by Serb/
Yugoslav forces. On 20 March, the OSCE evacuated its KVM personnel from Kosovo (Roberts 2000).
After Rambouillet, the last attempts by international mediators to persuade Belgrade to agree to
the peace terms or face military consequences came to a dead-end.
Judging that all diplomatic means had been exhausted, on 24 March 1999 the NATO
Alliance launched military airstrikes over Serbian/Yugoslav military and other installations. NATOs
virtual bombing campaign (the first of its kind in the Alliances 50 years of existence) over
rump Yugoslavia went on for 78 days, until Miloevis regime capitulated. The so-called Military
Technical Agreement between NATO and FRY/Serbia was signed in Kumanovo, Macedonia, on 9
June 1999, which set the terms of the latters immediate withdrawal, northwards from Kosovo to
Serbia (Ignatieff 2000).
While NATO was bombing from the air, the KLAs operations on the ground accelerated.
The Alliances intervention was welcome for the KLA, whose soldiers viewed themselves as
NATOs ground force (Selimi interview). NATOs commanders also regarded the KLAs operations
as being of specific importance during this time. For instance, it was considered a priority that the
KLA kept control of Mount Pashtrik, strategically located near the border with Albania, and that
NATO provided the necessary air force to ensure its control (Clark 2002).
Miloevis regime accelerated its persecution of the Albanian civilian population. The
project of ethnic cleansing was unravelling with frightening speed. By the time the war was over,
9 Adem Demai was named the KLAs General Political Representative, tasked with leading the politics of war. In
many ways, this position overlapped with that of the Political Directorate. Both this convergence of competencies
and his refusal to support the Peace Accords led Demai to resign his position (Gashi 2010).
10 On Rambouillet, refer to Tahiri 2001; Weller 1999 and 2009; Independent International Commission on Kosovo
2000; Judah 2002.
25
Armend R. Bekaj
around 12,000 Albanians had been killed, most of them civilians; more than 3,500 were unaccounted
for; 120,000 homes had been pillaged and destroyed; rape had been used as an intentional war
tool against Kosovar Albanian women. Almost 900,000 Albanians had fled from Kosovo. Of those,
almost 450,000 went to Albania, around 250,000 to Macedonia, 70,000 to Montenegro, and
90,000 to other countries. This, in addition to hundreds of thousands of Albanians displaced
within Kosovo, brought the total number of refugees and internally displaced persons to almost 1.5
million people, or more than 80% of the total population of Kosovo (Human Rights Watch 2001;
UNHCR records in Roberts 2000; Tahiri 2001; Gow 2003). Belgrades capitulation interrupted its
orchestrated and systematic campaign of emptying Kosovo.
During the NATO bombardment, on 24 May 1999, the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) issued an indictment against the top leadership of FRY/Serbia. The
ICTY was established in 1993 in response to allegations of atrocities committed in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Croatia. On 10 March 1998, its jurisdiction was expanded to cover the alleged
atrocities committed in Kosovo. After the NATO bombardment and the establishment of UNMIK,
several KLA individuals were accused of having taken part in revenge killings and kidnappings
of Serb civilians and Albanian collaborators during the conflict and in the immediate post-war
period. Over the last decade, the ICTY has issued indictments against several KLA members for
their alleged crimes. For this reason, many authors have stated that these alleged actions by some
of its members have placed a blemish upon the KLAs stance of waging a just war. As this topic is
of particular relevance, we make mention of it here and refer the reader to several sources of data
for more detailed analysis.11
11 On this topic see, among others, ICG (2000), Human Rights Watch (2001), Weller (2009) and the website of the ICTY
(see The Cases, accessed at www.icty.org/action/cases/4).
26
3. The post-war transformation of the KLA
The day following the signing of the Military Technical Agreement between NATOs Kosovo
Force (KFOR) and FRY/Serbia, on 10 June 1999 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244
which provided the legal framework for establishing the UN administration and KFOR in Kosovo.
On 12 June, NATO entered Kosovo from the south, as FRY/Serb forces were leaving northwards.
Under the resolution, Kosovo entered a period of international administration, titled the United
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which consisted of a comprehensive
conglomerate of international institutions and organisations, geared to provide orchestrated
efforts in post-war reconstruction and institution-building. KFORs membership of almost 50,000
men and women was set up to provide security in the territory. One of its first tasks was to oversee
the process of demilitarisation and transformation of the KLA.
After the war, a lot of KLA combatants returned to civilian life. But the biggest percentage
of them was eventually recruited to join the newly-formed civilian emergency agency and the
police force. A considerable number of them were integrated into locally- or internationally-owned
private security companies. Quite a few such companies were formed in Kosovo after 1999, thus
attending to an urgent post-war security vacuum. In section 3.3 we will address the transformation
of KLA combatants into politicians, their views channelled mainly through two political parties that
became dominant forces of Kosovar post-war politics (ICG 2000).
3.1 KPC: transformation, not dissolution
By March 1999 there were approximately 18,000 KLA combatants. After the war, the
estimated figure was around 20,000 (Heinemann-Grder and Paes 2001; Pettifer 2003). One of the
first challenges in post-war Kosovo was how to adequately address the demobilisation of this force.
The demobilisation and transformation of the KLA was regulated by international
agreements and primarily overseen by NATO forces. This process was preceded by the Military
Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. The KLA was not a signatory to
the agreement, largely because of its status as an actor that operated within internationally-
recognised state borders. The document was a bilateral agreement between KFOR on one hand
and representatives of the Yugoslav Army and its Interior Police on the other. The agreement
called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, and specified the timeline and procedures for
the withdrawal of Yugoslav/Serb forces from Kosovo. It also delineated a clear buffer area that
extended beyond Kosovo and into the Yugoslav territory.12
UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (10 June, 1999) demanded that the KLA end all
their offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarisation (Article 15).13 The
resolution stipulated that the public security mechanisms are reserved as executive competencies
of UNMIK (Peci and Dugolli 2006).
With the legal framework in place, one of NATOs first priorities was to set the terms of
agreement for the demilitarisation of the KLA. In fact, NATOs initial plans were to consider doing
away with KLA succession and push forward for complete dissolution and a return to civilian life
for its combatants. In other words, there was not much eagerness to transform KLA structures
into another security mechanism in post-war Kosovo. However, a large majority of the population
12 The text of the agreement can be accessed at www.nato.int/kfor/docu/docs/pdf/mta.pdf.
13 The resolution can be accessed at www.unmikonline.org/UNMIKONLINE2009/1244resolution.htm.
27
Armend R. Bekaj
considered the KLA to be the army of Kosovo, and as such they were expected to continue their
existence, albeit admittedly in another form and with another mission. The persistency of its legacy
was viewed to be one of the main symbolic features in the newly-liberated Kosovo. For Kosovar
Albanians it was very important, even essential, that there be a continuation of the KLA legacy, as
a symbol of a country that aspired to become independent (eku interview; Hamzaj 2001).
The KLA leadership was aware of its symbolism and prestige. Of course, there was
across-the-board agreement that, with NATOs arrival, its war mission was complete. However,
they were just as insistent that its legacy ought not to be broken off, and that the force should
be transformed into one that would be suitable for times of peace. The end result of a series of
negotiations between NATO officials and the KLAs leadership was the conclusion that there would
be no dissolution. Instead, the KLA would undergo a process of demilitarisation and transformation
(eku interview).
The negotiations resulted in an agreement entitled Undertaking of Demilitarisation and
Transformation by the UK, signed on 20 June 1999. The document was signed by the then-KFOR
Commander General Mike Jackson, the-then Chief of Staff of the KLA General Agim eku, the-then
Director of the Political Directorate of the KLA Hashim Thai, and in the presence of NATOs Supreme
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Wesley K. Clark, and UNMIKs Special Representative
of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Bernard Kouchner. The agreement set out the terms, the process
and the timeline for demobilising KLA combatants, and stated that the authority with regards
to monitoring the implementation rested with the Commander of KFOR (COMKFOR). The Joint
Implementation Commission, comprised of COMKFOR as Chair, two senior representatives from
KFOR and NATO respectively and a civilian from the UN Administration, ensured compliance with
the agreed arrangements for the ceasefire. Within 90 days of this agreement entering into force,
the KLA was to complete the process of demilitarisation and cease wearing military uniforms or
insignia (Qehaja interview).14
Exactly 90 days later, on 20 September 1999, UNMIK promulgated Regulation No.
1999/8 on the Establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC).15 By this time the process of
disarmament was complete, with the KLA handing over to KFOR around 9,000 small arms, 800
machine guns, 300 anti-tank mines, 1,200 mines, 178 mortars, 27,000 hand grenades, 1,000 kg of
explosives and over 5 million rounds of ammunition. However, this number still did not account
for the 20,000 KLA combatants registered at the end of the war. The explanation provided is that,
despite enjoying a huge following, there were shortages of weapons for all combatants. According
to some estimates, perhaps as many as 50% of those drafted had not had a weapon at some point
during the conflict (Heinemann-Grder and Paes 2001).
Borrowing from the French model of Securit Civile, the KPC was established as a civilian
emergency service agency, with the following tasks:
(a) provide disaster response services;
(b) perform search and rescue;
(c) provide a capacity for humanitarian assistance in isolated areas;
(d) assist in demining; and
(e) contribute to rebuilding infrastructure and communities.
In 2006, those tasks were expanded, after the promulgation of an amendment to the
above regulation (Regulation No. 2006/3),16 to comprise the following:
14 See also Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation by the UK at www.nato.int/kfor/docu/docs/pdf/
uck.pdf.
15 Accessible at www.unmikonline.org/regulations/unmikgazette/02english/E1999regs/RE1999_08.htm.
16 Accessible at www.unmikonline.org/regulations/unmikgazette/02english/E2006regs/RE2006_03.pdf.
28
(a) provide disaster response services;
(b) perform search and rescue;
(c) provide a capacity for humanitarian assistance in isolated areas;
(d) assist in demining;
(e) contribute to rebuilding infrastructure and reconstruction for communities, including
monitoring unoccupied reconstructed homes of minority communities and other
humanitarian tasks; and
(f) perform ceremonial duties within its scope as a civilian emergency service agency,
in accordance with directives of the KPC Coordinator and KFOR.
In essence, the KPC was a civilian emergency organisation, equipped and trained to carry
out rapid response tasks for public safety in times of emergency and humanitarian assistance.
Its mission was also set out in the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in
Kosovo, which came into effect in 2001.17 It was a reserved power and came under the authority
of the Special Representative of UNMIK. Nevertheless, in the eyes of the Albanian majority
population, the KPC was always viewed as more than a civilian organisation. If not an army as such,
it was certainly considered to be an army in waiting, as well as a direct successor of the KLA.18
The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) was charged with the responsibility
for registering and integrating KLA combatants, as well as building capacities for the new KPC
members in the area of civil protection. Around 25,000 persons were registered with the IOM
as former KLA combatants, out of which 20,000 applied for the 5,000 positions in the KPC (ICG
2006). The training was geared to promote basic individual and organisational skills, personal
responsibility and discipline. Specialised training on civil protection was also offered (KCSS 2010).
It should be noted that the structure and organisation of the KPC remained pretty much
the same as that of the KLA. Most of the commanding officers were former KLA fighters. Out of
5,000 members, 3,000 were on active duty, and 2,000 were reserve members. However, unlike its
predecessor, the KPCs profile was designed to be multi-ethnic (in addition to being a non-religious
and apolitical organisation). Minority representation was minimal, and virtually non-existent from
the Serb minority community. Officially, UNMIK and KFOR officials did try to push for the creation
of an organisation that would be representative of all ethnic groups living in Kosovo. From very
early on, the KPC allocated available slots for Serb minority representation. However, attempts
to recruit Serb members in its ranks were immediately seen as too ambitious, since the KPC was
regarded as and indeed stemmed directly from the KLA (KCSS 2009). In fact, in early 2000 UNMIK
had even suggested forming a separate KPC Serb unit, based in the Serb enclave of Graanica. This
suggestion was quickly dropped, however, as it clearly would have posed a challenge to the KPCs
operational chain of command, and Albanians were strongly opposed to it (Qehaja 2004).
Being a direct KLA successor, recruiting minority community members, particularly Serbs,
remained an issue throughout the KPCs mandate. This was made clear in UNMIKs Standards
before Status report.19 There were four major prerequisites for the KPC to fulfil, according to this
report: 1. the KPC was expected to act in a transparent, disciplined and professional manner;
2. the KPC should be representative of all the people of Kosovo; 3. the KPC should be proactive
17 Regulation No. 2001/9: A Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, accessible at www.
unmikonline.org/regulations/unmikgazette/02english/E2001regs/RE2001_09.pdf.
18 The Albanian name for the Kosovo Protection Corps is Trupat e Mbrojtjes s Kosovs (TMK). Mbrojtjes means
protection, but also defence, and in fact is more often used to mean the latter. During negotiations, KLA pushed
for the usage of this particular word. Although purely symbolic, such a close association between the KPC and
defence/army was important for peoples perception, as well as for the morale of the members of this organisation.
19 Standards before Status was the document produced to assess standards that were to be reached before
commencement of talks on Kosovos political status. Standard 8 focused on the consolidation of the KPC.
29
Armend R. Bekaj
in recruiting minority communities; and 4. the KPC was to be financed by the Kosovo budget
in a transparent manner (Qehaja 2004). Its 10% threshold of minority inclusion, however, was
eventually reached when the report was published in October 2005.
One of KPCs ongoing challenges in its hierarchical structure was the disproportionately
heavy representation in upper levels. A lot of men who had held more senior positions with the
KLA held similar or higher posts in the KPC. The war legacy definitely counted for seniority with the
KPC, which in turn could also deflate the ambitions of its younger members. Also, the percentage
of women in its midst was quite minimal around 3.5% (KCSS 2010). The table below, borrowed
from ICGs report An Army for Kosovo? (2006), offers a breakdown of the KPCs structure as of
the year 2006.
KPCs Structure as of July 2006
Rank Active Serving Members Reserve
Lt. General 1 1 0
Maj. General 2 1 0
Brig. General 14 13 0
Colonel 50 48 2
Lt. Colonel 119 117 2
Major 209 203 13
Captain 356 356 60
Lieutenant 440 436 136
Staff Sergeant 439 438 96
Sergeant 366 365 188
Corporal 1,035 1,028 1,438
Private 21 20 65
Total 3,052 3,026 2,000
30
3.2 Integration into the police force
As part of its institution-building mandate, UNMIK was tasked with the responsibility of
creating a new police force, called the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). The OSCE Mission in Kosovo
(OMiK) took charge of this responsibility, setting up the Kosovo Police Service School to select and
train interested applicants. Careful attention was paid to selecting members from all communities
living in Kosovo, making this force one of the most successful multi-ethnic institutions to date.
Initially, the KPS worked closely with UNMIK Police, often providing support for the latter. Following
independence and the passing of new legislation, its name was shortened to Kosovo Police (KP),
with a direct line of accountability to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Being mindful of the reintegration of former combatants in 1999 and thereafter, the KLA
leadership referred a large number of them to the KPS. Like the KPC, the police was seen as an
institution that could absorb a relatively big percentage of former combatants (Selimi interview).
In the end, according to statistics, approximately 25% of the 7,000 KPS members were former KLA
soldiers. When one has in mind that out of 3,000 active KPC members, 70% came from the KLA,
this represents roughly an equal distribution of KLA combatants in the KPC and KPS (ICG 2006).
3.3 The leap from combatant to politician
The immediate aftermath of the war in Kosovo saw the emergence of two kinds of
political parties: those that sprung from the KLA, or the war wing of resistance, and Dr. Rugovas
LDK party, which had led the pacifist, parallel system. After the war, the latter continued to be
one of the dominant political forces, even winning the first democratically free and internationally
recognised elections in 2001.
On the other hand, the disbandment of the KLA saw the creation of two main political
parties. The first one was the Party for Democratic Progress of Kosovo (Partia e Progresit
Demokratik t Kosovs), which soon afterwards became known as the Democratic Party of Kosovo
(Partia Demokratike e Kosovs, PDK), led by the KLAs former leader of the Political Directorate,
Hashim Thai. The PDK was formed just as the demilitarisation and transformation of the KLA
was completed, in September 1999. A lot of former members of the LPK, the organisation that
had operated illegally during the 1980s and 1990s and had been closely associated with the KLA,
joined its ranks. The second one to be formed was the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (Aleanca
pr Ardhmrin e Kosovs, AAK), under the leadership of the KLAs former commander for the
Dukagjin area, western Kosovo, Ramush Haradinaj.
Ideologically, these two parties have not yet been able to position themselves clearly,
although officially they would beg to differ. In the last ten years they have both promoted policies
on the left and right of the political spectrum. However, this situation reflects the overall lack of
profiling of political parties in the last ten years. In light of the importance of the national cause,
which was resolving the status of Kosovo, all other differences were seen as a lesser priority.
However, one categorisation that has always been clearly discerned between the PDK and AAK
is the regional factor. Whereas the PDK attracts large followings in the Drenica region, the AAK
continues to reign supreme in the Dukagjin area, in both cases because their respective leaders
come from these two places.
More than ten years after the conflict, Kosovos political scene is still dominated by the
parties that have emerged from the war. And, evocative of the second half of the 1990s, the LDK
has trodden alongside the KLA parties, even holding the position of the biggest party in national
31
Armend R. Bekaj
and local elections until 2007. From 2004 until 2007, the AAK managed to strike a deal with the LDK
for a coalition government, reserving the Prime Ministers post for itself.
In the November 2007 national and municipal elections, the PDK won the largest number
of votes, with its leader Hashim Thai becoming Prime Minister. In an ironic twist of fortunes, they
invited the LDK the second largest party in the elections to form a coalition government. These
two parties had represented two extreme positions of the resistance movement in Kosovo: the
pacifist and armed ones. Yet a political marriage that had seemed inconceivable in the past was
able to materialise in 2007. But in a way, the coming together of these two extremes although
many would argue that it was done for sheer expedient reasons symbolised the convergence
and complementarity of the armed and non-violent wings of popular resistance. On 17 February
2008, the government and parliament that came out of these elections proclaimed Kosovo a free,
democratic and independent country.
32
4. The post-independence security presence
During UNMIKs era, the security sector in Kosovo evolved into a conglomeration of
international and local mechanisms, with little or no accountability towards Kosovos institutions,
and little or no democratic oversight or control of armed forces. UNMIK Police and KFOR were
accountable to their own political masters, be they the SRSG, KFOR Commander, or their HQs in
New York or Brussels. Similarly, the KPC and KPS, although they were local, remained under the
executive competencies of the SRSG.
4.1 Security sector review
By 2004 and 2005, preparations were underway for talks on Kosovos future political
status. Reflecting the politics of the day, the need for a review of the security mechanisms
became increasingly more prevalent. In 2005, the then-SRSG Soren Jessen-Petersen initiated
a comprehensive Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR), put together by the Security Sector
Development Advisory Team, comprised of international and local experts. This was the most
comprehensive security review to date, aiming to assess the whole sector as such, and to offer
related recommendations for the institutions concerned.
The holistic study came at a time when the Ministry of Justice and that of Internal Affairs
had just been created. The study placed emphasis on strengthening those two ministries, as well
as exploring the possibilities of creating a Ministry of Defence. By way of enhancing ownership of
the Kosovo institutions, the review also recommended establishing a Kosovo Security Council. It
further recommended that the KPC should be disbanded, whereas the KPS should be reformed.
With regards to political competencies, it stated that the President and Prime Minister ought to
have an executive say in Kosovos security institutions. Finally, it called on the Assembly to exercise
its role by creating the relevant parliamentary committees for internal affairs and intelligence, so as
to ensure democratic oversight of Kosovos security mechanisms (ISSR 2006).
This review is worth noting, because the political developments that unfolded in Kosovo
in the next couple of years did herald dramatic changes to the security sector, changes that to a
large degree fit in with the findings of the report.
In 2005, the UN Secretary-General appointed the former Finnish President Martti
Ahtisaari as his Special Envoy, charging him to lead negotiations between Prishtina and Belgrade
on Kosovos future political status. Talks were held in Vienna in several rounds during 2006 and
2007. Finally, in March 2007 Ahtisaari submitted his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo
Status Settlement to the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon.20 His Proposal recommended that
Kosovo should be granted independence, with an interim period of supervision by the relevant
international mechanisms. The UN Secretary-General gave his full endorsement to the Proposal
before sending it to the UN Security Council for adoption. However, due to Serbias opposition to
Ahtisaaris recommendation, and thanks to its support from Russia, the UN Security Council has
not yet passed a resolution recognising Kosovos independence.
Based on Ahtisaaris Proposal, Kosovo declared its independence on 17 February 2008.
The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo came into force on 15 June 2008. Until now, Kosovo has
been recognised as independent by 70 states, including 22 out of 27 EU member-states, as well
as the US and all former Yugoslav republics, barring Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It has
gained full membership in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The issue of further
20 The proposal can be accessed at www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensive_proposal-english.pdf.
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Armend R. Bekaj
recognitions is an ongoing political process. The issue of membership in other institutions, such
as the Council of Europe, EU, OSCE or UN, is also a political one, depending on an increase in the
number of recognitions and the political good will to accept the new reality. However, the advisory
opinion of the International Court of Justice pronounced on 22 July 2010 was clear: the declaration
of independence of Kosovo adopted on 17 February 2008 did not violate international law.
Internally, the consolidation of state structures and the application of the rule of law is
also an ongoing process, fraught with many challenges. In addition to an economic situation that
needs urgent resuscitation, the north of Kosovo with its Serb community continues to challenge
Prishtinas authority. In this regard, Belgrades official or informal involvement poses obstacles to
the consolidation of state structures for Prishtina.
4.2 The dignified dissolution of the KPC
As the negotiations on Kosovos future status were nearing completion, it was becoming
clear that the KPC would dissolve. As it transpired, the KPC did not evolve into a fully-fledged army,
or a Kosovo Defence Force, as had clearly been the expressed aspiration of the KPC leadership
(eku, quoted in Pettifer 2003). Its war legacy and its identification as a direct inheritor of the
KLA were disqualifying traits in the eyes of the international community. It was considered that
the KPC had successfully accomplished its post-war emergency mission and needed to disband.
A necessary package of support would accompany its retirees, so as to make the dissolution as
appropriately dignified as possible. Moreover, there would be a clear interregnum between its
dissolution and the creation of the new security structure. For political reasons, the international
community is not open for the KPC to become an army [...] there would be more support for the
creation from scratch of a different professional security force, with clear criteria (Palokaj 2006).
The Ahtisaari Plan and the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo called for the
dissolution of the KPC. It also called for the establishment of a new professional and multi-ethnic
Kosovo Security Force (KSF). The KSF was to be lightly armed, and possess no heavy weapons,
such as tanks, heavy artillery or offensive air capability. According to Article 5 of Annex VIII of the
Ahtisaari Proposal:
Initially, the KSF shall be primarily responsible for crisis response, explosive
ordinance disposal, and civil protection. In addition, the KSF will be designed and
prepared to fulfil other security functions, not appropriate for the police or other law
enforcement organizations.21
Article 6 of the same document envisages the dissolution of the KPC:
The KPC, having accomplished its goals, including facilitation of Kosovos post-
conflict recovery, shall be dissolved. The IMP [International Military Presence],
in consultation with the ICR [International Civilian Representative] and Kosovo,
shall have executive authority over the KPC, and shall decide on the timing of the
KPCs dissolution. The dissolution is to be within one year of the conclusion of the
transition period as set forth in Article 15 of this Settlement. A Demobilization and
Reintegration process is to be developed by the International Community for these
KPC retirees.22
For its part, the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo states:
The Kosovo Protection Corps shall be dissolved within one year after entry into
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid
34
force of this constitution. Until such dissolution, the International Military Presence,
in consultation with the International Civilian Representative and the Republic of
Kosovo, shall exercise executive authority over the Kosovo Protection Corps and
shall decide on the schedule of its dissolution. (Article 154)23
On the establishment of the new force, it stipulates the following:
The Kosovo Security Force shall serve as a national security force for the Republic
of Kosovo and may send its members abroad in full conformity with its international
responsibilities [...] The Kosovo Security Force shall be professional, reflect ethnic
diversity of the people of the Republic of Kosovo and shall be recruited from among
the citizens of the Republic of Kosovo. (Article 126)24
Unlike the KPC, whose oversight was a reserved competence of the SRSG, the KSF was
to be directly accountable to the newly-formed Ministry of the Kosovo Security Force, the latter
representing an integrated model of civilian control. The President of the Republic of Kosovo is
simultaneously the Commander-in-Chief of the KSF. The Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo has
also established a Committee on the Kosovo Security Force, expected to provide parliamentary
oversight on the latters performance.
The deactivation of the KPC took place in January 2009. International experts who worked
closely with the KPC state that the organisation had grown and become fine-tuned in matters of
demining, disaster relief, urban search and rescue, and many routine community construction
projects. The KPC was praised for its demining contribution in Albania, in the aftermath of the
Grdec ammunition explosion in that country in March 2008. In the final weeks of its existence, the
KPC achieved international recognition for its Urban Search and Rescue Capability (Clewlow 2010).
However, with its mission being transitory, it came to a final completion after the declaration of
Kosovos independence.
The KSF was formally created immediately after the end of the KPCs mandate. All the
symbols and insignia of the new force are unlike any previous ones, in this way representing a
detachment from the old legacy. According to the Law on the Kosovo Security Force, as an all-
volunteer force, it is designed to fulfil security functions not appropriate for the police or other
law enforcement organisations. It is envisaged to consist of an active component of a maximum of
2,500 personnel and a reserve component of a maximum of 800 personnel. The KSFs emergency
response component consists of search and rescue, demining, hazardous materials, fire-fighting
and other humanitarian assistance capabilities. Its mandate also includes contributing to peace
operations. After five years, the current legislation foresees a possible review of the KSFs mission
and remit of operation. Article 10 of the Law on the Kosovo Security Force, which describes its
missions and tasks, states:
The Kosovo Security Force shall be lightly armed and possess no heavy weapons,
such as tanks, heavy artillery or offensive air capability. Any changes will be
determined by the International Military Presence, in coordination with the
International Civilian Representative. A full review of these limits to be conducted
no earlier than 5 years from the date this Law enters into force. The initial tasks of
the Kosovo Security Force shall be:
a) to participate in crisis response operations, including peace support operations.
This will include operations outside the territory of the Republic of Kosovo
where invited to do so;
b) to assist civil authorities in responding to natural and other disasters and
23 The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo can be accessed at www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/
Constitution1%20of%20the%20Republic%20of%20Kosovo.pdf.
24 Ibid.
35
Armend R. Bekaj
emergencies, including as part of a regional or international response effort,

c) to conduct explosive ordnance disposal,
d) to assist civil authorities through civil protection operations.25
Although it is a new force, a relatively large percentage of current KSF members were
recruited from the KPC. This is for the simple reason that the KPC possessed most of the skills
required for the new force. However, for many Kosovar Albanians, politicians and military men
alike, the dignified dissolution of the KPC was one of the hardest compromises that Kosovo
had to make on its way to statehood (eku interview). Especially for former KLA members, it was
vital that war veterans were offered an acceptable scheme of early retirement or reintegration. The
overall feeling was that failure to do so would be disrespectful to their contribution to Kosovos
recent history (Mustafa interview). In this regard, much has already been done, with support from
NATO countries, facilitated through the UNDP. However, the government has still got some way to
go towards accommodating war veterans. At present, the draft law on war veterans is still being
debated at the government level, before it is sent to the Assembly for review. One of the pending
issues to resolve has to do with the financial implications of the draft law, namely the costs that
need to be absorbed by the government in accommodating war veterans (Kajtazi interview).
For war veterans and others, during the dissolution process of the KPC, it was not just a
necessity to emphasise the dignified aspect of it. It was also the symbolism of it: the insecurity
that with the KPC, people would also witness the end of the KLA legacy. For it is a strongly held
feeling that the memory of war, the peoples sacrifices and tragedies, as well as the living legacy of
the resistance movement embodied in the KLA and inherited by the KPC, are and should continue
to be attributes of the state. These elements of remembrance, recollection and respect are much
needed for a new-born state, which Kosovo is. The preservation of this legacy, or its memory, and
the pride that comes with it, contribute towards state-formation and state-identity (eku interview).
These are some reasons as to why people were unsettled to see the KPC being dissolved.
However, the new force, although it is not called an army, is again seen by people as
being exactly that. Or, to be more realistic, being the force that already bears the symbolism of
defence and pride of the new country, it is expected to evolve into a sophisticated defence force or
army, working in close partnership with NATO,26 as is already the case.
25 The Law on the Kosovo Security Force can be accessed at www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/

ligjet/2008_03-L046_en.pdf.
26 NATO has over the years reduced its KFOR presence in Kosovo, bringing it to just under 10,000 troops at present,
who are still deployed in Kosovo to help maintain a safe and secure environment (see www.nato.int/kfor).
36
Conclusion
The KLA experienced a relatively short existence in Kosovos history, only occupying a
dominant stage in the second half of the 1990s. Its emergence represented the climax of a long
history of resistance movements, peaceful and armed ones, stretching right back to the beginning
of the 20th century. The consistent underlying principle was to give voice to the will of the people
for self-determination, justice and freedom from Serbia/FRY. Its struggle represented the interests
and concerns of the predominantly Albanian majority population of Kosovo. In this context, the
Kosovo case study shares many resemblances with other movements analysed in the context of
the Berghof series Resistance/Liberation Movements and Transition to Politics.
However, the KLA narrative, and with it the recent history of Kosovo, have also followed
their own trajectory of development, out of which one can distinguish a few unique traits:
There were two tiers of resistance in Kosovo: that of the peaceful resistance, led by the
LDK government, and the armed struggle, personified in the KLA. However, although their
objective was essentially the same, the gulf and the tension between the two tiers were never
reconciled. Far from acting as the political or armed wing of one another, both the peaceful
resistance and the armed struggle led a parallel existence until the end of the conflict.
The heavy involvement of the international factor: from being confined to the margins of
international attention in the first half of the 1990s, in the latter half Kosovo became a major
cause for concern due to its pending humanitarian catastrophe. In early 1999 international
diplomacy reached the peak of its involvement with the Rambouillet peace talks, which in
the end were signed by the Kosovar Albanian delegation but not by Belgrade. Considering
this as the end of diplomacy, the NATO Alliance embarked on its first military intervention
against a sovereign state, bombing Serbia/FRY for 78 days. The international community
followed this pattern of heavy engagement after the war, when the United Nations took over
the administration of Kosovo, with NATOs KFOR providing security for its citizens.
Unlike many other resistance movements, whose actors have been reintegrated into an
existing state structure following peace accords, Kosovo represents a breaking point in this
practice. After a period of almost a decade as an international protectorate, the Kosovo
representatives declared the country independent, thus factually and legally seceding
from Serbia.
In this whole context, Kosovo has proven to be a testing playground for the application
of some potentially conflicting norms in international relations and international
law. Namely, the ongoing dilemma between the principles of human rights and self-
determination versus those of sovereignty and non-interference in internal matters have
accompanied Kosovo throughout its most recent history. It was in the context of this
imbalance that the International Court of Justice, upon request, gave its advisory opinion
that Kosovos declaration of independence in February 2008 was not in contravention
with international law.
37
Armend R. Bekaj
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Kelmendi, Muhamet 1999. Pse nuk u ndrtua fronti pr lirimin e Kosovs. Tiran: Iliria.
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39
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Regulation 1999/8 on the Establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (20 September 1999), at
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Interviews
Agim eku 14 April 2010
Chief of Staff of the KLA, 1999;
Commander of the KPC (Lieutenant General), 1999-2006;
Prime Minister of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, 2006-2008;
Currently Chair of the Social-Democratic Party of Kosovo.

Besim Kajtazi 27 April 2010
Currently Director of the Legal Department, Office of the Prime Minister,
Republic of Kosovo.
Emrush Xhemajli 24 December 2009

Secretary General of the LPK, 1987-1998;
President of the LPK, 2000-2008;
Currently Member of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo.
Hajdin Abaz Lumi 29 January 2010

Officer for Morale, Policy and Communication with the KLA, 1998-1999;
Hydajet Hyseni 05 January 2010

Former Deputy Chair of LDK;
Nuredin Ibishi Leka 29 December 2009

Chief of Staff of the KLA for the Llap Region, 1998-1999.
Ramadan Qehaja 13 April 2010

Commander of the KPC Academy, 1999-2000;
Special Advisor to the KPC Coordinator at UNMIK, 2001-2005;
Advisor on Security to PM 2005-06;
Currently Executive Director of the Kosovar Center for Security Studies (KCSS).
40
Rexhep Selimi 28 December 2009
A founder of the KLA, 1993-1994;
Member of the KLA General HQ, 1994-1999;
Chief of the Operational Department of the KLA (G3), 1998;
General Inspector of the KLA, 1998-1999;
Minister of Public Order, Provisional Government of Kosovo, 1999-2000;
Commander of the KPC Protection Academy (Major General), 2000-2001;
Secretary General of AAK, 2003-2004
Rrustem Mustafa Remi 29 December 2009
Commander of the KLA for the Llap Region, 1997-1999;
Commander of the 5th Zone (Prishtina) of KPC, 1999-2000;
Commander of the 6th Zone of KPC, 2000-2001;
Currently Deputy Chair of PDK; Member of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo;
Chair of the Committee for Internal Affairs and Security of the Assembly of the
Republic of Kosovo.
Valon Murati 21 & 23 April 2010
Member of LKK, 1993-99;
Chair of LKK, 1999;
Member of Command of the Llap Region of the KLA, 1998-99;
Currently member of the presidency of Movement for Unification (Albanian:
Lvizja pr Bashkim).
41
Armend R. Bekaj
Annex I: Acronyms
AAK Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (Aleanca pr Ardhmrin e Kosovs)

COMKFOR Commander of KFOR
CSCE Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
EC European Commission
EC European Community
EU European Union
FARK Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (Forcat e Armatosura t Republiks
s Kosovs)
FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
ICJ nternational Court of Justice
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IOM International Organisation for Migration
KFOR (NATO) Kosovo Force
KPC (TMK) Kosovo Protection Corps (Trupat e Mbrojtjes s Kosovs)
KPS Kosovo Police Service
KP Kosovo Police
KVM (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission
KLA (UK) Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria lirimtare e Kosovs)
KSF Kosovo Security Force
LBD United Democratic Movement (Lvizja pr Bashkim Demokratik)
LDK Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovs)
LKK National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (Lvizja Kombtare pr
lirimin e Kosovs)
LPK Peoples Movement of Kosovo (Lvizja Popullore e Kosovs)
LRBSh Revolutionary Movement for Albanian Unification (Lvizja Revolucionare
pr Bashkimin e Shqiptarve)
OMiK OSCE Mission in Kosovo
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDK Democratic Party of Kosovo (Partia Demokratike e Kosovs)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
SFRY Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General
UNDP United Nations Development Fund
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UPSUP Independent Students Union of the University of Prishtina
(Unioni i Pavarur i Studentve t Universitetit t Prishtins)
42
Annex II: Chronology
1912/13 The Ottoman Empire withdraws from the Balkans. Serbia occupies Kosovo. The
Ambassadors Conference in London in December 1912 recognises the new Balkan
frontiers. Several armed struggles erupt in Kosovo between the two world wars, led by
kaaks, or Albanian outlaws rebelling against Serbian/Yugoslav rule.
1943/44 The Declaration of the Conference of Bujan, signed by Kosovos representatives,
envisages unification with Albania after the end of World War II. An armed uprising by
5000 Albanians is quashed by the Yugoslav partisans.
1950s Thousands of Kosovar Albanians face death, persecution and forced exile. The arms
collection campaign and the rigged trials of Kosovar Albanian communists add to this
toll.
1968 The first student demonstrations are held in Kosovos capital Prishtina. Slogans such as
Kosovo Republic are chanted by the demonstrators.
1974 The new Yugoslav Constitution gives Kosovo equal rights with other entities of the SFRY.
However, Kosovo continues to have the status of a province, not a republic.
1981 Massive student demonstrations take place in Prishtina, demanding equal rights
for Kosovo. The Yugoslav forces retaliate, killing tens of the students, wounding and
imprisoning hundreds.
1982 On 17 February, the organisation that came to be known as the Peoples Movement of
Kosovo (LPK) is created. This is a clandestine political and military organisation that
maintained its operations throughout the 1980s and 1990s in Kosovo and the West. Its
leadership played a key role in establishing the KLA. When the latter was created, several
of its leaders had been or continued to be members of the LPK.
1989 Following the ascent to power of the Serbian leader Slobodan Miloevi, Kosovos
autonomy is unconstitutionally annulled. More than 100,000 Kosovar Albanians are
expelled from their jobs, while university and most secondary schools are closed to
Kosovar Albanian students. In effect, Kosovo enters into an apartheid system.
The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) is formed, led by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova.
1990 On 2 July the deputies of the Assembly of Kosovo approve the Constitutional Declaration.
On 7 September in the town of Kaanik, the deputies of the Assembly of Kosovo adopt the
new Constitution and proclaim Kosovo a republic. Neither of these acts was recognised
by Yugoslavia or the international community.
1991 In September, the referendum on Kosovos independence is organised. 99% of the
87% who voted were in favour of independence. The referendum was not recognised
either.
1992 In April, the first multi-party elections are held in Kosovo. Winning by a landslide, the LDK
forms a government that would oppose Belgrade through non-violent means of resistance,
thus ushering Kosovo into a parallel system of governance and life. Neither the elections
nor Kosovos government is recognised by Belgrade or internationally. However, the
government enjoys the legitimacy of the predominantly Albanian population of Kosovo.
43
Armend R. Bekaj
1993 In March, the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (LKK) is created. As a
clandestine organisation, their programme emphasises mobilising the population for
war through propaganda and training, before entering into armed conflict.
The fund Homeland Calling is opened in Switzerland by the Kosovar Albanian diaspora.
Its assets are dedicated to the war in Kosovo.
1994 The first documented evidence of the existence of the KLA comes in the form of a
communiqu on 17 November. In the letter, its combatants take responsibility for several
actions taken against the Yugoslav/Serb forces and their collaborators.
1995 Under the auspices of the US administration, a peace agreement is reached in Dayton,
Ohio, to end the war in Bosnia. The agreement is signed by Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia and Serbia. The situation in Kosovo was not discussed.
1997 On 1 October, the Independent Students Union of the University of Prishtina (UPSUP)
organises massive non-violent protests against the forceful usurpation of university
premises by the Serbian regime. The protest, and others that followed, are crushed by the
police. The protests are a simultaneous manifestation of the popular growing frustration
with LDKs passive pacifist resistance.
On 28 November, the first public appearance of the KLA occurs during a funeral in the
region of Drenica. Until the end of this year, the army numbers just under 200 volunteer
fighters, in addition to logistical and operational support.
1998 In February the Yugoslav/Serb forces retaliate on civilians in the villages of Qirez and
Likoshan, killing twenty-four of them. The massacre is condemned strongly by the
international community.
On 5 March the Serbian heavy artillery surround the family compound of the KLAs moral
leader, Adem Jashari. In the three-day siege, fifty-six members of the extended family
are killed, together with Adem Jashari, his brother Hamz and his father Shaban. The
massacre sparks international outrage. It also triggers unprecedented support for the
KLA. Within a short time, 10,000 Kosovar Albanians volunteer to join the guerrilla army.
On 11 May, the LKK signs an agreement with the KLA, merging its military capacity under
the command structure of the KLAs General HQ.
Towards the end of the year, the KLA create their Political Directorate, which is tasked to
act as its political wing and interlocutor with international mediators and media.
By October, more than 1,500 Kosovar Albanians are killed, and more than 300,000 are
displaced, raising fears of a pending humanitarian catastrophe. The American envoy
Holbrooke mediates a ceasefire between the KLA and the Serbian forces, which proves
to be short-lived. However, it paves the way for the deployment of the OSCE Kosovo
Verification Mission (KVM) in Kosovo.
1999 On 15 January, the Serb forces retaliate and kill 45 civilians in the village of Reak. The
KVM Ambassador condemns the operation strongly, calling it a massacre on civilians.
Between 6 and 23 February, negotiations on the Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-
Government in Kosovo between the Kosovar Albanian and Serbian sides are held in
Rambouillet, France. The talks are sponsored by the Contact Group, comprised of the US,
UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia.
From 15 to 16 March, the peace negotiations recommence in Paris. The Kosovar Albanian
delegation signs the peace document, whilst the Serbian side refuses to sign.
On 24 March, the NATO Alliance launches a bombing campaign against Serbia, to stop
the escalating humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo. The campaign lasts 78 days.
44
On 9 June in Kumanovo, Macedonia, NATO and Serbia/FRY sign a Military Technical
Agreement, which sets the term for the latters immediate withdrawal from Kosovo.
On 10 June the UN Security Council pass Resolution 1244, providing the legal framework
for the establishment of UNMIK and KFOR in Kosovo.
On 12 June, NATO troops begin entering Kosovo from the south, as Serbian/FRY forces
leave northwards to Serbia.
By this time, around 12,000 Kosovar Albanians are killed; around 3,500 are unaccounted
for; 120,000 homes are burnt. Almost 900,000 Albanians are forced to flee Kosovo, and
in addition hundreds of thousands are internally displaced. Upon NATOs entry into
Kosovo, they begin their swift return home.
On 20 June, KFOR and the KLA sign the Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation
by the UK. The KLA is expected to complete this process within 90 days. This target is
accomplished successfully.
On 20 September, UNMIK promulgates Regulation 1999/8 on the Establishment of the
Kosovo Protection Corps. Out of over 20,000 KLA members, around 5,000 are recruited to
the KPC, and a similar number to the KPS. The rest of them are gradually integrated into
private security companies, politics etc.
Two political parties emerge from the war wing: the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK)
and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK).
2005 The UN Secretary-General appoints Martti Ahtisaari as his Special Envoy, charged to
lead negotiations between Prishtina and Belgrade on Kosovos future political status.
Negotiations are held in Vienna during 2006 and 2007.
2007 In March, Ahtisaari submits his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement
to the UN Secretary-General. The Proposal recommends independence for Kosovo, and
the UN Secretary-General endorses it.
2008 On 17 February, Kosovo is proclaimed an independent country by its elected leaders.
2009 In January, the KPC is dissolved and the KSF is established.
2010 On 22 July, the International Court of Justices advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovos
declaration of independence is clear-cut: the declaration of independence of Kosovo did
not violate international law.
45
Armend R. Bekaj
Annex III: Map of Kosovo
Source: International Crisis Group (19 May 2010). The Rule of Law in Independent Kosovo. Pristina / Brussels.
Europe Report No. 204.
46
About the Author
Armend R. Bekaj has been cooperating with the Berghof Conflict Research project
From War to Politics: Non-State Armed Groups and Security Transition Processes since 2009.
He is currently working for a donor institute supporting civil society organisations in Kosovo. From
2007-9, he worked as a political advisor for the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo on matters
pertaining to parliamentary oversight on security. In this capacity, he contributed to drawing up
the security-related legal framework, and cooperated with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
international organisations based in Kosovo. For several years he also worked in the UK, in the civil
society sector and humanitarian assistance area. He holds a masters degree in Conflict Resolution
from the University of Bradford.
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Armend R.

The KLA and the Kosovo War

Berghof Conflict Research/Berghof Forschungszentrum fr konstruktive Konfliktbearbeitung 2010

Copies can be ordered from:

Berghof Conflict Research is grateful to acknowledge

This case-study is one of a series produced by participants in an ongoing Berghof research

For further information on the project, please contact:

Vronique Dudouet (Project Coordinator) Prof. Hans J. Giessmann (Director, BCR)

1. Background and the years of nonviolent resistance 9

1.1 The historical perspective of the armed movement 9

2. Armed mobilisation and international intervention 17

3. The post-war transformation of the KLA 27

3.1 KPC: transformation, not dissolution 27

4. The post-independence security presence 33

4.1 Security sector review 33

Annex II: Chronology 43

Annex III: Map of Kosovo 46

About the Author 47

1.1. The historical perspective of the armed movement

1.2. 1945 to 1989: Kosovo and the socialist ideology

1.3. Kosovo in the parallel system

2. Armed mobilisation and international intervention

2.2 The dominance of the KLA

2.4 The involvement of international actors and NATOs bombing campaign

3.1 KPC: transformation, not dissolution

KPCs Structure as of July 2006

Rank Active Serving Members Reserve

Lt. Colonel 119 117 2

Major 209 203 13

Captain 356 356 60

Lieutenant 440 436 136

Staff Sergeant 439 438 96

Sergeant 366 365 188

Corporal 1,035 1,028 1,438

Total 3,052 3,026 2,000

3.3 The leap from combatant to politician

4.1 Security sector review

4.2 The dignified dissolution of the KPC

emergencies, including as part of a regional or international response effort,

25 The Law on the Kosovo Security Force can be accessed at www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/

Emrush Xhemajli 24 December 2009

Hajdin Abaz Lumi 29 January 2010

Hydajet Hyseni 05 January 2010

Nuredin Ibishi Leka 29 December 2009

Ramadan Qehaja 13 April 2010

AAK Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (Aleanca pr Ardhmrin e Kosovs)

Annex III: Map of Kosovo

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