jp3 05 PDF
jp3 05 PDF
jp3 05 PDF
Special Operations
16 July 2014
PREFACE
1. Scope
This publication provides overarching doctrine for special operations and the
employment and support for special operations forces across the range of military operations.
2. Purpose
This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance
of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal
basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational
operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant
commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes joint doctrine for operations,
education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in
preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the
authority of the joint force commander from organizing the force and executing the
mission in a manner the joint force commander deems most appropriate to ensure unity of
effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.
3. Application
a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of
combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of
these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.
i
Preface
Intentionally Blank
ii JP 3-05
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-05
DATED 18 APRIL 2011
Merges material from Joint Publication (JP) 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations
Task Force, which is consequently rescinded following approval of JP 3-05,
Special Operations.
Expands the discussion of special operations joint task force, to include the
addition of a vignette and a definition.
Modifies, adds, and removes multiple terms and definitions from JP 1-02, DOD
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
iii
Summary of Changes
Intentionally Blank
iv JP 3-05
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... ix
CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS
CHAPTER II
SPECIAL OPERATIONS CORE ACTIVITIES
Introduction ................................................................................................................II-1
Special Operations Core Activities ............................................................................II-2
CHAPTER III
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
CHAPTER IV
SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
v
Table of Contents
APPENDIX
GLOSSARY
FIGURE
vi JP 3-05
Table of Contents
vii
Table of Contents
Intentionally Blank
viii JP 3-05
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDERS OVERVIEW
ix
Executive Summary
x JP 3-05
Executive Summary
Security Force Assistance USG security sector reform (SSR) focuses on the way a
HN provides safety, security, and justice with civilian
government oversight. The Department of Defenses
(DODs) primary role in SSR is to support the reform,
restructure, or reestablishment of the HN armed forces
and the defense aspect of the security sector, which is
accomplished through security force assistance.
Hostage Rescue and Hostage rescue and recovery operations are sensitive
Recovery crisis response missions in response to terrorist threats
and incidents. Offensive operations in support of
hostage rescue and recovery can include the recapture of
US facilities, installations, and sensitive material
overseas.
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Executive Summary
Civil Affairs operations Civil affairs operations are actions planned, executed,
and assessed by civil affairs that enhance the operational
environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of
instability within civil society; or involve the application
of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility
of civil government.
Assignment of Special SOF units based in the US are generally assigned to and
Operations Forces under combatant command (COCOM) of Commander,
United States Special Operations Command
(CDRUSSOCOM), with OPCON exercised through the
USSOCOM Service component commands. SecDef
assigns the TSOCs to USSOCOM under
CDRUSSOCOMs COCOM, and assigns OPCON of the
TSOCs to the GCCs. SecDef also authorizes
CDRUSSOCOM/GCCs to establish support relationships
when SOF commanders are required to simultaneously
support multiple operations or commanders.
Special Operations Forces The special operations joint task force (SOJTF) is the
Joint Task Force principal joint SOF organization tasked to meet all
special operations requirements in major operations,
campaigns, or a contingency. A SOJTF is a modular,
tailorable, and scalable SOF organization that allows
USSOCOM to more efficiently provide integrated, fully
capable, and enabled joint SOF to GCCs and
subordinate JFCs based on the strategic, operational,
and tactical context. Depending on circumstances, the
SOJTF may be directed to serve as the joint task force
(JTF), or a joint force special operations component
commander (JFSOCC).
Command and Control of The TSOC plans and conducts operations in support of the
Special Operations Forces GCC. The GCC normally exercises OPCON of attached
in Theater SOF through the commander, theater special operations
command (CDRTSOC), who may exercise OPCON of
subordinate forces directly from the TSOC location, or
through a smaller special operations command-forward,
located elsewhere in the theater of operations.
xii JP 3-05
Executive Summary
Interdependence of SOF and CF often share the same operational areas for
Conventional Forces and extended periods when they are mutually reliant on each
Special Operations Forces others capabilities. SOF-CF synchronization facilitates
unity of effort; maximizes the capability of the joint
force; and allows the JFC to optimize the principles of
joint operations in planning and execution.
xiii
Executive Summary
xiv JP 3-05
Executive Summary
CONCLUSION
xv
Executive Summary
Intentionally Blank
xvi JP 3-05
CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS
1. Introduction
This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for the Services,
combatant commanders (CCDRs), and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) to prepare
for and conduct special operations. It describes special operations and provides general
guidance for commanders to plan for, employ, and execute command and control (C2) and
support of special operations forces (SOF) leveraging the global SOF network. The global
SOF network is a synchronized network of people and technology (US, allies, and partner
nations[PNs]) designed to support commanders through inter-operable capabilities that
enable special operations. See Chapter III, Command and Control of Special Operations
Forces, for more specific information on the global SOF network. Additional information
regarding some specific special operations and the qualities and capabilities of SOF also are
provided in the following publications: Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.2, Military Information
Support Operations; JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense; and JP 3-57, Civil-Military
Operations. Additionally, SOF maintains core competencies in counterinsurgency (COIN)
and counterterrorism (CT) operations that are discussed in detail in JP 3-24,
Counterinsurgency, and JP 3-26, Counterterrorism.
2. Special Operations
b. SOF often conduct distributed operations with small operational and logistics
footprints far from major bases. SOF employ sophisticated communications systems and a
I-1
Chapter I
broad array of infiltration, support, and exfiltration techniques to penetrate and return from
hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive areas.
d. Special operations are built on individuals and small units who apply special skills
with adaptability, improvisation, and innovation. Special operations normally require
precise tactical-level planning, detailed intelligence, and knowledge of the cultures and
languages of the operational areas. Rigorous training and mission rehearsals are integral to
the success of most special operations. Special operations conducted by small SOF units,
with unique capabilities and self-sufficiency (for short periods of time), provide the USG
with a wide array of military options. These options may generate less liability or risk of
escalation than are normally associated with employment of larger and more visible CF.
Foreign partners will at times be more willing to work with SOF due to their small
footprint in politically and/or diplomatically sensitive environments. Critical to the
evaluation and planning for future special operations is the review, and potential
employment of, joint lessons learned and best practices from previous operations.
Collection of joint lessons learned in accordance with (IAW) the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) guidance promotes the availability of such information for SOF
consideration and decision making.
e. Special operations can be a single engagement, such as direct action (DA) against a
critical target; as a protracted operation or series of activities such as support to insurgent
forces through unconventional warfare (UW); or support to a HN force through foreign
internal defense (FID) or security force assistance (SFA). Military information support
operations (MISO) can be used during special operations to influence selected target
audiences behavior and actions. Civil affairs operations (CAO) also provide essential
support to a JFC or country team. Special operations, synchronized with MISO and CAO,
can create effects disproportionate to the size of the units involved.
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Overview of Special Operations
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Chapter I
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Overview of Special Operations
g. Nationally Directed Missions. The President and SecDef use designated SOF to
conduct activities and operations across the world. Specific nationally directed special
mission units (SMUs) are comprised of SOF and other forces, as required by specific
mission requirements.
b. SOF Partnerships. SOF routinely operate with Department of State (DOS) and
other USG departments and agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and other
nations forces. Clandestine, covert, and low-visibility operations may require extensive
interagency or interorganizational coordination.
c. SOF Personnel
(1) SOF undergo a rigorous selection process. After selection, they receive
mission-specific training to achieve proficiency in special operations skills. SOF tend to
be more experienced personnel, many of whom maintain competency in more than one
military specialty.
(2) Selected SOF maintain regional, cultural, and linguistic specialties. Extensive
foreign language and cross-cultural training are routine parts of their development. Some
personnel require highly technical and advanced training for anticipated missions.
d. SOF Capabilities. Typically, SOF are organized into small, flexible, and agile self-
contained teams that can operate without support in ambiguous, austere, and dynamic
environments for short periods. SOF can:
(2) Work closely with foreign military and civilian authorities and populations,
when directed.
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Chapter I
e. Interdependence
(1) SOF are not a substitute for CF. SOF, however, can make CF more capable and
efficient. Just as joint interdependence is the purposeful reliance by one Service on another
Services capabilities, SOF and CF may rely on each others capabilities to maximize their
respective capabilities. The degree of interdependence will vary based on specific roles,
activities, and circumstances.
(2) SOF can operate independently or with CF. SOF add unique capabilities to
achieve sometimes otherwise unattainable objectives. Integration enables the JFC to
maximize CF and SOF core competencies. SOF special skills and low-visibility capabilities
also provide an adaptable and scalable military response in situations or crises requiring
tailored, precise, and focused use of force.
f. SOF Limitations
(1) Special operations are generally limited in scope by the size of the SOF unit.
(2) Improper employment of SOF runs the risk of rapidly depleting capacity. SOF
cannot be quickly reconstituted or rapidly expanded, because of the lengthy process required
to recruit, train, and educate them.
INTERDEPENDENCE
Various Sources
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Overview of Special Operations
Various Sources
(3) SOF are not a substitute for CF. In order to preserve SOF capabilities, SOF
should not be employed to conduct operations where CF could be used to achieve the
same objectives.
(4) Most special operations missions require CF logistics support. SOF are not
structured with robust sustainment capabilities, therefore, SOF must frequently rely on
external support for sustained operations. Limited SOF logistic capacity frequently
requires support from CF supplemented by host-nation support (HNS) and/or operational
contract support.
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Chapter I
(2) The mission should support theater campaign plans (TCPs), the JFCs
campaign, operation plan (OPLAN), or contingency response or the ambassadors
COMs/country teams mission performance plan. Unity of effort is essential for
unified action.
(4) The mission planning must include coordination for required resources to
support SOF during the mission. SOF missions often require support from CF sources.
(5) The mission objectives should justify the risks. SOF assets are limited.
Commanders should evaluate risks to SOF before making employment decisions. In
addition, commanders should consider US diplomatic and informational interests in risk
calculation.
a. SOF are a capabilities-based force. Each joint operation has a unique strategic
context, so the nature of SOF activities will vary according to the distinct aspects of the
mission and operational environment. TSOCs address GCC requirements through tailored
subordinate plans and utilize the global SOF network to complement other means for
maintaining global and theater situational awareness.
I-8 JP 3-05
Overview of Special Operations
Various Sources
(3) Major Operations and Campaigns. National interests are sometimes best
protected through major operations or campaigns involving large-scale combat. The US
seeks to prevail against the enemy as quickly as possible, conclude hostilities, and establish
conditions favorable to the US, its multinational partners, and the HN. For large-scale
efforts, SOF conduct activities that support the JFC throughout the operation or campaign.
Complex campaigns may require SOF, SMUs, and CF to conduct simultaneous activities.
For such campaigns, USSOCOM may provide C2 headquarters (HQ) to provide C2
of SOF.
c. Special operations can be conducted at all levels of warfare and throughout all phases
of a campaign or operation.
(1) For some national security objectives, special operations may be conducted
under the direct supervision of the President or SecDef.
(2) Otherwise, the TSOC integrates special operations into military operations that
support the TCP and other theater plans established by the GCC.
For a detailed discussion of the range of military operations, including the relationship to
the instruments of national power, levels of warfare, and the categories of joint military
activities, see JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 3-0,
Joint Operations.
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Chapter I
OPERATION ANACONDA
Various Sources
I-10 JP 3-05
CHAPTER II
SPECIAL OPERATIONS CORE ACTIVITIES
We used the smallest force, in the quickest time, in the farthest place.
1. Introduction
a. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 3-0, Joint
Operations, both address irregular warfare (IW) as a violent struggle among state and non-
state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Non-state actors
often seek to create instability and disrupt and negate state legitimacy and governance to
gain and maintain control or influence over and the support of a relevant population. Non-
state actors use political, psychological, and economic methods, reinforced with military-
type activities that favor indirect approaches and asymmetric means. Countering these
methods requires a different mindset and different capabilities than traditional warfare
methods. SOF are selected, trained, and equipped to conduct all forms of IW. Special
operations considers the totality of the cognitive, informational, physical, cultural, and
social aspects of the operational environment to influence the local populations behavior
through unique capabilities to identify and influence relevant populations, enhance
stability, prevent conflict, and when necessary, fight and defeat adversaries. SOF
capabilities complement CF capabilities.
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Chapter II
Irregular Warfare
FID
Stability OPs
Legend
COIN counterinsurgency OP operation
CT counterterrorism UW unconventional warfare
FID foreign internal defense
a. USSOCOM organizes, trains, and equips SOF for special operations core
activities (see Figure II-2), and other such activities as may be specified by the President
and/or SecDef. These core activities reflect the collective capabilities of all joint SOF
rather than those of any one Service or unit. While CF also conduct some of these
activities (e.g., FID, SFA, foreign humanitarian assistance [FHA], and COIN), SOF
conduct all of them using specialized tactics, techniques, and procedures, and in unique
conditions and to different standards, but in a manner that complements CF capabilities.
SOF can tailor their capabilities in combinations that provide options for creating various
effects to achieve a broad range of strategic and operational objectives. Additionally,
due to inherent capabilities, SOF can also perform collateral activities such as
counterdrug operations, support and advise multinational forces (MNFs), personnel
recovery (PR), countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) operations, and
noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs).
II-2 JP 3-05
Special Operations Core Activities
b. Special operations missions may include more than one core activity. The execution
of one core activity may have operational or strategic impact on other core activities being
planned or executed. While executing a major operation or campaign, the following are
some examples of the supporting aspects of some special operations activities that may
be conducted:
(2) Hostage rescue and recovery supports PR for the joint force;
(3) FID and SFA may support training, advising, and equipping HN security forces
as an element of a COIN operation;
(5) CAO are conducted across the range of military operations to enhance the
operational environment by identifying and mitigating the underlying causes of instability
within civil society or applying functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil
government to foster stability;
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Chapter II
Enable the armed forces, local forces, and national police to provide security
for the populace; and
Reestablish the justice system and local governance, and broaden state
services and sustainable development.
Along with their interagency partners, SOF advisors partnered with the
Colombian military and police to build their capacity to achieve those
objectives. US Army special forces trainers worked with Colombian special
forces and the Colombian National Police to develop a rural police program
in contested areas. US SOF advice and support facilitated fortified stations
to allow rural police a permanent presence in areas lacking dedicated police
forces.
US civil affairs and military information support personnel work closely with
their Colombian counterparts, US Government departments and agencies,
and other nongovernmental organizations to bring humanitarian assistance
and economic development into the contested areas. Convincing the
populace to recognize the Colombian governments legitimacy, versus the
insurgents or drug traffickers, takes sustained effort. Civil affairs and
psychological operations, although nascent in the Colombian military, can
help convince Colombians that their government is legitimate.
Various Sources
(6) CT and CWMD may be mutually supportive because of the potential nexus of
certain terrorists and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and
(7) During a COIN operation, FID, DA, SR, CT, MISO, and CAO are likely to be
conducted.
c. Preparation of the Environment (PE). SOF also take actions to prepare the
operational environment for potential operations. PE is conducted during the shape phase of
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Special Operations Core Activities
an operation as well as for developing and preparing for the entry of forces and supporting
agencies to resolve conflicts using either lethal or nonlethal actions. PE supports special
operations advance force operations (AFO) being conducted to refine the location of specific,
identified targets and further develops the operational environment. Special operations AFO
encompass many operational preparation of the environment (OPE) activities, but are
intended to prepare for near-term DA. Special operations AFO may include, but are not
limited to: close-target reconnaissance; tagging, tracking, and locating (TTL); reception,
staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of forces; infrastructure development;
and terminal guidance. Unless specifically withheld, special operations AFO also include
DA in situations when failure to act will mean loss of a fleeting opportunity for success.
(1) Forces conducting DA usually withdraw from the planned objective area as
quickly as possible to limit the operations scope and duration. DA can provide specific and
often time-sensitive results at operational and strategic levels of warfare.
(3) DA missions may also involve locating and capturing or seizing selected high-
value targets or materiel in sensitive, denied, or contested areas. These missions usually
result from situations involving diplomatic and/or political sensitivity or military criticality
of the adversary personnel or materiel being taken from remote or hostile environments.
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Chapter II
significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in CF. These actions
provide an additive collection capability for commanders and supplement other conventional
reconnaissance and surveillance actions. SR may include collecting information on activities
of an actual or potential enemy or securing data on the meteorological, hydrographic, or
geographic characteristics of a particular area. SEALs have historically conducted
hydrographic reconnaissance in support of amphibious operations. SR may also include
assessment of chemical, biological, residual radiological, or environmental hazards in a
denied area. SR includes target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance,
and may be accomplished by air, land, or maritime assets.
(1) SR complements national and theater intelligence collection assets and systems
by obtaining specific, well-defined, and time-sensitive information. SR may also
complement other collection methods constrained by weather, terrain-masking, or adversary
defenses. SOF conduct SR to place eyes on target. SR typically provides essential
information to develop a commanders situational awareness necessary for command
decisions, follow-on missions, or critical assessments.
(2) Using SR enables the JFC to enhance situational awareness and facilitate staff
planning and execution of joint operations. SOF are not dedicated reconnaissance assets for
CF. Rather, the JFC typically tasks SOF to provide SR, and may establish a joint special
operations area (JSOA) for that mission. On a case-by-case basis, the JFC may task SOF to
conduct SR for essential intelligence in a CFs operational area when the CF lacks the
reconnaissance capability.
(3) SR and other intelligence operations are inherent to operations, not just
planning. SOF also employ organic ISR assets that should not be confused with SR. These
assets require synchronization from planning through execution, and include the processing,
exploitation, and dissemination of information. Persistent surveillance combined with
tailored processing, exploitation, and dissemination provides SOF with precise intelligence.
SOF require precise, detailed intelligence which must often be produced and disseminated in
austere environments with limited data transport architectures.
(4) SOF depend on manned and unmanned assets. Essential intelligence support to
SR includes signals intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and TTL devices
to provide extended surveillance and reconnaissance according to SOF essential elements of
information and priority intelligence requirements. SR is used for target identification and
confirmation, laser target acquisition and post-strike reconnaissance. SR also may use
unmanned aircraft (UA) with imagery, SIGINT, and other intelligence collection capability
to provide persistent, high-fidelity intelligence on an adversary that moves and operates
among civilians.
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Special Operations Core Activities
OPERATIONS/INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE
Various Sources
are to reduce incentives to obtain and employ WMD; increase barriers to acquisition and use
of WMD; manage WMD risks emanating from hostile, fragile, failed states, and/or havens;
and deny the effects of current and emerging WMD threats. USSOCOM supports GCCs
through technical expertise, materiel, and special teams to complement other CCMD teams
that locate, tag, and track WMD; DA in limited access areas; helping build partnership
capacity to conduct CWMD activities; MISO to dissuade adversaries from reliance on
WMD; and other specialized capabilities. SOF are attentive to any nexus of WMD and
transnational violent extremist organizations.
g. CT. Terrorism has evolved over several decades from a tactic of inducing fear in
select populations to a transnational threat of strategic proportions perpetrated primarily by
groups of violent extremists. The US, its strategic partner nations, other Western societies,
and emerging democracies are frequent targets. Whether the extremists are local insurgents
or members of an international network, they are terrorists if they are non-state actors who
use violence or the threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies.
Access to WMD significantly increases terrorists capacity to install fear.
(1) CT is activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their networks
in order to render them incapable of using unlawful violence to instill fear and coerce
governments or societies to achieve their goals. In addition to being a SOF core activity, CT
is part of the Department of Defenses (DODs) broader construct of combating terrorism,
which is actions, including antiterrorism and CT, taken to oppose terrorism throughout the
entire threat continuum.
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Chapter II
the instruments of national power. USG interagency partners work with USSOCOM to
achieve unified action with PNs, IGOs, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the
private sector.
(3) GCCs may also employ SOF to conduct operations against terrorists and their
organizations, as well as to shape and stabilize their operational environment to erode the
capabilities of terrorist organizations and degrade their support and sanctuary. SOF activities
used in concert with stability operations, counterintelligence (CI), civil-military operations
(CMO), and communication synchronization, enable partners to combat terrorism, deter tacit
and active support for terrorism, and erode support for terrorist ideologies.
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Special Operations Core Activities
Various Sources
(4) UW operations are a national strategic option, which uses fewer resources than
conventional operations, while still mitigating an adversarys typical anti-access capabilities.
UW operations objectives include supporting the insurgency/resistance movement so it can
influence, coerce, disrupt, or foster a change in governing authority.
(5) The sensitive nature of UW operations, the methods by which they are
conducted and supported, and the ramifications of failure require the JFC to conduct
extensive planning and preparation to reduce risk and to promote an acceptable outcome for
US strategic interests. UW planning and preparation efforts typically involve extensive
coordination, deconfliction, and integration across the USG and its partners. Potential
strategic risk and diplomatic and/or political sensitivity of UW operations require planners to
approach UW as a whole-of-government effort. Planning should also include an assessment
of the depth of support for opposition groups; opposition groups plans for forming a new
government, including plans to re-integrate former regime elements; and the presence and
influence of radical or extremist elements among opposition groups.
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Chapter II
i. FID. FID refers to US activities that support a HNs internal defense and
development (IDAD) strategy and program designed to protect against subversion,
lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their internal security, and stability.
As shown in Figure II-3, FID involves the application of the instruments of national power.
In addition to enabling HNs to maintain internal stability and counter subversion and
violence, FID should address the causes of instability. FID programs are tailored to the
individual HN, and focus on CT, COIN, counterdrug, or stability operations. The three
categories of FID are indirect support, direct support (not involving combat operations), and
US combat operations. During combat operations, US forces either integrate with or operate
in the place of HN forces.
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Special Operations Core Activities
(1) The supported GCC normally designates a subordinate JFC from either the
CF or SOF to lead the military forces and coordinates with the appropriate chief of
mission (COM) who normally leads the overall USG effort. SOF typically contribute
to a FID under the tactical control (TACON) or OPCON of a CDRTSOC. The SOF
senior commander may be required to coordinate directly with the country team and
COM at appropriate US embassies. In smaller FID operations, SOF units may compose
the majority, if not the entire, US force. The opposite may be true in large-scale FID
operations, particularly when HNs limit total US troops. FID operations may be
initiated by SOF and then handed over to CF.
(2) As a joint operation, FID also uses stability operations to promote security
and reduce the influence of adverse economic, political, and informational drivers of
violence and conflict, through a combination of peacetime developmental, security
cooperation activities, and, when necessary, crisis response actions. The goal is to
enable HN forces to maintain internal stability, counter subversion and violence, and
address root causes of instability.
(3) SOF Service components can contribute to FID. Primarily, SOF assess,
train, advise, and assist HN military and paramilitary forces in support of FID. FID
may also take the form of mobile training teams to teach indigenous personnel how to
operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems, or to develop a self-
training capability in a particular skill. When authorized, SOF may also support HN
combat operations.
(4) FID operations are planned at the national and ministerial levels
(dependent upon the HNs governmental structure), in support of the HN IDAD
strategy and program, and in coordination with the COM. FID planning is complex.
To integrate FID with national strategy and regional plans, FID planners must
understand US foreign policy; focus to maintain or increase HN sovereignty and
legitimacy; and understand the strategic implications and sustainability of US
assistance to a HN. FID normally requires a security assistance program(s) to fund
materiel requirements for military activities. Military planning for unified action is
essential to build unity of effort in the USG approach to FID.
j. Security Force Assistance. USG security sector reform (SSR) focuses on the
way a HN provides safety, security, and justice with civilian government oversight.
DODs primary role in SSR is to support the reform, restructure, or reestablishment of
the HN armed forces and the defense aspect of the security sector, which is
accomplished through SFA. SFA are DOD activities that contribute to unified action
by the USG to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign
security forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions. While SFA is primarily to assist
a HN to defend against internal and transnational terrorist threats to stability, it also
prepares FSF to defend against external threats and to perform as part of a MNF. FSF
include, but are not limited to, military forces; police forces; border police, coast guard,
and customs officials; paramilitary forces; interior and intelligence services; forces
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Chapter II
peculiar to specific nations, states, tribes, or ethnic groups; prison, correctional, and
penal services; and their responsible government ministries or departments. US SFA
activities train, equip, advise, and assist FSF organized under the HNs national
ministry of defense, or the equivalent governmental structure. Other USG departments
and agencies focus on FSF assigned to other ministries such as interior, justice, or
intelligence services. US SFA can also be provided to regional military or paramilitary
forces, or an IGOs security organization.
(1) SOF/CF performing SFA conduct an initial assessment of the FSF they
will assist and then establish a way to continue assessing them throughout their
development. The HN determines the structure of its military forces, to include
approving all organizational structures and relationships. HN organizational
prerogatives include the size of forces, types of units, and internal design.
For further information on FID and SFA, refer to JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.
k. Hostage Rescue and Recovery. Hostage rescue and recovery operations are
sensitive crisis response missions in response to terrorist threats and incidents.
Offensive operations in support of hostage rescue and recovery can include the
recapture of US facilities, installations, and sensitive material overseas.
(1) SOF and COIN Approaches. SOF are essential to successful COIN
operations. Their capacity to conduct a wide array of missions with HN security forces
or integrated with US CF make them particularly suitable for COIN operations. They
are particularly adept at using an indirect approach to positively influence segments of
the indigenous population. In a more balanced or direct approach to COIN, however,
they should be used to complement rather than replace the role of CF.
(2) SOFs Core Activities and COIN. SOF are specifically organized, trained,
and equipped to accomplish core activities that may be involved in COIN. Any of these
special operations core activities may be conducted as part of a COIN operation. SOF
must adhere to the same tenets of COIN as CF. Even if focused on DA missions, SOF
must be cognizant of the need to win and maintain popular support.
(3) DA. DA missions may be required in COIN to capture or kill key insurgent
leaders or other vital insurgent targets. The specific types of DA are raids, ambushes, and
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Special Operations Core Activities
direct assaults; standoff attacks; terminal attack control and terminal guidance operations;
PR operations; precision destruction operations; and anti-surface operations.
During the Salvadoran civil war, support to foreign internal defense (FID) by
US trainers began in the early 1980s with mobile training teams from 7th
Special Forces Group (Airborne). Initially, the mobile training teams stood
up an elite counterinsurgency reaction force designed to counter the early
tactical successes of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN).
They trained five Immediate Reaction Infantry Battalions in-country, as well
as at Ft. Benning and Ft. Bragg, to help stand up EI Salvadors initial
counterinsurgency capability.
Nonetheless, this small cadre helped not only in training the ESAF, but also
played a significant role in the professionalization of the armed forces in the
face of repeated accusations of human rights abuses throughout the 1980s.
From training on basic soldier skills at the armed forces military training
center near La Unin, to working with the Salvadoran leadership at military
detachment, brigade, and national levels, US military personnel were
instrumental in setting the example for professional military conduct and
reinforcing the importance of respect for human rights. Their efforts helped
the ESAF overcome a reputation of unprofessional and abusive conduct that
was pervasive in the 1980s.
At the same time, a focused ESAF PSYOP effort and targeted application of
civil-military operations changed the image of the military. Inclusive
messages such as soy tan Salvadoreo como tu [Im as Salvadoran as you
are] and employing combat troops to support humanitarian and civic
assistance activities helped improve public and international perception of
the ESAF and turned sentiments against the abuses of the FMLN, ultimately
bringing about a peace agreement, cease fire, and demobilization
of forces in 1992.
Various Sources
II-13
Chapter II
(1) SOF and CF should plan MISO to support all phases of operations
and campaigns.
(2) MISO planners will identify target audiences and MISO objectives, themes,
activities, and products that support the JFCs plan. However, MISO is most successful
when integrated and synchronized with complementary information-related capabilities
(IRCs) and actions of the joint force and other interagency partners to create psychological
effects. Messages and action must be congruent to influence target audiences to change their
attitudes, perceptions, and behavior.
(3) In peacetime and during limited crises response operations, MISO are usually
planned and coordinated through the TSOC. In permissive or uncertain environments not
II-14 JP 3-05
Special Operations Core Activities
After the 2003 capture of Saddam Hussein, Abu Musab Zarqawi filled the
insurgent leadership vacuum in Iraq. He was viewed by many anti-American
Arabs as a modern day Robin Hood. His group, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI),
received manpower, money, arms, and sanctuary from across the Arab world
because Zarqawi stood up to the US military.
The role of PSYOP in marginalizing Abu Musab Zarqawi helped change the
AQI narrative from directly attacking US and coalition forces to defending AQI
activities despite mounting evidence of AQI civilian casualties. Brigadier
General Mark Kimmitt, spokesman Combined Joint Task ForceSeven, said
The Zarqawi PSYOP program is the most successful information campaign to
date. The psychological pressure on AQI and Zarqawi continued until 7 June
2006 when an airstrike killed him and several other AQI leaders.
Various Sources
involving combat operations, MISO are planned and integrated with other security
cooperation activities and operations and with other USG efforts to further national
strategy objectives through the GCCs TCP and contingency plans. In major
contingencies, the JFC may establish a separate joint military information support task
force (JMISTF) to conduct MISO.
II-15
Chapter II
(4) Military information support (MIS) forces can also be used to provide civil
authority information support (CAIS). CAIS include DOD information activities
conducted under a designated lead federal agency or other US civil authority to support
dissemination of public or other critical information during domestic emergencies.
(b) All CAIS activities are coordinated with ongoing military and lead
federal agency public affairs (PA) activities as required.
(6) USSOCOM retains the preponderance of active duty MIS forces under the
USASOC. USSOCOM also gains RC MIS forces through AFSOC when Air National
Guard assets are mobilized. USSOCOM is the DOD proponent for MISO to coordinate
the collaborative development and integration of DOD MISO with US strategic
objectives.
o. CAO. CAO are actions planned, executed, and assessed by CA that enhance the
operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within
civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the
responsibility of civil government. All CMO should be coordinated and support the
commanders objectives. All CA core tasks support the JFCs CMO objectives.
II-16 JP 3-05
Special Operations Core Activities
Various Sources
(b) FHA.
(4) CMO and CAO. CMO should be considered in the planning and execution of
military operations. At the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare, and during
all military operations, CMO are essential to the military instrument to coordinate the
integration of military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support
of stability, COIN, and other operations dealing with asymmetric and irregular threats.
Commanders responsible for an operational area typically are also responsible for the
civilian population. That responsibility may be reflected in the proportional balance of
stability operations with offensive and defensive operations during a joint operation. CMO
may be conducted before or during military operations and especially during stability
operations. Commanders conduct CMO in permissive, uncertain, or hostile operational
environments to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces
and civilian authorities (governmental and nongovernmental) and the civilian population.
II-17
Chapter II
CMO facilitate military operations and minimize interference by or friction with civilian
entities while supporting accomplishment of tasks to create the effects to achieve operational
objectives. CA may help military forces perform activities and functions that are normally
the responsibility of local government. CMO may be conducted prior to, concurrently with,
and following other military operations, especially during stability operations. In carrying
out their CMO responsibilities, commanders use CAO. The relationship between CMO and
CAO is best considered within the broad context of unified action that involves the
synchronization, coordination, or integration of the activities of governmental and
nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.
For further information on CMO, CME, and CAO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.
II-18 JP 3-05
CHAPTER III
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
The problem is to grasp, in innumerable special cases, the actual situation which
is covered by the mist of uncertainty, to appraise the facts correctly and to guess
the unknown elements, to reach a decision quickly and then to carry it out
forcefully and relentlessly.
Field Marshal Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke (The Elder), 1800-1891
1. Introduction
b. Unity of Command. Unity of command means all forces operate under a single
commander with the authority to direct and employ all forces in pursuit of a common
purpose. No two commanders may exercise the same command relationship over the same
force at any one time. While CDRUSSOCOM maintains COCOM of all SOF and TSOCs,
GCCs normally are given OPCON of the TSOCs in their theaters. Unity of command within
a chain of command for SOF is sometimes complex because of the diverse SOF component
capabilities, missions, and the small-size of numerous operational elements across large
operational areas. These elements can operate with numerous concurrent support
relationships with a JFCs Service components, and simultaneously work with HN forces
and among indigenous populations. The guiding principle is to place all SOF in an
operational area or tasked with a specific mission or operation under a single SOF
commander with the authority to coordinate special operations among all supporting and
supported units. Unless otherwise directed by the President or SecDef, GCCs command
special operations activities or missions in their area of responsibility (AOR). GCCs
generally command SOF through the CDRTSOC.
c. Unity of Effort and Unified Action. Unity of effort is the coordination and
cooperation toward common objectives, as a result of unified action, even if the participants
are not necessarily part of the same command or organization. Unified action is the
synchronized, coordinated, and integrated activities of government and nongovernment
entities with those of the military to achieve common objectives. Through unified action,
SOF are often employed as part of a whole-of-government effortoperating with other joint
forces, various interagency partnersand multinational partners, IGOs, NGOs, and HN
forces and organizations. This requires SOF commanders to ensure special operations are
coordinated and synchronized with other efforts. Unity of effort enables unity of command.
III-1
Chapter III
d. Global SOF Network. All SOF, whether in home station or deployed in support of
the GCCs, are part of the global SOF network. Networking allows SOF to exchange
information and intelligence and collaborate globally, which is essential to counter
transnational and transregional terrorists and other enemies and adversaries. The global SOF
network includes nodes and other liaison elements to coordinate and synchronize special
operations. The key organization in each GCCs AOR is the TSOC.
e. C2. SOF commanders may utilize the principles of mission command to execute C2.
Mission command emphasizes decentralized C2 to the tactical level. Mission command
enables military operations through decentralized execution based on mission-type orders.
Mission-type orders empower subordinate leaders to exercise judgment, disciplined
initiative, and independence when they carry out their tasks. SOF generally operate in small
units distributed across the operational area. This requires bottom-up tactical-level
planning and decentralized execution, framed by higher HQs strategic and operational
guidance, and a robust communications architecture.
(1) Provide a clear chain of command to create unity of command with the
authority to accomplish assigned tasks.
(3) Provide supported commands SOF staff with sufficient experience and
expertise to plan, conduct, and support operations.
(4) Integrate SOF with CF, multinational, and HN forces early in the planning
process.
(7) Ensure that requisite liaisons are in place and they know their roles,
responsibilities, and authorities.
III-2 JP 3-05
Command and Control of Special Operations Forces
(1) SOF begin planning by developing targeting and mission options based on the
JFCs guidance and intent. Timely articulation of how SOF can help achieve the JFCs
objectives and intent leads to effective utilization of SOF and optimizes integration with
the CF.
(2) Specific targets or mission assignments for SOF should always contribute to
the strategic and operational objectives within the lines of operation and lines of effort
being executed by the JFC. Limited resources and extensive planning require a
commander to selectively employ SOF for high-priority operations. Further, the
sensitivity of many SOF missions may dictate that the President and/or SecDef place
specific operational limitations upon the supported and supporting forces.
(3) SOF missions are complete packages that include infiltration, resupply,
potential emergency resupply, fire and maneuver support, and exfiltration must be
thoroughly planned before committing the force. The nature of the target, enemy and
friendly situation, and environmental characteristics of the operational area are key
planning factors. They will dictate the size, composition, and capabilities of the mission
force, the nature of the tactics, techniques, and procedures used, and the methods of
infiltration and exfiltration, period of force exposure, logistic requirements, and size and
composition of the command and support structure.
(b) Reliable intelligence is required for the detailed targeting and mission
planning by SOF. Intelligence is vital to successful mission execution and to the survival
of deployed operational elements. Based on assigned strategic theater objectives and
operational direction provided by the supported JFC, the CDRTSOC or CDRJSOTF
provides mission guidance to the subordinate SOF commanders, providing them with the
basis for the development of comprehensive concept of operations and mission plans that
allow for the flexible yet focused execution required by SOF.
(4) Special operations can rarely be repeated after first attempt since special
operations targets normally are perishable. Therefore, thorough mission planning and,
whenever possible, mission rehearsals are typically essential to success. Commanders
should anticipate such preparation time.
III-3
Chapter III
a. As established in Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 162, and discussed in
JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, all forces shall be assigned or
attached to and under command of a CCDR, except as otherwise directed by SecDef. A
force may be transferred from the CCDR to whom it is assigned and temporarily attached
to another CCDR by authority of SecDef. SOF units based in the US are generally
assigned to and under COCOM of CDRUSSOCOM, with OPCON exercised through the
USSOCOM Service component commands.
b. A SOJTF is composed of four elements: the HQ, SOF units, support forces, and
Service-provided capabilities. The HQ element provides the C2 of all SOF in the SOJTF.
It may augment existing capability, or provide the full theater capability, as required.
The second element is the SOF units, which may include air, ground, maritime, and
special designated SOF capabilities. The third element includes the SOF organic combat
support and combat service support capabilities, which may include, but are not limited
to, aviation support, fires support, intelligence, logistics, and communications. Since
SOF are limited in size and capability, the fourth element consists of Service-provided
capabilities augmented from CF. The SOJTF scalability also allows expanding into a
MNF as required (see Figure III-1).
III-4 JP 3-05
Command and Control of Special Operations Forces
Special Operation
Tailorable
a. TSOC. The TSOC is the primary theater SOF organization to plan and control
special operations and other SOF activities. The TSOC plans and conducts operations in
support of the GCC. The GCC normally exercises OPCON of attached SOF through the
CDRTSOC, who may exercise OPCON of subordinate forces directly from the TSOC
location, or through a smaller special operations command-forward (SOC-FWD), located
elsewhere in the theater of operations. A SOC-FWD is normally smaller than a TSOC, and a
tailored, operational-level HQ that provides a forward-deployed, persistent presence, and C2
capability (see Figure III-2). If conditions warrant more robust SOF presence and
engagement, a SOC-FWD can transition to a JSOTF. The SOC-FWD develops a close
working relationship with the associated country team, HN forces, and any MNFs or IGOs
within the HN, and helps the CDRTSOC in the role of JFC/CDRJSOTF, and as the senior
theater special operations advisor to the GCC. For military engagement, security
cooperation, and deterrence operations, forward-based and distributed nodes under the
OPCON of the CDRTSOC provide C2 for SOF.
III-5
Chapter III
SOCFWD Command
Group POLAD
SOCFWD
SEA (E-9) Deputy
SOCFWD
Aide-de-Camp Executive
Officer
JSOTF
Chief of Staff
JSOAC
Public affairs
Chaplain
Surgeon
Headquarters commandant
Staff judge advocate
Protocol
Special operations liaison officer
Legend
J-1 manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff JFSOCCE joint special operations command and
J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff control element
J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff JSOAC joint special operations air component
J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff JSOTF joint special operations task force
J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff POLAD political advisor (Department of State)
J-6 communications system directorate of a joint staff SEA senior enlisted advisor
J-8 force structure, resource, and assessment SOCFWD special operations commandforward
directorate of a joint staff
III-6 JP 3-05
Command and Control of Special Operations Forces
(2) Theater Special Operations Advisor. The CDRTSOC advises the GCC,
Service component commanders, and others on the employment of SOF. CDRTSOC may
develop specific recommendations for the use of SOF in theater. The GCC may designate
CDRTSOC as a staff officer on the CCMD staff, in addition to duties as CDRTSOC, and
designate the TSOC a special operations directorate of the CCMD in addition to being a
subordinate unified command. While this places additional staff responsibilities on the
TSOC, it facilitates special operations staff actions within the CCMD by providing the GCC
and staff one source for special operations expertise and eliminates special operations
division within a CCMD directorate.
III-7
Chapter III
Geographic Combatant
Commander
Theater
Army Air Force Navy Marine Corps Functional Special
Component Component Component Component Components* Operations
Command Command Command Command Command**
Commander,
Joint Task Force
(if designated)
Legend
AFFOR Air Force forces JFSOCC joint special operations component
ARFOR Army forces commander
CDRTSOC commander, theater special operations JMISTF joint military information support task force
component JSOTF joint special operations task force
CJTF commander, joint task force MARFOR Marine Corps forces
GCC geographic combatant commander NAVFOR Navy forces
JCMOTF joint civil-military operations task force
JFACC joint force air component commander combatant command (command authority)
JFC joint force commander
JFLCC joint force land component commander operational control
JFMCC joint force maritime component commander as designated
existing SOF Service component with augmentation from other SOF or CF. As directed by
the President or SecDef, a JSOTF may also be established and deployed from outside the
theater into the AOR in coordination with that GCC.
(3) JSOAC. The JSOAC is the SOF functional air component. A CDRTSOC,
JFSOCC, or CDRJSOTF may designate a joint special operations air component
commander (JSOACC) to plan and execute joint special operations air activities, and
III-8 JP 3-05
Command and Control of Special Operations Forces
coordinate conventional air support for SOF with the joint force air component commander
(JFACC), if designated. The JSOACC will normally be the commander with the
preponderance of SOF air assets or the best capacity to plan, coordinate, allocate, task,
control, and support the assigned and supporting air assets, which can include Army SOA,
AFSOF, and other air assets. SOF commanders may place selected SOA assets under CF
control. A JSOACC may support multiple JSOTFs in one or more operational areas in a
theater of operations. A JSOAC may be a standing organization, or formed in response to
a crisis, or for a major operation or campaign. Normally, the only SOF functional
component under a CDRTSOC, JFSOCC, or CDRJSOTF is a JSOAC. The other
components are Service components. Figure III-4 depicts notional JSOAC and its assets.
(1) ARSOF. ARSOF frequently form the core of a JSOTF with the commander
and staff of an SF group/Ranger regiment. An Army component of a JSOTF may be
designated as an SOTF and can consist of one or more of the following forces: SF, Rangers,
Joint
Special Operations
Air Component
Forces that might include: Forces that might include: Forces that might include:
Army special Air Force special Navy aviation units
operations aviation operations aviation supporting special
units units operations forces
Special tactics Forces made available
Foreign internal
defense units
III-9
Chapter III
MISO, CA, and Army SOA forces supported by the ARSOF sustainment brigade. A SOTF
is normally established with an SF battalion or Ranger regimental commander and staff and
their respective units. The SOTF normally has MIS and CA forces attached even if there is a
separate JMISTF or joint civilian-military operations task force.
(a) SF. SF units are task-organized as SF groups and battalions, both of which
have organic HQ and support elements. When deployed, an SF group or battalion may be
designated a SOTF.
(b) Rangers. A Ranger force can work unilaterally under a JSOTF. The
Ranger regimental HQ may serve as a SOTF HQ when augmented with liaison officers
(LNOs) and additional staff personnel from other conventional and SOF units. This
augmentation may include MIS, CA, aviation, communication, and logistic units or other
functions. Ranger-led SOTFs are normally the Army special operations component of a
JSOTF. Rangers can also serve as the Army component of a JTF. If the Ranger regiment
and other ARSOF or SOF HQ are under the same JSOTF commander, the JSOTF
commander normally forms two or more SOTFs.
(c) SOA. SOA are organic ARSOF assets with OPCON normally exercised
by the CDRJSOTF through either the Army Service component commander or JSOACC.
When a JSOACC is established as a functional component commander by the
CDRTSOC/JFSOCC/CDRJSOTF, the Army SOA may be under OPCON of
the JSOACC.
(a) Naval Special Warfare Task Force (NSWTF). For a major operation or
campaign, the NAVSOF component of a JSOTF is normally referred to as a NSWTF. An
NSWTF has one or more subordinate naval special warfare task groups (NSWTGs). NSW
units may be designated a SOTF and assigned a specific area in the JSOA.
(c) Some NSW units may be tasked to support and be placed under the
command of a US Navy CF commander rather than a joint SOF commander. When
NAVSOF conduct operations with a US Navy strike group, a NSW LNO will be assigned
to the strike group staff. Whenever possible, the NSWTG or NSWTU commander should
be embarked in the same ship or submarine hosting the assault force. A NSWTG or
NSWTU based on a submarine or ship may be TACON to the afloat unit commander.
(3) AFSOF. The Air Force special operations air component (AFSOAC) is
normally composed of elements of a special operations wing, special operations group, or
squadron, and Air Force special tactics personnel. A JSOACC, if designated by the
JFSOCC or CDRJSOTF, is typically the commander, AFSOAC (COMAFSOAC). When
III-10 JP 3-05
Command and Control of Special Operations Forces
subordinate AFSOF units deploy to forward operations bases or advanced operations bases,
the COMFSOAC may establish one or more provisional units:
(a) MSOR. MARSOC has one MSOR. The regiment maintains three
Marine special operations battalions and deploys task-organized scalable expeditionary
MARSOF worldwide. MSOR organizes, trains, equips, and deploys SOF in support of
USSOCOM or a GCC.
(c) Marine Special Operations Support Group. This unit provides specified
support to special operations missions as directed by the MARSOC.
d. JSOA
(1) The JFC may establish a JSOA, which is an area of land, sea, and airspace
assigned to the CDRJSOTF to conduct special operations activities. JSOAs normally help
coordinate and deconflict SOF and CF missions, which can reduce the risks of friendly fire
incidents. JSOAs are typically within the land and maritime component commanders areas
of operation and may be limited by time or until special operations activities are completed.
SOF often conduct operations prior to the arrival of CF. Coordination is vital in the
transition from SOF AFO to follow-on operations by CF to maintain the timing and tempo of
the operation. JSOAs are normally established within the operational areas of the CF for a
specific time or until special operations activities are completed.
(2) The SOF commander may further assign subordinated commanders specific
areas or sectors within the JSOA for mission execution. The scope and duration of the SOF
mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the
number, composition, and sequencing of SOF deployed into a JSOA. It may be limited in
III-11
Chapter III
5. Command and Control of Special Operations Forces across the Range of Military
Operations
The tailored C2 support of GCC plans starts with a SOC-FWD capability resident
within the TSOC, or provided through attached forces. The C2 process is scalable based
on the size of the force and tailored to the situation (such as integrated with CF,
multinational, or intergovernmental partners) (see Figure III-5). TSOCs may choose to
establish intermediate and/or distributed command elements from the TSOC, normally as a
SOC-FWD element. The TSOC has multiple options for tasking and deploying C2
elements in order to match SOF capabilities and meet GCC requirements. Examples of
forward-deployed SOF elements include the SOC-FWD, SOTF, JSOTF, and SOJTFeach
C2 element is designed to meet unique operational requirements. As an operation matures,
the SOC-FWD can expand to multiple SOTFs, or a SOC-FWD can form the nucleus of a
JSOTF or SOJTF. The various SOF C2 elements can provide timely information, halt or
delay the development of hostilities, and provide time for the JFC to prepare and deploy a
larger CF/SOF integrated response.
III-12 JP 3-05
Command and Control of Special Operations Forces
SOCCE
SOFLE
SOF LNO
GCC JTF SOLE
Legend
ARSOF Army special operations forces SOCCE special operations command and control
GCC geographic combatant commander element
JSOAC joint special operations air component SOF special operations forces
JSOTF joint special operations task force SOFLE special operations forces liaison element
JTF joint task force SOLE special operations liaison element
LNO liaison officer SOTF special operations task force
MARSOF Marine Corps special operations forces TF task force
NAVSOF Navy special operations forces TSOC theater special operations command
SOCFWD special operations commandforward
COM or US ambassador. The senior DOD representative within the country team is the
senior defense official (SDO) or defense attach (DATT) who is responsible for partner
nation military engagements and DOD security actions. SOF elements are deployed within
chosen countries and coordinate with US country teams through the DATT office or
designated DOD office. Although SOF elements under the OPCON of the CDRTSOC, the
supporting SOF element has coordination responsibilities with the country team. The scale
III-13
Chapter III
(1) The CDRTSOC plays a critical role during regional crisis response operations
Geographic
Combatant Commander
Commander,
Theater Special Operations
Command
Commander,
Special Operations
CommandForward
Special Special
Operations Operations
Forces Aviation
III-14 JP 3-05
Command and Control of Special Operations Forces
supporting the GCC, both as the special operations advisor and as the SOF component
commander. The CDRTSOC has SOF elements in theater for supporting contingencies. If the
SOF supporting element is deployed from the US, the CDRTSOC normally maintains the role as
the supported SOF commander with OPCON over all SOF. Normally, the TSOC will initially
deploy a small C2 element forward to allow time for larger C2 options dependent upon force
apportionment. In larger contingencies, the CDRTSOC may deploy forward as the JFSOCC or
designate a JFSOCC to a JTF, who is normally selected from the largest provider of forces.
(2) The CDRTSOC has multiple rapid C2 options including: establishing a SOC-
FWD element, designating a SOTF from the deploying force, or (based on the scope of
response) establishing a JSOTF, CJSOTF, or SOJTF. The general premise for this
methodology is to make available the appropriate C2 functions to meet the demands from the
supporting force. The goal is to establish the appropriate C2 architecture for the responding
force (including coalition partners) to support intergovernmental priorities, and to
synchronize operations and support (see Figure III-7). Dependent upon the operational
situation, the COM may be the USG lead in an affected HN.
Geographic
Combatant Commander
Commander,
Joint Task Force
Commander,
Theater Special Operations
Command/
Joint Force Special Operations
Component Commander
Joint Joint
Special Operations Special Operations
Task Force Task Force
III-15
Chapter III
c. Major Operations and Campaigns. Major operations and campaigns are inherently
joint that require robust C2 architectures. The buildup of forces can progress from a battalion
size force during crisis response or limited contingency operations to a corps-level force during
major operations or a campaign. Prior established SOF contingency C2 elements may
facilitate the buildup of supporting joint forces. An evolution of force buildup will influence
established SOF C2 structures resulting in a possible operational handover to, and potential
integration with, an incoming JTF. As major operations and campaigns develop, modifying
the SOF C2 organization(s) to better enable interdependence and synchronization with the
larger US and MNFs is critical to success.
For more information on the, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-16, Multinational
Operations.
(1) In major operations or campaigns, the GCC will normally establish a JTF
commanded by a JFC. If designated by the GCC, the JFC can be a SOF commander. If the
JFC is not a SOF commander, the GCC can task the CDRTSOC to provide a SOF
commander (i.e., JFSOCC, CDRJSOTF) to exercise C2 over assigned and attached US and
multinational SOF. The CDRTSOC has several scalable options to consider when
supporting the JTF.
(a) The CDRTSOC will consider the SOF requirements and capacity to
determine the appropriate SOF C2 architecture.
(b) The CDRTSOC will consider the amount of MNFs supporting the JTF and
whether apportionments of the MNFs are SOF, special police units, or partnered conventional
units supported by or advised by US SOF. C2 functions provided by SOF include scalable
levels of C2, coordination elements, and liaison elements.
(d) Scalable means the C2 is designed by size (i.e., company, battalion, brigade
equivalent levels) determined from analysis of the SOF functional requirements, size of the
SOF elements, complexity of the special operations, volume of multinational special
operations forces, and responsibilities of the force.
(2) If the SOF elements do not require a separate C2 structure, then liaison elements
are established to ensure that SOF ground and air operations are effectively coordinated,
synchronized, and deconflicted with the JTF. Normally, SOF liaison cells are functionally
designed, and the size depends on the scope of operations. Two examples of SOF liaison
elements are a special operations command and control element (SOCCE) and a special
operations liaison element (SOLE). A SOCCE supports the JTF to synchronize operations
between SOF and CF. A SOLE is designated by the SOF commander to the JFACC or
conventional air commander to coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict SOF and conventional
air operations. The benefits of liaisons to the joint force are communications, operations, and
intelligence connectivity between SOF and CF.
III-16 JP 3-05
Command and Control of Special Operations Forces
(4) SOF has inherent capability for contingency or crisis response operations.
Initially, the TSOC may provide organic C2 for the special operation or activity required in
theater. When the GCC designates a JTF to assume mission requirements, the TSOC may
send SOF liaison element representation to the JTF to coordinate special operations in the
region or maintain C2 of special operations from the TSOC. These decisions are determined
as the CDRTSOC evaluates the CF/SOF interdependence and integration requirements with
the incoming JTF (see Figure III-8).
d. SOF under control of a non-US command. When directed by the President or SecDef
through the CJCS, GCCs may place SOF units under the TACON of a non-US MNF
commander. In such instances, OPCON of US SOF units will be retained by an appropriate
CCDR, and the CCDR will normally delegate and exercise OPCON through a US SOF
commander within the multinational command structure.
Geographic Coordination
Combatant Commander
Theater
Commander,
Special Operations
Joint Task Force
Command
Figure III-8. Notional Organizational Structure for Major Operations and Campaigns
III-17
Chapter III
(1) SOCCE. The SOCCE is the focal point for SOF-CF coordination, and the
synchronization of special operations activities with other joint operations. The SOCCE is
normally employed when SOF conducts operations in support of a CF. It performs C2 or
liaison functions according to mission requirements and as directed by the establishing
SOF commander (JFSOCC, SOJTF, or CDRJSOTF). Its level of authority and
responsibility is defined in the order establishing the SOCCE and may vary. It collocates
with the command center/post of the supported force to coordinate planning, synchronize,
and deconflict special operations with the operations of the supported force, and it
facilitates communications interoperability. For example, a SOCCE may locate with the
JFC in the joint operations center (JOC) and another with the joint force land component
commander. The SOCCE can receive SOF operational, intelligence, and target acquisition
reports directly from deployed SOF elements and provide them to the supported
component HQ. The JFSOCC, CDRJSOTF, or JSOTF component commanders may attach
liaison teams from other SOF elements to the SOCCE. The SOCCE remains under the
OPCON of the establishing SOF commander. The SOCCE performs the following
functions:
(f) Assists the supported CF commander and staff in planning and executing
linkup with SOF.
III-18 JP 3-05
Command and Control of Special Operations Forces
International
Combined Joint Combined Joint
Security
Special Operations Special Operations Special Mission
Assistance Force
Task Force Air Component Units
Special Operations
Afghanistan Afghanistan
Forces
NATO
Special Operations
Task Force
(X 14)
NOTE:
The special operations joint task force utilized in Afghanistan, 2012, commonly referred to as Special Operations
Joint Task ForceAfghanistan, was modular and scalable combined and joint special operations force
organization that allowed the United States Special Operations Command to more efficiently provide predictable,
trained, ready, and enabled special operations forces.
III-19
Chapter III
Various Sources
(3) SOF LNOs. SOF LNOs report to their SOF commander or SOF Service
component commander. They are dispatched to JTF components to convey information
which enables mission execution and reduces the risk of friendly fire, minimizes duplication
of effort or disrupts ongoing operations, and prevents the loss of intelligence sources. SOF
LNOs may help coordinate fire support, overflight clearances, aerial refueling, targeting,
military deception (MILDEC), MISO, CAO, and other activities based on requirements.
These liaison efforts help the JFCs integrate CF and SOF to efficiently use limited resources
and assets.
(1) Special Operations Liaison Officer (SOLO). The SOLO is a SOF officer
with language, cultural, military, and civilian training in addition to SOF staff experience.
SOLOs are assigned to a HNs national SOF HQ as part of a recurring and permanent US
SOF presence in select HNs. Operating under COM authority, a SOLO is the
CDRUSSOCOMs direct representative and the primary SOF advisor to the SDO/DATT,
country team, and to HN SOF leadership. SOLOs focus on developing and maintaining the
HN SOF command and its institutional relationships with HN government ministries (e.g.,
the ministry of defense, ministry of finance, ministry of the interior), and their leadership.
SOLOs monitor all SOF activities inside the HN and coordinate in-country, theater, and
global SOF activities in support of COM/country team, CDRTSOC, GCC, and US/HN
III-20 JP 3-05
Command and Control of Special Operations Forces
Strategy Division
Coordinates and synchronizes special operations strategy and targets with other
components to meet combatant commander objectives and guidance.
Nominates SOF targets for inclusion in the joint integrated prioritized target list.
Provides SOF input for JFC apportionment recommendation decisions.
Combat Plans Division
Coordinates SOF air requirements within the master air attack plan.
Coordinates with JSOTF/JSOAC on ATO inputs and ensures distributed ATOs are merged
with the master ATO.
Provides special operations input for inclusion in SPINS.
Coordinates airspace requirements and deconfliction for future operations.
Represents the special operations components on the targeting effects team in the JAOC.
Combat Operations Division
Monitors and coordinates current day flying operations with other components.
Deconflicts ongoing special operations surface operations in real time with other
components.
Maintains updated list of team locations for deconfliction.
Coordinates support for and prosecution of SOF-monitored targets to include time-
sensitive targets.
Coordinates airspace management with JAOC airspace manager.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division
Coordinates ISR requirements for SOF in the field.
Provides intelligence support for combat plans and operations division.
Other Coordination
Coordinates requirements for airfield surveys supporting force basing (AMD).
Coordinates JTAC support for SOF when required.
Coordinates logistic requirements including supply, transportation, and contracting (AMD).
Coordinates communications requirements, as necessary, for SOF in the field
(communications representative).
Coordinates with JPRC.
Legend
AMD air mobility division JSOAC joint special operations air component
ATO air tasking order JSOTF joint special operations task force
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance JTAC joint terminal attack controller
JAOC joint air operations center SOF special operations forces
JFACC joint force air component commander SOLE special operations liaison element
JFC joint force commander SPINS special instructions
JPRC joint personnel recovery center
special operations command equities at the strategic level. SOLOs are under
CDRUSSOCOM COCOM and under OPCON of the CDRTSOCs unless otherwise directed.
SOLO are normally assigned to duty at the US embassy when the HN does not have
a SOF HQ.
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Chapter III
c. USSOCOM Elements in the NCR. The USSOCOM elements in the NCR are an
extension of HQ USSOCOM and serve as the focal point for coordinating and
collaborating special operations issues with interagency partners, PNs, and other
multinational or private sector entities represented in the NCR. USSOCOM elements in
the NCR facilitate interagency coordination between SOF and other interagency partners,
and are a major element in the global SOF network that enables interagency coordination
overseas. Special operations support teams (SOSTs) are cornerstones of the USSOCOM
NCR elements.
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Command and Control of Special Operations Forces
(3) USSOCOM elements in the NCR facilitate aligning the activities of SOF
with USG functional lines of effort. USSOCOM elements in the NCR are a major
element in part of the global SOF network that strengthens the relationships of SOF with
USG departments and agencies and other organizations.
(1) Global Awareness: Track global SOF inventory and demand; integrate
information on operations, plans, and threats; conduct critical event notifications;
improve SOF situational awareness.
a. SOF and CF often share the same operational areas for extended periods when
they are mutually reliant on each others capabilities. Early and detailed coordination
between SOF and CF enables unity of effort. SOF-CF synchronization facilitates unity
of effort; maximizes the capability of the joint force; and allows the JFC to optimize the
principles of joint operations in planning and execution.
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For further information on CF-SOF integration and interoperability, refer to Army Tactical
Publication 6-03.05/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-36.1/Navy Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures 3-05.19/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
3-2.73/USSOCOM Publication 3-33, v.3, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Synchronization.
8. Interorganizational Coordination
a. For unified action where the JFC may not control all elements, he seeks cooperation
and builds consensus to achieve unity of effort through interagency coordination for a whole-
of-government approach, and interorganizational coordination for a comprehensive
approach. Interorganizational coordination is integral to special operations from a local
through a global context. US SOF commanders should routinely foster personal
relationships with other leaders, and establish professional relationships with foreign military
staffs during military engagement and security cooperation activities. Those relationships
III-24 JP 3-05
Command and Control of Special Operations Forces
over time can build mutual trust and confidence that enable more effective
interorganizational coordination when there is a need for unified action. Through their
robust liaison structure, SOF establish the same type of relationships with certain interagency
partners and also enables more effective interagency coordination.
SOF operate with MNFs on a routine and recurring basis. US SOF assesses, trains,
advises, assists, equips (when applicable), and operates with numerous HN forces in joint
combine exchange training and other security cooperation activities, and SOF participate in
exercises or operations with them collectively as MNFs.
a. GCCs, in coordination with DOS and other interagency partners, typically assign
SOF to train and operate with MNFs. SOF tasked to train or operate with MNF partners will
often need to coordinate with PNs national and theater level leaders.
c. SOF may liaise with and advise units of a MNF, and provide those units primary
communications with their operational HQ. Under these conditions, SOF require significant
additional communications equipment.
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III-26 JP 3-05
CHAPTER IV
SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
Guerrilla war is a kind of war waged by the few but dependent on the support of
the many.
Sir Basil Liddell Hart
Foreword to Mao Tse-Tung,
Guerrilla Warfare (1961)
1. Introduction
Support for SOF is tailored to the situation and mission with flexibility to withstand
dynamic operational environments. Support arrangements often cross Service lines to
utilize unique capabilities and sustain independent and low-visibility operations in austere
and remote areas. SOF must be able to exploit information derived from the full range of
intelligence (i.e., multinational, national, theater, and tactical), and often directly from
ISR systems.
2. Intelligence Support
IV-1
Chapter IV
(F3EAD) analysis. F3EAD includes identifying the adversarys essential functions and
resources local customs and lifestyle, and positive identification of key adversaries. All-
source analysis also examines civil information, such as cultural characteristics, grievances
and issues, the condition of facilities and institutions, and opportunities to influence relevant
populations, especially for MISO, UW, FID, stability operations, COIN, and CA missions.
IV-2 JP 3-05
Support Considerations for Special Operations Forces
associations between people, places, and things; synchronizing this information and products
with that of the intelligence disciplines ensures that the specific threat and operational
environment are more fully understood. The effectiveness of WTI is amplified through
robust information sharing throughout DOD, interagency and PNs.
(6) Reachback
(a) Small footprint operations limit the amount and types of forward-located
intelligence support provided. As such, SOF typically require a value-added reachback
effort. Discrete reachback capabilities allow forward-located SOF teams to leverage theater,
national and Service assets outside the operational area for classified and open source
studies, data, and actionable intelligence. Sufficient communications bandwidth and
connectivity are essential to reachback support.
(7) Force Protection. Small footprint operations are often conducted in hostile or
uncertain environments. CI and military source operations (MSO) can help mitigate risks for
small SOF teams conducting these operations.
(a) CI. CI activities are conducted to detect, identify, assess, exploit, and
counter or neutralize the threat posed by foreign intelligence entities, or by individuals
engaged in espionage, sabotage, or terrorism. CI identifies vulnerabilities and assesses
hostile forces capabilities to target military operations. CI activities may also provide formal
liaison with HN, intelligence, law enforcement, and security activities to assist operations
and provide force protection support to joint forces.
(b) MSO. MSO are the collection, from, by, and/or via humans, of foreign
and military and military-related intelligence. HUMINT sources serve as eyes and ears
to track adversary activity. Sources include walk-ins, developed sources, unwitting
persons, and protected sources. HUMINT collection personnel may develop information
through the elicitation of sources. Establishing a reliable source network is an effective
collection method.
(8) PE. PE is an umbrella term for activities conducted by selectivity trained SOF
to prepare the operational environment for potential special operations. PE consists of OPE
and special operations AFO. PE is supported by intelligence operations. Intelligence
typically builds on the information provided by OPE and special operations AFO. The
information provided by these operations can enhance joint intelligence preparation of the
operational environment to support subsequent military operations.
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Chapter IV
(b) Special Operations AFO. Special operations AFO refine the location of
specific, identified targets and further develop the operational environment for near-term DA.
Special operations AFO encompass many OPE activities, including but not limited to close-
target reconnaissance; TTL; RSOI; infrastructure development; and terminal guidance. Special
operations AFO also include DA in situations when failure to act will mean loss of fleeting
opportunity for success, unless otherwise directed.
(a) Intelligence Sharing. Intelligence sharing with PNs enables joint and
multinational operations and helps maintain good relationships. Information about sources and
methods to obtain sensitive intelligence should not be shared with allies and resistance forces
unless authorized by the appropriate agency.
IV-4 JP 3-05
Support Considerations for Special Operations Forces
For further information on intelligence support, refer to JP 2-01, Joint and National
Intelligence Support to Military Operations, and JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of
the Operational Environment.
For more information regarding operational contract support, see JP 4-10, Operational
Contract Support.
4. Logistic Support
GCCs and their Service component commanders, in coordination with the CDRTSOC,
develop and provide support to assigned and attached SOF. The CDRTSOC, the JFSOCC or
CDRJSOTF when a JTF is established, approves logistic requirements for SOF in theater for
validation by the GCC. SOF logistic requirements should be identified during the planning
process. For limited contingency and crisis response operations that require rapid or time-
sensitive responses, USSOCOM component commands normally maintain the capability to
support SOF elements for an initial period of 15 days. Service and/or supporting
organizations should be prepared to support special operations as soon as possible but not
later than 15 days after SOF are employed. Logistic support for SOF units can be provided
through one or more of the following:
a. Service Support. Logistic support of SOF units is the responsibility of their parent
Service, except where otherwise agreed or directed. Services support SOF units whether the
SOF unit is assigned to the Service component, the TSOC, JFSOCC, or a JSOTF. SOF
Service-common logistic support includes equipment, material, and supplies. These include
standard military items, base operating support, and the supplies and services provided by a
Service to support and sustain its own forces, including those forces assigned to the CCMDs.
Items and services defined as Service-common by one Service are not necessarily Service-
common for all other Services.
b. Joint In-Theater Support. The majority of SOF missions require theater joint
logistic planning and execution. When a theater Service component cannot satisfy its
Service SOF support requirements, the GCC will determine if another Service component
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Chapter IV
(1) Austere SOF Support Structure. SOF health support has a limited number
of medical personnel with enhanced medical skills, to include emergency treatment,
preventive medicine, and limited veterinary and dental care. SOF medical personnel can
plan and conduct specialized medical support and patient movement. Not all SOF missions
require SOF-trained medical assets. SOF medical assets are limited and may require
support from CF. SOF units have varying degrees of first responder (Role 1) capabilities
and limited forward resuscitative (Role 2) capabilities. SOF does not have organic theater
hospitalization (Role 3) or definitive care (Role 4) capabilities readily available and must
rely on either available theater health services assets or local HN capabilities when access
to theater hospitalization (Role 3) care is an urgent necessity.
IV-6 JP 3-05
Support Considerations for Special Operations Forces
For further information on SOF logistic support, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.
5. Host-Nation Support
HNS is that civil and military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its
territory based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. For special operations,
HNS may be restricted by OPSEC considerations, mission requirements and duration, and
the operational environment.
a. HNS can reduce the military logistic footprint and allow earlier deployment combat
capabilities. Long-term HNS logistic support can free service logistic capabilities for other
contingencies.
(1) Authority to negotiate must be obtained through the supported JFC (to include
the supported GCC) and through the appropriate COM channels.
(3) Interpreter support for negotiations should be obtained through local nationals.
(4) A legal advisor, preferably experienced in HNS, should help negotiate and
review HNS agreements.
(5) The lead USG department or agency negotiates and contracts HNS.
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Chapter IV
(7) HN logistic support must include movement, distribution, and security of HNS
items appropriate to the operational environment.
For additional information regarding HNS, see JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. Refer to DODD
2010.9, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements, for policy for the acquisition from and
transfer to authorized foreign governments of logistics support, supplies, and services.
6. Multinational Support
IV-8 JP 3-05
Support Considerations for Special Operations Forces
b. SOF commanders may use CA to leverage the resources and expertise of IGOs,
NGOs, HN organizations, and USG departments and agencies to support the SOF
commanders CMO efforts.
8. Service-Provided Capabilities
When SOF organizations lack mission-essential capabilities, SOF will identify and
request CF support through joint planning and force management processes. CF can be asked
to provide conventional airlift support, ground security and air defense assets, especially at
remote sites; horizontal and vertical engineer assets; medical and veterinary assets for
medical or agricultural projects; combat service support assets; criminal investigation and
legal services; Service-common equipment and associated maintenance assets; expertise in
conventional force specialties for training missions (e.g., indirect fire assets above 81
millimeter; cultural engagement teams; civil government functions, civil infrastructure
development, economic development). SOF pre-deployment planning for Service-provided
capabilities will ensure training to reduce SOF and CF redundancies or gaps.
(1) Use systems which leverage national systems and services to the maximum
extent possible.
b. The DOD communications systems architecture allows operators at all levels access
to a worldwide communications backbone and seamless information transfer through a
robust, global infrastructure known as part of the Department of Defense information
networks (DODIN). The DODIN is the globally interconnected, end-to-end set of
information capabilities, and associated processes for collecting, processing, storing,
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Chapter IV
c. All acquired and fielded information technology solutions (i.e., networks, radios,
applications) are tailored to provide interoperable capabilities and value so their use does not
compromise the SOF operational unit. The information technology solutions must have the
flexibility to integrate not only with state-of-the-art technology and current organic systems,
but also with older communications infrastructure and equipment often found in less
developed nations.
b. PA Planning and the Special Operations Mission. PA will accurately reflect the
objective of SOF missions to US audiences. PA will also be aligned with MISO and CMO,
and with strategic, operational, and tactical OPSEC requirements. The GCC should develop
proposed PA guidance that is coordinated and synchronized with supporting commands and
other USG departments and agencies, as appropriate, prior to forwarding that guidance to the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) for approval.
a. Combat camera provides still and video documentary products that support MISO
and other special operations missions. Many combat camera teams supporting SOF are
uniquely equipped with night-vision and digital-image transmission capabilities. Combat
camera imagery is used to portray the true nature of US operations to multinational partners
and civilian populations, as well as adversaries, and to counter adversary disinformation.
The SOF link to combat camera support is normally through the supported GCCs visual
information planner.
IV-10 JP 3-05
Support Considerations for Special Operations Forces
Significant legal and policy considerations apply to many special operations activities.
Legitimacy is the most crucial factor in developing and maintaining internal and
international support. The US cannot sustain its assistance to a foreign power without this
legitimacy. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates foster legitimacy and credibility through
decisions and actions that comply with applicable US, international, and, in some cases, HN
laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their forces operate IAW the law of
war and the established rules of engagement (ROE). Each SOF commander has a servicing
staff judge advocate (SJA) to advise on these and other legal issues during all stages of the
planning and execution of special operations missions and are encouraged to seek legal
review. Nonetheless, the concept of legitimacy is broader than the strict adherence to law.
The concept also includes the moral and political legitimacy of a government or resistance
organization, as applicable.
For further information on legal support, refer to JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations.
13. Protection
b. Protection considerations include basic force security; active and passive air and
missile defense; OPSEC; defensive cyberspace operations cybersecurity; electronic
protection; PR; CBRN operations; explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations;
antiterrorism support; combat identification; survivability; safety; and force health
protection. SOF commanders must ensure special procedures for air and missile defense are
established when garrisoned outside of the JFCs operational area.
For more detailed information regarding protection, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations,
and JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater. For more detailed information regarding
cyberspace operations, see JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.
Special operations may require long-range, surface-based, joint fire support in remote
locations or for targets beyond the land, maritime, and amphibious force area of operations.
SOF liaison elements coordinate fire support through both external and SOF channels. SOF
liaison elements (e.g., SOCCE and SOLE) coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict SOF fire
IV-11
Chapter IV
For further information on fire support, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.
For further information on close air support, refer to JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support. For
more information on air mobility operations, see JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations. For
more information on air C2, see JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.
b. Seabasing support can be provided by conventional naval forces (carrier strike group,
amphibious ready group, surface strike group, missile defense surface action group, or
submarines) as well as Military Sealift Command ships and commercial vessels.
c. Seabasing of SOF provides the JFC with multiple options. Given the freedom of
navigation laws for surface ships and the stealth of submarines, seabased SOF are able to
operate throughout the oceans and along the littorals of the world with few restrictions
lower profile and less intrusive presence, no reliance on HNS, no diplomatic clearance,
minimal political risk, and often without detectionto enable persistent, unobtrusive,
mobile, SOF presence in locations where conflict is most likely and most consequential.
Seabasing provides SOF with access to the global, sustained, forward presence
of the US Navy.
d. Seabasing allows the force to position and maneuver, approach inside the horizon or
retreat over it, to reposition along a coastline, to move beyond the reach of sensors, or to
move to a different area as situations change. The inherent mobility increases options
compared to land-based assaults from a known point, improves operational security, and
IV-12 JP 3-05
Support Considerations for Special Operations Forces
mitigates an adversarys ability to evade US operations. Another key value that Navy or
other seabase platforms brings is persistent presence. Seabasing can offer this presence in
remote littoral areas where land bases are not available for reasons of diplomacy, geography,
or lack of supporting infrastructure. Even when land basing may be an option, sea-based
platforms reduce the land based footprint, may decrease strategic airlift requirements, and
improve force security.
f. Seabases can support patrol craft, auxiliary boats, helicopters, and SOF, providing a
base of operations for everything from counter-piracy/smuggling, maritime security, CT
operations, and major combat operations. Seabases can range from relatively small
platforms with limited ability to support a NSWTU to larger platforms that can support a
JSOTF HQ with robust combatant craft and helicopter support capabilities. Capabilities
provided by the seabase, which may consist of more than one vessel, are scaled to mission-
specific requirements based on mission type and duration, threat, operational security
considerations, and environmental conditions. During amphibious operations, the
commander, amphibious task force, and the commander, landing force, may also provide
amphibious support for the MARSOF and other SOF units.
g. When a surface ship or ships are assigned as the supporting force to SOF, it is
referred to as an afloat forward staging base (AFSB).
For more information on helicopter and tiltrotor aircraft employment from Navy ships, see
JP 3-04, Joint Shipboard Helicopter and Tiltrotor Aircraft Operations. For more information
on amphibious operations, see JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations. For more information on
seabasing, see Navy Warfare Publication 3-62M, Seabasing.
Space support to SOF is provided through national and DOD space capabilities in
coordination with the JFCs space coordinating authority, to include validation by the
supported CCDR. DOD space support is provided to CCDRs and subordinate JFCs through
the Joint Functional Component Command for Space under Commander, United States
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).
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Chapter IV
Cyberspace operations are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary
purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. Cyberspace operations in support
of special operations can sometimes be conducted remotely, thus reducing the SOF footprint
and contributing to freedom of action within a given operational area. The Services maintain
administrative control of their cyberspace forces, some of which provide direct, general, or
mutual support to SOF missions. SOF requires cyberspace support in the areas of planning,
coordination, synchronization, monitoring, and potentially access. Cyberspace operations
support is typically provided through respective CCMDs joint cyberspace center, which is
supported by US Cyber Command. JFSOCC/CDRJSOTF normally requests cyberspace
support when joint operation planning is initiated. Elements provided to SOF units may
require additional training or equipment to effectively and safely facilitate cyberspace
support during special operations. SOF communications systems must leverage national
cyberspace capabilities, systems and services to the maximum extent possible. SOF
cyberspace capabilities and systems must support C2 while simultaneously providing full
cyberspace situational awareness to the lowest tactical SOF element.
IV-14 JP 3-05
Support Considerations for Special Operations Forces
CA assess the civil environment; identify and engage with key authorities and other
influential civilians; build civil relationships; identify factors fostering instability; and
conduct CAO to achieve JFC objectives or build partnership capacity in support of strategic
goals. When the scope of the JFCs objectives exceeds the capacity of SOF CA, the SOF
commander may request CF to augment SOF CA capability.
a. While the majority of the Armys CA organizations are US Army Reserve, the entire
force consists of commands, brigades, battalions, and companies capable of supporting SOF
and CF at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
For more information on CA structure with the Services, see JP 3-57, Civil-Military
Operations.
CWMD USG activities are conducted to ensure the US, its Armed Forces, allies,
partners, and interests are neither coerced nor attacked with WMD. WMD are CBRN
weapons capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties, and exclude the
means of transporting or propelling the weapons when such means are separable from the
weapons. The threat posed by the proliferation of WMD technology to additional state
actors and the possibility of terrorist access to a nuclear device are recognized through a
range of capabilities and activities to detect, protect against, and respond to WMD use,
should preventive measures fail. The primary role of SOF for CWMD is preventing WMD
development, proliferation, and use. USSOCOM supports GCCs by delivering the following
capabilities: technical expertise, materiel, and special teams to complement the supported
GCCs whose teams locate, tag, and track WMD; capabilities to conduct DA in limited access
areas; support for building partners capacity for conducting CWMD activities; use of MISO
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Chapter IV
to dissuade adversary pursuit of and reliance on WMD; and other specialized capabilities as
required to counter WMD. CDRUSSOCOM is the global synchronizer for CT planning to
include operations against terrorist use of WMD and supports Commander, USSTRATCOM
as the global synchronizer for DOD CWMD planning.
For more detailed information on the SOF role in CWMD including capabilities and
limitations, see JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Field Manual 3-
05.105/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-11.30/Air Force Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures 3-2.35/USSOCOM Publication 3-11, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures for Special Operations Forces in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
Nuclear Environments.
SOF use Service multipurpose canines to support joint activities during military
operations. Multipurpose canines are military working dogs that are capable of locating
explosives or humans to provide early warning of potential hazards; facilitate capture of
armed enemies, and saves lives. Multipurpose canines can detect a wide range of munitions
and homemade explosives used to construct IEDs. Tactical use of multipurpose canines can
deprive the enemy of explosive caches and components, and disrupt the enemys ability to
attack mounted and dismounted patrols. Integration of SOF and conventional canine teams
in pre-mission training improves the capabilities of the handler/canine team. Lessons
learned show that canines can reduce casualties, increase freedom of movement, and instill
unit confidence to counter IED threats.
The JFC may provide SOF a counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) support
element. A C-IED support element is a tailored combination of specialized enablers.
These enablers include, but are not limited to, biometrics, forensics, EOD, WTI, site
exploitation, sociocultural analysis, network analysis (friendly, neutral, and threat
networks), cellular exploitation, DOMEX, and law enforcement professionals. These
enablers are internally task organized across multiple staff sections to assist in the
organization, coordination, integration, and assessments of C-IED enablers. The C-IED
support element may also have representative that participates in targeting and assessment
boards, cells, and working groups.
CTF activities are designed to deny, disrupt, destroy, or defeat the generation,
storage, movement, and/or use of assets to fund activities that support an adversarys
ability to negatively affect US interests. CTF support can assist SOF in the execution of
SOF core activities in many operations, to include CWMD, CT, UW, FID, SFA, MISO,
and CAO.
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Support Considerations for Special Operations Forces
EOD forces have become a critical enabler to special operation over the past decade.
Within the current and anticipated future global security environment, the proliferation of
commercially available technology has elevated the IED to the weapon system of choice
for IW adversaries to offset overwhelming US military superiority. Each Marine special
operations battalion has been assigned organic EOD operators within their command.
EOD personnel possess the capability to detect, locate, access, diagnose, render safe,
and/or neutralize, recover, exploit, and dispose of unexploded explosive ordnance,
IEDs, and WMD.
For more detailed information on the Services EOD capabilities see Army Tactical
Techniques, and Procedures 4-32.16/Marine Corps Reference Publication 3-17.2C/Navy
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-02.5/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
3-2.32, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal
in a Joint Environment.
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IV-18 JP 3-05
APPENDIX A
JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE
ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A JFC [joint force commander] has the authority to organize assigned or attached
forces with specification of OPCON [operational control] to best accomplish the
assigned mission based on his intent, the CONOPS [concept of operations], and
consideration of Service organizations.
1. General
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Appendix A
When the nucleus of a TSOC staff is used to establish a JSOTF, the CDRTSOC still
maintains responsibility for continued theater strategic-level activities in support of the
GCC. The JSOTF establishment may impact on the TSOCs other missions by the loss
of key TSOC staff personnel to the JSOTF. Therefore, a TSOC may require significant
augmentation to its staff in order to stand up and operate a JSOTF along with its normal
theater missions.
b. Decision Process. CAP provides a basis for higher authority decisions that must
be acted upon by the CDRJSOTF. JTF and JSOTF establishment normally occurs
between the stages of crisis assessment and course of action (COA) selection of CAP.
Once a CDRJSOTF is designated, the CDRJSOTF and JSOTF staff will participate in
CAP procedures concurrently with the complex task of establishing the JSOTF.
c. LNOs. During CAP, the CDRJSOTF may request LNOs from allocated SOF
components to assist in mission analysis and COA development. Component LNOs
ensure that all capabilities and limitations are considered and that their component
commanders remain fully informed of activities, plans, and intentions. The CDRJSOTF
may also collocate LNOs with the GCC commander and with the subordinate JFC, if
designated, to advise their staffs on special operations capabilities, and to keep the
CDRJSOTF informed as to COAs being considered and potential operational
requirements. These LNOs can significantly improve the flow of information, facilitate
concurrent planning, and enhance SOF mission planning and targeting processes.
d. Nucleus of the JSOTF Staff. The CDRTSOC normally has a plan with a joint
manning document to create a JSOTF staff. A preferred method is to develop a JSOTF
staff around a core drawn from the TSOC or another existing SOF component (HQ
element of an SF group). Augmentees may then be added to the core staff from other
SOF Service components. Additional augmentation is typically drawn from CF Service
components. The primary sources of these augmentees will be a USSOCOM
augmentation package drawn from the USSOCOM staff and USSOCOM Service
component staffs and their subordinate commands; an augmentation package drawn from
the staffs of the CCMD and Service components; individual mobilization augmentees
assigned to the TSOC; and special operations detachments from the National Guard.
A-2 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Organizational Considerations
the operational situation, and the JFCs intent, guidance, and objectives.
Other specific responsibilities include:
(1) Organizing the Force. CDRJSOTF organizes forces over which he has
OPCON. CDRJSOTF also organizes the JSOTF HQ to assist in the control of SOF, provide
support to subordinate SOF units, and coordinate with other JTFs and components
as required.
(5) Maintain Integrity and Quality of SOF Mission Planning and Targeting
Processes. SOF employment is guided by the special operations mission planning
principles. The establishing JFC and supporting components should understand SOF
mission planning and targeting processes. The integrity and quality of the SOF mission
planning and targeting processes rely on well-informed decisions by JFCs/CDRJSOTFs.
A-3
Appendix A
the JSOTF mission and provide the best opportunity for success. When fully organized,
the JSOTF staff will be composed of appropriate members in key positions of
responsibility from each Service SOF having significant forces assigned to the command.
CDRJSOTF will make the final decision on the composition of the HQ, to include the
establishment of boards, centers, cells, and a battle rhythm, as required. Figure A-1 depicts
a notional JSOTF HQ organization.
(3) Fill key positions based on the mission and type of special operation
anticipated. JSOTF manning documents also assign conventional personnel to non-SOF
technical, administrative, and logistics positions.
A-4 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Organizational Considerations
Surgeon
Legend
J-1 manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff
J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff J-6 communications system directorate of a
J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff joint staff
J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff JSOTF joint special operations task force
with staff operating procedures. This can be accomplished through a joint personnel
reception center, a short training program, or even use of a buddy system whereby an
experienced JSOTF staff member mentors a newly assigned individual. Staff directorates
normally provide specific orientation and training for personnel working
in their sections.
A-5
Appendix A
CDRJSOTFs are provided staffs to assist them in the decision-making and execution
process. The staff is an extension of the commander; its sole function is command support
and its authority is delegated to it by the commander. A properly trained and directed staff
will free the commander to devote more attention to directing subordinate commanders and
maintaining situational awareness.
(1) Functions
(a) The JSOTF J-1 provides oversight of joint personnel readiness, joint
personnel services coordination, and joint manpower management for the JSOTF. If the
mission is limited, the HQ staff will likely be small, and will have few if any, special staff
officers. In this event, the J-1 may be responsible for oversight or coordination of additional
staff functions such as: legal; financial management; safety; casualty reporting; postal
operations; and morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR). If the JSOTF chaplain does not
accompany the HQ for a specific mission, the J-1 may have additional responsibility for
coordinating religious support.
(c) Most of the JSOTF J-1 tasks are of a general nature and differ little from
those performed by any JTF J-1. These include the development and coordination of
personnel policies and plans; providing appropriate input to the operations directorate of a
joint staff (J-3) and plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5) for the personnel section of JSOTF
OPLANs; the maintenance of current personnel estimates, personnel readiness, and casualty
reporting; oversight and planning of the JSOTF personnel replacement program; and the
projection of future JSOTF personnel requirements, to include RC augmentation. The
JSOTF J-1 also manages the commands evaluation reporting, joint awards and decorations,
and leave programs. Service awards for which the CDRJSOTF may not have authority are
forwarded to respective Service commands in theater for management. Additionally, the J-1
will provide assistance to the joint mortuary affairs office as part of the logistics directorate
of a joint staff (J-4) on an as-required basis. The JSOTF J-1 assists the mortuary affairs
effort by managing the entry points for the casualty reporting and casualty notification
systems for the Services.
(d) Some J-1 tasks are performed differently during special operations than
during conventional operations. What differentiates special operations-specific J-1 tasks
from general personnel and manpower tasks is that they must properly address the special
operations-specific dimensions of manpower and personnel matters. Additionally,
because special operations missions are often conducted in remote regions outside of
A-6 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Organizational Considerations
established support areas, routine personnel-related duties may require effort beyond
that required of a conventional staff.
(e) Special operations situations affect several of the general joint manpower
and personnel J-1 functions and will differ with the special operations core task being
performed. For example, during FID operations, the JSOTF J-1 may have duties in addition
to those associated with the JSOTF HQ itself. In these situations, the J-1 may be advising,
assisting, and training an indigenous HN military organization. During UW missions, the J-1
may be deeply involved in monitoring personnel strength, health, and readiness of a US
supported insurgent force. Thus, the J-1 can easily be involved in activities beyond the
duties generally associated with a personnel and administrative staff officer. A notional
JSOTF J-1 organization is depicted in Figure A-2.
(2) Responsibilities
(c) Prepare the personnel estimates and annex E (Personnel) to the OPLAN.
J-1
Joint Personnel
Reception Center
Legend
J-1 manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
Figure A-2. Notional Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a Joint Staff Organization
within a Joint Special Operations Task Force
A-7
Appendix A
(d) Prepare and maintain the joint manning document and request
augmentation as required.
(e) Establish and effectively operate the joint visitors bureau (JVB) and joint
personnel reception center, as directed. The JSOTF may operate a protocol section vice a
JVB based on size and capability.
(g) Monitor unit strengths, both current and projected, by means of daily
personnel status reports, casualty reports, and reports of critical personnel shortages.
(i) When a safety officer is not assigned to the JSOTF staff, implement and
monitor the JSOTF safety program and recommend remedial actions.
(k) When a provost marshal is not assigned to the JSOTF staff, and in
consultation with the SJA, administer policies and procedures for detainees, civilian
internees, other detained personnel, and formerly captured or missing US personnel.
(l) In consultation with the J-3, administer policies and procedures for
indigenous and dislocated civilians who fall under the care and responsibility
of the JSOTF.
(1) Functions
(a) The primary function of the J-2 is to provide intelligence and CI support
to the JSOTF HQ and to direct the intelligence activities of the JSOTF. An additional
function of the J-2 is to support the CDRJSOTF and staff by providing timely warning
intelligence and ensuring the availability of intelligence on the JSOA and the JOA.
Members of the directorate actively participate in joint staff planning and coordinating,
A-8 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Organizational Considerations
directing, integrating, and controlling of intelligence efforts. The JSOTF J-2 also ensures
adequate intelligence collection and reporting to disclose adversary capabilities and
intentions. A notional JSOTF J-2 organization is depicted in Figure A-3.
(b) The JSOTF J-2 should be responsive to intelligence taskings and requests
from higher HQ, lateral HQ, and subordinate SOF components. Additionally, the J-2 is the
access point for joint force acquisition of JSOTF-produced intelligence and CI products. The
J-2 supervises the production and maintenance of target intelligence packages (TIPs) and
National Intelligence
J-2 Support Team
Joint
J-2 Intelligence Special
Noncommissioned J-2X
Support Element Security Officer
Officer-In-Charge (JISE) Director
Special Sensitive
Special Security Compartmented Information Compartmented
Order of Battle Officer Joint Deployable Information
Administration Intelligence Facility
Support System Security Force
Legend
J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff J-2X joint force counterintelligence and
human intelligence staff element
A-9
Appendix A
ensures that intelligence is integrated from all sources. Special Operations intelligence may
differ from that used by CF in that it is often more detailed and more perishable, particularly
in missions to combat terrorism and for the insertion or extraction of SOF. This is especially
true when target-area social, political, and economic information, as well as adversary
infrastructure data, are germane to SOFs expected missions. The JSOTF J-2 may request
additional national intelligence support.
(2) Responsibilities
(c) Develop, refine, and update the JSOTF intelligence estimate, based on
the CJTF estimates, to provide a common understanding and view of the
operational environment.
(f) Request support from the theater J-2 for TIPs for preplanned targets, and
for assistance and input in the development of TIPs for emerging missions. This support
is normally provided by the supported GCCs intelligence assets.
(g) Act as the central point of contact for intelligence RFIs within the
JSOTF HQ and components. Answer RFIs and validate and forward other RFIs as
appropriate, using the Community On-Line Intelligence System for End-Users and
Managers. Prioritize and track RFIs, and review RFI responses for content and
completeness of answers.
(h) Provide intelligence support to targeting within the JISE/JOC, and to the
joint planning group (JPG).
(i) Assist the JSOTF J-3 in developing and refining the CDRJSOTFs
critical information requirements by consolidating PIR nominations into the staff
recommendation for the commander.
(j) Provide support to the JSOTF J-3 in the planning and execution of
information operations (IO) and IRCs and related activities such as OPSEC and
MILDEC.
A-10 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Organizational Considerations
(l) Provide intelligence summaries IAW JFC guidance to the next higher
HQ, laterally, to components, and other coordinating agencies and pass time-sensitive
information collected by SOF assets to the JISE in a timely manner.
(m) Assign and task intelligence resources within the JSOTF to answer
commanders PIRs and refine targeting data provided in theater TIPs.
(1) Functions
(a) The JSOTF J-3 assists the CDRJSOTF to plan, coordinate, synchronize,
direct, control, monitor, and assess operations. The CDRJSOTF normally will delegate
tasking authority over subordinate units to the J-3 for mission-type orders. While a
JSOTF normally includes a J-5, in unusual situations where there is not a J-5, the J-3
assumes responsibility for current and future planning functions. A notional JSOTF J-3
organization is depicted in Figure A-4.
(c) The J-3 current operations division establishes the JOC and monitors the
readiness of assigned and attached forces. It receives approved OPORDs and
FRAGORDs in a handover from the J-3 future operations division, and then directs,
monitors, coordinates, synchronizes, and assesses their execution.
A-11
Appendix A
Future Plans
J-3 J-5
Plans
Handover
Current Information
Operations Operations Special Actions Future Operations
Legend
J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff
(d) A special actions cell located within the J-3 may be established to handle
sensitive staff actions and operations that exceed the capabilities of normal staff channels due
to their handling and classification levels. In combined operations the special actions cell
will often handle issues (not releasable to foreign nationals) that cannot be handled in normal
staff channels because of the integration of MNF staff within the JSOTF. Special actions are
frequently interagency in nature, involve sensitive capabilities, and almost always not
releasable to multinational partners or allies. Often special actions remain compartmented
throughout planning but in many cases are downgraded and handled as normal functions
once operations commence.
(2) Responsibilities
(a) Understand the intent from the President, SecDef, and/or the CCDR.
(b) Plan, direct, monitor, coordinate, synchronize, and assess current and
future operations.
(f) In coordination with the J-2, J-5, and the SJA, anticipate, review, and
recommend changes to ROE. Participate in ROE development. Assist the CDRJSOTF in
proper dissemination of ROE.
A-12 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Organizational Considerations
(i) Coordinate staging areas, airspace, and JSOTF operations with those of
other friendly forces.
(j) Plan and coordinate METOC operations for the JSOTF (including oversight
of SOF component METOC requirements) and prepare annex H (Meteorological and
Oceanographic Services) for all OPLANs or OPORDs.
(o) Plan and coordinate comprehensive SOF support to JFCs PR strategy, and
be prepared to establish and operate a PR coordination cell and an unconventional assisted
recovery coordination cell.
(p) Minimize the potential for friendly fire incidents. Methods to do so may
include ensuring reasonable safeguards used in planning processes and effective C2 systems
used during execution phases.
(t) Manage the special access program and focal point system.
(v) Represent SOF activities to JTF organizations such as the joint targeting
coordination board (JTCB) and IO cell.
A-13
Appendix A
(y) Plan, synchronize, and deconflict joint fires and joint air support within the
JSOTF. If required, form a joint fires element and a joint air coordination element.
(1) Functions
(a) The J-4 is charged with the formulation of logistic plans and the
coordination and supervision of supply, maintenance, transportation, field services, general
engineering, OPCON support, and other logistic activities as directed. If there is no
command surgeon attached to the JSOTF, the J-4 is also responsible for health services; if a
command surgeon is attached, health services planning are stand-alone functions of the
surgeon. If there is no budget officer attached to the JSOTF, the J-4 may perform this
function. A notional JSOTF J-4 organization is depicted in Figure A-5.
(b) While SOF logistic support is primarily a Service responsibility, the J-4
must monitor the JSOTFs logistic readiness to ensure successful accomplishment of the
J-4
Operational
Logistics Contracting Engineer Health Support
Support
Legend
J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff
A-14 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Organizational Considerations
CDRJSOTFs assigned tasks. The routine sustainment of forces is monitored by the J-4 who
is responsible for recommending logistic priorities to the CDRJSOTF, monitoring Service
support to SOF, arranging inter-Service support agreements when advantageous and
coordinating special operations peculiar logistic support with USSOCOM.
(2) Responsibilities
(b) Plan, coordinate, and manage external logistic support for the CDRJSOTF
and staff. The HQ commandant normally provides internal support to the JSOTF.
(e) Coordinate all SOF Service component requests for special operation-
peculiar supplies and equipment items through the TSOC to the USSOCOM SOF
support activity.
(o) In conjunction with the J-5 and the J-3, plan and coordinate the strategic
movement of SOF via the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) list.
A-15
Appendix A
(r) Ensure that adequate logistic support is provided for those detainees that
are under the control of the JSOTF.
(s) Ensure that adequate logistic support is provided for those indigenous and
dislocated civilians who fall under the care and responsibility of the JSOTF.
(t) Ensure that access to USSOCOM through the TSOC is established for
reachback support for special operations-peculiar requirements.
(1) Functions
(a) The JSOTF J-5 conducts planning for the JSOTF, develops and
recommends C2 arrangements, coordinates ROE with the J-3 and in consultation with the
SJA, may represent the command at the JFCs JTCB, and may chair the JSOTF targeting
panel if designated. The J-5 participates in the JFCs planning process. The J-5 also may
be tasked to develop plans unique to special operations in support of the JFC. The J-5 also
projects future SOF requirements for material, organization, and doctrine based on an
analysis of current operations. In coordination with the JSOTF J-3 and J-4, the J-5
develops the JSOTF input to the theater TPFDD and submits it to the TSOC J-5 for
approval and further action. A notional JSOTF J-5 organization is depicted
in Figure A-6.
A-16 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Organizational Considerations
J-5
Legend
J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff
(c) During the execution phase of an operation, the J-5 is the JSOTFs future
planner. The J-5 is responsible for developing the JSOTF input to the JFC future plans
division, participating in the JFC JPG, and translating JFC future plans. The JSOTF J-5
may place a liaison element within the JFC future plans division to facilitate these actions.
In these roles, the J-5 develops special operations tasks to support each phase of the
operation, develops future plans, and passes these plans to the J-3 for coordination and
tasking to the subordinate components. The J-5 analyzes the operation and develops
special operations tasks for operations planned 72 hours in advance and beyond.
(2) Responsibilities
(c) Develop COAs within the framework of the JSOTF assigned objective or
mission, forces available, and commanders intent. This includes: anticipating tactical and
operational opportunities and risks and recommending supporting ROE; wargaming;
synchronizing combat power in support of each COA; consideration of command
relationships; and identifying decision criteria to support analysis of
the developed COA.
A-17
Appendix A
(f) Coordinate planning efforts with higher, lower, adjacent, and multinational
HQ as required.
(h) Ensure that the SOF requirements are entered in the Joint Operation
Planning and Execution System.
(k) Coordinate and review the TPFDD input through the Global Command and
Control System.
(l) Coordinate with the J-3 to ensure that political-military activities such as
NEO and CMO are properly addressed with the appropriate US embassy and HN
governments from a strategy and policy perspective.
(1) Functions
(a) The J-6 has the functional responsibility for communications and
computer/information systems in support of the CDRJSOTF. This includes development and
integration of communications system architecture and plans that support the commands
operational and strategic requirements as well as policy and guidance for implementation and
integration of interoperable communications systems to exercise command in the execution
of the JSOTF mission. A notional JSOTF J-6 organization is depicted in Figure A-7.
(b) The directorate provides communications and computer systems within the
JSOTF HQ and coordinates support by second-party providers such as the Joint
Communication Support Element and US Army 112th Signal Battalion by providing circuits
over satellite, radio, and other communications links.
A-18 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Organizational Considerations
J-6
Information Special
Technology Operations
Communications
Management
Plans, Programs,
Cybersecurity and
Requirements
Legend
J-6 communications system directorate of a joint staff
(2) Responsibilities
A-19
Appendix A
(h) Establish and maintain JSOTF ability to protect data and information, to
include identifying SOF cyberspace capabilities that could be targeted by the adversary;
defensive methods to protect cyberspace capabilities given the cyberspace threat intelligence;
and proven processes to execute special operations in the event that the adversary degrades
SOF cyberspace capabilities that negatively impacts special operations.
g. SJA
(1) Functions
(a) The SJA is the CDRJSOTFs legal adviser, ensuring that the JSOTF
complies with international law, US law, and DOD policy. The SJA coordinates with the
JTF SJA and JSOTF component commands and performs other legal functions as required.
(b) Legal professionals provide decision makers with the information and
analysis needed to evaluate options, assess risks, and make informed decisions within the
bounds of international and domestic law. The SJA applies a comprehensive
understanding of the law, multilateral and bilateral agreements, and international legal
customs and practices to help commanders evaluate the alternatives necessary to plan,
train, mobilize, deploy, employ forces, and then transition to peace. From the earliest
stages of planning, execution, and redeployment, legal professionals identify and assist in
the resolution of legal constraints and by providing responsive readiness programs to the
military member.
(2) Responsibilities
(a) In consultation with the CDRJSOTF, J-5, and J-3, assist in ROE
development, both initial and supplemental, and provide expertise on all ROE. Once
approved, the SJA should assist the J-3 in the training of all personnel on the ROE.
(c) Participate in ROE and targeting cells to ensure compliance with the law of
war, ROE, and other legal requirements.
(e) Provide legal advice to CDRJSOTF and the JSOTF targeting panel as part
of the target validation phase of the targeting cycle.
A-20 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Organizational Considerations
(f) Review the OPLAN/OPORD for any legal considerations that may affect
implementation of the plan or order, such as the law of war, status of forces, ROE,
international agreements, and United Nations Security Council resolutions.
(g) Advise the CDRJSOTF on all disciplinary and military justice issues, with
particular attention to Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and courts-
martial convening authority.
(h) Oversee the reporting and investigation of incidents including law of war
violations, claims, loss of equipment or funds, and personal injury or death.
(i) Coordinate with the JSOTF J-2 to ensure compliance with intelligence
oversight requirements.
For further information on the SJA, refer to JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations.
(1) Functions
(a) The PAO advises the commander on the impact that JSOTF operations
are likely to have on public attitude, PA policies of higher HQ, and the commands need
for media products. Additionally, a PAO will usually serve as the JSOTF public
spokesperson and will prepare public affairs guidance (PAG) and the PA portion of
OPLANs and OPORDs.
(2) Responsibilities
(a) Based on guidance from the JFC develop PAG and a PA plan prior to
deployment and execute and update as required. The PAG and the PA plan should support
the JFCs mission and objectives.
(b) Ensure PA and visual information assets are deployed with the JSOTF
command group.
A-21
Appendix A
(d) Coordinate with the JSOTF J-3, JSOTF or JTF IO cell or designated IO
staff section to plan, coordinate, and deconflict the PA and MISO activities.
(f) Depending on the scope and duration of an operation, coordinate with the
news media representatives, as appropriate.
(g) Coordinate the use of combat camera assets with the JFC.
i. Surgeon
(1) Functions. The surgeon establishes, monitors, and evaluates JSOTF health
services for the JSOTF and SOF components.
(2) Responsibilities
(i) Assess allied, PN, HN, and NGO medical asset availability.
A-22 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Organizational Considerations
j. Chaplain
(1) Functions. The chaplain is the CDRJSOTFs primary advisor for religious
affairs. The chaplain develops and coordinates plans, policies, and procedures for religious
support for the CDRJSOTF and supervises the provision of religious support throughout the
JSOTF operational area.
(2) Responsibilities
(c) Advise the command and leaders on ethical decision -making and moral
leadership concerning issues related to policies, programs, initiatives, plans,
and exercises.
(g) In coordination with the command CMO staff, perform liaison with local
national civilian religious leaders, NGOs, and IGOs as required.
(h) Coordinate with combatant command, joint force, MNF, and Service
component command chaplains as necessary to ensure that subordinate religious support
teams are resourced to provide religious support for members of their units and others
as required.
(i) Develop and maintain staff estimates and joint religious support plans.
Prepare appendix 6 (Religious Support) to annex E (Personnel) of all OPLANs
or OPORDs.
A-23
Appendix A
For further information on chaplain functions, refer to JP 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint
Operations.
k. Budget Officer
(1) Functions. The budget officer is the CDRJSOTFs financial manager and
advisor. In lieu of a budget officer, the J-4 may perform this function. Financial
management functions include obtaining various obligation authorities, funds control, cost
capturing, and cost reporting.
(2) Responsibilities
(e) Establish fiscal controls to ensure the efficient use of resources. This may
include publishing procedures as necessary to address items such as automated data
processing equipment and copier procurement, local purchase thresholds, and the
establishment of blanket purchase agreements.
(f) Coordinate with the JSOTF J-1 on special pay and allowances for JSOTF
personnel.
(g) Coordinate with the JSOTF J-4 on logistic requirements and support to
ensure that they complement the financial management responsibilities.
(h) Coordinate with the SJA and/or legal advisor on fiscal and contract issues.
(j) Coordinate with JSOTF or JFC contracting office/officer for the legal
review of contracts.
(k) Obtain necessary advice from JSOTF SJA to ensure that expenditures
comply with fiscal law and regulation.
A-24 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Organizational Considerations
(m) Responsible for all aspects of cash management in the JSOTF to include
training of paying agents and field ordering officers, coordinating for funds issuance,
clearing and review of accounts and processing of reporting requirements.
(n) Careful coordination with executive agent, HQ, theater command elements,
the TSOC, MNFs, and CJSOTF is required to deconflict authorities and establish formal
processes ensure proper support and sharing of costs if appropriate.
l. HQ Commandant
(2) Responsibilities. The task support activity areas that follow are common to
most operations for a JSOTF HQ. Certain procedures may vary. Preliminary requirements
can be identified through the conduct of a site survey.
(a) Base operations support to include: unit level logistic support, billeting,
transportation, messing, unit level health support, sanitation, environmental protection,
Headquarters
Commandant
Administrative
Base Operations Physical Security
and Personnel
Support Support
Support
A-25
Appendix A
(b) Assist the J-1, as required, with postal administration. This may require a
terminal capability, distribution, collection, postal finance services, security, and customs
and agriculture support.
(d) Assist the J-1 in operating the joint personnel reception center. This
includes provision for facilities, security, and transportation.
(e) Assist the J-1, as required, with the operation of the MWR program. This
includes provision for facilities, security, and transportation.
(f) Provide for camp physical security operations. Coordinate with the J-2 to
obtain security, base defense, and force protection information and intelligence and the J-3 to
address force protection requirements. Ensure that a threat assessment is completed and
measures identified to combat each threat. Also consider: rear area security, physical
security of classified material, visitor control, refugee assistance, traffic control and flow
within the HQ area, internment facilities, and other security considerations as warranted.
The HQ commandant may be assigned the mission for base defense of the JSOTF HQ. In
this case, the HQ commandant would assume the role of the base defense commander and be
responsible for perimeter security, guard mount, physical security of the compound, and
battle action drills.
(h) Ensure that coordination has been accomplished for JSOTF advanced
echelon elements.
The CDRJSOTF may elect to form any number and type of organizational structures within
the JSOTF HQ to support the mission. The first step in that decision-making process is to
determine what organizational structures (boards, centers, and cells) have been formed by the
JFC and/or what organizational structures have been delegated to the CDRJSOTF as the
principal commander to operate. Then the CDRJSOTF formulates which JSOTF HQ
organizations (and LNOs or staff officers) are best suited to support both the JFC concept of
A-26 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Organizational Considerations
operations and the JSOTF mission. Typically, the CDRJSOTF forms subordinate organizations,
each under the supervision of a specific staff director, to support the mission (see Figure A-9).
Legend
J-1 manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff
J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff J-6 communications system directorate of a joint staff
Figure A-9. Joint Special Operations Task Force Boards and Cells
A-27
Appendix A
Detailed checklists that may be of assistance to the JSOTF principal staff (J-1-J-6, HQ
commandant, and SJA) are provided in Appendix B, Joint Special Operations Task Force
Headquarters Staff Checklists.
A TSOC or Service SOF unit that may be tasked to establish a JSOTF HQ may consider
the need for preparing a SOP for use when organizing a JSOTF. It may be used for both
exercises and actual contingencies, as appropriate.
A-28 JP 3-05
APPENDIX B
JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS STAFF
CHECKLISTS
The following checklists are provided to assist the JSOTF staff in the preparation,
planning, and execution of their functional responsibilities. They are not intended to be all-
inclusive and should be modified to suit the accomplishment of the stated JSOTF mission.
a. General
(1) Does a joint system exist for the J-1 that allows summation of separate Service
personnel status reports, including authorized, assigned, and deployed strengths; critical
personnel shortages; casualties accounting; and personnel requisitions?
(a) Have JSOTF augmentation shortfalls and requirements been identified and
submitted to the CCDR?
(c) Are special experience requirements consistent with pay grade level and
military occupational designations?
(d) Have instructions been issued for passports, visas, immunizations, uniform
requirements, and travel restrictions?
(a) Giving members the opportunity to update wills and powers of attorney and
to seek other Service-provided legal assistance (as available)?
(b) Giving members the opportunity to adjust pay allotments and establish
direct deposit?
(6) Does the J-1 have the required capabilities to correct any deficiencies for
personnel once they have deployed to the field?
B-1
Appendix B
(7) Have other personnel actions been accomplished, such as medical screening,
identification cards or tags, and Service record updates (including a record of emergency
data)?
(10) Is military postal support adequately and equitably addressed in JSOTF and
Service component commands plans?
(12) Are planning factors for computing personnel attrition developed IAW
existing Service procedures?
(13) Has liaison been established with the International Committee of the Red
Cross regarding the handling of detainees, civilian internees, and other detained persons?
(14) Have procedures been developed between the J-1 and J-2 for the in-theater
processing of returned formerly captured, missing, or detained US personnel?
(17) Consistent with operational requirements, is the maximum practical use being
made of local civilian labor?
(18) Have appropriate liaison positions been established with local civil
authorities?
B-2 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists
(1) Have all policies regarding use of indigenous labor by the JSOTF been
coordinated with component CA officers? (The JSOTF J-1 and J-3 should coordinate CA
issues.)
(2) Have J-1 supporting plans been developed for the evacuation of noncombatants
and civilians?
(3) Have internal SOPs been developed and coordinated to streamline the execution
of recurring activities and reports?
a. General
(1) With inputs from the JSOTF J-3, have the JSOTF J-2s missions, tasks, and
requirements been clarified, prioritized, and confirmed with the CDRJSOTF?
(3) Have the current warning intelligence indicators in the JSOA been identified?
(6) Has an intelligence situation assessment been completed and submitted to the
CDRJSOTF and up the chain of command?
(7) Are the CDRJSOTF intelligence tasking and guidance completely understood,
and have they been analyzed and applied to regional and/or theater assessments?
(8) Have intelligence priorities been regularly updated and passed throughout the
entire chain of command, including components and supported commands?
(9) Has the status (such as number, type, and readiness condition) of the JSOTFs,
JTFs and CCMDs organic intelligence collection and production assets been determined?
(11) Have the JSOTF J-2 requirements for personnel augmentation, to include
regional or functional experts, linguists, and/or reservists, been identified?
(12) Have the deployable elements to support the JSOTFs efforts in collection
management, Service expertise, communications, and tactical in-depth analysis been
identified?
(13) Have the JSOTF intelligence managers been kept abreast of intelligence
personnel, equipment, and related movement requirements?
B-3
Appendix B
(14) Have the requirements for a JISE to support the JSOTF been determined?
(Establishment of a JISE will be situation dependent.)
(15) Has the JSOTF J-2, in coordination with the JSOTF J-6, developed a JSOTF
intelligence communications architecture that achieves interoperability and adequate and
appropriate security laterally, vertically, and with MNFs? (JSOTF communications links
include satellite, microwave, radio, landline, and LAN to carry information and
intelligence.)
(16) Has the intelligence architecture for flow of responsibilities for PIRs and
RFIs been determined?
(18) Have any JSOTF subordinate units been receiving intelligence support
directly from the supported CCDR or national levels?
(19) Has the JSOTF coordinated, through the JTF, with the supported GCCs
JIOC to determine whether PIRs have already been established for the current situation?
(PIRs should be built around CDRJSOTFs requirements.)
(20) In concert with the JSOTF J-3, JTF J-3, and the supported CCDRs JIOC,
have PIRs been tailored for the current situation?
(21) Have PIRs been kept current, and are they updated periodically?
(23) Have the JSOTF J-2s automated data processing equipment requirements
been identified, and are they compatible with the supported JTFs, CCMDs, and
subordinates systems (to include compatibility for multinational JSOTF operations when
required)?
(24) In concert with the supported commanders J-2 and the JSOTF J-3, have all
the JSOTF intelligence collection requirements been identified, developed, and published?
B-4 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists
(29) Has information to support the joint intelligence estimate for planning been
passed, through channels, the Joint Staff J-2?
(30) Has the annex B (Intelligence) been prepared for the CDRJSOTFs
OPLAN, OPORD, or subordinate plan?
(31) Can the JSOTF J-2 continue to monitor and evaluate the crisis event and
issue status reports to the superior commander as directed?
(33) Have procedures been established and coordinated with the supported
GCCs JIOC to support the production of TIPs?
(37) Have personnel designated to fill deployed J-2 exploitation positions been
identified and properly trained?
(40) Have procedures been implemented for issuing security badges and access
control to the JSOTF HQ?
(1) Have the JSOTFs requirements for CI, HUMINT, GEOINT, OSINT,
SIGINT, MASINT, and TECHINT collection been identified?
B-5
Appendix B
(4) If the full center capability is not necessary, have adequate smaller elements
(teams or cells) been requested?
(5) Have the requirements for interrogation and debriefing capabilities been
identified?
(6) Has emergency dissemination authority for GEOINT products been obtained?
(7) Has tailored GEOINT been requested (once target has been identified)? Has
GEOINT been forwarded to requesting command?
(8) Has the requirement for SIGINT operational tasking authority been identified?
(If not, work with cryptologic support group and command NSA Central Security Service
representative and/or GCC to obtain if applicable.)
(9) Have MASINT management liaison and exchange programs been identified?
c. J-2X
(1) Have JSOTF CI, HUMINT, and CT intelligence requirements been identified?
(3) Has the J-2, if required, been appointed the CI coordinating authority?
(4) Has CI been incorporated into the planning as a force protection measure?
(1) Has the collection plan for materials to be exploited been created?
(2) Have the collection and exploitation requirements for deployed laboratories and
material evacuation been identified?
(3) Have the authorities been granted to collect and process captured material?
(4) Are all available exploitation capabilities, to include partner and HNs,
coordinated and synchronized to the fullest extent possible?
(5) Has reachback support been determined and the logistics infrastructure
identified in order to transport material?
B-6 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists
(6) What is the regions improvised weapons threat (i.e., modified munitions and
weapons, improvised explosive devices, and improvised CBRN weapons)?
(7) What is the regions history of manufacturing and usage of conventional and
improvised weapon component and precursors?
e. Multinational Interaction
(1) Has liaison been established between joint and MNF intelligence structures?
(2) Have procedures been established and reviewed to expedite sharing US-
generated intelligence products with MNFs?
(3) Have friendly objectives, intentions, and plans been fully communicated to
appropriate intelligence organizations?
Note: A number of the checklist items refer to the planning process and may fall under the
responsibility of the J-5 depending on how the JSOTF is organized and who is directed to
accomplish the planning.
(2) Have special operations options been developed, prioritized, and passed to the
superior commander?
(3) Have special operations strategic and operational military objectives been
developed and forwarded to the superior commander?
(4) Have component and supporting commanders been tasked to analyze the
situation and begin tentative planning to support proposed COAs?
(5) Have the disposition and location of assigned and attached forces been
reviewed and, if needed, has an increased force posture and force readiness been directed
within established authority? (Respond as necessary within existing ROE, requesting
modification if necessary.)
B-7
Appendix B
(7) Has the commanders estimate, containing an appropriate risk assessment, been
developed and submitted to the superior commander?
(8) Has the status of noncombatants in the JOA or JSOA been evaluated to
determine the requirement for a NEO plan?
(9) Has the process of obtaining country clearances and overflight, landing, and
staging rights been initiated?
(12) Have replacement units and personnel been identified or shortfalls forwarded
to the superior commander for resolution?
(13) Has the superior commanders tasking and guidance been analyzed?
(15) Have completed COAs, including validated forces and sustainment, been
developed?
(16) Have pre-hostility special operations (SR, UW, MISO, CAO, CT) been
considered during COA development?
(17) Have IRCs, requirements, and coordination been considered in SOF missions
and activities?
(18) Has the CJTF or senior JFC been notified that the selected COA is ready for
evaluation?
(19) Has the JSOTF legal officer been consulted concerning applicable
international agreements, any special requirements of the law of war that affect the particular
operation, or the ROE authorized for the mission?
(20) Have joint fire support capabilities, requirements, and coordination, to include
fire support coordination measures, been considered in SOF missions and activities?
(21) Have SOF aviation and/or support aviation requirements been properly
considered and planned for?
B-8 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists
(25) Can the shortfalls be resolved using organic resources, or do they require
elevation to the senior commander?
(26) How will the COA likely be perceived by the indigenous, US, and allied
publics?
(28) Has the COA been adjusted based on the superior commanders guidance?
(29) Have all support annexes been incorporated in the OPLAN, OPORD, or
subordinate plan?
(30) Is the OPLAN, OPORD, or subordinate plan complete and in the proper
format?
(31) Has the OPLAN, OPORD, or subordinate plan been submitted to the superior
commander for approval?
(33) Has the OPORD, or subordinate plan been adjusted for the senior
commanders EXORD before issuing the commanders EXORD?
(36) Are situations developing that require additional force and sustainment
resources, or redirection of allocated force and sustainment resources?
(41) Can the JSOTF J-3 continue to monitor and evaluate the event and issue status
reports to the superior commander as directed?
(42) Have USG departments and agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and in-country relief
organizations been contacted to ensure maximum support of component CA operations?
(43) Has the senior commanders CMO plan provided guidance on CMO priorities
and are the priorities supporting on-going operations?
B-9
Appendix B
(46) Have requirements for integrated space force enhancement been coordinated
through channels with USSTRATCOMs Joint Space Operations Center (JSPOC)?
(47) Have the effects of WMD, and the toxic industrial materials which can
produce similar effects, been evaluated and the appropriate technical operations units been
notified?
(48) Have the warning and reporting systems for WMD been tested?
(50) Have control measures and procedures been coordinated and deconflicted?
(51) Have all C-IED enablers, inherent within the C-IED support element, been
organized and integrated throughout the staff?
(1) In the absence of a JPG, the JSOTF J-3 may establish an operations planning
and execution cell, composed of J-3, J-4, and J-5 planners (at a minimum), to complete the
TPFDD planning tasks, monitor the flow of SOF, and track forces to their destination. The
following questions may be of use to this team.
(a) Have plan identification numbers been established for each COA?
(b) Have movement requirements for each COA been created and tested?
(f) Have units that are moving by organic lift been identified?
B-10 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists
(b) Has the next deployment increment been confirmed once the first
increment is under way?
(c) Is organic lift being monitored to ensure that arrival times meet OPORD
requirements?
(e) Are use rates, requirements, and all transportation modes being monitored?
(g) Is actual arrival data, if different than scheduled, being entered into the
database? (Continue to update deployment information on the deployment database.)
(3) Has a rotation schedule for SOF assets, personnel, and equipment been
established?
(a) Is there a necessity to establish a JOC or portions thereof during the CAP
process?
(b) If established during the CAP process, what role does the JOC play?
B-11
Appendix B
(h) Has the CDRJSOTF provided initial guidance concerning the functions and
responsibilities of the above organizations?
(j) Have these organizations analyzed all phases of the operation (deployment
through redeployment)?
(3) If directed by the CDRJSOTF, is the J-3 properly staffed to plan, monitor, and
coordinate execution of joint special operations air operations?
(4) If directed by the CDRJSOTF, is the J-3 properly staffed to coordinate and
integrate the use of airspace in the JSOA?
(5) If directed by the CDRJSOTF, is the J-3 properly staffed to coordinate and
integrate joint air offense/defense operations within the JSOA?
(6) Has the base defense commander integrated the base defense plan into the
tactical operations of the JSOTF?
(1) Have recommendations been provided to the J-3 pertaining to the organization,
use, and integration of attached CA forces?
(2) Have specific plans, policies, and programs been developed to further the
relationship between the JSOTF and the civil component in the JSOA?
(3) Has the CDRJSOTF been advised of the impact that JSOTF operations and the
civilian population will have on one another?
(4) Do CMO plans, policies, procedures, and programs deconflict civilian activities
with military operations within the JSOA?
(5) In coordination with the SJA, has the CDRJSOTF been advised of his legal and
moral obligations incurred from the long- and short-term effects (economic, environmental,
and health) of JSOTF operations on civilian populations.
B-12 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists
(8) Have procedures to facilitate movement, provide security, and control funds to
subordinate units been identified?
(10) Have the requirements for CMO/CAO area assessments and area studies been
coordinated and integrated in support of the CMO plan?
(11) Have culturally significant sites been identified and coordinated with the joint
targeting coordination board (JTCB) as no-fire or restricted fire areas?
(12) Has coordination been established for the integration of civil inputs to the
CDRJSOTF CMO plan?
(13) Have military units and assets that can perform CMO missions been identified
and integrated with the CMO plan?
a. General
(1) Is there a concise statement of the purpose for which the logistic support plan is
prepared?
(2) Does this paragraph provide a summary of the requirements, taskings, and
CONOPS that the logistic planning supports?
(4) Have SOF submitted requirements that identify logistics support requirements?
b. Assumptions. Does this paragraph list the assumptions upon which the CONOPS
and logistic support are based?
(2) USSOCOM?
(3) USTRANSCOM?
(4) Services?
B-13
Appendix B
(6) TSOCs?
(1) Does this paragraph describe how supply, maintenance, deployment and
distribution, contracting, engineer, and logistic field service support will be provided?
(2) Does this paragraph specify which logistic elements will provide the support?
Are the forces provided adequate?
(3) Does the planned support complement the tactical plan? Is it adequate and
feasible?
(4) Have the terrain and enemy intelligence been analyzed to determine the
impact on logistic support?
(5) Has the deployment flow been properly analyzed to determine the time
phasing for introduction of logistic elements to support the combat forces?
(9) Is there an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement with HNs in the JOA or
with other coalition nations in the operation?
B-14 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists
(10) Are provisions made for adequate logistic support of detainees, civilian
internees, and other detained persons?
(11) Are provisions made for adequate logistic support for those indigenous and
displace civilians who fall under the care and responsibility of the JSOTF?
e. Supply
(1) General
(i) Are provisions made for contracting and local purchase support?
(l) Will automated systems of supported units and task-organized CSS units
interface?
(p) Are retrograde procedures for excess and unserviceable items spelled out?
B-15
Appendix B
communications, positioning, and navigation) that can help resolve logistic issues through
in-transit visibility?
(s) Have initial preplanned supply support and emergency support packages
been considered?
(u) Are changes to the DOD activity address file required, such as ship-to
address?
(x) Are provisions made for logistic support of displaced civilians, detainees,
and indigenous personnel?
(y) Is there covered storage in the operational area to protect supplies from the
elements? If not, are shipments packed for outdoor storage?
(b) Are the ration cycles described by phase? Is a ration cycle proposed?
(c) Are fresh eggs, fresh fruits and vegetables, fresh meats, juices, milk, and
canned soft-drink supplements to ration meals considered?
(e) Have unitized operational rations been considered for ease of handling and
accountability?
B-16 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists
(k) Are chill, freeze, and refrigeration requirements for unit dining facilities
and Class I supply point addressed?
(q) What is the water planning factor in gallons per person per day?
(r) What are the treatment, storage, distribution, and cooling requirements?
Are they satisfied by deploying unit capability?
(s) What are the well drilling requirements? Are there any existing wells?
What is the quality of water from existing wells?
(t) Are potable ice considerations covered? What is the requirement planning
factor?
(u) Have the medical planners provided for certification of ice as potable?
(b) Have provisions been made for the replacement of damaged personal
clothing and CBRN individual protective equipment or personal protection equipment?
(c) Which self-service supply center listing will be used as the basis for the
Class II stockage?
B-17
Appendix B
(d) How will the logistic support element replenish organizational clothing and
individual equipment and self-service supply center items?
4. Folding cots.
14. Batteries.
(a) Is proper storage and dispensing equipment available for Class III items
(POL, industrial gasses, etc.)?
(b) Are Service requirements by location for each type of product established?
B-18 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists
(e) Are existing pipeline distribution systems available? What are the pipeline
and storage capabilities?
(f) Are remote refueling sites or forward arming and refueling points required?
What capabilities are required?
(h) Are POL-quality surveillance procedures specified? Are the required test
kits on hand?
(j) Are additives required for commercial fuels? Who will provide them?
(g) Have the storage, handling, shipping, security, and safety requirements
been reviewed and addressed in the planning?
B-19
Appendix B
(a) Are the deploying personnel provided guidance on personal demand items?
1. Has HQ Army and Air Force Exchange Service (Plans) been notified?
(b) Does the plan specify the equipment fill level for deploying units?
(b) Does this portion of the logistic support plan complement the medical
support plan?
(c) Are special medical equipment and supply requirements identified based on
medical mission and the operational area?
B-20 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists
(g) Are medical oxygen and other medical gas requirements (such as
anesthesia) identified and resupply procedures established?
(f) Have special storage requirements been addressed for dry batteries,
classified repair parts, high dollar, and pilferables, etc.?
(a) If Class X materials are required, does the plan describe the source?
f. Maintenance
(1) Does the plan describe how unit, intermediate (direct support and general
support), and special operations-peculiar equipment maintenance will be performed?
(5) Have extreme weather aspects been considered (e.g., heat, cold, humidity, and
dust)?
B-21
Appendix B
(7) Are special power requirements for maintenance facilities identified (e.g.,
voltage, phase, frequency, stability, and anticipated load in kilowatts)?
(10) How will repairs under warranty be performed in the operational area?
(13) Have procedures for replacing maintenance tools and equipment been
specified?
(1) General
(b) Are the transportation support systems for supply distribution and air LOC
validation procedures outlined?
(e) Is there a rail system available? What are schedules and capability?
(f) Is the highway net described? What are the capabilities and limitations?
(g) What is the weather impact on ports, airfields, and highway nets?
(h) Are in-country highway, rail, air, and inland waterway mode requirements
addressed?
(i) Are the transportation movement priority and transportation account codes
provided? Are transportation funding procedures established?
B-22 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists
(k) Has coordination been made with USTRANSCOM for personnel and
equipment movements?
(2) Airfields
(c) Has support been planned for USAF mobile aeromedical staging facilities?
(d) What are the personnel and cargo reception capabilities of the aerial ports
of embarkation and debarkation?
(f) What are the characteristics and capabilities of the roads that access the
airfield?
(g) What contract civilian or HN personnel and equipment assets are available
to assist at the aerial ports of debarkation and embarkation?
(i) Have aerial port squadron and/or contingency response group requirements
been identified?
(j) What airfield facilities are available for military use during arrival/departure
airfield control group operations?
(k) What is the best source for additional information on the airfields?
B-23
Appendix B
(o) What types of aircraft are the airfields improved areas (landing strip[s],
taxiways, parking ramps, etc.) rated for? Does the ADVON have the capability to
determine this information?
(c) What are the terrain characteristics and capabilities of the routes
available to support military operations?
(d) What are the dimensions and classifications of roads, tunnels, and
bridges along the routes?
(f) What segments of the routes are heavily used by the civilian populace?
(g) What are the most likely routes fleeing refugees would use?
(i) What is the best source for additional information on the routes?
h. Field Services
(1) Are laundry, bath, clothing renovation, and latrine requirements addressed?
Local sources?
(2) Are graves registration and mortuary capabilities adequate to support the
anticipated requirements?
(3) Are procedures for salvage collection, evacuation, and disposal covered?
B-24 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists
(8) Are procedures specified and do units have the equipment necessary for
cleaning of equipment for redeployment to meet customs and agriculture requirements to
enter the US or other nations?
i. Miscellaneous
(1) Have billeting and support requirements at ISBs and FSBs been addressed?
(3) Have arrangements been made with US and HN customs and immigration for
the movement of US personnel and equipment? Will contractors (transportation and on-
ground support) need USG support for resupplying US forces or bringing their
people/equipment into the HN?
(12) What is the electrical power cycles of the country? Are transformers required?
(14) Are the communications to support logistic operations provided for in the
communications planning? Telephone? Facsimile (secure and nonsecure)? Secure copiers
and storage and handling facilities? Computer connectivity for operation planning,
situational awareness, and Standard Army Management Information System and other
logistic systems? Secure and nonsecure VTC and other collaboration tools, if required? Are
these systems protected using cybersecurity and defense in depth?
(15) Have requirements for aerial delivery, personal parachutes, and air items been
identified?
B-25
Appendix B
(21) Are there adequate provisions in the plan for contracting support?
(22) Have an adequate number of contracting officers with the proper warrant been
provided?
(26) Are there provisions in the plan for maneuver or war damage claims resulting
from logistic operations?
(28) Have backup master files been established and prepared for shipment separate
from the primary master files?
(29) Are maintainers, operators, and managers assigned and well trained?
(30) Have site selection and preparation for automated equipment considered
accessibility, geographic, terrain, and security requirements?
(33) Are sufficient repair parts available for the computer hardware, including
generators and other subsystems?
(34) Have provisions been made for backup support for repair parts, hardware
maintenance, and the receipt of software change packages?
(35) Have details been worked out for transmission of documents to higher and
lower echelons?
(36) Will customer units require training? Are customer user manuals available for
automated system support?
B-26 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists
(37) Have OPSEC requirements been integrated into logistic planning? Has the
logistic signature been minimized?
(38) Have security police requirements for special operations bases, facilities,
training areas, rehearsal sites, and storage sites been identified and resourced?
a. General
(2) Has a national strategic political-military plan been received from the supported
JFC?
(4) Have special operations strategic and operational military objectives been
developed and forwarded to the supported commander?
(6) Have replacement units been identified or shortfalls forwarded to the JSOTF
establishing authority for resolution?
(7) Has the JSOTF supported commanders tasking and guidance been analyzed?
(9) Have OPORD or OPLAN shortfalls and limitations been identified and
resolved?
(10) Have all support annexes been incorporated in the OPORD or OPLAN?
(12) Does the database accurately reflect all force and sustainment requirements
needed to accomplish the assigned mission?
(13) Are these requirements properly routed, phased, prioritized, and sourced?
(15) Do current conditions indicate the need and suitability for planning for
operations during prehostilities?
b. CAP
B-27
Appendix B
Note: The following checklist is arranged by the joint operation planning activities and
functions that the CDRJSOTF and planning staff should consider during a crisis situation.
All items in the checklist may not apply directly to the CDRJSOTF, but are provided to
illustrate the overarching CAP process.
1. What are the national and military strategies and US national security
policy for the region or country?
2. What is the nature of the conflict or crisis that might require military
resources to resolve it?
3. What are or might be the potential missions or tasks from the President
or Secretary of Defense?
5. What is the current situation (who, what, when, where, and why)?
6. How will the enemy or adversary conceptualize the situation? What are
the goals, objectives, strategy, intentions, capabilities, methods of operation, vulnerabilities,
and sense of value and loss?
12. Are any US or MNFs conducting operations within the JSOTF JSOA?
What type? Duration? Who commands those forces?
13. What is the status of communications to and/or from and within the
JSOA?
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Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists
1. Is NEO needed?
b. Is there a NEO plan for this JOA? Has the DOS authorized a NEO?
Has the DOS asked for DOD assistance?
13. What coordination and assistance will be required for other USG
department and agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and foreign national agencies and authorities?
15. What type and level of special operations are most advantageous for
the current situation?
16. What are the key friendly, enemy, and neutral target groups and their
special operations vulnerabilities?
B-29
Appendix B
21. What OPSEC and MILDEC measures are required? Is a cover story
required or available? Are diversionary actions needed to support the preparation,
deployment, and employment of forces?
24. What are the reactions of friendly, neutral, and unfriendly foreign
governments?
26. What support can be expected from friendly and allied and coalition
governments?
27. What access and overflight assurances do friendly forces have for
deployment or employment operations?
28. What are the PA implications and responsibilities for the area?
30. What are the JFC themes and messages that apply to this crisis?
(2) Planning
B-30 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists
7. What SOF are readily available and when could they arrive on scene?
9. What types and amounts of logistic support are available from friendly
and allied nations?
16. What are the major constraints before forces can be committed?
B-31
Appendix B
20. Will the use of IRCs enhance mission success for each COA being
considered?
22. Have plans for the use of space systems (e.g., for reconnaissance and
surveillance, warning, positioning and navigation, communications, imagery,
environmental monitoring) been integrated into JSOTF plans?
24. What are the logistic factors that affect actions under consideration?
28. What all-source intelligence resources are available? Has the full
range of intelligence capabilities been employed to ensure maximum intelligence support
to planning efforts by the supported CCDR? Has CDRJSOTF declared emergency
reconnaissance and implemented SIGINT operational tasking authority, if delegated? Will
additional national intelligence support be requested?
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Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists
39. Have standard JSOTF special technical operations (STO) billets been
activated and indoctrination conducted on special access programs?
1. What COA has been selected? Have the pros and cons of each
alternative, with regard to enemy options, been fully and objectively assessed (wargamed)?
3. Is the COA consistent with the law of war and other aspects of the
legal guidelines affecting the operation?
B-33
Appendix B
c. Have LNOs from the other JTF and JSOTF components been
assigned to functional component commanders to facilitate coordinated joint force
operations?
12. What forces and CONOPS are available if the adversary escalates
operations abruptly?
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Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists
17. Has the enemy situation changed appreciably? If so, what are the
effects on the selected COAs?
18. Have all necessary actions been taken to provide for self-defense of
JSOTF forces?
(3) Execution
B-35
Appendix B
(b) What is the status of the deployment as planned? Are any phasing or
prioritization changes required based on changes in the situation, mission, or strategic or
operational lift availability? Are additional SOF required?
(c) Are any other changes necessary to ensure that military action will
accomplish the objectives intended?
a. General
(1) Is the communications system planner brought into the planning process early?
(3) Are the C2 relationship decisions made in sufficient time to allow supporting
communications to be adequately planned and communications system decisions to be
promulgated in a timely manner?
(4) Are the communications system planners familiar with the C2 relationships for
the JSOTF operation and are these relationships adequately covered in communications
system planning documents?
(7) Are support systems adequate to enable the communications system to support
each COA being addressed?
(8) Are close-hold and limited access procedures understood by all planners?
(9) Is planning adequate to ensure that all communications nets have interoperable
COMSEC devices and keying material? Is secure equipment availability and installation
adequate for this operation (e.g., encrypted UHF SATCOM narrowband secure voice
terminals)?
B-36 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists
(11) Is the use of the intertheater COMSEC package (ICP) being considered to
ensure interoperable keying materiel? Do all forces hold all necessary components of the
ICP? Has NATO COMSEC been considered for operations in NATO?
(12) Are provisions being made to ensure that all participating organizations are
notified as to which frequencies, call signs, and COMSEC procedures are to be used for the
operation?
(13) Is there adequate planning to ensure that JCEOI are prepared in a timely
manner? Are frequency management decisions made in a timely manner to enable JCEOI
dissemination to participating units when needed?
(15) Is planning for SOF and CF interoperability adequate for this operation?
(16) Are procedures in place to adequately plan communications system for special
operations under both special operations and mission-imposed close-hold restrictions?
(20) Does the JSOTF have qualified GCCS and special operations-unique
communications operators?
(21) Is planning adequate to have communications move into the objective area in
the proper sequence and in sufficient amount and type to support the operation?
(22) Have the functions of the JNCC, if established, been developed and published?
(23) Has the J-6 determined what communications assets are already in the JOA
(military, commercial, and other civilian) and can they be used?
(24) Is planning adequate to have the buildup of communications into the objective
area early enough to prevent overload of initially deployed communications systems?
(25) Are communications units, equipment, and personnel included in the TPFDD?
(26) Has the operational impact of communications equipment arrival times been
brought to the attention of the CDRJSOTF?
B-37
Appendix B
(27) Is there enough detail in the TPFDD about communications assets to assist in
communications planning?
(28) Are there any special communications needs for the use and transfer of
imagery or geospatial information?
(30) Are communications systems support relationships with Service, agency and
non-DOD partners understood?
(a) Have the J-2, J-3, and J-6 prioritized the intelligence requirements within
the overall communications requirements?
(c) Are the intelligence systems communications integrated into the overall
communications planning? Are there provisions for frequency deconfliction to protect
friendly use of the spectrum?
(g) Has the JSOTF standard datum been disseminated for GPS user
equipment?
(32) Have procedures been established to ensure the collection of lessons learned
and best practices?
B-38 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists
(34) Are dedicated and secure communications for PA and the news media
adequately covered in planning?
(35) Is there a heavy dependence on any one means of communications during the
operation?
(36) Have SATCOM requirements been evaluated to ensure proper use of limited
assets?
(a) VTC.
(c) GCCS.
(d) JDISS.
(e) TBMCS.
(f) METOC.
(l) Tactical telephone, digital secure voice terminal, or voice over secure
internet protocol.
B-39
Appendix B
B-40 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists
7. Headquarters Commandant
b. Mailing address.
B-41
Appendix B
f. Currency conversion.
(1) Required?
(2) Cost?
(1) Denominations.
(2) Time.
j. Orders requirements.
B-42 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists
(1) Air.
(b) Standby.
(c) Capabilities?
(4) Medical, dental, and pharmacy coverage; flight surgeon for airborne operations
x. Passport required?
B-43
Appendix B
(2) In maneuver area, are fires permitted, cutting of trees allowed, digging holes,
trash, disposal, and other activities allowed?
z. Medical
(1) Force health protection and health care capabilities in the operational area.
(a) Water purification requirements and testing (nitrates, lead, iron, other).
aa. Other
Specific responsibilities from the above checklist may be performed, as directed by the
JFC, CDRJSOTF, J-1, or HQ commandant.
b. Interpret and provide advice on status-of-forces agreement, if one exists, and other
relevant international agreements.
B-44 JP 3-05
Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists
k. Review and provide advice on procedures for handling detainees, refugees, and
displaced persons.
n. Claims.
(3) Coordinate with the proper claims adjudication authority to resolve claims.
o. Advise the staff on contract law issues, including fiscal law, military construction,
and HA (Denton shipments, Title 10, USC, Section 402, Transportation of humanitarian
relief supplies to foreign countries).
B-45
Appendix B
u. Report questionable activity to the general counsel and inspector general of the DOD
intelligence component concerned.
w. Are there procedures and formats for reporting to the CDRJSOTF all alleged serious
crimes and incidents of national or international interest involving JSOTF personnel (e.g.,
a serious vehicle mishap)?
y. Have legal advisors been identified through coordination with Service component for
all legal support required by CDRJSOTF?
9. Provost Marshal
a. Which component within the JSOTF will handle detainees, civilian internee, and
other detained persons?
b. Are component forces trained in the proper handling and humane treatment of
detainees, civilian internee, and other detained persons?
c. Which component within the JSOTF will handle indigenous and displaced civilians
who fall under the care and responsibility of the JSOTF?
d. Are component forces trained in the proper handling and humane treatment of
indigenous and displaced civilians who fall under the care and responsibility
of the JSOTF?
B-46 JP 3-05
APPENDIX C
REFERENCES
1. General
d. DODD 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components.
e. CJCSI 3110.12D, Civil Affairs Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
for FY 2006 (JSCP FY 2006) (U).
C-1
Appendix C
u. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.
C-2 JP 3-05
References
C-3
Appendix C
5. Other Sources
a. David S. Maxwell, Why Does Special Forces Train and Educate for Unconventional
Warfare?, Small Wars Journal, 2010.
C-4 JP 3-05
APPENDIX D
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
1. User Comments
Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Joint
Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Analysis
Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should
address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing,
and appearance.
2. Authorship
The lead agent for this publication is the United States Special Operations Command.
The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).
3. Supersession
This publication supersedes JP 3-05, Special Operations, 18 April 2011; and JP 3-05.1,
Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, 26 April 2007, is cancelled.
4. Change Recommendations
c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change
source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a
proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other
organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents
reflected in this publication are initiated.
5. Distribution of Publications
D-1
Appendix D
a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are
available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp
(NIPRNET) and http://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/index.jsp (SIPRNET), and on the JEL at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET).
b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and
Joint Staff. Release of any classified JP to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be
requested through the local embassy (Defense Attach Office) to DIA, Defense Foreign
Liaison PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.
D-2 JP 3-05
GLOSSARY
PART IABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AC Active Component
AFO advance force operations
AFSB afloat forward staging base
AFSOAC Air Force special operations air component
AFSOAD Air Force special operations air detachment
AFSOAE Air Force special operations air element
AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command
AFSOF Air Force special operations forces
AOR area of responsibility
ARSOF Army special operations forces
ASOC air support operations center
GL-1
Glossary
DA direct action
DATT defense attach
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive
DODI Department of Defense instruction
DODIN Department of Defense information networks
DOMEX document and media exploitation
DOS Department of State
HA humanitarian assistance
HN host nation
HNS host-nation support
HQ headquarters
HUMINT human intelligence
I2 identity intelligence
IAPP Interagency Partnership Program
IAW in accordance with
IC intelligence community
IDAD internal defense and development
IED improvised explosive device
IGO intergovernmental organization
IO information operations
IRC information-related capability
ISR intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
IW irregular warfare
GL-2 JP 3-05
Glossary
GL-3
Glossary
PA public affairs
PAG public affairs guidance
PAO public affairs officer
PDT partnership development team
PE preparation of the environment
PIR priority intelligence requirement
PN partner nation
PR personnel recovery
RC Reserve Component
RFI request for information
ROE rules of engagement
RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
GL-4 JP 3-05
Glossary
UA unmanned aircraft
UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice
UN United Nations
UNHCR United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs
USASOC United States Army Special Operations Command
USC United States Code
USG United States Government
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command
USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command
UW unconventional warfare
GL-5
PART IITERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Air Force special operations air component. The Air Force component of a joint special
operations force, normally composed of a special operations wing, special operations
group, or squadron, and element of an Air Force special tactics personnel. Also called
AFSOAC. (Approved for replacement of Air Force special operations component
and its definition in JP 1-02.)
Air Force special operations air detachment. A squadron-size headquarters that could be
a composite organization composed of different Air Force special operations assets,
normally subordinate to an Air Force special operations air component, joint special
operations air component, joint special operations task force, or a joint task force. Also
called AFSOAD. (Approved for replacement of Air Force special operations
detachment and its definition in JP 1-02.)
Air Force special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component Air Force
forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained,
and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called AFSOF. (JP 1-02.
SOURCE: JP 3-05)
Army special operations component. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
Army special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component Army forces
designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and
equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called ARSOF. (JP 1-02.
SOURCE: JP 3-05)
GL-6 JP 3-05
Glossary
counter threat finance. Activities conducted to deny, disrupt, destroy, or defeat the
generation, storage, movement, and use of assets to fund activities that support an
adversarys ability to negatively affect United States interests. Also called CTF.
(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)
covert operation. An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of
or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)
denied area. An area under enemy or unfriendly control in which friendly forces cannot
expect to operate successfully within existing operational constraints and force
capabilities. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)
direct action. Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a
special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive environments and which
employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or
damage designated targets. Also called DA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)
earliest anticipated launch time. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
feasibility assessment. A basic target analysis that provides an initial determination of the
viability of a proposed target for special operations forces employment. Also called
FA. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-05 as the source JP.)
GL-7
Glossary
joint after action report. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
joint combined exchange training. A program conducted overseas to fulfill United States
forces training requirements and at the same time exchange the sharing of skills between
United States forces and host nation counterparts. Also called JCET. (Approved for
incorporation into JP 1-02.)
joint servicing. That function performed by a jointly staffed and financed activity in
support of two or more Services. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)
joint special operations air component commander. The commander within a joint force
special operations command responsible for planning and executing joint special
operations air activities. Also called JSOACC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)
joint special operations task force. A joint task force composed of special operations
units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or
prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations.
Also called JSOTF. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)
Marine Corps special operations forces. Those Active Component Marine Corps forces
designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and
equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called MARSOF.
(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-05 as the source JP.)
naval special warfare. A naval warfare specialty that conducts special operations with an
emphasis on maritime, coastal, and riverine environments using small, flexible, mobile
units operating under, on, and from the sea. Also called NSW. (JP 1-02. SOURCE:
JP 3-05)
GL-8 JP 3-05
Glossary
naval special warfare forces. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
naval special warfare group. A permanent Navy echelon III major command to which
most naval special warfare forces are assigned for some operational and all
administrative purposes. Also called NSWG. (Approved for incorporation into
JP 1-02.)
naval special warfare task element. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
naval special warfare task group. A provisional naval special warfare organization that
plans, conducts, and supports special operations in support of fleet commanders and
joint force special operations component commanders. Also called NSWTG.
(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-05 as the source JP.)
naval special warfare task unit. A provisional subordinate unit of a naval special warfare
task group. Also called NSWTU. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with
JP 3-05 as the source JP.)
naval special warfare unit. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
Navy special operations component. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
Navy special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component Navy forces
designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and
equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called NAVSOF. (Approved
for inclusion in JP 1-02.)
preparation of the environment. An umbrella term for operations and activities conducted
by selectively trained special operations forces to develop an environment for potential
future special operations. Also called PE. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)
Rangers. Rapidly deployable airborne light infantry organized and trained to conduct
highly complex joint direct action operations in coordination with or in support of other
special operations units of all Services. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)
GL-9
Glossary
SEAL delivery vehicle team. United States Navy forces organized, trained, and equipped
to conduct special operations with SEAL delivery vehicles, dry deck shelters, and other
submersible platforms. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)
SEAL team. United States Navy forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special
operations with an emphasis on maritime, coastal, and riverine environments. (JP 1-02.
SOURCE: JP 3-05)
special forces. United States Army forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct
special operations with an emphasis on unconventional warfare capabilities. Also called
SF. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
special forces group. The largest Army combat element for special operations consisting of
command and control, special forces battalions, and a support battalion capable of long
duration missions. Also called SFG. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)
GL-10 JP 3-05
Glossary
special operations combat control team. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
special operations command and control element. A special operations element that is the
focal point for the synchronization of special operations forces activities with
conventional forces activities. Also called SOCCE. (JP 1-02. SOURCE JP 3-05)
special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Services
designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped
to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (Approved for
incorporation into JP 1-02.)
special operations joint task force. A modular, tailorable, and scalable special operations
task force designed to provide integrated, fully-capable, and enabled joint special
operations forces to geographic combatant commanders and joint force commanders.
Also called SOJTF. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)
special operations liaison element. A special operations liaison team provided by the joint
force special operations component commander to coordinate, deconflict, and
synchronize special operations air, surface, and subsurface operations with conventional
air operations. Also called SOLE. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
special operations mission planning folder. None. (Approved for removal from
JP 1-02.)
special operations naval mobile environment team. None. (Approved for removal from
JP 1-02.)
special operations task force. A scalable unit, normally of battalion size, in charge of the
special operations element, organized around the nucleus of special operations forces
and support elements. Also called SOTF. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)
GL-11
Glossary
special operations weather team. A task organized team of Air Force personnel
organized, trained, and equipped to collect critical environmental information from
data sparse areas. Also called SOWT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)
special operations wing. An Air Force special operations wing. Also called SOW.
(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-05 as the source JP.)
special tactics team. An Air Force task-organized element of special tactics that may
include combat control, pararescue, tactical air control party, and special operations
weather personnel. Also called STT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)
target critical damage point. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
tasking order. A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units,
and command and control agencies projected targets and specific missions as well as
general and specific instructions for accomplishment of the mission. Also called
TASKORD. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
GL-12 JP 3-05
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY
JP 1
JOINT
DOCTRINE
All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint
Publication (JP) 3-05 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below
illustrates an overview of the development process:
Initiation
ENHANCED
JOINT JOINT
WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE
CAPABILITY PUBLICATION
Approval Development