Under Sec.

4(t), Rule I of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, the precautionary
principle states that when human activities may lead to threats of serious and irreversible damage to
the environment that is scientifically plausible but uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or
diminish the threat.

Section I. Nature of the Writ. - The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity
authorized by law, people's organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest
group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in
two or more cities or provinces.

46
SEC. 3. Permanent EPO; writ of continuing mandamus. - In the judgment, the court may convert
the TEPO to a permanent EPO or issue a writ of continuing mandamus directing the performance of
acts which shall be effective until the judgment is fully satisfied.

The court may, by itself or through the appropriate government agency, monitor the
execution of the judgment and require the party concerned to submit written reports on a
quarterly basis or sooner as may be necessary, detailing the progress of the execution and
satisfaction of the judgment. The other party may, at its option, submit its comments or
observations on the execution of the judgment

MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (Environmental

Law)
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
GR No. 171947-48
December 18, 2008

FACTS:

The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had
fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants
(public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up
Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and
other forms of contact recreation.

ISSUES:

(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water
Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited
only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila
Bay.
APPLICABLE LAWS:

PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.

Where the quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s state will
adversely affect its best u sage, the government agencies concerned shall take such
measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet
the prescribed water quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be
the responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove and clean - up water pollution
incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government
agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and
expenses incurred in said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities
responsible for such pollution.

HELD:

(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned
ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations
when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to
act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality
has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage.
Section 17 & 20 are of general application and are not for specific pollution incidents only.
The fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it
is well -nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution
incident.

(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the
implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process,
the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done
is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Under what other
judicial discipline describes as continuing mandamus , the Court may, under
extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its
decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.

NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized in

the rules of procedure for environmental cases.

20 days Temporary restraining order

MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

G.R. Nos. 171947-48 December 18, 2008

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL

RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP,
and DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, petitioners,
vs.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS, SABINIANO
ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS,
DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL
AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, respondents.
EN BANC

The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late gained the attention of the
international community. Media have finally trained their sights on the ill effects of pollution, the destruction of forests
and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude
of environmental destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself. But
amidst hard evidence and clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and
procrastinators can still be heard.

This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their respective offices or by direct
statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the first instance, our internal waters, rivers, shores, and
seas polluted by human activities. To most of these agencies and their official complement, the pollution menace
does not seem to carry the high national priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier
attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary on bureaucratic
efficiency and commitment.

At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming with marine life and, for
so many decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying
expanse mainly because of the abject official indifference of people and institutions that could have otherwise made a
difference.

Facts:

On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of
the Manila Bay.

The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by
law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code.

In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the
pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:

(1) Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;

(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);

(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);

(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);

(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);

(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);

(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);

(8) Executive Order No. 192;

(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);

(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;

(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and

(12) International Law

Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to
the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

Issues:

a) Whether or not pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific
pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general.

b) Whether or not the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.

Held:

Regional Trial Courts Order to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay

On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. Finding merit in the complaint, the
Court ordered defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and
restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation.

To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from
receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted
scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.

In particular:

Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in strategic
places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.

Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and operate sewage facilities
for the proper disposal of waste.

Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and maintain waste facilities
to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances.

Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but also of other solid
and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay.

Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and/or adequate
solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal system such as re-use or recycling of
wastes.

Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life in Manila Bay and
restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.

Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation
of Manila Bay.

Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters to the
bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction
and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass
of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.

Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies and require them to
have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.

Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the importance of preserving
and protecting the environment.

Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila Bay from all forms
of illegal fishing.
The Court of Appeals Sustained the RTCs Decision

The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) individual
Notices of Appeal. On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime
Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under
Rule 45.

In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all
concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective official duties and
obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set timetables for the performance and
completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices and
mandates.

The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark cannot be over-
emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the plants
and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be
accomplished if those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds
to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the
preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.

So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not
even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications. Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up
the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of
Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a
betrayal of the trust reposed in them.

By a Decision of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto,
stressing that the trial courts decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions
under existing laws.

Endangered Species May Be Impleaded

as the Real Parties-In-Interest in a
Citizens Suit (Resident vs DOE, 2015)

Resident Marine Mammals vs Secretary of Department of Energy

Case Digest GR 180771 April 21 2015

Facts:

In 2002, the Department of Energy entered into a Geophysical Survey and

Exploration Contract with JAPEX, a 100% Japanese corporation, which was later
converted to a service contract, known as SC-46, for the exploration,
development and utilization of petroleum resources in an area that basically
affects the Tanon Strait. The President at that time was not a signatory to the
SC-46 and such contract was not submitted to the Congress for review.
Tanon Strait is a narrow passage of water in Cebu which harbors a biodiversity of
marine life and is declared by laws as a protected seascape. When JAPEX
started its seismic surveys and drilling activities over the area, petitions were
filed assailing the constitutionality of SC-46. One petition protesting the
activities for its ecological impact was in the name of Resident Marine
Mammals which are literally toothed whales, turtles and such, joined in by
human petitioners referred to as Stewards, in their representative as well as
personal capacity. Pres. Arroyo was also impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner,
purportedly because of her express declaration and undertaking under the
ASEAN Charter to protect habitats and other environmental concerns.

FIDEC, an organization committed to the welfare of marginal fisherfolk in the

area, also questioned the SC-46 on the ground that service contracts are no
longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution, and that if it were, SC-46 is still null
and void because it did not comply with the Constitution, most especially the
safeguards that the Court laid down in La Bugal Blaan case.

Remedial Law

Issue 1: W/N the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, have

standing as the real party-in-interests in this suit

Yes. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizens
suit. A citizens suit under this rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for
the enforcement of environmental law on behalf of minors or generations yet
unborn. It is essentially a representative suit that allows persons who
are not real parties in interest to institute actions on behalf of the real party in
interest.
Dissent

Issue 2: W/N the name of former President Arroyo impleaded in the petition as an
unwilling co-plaintiff is proper

No. The name of Pres Arroyo as an unwilling plaintiff impleaded in the petition
should be stricken from the title of the case.

First, under Rule 3, Sec 10 of the ROC, when the consent of a party who should
be joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she may be made a
party defendant. This will put the unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the
court, which may properly implead him or her through its processes. The
unwilling partys name cannot be simply included in the petition without her
knowledge or consent, as this would be a denial of due process.

Second, impleading the former President for an act she made in performance of
the functions of her office is contrary to the public policy against embroiling
Presidents in suits.
Political Law

Issue 3: W/N service contracts are no longer allowed by the 1987 Constitution

No. As settled in the La Bugal case, the deletion of the words service contracts
in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, the
deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission show that in
deliberating on Art XII Sec 2(4), they were actually referring to service contracts
as understood in the 1973 Constitution. The framers, in short, used the term
service contracts in referring to agreements involving technical or financial
assistance.

Issue 4: W/N SC-46 is valid

No. The SC-46 is not valid because it did not comply with the Art XII, Sec 2 (4) of
the Constitution. First, it was not crafted in accordance with a general law that
provides standards, terms and conditions; second, it was not signed by the
President for and on behalf of the Philippine government; and third, it was not
reported by the President to the Congress within 30 days of execution.

WILFREDO MOSQUEDA v. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS

ASSOCIATION, GR No. 189185, 2016-08-16

Facts:

After several committee hearings and consultations with various

stakeholders, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted
Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial
spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within
Davao City

The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and
two of its members, namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday
Agricultural and Development Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed their
petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance

They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of

police power; violated the equal protection clause; amounted to the
confiscation of property without due process of law; and lacked
publication pursuant] to Section 511[6] of Republic Act No. 7160

On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring
Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid and constitutional

The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police
power[13] under the General Welfare Clause of the Local Government
Code;[14] that the ordinance, being based on a valid classification, was
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause; that aerial spraying was
distinct from other methods of pesticides application because it exposed
the residents to a higher degree of health risk caused by aerial drift;[15]
and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality, and
could be invalidated only upon a clear showing that it had violated the
Constitution.

On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing

the judgment of the RTC.[22] It declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-
07 as void and unconstitutional for being unreasonable and oppressive;

The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of
protecting the public and the environment against the harmful effects of
aerial spraying, on one hand, and the imposition of the ban against aerial
spraying of all forms of substances, on the other.

Issues:

whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process

and equal protection grounds for being unreasonable and oppressive, and
an invalid exercise of police power: (a) in imposing a ban on aerial
spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b) in
decreeing a 3-month transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide
application under Section 5; and (c) in requiring the maintenance of the
30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in
Davao City.

Ruling:

The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao Cityenacted Ordinance No. 0309-

07under its corporate powers... the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications. It is under this milieu that the questioned
ordinance should be appreciated.

Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged
health risks due to their exposure to pesticide drift justifies the
motivation behind the enactment of the ordinance. The City of Davao has
the authority to enact pieces of legislation that will promote the general
welfare, specifically the health of its constituents. Such authority should
not be construed, however, as a valid license for the City of Davao to
enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its mandate. A thin but well-
defined line separates authority to enact legislations from the method of
accomplishing the same.

Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause

A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers
of the local government and passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law.[108] In order to declare it as a valid piece of local
legislation, it must also comply with the following substantive
requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must
be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not be
unreasonable.[109]In the State's exercise of police power, the property
rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order
to fulfill the objectives of the Government.[110] A local government unit is
considered to have properly exercised its police powers only if it satisfies
the following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of
the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive.[111] The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution; the second, to the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution.[112]Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance
must have a sufficient justification for the Government's action.[113] This
means that in exercising police power the local government unit must not
arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact the ordinance regardless of
its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance realistically serves a
legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably
necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing the
individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process
challenge.

The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom

spraying alone will consume considerable time and financial resources
given the topography and geographical features of the plantations.[117]
As such, the conversion could not be completed within the short
timeframe of three months. Requiring the respondents and other affected
individuals to comply with the consequences of the ban within the three-
month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even
cancellation of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to
constitute abuse of police power.

The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone

under Section 6 of the ordinance violates due process for being
confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all agricultural
landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use of their property that
amounts to taking without just compensation.
The position of the respondents is untenable.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[118] we have thoroughly explained that

taking only becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of
the beneficial use of its property

Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause

The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or

things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The
guaranty equal protection secures every person within the State's
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the State's duly constituted authorities. The concept of equal
justice under the law demands that the State governs impartially, and not
to draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to the legitimate governmental objective.

Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all

persons or things without distinction,[120] nor intends to prohibit
legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by the territory
in which it is to operate.[121] The guaranty of equal protection envisions
equality among equals determined according to a valid classification.
[122] If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently
from another.[123] In other word, a valid classification must be: (1) based
on substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all
members of the class.

In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis
approach appropriately applies herein. Under the rational basis test, we
shall: (1) discern the reasonable relationship between the means and the
purpose of the ordinance; and (2) examine whether the means or the
prohibition against aerial spraying is based on a substantial or reasonable
distinction. A reasonable classification includes all persons or things
similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.

Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting

that the occurrence of drift causes inconvenience and harm to the
residents and degrades the environment. Given this justification, does the
ordinance satisfy the requirement that the classification must rest on
substantial distinction?We answer in the negative.
The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but
results from the conduct of any mode of pesticide application. Even
manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift that may
bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks
to the community and to the environment.[141] A ban against aerial
spraying does not weed out the harm that the ordinance seeks to achieve.
[142] In the process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive"
because the classification does not include all individuals tainted with
the same mischief that the law seeks to eliminate.[143] A classification
that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end
appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly
serves the intended purpose of the law.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on

certiorari for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN. declaring Ordinance No.
0309-07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL;

Principles:

Constitutional Law... the right to a balanced and healthful ecology under

Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications.
MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al., Petitioners,
vs.
SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014

PONENTE: Villarama
TOPIC: Writ of kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity from suit

FACTS:
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US
Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested
diplomatic clearance for the said vessel to enter and exit the territorial waters of the
Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship
replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty. On January 6, 2013, the ship left
Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in
Okinawa, Japan.
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of
call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu
Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs,
about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there
have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
 Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations
of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo,
Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-
Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
2. Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS
Guardian.
3. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

HELD:
First issue: YES.

Petitioners have legal standing

Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.
Specifically, it is a partys personal and substantial interest in a case where he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the act being challenged, and calls
for more than just a generalized grievance. However, the rule on standing is a
procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the public right
of citizens to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. We declared
that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution
for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to
exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment.
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa,
this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the
enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and
future generations.
Second issue: YES.

The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers

of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew.
The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian
on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties.
Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require
remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed
to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and
Robling.
 During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the
position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted
area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings
the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy
sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the
UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply
with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage
through the latters internal waters and the territorial sea.

In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they

continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:
Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal
State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for
compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the
territorial sea immediately.
Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other
government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the
coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship
operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention
or other rules of international law.
Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-
commercial purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and
31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government
ships operated for non-commercial purposes. A foreign warships unauthorized
entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is
one situation in which the above provisions may apply.
But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the
US?
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a
matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international
rules on the traditional uses of the oceans as codified in UNCLOS.
Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was
centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI)
which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind, pointing
out that such has nothing to do with its the US acceptance of customary international
rules on navigation.
The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpios view that non-membership in the
UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a
Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear
international responsibility under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian
grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the
countrys efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation
to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters.
Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international
affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in
the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article
197 of UNCLOS
Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly
or through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating
international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent
with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment,
taking into account characteristic regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is
beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships
from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latters
territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea
immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and
they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other
government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.
Third issue: NO.

The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal

jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a
writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a
criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be
filed separately.
The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application
of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found
responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the
province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such
waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages
which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the
recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No.
10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action
charging the same violation of an environmental law.

Paje v. Casino et al.

October 27, 2016

(Remedial law: Appeal; Environmental Law: Writ of Kalikasan)

G.R. No. 207257 February 3, 2015

 HON. RAMON JESUS PAJE, in his capacity as DENR Secretary v. Hon. Teodoro
Casino, et al.

Facts

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, issued an Environmental

Compliance Certificate for a proposed coal-fired power plant at Subic, Zambales to be
implemented by RP Energy.

Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number of legislators filed a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan
against RP energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR secretary on the ground
that actual environmental damage will occur if the power plant project is implemented
and that the respondents failed to comply with certain laws and rules governing or
relating to the issuance of an ECC and amendments thereto.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition for the Writ of Kalikasan and invalidated the
ECC. Both the DENR and Casino filed an appeal, the former imputing error in
invalidating the ECC and its amendments, arguing that the determination of the validity
of the ECC as well as its amendments is beyond the scope of a Petition for a Writ
of kalikasan; while the latter claim that it is entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan.

Issues

1. Whether the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan; and

2. Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan

Ruling

1. Yes, the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan because the Rules on the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7, Section 16 of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases)allow the parties to raise, on appeal, questions of fact
and, thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because of the
extraordinary nature of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ of kalikasan.

2. Yes, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because such writ
is principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage of a magnitude that
transcends political and territorial boundaries.
A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the
issuance of an ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but
must also provide a causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection between the
defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened violation
of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude
contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and
the action re-filed before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.

In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even
attempted relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the
perceived defects or irregularities in the issuance of the ECC.