Knowing Power Grids
Knowing Power Grids
Knowing Power Grids
Abstract
Complex networks theory has been well established as a useful framework for studying
and analyzing structure, dynamics and evolution of many complex systems.
Infrastructural and man-made systems like power grids, gas and water networks and the
internet, have been also included in this network framework, albeit sometimes ignoring
the huge historical body of knowledge surrounding them. Although there seems to exist
clear evidence that both complexity approach in general, and complex networks in
particular, can be useful, it is necessary and profitable to put forward some of the limits
that this scheme is facing when dealing with not so complex but rather complicated
systems like the power grid. In this position paper we offer a critical revision of the
usefulness of the complexity and complex networks approach in this later case,
highlighting both its strengths and weaknesses. At the same time we emphasize the
disconnection between the so called complex and the more traditional engineering
communities as one of the major drawbacks in the advent of a true body of
understanding (more than simply knowing) the subtleties of this kind of complex
systems.
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definition of a complex system, these are usually composed of many interacting units
often called agents (which can be consumers, species, vehicles, neurons, etc.) capable
of many different types of interactions (Nature 2008). This definition is usually
completed with that of emergent behavior, so that the collective behavior of those parts
together is more than the sum of their individual ones. These emergent phenomena are
usually related with nonlinear positive and negative feedback loops among composing
parts (which means that small changes in the initial conditions can have a big effect at a
global level) and the appearance of self-organizing processes, which tends to drive them
out of any perennial static equilibrium (i.e., classical thermodynamic principles do not
apply). Classic and so-believed examples of complex systems include ecosystems,
insect colonies, human societies, financial markets and infrastructural systems like the
Internet, road networks, gas pipe work or the power grid.
Criticality
As said before, self-organizing processes are one usual outcome of complex systems. In
any self-organizing process, a pattern appears that can be clearly recognized and, far
from subjective opinions, statistically quantified. Among the many statistical signatures
of self-organization, those involved in the characterization of phase-transitions and
critical states have become the most remarkable, like scaling relations, power-law
divergences of some quantities, universality, fractality, etc. Notably, the appearance of
algebraic probability distributions, especially power laws, in terms of event or object
sizes, is often thought to be the signature of hierarchy, robustness, criticality and
universal underlying mechanisms (Bak 1996). In the case of power transmission
networks, time series of usual measures of blackout size like energy not served, power
loss or number of customers affected, have been shown to be algebraically distributed in
many countries. This apparent ubiquitous evidence have led to believe and try to
demonstrate that power systems tend to self-organize near a critical point and that there
may be some universality ruling the inner depths of these systems [see (Dobson,
Carreras et al. 2007) for a complete review and references therein].
Complex networks
In the last years, complex networks theory has appeared as a new framework to study
complex systems (Newman 2010). A network is a simplified representation of a system.
It reduces it to a graph, an abstract entity that captures essentially its structure. Although
some amount of specificity is lost, this is an advantage when questions that arise from
difficult hypothesis can be answered with limited computational power and simplifying
assumptions. Complex networks theory applied to infrastructures in general, and power
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grid systems in particular, has produced a huge amount of literature basically centered
around the three following issues:
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changes the shortest paths between nodes and, consequently, the distribution of
loads, creating overloads on some other nodes that, similarly, are eliminated
from the network. This leads to a new redistribution of loads and the new
overloaded nodes are removed. The redistribution process continues until when,
at a certain time, all the remaining nodes have values under or equal to its
capacity. Somehow related to this analysis, there has been lately remarkable
research in network synchronization, where networks of oscillators with
particular distributions of frequencies are interpreted as models of frequency
synchronization dynamics among generators and loads. (Lozano, Buzna et al.
2012)
Complex or complicated?
There are huge conceptual and practical problems when engineering and complexity
sciences are tried to be connected. The truth is that finding most of the characteristics of
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complex systems in man-made ones like the power grid is a difficult task. Concepts like
emergence, self-organization and adaptation are far from the engineering purposes and
difficult, if not impossible, to experience in the man-made realm. Engineering is about
assembling pieces that work in specific ways: that is, designing (complicated or not so)
systems. These systems are robust in terms of redundancies but not adaptation: once a
transmission line is constructed, it remains there for years to come and the system must
deal with its fixed topology, and associated impact in the systems dynamics, whether it
is beneficial for the whole functioning scheme or not in the long term. In the power grid
case, self-organization does not exist: synchronization and phase angles must be
maintained constantly under schedule. And so, it cannot lead to any kind of emergent
behavior or pose the system to any critical state (if we consider blackouts not as an
emergent phenomenon but as an expected malfunction output and so, understandable
from the individual behaviors of the systems composing elements).
Complexity and network theory have offered a new and fresh approach to an old
system, that of the power grid. However, and paradoxically, it seems its usefulness has
been relatively undermined by its oversimplifying assumptions. From a general
conceptual point of view, there is one main drawback associated to the
oversimplification of any real power network. This is that for power grids we can (a)
obtain a closed form mathematical model of the many equations that assess the physical
system and (b) manage to solve it in the time it is needed (being it off-line or even on-
line). Thus, the question about why do we need simplified (or approximated) complex
networks models if we can get better answers with fully precise models seems a natural
and obvious one. The approach offered by complex networks theory, with purely
topological analysis (or even extended ones to take into account minimal electrical
information), has been useful in order to detect critical components and evaluate
topological robustness. The assessment of these results has been done by means of
correlating these topological and extended degrees (Bompard, Napoli et al. 2009) with
load shedding in real systems (over several time spans) or even with statistical failure
data of real blackouts and failures (Sol, Rosas-Casals et al. 2008). However results
have been not conclusive and their applicability could not be generalized. Graph theory
and applied statistical physics alone cannot account for a full characterization of an
electricity grid: there is a need for the deeper interplay between structural and electrical
aspects.
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have been usually the prologue to huge blackouts (Nedic, Dobson et al. 2006). But at
the same time, power system operation, flow and generation turns out to be one of the
most mathematically complicated problems encountered in engineering nowadays. All
the variables and processes involved in such calculations demonstrate that power grids
do not concentrate flows depending on topological centrality measures (like
betweenness) nor the pool of sinks and sources are necessarily constrained by shortest
paths (Wood, Wollenberg 1996). Therefore, most of the initial complex networks
dynamic models encountered in the literature have only a qualitative role as explanatory
theory. Although they provide some indications on the actions that can be performed in
order to decrease undesired effects such as congestions, avalanches of node breakdown
and cascading failures, these are not realistic neither sufficiently accurate to explain the
power grid dynamics. If the word dynamics is used as in the engineering acceptation, it
does not mean a change in the configuration or topology (and not even the power flows
over the lines). Dynamics is referred to the voltage and angular behavior over time
which concerns on stability. It does not mean a change in the configuration, but on the
voltage and angular behavior over time. Therefore, blackouts are due to voltage and
angular instability and cannot be explained by any of the previous approaches.
It seems reasonable to ask ourselves whether the power grid is only complicated or there
are other aspects that can turn it into a complex system. The answer is that maybe the
physical network is not complex, but when other layers of agents are present, an
increased number of nonlinear interactions and unexpected phenomena can easily arise.
These new agents, different from solely transformers, substations or lines, can be
multiple heterogeneous decision makers at national and transnational levels, like TSOs
(each one operating a subsystem of a global interconnected transmission system), policy
makers, regulators or market participants. Topology (and the complex networks
approach) appears then as just one more of the many dimensions of performance that
influence global risk and security. In addition to purely electrical dynamics, the specific
operative status of the grid is then a multivariable and multileveled problem, with
possibilities for emergent phenomena and self-organizing processes to develop.
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systems are useful and with a high potential of developing sound scientific frameworks
in the short and mid terms would be the following:
Agents. It has been previously stated that, in the particular field of power
systems, complexity appears when users of many kind interact with the physical
system. When interacting and thoughtful agents appear, dependencies among the
elements become increasingly important, stochastic processes arise and we are
finally dealing with adaptive systems, usually modeled by computational units
termed agents (Miller, Page 2007, Railsback, Grimm 2012). Agent (or
individual) based modeling has been traditionally linked to complexity and
computer sciences and allows to modeling unique and autonomous entities that
usually interact with each other and their environment locally. Using agent-
based modeling lets us address problems that concern adaptive behavior and
emergence phenomena, very much connected to prosumers (i.e., small
producers and consumers of energy at the same time) activities and dynamic
behavior of the power grid.
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collaboration between complexity and complex networks communities, on the one
hand, and electrical engineers, on the other, is compulsory. In order to fully develop the
former issues, where complexity science can clearly help engineering science and
conversely, this communicative gap between these two communities of knowledge must
be overcome. This is the only way to finally become communities of understanding.
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